Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q41

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Q40 Q42



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Iª q. 41 pr. Deinde considerandum est de personis in comparatione ad actus notionales. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum actus notionales sint attribuendi personis. Secundo, utrum huiusmodi actus sint necessarii vel voluntarii. Tertio, utrum, secundum huiusmodi actus, persona procedat de nihilo, vel de aliquo. Quarto, utrum in divinis sit ponere potentiam respectu actuum notionalium. Quinto, quid significet huiusmodi potentia. Sexto, utrum actus notionalis ad plures personas terminari possit.
Iª q. 41 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus notionales non sint personis attribuendi. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de Trin., quod omnia genera, cum quis in divinam vertit praedicationem, in divinam mutantur substantiam, exceptis relativis. Sed actio est unum de decem generibus. Si igitur actio aliqua Deo attribuitur, ad eius essentiam pertinebit, et non ad notionem. Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin.): "Whatever is predicated of God, of whatever genus it be, becomes the divine substance, except what pertains to the relation." But action is one of the ten "genera." Therefore any action attributed to God belongs to His essence, and not to a notion.
Iª q. 41 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, V de Trin., omne quod de Deo dicitur, aut dicitur secundum substantiam, aut secundum relationem. Sed ea quae ad substantiam pertinent, significantur per essentialia attributa, quae vero ad relationem, per nomina personarum et per nomina proprietatum. Non sunt ergo, praeter haec, attribuendi personis notionales actus. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5) that, "everything which is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His substance, or relation." But whatever belongs to the substance is signified by the essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the relations, by the names of the persons, or by the names of the properties. Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons.
Iª q. 41 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, proprium actionis est ex se passionem inferre. Sed in divinis non ponimus passiones. Ergo neque actus notionales ibi ponendi sunt. Objection 3. Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause passion. But we do not place passions in God. Therefore neither are notional acts to be placed in God.
Iª q. 41 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, proprium patris est, quod filium genuit. Sed generatio actus quidam est. Ergo actus notionales ponendi sunt in divinis. On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says: "It is a property of the Father to beget the Son." Therefore notional acts are to be placed in God.
Iª q. 41 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in divinis personis attenditur distinctio secundum originem. Origo autem convenienter designari non potest nisi per aliquos actus. Ad designandum igitur ordinem originis in divinis personis, necessarium fuit attribuere personis actus notionales. I answer that, In the divine persons distinction is founded on origin. But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts. Wherefore, to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we must attribute notional acts to the persons.
Iª q. 41 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnis origo designatur per aliquem actum. Duplex autem ordo originis attribui Deo potest. Unus quidem, secundum quod creatura ab eo progreditur, et hoc commune est tribus personis. Et ideo actiones quae attribuuntur Deo ad designandum processum creaturarum ab ipso, ad essentiam pertinent. Alius autem ordo originis in divinis attenditur secundum processionem personae a persona. Unde actus designantes huius originis ordinem, notionales dicuntur, quia notiones personarum sunt personarum habitudines ad invicem, ut ex dictis patet. Reply to Objection 1. Every origin is designated by an act. In God there is a twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature proceeds from Him, and this is common to the three persons; and so those actions which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding of creatures from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of origin in God regards the procession of person from person; wherefore the acts which designate the order of this origin are called notional; because the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons, as is clear from what was above explained (32, 2).
