Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q42

• Question 42.1 The object of fear
• Question 42.2
• Question 42.3
• Question 42.4
• Question 42.5
• Question 42.6

Latin	English
Iª-IIae q. 42 pr. Deinde considerandum est de obiecto timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum bonum sit obiectum timoris, vel malum. Secundo, utrum malum naturae sit obiectum timoris. Tertio, utrum timor sit de malo culpae. Quarto, utrum ipse timor timeri possit. Quinto, utrum repentina magis timeantur. Sexto, utrum ea contra quae non est remedium, magis timeantur.	Question 42. The object of fear Is good or evil the object of fear? Is evil of nature the object of fear? Is the evil of sin an object of fear? Can fear itself be feared? Are sudden things especially feared? Are those things more feared against which there is no remedy?
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum sit obiectum timoris. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod nihil timemus, nisi ne id quod amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum. Sed id quod amamus est bonum. Ergo timor respicit bonum sicut proprium obiectum.	Objection 1. It would seem that good is the object of fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing save to lose what we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for." But that which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good as its proper object.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod potestas, et super alium ipsum esse, est terribile. Sed huiusmodi est quoddam bonum. Ergo bonum est obiectum timoris.	Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "power and to be above another is a thing to be feared." But this is a good thing. Therefore good is the object of fear.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, in Deo nihil malum esse potest. Sed mandatur nobis ut Deum timeamus; secundum illud Psalmi XXXIII, timete dominum, omnes sancti eius. Ergo etiam timor est de bono.	Objection 3. Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded to fear God, according to Psalm 33:10: "Fear the Lord, all ye saints." Therefore even the good is an object of fear.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod timor est de malo futuro.	On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of future evil.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod timor est quidam motus appetitivae virtutis. Ad virtutem autem appetitivam pertinet prosecutio et fuga, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Est autem prosecutio boni. Fuga autem mali. Unde quicumque motus appetitivae virtutis importat prosecutionem, habet aliquod bonum pro obiecto, quicumque autem importat fugam, habet malum pro obiecto. Unde, cum timor fugam quandam importet, primo et per se respicit malum sicut proprium obiectum. Potest autem respicere etiam bonum, secundum quod habet habitudinem ad malum. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, inquantum per malum privatur bonum. Ex hoc autem ipso est aliquid malum, quod est privativum boni. Unde, cum fugiatur malum quia malum est, sequitur ut fugiatur quia privat bonum quod quis amando prosequitur. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus quod nulla est causa timendi, nisi ne amittatur bonum amatum. Alio modo comparatur bonum ad malum, ut causa ipsius, inquantum scilicet aliquod bonum sua virtute potest inducere aliquod nocumentum in bono amato. Et ideo, sicut spes, ut supra dictum est, ad duo respicit, scilicet ad bonum in quod tendit, et ad id per quod sperat se bonum concupitum adipisci; ita etiam timor ad duo respicit, scilicet ad malum quod refugit, et ad illud bonum quod sua virtute potest infligere malum. Et per hunc modum Deus timetur ab homine, inquantum potest infligere poenam, vel spiritualem vel corporalem. Per hunc etiam modum timetur potestas alicuius hominis, maxime quando est laesa, vel quando est iniusta, quia sic in promptu habet nocumentum inferre. Ita etiam timetur super alium esse, idest inniti alii, ut scilicet in eius potestate sic constitutum nobis nocumentum inferre, sicut ille qui est conscius criminis, timetur, ne crimen revelet.	I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power. Now it belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil. Consequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies pursuit, has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since fear implies an avoidance, in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as its proper object. It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good. Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we love. In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far as some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love: and so, just as hope, as stated above (Question 40, Article 7), regards two things, namely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there is a hope of obtaining the desired good; so also does fear regard two things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which, by its power, can inflict that evil. In this way God is feared by man, inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In this way, too, we fear the power of man; especially when it has been thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us a harm. In like manner one fears "to be over another," i.e. to lean on another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus a man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime lest he reveal it to others.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.	This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit de malo naturae. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod timor consiliativos facit. Non autem consiliamur de his quae a natura eveniunt, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo timor non est de malo naturae.	Objection 1. It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take counsel." But we do not take counsel about things which happen naturally, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is not an object of fear.