Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q39

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Q38 Q40



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Iª-IIae q. 39 pr. Deinde considerandum est de bonitate et malitia doloris vel tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum omnis tristitia sit malum. Secundo, utrum possit esse bonum honestum. Tertio, utrum possit esse bonum utile. Quarto, utrum dolor corporis sit summum malum. Question 39. The goodness and malice of sorrow or pain Is all sorrow evil? Can sorrow be a virtuous good? Can it be a useful good? Is bodily pain the greatest evil?
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis tristitia sit mala. Dicit enim Gregorius Nyssenus, omnis tristitia malum est, sui ipsius natura. Sed quod naturaliter est malum, semper et ubique est malum. Ergo omnis tristitia est mala. Objection 1. It would seem that all sorrow is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] says: "All sorrow is evil, from its very nature." Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and everywhere. Therefore, all sorrow is evil.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod omnes fugiunt, etiam virtuosi, est malum. Sed tristitiam omnes fugiunt, etiam virtuosi, quia, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., etsi prudens non intendat delectari, tamen intendit non tristari. Ergo tristitia est malum. Objection 2. Further, that which all, even the virtuous, avoid, is evil. But all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous, since as stated in Ethic. vii, 11, "though the prudent man does not aim at pleasure, yet he aims at avoiding sorrow." Therefore sorrow is evil.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut malum corporale est obiectum et causa doloris corporalis, ita malum spirituale est obiectum et causa tristitiae spiritualis. Sed omnis dolor corporalis est malum corporis. Ergo omnis tristitia spiritualis est malum animae. Objection 3. Further, just as bodily evil is the object and cause of bodily pain, so spiritual evil is the object and cause of sorrow in the soul. But every bodily pain is a bodily evil. Therefore every spiritual sorrow is an evil of the soul.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, tristitia de malo contrariatur delectationi de malo. Sed delectatio de malo est mala, unde in detestationem quorundam dicitur Prov. II, quod laetantur cum malefecerint. Ergo tristitia de malo est bona. On the contrary, Sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure in evil. But pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in condemnation of certain men, it is written (Proverbs 2:14), that "they were glad when they had done evil." Therefore sorrow for evil is good.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid esse bonum vel malum, potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo, simpliciter et secundum se. Et sic omnis tristitia est quoddam malum, hoc enim ipsum quod est appetitum hominis anxiari de malo praesenti, rationem mali habet; impeditur enim per hoc quies appetitus in bono. Alio modo dicitur aliquid bonum vel malum, ex suppositione alterius, sicut verecundia dicitur esse bonum, ex suppositione alicuius turpis commissi, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sic igitur, supposito aliquo contristabili vel doloroso, ad bonitatem pertinet quod aliquis de malo praesenti tristetur vel doleat. Quod enim non tristaretur vel non doleret, non posset esse nisi quia vel non sentiret, vel quia non reputaret sibi repugnans, et utrumque istorum est malum manifeste. Et ideo ad bonitatem pertinet ut, supposita praesentia mali, sequatur tristitia vel dolor. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., adhuc est bonum quod dolet amissum bonum, nam nisi aliquod bonum remansisset in natura, nullius boni amissi dolor esset in poena. Sed quia sermones morales sunt in singularibus, quorum sunt operationes, illud quod est ex suppositione bonum, debet bonum iudicari, sicut quod est ex suppositione voluntarium, iudicatur voluntarium, ut dicitur in III Ethic., et supra habitum est. I answer that, A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first considered simply and in itself; and thus all sorrow is an evil, because the mere fact of a man's appetite being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the response of the appetite in good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition of something else: thus shame is said to be good, on the supposition of a shameful deed done, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Accordingly, supposing the presence of something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain on account of this present evil. For if he were not to be in sorrow or pain, this could only be either because he feels it not, or because he does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils. Consequently it is a condition of goodness, that, supposing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue. Wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "It is also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good remained in his nature, he could not be punished by the loss of good." Because, however, in the science of Morals, we consider things individually--for actions are concerned about individuals--that which is good on some supposition, should be considered as good: just as that which is voluntary on some supposition, is judged to be voluntary, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, and likewise above (Question 6, Article 6).
