Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q34

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Q33 Q35



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Iª-IIae q. 34 pr. Deinde considerandum est de bonitate et malitia delectationum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum omnis delectatio sit mala. Secundo, dato quod non, utrum omnis delectatio sit bona. Tertio, utrum aliqua delectatio sit optimum. Quarto, utrum delectatio sit mensura vel regula secundum quam iudicetur bonum vel malum in moralibus. Question 34. The goodness and malice of pleasures Is every pleasure evil? If not, is every pleasure good? Is any pleasure the greatest good? Is pleasure the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil?
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis delectatio sit mala. Illud enim quod corrumpit prudentiam, et impedit rationis usum, videtur esse secundum se malum, quia bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed delectatio corrumpit prudentiam, et impedit rationis usum, et tanto magis, quanto delectationes sunt maiores. Unde in delectationibus venereis, quae sunt maximae, impossibile est aliquid intelligere, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Et Hieronymus etiam dicit, super Matth., quod illo tempore quo coniugales actus geruntur, praesentia sancti spiritus non dabitur, etiam si propheta esse videatur qui officio generationis obsequitur. Ergo delectatio est secundum se malum. Ergo omnis delectatio mala. Objection 1. It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil in itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater: wherefore "in sexual pleasures," which are the greatest of all, "it is impossible to understand anything," as stated in Ethic. vii, 11. Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that "at the time of conjugal intercourse, the presence of the Holy Ghost is not vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty." Therefore pleasure is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure is evil.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod fugit virtuosus, et prosequitur deficiens a virtute, videtur esse secundum se malum, et fugiendum, quia, ut dicitur in X Ethic., virtuosus est quasi mensura et regula humanorum actuum; et apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. II, spiritualis iudicat omnia. Sed pueri et bestiae, in quibus non est virtus, prosequuntur delectationes, fugit autem eas temperatus. Ergo delectationes secundum se sunt malae, et fugiendae. Objection 2. Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the man lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be avoided; because, as stated in Ethic. x, 5 "the virtuous man is a kind of measure and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 2:15): "The spiritual man judgeth all things." But children and dumb animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas the man who is master of himself does not. Therefore pleasures are evil in themselves and should be avoided.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, virtus et ars sunt circa difficile et bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed nulla ars ordinata est ad delectationem. Ergo delectatio non est aliquid bonum. Objection 3. Further, "virtue and art are concerned about the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to pleasure. Therefore pleasure is not something good.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo XXXVI, dicitur, delectare in domino. Cum igitur ad nihil mali auctoritas divina inducat, videtur quod non omnis delectatio sit mala. On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 36:4): "Delight in the Lord." Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that not every pleasure is evil.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., aliqui posuerunt omnes delectationes esse malas. Cuius ratio videtur fuisse, quia intentionem suam referebant ad solas delectationes sensibiles et corporales, quae sunt magis manifestae, nam et in ceteris intelligibilia a sensibilibus antiqui philosophi non distinguebant, nec intellectum a sensu, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Delectationes autem corporales ut dicitur in libro de anima. Delectationes autem corporales arbitrabantur dicendum omnes esse malas, ut sic homines, qui ad delectationes immoderatas sunt proni, a delectationibus se retrahentes, ad medium virtutis perveniant. Sed haec existimatio non fuit conveniens. Cum enim nullus possit vivere sine aliqua sensibili et corporali delectatione, si illi qui docent omnes delectationes esse malas, deprehendantur aliquas delectationes suscipere; magis homines ad delectationes erunt proclives exemplo operum, verborum doctrina praetermissa. In operationibus enim et passionibus humanis, in quibus experientia plurimum valet, magis movent exempla quam verba. Dicendum est ergo aliquas delectationes esse bonas, et aliquas esse malas. Est enim delectatio quies appetitivae virtutis in aliquo bono amato, et consequens aliquam operationem. Unde huius ratio duplex accipi potest. Una quidem ex parte boni in quo aliquis quiescens delectatur. Bonum enim et malum in moralibus dicitur secundum quod convenit rationi vel discordat ab ea, ut supra dictum est, sicut in rebus naturalibus aliquid dicitur naturale ex eo quod naturae convenit, innaturale vero ex eo quod est a natura discordans. Sicut igitur in naturalibus est quaedam quies naturalis, quae scilicet est in eo quod convenit naturae, ut cum grave quiescit deorsum; et quaedam innaturalis, quae est in eo quod repugnat naturae, sicut cum grave quiescit sursum, ita et in moralibus est quaedam delectatio bona, secundum quod appetitus superior aut inferior requiescit in eo quod convenit rationi; et quaedam mala, ex eo quod quiescit in eo quod a ratione discordat, et a lege Dei. Alia ratio accipi potest ex parte