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, defectus naturales semper homini imminent, ut mors et alia huiusmodi. Si igitur de huiusmodi malis esset timor, oporteret quod homo semper esset in timore.	Objection 2. Further, natural defects such as death and the like are always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object of fear, man would needs be always in fear.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, natura non movet ad contraria. Sed malum naturae provenit ex natura. Ergo quod timendo aliquis refugiat huiusmodi malum, non est a natura. Timor ergo naturalis non est de malo naturae; ad quem tamen hoc malum pertinere videtur.	Objection 3. Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such like evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature. Therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and yet it seems that it should be.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod inter omnia terribilissimum est mors, quae est malum naturae.	On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., timor provenit ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel contristativi. Sicut autem contristativum malum est quod contrariatur voluntati; ita corruptivum malum est quod contrariatur naturae. Et hoc est malum naturae. Unde de malo naturae potest esse timor. Sed considerandum est quod malum naturae quandoque est a causa naturali, et tunc dicitur malum naturae, non solum quia privat naturae bonum, sed etiam quia est effectus naturae; sicut mors naturalis, et alii huiusmodi defectus. Aliquando vero malum naturae provenit ex causa non naturali, sicut mors quae violenter infertur a persecutore. Et utroque modo malum naturae quodammodo timetur, et quodammodo non timetur. Cum enim timor proveniat ex phantasia futuri mali, ut dicit philosophus; illud quod removet futuri mali phantasiam, excludit etiam timorem. Quod autem non appareat aliquod malum ut futurum, potest ex duobus contingere. Uno quidem modo, ex hoc quod est remotum et distans, hoc enim, propter distantiam, imaginamur ut non futurum. Et ideo vel non timemus, vel parum timemus. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quae valde longe sunt non timentur, sciunt enim omnes, quod morientur; sed quia non prope est, nihil curant. Alio modo aestimatur aliquod malum quod est futurum, ut non futurum, propter necessitatem, quae facit ipsum aestimare ut praesens. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod illi qui iam decapitantur non timent, videntes sibi necessitatem mortis imminere; sed ad hoc quod aliquis timeat, oportet adesse aliquam spem salutis. Sic igitur malum naturae non timetur, quia non apprehenditur ut futurum. Si vero malum naturae, quod est corruptivum, apprehendatur ut propinquum, et tamen cum aliqua spe evasionis, tunc timebitur.	I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is caused by the "imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful." Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary to nature: and this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the object of fear. But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, not merely from being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are natural death and other like defects. But sometimes evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent death inflicted by an assailant. In either case evil of nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear arises "from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the future evil, removes fear also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not." Secondly, a future evil is considered as though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the very point of a death from which there is no escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for him." Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive, be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod malum naturae quandoque non provenit a natura, ut dictum est. Secundum tamen quod a natura provenit, etsi non ex toto vitari possit, potest tamen differri. Et sub hac spe, potest esse consilium de vitatione ipsius.	Reply to Objection 1. The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of nature, as stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of nature, although it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be possible to delay it. And with this hope one may take counsel about avoiding it.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod malum naturae, etsi semper immineat, non tamen semper imminet de propinquo. Et ideo non semper timetur.	Reply to Objection 2. Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not always feared.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod mors et alii defectus naturae proveniunt a natura universali, quibus tamen repugnat natura particularis quantum potest. Et sic ex inclinatione particularis naturae, est dolor et tristitia de huiusmodi malis, cum sunt praesentia; et timor, si immineant in futurum.	Reply to Objection 3. Death and other defects of nature are the effects of the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them as far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when present; fear when threatening in the future.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor possit esse de malo culpae. Dicit enim Augustinus, super canonicam Ioan., quod timore casto timet homo separationem a Deo. Sed nihil separat nos a Deo nisi culpa; secundum illud Isaiae LIX. Peccata vestra diviserunt inter vos et Deum vestrum. Ergo timor potest esse de malo culpae.	Objection 1. It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. ix), that "by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God." Now nothing but sin severs us from God; according to Isaiah 59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Therefore the evil of sin can be an object of fear.