Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q28

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Q27 Q29



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Iª-IIae q. 28 pr. Deinde considerandum est de effectibus amoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum unio sit effectus amoris. Secundo, utrum mutua inhaesio. Tertio, utrum extasis sit effectus amoris. Quarto, utrum zelus. Quinto, utrum amor sit passio laesiva amantis. Sexto, utrum amor sit causa omnium quae amans agit. Question 28. The effects of love Is union an effect of love? Is mutual indwelling an effect of love? Is ecstasy an effect of love? Is zeal an effect of love? Is love a passion that is hurtful to the lover? Is love cause of all that the lover does?
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio non sit effectus amoris. Absentia enim unioni repugnat. Sed amor compatitur secum absentiam, dicit enim apostolus, ad Galat. IV, bonum aemulamini in bono semper (loquens de seipso, ut Glossa dicit), et non tantum cum praesens sum apud vos. Ergo unio non est effectus amoris. Objection 1. It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence; for the Apostle says (Galatians 4:18): "Be zealous for that which is good in a good thing always" (speaking of himself, according to a gloss), "and not only when I am present with you." Therefore union is not an effect of love.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnis unio aut est per essentiam, sicut forma unitur materiae, et accidens subiecto, et pars toti vel alteri parti ad constitutionem totius, aut est per similitudinem vel generis, vel speciei, vel accidentis. Sed amor non causat unionem essentiae, alioquin nunquam haberetur amor ad ea quae sunt per essentiam divisa. Unionem autem quae est per similitudinem, amor non causat, sed magis ab ea causatur. Ut dictum est. Ergo unio non est effectus amoris. Objection 2. Further, every union is either according to essence, thus form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the whole, or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according to likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love does not cause union of essence; else love could not be between things essentially distinct. On the other hand, love does not cause union of likeness, but rather is caused by it, as stated above (Question 27, Article 3). Therefore union is not an effect of love.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, sensus in actu fit sensibile in actu, et intellectus in actu fit intellectum in actu. Non autem amans in actu fit amatum in actu. Ergo unio magis est effectus cognitionis quam amoris. Objection 3. Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover in act is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of knowledge rather than of love.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod amor quilibet est virtus unitiva. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a "unitive love."
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est unio amantis ad amatum. Una quidem secundum rem, puta cum amatum praesentialiter adest amanti. Alia vero secundum affectum. Quae quidem unio consideranda est ex apprehensione praecedente, nam motus appetitivus sequitur apprehensionem. Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiae et amicitiae, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis amati ad amantem. Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse. Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi. Et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse, et Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae suae. Primam ergo unionem amor facit effective, quia movet ad desiderandum et quaerendum praesentiam amati, quasi sibi convenientis et ad se pertinentis. Secundam autem unionem facit formaliter, quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus. Unde Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Trin., quod amor est quasi vita quaedam duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem scilicet et quod amatur. Quod enim dicit copulans, refertur ad unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor, quod vero dicit copulare intendens, pertinet ad unionem realem. I answer that, The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being. In like manner when a man loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul." The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused "formally" by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de unione reali. Quam quidem requirit delectatio sicut causam, desiderium vero est in reali absentia amati, amor vero et in absentia et in praesentia. Reply to Objection 1. This argument is true of real union. That is necessary to pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real absence of the beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent or present.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod unio tripliciter se habet ad amorem. Quaedam enim unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum, quantum vero ad amorem quo quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est. Quaedam vero unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae, ut ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiae, ut ad aliquid sui. Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis, quam amans quaerit de re amata. Et haec quidem unio est secundum convenientiam amoris, ut enim philosophus refert, II Politic., Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri unum, sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi, quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi coniungantur. Reply to Objection 2. Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above (Question 27, Article 3). There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence. Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one," but since "this would result in either one or both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union--to live together, speak together, and be united together in other like things.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod cognitio perficitur per hoc quod cognitum unitur cognoscenti secundum suam similitudinem. Sed amor facit quod ipsa res quae amatur, amanti aliquo modo uniatur, ut dictum est. Unde amor est magis unitivus quam cognitio. Reply to Objection 3. Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is that the thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the lover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love is closer than that which is caused by knowledge.