Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q6

• Question 6.1 The Goodness of God
• Question 6.2
• Question 6.3
• Question 6.4

Latin	English
Iª q. 6 pr. Deinde quaeritur de bonitate Dei. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum esse bonum conveniat Deo. Secundo, utrum Deus sit summum bonum. Tertio, utrum ipse solus sit bonus per suam essentiam. Quarto, utrum omnia sint bona bonitate divina.
Iª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum non conveniat Deo. Ratio enim boni consistit in modo, specie et ordine. Haec autem non videntur Deo convenire, cum Deus immensus sit, et ad aliquid non ordinetur. Ergo esse bonum non convenit Deo.	Objection 1. It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem to belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
Iª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Sed Deum non omnia appetunt, quia non omnia cognoscunt ipsum, nihil autem appetitur nisi notum. Ergo esse bonum non convenit Deo.	Objection 2. Further, the good is what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and nothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
Iª q. 6 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Thren. III, bonus est dominus sperantibus in eum, animae quaerenti illum.	On the contrary, It is written (Lamentations 3:25): "The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him."
Iª q. 6 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod bonum esse praecipue Deo convenit. Bonum enim aliquid est, secundum quod est appetibile. Unumquodque autem appetit suam perfectionem. Perfectio autem et forma effectus est quaedam similitudo agentis, cum omne agens agat sibi simile. Unde ipsum agens est appetibile, et habet rationem boni, hoc enim est quod de ipso appetitur, ut eius similitudo participetur. Cum ergo Deus sit prima causa effectiva omnium, manifestum est quod sibi competit ratio boni et appetibilis. Unde Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom., attribuit bonum Deo sicut primae causae efficienti, dicens quod bonus dicitur Deus, sicut ex quo omnia subsistunt.	I answer that, To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good "as by Whom all things subsist."
Iª q. 6 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod habere modum, speciem et ordinem, pertinet ad rationem boni causati. Sed bonum in Deo est sicut in causa, unde ad eum pertinet imponere aliis modum, speciem et ordinem. Unde ista tria sunt in Deo sicut in causa.	Reply to Objection 1. To have mode, species and order belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence it belongs to Him to impose mode, species and order on others; wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.
Iª q. 6 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia, appetendo proprias perfectiones, appetunt ipsum Deum, inquantum perfectiones omnium rerum sunt quaedam similitudines divini esse, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic eorum quae Deum appetunt, quaedam cognoscunt ipsum secundum seipsum, quod est proprium creaturae rationalis. Quaedam vero cognoscunt aliquas participationes suae bonitatis, quod etiam extenditur usque ad cognitionem sensibilem. Quaedam vero appetitum naturalem habent absque cognitione, utpote inclinata ad suos fines ab alio superiori cognoscente.	Reply to Objection 2. All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said above (4, 3). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.
Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit summum bonum. Summum enim bonum addit aliquid supra bonum, alioquin omni bono conveniret. Sed omne quod se habet ex additione ad aliquid, est compositum. Ergo summum bonum est compositum. Sed Deus est summe simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est summum bonum.	Objection 1. It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is supremely simple; as was shown above (3, 7). Therefore God is not the supreme good.
Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicit philosophus. Sed nihil aliud est quod omnia appetunt, nisi solus Deus, qui est finis omnium. Ergo nihil aliud est bonum nisi Deus. Quod etiam videtur per id quod dicitur Matth. XIX, nemo bonus nisi solus Deus. Sed summum dicitur in comparatione aliorum; sicut summum calidum in comparatione ad omnia calida. Ergo Deus non potest dici summum bonum.	Objection 2. Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said (Luke 18:19): "None is good but God alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good.
Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, summum comparationem importat. Sed quae non sunt unius generis, non sunt comparabilia; sicut dulcedo inconvenienter dicitur maior vel minor quam linea. Cum igitur Deus non sit in eodem genere cum aliis bonis, ut ex superioribus patet, videtur quod Deus non possit dici summum bonum respectu eorum.	Objection 3. Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above (3, 5; 4, 3) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others.
Iª q. 6 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, I de Trin., quod Trinitas divinarum personarum est summum bonum, quod purgatissimis mentibus cernitur.	On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds."