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod de illis timemus, cum futura sunt, de quorum praesentia tristamur. Sed de malo culpae potest aliquis dolere vel tristari. Ergo etiam malum culpae aliquis potest timere.	Objection 2. Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4,6) that "we fear when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when they are present." But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also fear the evil of sin.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, spes timori opponitur. Sed spes potest esse de bono virtutis, ut patet per philosophum in IX Ethic. Et apostolus dicit, ad Gal. V, confido de vobis in domino, quod nihil aliud sapietis. Ergo etiam timor potest esse de malo culpae.	Objection 3. Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue can be the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ix, 4): and the Apostle says (Galatians 5:10): "I have confidence in you in the Lord, that you will not be of another mind." Therefore fear can regard evil of sin.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, verecundia est quaedam species timoris, ut supra dictum est. Sed verecundia est de turpi facto. Quod est malum culpae. Ergo et timor.	Objection 4. Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (Question 41, Article 4). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an evil of sin. Therefore fear does so likewise.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod non omnia mala timentur, puta si aliquis erit iniustus, aut tardus.	On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow."
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sicut obiectum spei est bonum futurum arduum quod quis potest adipisci; ita timor est de malo futuro arduo quod non potest de facili vitari. Ex quo potest accipi quod id quod omnino subiacet potestati et voluntati nostrae, non habet rationem terribilis, sed illud solum est terribile, quod habet causam extrinsecam. Malum autem culpae propriam causam habet voluntatem humanam. Et ideo proprie non habet rationem terribilis. Sed quia voluntas humana ab aliquo exteriori potest inclinari ad peccandum; si illud inclinans habeat magnam vim ad inclinandum, secundum hoc poterit esse timor de malo culpae, inquantum est ab exteriori causa, puta cum aliquis timet commorari in societate malorum, ne ab eis ad peccandum inducatur. Sed proprie loquendo, in tali dispositione magis timet homo seductionem quam culpam secundum propriam rationem, idest inquantum est voluntaria, sic enim non habet ut timeatur.	I answer that, As stated above (40, 1; 41, 2), as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, is not an object of fear; and that nothing gives rise to fear save what is due to an external cause. Now human will is the proper cause of the evil of sin: and consequently evil of sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear. But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause; if this cause have a strong power of inclination, in that respect a man may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from that extrinsic cause: as when he fears to dwell in the company of wicked men, lest he be led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed, fears the being led astray rather than the sin considered in its proper nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for considered in this light it is not an object of fear to him.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod separatio a Deo est quaedam poena consequens peccatum, et omnis poena aliquo modo est ab exteriori causa.	Reply to Objection 1. Separation from God is a punishment resulting from sin: and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic cause.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod tristitia et timor in uno conveniunt, quia utrumque est de malo, differunt autem in duobus. In uno quidem, quia tristitia est de malo praesenti, timor de malo futuro. In alio vero, quia tristitia, cum sit in concupiscibili, respicit malum absolute, unde potest esse de quocumque malo, sive parvo sive magno. Timor vero, cum sit in irascibili, respicit malum cum quadam arduitate seu difficultate, quae tollitur, inquantum aliquid subiacet voluntati. Et ideo non omnia timemus quae sunt futura, de quibus tristamur cum sunt praesentia, sed aliqua, quae scilicet sunt ardua.	Reply to Objection 2. Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each regards evil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because sorrow is about present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because sorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil absolutely; wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas fear, being in the irascible part, regards evil with the addition of a certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so far as a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things that give us pain when they are present, make us fear when they are yet to come, but only some things, namely, those that are difficult.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod spes est de bono quod quis potest adipisci. Potest autem aliquis adipisci bonum vel per se, vel per alium, et ideo spes potest esse de actu virtutis, qui est in potestate nostra constitutus. Sed timor est de malo quod non subiacet nostrae potestati, et ideo semper malum quod timetur, est a causa extrinseca. Bonum autem quod speratur, potest esse et a causa intrinseca, et a causa extrinseca.	Reply to Objection 3. Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may obtain a good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may be of an act of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other hand, fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: and consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both from an intrinsic and from an extrinsic cause.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, verecundia non est timor de actu ipso peccati, sed de turpitudine vel ignominia quae consequitur ipsum, quae est a causa extrinseca.	