Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q86

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Q85 Q87



Latin English
Iª q. 86 What our intellect knows in material things
Iª q. 86 pr. Deinde considerandum est quid intellectus noster in rebus materialibus cognoscat. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum cognoscat singularia. Secundo, utrum cognoscat infinita. Tertio, utrum cognoscat contingentia. Quarto, utrum cognoscat futura.
Iª q. 86 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster cognoscat singularia. Quicumque enim cognoscit compositionem, cognoscit extrema compositionis. Sed intellectus noster cognoscit hanc compositionem. Socrates est homo, eius enim est propositionem formare. Ergo intellectus noster cognoscit hoc singulare quod est Socrates. Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For whoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our intellect knows this composition; "Socrates is a man": for it belongs to the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows this singular, Socrates.
Iª q. 86 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, intellectus practicus dirigit ad agendum. Sed actus sunt circa singularia. Ergo cognoscit singularia. Objection 2. Further, the practical intellect directs to action. But action has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect knows the singular.
Iª q. 86 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, intellectus noster intelligit seipsum. Ipse autem est quoddam singulare, alioquin non haberet aliquem actum; actus enim singularium sunt. Ergo intellectus noster cognoscit singulare. Objection 3. Further, our intellect understands itself. But in itself it is a singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows singulars.
Iª q. 86 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest superior. Sed sensus cognoscit singulare. Ergo multo magis intellectus. Objection 4. Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by an inferior power. But sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore, can the intellect know it.
Iª q. 86 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit philosophus, in I Physic., quod universale secundum rationem est notum, singulare autem secundum sensum. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5), that "the universal is known by reason; and the singular is known by sense."
Iª q. 86 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod singulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia principium singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia individualis, intellectus autem noster, sicut supra dictum est, intelligit abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem ab huiusmodi materia. Quod autem a materia individuali abstrahitur, est universale. Unde intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium. Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare, quia, sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc modo format hanc propositionem, Socrates est homo. I answer that, Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter, whereas our intellect, as have said above (85, 1), understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted from individual matter is the universal. Hence our intellect knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as it were by a kind of reflection, it can know the singular, because, as we have said above (85, 7), even after abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the phantasms in which it understands the species, as is said De Anima iii, 7. Therefore it understands the universal directly through the intelligible species, and indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition "Socrates is a man."
Iª q. 86 a. 1 ad 1 Unde patet solutio ad primum. Wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear.
Iª q. 86 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod electio particularis operabilis est quasi conclusio syllogismi intellectus practici, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ex universali autem propositione directe non potest concludi singularis, nisi mediante aliqua singulari propositione assumpta. Unde universalis ratio intellectus practici non movet nisi mediante particulari apprehensione sensitivae partis, ut dicitur in III de anima. Reply to Objection 2. The choice of a particular thing to be done is as the conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect, as is said Ethic. vii, 3. But a singular proposition cannot be directly concluded from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a singular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the practical intellect does not move save through the medium of the particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is said De Anima iii, 11.
Iª q. 86 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod singulare non repugnat intelligibilitati inquantum est singulare, sed inquantum est materiale, quia nihil intelligitur nisi immaterialiter. Et ideo si sit aliquod singulare immateriale, sicut est intellectus, hoc non repugnat intelligibilitati. Reply to Objection 3. Intelligibility is incompatible with the singular not as such, but as material, for nothing can be understood otherwise than immaterially. Therefore if there be an immaterial singular such as the intellect, there is no reason why it should not be intelligible.
Iª q. 86 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod virtus superior potest illud quod potest virtus inferior, sed eminentiori modo. Unde id quod cognoscit sensus materialiter et concrete, quod est cognoscere singulare directe, hoc cognoscit intellectus immaterialiter et abstracte, quod est cognoscere universale. Reply to Objection 4. The higher power can do what the lower power can, but in a more eminent way. Wherefore what the sense knows materially and concretely, which is to know the singular directly, the intellect knows immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know the universal.
Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster possit cognoscere infinita. Deus enim excedit omnia infinita. Sed intellectus noster potest cognoscere Deum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo multo magis potest cognoscere omnia alia infinita. Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite. For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, as we have said above (12, 1). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know all other infinite things.
Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, intellectus noster natus est cognoscere genera et species. Sed quorundam generum sunt infinitae species, sicut numeri, proportionis et figurae. Ergo intellectus noster potest cognoscere infinita. Objection 2. Further, our intellect can naturally know "genera" and "species." But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as in number, proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite.
Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, si unum corpus non impediret aliud ab existendo in uno et eodem loco, nihil prohiberet infinita corpora in uno loco esse. Sed una species intelligibilis non prohibet aliam ab existendo simul in eodem intellectu, contingit enim multa scire in habitu. Ergo nihil prohibet intellectum nostrum infinitorum scientiam habere in habitu. Objection 3. Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same place, there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies being in one place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in the same intellect, for many things can be habitually known at the same time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an infinite number of things.
Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, intellectus, cum non sit virtus materiae corporalis, ut supra dictum est, videtur esse potentia infinita. Sed virtus infinita potest super infinita. Ergo intellectus noster potest cognoscere infinita. Objection 4. Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as we have said (76, 1), it appears to be an infinite power. But an infinite power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite.
Iª q. 86 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in I Physic., quod infinitum, inquantum est infinitum, est ignotum. On the contrary, It is said (Phys. i, 4) that "the infinite, considered as such, is unknown."
Iª q. 86 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum potentia proportionetur suo obiecto, oportet hoc modo se habere intellectum ad infinitum, sicut se habet eius obiectum, quod est quidditas rei materialis. In rebus autem materialibus non invenitur infinitum in actu, sed solum in potentia, secundum quod unum succedit alteri, ut dicitur in III Physic. Et ideo in intellectu nostro invenitur infinitum in potentia, in accipiendo scilicet unum post aliud, quia nunquam intellectus noster tot intelligit, quin possit plura intelligere. Actu autem vel habitu non potest cognoscere infinita intellectus noster. Actu quidem non, quia intellectus noster non potest simul actu cognoscere nisi quod per unam speciem cognoscit. Infinitum autem non habet unam speciem, alioquin haberet rationem totius et perfecti. Et ideo non potest intelligi nisi accipiendo partem post partem, ut ex eius definitione patet in III Physic., est enim infinitum cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid extra accipere, et sic infinitum cognosci non posset actu, nisi omnes partes eius numerarentur, quod est impossibile. Et eadem ratione non possumus intelligere infinita in habitu. In nobis enim habitualis cognitio causatur ex actuali consideratione, intelligendo enim efficimur scientes, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Unde non possemus habere habitum infinitorum secundum distinctam cognitionem, nisi consideravissemus omnia infinita, numerando ea secundum cognitionis successionem, quod est impossibile. Et ita nec actu nec habitu intellectus noster potest cognoscere infinita, sed in potentia tantum, ut dictum est. I answer that, Since a faculty and its object are proportional to each other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its object, which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material things the infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, in the sense of one succeeding another, as is said Phys. iii, 6. Therefore infinity is potentially in our mind through its considering successively one thing after another: because never does our intellect understand so many things, that it cannot understand more. On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite either actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect cannot know actually at the same time, except what it knows through one species. But the infinite is not represented by one species, for if it were it would be something whole and complete. Consequently it cannot be understood except by a successive consideration of one part after another, as is clear from its definition (Phys. iii, 6): for the infinite is that "from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken." Thus the infinite could not be known actually, unless all its parts were counted: which is impossible. For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite: because in us habitual knowledge results from actual consideration: since by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore it would not be possible for us to have a habit of an infinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already considered the entire infinity thereof, counting them according to the succession of our knowledge: which is impossible. And therefore neither actually nor habitually can our intellect know the infinite, but only potentially as explained above.
Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Deus dicitur infinitus sicut forma quae non est terminata per aliquam materiam, in rebus autem materialibus aliquid dicitur infinitum per privationem formalis terminationis. Et quia forma secundum se nota est, materia autem sine forma ignota, inde est quod infinitum materiale est secundum se ignotum. Infinitum autem formale, quod est Deus, est secundum se notum, ignotum autem quoad nos, propter defectum intellectus nostri, qui secundum statum praesentis vitae habet naturalem aptitudinem ad materialia cognoscenda. Et ideo in praesenti Deum cognoscere non possumus nisi per materiales effectus. In futuro autem tolletur defectus intellectus nostri per gloriam, et tunc ipsum Deum in sua essentia videre poterimus, tamen absque comprehensione. Reply to Objection 1. As we have said above (7, 1), God is called infinite, because He is a form unlimited by matter; whereas in material things, the term 'infinite' is applied to that which is deprived of any formal term. And form being known in itself, whereas matter cannot be known without form, it follows that the material infinite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is of Himself known; but He is unknown to us by reason of our feeble intellect, which in its present state has a natural aptitude for material objects only. Therefore we cannot know God in our present life except through material effects. In the future life this defect of intellect will be removed by the state of glory, when we shall be able to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to comprehend Him.
Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus noster natus est cognoscere species per abstractionem a phantasmatibus. Et ideo illas species numerorum et figurarum quas quis non est imaginatus, non potest cognoscere nec actu nec habitu, nisi forte in genere et in principiis universalibus; quod est cognoscere in potentia et confuse. Reply to Objection 2. The nature of our mind is to know species abstracted from phantasms; therefore it cannot know actually or habitually species of numbers or figures that are not in the imagination, except in a general way and in their universal principles; and this is to know them potentially and confusedly.
Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, si duo corpora essent in uno loco, vel plura, non oporteret quod successive subintrarent locum, ut sic per ipsam subintrationis successionem numerarentur locata. Sed species intelligibiles ingrediuntur intellectum nostrum successive, quia non multa simul actu intelliguntur. Et ideo oportet numeratas, et non infinitas species esse in intellectu nostro. Reply to Objection 3. If two or more bodies were in the same place, there would be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in order for the things placed to be counted according to this succession of occupation. On the other hand, the intelligible species enter into our intellect successively; since many things cannot be actually understood at the same time: and therefore there must be a definite and not an infinite number of species in our intellect.
Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod sicut intellectus noster est infinitus virtute, ita infinitum cognoscit. Est enim virtus eius infinita, secundum quod non terminatur per materiam corporalem. Et est cognoscitivus universalis, quod est abstractum a materia individuali, et per consequens non finitur ad aliquod individuum, sed, quantum est de se, ad infinita individua se extendit. Reply to Objection 4. As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it know the infinite. For its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is not terminated by corporeal matter. Moreover it can know the universal, which is abstracted from individual matter, and which consequently is not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to an infinite number of individuals.
Iª q. 86 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit cognoscitivus contingentium. Quia, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., intellectus et sapientia et scientia non sunt contingentium, sed necessariorum. Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent things: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 6), the objects of understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but necessary things.
Iª q. 86 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut dicitur in IV Physic., ea quae quandoque sunt et quandoque non sunt, tempore mensurantur. Intellectus autem a tempore abstrahit, sicut et ab aliis conditionibus materiae. Cum igitur proprium contingentium sit quandoque esse et quandoque non esse, videtur quod contingentia non cognoscantur ab intellectu. Objection 2. Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, "what sometimes is and sometimes is not, is measured by time." Now the intellect abstracts from time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is proper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime not to be, it seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect.
Iª q. 86 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, omnis scientia est in intellectu. Sed quaedam scientiae sunt de contingentibus; sicut scientiae morales, quae sunt de actibus humanis subiectis libero arbitrio; et etiam scientiae naturales, quantum ad partem quae tractat de generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Ergo intellectus est cognoscitivus contingentium. On the contrary, All knowledge is in the intellect. But some sciences are of the contingent things, as the moral sciences, the objects of which are human actions subject to free-will; and again, the natural sciences in as far as they relate to things generated and corruptible. Therefore the intellect knows contingent things.
Iª q. 86 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod contingentia dupliciter possunt considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod contingentia sunt. Alio modo, secundum quod in eis aliquid necessitatis invenitur, nihil enim est adeo contingens, quin in se aliquid necessarium habeat. Sicut hoc ipsum quod est Socratem currere, in se quidem contingens est; sed habitudo cursus ad motum est necessaria, necessarium enim est Socratem moveri, si currit. Est autem unumquodque contingens ex parte materiae, quia contingens est quod potest esse et non esse; potentia autem pertinet ad materiam. Necessitas autem consequitur rationem formae, quia ea quae consequuntur ad formam, ex necessitate insunt. Materia autem est individuationis principium, ratio autem universalis accipitur secundum abstractionem formae a materia particulari. Dictum autem est supra quod per se et directe intellectus est universalium; sensus autem singularium, quorum etiam indirecte quodammodo est intellectus, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur contingentia, prout sunt contingentia, cognoscuntur directe quidem sensu, indirecte autem ab intellectu, rationes autem universales et necessariae contingentium cognoscuntur per intellectum. Unde si attendantur rationes universales scibilium, omnes scientiae sunt de necessariis. Si autem attendantur ipsae res, sic quaedam scientia est de necessariis, quaedam vero de contingentibus. I answer that, Contingent things can be considered in two ways; either as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity, since every contingent thing has in it something necessary: for example, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the relation of running to motion is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, for contingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality belongs to matter; whereas necessity results from form, because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject. But matter is the individualizing principle: whereas the universal comes from the abstraction of the form from the particular matter. Moreover it was laid down above (1) that the intellect of itself and directly has the universal for its object; while the object of sense is the singular, which in a certain way is the indirect object of the intellect, as we have said above (1). Therefore the contingent, considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect; while the universal and necessary principles of contingent things are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the objects of science in their universal principles, then all science is of necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus some sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things.