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius Nyssenus loquitur de tristitia ex parte mali tristantis, non autem ex parte sentientis et repudiantis malum. Et ex hac etiam parte omnes fugiunt tristitiam, inquantum fugiunt malum, sed sensum et refutationem mali non fugiunt. Et sic etiam dicendum est de dolore corporali, nam sensus et recusatio mali corporalis attestatur naturae bonae. Reply to Objection 1. Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius] is speaking of sorrow on the part of the evil that causes it, but not on the part of the subject that feels and rejects the evil. And from this point of view, all shun sorrow, inasmuch as they shun evil: but they do not shun the perception and rejection of evil. The same also applies to bodily pain: because the perception and rejection of bodily evil is the proof of the goodness of nature.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 ad 2 Unde patet responsio ad secundum et tertium. This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non habeat rationem boni honesti. Quod enim ad Inferos deducit, contrariatur honesto. Sed sicut dicit Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., Iacob hoc timuisse videtur, ne nimia tristitia sic perturbaretur, ut non ad requiem beatorum iret, sed ad Inferos peccatorum. Ergo tristitia non habet rationem boni honesti. Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For that which leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), "Jacob seems to have feared lest he should be troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of entering into the rest of the blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, bonum honestum habet rationem laudabilis et meritorii. Sed tristitia diminuit rationem laudis et meriti, dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. IX, unusquisque prout destinavit in corde suo, non ex tristitia aut ex necessitate. Ergo tristitia non est bonum honestum. Objection 2. Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious. But sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 9:7): "Everyone, as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, tristitia est de his quae, nobis nolentibus, accidunt. Sed non velle ea quae praesentialiter fiunt, est habere voluntatem repugnantem ordinationi divinae, cuius providentiae subiacent omnia quae aguntur. Ergo, cum conformitas humanae voluntatis ad divinam pertineat ad rectitudinem voluntatis, ut supra dictum est; videtur quod tristitia contrarietur rectitudini voluntatis. Et sic non habet rationem honesti. Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is concerned about those things which happen against our will." But not to will those things which are actually taking place, is to have a will opposed to the decree of God, to Whose providence whatever is done is subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to the Divine will is a condition of the rectitude of the will, as stated above (Question 19, Article 9), it seems that sorrow is incompatible with rectitude of the will, and that consequently it is not virtuous.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, omne quod meretur praemium vitae aeternae, habet rationem honesti. Sed tristitia est huiusmodi, ut patet per id quod dicitur Matth. V, beati qui lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur. Ergo tristitia est bonum honestum. On the contrary, Whatever merits the reward of eternal life is virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from Matthew 5:5: "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow is a virtuous good.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum illam rationem qua tristitia est bonum, potest esse bonum honestum. Dictum est enim quod tristitia est bonum secundum cognitionem et recusationem mali. Quae quidem duo in dolore corporali, attestantur bonitati naturae, ex qua provenit quod sensus sentit, et natura refugit laesivum, quod causat dolorem. In interiori vero tristitia, cognitio mali quandoque quidem est per rectum iudicium rationis; et recusatio mali est per voluntatem bene dispositam detestantem malum. Omne autem bonum honestum ex his duobus procedit, scilicet ex rectitudine rationis et voluntatis. Unde manifestum est quod tristitia potest habere rationem boni honesti. I answer that, In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous good. For it has been said above (Article 1) that sorrow is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil. These two things, as regards bodily pain, are a proof of the goodness of nature, to which it is due that the senses perceive, and that nature shuns, the harmful thing that causes pain. As regards interior sorrow, perception of the evil is sometimes due to a right judgment of reason; while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will, well disposed and detesting that evil. Now every virtuous good results from these two things, the rectitude of the reason and the will. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow may be a virtuous good.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes passiones animae regulari debent secundum regulam rationis, quae est radix boni honesti. Quam transcendit immoderata tristitia, de qua loquitur Augustinus. Et ideo recedit a ratione boni honesti. Reply to Objection 1. All the passions of the soul should be regulated according to the rule of reason, which is the root of the virtuous good; but excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps this rule, and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut tristitia de malo procedit ex voluntate et ratione recta, quae detestatur malum; ita tristitia de bono procedit ex ratione et voluntate perversa, quae detestatur bonum. Et ideo talis tristitia impedit laudem vel meritum boni honesti, sicut cum quis facit cum tristitia eleemosynam. Reply to Objection 2. Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to a perverse reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good; for instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliqua praesentialiter eveniunt, quae non fiunt Deo volente, sed Deo permittente, sicut peccata. Unde voluntas repugnans peccato existenti vel in se vel in alio, non discordat a voluntate Dei. Mala vero poenalia praesentialiter contingunt, etiam Deo volente. Non tamen exigitur ad rectitudinem voluntatis, quod ea secundum se homo velit, sed solum quod non contranitatur ordini divinae iustitiae, ut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. Some things do actually happen, not because God wills, but because He permits them to happen--such as sins. Consequently a will that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not discordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen actually, even by God's will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will, that man should will them in themselves: but only that he should not revolt against the order of Divine justice, as stated above (Question 19, Article 10).