Reply to Objection 4. As stated above (41, 4, ad 2,3), shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or ignominy which arises therefrom, and which is due to an extrinsic cause.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor timeri non possit. Omne enim quod timetur, timendo custoditur, ne amittatur, sicut ille qui timet amittere sanitatem timendo custodit eam. Si igitur timor timeatur, timendo se custodiet homo ne timeat. Quod videtur esse inconveniens.	Objection 1. It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever is feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus a man who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss. If therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep himself from fear by being afraid: which seems absurd.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, timor est quaedam fuga. Sed nihil fugit seipsum. Ergo timor non timet timorem.	Objection 2. Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, timor est de futuro. Sed ille qui timet, iam habet timorem. Non ergo potest timere timorem.	Objection 3. Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to him that fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod homo potest amare amorem, et dolere de dolore. Ergo etiam, pari ratione, potest timere timorem.	On the contrary, A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his own sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, illud solum habet rationem terribilis, quod ex causa extrinseca provenit, non autem quod provenit ex voluntate nostra. Timor autem partim provenit ex causa extrinseca, et partim subiacet voluntati. Provenit quidem ex causa extrinseca, inquantum est passio quaedam consequens phantasiam imminentis mali. Et secundum hoc, potest aliquis timere timorem, ne scilicet immineat ei necessitas timendi, propter ingruentiam alicuius excellentis mali. Subiacet autem voluntati, inquantum appetitus inferior obedit rationi, unde homo potest timorem repellere. Et secundum hoc, timor non potest timeri, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest. Sed quia rationibus quas inducit, aliquis posset uti ad ostendendum quod timor nullo modo timeatur, ideo ad eas respondendum est.	I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), nothing can be an object of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which ensues from our own will. Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic cause, in so far as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the object of fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he should be threatened by the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil. It is subject to the will, in so far as the lower appetite obeys reason; wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be the object of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33). Lest, however, anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove that fear cannot be at all be the object of fear, we must add a solution to the same.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, non omnis timor est unus timor, sed secundum diversa quae timentur, sunt diversi timores. Nihil ergo prohibet quin uno timore aliquis praeservet se ab alio timore, et sic custodiat se non timentem illo timore.	Reply to Objection 1. Not every fear is identically the same; there are various fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing, then, prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by fearing another, so that the fear which he has preserves him from the fear which he has not.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum sit alius timor quo timetur malum imminens, et alius timor quo timetur ipse timor mali imminentis; non sequitur quod idem fugiat seipsum, vel quod sit idem fuga sui ipsius.	Reply to Objection 2. Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical with the fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a thing flies from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod propter diversitatem timorum iam dictam, timore praesenti potest homo timere futurum timorem.	Reply to Objection 3. On account of the various kinds of fear already alluded to (ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its object.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod insolita et repentina non sint magis terribilia. Sicut enim spes est de bono, ita timor est de malo. Sed experientia facit ad augmentum spei in bonis. Ergo etiam facit ad augmentum timoris in malis.	Objection 1. It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not especially feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is about evil things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in good things. Therefore it also adds to fear in evil things.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod magis timentur non qui acutae sunt irae, sed mites et astuti. Constat autem quod illi qui acutae irae sunt, magis habent subitos motus. Ergo ea quae sunt subita, sunt minus terribilia.	Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and cunning." Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are less to be feared.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, quae sunt subita, minus considerari possunt. Sed tanto aliqua magis timentur, quanto magis considerantur, unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod aliqui videntur fortes propter ignorantiam, qui, si cognoverint quod aliud sit quam suspicantur, fugiunt. Ergo repentina minus timentur.	Objection 3. Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly. But the more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some appear to be courageous through ignorance, but as soon as they discover that the case is different from what they expected, they run away." Therefore sudden things are feared less.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., timor insolita et repentina exhorrescit, rebus quae amantur adversantia, dum praecavet securitati.	On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes forethought for their safety."
