Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q97

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Iª q. 97 pr. Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad statum primi hominis secundum corpus. Et primo, quantum ad conservationem individui; secundo, quantum ad conservationem speciei. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum homo in statu innocentiae esset immortalis. Secundo, utrum esset impassibilis. Tertio, utrum indigeret cibis. Quarto, utrum per lignum vitae immortalitatem consequeretur. Question 97. The preservation of the individual in the primitive stateWas man in the state of innocence immortal? Was he impassible? Did he stand in need of food? Would he have obtained immortality by the tree of life?
Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae non erat immortalis. Mortale enim ponitur in definitione hominis. Sed remota definitione, aufertur definitum. Ergo si homo erat, non poterat esse immortalis. Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. But if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal.
Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, corruptibile et incorruptibile genere differunt, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed eorum quae differunt genere, non est transmutatio in invicem. Si ergo primus homo fuit incorruptibilis, non posset homo in statu isto esse corruptibilis. Objection 2. Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present state.
Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, si homo in statu innocentiae fuit immortalis, aut hoc habuit per naturam, aut per gratiam. Sed non per naturam, quia, cum natura eadem maneat secundum speciem, nunc quoque esset immortalis. Similiter nec per gratiam, quia primus homo gratiam per poenitentiam recuperavit, secundum illud Sap. X, eduxit illum a delicto suo; ergo immortalitatem recuperasset; quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo homo erat immortalis in statu innocentiae. Objection 3. Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence, this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature, for since nature does not change within the same species, he would also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to Wisdom 10:2: "He brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have regained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.
Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, immortalitas promittitur homini in praemium; secundum illud Apoc. XXI, mors ultra non erit. Sed homo non fuit conditus in statu praemii, sed ut praemium mereretur. Ergo homo in statu innocentiae non fuit immortalis. Objection 4. Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward, according to Apocalypse 21:4: "Death shall be no more." But man was not created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.
Iª q. 97 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Rom. V, quod per peccatum intravit mors in mundum. Ergo ante peccatum homo erat immortalis. On the contrary, It is written (Romans 5:12): "By sin death came into the world." Therefore man was immortal before sin.
Iª q. 97 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest dici incorruptibile tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte materiae, eo scilicet quod vel non habet materiam, sicut Angelus; vel habet materiam quae non est in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut corpus caeleste. Et hoc dicitur secundum naturam incorruptibile. Alio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte formae, quia scilicet rei corruptibili per naturam, inhaeret aliqua dispositio per quam totaliter a corruptione prohibetur. Et hoc dicitur incorruptibile secundum gloriam, quia, ut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad Dioscorum, tam potenti natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex eius beatitudine redundet in corpus plenitudo sanitatis, idest incorruptionis vigor. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte causae efficientis. Et hoc modo homo in statu innocentiae fuisset incorruptibilis et immortalis. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., Deus hominem fecit, qui quandiu non peccaret, immortalitate vigeret, ut ipse sibi auctor esset aut ad vitam aut ad mortem. Non enim corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentem; sed inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus data, per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptione praeservare, quandiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset. Quod rationabiliter factum est. Quia enim anima rationalis excedit proportionem corporalis materiae, ut supra dictum est. Conveniens fuit ut in principio ei virtus daretur, per quam corpus conservare posset supra naturam corporalis materiae. I answer that, A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First, on the part of matter--that is to say, either because it possesses no matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): "God made man's soul of such a powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption." Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine): "God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that he might achieve for himself life or death." For man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter, as above explained (76, 1), it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter.
Iª q. 97 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo et secundum dicendum quod rationes illae procedunt de incorruptibili et immortali per naturam. Reply to Objection 1 and 2 These objections are founded on natural incorruptibility and immortality.
Iª q. 97 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod vis illa praeservandi corpus a corruptione, non erat animae humanae naturalis, sed per donum gratiae. Et quamvis gratiam recuperaverit ad remissionem culpae et meritum gloriae, non tamen ad amissae immortalitatis effectum. Hoc enim reservabatur Christo, per quem naturae defectus in melius reparandus erat, ut infra dicetur. Reply to Objection 3. This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further on (III, 14 , 4, ad 1).
Iª q. 97 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod differt immortalitas gloriae, quae promittitur in praemium, ab immortalitate quae fuit homini collata in statu innocentiae. Reply to Objection 4. The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence.
Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae fuisset passibilis. Sentire enim est pati quoddam. Sed homo in statu innocentiae fuisset sensibilis. Ergo fuisset passibilis. Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence man was passible. For "sensation is a kind of passion." But in the state of innocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been passible.
Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, somnus passio quaedam est. Sed homo in statu innocentiae dormivisset; secundum illud Gen. II, immisit Deus soporem in Adam. Ergo fuisset passibilis. Objection 2. Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the state of innocence, according to Genesis 2:21, "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam." Therefore he would have been passible.
Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, ibidem subditur quod tulit unam de costis eius. Ergo fuisset passibilis etiam per abscissionem partis. Objection 3. Further, the same passage goes on to say that "He took a rib out of Adam." Therefore he was passible even to the degree of the cutting out of part of his body.
Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, corpus hominis molle fuit. Sed molle naturaliter passivum est a duro. Ergo si corpori primi hominis obvium fuisset aliquod corpus durum, ab eo passum fuisset. Et sic primus homo fuit passibilis. Objection 4. Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was passible.
Iª q. 97 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quia, si fuit passibilis, fuit etiam corruptibilis, quia passio, magis facta, abiicit a substantia. On the contrary, Had man been passible, he would have been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): "Excessive suffering wastes the very substance."
Iª q. 97 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod passio dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, proprie, et sic pati dicitur quod a sua naturali dispositione removetur. Passio enim est effectus actionis, in rebus autem naturalibus contraria agunt et patiuntur ad invicem, quorum unum removet alterum a sua naturali dispositione. Alio modo, dicitur passio communiter, secundum quamcumque mutationem, etiam si pertineat ad perfectionem naturae; sicut intelligere vel sentire dicitur pati quoddam. Hoc igitur secundo modo, homo in statu innocentiae passibilis erat, et patiebatur, et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Primo autem modo dicta passione, erat impassibilis et secundum animam et secundum corpus, sicut et immortalis, poterat enim passionem prohibere, sicut et mortem, si absque peccato perstitisset. I answer that, "Passion" may be taken in two senses. First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in nature contraries are mutually active or passive, according as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly, "passion" can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus understanding and sensation are said to be passions. In this second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive both in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin.
Iª q. 97 a. 2 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima. Nam sentire et dormire non removent hominem a naturali dispositione, sed ad bonum naturae ordinantur. Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, but are ordered to his natural welfare.
Iª q. 97 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, costa illa fuit in Adam, inquantum erat principium humani generis; sicut semen est in homine, inquantum est principium per generationem. Sicut igitur decisio seminis non est cum passione quae removeat hominem a naturali dispositione, ita etiam est dicendum de separatione illius costae. Reply to Objection 3. As already explained (92, 3, ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through generation. Hence as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the separation of the rib.
Iª q. 97 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod corpus hominis in statu innocentiae poterat praeservari ne pateretur laesionem ab aliquo duro, partim quidem per propriam rationem, per quam poterat nociva vitare; partim etiam per divinam providentiam, quae sic ipsum tuebatur, ut nihil ei occurreret ex improviso, a quo laederetur. Reply to Objection 4. Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature could come upon him unawares.
Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae non indigebat cibis. Cibus enim necessarius est homini ad restaurationem deperditi. Sed in corpore Adae, ut videtur, nulla fiebat deperditio, quia incorruptibile erat. Ergo non erat ei cibus necessarius. Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not require food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has lost. But Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible. Therefore he had no need of food.
Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, cibus est necessarius ad nutriendum. Sed nutritio non est sine passione. Cum ergo corpus hominis esset impassibile, non erat ei cibus necessarius, ut videtur. Objection 2. Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment involves passibility. Since, then, man's body was impassible; it does not appear how food could be needful to him.
Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, cibus dicitur esse nobis necessarius ad vitae conservationem. Sed Adam aliter vitam poterat conservare, quia si non peccaret, non moreretur. Ergo cibus non erat ei necessarius. Objection 3. Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he would not have died. Therefore he did not require food.
Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, ad sumptionem cibi sequitur emissio superfluitatum, quae habent quandam turpitudinem non convenientem dignitati primi status. Ergo videtur quod homo in primo statu cibis non uteretur. Objection 4. Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state.
Iª q. 97 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, de omni ligno quod est in Paradiso, comedetis. On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 2:16): "Of every tree in paradise ye shall [Vulg. 'thou shalt'] eat."