Iª q. 86 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta. From which the replies to the objections are clear.
Iª q. 86 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster cognoscat futura. Intellectus enim noster cognoscit per species intelligibiles, quae abstrahunt ab hic et nunc, et ita se habent indifferenter ad omne tempus. Sed potest cognoscere praesentia. Ergo potest cognoscere futura. Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For our intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from the "here" and "now," and related indifferently to all time. But it can know the present. Therefore it can know the future.
Iª q. 86 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, homo quando alienatur a sensibus, aliqua futura cognoscere potest; ut patet in dormientibus et phreneticis. Sed quando alienatur a sensibus, magis viget intellectu. Ergo intellectus, quantum est de se, est cognoscitivus futurorum. Objection 2. Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the intellect of its own nature can know the future.
Iª q. 86 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, cognitio intellectiva hominis efficacior est quam cognitio quaecumque brutorum animalium. Sed quaedam animalia sunt quae cognoscunt quaedam futura; sicut corniculae frequenter crocitantes significant pluviam mox futuram. Ergo multo magis intellectus humanus potest futura cognoscere. Objection 3. The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows by their frequent cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can the intellect know the future.
Iª q. 86 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. VIII, multa hominis afflictio, qui ignorat praeterita, et futura nullo potest scire nuntio. On the contrary, It is written (Ecclesiastes 8:6-7), "There is a great affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things to come he cannot know by any messenger."
Iª q. 86 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod de cognitione futurorum eodem modo distinguendum est, sicut de cognitione contingentium. Nam ipsa futura ut sub tempore cadunt, sunt singularia, quae intellectus humanus non cognoscit nisi per reflexionem, ut supra dictum est. Rationes autem futurorum possunt esse universales, et intellectu perceptibiles, et de eis etiam possunt esse scientiae. Ut tamen communiter de cognitione futurorum loquamur, sciendum est quod futura dupliciter cognosci possunt, uno modo, in seipsis; alio modo, in suis causis. In seipsis quidem futura cognosci non possunt nisi a Deo; cui etiam sunt praesentia dum in cursu rerum sunt futura, inquantum eius aeternus intuitus simul fertur supra totum temporis cursum, ut supra dictum est cum de Dei scientia ageretur. Sed prout sunt in suis causis, cognosci possunt etiam a nobis. Et si quidem in suis causis sint ut ex quibus ex necessitate proveniant, cognoscuntur per certitudinem scientiae; sicut astrologus praecognoscit eclipsim futuram. Si autem sic sint in suis causis ut ab eis proveniant ut in pluribus, sic cognosci possunt per quandam coniecturam vel magis vel minus certam, secundum quod causae sunt vel magis vel minus inclinatae ad effectus. I answer that, We must apply the same distinction to future things, as we applied above (3) to contingent things. For future things considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect knows them by reflection only, as stated above (1). But the principles of future things may be universal; and thus they may enter the domain of the intellect and become the objects of science. Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way, we must observe that the future may be known in two ways: either in itself, or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by God alone; to Whom even that is present which in the course of events is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole course of time, as we have said above when treating of God's knowledge (14, 13). But forasmuch as it exists in its cause, the future can be known by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to have a necessary connection with its future result, then the future is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer foresees the future eclipse. If, however, the cause be such as to produce a certain result more frequently than not, then can the future be known more or less conjecturally, according as its cause is more or less inclined to produce the effect.
