Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q61

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Q60 Q62



Latin English
Iª q. 61 pr. Post ea quae praemissa sunt de natura Angelorum, et cognitione et voluntate eorum, restat considerandum de eorum creatione, sive universaliter de eorum exordio. Et haec consideratio est tripartita. Nam primo considerabimus quomodo producti sunt in esse naturae; secundo, quomodo perfecti sunt in gratia vel gloria; tertio, quomodo aliqui ex eis facti sunt mali. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Angelus habeat causam sui esse. Secundo, utrum Angelus sit ab aeterno. Tertio, utrum Angelus sit creatus ante corporalem creaturam. Quarto, utrum Angeli fuerint creati in caelo Empyreo.
Iª q. 61 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli non habeant causam sui esse. De his enim quae sunt a Deo creata, agitur Genesis I. Sed nulla mentio fit ibi de Angelis. Ergo Angeli non sunt creati a Deo. Objection 1. It would seem that the angels have no cause of their existence. For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created by God. But there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were not created by God.
Iª q. 61 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod si aliqua substantia sit forma sine materia, statim per seipsam est ens et unum, et non habet causam quae faciat eam ens et unum. Sed Angeli sunt formae immateriales, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo non habent causam sui esse. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 16) that if any substance be a form without matter, "straightway it has being and unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity." But the angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above (50, 2). Therefore they have no cause of their being.
Iª q. 61 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, omne quod fit ab aliquo agente, per hoc quod fit, accipit formam ab eo. Sed Angeli, cum sint formae, non accipiunt formam ab aliquo agente. Ergo Angeli non habent causam agentem. Objection 3. Further, whatever is produced by any agent, from the very fact of its being produced, receives form from it. But since the angels are forms, they do not derive their form from any agent. Therefore the angels have no active cause.
Iª q. 61 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo CXLVIII, laudate eum, omnes Angeli eius. Et postea subdit, quoniam ipse dixit, et facta sunt. On the contrary, It is said (Psalm 148:2): "Praise ye Him, all His angels"; and further on, verse 5: "For He spoke and they were made."
Iª q. 61 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere et Angelos, et omne id quod praeter Deum est, a Deo factum esse. Solus enim Deus est suum esse, in omnibus autem aliis differt essentia rei et esse eius, ut ex superioribus patet. Et ex hoc manifestum est quod solus Deus est ens per suam essentiam, omnia vero alia sunt entia per participationem. Omne autem quod est per participationem causatur ab eo quod est per essentiam, sicut omne ignitum causatur ab igne. Unde necesse est Angelos a Deo creatos esse. I answer that, It must be affirmed that angels and everything existing, except God, were made by God. God alone is His own existence; while in everything else the essence differs from the existence, as was shown above (3, 4). From this it is clear that God alone exists of His own essence: while all other things have their existence by participation. Now whatever exists by participation is caused by what exists essentially; as everything ignited is caused by fire. Consequently the angels, of necessity, were made by God.
Iª q. 61 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus dicit, in XI de Civ. Dei, quod Angeli non sunt praetermissi in illa prima rerum creatione, sed significantur nomine caeli, aut etiam lucis. Ideo autem vel praetermissi sunt, vel nominibus rerum corporalium significati, quia Moyses rudi populo loquebatur, qui nondum capere poterat incorpoream naturam; et si eis fuisset expressum aliquas res esse super omnem naturam corpoream, fuisset eis occasio idololatriae, ad quam proni erant, et a qua Moyses eos praecipue revocare intendebat. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 50) that the angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of things, but are designated by the name "heavens" or of "light." And they were either passed over, or else designated by the names of corporeal things, because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature; and if it had been divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal nature, it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which they were inclined, and from which Moses especially meant to safeguard them.
Iª q. 61 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod substantiae quae sunt formae subsistentes, non habent causam aliquam formalem sui esse et suae unitatis, nec causam agentem per transmutationem materiae de potentia in actum, sed habent causam producentem totam substantiam. Reply to Objection 2. Substances that are subsisting forms have no 'formal' cause of their existence and unity, nor such active cause as produces its effect by changing the matter from a state of potentiality to actuality; but they have a cause productive of their entire substance.
