Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q15

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Q14 Q16



Latin English
Iª-IIae q. 15 pr. Deinde considerandum est de consensu. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum consensus sit actus appetitivae, vel apprehensivae virtutis. Secundo, utrum conveniat brutis animalibus. Tertio, utrum sit de fine, vel de his quae sunt ad finem. Quarto, utrum consensus in actum pertineat solum ad superiorem animae partem. Question 15. Consent, which is an act of the will in regard to the means Is consent an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power? Is it to be found in irrational animals? Is it directed to the end or to the means? Does consent to an act belong to the higher part of the soul only?
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod consentire pertineat solum ad partem animae apprehensivam. Augustinus enim, XII de Trin., consensum attribuit superiori rationi. Sed ratio nominat apprehensivam virtutem. Ergo consentire pertinet ad apprehensivam virtutem. Objection 1. It would seem that consent belongs only to the apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) ascribes consent to the higher reason. But the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent belongs to an apprehensive power.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, consentire est simul sentire. Sed sentire est apprehensivae potentiae. Ergo et consentire. Objection 2. Further, consent is "co-sense." But sense is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive power.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut assentire dicit applicationem intellectus ad aliquid, ita et consentire. Sed assentire pertinet ad intellectum, qui est vis apprehensiva. Ergo et consentire ad vim apprehensivam pertinet. Objection 3. Further, just as assent is an application of the intellect to something, so is consent. But assent belongs to the intellect, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent also belongs to an apprehensive power.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod si aliquis iudicet, et non diligat, non est sententia, idest consensus. Sed diligere ad appetitivam virtutem pertinet. Ergo et consensus. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "if a man judge without affection for that of which he judges, there is no sentence," i.e. consent. But affection belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore consent does also.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod consentire importat applicationem sensus ad aliquid. Est autem proprium sensus quod cognoscitivus est rerum praesentium, vis enim imaginativa est apprehensiva similitudinum corporalium, etiam rebus absentibus quarum sunt similitudines; intellectus autem apprehensivus est universalium rationum, quas potest apprehendere indifferenter et praesentibus et absentibus singularibus. Et quia actus appetitivae virtutis est quaedam inclinatio ad rem ipsam, secundum quandam similitudinem ipsa applicatio appetitivae virtutis ad rem, secundum quod ei inhaeret, accipit nomen sensus, quasi experientiam quandam sumens de re cui inhaeret, inquantum complacet sibi in ea. Unde et Sap. I, dicitur, sentite de domino in bonitate. Et secundum hoc, consentire est actus appetitivae virtutis. I answer that, Consent implies application of sense to something. Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for the imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even in the absence of the things of which they bear the likeness; while the intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend indifferently, whether the singulars be present or absent. And since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, in so far as it takes complacency in it. Hence it is written (Wisdom 1:1): "Think of [Sentite] the Lord in goodness." And on these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III de anima, voluntas in ratione est. Unde cum Augustinus attribuit consensum rationi, accipit rationem secundum quod in ea includitur voluntas. Reply to Objection 1. As stated in De Anima iii, 9, "the will is in the reason." Hence, when Augustine ascribes consent to the reason, he takes reason as including the will.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum, quod sentire proprie dictum ad apprehensivam potentiam pertinet, sed secundum similitudinem cuiusdam experientiae, pertinet ad appetitivam, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 2. Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive faculty; but by way of similitude, in so far as it implies seeking acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power, as stated above.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod assentire est quasi ad aliud sentire, et sic importat quandam distantiam ad id cui assentitur. Sed consentire est simul sentire, et sic importat quandam coniunctionem ad id cui consentitur. Et ideo voluntas, cuius est tendere ad ipsam rem, magis proprie dicitur consentire, intellectus autem, cuius operatio non est secundum motum ad rem, sed potius e converso, ut in primo dictum est, magis proprie dicitur assentire, quamvis unum pro alio poni soleat. Potest etiam dici quod intellectus assentit, inquantum a voluntate movetur. Reply to Objection 3. "Assentire" [to assent] is, to speak, "ad aliud sentire" [to feel towards something]; and thus it implies a certain distance from that to which assent is given. But "consentire" [to consent] is "to feel with," and this implies a certain union to the object of consent. Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the thing itself, is more properly said to consent: whereas the intellect, whose act does not consist in a movement towards the thing, but rather the reverse, as we have stated in the I, 16, 01; I, 27, 4; I, 59, 2, is more properly said to assent: although one word is wont to be used for the other [In Latin rather than in English.]. We may also say that the intellect assents, in so far as it is moved by the will.