operationum, quarum quaedam sunt bonae, et quaedam malae. Operationibus autem magis sunt affines delectationes, quae sunt eis coniunctae, quam concupiscentiae, quae tempore eas praecedunt. Unde, cum concupiscentiae bonarum operationum sint bonae, malarum vero malae; multo magis delectationes bonarum operationum sunt bonae, malarum vero malae. I answer that, As stated in Ethic. x, 2,[3]. some have maintained that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they took account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest; since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers did not discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they held that all bodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being prone to immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by abstaining from pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this opinion. Because, since none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they who teach that all pleasures are evil, are found in the act of taking pleasure; men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the example of their works instead of listening to the doctrine of their words: since, in human actions and passions, wherein experience is of great weight, example moves more than words. We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a twofold reason for this assertion. The first is in respect of the good in which a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order depend on agreement or disagreement with reason, as stated above (Question 18, Article 5): just as in the order of nature, a thing is said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural, if it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the natural order there is a certain natural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with its nature, for instance, when a heavy body rests down below; and again an unnatural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees with its nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so, in the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant from reason and the law of God. The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined to actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions are good, and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good actions good, and those of evil actions evil.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, delectationes quae sunt de actu rationis, non impediunt rationem, neque corrumpunt prudentiam; sed delectationes extraneae, cuiusmodi sunt delectationes corporales. Quae quidem rationis usum impediunt, sicut supra dictum est, et per contrarietatem appetitus, qui quiescit in eo quod repugnat rationi, et ex hoc habet delectatio quod sit moraliter mala, vel secundum quandam ligationem rationis, sicut in concubitu coniugali delectatio, quamvis sit in eo quod convenit rationi, tamen impedit rationis usum, propter corporalem transmutationem adiunctam. Sed ex hoc non consequitur malitiam moralem, sicut nec somnus quo ligatur usus rationis, moraliter est malus, si sit secundum rationem receptus, nam et ipsa ratio hoc habet, ut quandoque rationis usus intercipiatur. Dicimus tamen quod huiusmodi ligamentum rationis ex delectatione in actu coniugali, etsi non habeat malitiam moralem, quia non est peccatum mortale nec veniale; provenit tamen ex quadam morali malitia, scilicet ex peccato primi parentis, nam hoc in statu innocentiae non erat, ut patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (Question 33, Article 3), it is not the pleasures which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or destroy prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of the body. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above (Question 33, Article 3), either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure morally bad; or by fettering the reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily change. But in this case the pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason: for reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times. We must add, however, that although this fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice, since it is neither a mortal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of moral malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent; because, as stated in the I, 98, 2 the case was different in the state of innocence.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod temperatus non fugit omnes delectationes, sed immoderatas, et rationi non convenientes. Quod autem pueri et bestiae delectationes prosequantur, non ostendit eas universaliter esse malas, quia in eis est naturalis appetitus a Deo, qui movetur in id quod est eis conveniens. Reply to Objection 2. The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that children and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all pleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural appetite, which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non omnis boni est ars, sed exteriorum factibilium, ut infra dicetur. Circa operationes autem et passiones quae sunt in nobis, magis est prudentia et virtus quam ars. Et tamen aliqua ars est factiva delectationis; scilicet pulmentaria et pigmentaria, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Reply to Objection 3. Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but with the making of external things, as we shall state further on (57, 3). But actions and passions, which are within us, are more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there is an art of making pleasure, namely, "the art of cookery and the art of making arguments," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis delectatio sit bona. Sicut enim in primo dictum est, bonum in tria dividitur, scilicet honestum, utile et delectabile. Sed honestum omne est bonum; et similiter omne utile. Ergo et omnis delectatio est bona. Objection 1. It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as stated in the I, 5, 6 there are three kinds of good: the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous is good; and in like manner everything useful is good. Therefore also every pleasure is good.