Iª q. 61 a. 1 ad 3 Et per hoc patet solutio ad tertium. From this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.
Iª q. 61 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus sit productus a Deo ab aeterno. Deus enim est causa Angeli per suum esse, non enim agit per aliquid additum suae essentiae. Sed esse eius est aeternum. Ergo ab aeterno Angelos produxit. Objection 1. It would seem that the angel was produced by God from eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does not act through something besides His essence. But His being is eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity.
Iª q. 61 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne quod quandoque est et quandoque non est, subiacet tempori. Sed Angelus est supra tempus, ut dicitur in libro de causis. Ergo Angelus non quandoque est, et quandoque non est, sed semper. Objection 2. Further, everything which exists at one period and not at another, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is laid down in the book De Causis. Therefore the angel is not at one time existing and at another non-existing, but exists always.
Iª q. 61 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus probat incorruptibilitatem animae per hoc, quod per intellectum est capax veritatis. Sed sicut veritas est incorruptibilis, ita est aeterna. Ergo natura intellectualis et animae et Angeli, non solum est incorruptibilis, sed etiam aeterna. Objection 3. Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves the soul's incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But as truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, but likewise eternal.
Iª q. 61 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. VIII, ex persona sapientiae genitae, dominus possedit me ab initio viarum suarum, antequam quidquam faceret a principio. Sed Angeli sunt facti a Deo, ut ostensum est. Ergo Angeli aliquando non fuerunt. On the contrary, It is said (Proverbs 8:22), in the person of begotten Wisdom: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning." But, as was shown above (1), the angels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not.
Iª q. 61 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod solus Deus, pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, est ab aeterno. Hoc enim fides Catholica indubitanter tenet; et omne contrarium est sicut haereticum refutandum. Sic enim Deus creaturas produxit, quod eas ex nihilo fecit, idest postquam nihil fuerat. I answer that, God alone, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is from eternity. Catholic Faith holds this without doubt; and everything to the contrary must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He made them "from nothing"; that is, after they had not been.
Iª q. 61 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse Dei est ipsum eius velle. Per hoc ergo quod Deus produxit Angelos et alias creaturas per suum esse, non excluditur quin eas produxerit per suam voluntatem. Voluntas autem Dei non de necessitate se habet ad productionem creaturarum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo produxit et quae voluit, et quando voluit. Reply to Objection 1. God's being is His will. So the fact that God produced the angels and other creatures by His being does not exclude that He made them also by His will. But, as was shown above (19, 3; 46, 1). God's will does not act by necessity in producing creatures. Therefore He produced such as He willed, and when He willed.
Iª q. 61 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Angelus est supra tempus quod est numerus motus caeli, quia est supra omnem motum corporalis naturae. Non tamen est supra tempus quod est numerus successionis esse eius post non esse, et etiam quod est numerus successionis quae est in operationibus eius. Unde Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempus. Reply to Objection 2. An angel is above that time which is the measure of the movement of the heavens; because he is above every movement of a corporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above time which is the measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence, and which is also the measure of the succession which is in his operations. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,21) that "God moves the spiritual creature according to time."
Iª q. 61 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Angeli et animae intellectivae, ex hoc ipso quod habent naturam per quam sunt capaces veritatis, sunt incorruptibiles. Sed hanc naturam non habuerunt ab aeterno; sed data fuit eis a Deo quando ipse voluit. Unde non sequitur quod Angeli sint ab aeterno. Reply to Objection 3. Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by the very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of truth. But they did not possess this nature from eternity; it was bestowed upon them when God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not follow that the angels existed from eternity.
Iª q. 61 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli fuerint creati ante mundum corporeum. Dicit enim Hieronymus, super epistolam ad Titum, sex millia nondum nostri temporis complentur annorum; et quanta tempora, quantasque saeculorum origines fuisse arbitrandum est, in quibus Angeli, throni, dominationes, ceterique ordines Deo servierunt? Damascenus etiam dicit, in II libro, quidam dicunt quod ante omnem creationem geniti sunt Angeli; ut theologus dicit Gregorius, primum quidem excogitavit angelicas virtutes et caelestes, et excogitatio opus eius fuit. Objection 1. It would seem that the angels were created before the corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): "Six thousand years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones, Dominations, and the other orders served God?" Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii): "Some say that the angels were begotten before all creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, He first of all devised the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the making thereof."