Iª q. 86 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de cognitione quae fit per rationes universales causarum, ex quibus futura cognosci possunt secundum modum ordinis effectus ad causam. Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers that knowledge which is drawn from universal causal principles; from these the future may be known, according to the order of the effects to the cause.
Iª q. 86 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XII Confess., anima habet quandam vim sortis, ut ex sui natura possit futura cognoscere, et ideo quando retrahitur a corporeis sensibus, et quodammodo revertitur ad seipsam, fit particeps notitiae futurorum. Et haec quidem opinio rationabilis esset, si poneremus quod anima acciperet cognitionem rerum secundum participationem idearum, sicut Platonici posuerunt, quia sic anima ex sui natura cognosceret universales causas omnium effectuum, sed impeditur per corpus; unde quando a corporis sensibus abstrahitur, futura cognoscit. Sed quia iste modus cognoscendi non est connaturalis intellectui nostro, sed magis ut cognitionem a sensibus accipiat; ideo non est secundum naturam animae quod futura cognoscat cum a sensibus alienatur; sed magis per impressionem aliquarum causarum superiorum spiritualium et corporalium. Spiritualium quidem, sicut cum virtute divina ministerio Angelorum intellectus humanus illuminatur, et phantasmata ordinantur ad futura aliqua cognoscenda; vel etiam cum per operationem Daemonum fit aliqua commotio in phantasia ad praesignandum aliqua futura quae Daemones cognoscunt, ut supra dictum est. Huiusmodi autem impressiones spiritualium causarum magis nata est anima humana suscipere cum a sensibus alienatur, quia per hoc propinquior fit substantiis spiritualibus, et magis libera ab exterioribus inquietudinibus. Contingit autem et hoc per impressionem superiorum causarum corporalium. Manifestum est enim quod corpora superiora imprimunt in corpora inferiora. Unde cum vires sensitivae sint actus corporalium organorum, consequens est quod ex impressione caelestium corporum immutetur quodammodo phantasia. Unde cum caelestia corpora sint causa multorum futurorum, fiunt in imaginatione aliqua signa quorundam futurorum. Haec autem signa magis percipiuntur in nocte et a dormientibus, quam de die et a vigilantibus, quia, ut dicitur in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quae deferuntur de die, dissolvuntur magis; plus est enim sine turbatione aer noctis, eo quod silentiores sunt noctes. Et in corpore faciunt sensum propter somnum, quia parvi motus interiores magis sentiuntur a dormientibus quam a vigilantibus. Hi vero motus faciunt phantasmata, ex quibus praevidentur futura. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Confess. xii [Gen. ad lit. xii. 13), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very nature it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal sense, and, as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares in the knowledge of the future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we were to admit that the soul receives knowledge by participating the ideas as the Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul by its nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and would only be impeded in its knowledge by the body, and hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would know the future. But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, not thus, but by receiving its knowledge from the senses; it is not natural for the soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses: rather does it know the future by the impression of superior spiritual and corporeal causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human intellect is enlightened through the ministry of angels, and the phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events; or, by the influence of demons, when the imagination is moved regarding the future known to the demons, as explained above (57, 3). The soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, as it is then nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions. The same may also come from superior corporeal causes. For it is clear that superior bodies influence inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence of the sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal organs, the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future events, the imagination receives certain images of some such events. These images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake, because, as stated in De Somn. et Vigil. ii [De Divinat. per somn. ii.], "impressions made by day are evanescent. The night air is calmer, when silence reigns, hence bodily impressions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements are felt more than in wakefulness, and such movements produce in the imagination images from which the future may be foreseen."
Iª q. 86 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod animalia bruta non habent aliquid supra phantasiam quod ordinet phantasmata, sicut habent homines rationem; et ideo phantasia brutorum animalium totaliter sequitur impressionem caelestem. Et ideo ex motibus huiusmodi animalium magis possunt cognosci quaedam futura, ut pluvia et huiusmodi, quam ex motibus hominum, qui moventur per consilium rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod quidam imprudentissimi sunt maxime praevidentes, nam intelligentia horum non est curis affecta, sed tanquam deserta et vacua ab omnibus, et mota secundum movens ducitur. Reply to Objection 3. Brute animals have no power above the imagination wherewith to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their imagination follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus from such animals' movements some future things, such as rain and the like, may be known rather from human movements directed by reason. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vig.), that "some who are most imprudent are most far-seeing; for their intelligence is not burdened with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety moving at the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it."

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