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod consensus conveniat brutis animalibus. Consensus enim importat determinationem appetitus ad unum. Sed appetitus brutorum animalium sunt determinati ad unum. Ergo consensus in brutis animalibus invenitur. Objection 1. It would seem that consent is to be found in irrational animals. For consent implies a determination of the appetite to one thing. But the appetite of irrational animals is determinate to one thing. Therefore consent is to be found in irrational animals.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, remoto priori, removetur posterius. Sed consensus praecedit operis executionem. Si ergo in brutis non esset consensus, non esset in eis operis executio. Quod patet esse falsum. Objection 2. Further, if you remove what is first, you remove what follows. But consent precedes the accomplished act. If therefore there were no consent in irrational animals, there would be no act accomplished; which is clearly false.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, homines interdum consentire dicuntur in aliquid agendum ex aliqua passione, puta concupiscentia vel ira. Sed bruta animalia ex passione agunt. Ergo in eis est consensus. Objection 3. Further, men are sometimes said to consent to do something, through some passion; desire, for instance, or anger. But irrational animals act through passion. Therefore they consent.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit quod post iudicium, homo disponit et amat quod ex consilio iudicatum est, quod vocatur sententia, idest consensus. Sed consilium non est in brutis animalibus. Ergo nec consensus. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after judging, man approves and embraces the judgment of his counselling, and this is called the sentence," i.e. consent. But counsel is not in irrational animals. Therefore neither is consent.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod consensus, proprie loquendo, non est in brutis animalibus. Cuius ratio est quia consensus importat applicationem appetitivi motus ad aliquid agendum. Eius autem est applicare appetitivum motum ad aliquid agendum, in cuius potestate est appetitivus motus, sicut tangere lapidem convenit quidem baculo, sed applicare baculum ad tactum lapidis, est eius qui habet in potestate movere baculum. Bruta autem animalia non habent in sui potestate appetitivum motum, sed talis motus in eis est ex instinctu naturae. Unde brutum animal appetit quidem, sed non applicat appetitivum motum ad aliquid. Et propter hoc non proprie dicitur consentire, sed solum rationalis natura, quae habet in potestate sua appetitivum motum, et potest ipsum applicare vel non applicare ad hoc vel ad illud. I answer that, Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational animals. The reason of this is that consent implies an application of the appetitive movement to something as to be done. Now to apply the appetitive movement to the doing of something, belongs to the subject in whose power it is to move the appetite: thus to touch a stone is an action suitable to a stick, but to apply the stick so that it touch the stone, belongs to one who has the power of moving the stick. But irrational animals have not the command of the appetitive movement; for this is in them through natural instinct. Hence in the irrational animal, there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but it does not apply that movement to some particular thing. And hence it is that the irrational animal is not properly said to consent: this is proper to the rational nature, which has the command of the appetitive movement, and is able to apply or not to apply it to this or that thing.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in brutis animalibus invenitur determinatio appetitus ad aliquid passive tantum. Consensus vero importat determinationem appetitus non solum passivam, sed magis activam. Reply to Objection 1. In irrational animals the determination of the appetite to a particular thing is merely passive: whereas consent implies a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely passive.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, remoto priori, removetur posterius quod proprie ex eo tantum sequitur. Si autem aliquid ex pluribus sequi possit, non propter hoc posterius removetur, uno priorum remoto, sicut si induratio possit fieri et a calido et frigido (nam lateres indurantur ab igne, et aqua congelata induratur ex frigore), non oportet quod, remoto calore, removeatur induratio. Executio autem operis non solum sequitur ex consensu, sed etiam ex impetuoso appetitu, qualis est in brutis animalibus. Reply to Objection 2. If the first be removed, then what follows is removed, provided that, properly speaking, it follow from that only. But if something can follow from several things, it is not removed by the fact that one of them is removed; thus if hardening is the effect of heat and of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and frozen water is hardened by the cold), then by removing heat it does not follow that there is no hardening. Now the accomplishment of an act follows not only from consent, but also from the impulse of the appetite, such as is found in irrational animals.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod homines qui ex passione agunt, possunt passionem non sequi. Non autem bruta animalia. Unde non est similis ratio. Reply to Objection 3. The man who acts through passion is able not to follow the passion: whereas irrational animals have not that power. Hence the comparison fails.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod consensus sit de fine. Quia propter quod unumquodque, illud magis. Sed his quae sunt ad finem consentimus propter finem. Ergo fini consentimus magis. Objection 1. It would seem that consent is directed to the end. Because that on account of which a thing is such is still more such. But it is on account of the end that we consent to the means. Therefore, still more do we consent to the end.