Iª q. 41 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod actus notionales secundum modum significandi tantum differunt a relationibus personarum; sed re sunt omnino idem. Unde Magister dicit, in I Sent., XXVI dist., quod generatio et nativitas aliis nominibus dicuntur paternitas et filiatio. Ad cuius evidentiam, attendendum est quod primo coniicere potuimus originem alicuius ab alio, ex motu, quod enim aliqua res a sua dispositione removeretur per motum, manifestum fuit hoc ab aliqua causa accidere. Et ideo actio, secundum primam nominis impositionem, importat originem motus, sicut enim motus, prout est in mobili ab aliquo, dicitur passio; ita origo ipsius motus, secundum quod incipit ab alio et terminatur in id quod movetur, vocatur actio. Remoto igitur motu, actio nihil aliud importat quam ordinem originis, secundum quod a causa aliqua vel principio procedit in id quod est a principio. Unde, cum in divinis non sit motus, actio personalis producentis personam, nihil aliud est quam habitudo principii ad personam quae est a principio. Quae quidem habitudines sunt ipsae relationes vel notiones. Quia tamen de divinis et intelligibilibus rebus loqui non possumus nisi secundum modum rerum sensibilium, a quibus cognitionem accipimus; et in quibus actiones et passiones, inquantum motum implicant, aliud sunt a relationibus quae ex actionibus et passionibus consequuntur, oportuit seorsum significari habitudines personarum per modum actus, et seorsum per modum relationum. Et sic patet quod sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt solum secundum modum significandi. Reply to Objection 2. The notional acts differ from the relations of the persons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are altogether the same. Whence the Master says that "generation and nativity in other words are paternity and filiation" (Sent. i, D, xxvi). To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing from another is firstly inferred from movement: for that anything be changed from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some cause. Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin of movement; for, as movement derived from another into a mobile object, is called "passion," so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another and terminating in what is moved, is called "action." Hence, if we take away movement, action implies nothing more than order of origin, in so far as action proceeds from some cause or principle to what is from that principle. Consequently, since in God no movement exists, the personal action of the one producing a person is only the habitude of the principle to the person who is from the principle; which habitudes are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except after the manner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and wherein actions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ from the relations which result from action and passion, and therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons separately after the manner of act, and separately after the manner of relations. Thus it is evident that they are really the same, differing only in their mode of signification.
Iª q. 41 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod actio, secundum quod importat originem motus, infert ex se passionem, sic autem non ponitur actio in divinis personis. Unde non ponuntur ibi passiones, nisi solum grammatice loquendo, quantum ad modum significandi; sicut patri attribuimus generare, et filio generari. Reply to Objection 3. Action, so far as it means origin of movement, naturally involves passion; but action in that sense is not attributed to God. Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from a grammatical standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of speaking, as we attribute "to beget" with the Father, and to the Son "to be begotten."
Iª q. 41 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus notionales sint voluntarii. Dicit enim Hilarius, in libro de Synod., non naturali necessitate ductus, pater genuit filium. Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary. For Hilary says (De Synod.): "Not by natural necessity was the Father led to beget the Son."
Iª q. 41 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, apostolus, Coloss. I, transtulit nos in regnum filii dilectionis suae. Dilectio autem voluntatis est. Ergo filius genitus est a patre, voluntate. Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says, "He transferred us to the kingdom of the Son of His love" (Colossians 1:13). But love belongs to the will. Therefore the Son was begotten of the Father by will.
Iª q. 41 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, nihil magis est voluntarium quam amor. Sed spiritus sanctus procedit a patre et filio ut amor. Ergo procedit voluntarie. Objection 3. Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore He proceeds voluntarily.
Iª q. 41 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, filius procedit per modum intellectus, ut verbum. Sed omne verbum procedit a dicente per voluntatem. Ergo filius procedit a patre per voluntatem, et non per naturam. Objection 4. Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect, as the Word. But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker. Therefore the Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.
Iª q. 41 a. 2 arg. 5 Praeterea, quod non est voluntarium, est necessarium. Si igitur pater non genuit filium voluntate, videtur sequi quod necessitate genuerit. Quod est contra Augustinum, in libro ad Orosium. Objection 5. Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore if the Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that He begot Him by necessity; and this is against what Augustine says (Ad Orosium qu. vii).
Iª q. 41 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in eodem libro, quod neque voluntate genuit pater filium, neque necessitate. On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same book, that, "the Father begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity."