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non possit esse bonum utile. Dicitur enim Eccli. XXX, multos occidit tristitia, et non est utilitas in illa. Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good. For it is written (Sirach 30:25): "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it."
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, electio est de eo quod est utile ad finem aliquem. Sed tristitia non est eligibilis, quinimmo idem sine tristitia, quam cum tristitia, est magis eligendum, ut dicitur in III Topic. Ergo tristitia non est bonum utile. Objection 2. Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, "a thing without sorrow is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow" (Topic. iii, 2). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, omnis res est propter suam operationem, ut dicitur in II de coelo. Sed tristitia impedit operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo tristitia non habet rationem boni utilis. Objection 3. Further, "Everything is for the sake of its own operation," as stated in De Coel. ii, 3. But "sorrow hinders operation," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, sapiens non quaerit nisi utilia. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, cor sapientum ubi tristitia, et cor stultorum ubi laetitia. Ergo tristitia est utilis. On the contrary, The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But according to Ecclesiastes 7:5, "the heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth." Therefore sorrow is useful.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ex malo praesenti insurgit duplex appetitivus motus. Unus quidem est quo appetitus contrariatur malo praesenti. Et ex ista parte tristitia non habet utilitatem, quia id quod est praesens, non potest non esse praesens. Secundus motus consurgit in appetitu ad fugiendum vel repellendum malum contristans. Et quantum ad hoc, tristitia habet utilitatem, si sit de aliquo quod est fugiendum. Est enim aliquid fugiendum dupliciter. Uno modo, propter seipsum, ex contrarietate quam habet ad bonum; sicut peccatum. Et ideo tristitia de peccato utilis est ad hoc quod homo fugiat peccatum, sicut apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. VII, gaudeo, non quia contristati estis, sed quia contristati estis ad poenitentiam. Alio modo est aliquid fugiendum, non quia sit secundum se malum, sed quia est occasio mali; dum vel homo nimis inhaeret ei per amorem, vel etiam ex hoc praecipitatur in aliquod malum, sicut patet in bonis temporalibus. Et secundum hoc, tristitia de bonis temporalibus potest esse utilis, sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, melius est ire ad domum luctus quam ad domum convivii, in illa enim finis cunctorum admonetur hominum. Ideo autem tristitia in omni fugiendo est utilis, quia geminatur fugiendi causa. Nam ipsum malum secundum se fugiendum est, ipsam autem tristitiam secundum se omnes fugiunt, sicut etiam bonum omnes appetunt, et delectationem de bono. Sicut ergo delectatio de bono facit ut bonum avidius quaeratur, ita tristitia de malo facit ut malum vehementius fugiatur. I answer that, A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a present evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the present evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that which is present, cannot be not present. The other movement arises in the appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil: and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, if it be for something which ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for which it may be right to avoid a thing. First, because it should be avoided in itself, on account of its being contrary to good; for instance, sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin: hence the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 7:9): "I am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance." Secondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either through one's being attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the case of temporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may be useful; according to Ecclesiastes 7:3: "It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in mind of the end of all." Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful, since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because the very evil is in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for its own sake, just as everyone seeks the good, and pleasure in the good. Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa intelligitur de immoderata tristitia, quae animum absorbet. Huiusmodi enim tristitia immobilitat animum, et impedit fugam mali, ut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes the soul, and hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above (Question 37, Article 2).