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non causet mutuam inhaesionem, ut scilicet amans sit in amato, et e converso. Quod enim est in altero, continetur in eo. Sed non potest idem esse continens et contentum. Ergo per amorem non potest causari mutua inhaesio, ut amatum sit in amante et e converso. Objection 1. It would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For that which is in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, nihil potest penetrare in interiora alicuius integri, nisi per aliquam divisionem. Sed dividere quae sunt secundum rem coniuncta, non pertinet ad appetitum, in quo est amor, sed ad rationem. Ergo mutua inhaesio non est effectus amoris. Objection 2. Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by means of a division of the whole. But it is the function of the reason, not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that are really united. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, si per amorem amans est in amato et e converso, sequetur quod hoc modo amatum uniatur amanti, sicut amans amato. Sed ipsa unio est amor, ut dictum est. Ergo sequitur quod semper amans ametur ab amato, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo mutua inhaesio est effectus amoris. Objection 3. Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover, in the same way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union itself is love, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore it follows that the lover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently false. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Caritas autem est amor Dei. Ergo, eadem ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e converso. On the contrary, It is written (1 John 4:16): "He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him." Now charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason, every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod iste effectus mutuae inhaesionis potest intelligi et quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam. Nam quantum ad vim apprehensivam amatum dicitur esse in amante, inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis; secundum illud Philipp. I, eo quod habeam vos in corde. Amans vero dicitur esse in amato secundum apprehensionem inquantum amans non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad interiora eius ingreditur. Sicut de spiritu sancto, qui est amor Dei, dicitur, I ad Cor. II, quod scrutatur etiam profunda Dei. Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in eius affectu, ut vel delectetur in eo, aut in bonis eius, apud praesentiam; vel in absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem concupiscentiae; vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem amicitiae; non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa, sicut cum aliquis desiderat aliquid propter alterum, vel cum aliquis vult bonum alteri propter aliquid aliud; sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam. Unde et amor dicitur intimus; et dicuntur viscera caritatis. E converso autem amans est in amato aliter quidem per amorem concupiscentiae, aliter per amorem amicitiae. Amor namque concupiscentiae non requiescit in quacumque extrinseca aut superficiali adeptione vel fruitione amati, sed quaerit amatum perfecte habere, quasi ad intima illius perveniens. In amore vero amicitiae, amans est in amato, inquantum reputat bona vel mala amici sicut sua, et voluntatem amici sicut suam, ut quasi ipse in suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati, et affici. Et propter hoc, proprium est amicorum eadem velle, et in eodem tristari et gaudere secundum philosophum, in IX Ethic. et in II Rhetoric. Ut sic, inquantum quae sunt amici aestimat sua, amans videatur esse in amato, quasi idem factus amato. Inquantum autem e converso vult et agit propter amicum sicut propter seipsum, quasi reputans amicum idem sibi, sic amatum est in amante. Potest autem et tertio modo mutua inhaesio intelligi in amore amicitiae, secundum viam redamationis, inquantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona volunt et operantur. I answer that, This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover, according to Philippians 1:7, "For that I have you in my heart": while the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus it is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He "searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God" (1 Corinthians 2:10). As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish good to another on account of something else), but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. For this reason we speak of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity." On the other hand, the lover is in the beloved, by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of concupiscence is not satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend's will as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper to friends "to desire the same things, and to grieve and rejoice at the same," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4). Consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he were become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking on his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover. In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch as friends return love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amatum continetur in amante, inquantum est impressum in affectu eius per quandam complacentiam. E converso vero amans continetur in amato, inquantum amans sequitur aliquo modo illud quod est intimum amati. Nihil enim prohibet diverso modo esse aliquid continens et contentum, sicut genus continetur in specie et e converso. Reply to Objection 1. The beloved is contained in the lover, by being impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency. On the other hand, the lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For nothing hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different ways: just as a genus is contained in its species, and vice versa.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod rationis apprehensio praecedit affectum amoris. Et ideo, sicut ratio disquirit, ita affectus amoris subintrat in amatum, ut ex dictis patet. Reply to Objection 2. The apprehension of the reason precedes the movement of love. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the movement of love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de tertio modo mutuae inhaesionis, qui non invenitur in quolibet amore. Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of the third kind of mutual indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod extasis non sit effectus amoris. Extasis enim quandam alienationem importare videtur. Sed amor non semper facit alienationem, sunt enim amantes interdum sui compotes. Ergo amor non facit extasim. Objection 1. It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always result in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times. Therefore love does not cause ecstasy.