Iª q. 41 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum dicitur aliquid esse vel fieri voluntate, dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, ut ablativus designet concomitantiam tantum, sicut possum dicere quod ego sum homo mea voluntate, quia scilicet volo me esse hominem. Et hoc modo potest dici quod pater genuit filium voluntate, sicut et est voluntate Deus, quia vult se esse Deum, et vult se generare filium. Alio modo sic, quod ablativus importet habitudinem principii, sicut dicitur quod artifex operatur voluntate, quia voluntas est principium operis. Et secundum hunc modum, dicendum est quod Deus pater non genuit filium voluntate; sed voluntate produxit creaturam. Unde in libro de Synod. dicitur, si quis voluntate Dei, tanquam unum aliquid de creaturis, filium factum dicat, anathema sit. Et huius ratio est, quia voluntas et natura secundum hoc differunt in causando, quia natura determinata est ad unum; sed voluntas non est determinata ad unum. Cuius ratio est, quia effectus assimilatur formae agentis per quam agit. Manifestum est autem quod unius rei non est nisi una forma naturalis, per quam res habet esse, unde quale ipsum est, tale facit. Sed forma per quam voluntas agit, non est una tantum, sed sunt plures, secundum quod sunt plures rationes intellectae, unde quod voluntate agitur, non est tale quale est agens, sed quale vult et intelligit illud esse agens. Eorum igitur voluntas principium est, quae possunt sic vel aliter esse. Eorum autem quae non possunt nisi sic esse, principium natura est. Quod autem potest sic vel aliter esse, longe est a natura divina, sed hoc pertinet ad rationem creaturae, quia Deus est per se necesse esse, creatura autem est facta ex nihilo. Et ideo Ariani, volentes ad hoc deducere quod filius sit creatura, dixerunt quod pater genuit filium voluntate, secundum quod voluntas designat principium. Nobis autem dicendum est quod pater genuit filium non voluntate, sed natura. Unde Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., omnibus creaturis substantiam Dei voluntas attulit; sed naturam filio dedit ex impassibili ac non nata substantia perfecta nativitas. Talia enim cuncta creata sunt, qualia Deus esse voluit, filius autem, natus ex Deo, talis subsistit, qualis et Deus est. I answer that, When anything is said to be, or to be made by the will, this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the ablative designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man by my will--that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can be said that the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by will, because He wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the other sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it is said that the workman works by his will, as the will is the principle of his work; and thus in that sense it must be said the God the Father begot the Son, not by His will; but that He produced the creature by His will. Whence in the book De Synod, it is said: "If anyone say that the Son was made by the Will of God, as a creature is said to be made, let him be anathema." The reason of this is that will and nature differ in their manner of causation, in such a way that nature is determined to one, while the will is not determined to one; and this because the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent, whereby the latter acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing there is only one natural form whereby it exists; and hence such as it is itself, such also is its work. But the form whereby the will acts is not only one, but many, according to the number of ideas understood. Hence the quality of the will's action does not depend on the quality of the agent, but on the agent's will and understanding. So the will is the principle of those things which may be this way or that way; whereas of those things which can be only in one way, the principle is nature. What, however, can exist in different ways is far from the divine nature, whereas it belongs to the nature of a created being; because God is of Himself necessary being, whereas a creature is made from nothing. Thus, the Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will, taking will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, must assert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but by nature. Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): "The will of God gave to all creatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the Son a nature derived from a substance impassible and unborn. All things created are such as God willed them to be; but the Son, born of God, subsists in the perfect likeness of God."
Iª q. 41 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa inducitur contra illos qui a generatione filii etiam concomitantiam paternae voluntatis removebant, dicentes sic eum natura genuisse filium, ut inde voluntas generandi ei non adesset, sicut nos multa naturali necessitate contra voluntatem patimur, ut mortem, senectutem, et huiusmodi defectus. Et hoc patet per praecedentia et subsequentia. Sic enim ibi dicitur, non enim, nolente patre, vel coactus pater, vel naturali necessitate inductus cum nollet, genuit filium. Reply to Objection 1. This saying is directed against those who did not admit even the concomitance of the Father's will in the generation of the Son, for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner by nature that the will to beget was wanting; just as we ourselves suffer many things against our will from natural necessity--as, for instance, death, old age, and like ills. This appears from what precedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted, for thus we read: "Not against His will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He were led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son."