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, obiectum timoris est malum imminens quod non de facili repelli potest. Hoc autem ex duobus contingit, scilicet ex magnitudine mali, et ex debilitate timentis. Ad utrumque autem horum operatur quod aliquid sit insolitum et repentinum. Primo quidem, facit ad hoc quod malum imminens maius appareat. Omnia enim corporalia, et bona et mala, quanto magis considerantur, minora apparent. Et ideo, sicut propter diuturnitatem dolor praesentis mali mitigatur, ut patet per Tullium in III de Tusculanis quaest.; ita etiam ex praemeditatione minuitur timor futuri mali. Secundo, aliquid esse insolitum et repentinum facit ad debilitatem timentis, inquantum subtrahit remedia quae homo potest praeparare ad repellendum futurum malum, quae esse non possunt quando ex improviso malum occurrit.	I answer that, As stated about (3; 41, 2), the object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty. Now this is due to one of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce to both of these causes. First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil, the more we consider them, the smaller they seem. Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand. Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness increase the weakness of him that fears, in so far as they deprive him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide himself to forestall the coming evil, were it not for the evil taking him by surprise.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectum spei est bonum quod quis potest adipisci. Et ideo ea quae augmentant potestatem hominis, nata sunt augere spem, et eadem ratione, diminuere timorem, quia timor est de malo cui non de facili potest resisti. Quia igitur experientia facit hominem magis potentem ad operandum, ideo, sicut auget spem, ita diminuit timorem.	Reply to Objection 1. The object of hope is a good that is possible to obtain. Consequently whatever increases a man's power, is of a nature to increase hope, and, for the same reason, to diminish fear, since fear is about an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since, therefore, experience increases a man's power of action, therefore, as it increases hope, so does it diminish fear.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui habent iram acutam, non occultant eam, et ideo nocumenta ab eis illata non ita sunt repentina, quin praevideantur. Sed homines mites et astuti occultant iram, et ideo nocumentum quod ab eis imminet, non potest praevideri, sed ex improviso advenit. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod tales magis timentur.	Reply to Objection 2. Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger; wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, as not to be foreseen. On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger; wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, per se loquendo, bona vel mala corporalia in principio maiora apparent. Cuius ratio est, quia unumquodque magis apparet, contrario iuxta se posito. Unde cum aliquis statim a paupertate ad divitias transit, propter paupertatem praeexistentem divitias magis aestimat, et e contrario divites statim ad paupertatem devenientes, eam magis horrent. Et propter hoc, malum repentinum magis timetur, quia magis videtur esse malum. Sed potest propter aliquod accidens contingere quod magnitudo alicuius mali lateat, puta cum hostes se insidiose occultant. Et tunc verum est quod malum ex diligenti consideratione fit terribilius.	Reply to Objection 3. Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems greater at first. The reason for this is that a thing is more obvious when seen in juxtaposition with its contrary. Hence, when a man passes unexpectedly from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his wealth on account of his previous poverty: while, on the other hand, the rich man who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty all the more disagreeable. For this reason sudden evil is feared more, because it seems more to be evil. However, it may happen through some accident that the greatness of some evil is hidden; for instance if the foe hides himself in ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires greater fear through being much thought about.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae non habent remedium, non sint magis timenda. Ad timorem enim requiritur quod remaneat aliqua spes salutis, ut supra dictum est. Sed in malis quae non habent remedium, nulla remanet spes salutis. Ergo talia mala nullo modo timentur.	Objection 1. It would seem that those things are not more to be feared, for which there is no remedy. Because it is a condition of fear, that there be some hope of safety, as stated above (Article 2). But an evil that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape. Therefore such things are not feared at all.