Iª q. 61 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, angelica natura est media inter naturam divinam et naturam corpoream. Sed natura divina est ab aeterno, natura autem corporea ex tempore. Ergo natura angelica facta est ante creationem temporis, et post aeternitatem. Objection 2. Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the Divine and the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from eternity; while corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic nature was produced ere time was made, and after eternity.
Iª q. 61 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, plus distat natura angelica a natura corporali, quam una natura corporalis ab alia. Sed una natura corporalis fuit facta ante aliam, unde et sex dies productionis rerum in principio Genesis describuntur. Ergo multo magis natura angelica facta est ante omnem naturam corporalem. Objection 3. Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal nature was made before another; hence the six days of the production of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much more, therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal nature.
Iª q. 61 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Non autem hoc esset verum, si aliquid creasset antea. Ergo Angeli non sunt ante naturam corpoream creati. On the contrary, It is said (Genesis 1:1): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Now, this would not be true if anything had been created previously. Consequently the angels were not created before corporeal nature.
Iª q. 61 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc invenitur duplex sanctorum doctorum sententia, illa tamen probabilior videtur, quod Angeli simul cum creatura corporea sunt creati. Angeli enim sunt quaedam pars universi, non enim constituunt per se unum universum, sed tam ipsi quam creatura corporea in constitutionem unius universi conveniunt. Quod apparet ex ordine unius creaturae ad aliam, ordo enim rerum ad invicem est bonum universi. Nulla autem pars perfecta est a suo toto separata. Non est igitur probabile ut Deus, cuius perfecta sunt opera, ut dicitur Deut. XXXII, creaturam angelicam seorsum ante alias creaturas creaverit. Quamvis contrarium non sit reputandum erroneum; praecipue propter sententiam Gregorii Nazianzeni, cuius tanta est in doctrina Christiana auctoritas, ut nullus unquam eius dictis calumniam inferre praesumpserit, sicut nec Athanasii documentis, ut Hieronymus dicit. I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the angels are part of the universe: they do not constitute a universe of themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting one universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of creature to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate from the whole. Consequently it is improbable that God, Whose "works are perfect," as it is said Dt. 32:4, should have created the angelic creature before other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not to be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, "whose authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight that no one has ever raised objection to his teaching, as is also the case with the doctrine of Athanasius," as Jerome says.
Iª q. 61 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Hieronymus loquitur secundum sententiam doctorum Graecorum, qui omnes hoc concorditer sentiunt, quod Angeli sunt ante mundum corporeum creati. Reply to Objection 1. Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of the Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have taken place previously to that of the corporeal world.
Iª q. 61 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non est aliqua pars universi, sed est supra totum universum, praehabens in se eminentiori modo totam universi perfectionem. Angelus autem est pars universi. Unde non est eadem ratio. Reply to Objection 2. God is not a part of, but far above, the whole universe, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the universe in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the universe. Hence the comparison does not hold.
Iª q. 61 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod creaturae corporeae omnes sunt unum in materia, sed Angeli non conveniunt in materia cum creatura corporea. Unde, creata materia corporalis creaturae, omnia quodammodo sunt creata, non autem, creatis Angelis, esset ipsum universum creatum. Si vero contrarium teneatur, quod dicitur Gen. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram exponendum est, in principio, idest in filio, vel in principio temporis, non autem in principio, idest ante quod nihil, nisi dicatur, ante quod nihil in genere corporalium creaturarum. Reply to Objection 3. All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while the angels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation of the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the creation of all things; but the creation of the angels does not involve creation of the universe. If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Gn. 1, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," the words, "In the beginning," must be interpreted, "In the Son," or "In the beginning of time": but not, "In the beginning, before which there was nothing," unless we say "Before which there was nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures."