Iª q. 41 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod apostolus nominat Christum filium dilectionis Dei, inquantum est a Deo superabundanter dilectus, non quod dilectio sit principium generationis filii. Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the love of God, inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God; not, however, as if love were the principle of the Son's generation.
Iª q. 41 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam voluntas, inquantum est natura quaedam, aliquid naturaliter vult; sicut voluntas hominis naturaliter tendit ad beatitudinem. Et similiter Deus naturaliter vult et amat seipsum. Sed circa alia a se, voluntas Dei se habet ad utrumque quodammodo, ut dictum est. Spiritus autem sanctus procedit ut amor, inquantum Deus amat seipsum. Unde naturaliter procedit, quamvis per modum voluntatis procedat. Reply to Objection 3. The will, as a natural faculty, wills something naturally, as man's will naturally tends to happiness; and likewise God naturally wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to things other than Himself, the will of God is in a way, undetermined in itself, as above explained (19, 3). Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence He proceeds naturally, although He proceeds by mode of will.
Iª q. 41 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod etiam in conceptionibus intellectualibus fit reductio ad prima, quae naturaliter intelliguntur. Deus autem naturaliter intelligit seipsum. Et secundum hoc, conceptio verbi divini est naturalis. Reply to Objection 4. Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the mind, a return is made to those first principles which are naturally understood. But God naturally understands Himself, and thus the conception of the divine Word is natural.
Iª q. 41 a. 2 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod necessarium dicitur aliquid per se, et per aliud. Per aliud quidem dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut per causam agentem et cogentem, et sic necessarium dicitur quod est violentum. Alio modo, sicut per causam finalem, sicut dicitur aliquid esse necessarium in his quae sunt ad finem, inquantum sine hoc non potest esse finis, vel bene esse. Et neutro istorum modorum divina generatio est necessaria, quia Deus non est propter finem, neque coactio cadit in ipsum. Per se autem dicitur aliquid necessarium, quod non potest non esse. Et sic Deum esse est necessarium. Et hoc modo patrem generare filium est necessarium. Reply to Objection 5. A thing is said to be necessary "of itself," and "by reason of another." Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold meaning: firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus necessary means what is violent; secondly, it means a final cause, when a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an end, so far as without it the end could not be attained, or, at least, so well attained. In neither of these ways is the divine generation necessary; because God is not the means to an end, nor is He subject to compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary "of itself" which cannot but be: in this sense it is necessary for God to be; and in the same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the Son.
Iª q. 41 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus notionales non sint de aliquo. Quia si pater generat filium de aliquo, aut de seipso, aut de aliquo alio. Si de aliquo alio, cum id de quo aliquid generatur, sit in eo quod generatur, sequitur quod aliquid alienum a patre sit in filio. Quod est contra Hilarium, VII de Trin., ubi dicit, nihil in his diversum est vel alienum. Si autem filium generat pater de seipso, id autem de quo aliquid generatur, si sit permanens, recipit eius praedicationem quod generatur; sicut dicimus quod homo est albus, quia homo permanet, cum de non albo fit albus, sequitur igitur quod pater vel non permaneat, genito filio, vel quod pater sit filius, quod est falsum. Non ergo pater generat filium de aliquo, sed de nihilo. Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this will be either from Himself or from something else. If from something else, since that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, it follows that something different from the Father exists in the Son, and this contradicts what is laid down by Hilary (De Trin. vii) that, "In them nothing diverse or different exists." If the Father begets the Son from Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if it be something permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated therefrom just as we say, "The man is white," since the man remains, when not from white he is made white--it follows that either the Father does not remain after the Son is begotten, or that the Father is the Son, which is false. Therefore the Father does not beget the Son from something, but from nothing.