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, malo mortis nullum remedium adhiberi potest, non enim, secundum naturam, potest esse reditus a morte ad vitam. Non tamen mors maxime timetur, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Non ergo ea magis timentur quae remedium non habent.	Objection 2. Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death: since, in the natural course of things, there is no return from death to life. And yet death is not the most feared of all things, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore those things are not feared most, for which there is no remedy.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod non est magis bonum quod est diuturnius, eo quod est unius diei, neque quod est perpetuum, eo quod non est perpetuum. Ergo, eadem ratione, neque maius malum. Sed ea quae non habent remedium, non videntur differre ab aliis nisi propter diuturnitatem vel perpetuitatem. Ergo propter hoc non sunt peiora, vel magis timenda.	Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "a thing which lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one day: nor is that which lasts for ever any better than that which is not everlasting": and the same applies to evil. But things that cannot be remedied seem to differ from other things, merely in the point of their lasting long or for ever. Consequently they are not therefore any worse or more to be feared.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod omnia timenda sunt terribiliora quaecumque, si peccaverint, corrigi non contingit; aut quorum auxilia non sunt; aut non facilia.	On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . . . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy."
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod obiectum timoris est malum, unde illud quod facit ad augmentum mali, facit ad augmentum timoris. Malum autem augetur non solum secundum speciem ipsius mali, sed etiam secundum circumstantias, ut ex supra dictis apparet. Inter ceteras autem circumstantias, diuturnitas, vel etiam perpetuitas, magis videtur facere ad augmentum mali. Ea enim quae sunt in tempore, secundum durationem temporis quodammodo mensurantur, unde si pati aliquid in tanto tempore est malum, pati idem in duplo tempore apprehenditur ut duplatum. Et secundum hanc rationem, pati idem in infinito tempore, quod est perpetuo pati, habet quodammodo infinitum augmentum. Mala autem quae, postquam advenerint, non possunt habere remedium, vel non de facili, accipiuntur ut perpetua vel diuturna. Et ideo maxime redduntur timenda.	I answer that, The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil is increased not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above (Question 18, Article 3). And of all the circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase of evil. Because things that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to the duration of time: wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain length of time, we should reckon the evil doubled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time. And accordingly, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length of time, i.e. for ever, implies, so to speak, an infinite increase. Now those evils which, after they have come, cannot be remedied at all, or at least not easily, are considered as lasting for ever or for a long time: for which reason they inspire the greatest fear.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod remedium mali est duplex. Unum, per quod impeditur futurum malum, ne adveniat. Et tali remedio sublato, aufertur spes, et per consequens timor. Unde de tali remedio nunc non loquimur. Aliud remedium mali est, quo malum iam praesens removetur. Et de tali remedio nunc loquimur.	Reply to Objection 1. Remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by which a future evil is warded off from coming. If such a remedy be removed, there is an end to hope and consequently to fear; wherefore we do not speak now of remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one by which an already present evil is removed: and of such a remedy we speak now.
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet mors sit irremediabile malum, tamen, quia non imminet de prope, non timetur, ut supra dictum est.	Reply to Objection 2. Although death be an evil without remedy, yet, since it threatens not from near, it is not feared, as stated above (Article 2).
Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de per se bono, quod est bonum secundum speciem suam. Sic autem non fit aliquid magis bonum propter diuturnitatem vel perpetuitatem, sed propter naturam ipsius boni.	Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher is speaking there of things that are good in themselves, i.e. good specifically. And such like good is no better for lasting long or for ever: its goodness depends on its very nature.