Iª q. 61 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli non sint creati in caelo Empyreo. Angeli enim sunt substantiae incorporeae. Sed substantia incorporea non dependet a corpore secundum suum esse, et per consequens neque secundum suum fieri. Ergo Angeli non sunt creati in loco corporeo. Objection 1. It would seem that the angels were not created in the empyrean heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a substance which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its existence; and as a consequence, neither is it for its creation. Therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place.
Iª q. 61 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, III super Gen. ad Litt., quod Angeli fuerunt creati in superiori parte aeris. Non ergo in caelo Empyreo. Objection 2. Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that the angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in the empyrean heaven.
Iª q. 61 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, caelum Empyreum dicitur esse caelum supremum. Si igitur Angeli creati fuissent in caelo Empyreo, non convenisset eis in superius caelum ascendere. Quod est contra id quod ex persona Angeli peccantis dicitur Isaiae XIV, ascendam in caelum. Objection 3. Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest heaven. If therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven, it would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And this is contrary to what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of the sinning angel: "I will ascend into heaven" (Isaiah 14:13).
Iª q. 61 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Strabus dicit, super illud, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, caelum non visibile firmamentum hic appellat, sed Empyreum, idest igneum vel intellectuale, quod non ab ardore, sed a splendore dicitur, quod statim factum, Angelis est repletum. On the contrary, Strabus, commenting on the text "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," says: "By heaven he does not mean the visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but from its splendor; and which was filled with angels directly it was made."
Iª q. 61 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ex creaturis corporalibus et spiritualibus unum universum constituitur. Unde sic creatae sunt spirituales creaturae, quod ad creaturam corporalem aliquem ordinem habent, et toti creaturae corporali praesident. Unde conveniens fuit quod Angeli in supremo corpore crearentur, tanquam toti naturae corporeae praesidentes; sive id dicatur caelum Empyreum, sive qualitercumque nominetur. Unde Isidorus dicit quod supremum caelum est caelum Angelorum, super illud Deut. X, domini Dei tui est caelum, et caelum caeli. I answer that, As was observed (3), the universe is made up of corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures were so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal creature, and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the angels to be created in the highest corporeal place, as presiding over all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the empyrean heaven, or whatever else it be called. So Isidore says that the highest heaven is the heaven of the angels, explaining the passage of Dt. 10:14: "Behold heaven is the Lord's thy God, and the heaven of heaven."
Iª q. 61 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Angeli non sunt creati in loco corporeo, quasi dependentes a corpore secundum suum esse vel secundum suum fieri, potuisset enim Deus Angelos ante totam creaturam corporalem creasse, ut multi sancti doctores tenent. Sed facti sunt in loco corporeo, ad ostendendum ordinem eorum ad naturam corpoream, et quod sua virtute corpora contingunt. Reply to Objection 1. The angels were created in a corporeal place, not as if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their being made; because God could have created them before all corporeal creation, as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and that they are by their power in touch with bodies.
Iª q. 61 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus forte per supremam partem aeris intelligit supremam partem caeli, cum quo aer quandam convenientiam habet propter suam subtilitatem et diaphaneitatem. Vel loquitur non de omnibus Angelis, sed de illis qui peccaverunt, qui secundum quosdam fuerunt de inferioribus ordinibus. Nihil autem prohibet dicere quod superiores Angeli, habentes virtutem elevatam et universalem supra omnia corpora, sint in supremo creaturae corporeae creati; alii vero, habentes virtutes magis particulares, sint creati in inferioribus corporibus. Reply to Objection 2. By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly means the highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of affinity owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not speaking of all the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in the opinion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, as having an exalted and universal power over all corporeal things, were created in the highest place of the corporeal creature; while the other angels, as having more restricted powers, were created among the inferior bodies.
Iª q. 61 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod loquitur ibi non de caelo aliquo corporeo, sed de caelo sanctae Trinitatis, in quod Angelus peccans ascendere voluit, dum voluit aliquo modo Deo aequiparari, ut infra patebit. Reply to Objection 3. Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal heaven, but of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; unto which the sinning angel wished to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some manner to God, as will appear later on (63, 3).

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