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, actio intemperati est finis eius, sicut et actio virtuosi est finis eius. Sed intemperatus consentit in proprium actum. Ergo consensus potest esse de fine. Objection 2. Further, the act of the intemperate man is his end, just as the act of the virtuous man is his end. But the intemperate man consents to his own act. Therefore consent can be directed to the end.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, est electio, ut supra dictum est. Si igitur consensus esset solum de his quae sunt ad finem, in nullo ab electione differre videretur. Quod patet esse falsum per Damascenum, qui dicit quod post dispositionem, quam vocaverat sententiam, fit electio. Non ergo consensus est solum de his quae sunt ad finem. Objection 3. Further, desire of the means is choice, as stated above (Question 13, Article 01). If therefore consent were only directed to the means it would nowise differ from choice. And this is proved to be false by the authority of Damascene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after the approval" which he calls "the sentence," "comes the choice." Therefore consent is not only directed to the means.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus ibidem dicit, quod sententia, sive consensus, est quando homo disponit et amat quod ex consilio iudicatum est. Sed consilium non est nisi de his quae sunt ad finem. Ergo nec consensus. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that the "sentence," i.e. the consent, takes place "when a man approves and embraces the judgment of his counsel." But counsel is only about the means. Therefore the same applies to consent.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod consensus nominat applicationem appetitivi motus ad aliquid praeexistens in potestate applicantis in ordine autem agibilium, primo quidem oportet sumere apprehensionem finis; deinde appetitum finis; deinde consilium de his quae sunt ad finem; deinde appetitum eorum quae sunt ad finem. Appetitus autem in ultimum finem tendit naturaliter, unde et applicatio motus appetitivi in finem apprehensum, non habet rationem consensus, sed simplicis voluntatis. De his autem quae sunt post ultimum finem, inquantum sunt ad finem, sub consilio cadunt, et sic potest esse de eis consensus, inquantum motus appetitivus applicatur ad id quod ex consilio iudicatum est. Motus vero appetitivus in finem, non applicatur consilio, sed magis consilium ipsi, quia consilium praesupponit appetitum finis. Sed appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, praesupponit determinationem consilii. Et ideo applicatio appetitivi motus ad determinationem consilii, proprie est consensus. Unde, cum consilium non sit nisi de his quae sunt ad finem, consensus, proprie loquendo, non est nisi de his quae sunt ad finem. I answer that, Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the power of him who causes the application. Now the order of action is this: First there is the apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel about the means; then the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends to the last end naturally: wherefore the application of the appetitive movement to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent, but of simple volition. But as to those things which come under consideration after the last end, in so far as they are directed to the end, they come under counsel: and so counsel can be applied to them, in so far as the appetitive movement is applied to the judgment resulting from counsel. But the appetitive movement to the end is not applied to counsel: rather is counsel applied to it, because counsel presupposes the desire of the end. On the other hand, the desire of the means presupposes the decision of counsel. And therefore the application of the appetitive movement to counsel's decision is consent, properly speaking. Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent, properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut conclusiones scimus per principia, horum tamen non est scientia, sed quod maius est, scilicet intellectus; ita consentimus his quae sunt ad finem propter finem, cuius tamen non est consensus, sed quod maius est, scilicet voluntas. Reply to Objection 1. Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not science, but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our act is not consent but something greater, namely, volition.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod intemperatus habet pro fine delectationem operis, propter quam consentit in opus, magis quam ipsam operationem. Reply to Objection 2. Delight in his act, rather than the act itself, is the end of the intemperate man, and for sake of this delight he consents to that act.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod electio addit supra consensum quandam relationem respectu eius cui aliquid praeeligitur, et ideo post consensum, adhuc remanet electio. Potest enim contingere quod per consilium inveniantur plura ducentia ad finem, quorum dum quodlibet placet, in quodlibet eorum consentitur, sed ex multis quae placent, praeaccipimus unum eligendo. Sed si inveniatur unum solum quod placeat, non differunt re consensus et electio, sed ratione tantum, ut consensus dicatur secundum quod placet ad agendum; electio autem, secundum quod praefertur his quae non placent. Reply to Objection 3. Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is preferred: and therefore after consent there still remains a choice. For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval, consent has been given to each: but after approving of many, we have given our preference to one by choosing it. But if only one meets with approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according as we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to those that do not meet with our approval.