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut quodlibet eligibile fit minus eligibile propter tristitiam, ita quodlibet fugiendum redditur magis fugiendum propter tristitiam. Et quantum ad hoc, tristitia est utilis. Reply to Objection 2. Just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is still more to be shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is useful.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod tristitia de operatione aliqua, impedit operationem, sed tristitia de cessatione operationis, facit avidius operari. Reply to Objection 3. Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action: but sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more earnestly.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia sit summum malum. Optimo enim opponitur pessimum, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Sed quaedam delectatio est optimum, quae scilicet pertinet ad felicitatem. Ergo aliqua tristitia est summum malum. Objection 1. It would seem that pain is the greatest evil. Because "the worst is contrary to the best" (Ethic. viii, 10). But a certain pleasure is the greatest good, viz. the pleasure of bliss. Therefore a certain pain is the greatest evil.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, beatitudo est summum bonum hominis, quia est ultimus hominis finis. Sed beatitudo consistit in hoc quod homo habeat quidquid velit, et nihil mali velit, ut supra dictum est. Ergo summum bonum hominis est impletio voluntatis ipsius. Sed tristitia consistit in hoc quod accidit aliquid contra voluntatem, ut patet per Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo tristitia est summum malum hominis. Objection 2. Further, happiness is man's greatest good, because it is his last end. But man's Happiness consists in his "having whatever he will, and in willing naught amiss," as stated above (3, 4, Objection 5; 5, 8, Objection 3). Therefore man's greatest good consists in the fulfilment of his will. Now pain consists in something happening contrary to the will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6,15). Therefore pain is man's greatest evil.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus sic argumentatur in Soliloq., ex duabus partibus compositi sumus, ex anima scilicet et corpore, quarum pars deterior corpus est. Summum autem bonum est melioris partis optimum, summum autem malum, pessimum deterioris. Est autem optimum in animo sapientia, in corpore pessimum dolor. Summum igitur bonum hominis est sapere, summum malum dolere. Objection 3. Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. i, 12): "We are composed of two parts, i.e. of a soul and a body, whereof the body is the inferior. Now the sovereign good is the greatest good of the better part: while the supreme evil is the greatest evil of the inferior part. But wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the worst thing in the body is pain. Therefore man's greatest good is to be wise: while his greatest evil is to suffer pain."
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, culpa est magis malum quam poena, ut in primo habitum est. Sed tristitia seu dolor pertinet ad poenam peccati; sicut frui rebus mutabilibus est malum culpae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de vera religione, quis est dolor qui dicitur animi, nisi carere mutabilibus rebus quibus fruebatur, aut frui se posse speraverat? Et hoc est totum quod dicitur malum, idest peccatum, et poena peccati. Ergo tristitia seu dolor non est summum malum hominis. On the contrary, Guilt is a greater evil than punishment, as was stated in the I, 48, 6. But sorrow or pain belongs to the punishment of sin, just as the enjoyment of changeable things is an evil of guilt. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii): "What is pain of the soul, except for the soul to be deprived of that which it was wont to enjoy, or had hoped to enjoy? And this is all that is called evil, i.e. sin, and the punishment of sin." Therefore sorrow or pain is not man's greatest evil.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est aliquam tristitiam seu dolorem esse summum hominis malum. Omnis enim tristitia seu dolor aut est de hoc quod est vere malum, aut est de aliquo apparenti malo, quod est vere bonum. Dolor autem seu tristitia quae est de vere malo, non potest esse summum malum, est enim aliquid eo peius, scilicet vel non iudicare esse malum illud quod vere est malum, vel etiam non refutare illud. Tristitia autem vel dolor qui est de apparenti malo, quod est vere bonum, non potest esse summum malum, quia peius esset omnino alienari a vero bono. Unde impossibile est quod aliqua tristitia vel dolor sit summum hominis malum. I answer that, It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either for something that is truly evil, or for something that is apparently evil, but good in reality. Now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil cannot be the greatest evil: for there is something worse, namely, either not to reckon as evil that which is really evil, or not to reject it. Again, sorrow or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really good, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse to be altogether separated from that which is truly good. Hence it is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duo bona sunt communia et delectationi et tristitiae, scilicet iudicium verum de bono et malo; et ordo debitus voluntatis approbantis bonum et recusantis malum. Et sic patet quod in dolore vel tristitia est aliquod bonum per cuius privationem potest fieri deterius. Sed non in omni delectatione est aliquod malum, per cuius remotionem possit fieri melius. Unde delectatio aliqua potest esse summum hominis bonum, eo modo quo supra dictum est, tristitia autem non potest esse summum hominis malum. Reply to Objection 1. Pleasure and sorrow have two good points in common: namely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear that in pain or sorrow there is a good, by the removal of which they become worse: and yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the removal of which the pleasure is better. Consequently, a pleasure can be man's highest good, in the way above stated (34, 3): whereas sorrow cannot be man's greatest evil.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod est voluntatem repugnare malo, est quoddam bonum. Et propter hoc, tristitia vel dolor non potest esse summum malum, quia habet aliquam permixtionem boni. Reply to Objection 2. The very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a good. And for this reason, sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest evil; because it has an admixture of good.
Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod peius est quod nocet meliori, quam quod nocet peiori. Malum autem dicitur quia nocet, ut dicit Augustinus in Enchirid. Unde maius malum est quod est malum animae, quam quod est malum corporis. Unde non est efficax, ratio, quam Augustinus inducit non ex sensu suo sed ex sensu alterius. Reply to Objection 3. That which harms the better thing is worse than that which harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it harms," as Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body. Therefore this argument does not prove: nor does Augustine give it as his own, but as taken from another [Cornelius Celsus].

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