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, amans desiderat amatum sibi uniri. Magis ergo amatum trahit ad se, quam etiam pergat in amatum, extra se exiens. Objection 2. Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to him. Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes himself into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, amor unit amatum amanti, sicut dictum est. Si ergo amans extra se tendit, ut in amatum pergat, sequitur quod semper plus diligat amatum quam seipsum. Quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo extasis est effectus amoris. Objection 3. Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated above (Article 1). If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in order to betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover always loves the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false. Therefore ecstasy is not an effect of love.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod divinus amor extasim facit, et quod ipse Deus propter amorem est extasim passus. Cum ergo quilibet amor sit quaedam similitudo participata divini amoris, ut ibidem dicitur, videtur quod quilibet amor causet extasim. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the Divine love produces ecstasy," and that "God Himself suffered ecstasy through love." Since therefore according to the same author (Div. Nom. iv), every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it seems that every love causes ecstasy.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod extasim pati aliquis dicitur, cum extra se ponitur. Quod quidem contingit et secundum vim apprehensivam, et secundum vim appetitivam. Secundum quidem vim apprehensivam aliquis dicitur extra se poni, quando ponitur extra cognitionem sibi propriam, vel quia ad superiorem sublimatur, sicut homo, dum elevatur ad comprehendenda aliqua quae sunt supra sensum et rationem, dicitur extasim pati, inquantum ponitur extra connaturalem apprehensionem rationis et sensus; vel quia ad inferiora deprimitur; puta, cum aliquis in furiam vel amentiam cadit, dicitur extasim passus. Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur aliquis extasim pati, quando appetitus alicuius in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo extra seipsum. Primam quidem extasim facit amor dispositive, inquantum scilicet facit meditari de amato, ut dictum est, intensa autem meditatio unius abstrahit ab aliis. Sed secundam extasim facit amor directe, simpliciter quidem amor amicitiae; amor autem concupiscentiae non simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Nam in amore concupiscentiae, quodammodo fertur amans extra seipsum, inquantum scilicet, non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, quaerit frui aliquo extra se. Sed quia illud extrinsecum bonum quaerit sibi habere, non exit simpliciter extra se, sed talis affectio in fine infra ipsum concluditur. Sed in amore amicitiae, affectus alicuius simpliciter exit extra se, quia vult amico bonum, et operatur, quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter ipsum amicum. I answer that, To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself. This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be placed outside himself, when he is placed outside the knowledge proper to him. This may be due to his being raised to a higher knowledge; thus, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as he is placed outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and reason, when he is raised up so as to comprehend things that surpass sense and reason: or it may be due to his being cast down into a state of debasement; thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy, when he is overcome by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive power, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as it were. The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far, namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, as stated above (Article 2), and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from other things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love of friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But since he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement remains finally within him. On the other hand, in the love of friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because he wishes and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him, for his sake.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de prima extasi. Reply to Objection 1. This argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de amore concupiscentiae, qui non facit simpliciter extasim, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 2. This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui amat, intantum extra se exit, inquantum vult bona amici et operatur. Non tamen vult bona amici magis quam sua. Unde non sequitur quod alterum plus quam se diligat. Reply to Objection 3. He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will the good of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not follow that he loves another more than himself.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod zelus non sit effectus amoris. Zelus enim est contentionis principium, unde dicitur I ad Cor. III, cum sit inter vos zelus et contentio, et cetera. Sed contentio repugnat amori. Ergo zelus non est effectus amoris. Objection 1. It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written (1 Corinthians 3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention," etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea obiectum amoris est bonum, quod est communicativum sui. Sed zelus repugnat communicationi, ad zelum enim pertinere videtur quod aliquis non patiatur consortium in amato; sicut viri dicuntur zelare uxores, quas nolunt habere communes cum ceteris. Ergo zelus non est effectus amoris. Objection 2. Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be jealous of [zelare] their wives, because they will not share them with others. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, zelus non est sine odio, sicut nec sine amore, dicitur enim in Psalmo LXXII, zelavi super iniquos. Non ergo debet dici magis effectus amoris quam odii. Objection 3. Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there without love: for it is written (Psalm 72:3): "I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked." Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of love any more than of hatred.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus appellatur Zelotes propter multum amorem quem habet ad existentia. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "God is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love for all things."