Iª q. 97 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae habuit vitam animalem cibis indigentem; post resurrectionem vero habebit vitam spiritualem cibis non indigentem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod anima rationalis et anima est et spiritus. Dicitur autem esse anima secundum illud quod est sibi commune et aliis animabus, quod est vitam corpori dare, unde dicitur Gen. II, factus est homo in animam viventem, idest vitam corpori dantem. Sed spiritus dicitur secundum illud quod est proprium sibi et non aliis animabus, quod scilicet habeat virtutem intellectivam immaterialem. In primo igitur statu anima rationalis communicabat corpori id quod competit ei inquantum est anima, et ideo corpus illud dicebatur animale, inquantum scilicet habebat vitam ab anima. Primum autem principium vitae in istis inferioribus, ut dicitur in libro de anima, est anima vegetabilis, cuius opera sunt alimento uti et generare et augeri. Et ideo haec opera homini in primo statu competebant. In ultimo vero statu post resurrectionem, anima communicabit quodammodo corpori ea quae sunt sibi propria inquantum est spiritus, immortalitatem quidem, quantum ad omnes; impassibilitatem vero et gloriam et virtutem, quantum ad bonos, quorum corpora spiritualia dicentur. Unde post resurrectionem homines cibis non indigebunt, sed in statu innocentiae eis indigebant. I answer that, In the state of innocence man had an animal life requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls--that is, as giving life to the body; whence it is written (Genesis 2:7): "Man was made into a living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body. But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual immaterial power. Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body was called "animal" [From 'anima', a soul; Cf. 1 Corinthians 15:44 seqq.], through having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) is the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the state of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone; impassibility, glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be called "spiritual." So, after the resurrection, man will not require food; whereas he required it in the state of innocence.
Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., quomodo immortale corpus habebat, quod cibo sustentabatur? Immortale enim non eget esca neque potu. Dictum est enim supra quod immortalitas primi status erat secundum vim quandam supernaturalem in anima residentem; non autem secundum aliquam dispositionem corpori inhaerentem. Unde per actionem caloris aliquid de humido illius corporis poterat deperdi; et ne totaliter consumeretur, necesse erat per assumptionem cibi homini subveniri. Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [Works of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine): "How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained by food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink." For we have explained (1) that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic disposition of the body: so that by the action of heat, the body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the entire consumption of the humor, man was obliged to take food.
Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in nutritione est quaedam passio et alteratio, scilicet ex parte alimenti, quod convertitur in substantiam eius quod alitur. Unde ex hoc non potest concludi quod corpus hominis fuerit passibile, sed quod cibus assumptus erat passibilis. Quamvis etiam talis passio esset ad perfectionem naturae. Reply to Objection 2. A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing nourished. So we cannot thence conclude that man's body was passible, but that the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion conduced to the perfection of the nature.
Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, si homo sibi non subveniret de cibo, peccaret; sicut peccavit sumendo vetitum cibum. Simul enim sibi praeceptum fuit ut a ligno scientiae boni et mali abstineret, et ut de omni alio ligno Paradisi vesceretur. Reply to Objection 3. If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the same time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of every other tree of Paradise.
Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod homo in statu innocentiae non assumpsisset de cibo nisi quantum fuisset ei necessarium, unde non fuisset ibi superfluitatum emissio. Sed hoc irrationabile videtur, quod in cibo assumpto non esset aliqua faeculentia, quae non esset apta ut converteretur in hominis nutrimentum. Unde oportebat superfluitates emitti. Tamen fuisset divinitus provisum ut nulla ex hoc indecentia esset. Reply to Objection 4. Some say that in the state of innocence man would not have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be decorous and suitable to the state.
Iª q. 97 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lignum vitae non poterat esse causa immortalitatis. Nihil enim potest agere ultra suam speciem, effectus enim non excedit causam. Sed lignum vitae erat corruptibile, alioquin non potuisset in nutrimentum assumi, quia alimentum convertitur in substantiam nutriti, ut dictum est. Ergo lignum vitae incorruptibilitatem seu immortalitatem conferre non poterat. Objection 1. It would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; since food is changed into the substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree of life could not give incorruptibility or immortality.
Iª q. 97 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, effectus qui causantur a virtutibus plantarum et aliarum naturalium rerum, sunt naturales. Si ergo lignum vitae immortalitatem causasset, fuisset illa immortalitas naturalis. Objection 2. Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other natural agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of life caused immortality, this would have been natural immortality.
Iª q. 97 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, hoc videtur redire in fabulas antiquorum, qui dixerunt quod dii qui comedebant de quodam cibo, facti sunt immortales, quos irridet philosophus in III Metaphys. Objection 3. Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable, that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which the Philosopher ridicules (Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4).