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod consensus ad agendum non semper pertineat ad superiorem rationem. Delectatio enim consequitur operationem, et perficit eam, sicut decor iuventutem, sicut dicitur in X Ethic. Sed consensus in delectationem pertinet ad inferiorem rationem, ut dicit Augustinus in XII de Trin. Ergo consensus in actum non pertinet ad solam superiorem rationem. Objection 1. It would seem that consent to the act does not always belong to the higher reason. For "delight follows action, and perfects it, just as beauty perfects youth" [oion tois akmaiois he hora--as youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x, 4). But consent to delight belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore consent to the act does not belong only to the higher reason.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, actio in quam consentimus, dicitur esse voluntaria. Sed multarum potentiarum est producere actiones voluntarias. Ergo non sola superior ratio consentit in actum. Objection 2. Further, an act to which we consent is said to be voluntary. But it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts. Therefore the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, superior ratio intendit aeternis inspiciendis ac consulendis, ut Augustinus dicit in XII de Trin. Sed multoties homo consentit in actum non propter rationes aeternas, sed propter aliquas rationes temporales, vel etiam propter aliquas animae passiones. Non ergo consentire in actum pertinet ad solam superiorem rationem. Objection 3. Further, "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7). But man often consents to an act not for eternal, but for temporal reasons, or even on account of some passion of the soul. Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher reason alone.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., non potest peccatum efficaciter perpetrandum mente decerni, nisi illa mentis intentio penes quam summa potestas est membra in opus movendi vel ab opere cohibendi, malae actioni cedat et serviat. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "It is impossible for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that mental faculty which has the sovereign power of urging his members to, or restraining them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become its slave."
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod finalis sententia semper pertinet ad eum qui superior est, ad quem pertinet de aliis iudicare, quandiu enim iudicandum restat quod proponitur, nondum datur finalis sententia. Manifestum est autem quod superior ratio est quae habet de omnibus iudicare, quia de sensibilibus per rationem iudicamus; de his vero quae ad rationes humanas pertinent, iudicamus secundum rationes divinas, quae pertinent ad rationem superiorem. Et ideo quandiu incertum est an secundum rationes divinas resistatur vel non, nullum iudicium rationis habet rationem finalis sententiae. Finalis autem sententia de agendis est consensus in actum. Et ideo consensus in actum pertinet ad rationem superiorem, secundum tamen quod in ratione voluntas includitur, sicut supra dictum est. I answer that, The final decision belongs to him who holds the highest place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as long as judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the final decision has not been given. Now it is evident that it belongs to the higher reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that we judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining to human principles we judge according to Divine principles, which is the function of the higher reason. Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or not, according to Divine principles, no judgment of the reason can be considered in the light of a final decision. Now the final decision of what is to be done is consent to the act. Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher reason; but in that sense in which the reason includes the will, as stated above (01, ad 1).
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod consensus in delectationem operis pertinet ad superiorem rationem, sicut et consensus in opus, sed consensus in delectationem cogitationis, pertinet ad rationem inferiorem, sicut ad ipsam pertinet cogitare. Et tamen de hoc ipso quod est cogitare vel non cogitare, inquantum consideratur ut actio quaedam, habet iudicium superior ratio, et similiter de delectatione consequente. Sed inquantum accipitur ut ad actionem aliam ordinatum, sic pertinet ad inferiorem rationem. Quod enim ad aliud ordinatur, ad inferiorem artem vel potentiam pertinet quam finis ad quem ordinatur, unde ars quae est de fine, architectonica, seu principalis, vocatur. Reply to Objection 1. Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the higher reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to delight in thought belongs to the lower reason, just as to the lower reason it belongs to think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an action; and in like manner on the delight that results. But in so far as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it belongs to the lower reason. For that which is ordained to something else, belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it is ordained: hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the master or principal art.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia actiones dicuntur voluntariae ex hoc quod eis consentimus, non oportet quod consensus sit cuiuslibet potentiae, sed voluntatis, a qua dicitur voluntarium; quae est in ratione, sicut dictum est. Reply to Objection 2. Since actions are called voluntary from the fact that we consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act of each power, but of the will which is in the reason, as stated above (01, ad 1), and from which the voluntary act is named.
Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio superior dicitur consentire, non solum quia secundum rationes aeternas semper moveat ad agendum; sed etiam quia secundum rationes aeternas non dissentit. Reply to Objection 3. The higher reason is said to consent not only because it always moves to act, according to the eternal reasons; but also because it fails to dissent according to those same reasons.

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