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod zelus, quocumque modo sumatur, ex intensione amoris provenit. Manifestum est enim quod quanto aliqua virtus intensius tendit in aliquid, fortius etiam repellit omne contrarium vel repugnans. Cum igitur amor sit quidam motus in amatum, ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., intensus amor quaerit excludere omne quod sibi repugnat. Aliter tamen hoc contingit in amore concupiscentiae, et aliter in amore amicitiae. Nam in amore concupiscentiae, qui intense aliquid concupiscit, movetur contra omne illud quod repugnat consecutioni vel fruitioni quietae eius quod amatur. Et hoc modo viri dicuntur zelare uxores, ne per consortium aliorum impediatur singularitas quam in uxore quaerunt. Similiter etiam qui quaerunt excellentiam, moventur contra eos qui excellere videntur, quasi impedientes excellentiam eorum. Et iste est zelus invidiae, de quo dicitur in Psalmo XXXVI, noli aemulari in malignantibus, neque zelaveris facientes iniquitatem. Amor autem amicitiae quaerit bonum amici, unde quando est intensus, facit hominem moveri contra omne illud quod repugnat bono amici. Et secundum hoc, aliquis dicitur zelare pro amico, quando, si qua dicuntur vel fiunt contra bonum amici, homo repellere studet. Et per hunc etiam modum aliquis dicitur zelare pro Deo, quando ea quae sunt contra honorem vel voluntatem Dei, repellere secundum posse conatur; secundum illud III Reg. XIX, zelo zelatus sum pro domino exercituum. Et Ioan. II, super illud, zelus domus tuae comedit me, dicit Glossa quod bono zelo comeditur, qui quaelibet prava quae viderit, corrigere satagit; si nequit, tolerat et gemit. I answer that, Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object loved," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove everything that opposes it. But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence he who desires something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love. It is thus that husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a hindrance to their exclusive individual rights. In like manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, as though these were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written (Psalm 36:1): "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy [zelaveris] them that work iniquity." On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In this way, too, a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the honor or will of God; according to 1 Kings 19:14: "With zeal I have been zealous for the Lord of hosts." Again on the words of John 2:17: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," a gloss says that "a man is eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever evil he perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it."