Iª q. 97 a. 4 s. c. 1 /2 Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. III, ne forte mittat manum suam et sumat de ligno vitae, et comedat et vivat in aeternum.Praeterea, Augustinus in libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., dicit, gustus arboris vitae corruptionem corporis inhibebat, denique etiam post peccatum potuit insolubilis manere, si permissum esset illi edere de arbore vitae. On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 3:22): "Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever." Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine): "A taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the body; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he been allowed to eat of the tree of life."
Iª q. 97 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod lignum vitae quodammodo immortalitatem causabat, non autem simpliciter. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod duo remedia ad conservationem vitae habebat homo in primo statu, contra duos defectus. Primus enim defectus est deperditio humidi per actionem caloris naturalis, qui est animae instrumentum. Et contra hunc defectum subveniebatur homini per esum aliorum lignorum Paradisi, sicut et nunc subvenitur nobis, per cibos quos sumimus. Secundus autem defectus est quia, ut philosophus dicit I de Generat., illud quod generatur ex aliquo extraneo, adiunctum ei quod prius erat humido praeexistenti, imminuit virtutem activam speciei, sicut aqua adiuncta vino, primo quidem convertitur in saporem vini, sed secundum quod magis et magis additur, diminuit vini fortitudinem, et tandem vinum fit aquosum. Sic igitur videmus quod in principio virtus activa speciei est adeo fortis, quod potest convertere de alimento non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, sed etiam quod sufficit ad augmentum. Postmodum vero quod aggeneratur non sufficit ad augmentum, sed solum ad restaurationem deperditi. Tandem vero, in statu senectutis, nec ad hoc sufficit, unde sequitur decrementum, et finaliter naturalis dissolutio corporis. Et contra hunc defectum subveniebatur homini per lignum vitae, habebat enim virtutem fortificandi virtutem speciei contra debilitatem provenientem ex admixtione extranei. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod cibus aderat homini ne esuriret, potus ne sitiret, et lignum vitae ne senectus eum dissolveret. Et in libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., dicit quod vitae arbor medicinae modo corruptionem hominum prohibebat. Non tamen simpliciter immortalitatem causabat. Quia neque virtus quae inerat animae ad conservandum corpus, causabatur ex ligno vitae, neque etiam poterat immortalitatis dispositionem corpori praestare, ut nunquam dissolvi posset. Quod ex hoc patet, quia virtus cuiuscumque corporis est finita. Unde non poterat virtus ligni vitae ad hoc se extendere ut daret corpori virtutem Durandi tempore infinito, sed usque ad determinatum tempus. Manifestum est enim quod, quanto aliqua virtus est maior, tanto imprimit durabiliorem effectum. Unde cum virtus ligni vitae esset finita, semel sumptum praeservabat a corruptione usque ad determinatum tempus; quo finito, vel homo translatus fuisset ad spiritualem vitam, vel indiguisset iterum sumere de ligno vitae. I answer that, The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of immortality, but not absolutely. To understand this, we must observe that in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of life, two remedies, against two defects. One of these defects was the lost of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the soul's instrument: as a remedy against such loss man was provided with food, taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are provided with the food, which we take for the same purpose. The second defect, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), arises from the fact that the humor which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the humor already existing, lessens the specific active power: as water added to wine takes at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is added, the strength of the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes watery. In like manner, we may observe that at first the active force of the species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of the food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well as what suffices for growth; later on, however, the assimilated food does not suffice for growth, but only replaces what is lost. Last of all, in old age, it does not suffice even for this purpose; whereupon the body declines, and finally dies from natural causes. Against this defect man was provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its effect was to strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous nutriment. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to slake his thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of old age"; and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine) "The tree of life, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption." Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the soul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life, nor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to immortality, whereby it might become indissoluble; which is clear from the fact that every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree of life could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For it is manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its effect; therefore, since the power of the tree of life was finite, man's life was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once; and when that time had elapsed, man was to be either transferred to a spiritual life, or had need to eat once more of the tree of life.
Iª q. 97 a. 4 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ab obiecta. Nam primae rationes concludunt quod non causabat incorruptibilitatem simpliciter. Aliae vero concludunt quod causabat incorruptibilitatem impediendo corruptionem, secundum modum praedictum. From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. For the first proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause immortality; while the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off corruption, according to the explanation above given.

Notes

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