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud est per se bonum, quod non quaeritur propter aliud, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed delectatio non quaeritur propter aliud, ridiculum enim videtur ab aliquo quaerere quare vult delectari. Ergo delectatio est per se bonum. Sed quod per se praedicatur de aliquo, universaliter praedicatur de eo. Ergo omnis delectatio est bona. Objection 2. Further, that which is not sought for the sake of something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic. i, 6,7. But pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure is good in itself. Now that which is predicated to a thing considered in itself, is predicated thereof universally. Therefore every pleasure is good.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, id quod ab omnibus desideratur, videtur esse per se bonum, nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed omnes appetunt aliquam delectationem, etiam pueri et bestiae. Ergo delectatio est secundum se bonum. Omnis ergo delectatio est bona. Objection 3. Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of itself: because good is "what all things seek," as stated in Ethic. i, 1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and consequently all pleasure is good.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. II, qui laetantur cum malefecerint, et exultant in rebus pessimis. On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 2:14): "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things."
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut aliqui Stoicorum posuerunt omnes delectationes esse malas, ita Epicurei posuerunt delectationem secundum se esse bonum, et per consequens delectationes omnes esse bonas. Qui ex hoc decepti esse videntur, quod non distinguebant inter id quod est bonum simpliciter, et id quod est bonum quoad hunc. Simpliciter quidem bonum est quod secundum se bonum est. Contingit autem quod non est secundum se bonum, esse huic bonum, dupliciter. Uno modo, quia est ei conveniens secundum dispositionem in qua nunc est, quae tamen non est naturalis, sicut leproso bonum est quandoque comedere aliqua venenosa, quae non sunt simpliciter convenientia complexioni humanae. Alio modo, quia id quod non est conveniens, aestimatur ut conveniens. Et quia delectatio est quies appetitus in bono, si sit bonum simpliciter illud in quo quiescit appetitus, erit simpliciter delectatio, et simpliciter bona. Si autem non sit bonum simpliciter, sed quoad hunc, tunc nec delectatio est simpliciter, sed huic, nec simpliciter est bona, sed bona secundum quid, vel apparens bona. I answer that, While some of the Stoics maintained that all pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself, and that consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual. That which is good simply, is good in itself. Now that which is not good in itself, may be good in respect of some individual in two ways. In one way, because it is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which disposition, however, is not natural: thus it is sometimes good for a leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are not suitable simply to the human temperament. In another way, through something unsuitable being esteemed suitable. And since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in some good, if the appetite reposes in that which is good simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good simply. But if a man's appetite repose in that which is good, not simply, but in respect of that particular man, then his pleasure will not be pleasure simply, but a pleasure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain respect, or an apparent good.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod honestum et utile dicuntur secundum rationem, et ideo nihil est honestum vel utile, quod non sit bonum. Delectabile autem dicitur secundum appetitum, qui quandoque in illud tendit quod non est conveniens rationi. Et ideo non omne delectabile est bonum bonitate morali, quae attenditur secundum rationem. Reply to Objection 1. The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason. Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends on the order of reason.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ideo delectatio non quaeritur propter aliud, quia est quies in fine. Finem autem contingit esse bonum et malum quamvis nunquam sit finis nisi secundum quod est bonum quoad hunc. Ita etiam est de delectatione. Reply to Objection 2. The reason why pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so far as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with regard to pleasure.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc modo omnia appetunt delectationem, sicut et bonum, cum delectatio sit quies appetitus in bono. Sed sicut contingit non omne bonum quod appetitur, esse per se et vere bonum; ita non omnis delectatio est per se et vere bona. Reply to Objection 3. All things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself and verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla delectatio sit optimum. Nulla enim generatio est optimum, nam generatio non potest esse ultimus finis. Sed delectatio consequitur generationem, nam ex eo quod aliquid constituitur in suam naturam, delectatur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo nulla delectatio potest esse optimum. Objection 1. It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good. Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation cannot be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation: for the fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being established in its own nature, as stated above (Question 31, Article 1). Therefore no pleasure is the greatest good.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod est optimum, nullo addito potest fieri melius. Sed delectatio aliquo addito fit melior, est enim melior delectatio cum virtute quam sine virtute. Ergo delectatio non est optimum. Objection 2. Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made better by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue. Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, id quod est optimum, est universaliter bonum, sicut per se bonum existens, nam quod est per se, est prius et potius eo quod est per accidens. Sed delectatio non est universaliter bonum, ut dictum est. Ergo delectatio non est optimum. Objection 3. Further, that which is the greatest good is universally good, as being good of itself: since that which is such of itself is prior to and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure is not universally good, as stated above (Article 2). Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra beatitudo est optimum, cum sit finis humanae vitae. Sed beatitudo non est sine delectatione, dicitur enim in Psalmo XV, adimplebis me laetitia cum vultu tuo; delectationes in dextera tua usque in finem. On the contrary, Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the end of man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is written (Psalm 15:11): "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy right hand are delights even to the end."
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Plato non posuit omnes delectationes esse malas, sicut Stoici; neque omnes esse bonas, sicut Epicurei; sed quasdam esse bonas, et quasdam esse malas; ita tamen quod nulla sit summum bonum, vel optimum. Sed quantum ex eius rationibus datur intelligi, in duobus deficit. In uno quidem quia, cum videret delectationes sensibiles et corporales in quodam motu et generatione consistere, sicut patet in repletione ciborum et huiusmodi; aestimavit omnes delectationes consequi generationem et motum. Unde, cum generatio et motus sint actus imperfecti, sequeretur quod delectatio non haberet rationem ultimae perfectionis. Sed hoc manifeste apparet falsum in delectationibus intellectualibus. Aliquis enim non solum delectatur in generatione scientiae, puta cum addiscit aut miratur, sicut supra dictum est; sed etiam in contemplando secundum scientiam iam acquisitam. Alio vero modo, quia dicebat optimum illud quod est simpliciter summum bonum, quod scilicet est ipsum bonum quasi abstractum et non participatum, sicut ipse Deus est summum bonum. Nos autem loquimur de optimo in rebus humanis. Optimum autem in unaquaque re est ultimus finis. Finis autem, ut supra dictum est, dupliciter dicitur, scilicet ipsa res, et usus rei; sicut finis avari est vel pecunia, vel possessio pecuniae. Et secundum hoc, ultimus finis hominis dici potest vel ipse Deus, qui est summum bonum simpliciter; vel fruitio ipsius, quae importat delectationem quandam in ultimo fine. Et per hunc modum aliqua delectatio hominis potest dici optimum inter bona humana. I answer that, Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted that all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained that all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some evil; yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good. But, judging from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because, from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure consists in a certain movement and "becoming," as is evident in satiety from eating and the like; he concluded that all pleasure arises from some "becoming" and movement: and from this, since "becoming" and movement are the acts of something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature of ultimate perfection. But this is seen to be evidently false as regards intellectual pleasures: because one takes pleasure, not only in the "becoming" of knowledge, for instance, when one learns or wonders, as stated above (32, 8, ad 2); but also in the act of contemplation, by making use of knowledge already acquired. Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the supreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from, and unparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme Good; whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human things. Now the greatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated above (1, 8; 2, 7) is twofold; namely, the thing itself, and the use of that thing; thus the miser's end is either money or the possession of money. Accordingly, man's last end may be said to be either God Who is the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment of God, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this sense a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among human goods.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnis delectatio consequitur generationem; sed aliquae delectationes consequuntur operationes perfectas, ut dictum est. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquam delectationem esse optimum, etsi non omnis sit talis. Reply to Objection 1. Not every pleasure arises from a "becoming"; for some pleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above. Accordingly nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good, although every pleasure is not such.