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de zelo invidiae; qui quidem est causa contentionis, non contra rem amatam, sed pro re amata contra impedimenta ipsius. Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum amatur inquantum est communicabile amanti. Unde omne illud quod perfectionem huius communicationis impedit, efficitur odiosum. Et sic ex amore boni zelus causatur. Ex defectu autem bonitatis contingit quod quaedam parva bona non possunt integre simul possideri a multis. Et ex amore talium causatur zelus invidiae. Non autem proprie ex his quae integre possunt a multis possideri, nullus enim invidet alteri de cognitione veritatis, quae a multis integre cognosci potest; sed forte de excellentia circa cognitionem huius. Reply to Objection 2. Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this communication, becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot, in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it does not arise, properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in their entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by many; except perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod aliquis odio habet ea quae repugnant amato, ex amore procedit. Unde zelus proprie ponitur effectus amoris magis quam odii. Reply to Objection 3. The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down as an effect of love rather than of hatred.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sit passio laesiva. Languor enim significat laesionem quandam languentis. Sed amor causat languorem, dicitur enim Cant. II, fulcite me floribus, stipate me malis, quia amore langueo. Ergo amor est passio laesiva. Objection 1. It would seem that love wounds the lover. For languor denotes a hurt in the one that languishes. But love causes languor: for it is written (Canticles 2:5): "Stay me up with flowers, compass me about with apples; because I languish with love." Therefore love is a wounding passion.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, liquefactio est quaedam resolutio. Sed amor est liquefactivus, dicitur enim Cant. V, anima mea liquefacta est, ut dilectus meus locutus est. Ergo amor est resolutivus. Est ergo corruptivus et laesivus. Objection 2. Further, melting is a kind of dissolution. But love melts that in which it is: for it is written (Canticles 5:6): "My soul melted when my beloved spoke." Therefore love is a dissolvent: therefore it is a corruptive and a wounding passion.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, fervor designat quendam excessum in caliditate, qui quidem excessus corruptivus est. Sed fervor causatur ex amore, Dionysius enim, VII cap. Cael. Hier., inter ceteras proprietates ad amorem Seraphim pertinentes, ponit calidum et acutum et superfervens. Et Cant. VIII, dicitur de amore quod lampades eius sunt lampades ignis atque flammarum. Ergo amor est passio laesiva et corruptiva. Objection 3. Further, fervor denotes a certain excess of heat; which excess has a corruptive effect. But love causes fervor: for Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) in reckoning the properties belonging to the Seraphim's love, includes "hot" and "piercing" and "most fervent." Moreover it is said of love (Canticles 8:6) that "its lamps are fire and flames." Therefore love is a wounding and corruptive passion.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod singula seipsa amant contentive, idest conservative. Ergo amor non est passio laesiva, sed magis conservativa et perfectiva. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "everything loves itself with a love that holds it together," i.e. that preserves it. Therefore love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that preserves and perfects.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, amor significat coaptationem quandam appetitivae virtutis ad aliquod bonum. Nihil autem quod coaptatur ad aliquid quod est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso laeditur, sed magis, si sit possibile, proficit et melioratur. Quod vero coaptatur ad aliquid quod non est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso laeditur et deterioratur. Amor ergo boni convenientis est perfectivus et meliorativus amantis, amor autem boni quod non est conveniens amanti, est laesivus et deteriorativus amantis. Unde maxime homo perficitur et melioratur per amorem Dei, laeditur autem et deterioratur per amorem peccati, secundum illud Osee IX, facti sunt abominabiles, sicut ea quae dilexerunt. Et hoc quidem dictum sit de amore, quantum ad id quod est formale in ipso, quod est scilicet ex parte appetitus. Quantum vero ad id quod est materiale in passione amoris, quod est immutatio aliqua corporalis, accidit quod amor sit laesivus propter excessum immutationis, sicut accidit in sensu, et in omni actu virtutis animae qui exercetur per aliquam immutationem organi corporalis. I answer that, As stated above (26, 1,2; 27, 1), love denotes a certain adapting of the appetitive power to some good. Now nothing is hurt by being adapted to that which is suitable to it; rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be adapted to that which is not suitable to it, it is hurt and made worse thereby. Consequently love of a suitable good perfects and betters the lover; but love of a good which is unsuitable to the lover, wounds and worsens him. Wherefore man is perfected and bettered chiefly by the love of God: but is wounded and worsened by the love of sin, according to Hosea 9:10: "They became abominable, as those things which they loved." And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect of the material element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful, by reason of this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through the change of some bodily organ.