Iª q. 6 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Deus est summum bonum simpliciter, et non solum in aliquo genere vel ordine rerum. Sic enim bonum Deo attribuitur, ut dictum est, inquantum omnes perfectiones desideratae effluunt ab eo, sicut a prima causa. Non autem effluunt ab eo sicut ab agente univoco, ut ex superioribus patet, sed sicut ab agente quod non convenit cum suis effectibus, neque in ratione speciei, nec in ratione generis. Similitudo autem effectus in causa quidem univoca invenitur uniformiter, in causa autem aequivoca invenitur excellentius, sicut calor excellentiori modo est in sole quam in igne. Sic ergo oportet quod cum bonum sit in Deo sicut in prima causa omnium non univoca, quod sit in eo excellentissimo modo. Et propter hoc dicitur summum bonum.	I answer that, God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above (4, 2); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.
Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod summum bonum addit super bonum, non rem aliquam absolutam, sed relationem tantum. Relatio autem qua aliquid de Deo dicitur relative ad creaturas, non est realiter in Deo, sed in creatura; in Deo vero secundum rationem; sicut scibile relative dicitur ad scientiam, non quia ad ipsam referatur, sed quia scientia refertur ad ipsum. Et sic non oportet quod in summo bono sit aliqua compositio, sed solum quod alia deficiant ab ipso.	Reply to Objection 1. The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are deficient in comparison with it.
Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur bonum est quod omnia appetunt, non sic intelligitur quasi unumquodque bonum ab omnibus appetatur, sed quia quidquid appetitur, rationem boni habet. Quod autem dicitur, nemo bonus nisi solus Deus, intelligitur de bono per essentiam, ut post dicetur.	Reply to Objection 2. When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all; but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood of essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.
Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quae non sunt in eodem genere, si quidem sint in diversis generibus contenta, nullo modo comparabilia sunt. De Deo autem negatur esse in eodem genere cum aliis bonis, non quod ipse sit in quodam alio genere; sed quia ipse est extra genus, et principium omnis generis. Et sic comparatur ad alia per excessum. Et huiusmodi comparationem importat summum bonum.	Reply to Objection 3. Things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.
Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum per essentiam non sit proprium Dei. Sicut enim unum convertitur cum ente, ita et bonum, ut supra habitum est. Sed omne ens est unum per suam essentiam, ut patet per philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne ens est bonum per suam essentiam.	Objection 1. It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good"; as we said above (5, 1). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially.
Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, si bonum est quod omnia appetunt, cum ipsum esse sit desideratum ab omnibus, ipsum esse cuiuslibet rei est eius bonum. Sed quaelibet res est ens per suam essentiam. Ergo quaelibet res est bona per suam essentiam.	Objection 2. Further, if good is what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good. But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good essentially.
Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, omnis res per suam bonitatem est bona. Si igitur aliqua res est quae non sit bona per suam essentiam, oportebit quod eius bonitas non sit sua essentia. Illa ergo bonitas, cum sit ens quoddam, oportet quod sit bona, et si quidem alia bonitate, iterum de illa bonitate quaeretur. Aut ergo erit procedere in infinitum, aut venire ad aliquam bonitatem quae non erit bona per aliam bonitatem. Eadem ergo ratione standum est in primo. Res igitur quaelibet est bona per suam essentiam.	Objection 3. Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.
Iª q. 6 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., quod alia omnia a Deo sunt bona per participationem. Non igitur per essentiam.	On the contrary, Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially.
Iª q. 6 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod solus Deus est bonus per suam essentiam. Unumquodque enim dicitur bonum, secundum quod est perfectum. Perfectio autem alicuius rei triplex est. Prima quidem, secundum quod in suo esse constituitur. Secunda vero, prout ei aliqua accidentia superadduntur, ad suam perfectam operationem necessaria. Tertia vero perfectio alicuius est per hoc, quod aliquid aliud attingit sicut finem. Utpote prima perfectio ignis consistit in esse, quod habet per suam formam substantialem, secunda vero eius perfectio consistit in caliditate, levitate et siccitate, et huiusmodi, tertia vero perfectio eius est secundum quod in loco suo quiescit. Haec autem triplex perfectio nulli creato competit secundum suam essentiam, sed soli Deo, cuius solius essentia est suum esse; et cui non adveniunt aliqua accidentia; sed quae de aliis dicuntur accidentaliter, sibi conveniunt essentialiter, ut esse potentem, sapientem, et huiusmodi, sicut ex dictis patet. Ipse etiam ad nihil aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, sed ipse est ultimus finis omnium rerum. Unde manifestum est quod solus Deus habet omnimodam perfectionem secundum suam essentiam. Et ideo ipse solus est bonus per suam essentiam.	I answer that, God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above (3, 6); and He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially.
Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unum non importat rationem perfectionis, sed indivisionis tantum, quae unicuique rei competit secundum suam essentiam. Simplicium autem essentiae sunt indivisae et actu et potentia, compositorum vero essentiae sunt indivisae secundum actum tantum. Et ideo oportet quod quaelibet res sit una per suam essentiam, non autem bona, ut ostensum est.	Reply to Objection 1. "One" does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above.
Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet unumquodque sit bonum inquantum habet esse, tamen essentia rei creatae non est ipsum esse, et ideo non sequitur quod res creata sit bona per suam essentiam.	Reply to Objection 2. Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does not follow that a creature is good essentially.
Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod bonitas rei creatae non est ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid superadditum; vel ipsum esse eius, vel aliqua perfectio superaddita, vel ordo ad finem. Ipsa tamen bonitas sic superaddita dicitur bona sicut et ens, hac autem ratione dicitur ens, quia ea est aliquid, non quia ipsa aliquo alio sit. Unde hac ratione dicitur bona, quia ea est aliquid bonum, non quia ipsa habeat aliquam aliam bonitatem, qua sit bona.	Reply to Objection 3. The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it called being because by it something has being, not because it itself has being through something else: hence for this reason is it called good because by it something is good, and not because it itself has some other goodness whereby it is good.
Iª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia sint bona bonitate divina. Dicit enim Augustinus, VII de Trin., bonum hoc et bonum illud, tolle hoc et tolle illud, et vide ipsum bonum, si potes, ita Deum videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni. Sed unumquodque est bonum suo bono. Ergo unumquodque est bonum ipso bono quod est Deus.	Objection 1. It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good." But everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by that very good which is God.
Iª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., omnia dicuntur bona inquantum ordinantur ad Deum, et hoc ratione bonitatis divinae. Ergo omnia sunt bona bonitate divina.	Objection 2. Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the divine goodness.
Iª q. 6 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod omnia sunt bona inquantum sunt. Sed non dicuntur omnia entia per esse divinum, sed per esse proprium. Ergo non omnia sunt bona bonitate divina, sed bonitate propria.	On the contrary, All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their own goodness.
Iª q. 6 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet in his quae relationem important, aliquid ab extrinseco denominari; sicut aliquid denominatur locatum a loco, et mensuratum a mensura. Circa vero ea quae absolute dicuntur, diversa fuit opinio. Plato enim posuit omnium rerum species separatas; et quod ab eis individua denominantur, quasi species separatas participando; ut puta quod Socrates dicitur homo secundum ideam hominis separatam. Et sicut ponebat ideam hominis et equi separatam, quam vocabat per se hominem et per se equum, ita ponebat ideam entis et ideam unius separatam, quam dicebat per se ens et per se unum, et eius participatione unumquodque dicitur ens vel unum. Hoc autem quod est per se bonum et per se unum, ponebat esse summum Deum, a quo omnia dicuntur bona per modum participationis. Et quamvis haec opinio irrationabilis videatur quantum ad hoc, quod ponebat species rerum naturalium separatas per se subsistentes, ut Aristoteles multipliciter probat; tamen hoc absolute verum est, quod est aliquod unum per essentiam suam bonum, quod dicimus Deum, ut ex superioribus patet. Huic etiam sententiae concordat Aristoteles. A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono, unumquodque potest dici bonum et ens, inquantum participat ipsum per modum cuiusdam assimilationis, licet remote et deficienter, ut ex superioribus patet. Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est formaliter sua bonitas denominans ipsum. Et sic est bonitas una omnium; et etiam multae bonitates.	I answer that, As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and "measured" from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (84, 4) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by way of participation. Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves--as Aristotle argues in many ways--still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above (2, 3), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears from the above (4, 3). Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.
Iª q. 6 a. 4 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.	This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.