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de optimo simpliciter, per cuius participationem omnia sunt bona, unde ex nullius additione fit melius. Sed in aliis bonis universaliter verum est quod quodlibet bonum ex additione alterius fit melius. Quamvis posset dici quod delectatio non est aliquid extraneum ab operatione virtutis, sed concomitans ipsam, ut in I Ethic. dicitur. Reply to Objection 2. This argument is true of the greatest good simply, by participation of which all things are good; wherefore no addition can make it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is universally true that any good becomes better by the addition of another good. Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies it, as stated in Ethic. i, 8.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod delectatio non habet quod sit optimum ex hoc quod est delectatio, sed ex hoc quod est perfecta quies in optimo. Unde non oportet quod omnis delectatio sit optima, aut etiam bona. Sicut aliqua scientia est optima, non tamen omnis. Reply to Objection 3. That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect repose in the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every pleasure is supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain science is supremely good, but not every science is.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit mensura vel regula boni et mali moralis. Omnia enim mensurantur primo sui generis, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed delectatio non est primum in genere moralium, sed praecedunt ipsam amor et desiderium. Non ergo est regula bonitatis et malitiae in moralibus. Objection 1. It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is the measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire. Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, mensuram et regulam oportet esse uniformem, et ideo motus qui est maxime uniformis, est mensura et regula omnium motuum, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed delectatio est varia et multiformis, cum quaedam earum sint bonae, et quaedam malae. Ergo delectatio non est mensura et regula moralium. Objection 2. Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform: since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not the measure and rule of morals.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, certius iudicium sumitur de effectu per causam, quam e converso. Sed bonitas vel malitia operationis est causa bonitatis vel malitiae delectationis, quia bonae delectationes sunt quae consequuntur bonas operationes, malae autem quae malas, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo delectationes non sunt regula et mensura bonitatis et malitiae in moralibus. Objection 3. Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because "those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and those are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and malice.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super illud Psalmi VII, scrutans corda et renes Deus, finis curae et cogitationis est delectatio ad quam quis nititur pervenire. Et philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod delectatio est finis architecton, idest principalis, ad quem respicientes, unumquodque hoc quidem malum, hoc autem bonum simpliciter dicimus. On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Psalm 7:10 "The searcher of hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the pleasure which each one aims at achieving." And the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i.e. the principal, "end [St. Thomas took "finis" as being the nominative, whereas it is the genitive--tou telous; and the Greek reads "He" (i.e. the political philosopher), "is the architect of the end."], in regard to which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good."
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod bonitas vel malitia moralis principaliter in voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Utrum autem voluntas sit bona vel mala, praecipue ex fine cognoscitur. Id autem habetur pro fine, in quo voluntas quiescit. Quies autem voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitus, in bono, est delectatio. Et ideo secundum delectationem voluntatis humanae, praecipue iudicatur homo bonus vel malus; est enim bonus et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus virtutum; malus autem qui in operibus malis. Delectationes autem appetitus sensitivi non sunt regula bonitatis vel malitiae moralis, nam cibus communiter delectabilis est secundum appetitum sensitivum, bonis et malis. Sed voluntas bonorum delectatur in eis secundum convenientiam rationis, quam non curat voluntas malorum. I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as stated above (Question 20, Article 1); and it is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that in which the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works. On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amor et desiderium sunt priora delectatione in via generationis. Sed delectatio est prior secundum rationem finis, qui in operabilibus habet rationem principii, a quo maxime sumitur iudicium, sicut a regula vel mensura. Reply to Objection 1. Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis delectatio in hoc est uniformis, quod est quies in aliquo bono, et secundum hoc potest esse regula vel mensura. Nam ille bonus est cuius voluntas quiescit in vero bono; malus autem, cuius voluntas quiescit in malo. Reply to Objection 2. All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.
Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum delectatio perficiat operationem per modum finis, ut supra dictum est; non potest esse operatio perfecte bona, nisi etiam adsit delectatio in bono, nam bonitas rei dependet ex fine. Et sic quodammodo bonitas delectationis est causa bonitas in operatione. Reply to Objection 3. Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated above (Question 33, Article 4); an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a thing depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.

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