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 ad 1 Ad ea vero quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, dicendum quod amori attribui possunt quatuor effectus proximi, scilicet liquefactio, fruitio, languor et fervor. Inter quae primum est liquefactio, quae opponitur congelationi. Ea enim quae sunt congelata, in seipsis constricta sunt, ut non possint de facili subintrationem alterius pati. Ad amorem autem pertinet quod appetitus coaptetur ad quandam receptionem boni amati, prout amatum est in amante, sicut iam supra dictum est. Unde cordis congelatio vel duritia est dispositio repugnans amori. Sed liquefactio importat quandam mollificationem cordis, qua exhibet se cor habile ut amatum in ipsum subintret. Si ergo amatum fuerit praesens et habitum, causatur delectatio sive fruitio. Si autem fuerit absens, consequuntur duae passiones, scilicet tristitia de absentia, quae significatur per languorem (unde et Tullius, in III de Tusculanis quaest., maxime tristitiam aegritudinem nominat); et intensum desiderium de consecutione amati, quod significatur per fervorem. Et isti quidem sunt effectus amoris formaliter accepti, secundum habitudinem appetitivae virtutis ad obiectum. Sed in passione amoris, consequuntur aliqui effectus his proportionati, secundum immutationem organi. In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment, languor, and fervor. Of these the first is "melting," which is opposed to freezing. For things that are frozen, are closely bound together, so as to be hard to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to receive the good which is loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover, as stated above (Article 2). Consequently the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with love: while melting denotes a softening of the heart, whereby the heart shows itself to be ready for the entrance of the beloved. If, then, the beloved is present and possessed, pleasure or enjoyment ensues. But if the beloved be absent, two passions arise; viz. sadness at its absence, which is denoted by "languor" (hence Cicero in De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 11 applies the term "ailment" chiefly to sadness); and an intense desire to possess the beloved, which is signified by "fervor." And these are the effects of love considered formally, according to the relation of the appetitive power to its object. But in the passion of love, other effects ensue, proportionate to the above, in respect of a change in the organ.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amans non agat omnia ex amore. Amor enim quaedam passio est, ut supra dictum est. Sed non omnia quae agit homo, agit ex passione, sed quaedam agit ex electione, et quaedam ex ignorantia, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo non omnia quae homo agit, agit ex amore. Objection 1. It would seem that the lover does not do everything from love. For love is a passion, as stated above (Question 26, Article 2). But man does not do everything from passion: but some things he does from choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Therefore not everything that a man does, is done from love.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, appetitus est principium motus et actionis in omnibus animalibus, ut patet in III de anima. Si igitur omnia quae quis agit, agit ex amore, aliae passiones appetitivae partis erunt superfluae. Objection 2. Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. If, therefore, whatever a man does is done from love, the other passions of the appetitive faculty are superfluous.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, nihil causatur simul a contrariis causis. Sed quaedam fiunt ex odio. Non ergo omnia sunt ex amore. Objection 3. Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by contrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore all things are not done from love.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod propter amorem boni omnia agunt quaecumque agunt. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good."
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod omne agens agit propter finem aliquem, ut supra dictum est. Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum unicuique. Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore. I answer that, Every agent acts for an end, as stated above (Question 1, Article 2). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some kind.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de amore qui est passio in appetitu sensitivo existens. Nos autem loquimur nunc de amore communiter accepto, prout comprehendit sub se amorem intellectualem, rationalem, animalem, naturalem, sic enim Dionysius loquitur de amore in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Reply to Objection 1. This objection takes love as a passion existing in the sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love in a general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks of love in chapter iv of De Divinis Nominibus.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ex amore, sicut iam dictum est, causantur et desiderium et tristitia et delectatio, et per consequens omnes aliae passiones. Unde omnis actio quae procedit ex quacumque passione, procedit etiam ex amore, sicut ex prima causa. Unde non superfluunt aliae passiones, quae sunt causae proximae. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (05; 27, 4) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the soul, result from love. Wherefore every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod odium etiam ex amore causatur, sicut infra dicetur. Reply to Objection 3. Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state further on (29, 2).

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