Iª q. 41 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, id de quo aliquid generatur, est principium eius quod generatur. Si ergo pater generat filium de essentia vel natura sua sequitur quod essentia vel natura patris sit principium filii. Sed non principium materiale, quia materia locum in divinis non habet. Ergo est principium quasi activum, sicut generans est principium geniti. Et ita sequitur quod essentia generet, quod supra improbatum est. Objection 2. Further, that whence anything is generated is the principle regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the Son from His own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or nature of the Father is the principle of the Son. But it is not a material principle, because in God nothing material exists; and therefore it is, as it were, an active principle, as the begetter is the principle of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence generates, which was disproved above (39, 5).
Iª q. 41 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit quod tres personae non sunt ex eadem essentia, quia non est aliud essentia et persona. Sed persona filii non est aliud ab essentia patris. Ergo filius non est de essentia patris. Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that the three persons are not from the same essence; because the essence is not another thing from person. But the person of the Son is not another thing from the Father's essence. Therefore the Son is not from the Father's essence.
Iª q. 41 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, omnis creatura est ex nihilo. Sed filius in Scripturis dicitur creatura, dicitur enim Eccli. XXIV, ex ore sapientiae genitae, ego ex ore altissimi prodii, primogenita ante omnem creaturam; et postea ex ore eiusdem sapientiae dicitur, ab initio, et ante saecula, creata sum. Ergo filius non est genitus ex aliquo, sed ex nihilo. Et similiter potest obiici de spiritu sancto, propter hoc quod dicitur, Zac. XII dixit dominus, extendens caelum et fundans terram, et creans spiritum hominis in eo; et Amos IV, secundum aliam litteram, ego formans montes, et creans spiritum. Objection 4. Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture the Son is called a creature; for it is said (Sirach 24:5), in the person of the Wisdom begotten,"I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before all creatures": and further on (Sirach 24:14) it is said as uttered by the same Wisdom, "From the beginning, and before the world was I created." Therefore the Son was not begotten from something, but from nothing. Likewise we can object concerning the Holy Ghost, by reason of what is said (Zechariah 12:1): "Thus saith the Lord Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him"; and (Amos 4:13) according to another version [the Septuagint]: "I Who form the earth, and create the spirit."
Iª q. 41 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, pater Deus de sua natura sine initio genuit filium sibi aequalem. On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i, 1) says: "God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal to Himself."
Iª q. 41 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod filius non est genitus de nihilo, sed de substantia patris. Ostensum est enim supra quod paternitas, et filiatio, et nativitas, vere et proprie est in divinis. Hoc autem interest inter generationem veram, per quam aliquis procedit ut filius, et factionem, quod faciens facit aliquid de exteriori materia, sicut scamnum facit artifex de ligno; homo autem generat filium de seipso. Sicut autem artifex creatus facit aliquid ex materia, ita Deus facit ex nihilo, ut infra ostendetur, non quod nihilum cedat in substantiam rei, sed quia ab ipso tota substantia rei producitur, nullo alio praesupposito. Si ergo filius procederet a patre ut de nihilo existens, hoc modo se haberet ad patrem ut artificiatum ad artificem, quod manifestum est nomen filiationis proprie habere non posse, sed solum secundum aliquam similitudinem. Unde relinquitur quod, si filius Dei procederet a patre quasi existens ex nihilo, non esset vere et proprie filius. Cuius contrarium dicitur I Ioan. ult., ut simus in vero filio eius Iesu Christo. Filius igitur Dei verus non est ex nihilo, nec factus, sed tantum genitus. Si qui autem ex nihilo a Deo facti filii Dei dicantur, hoc erit metaphorice, secundum aliqualem assimilationem ad eum qui vere filius est. Unde, inquantum solus est verus et naturalis Dei filius, dicitur unigenitus, secundum illud Ioan. I unigenitus, qui est in sinu patris, ipse enarravit. Inquantum vero per assimilationem ad ipsum alii dicuntur filii adoptivi, quasi metaphorice dicitur esse primogenitus, secundum illud Rom. VIII, quos praescivit, et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Relinquitur ergo quod Dei filius sit genitus de substantia patris. Aliter tamen quam filius hominis. Pars enim substantiae hominis generantis transit in substantiam geniti. Sed divina natura impartibilis est. Unde necesse est quod pater, generando filium, non partem naturae in ipsum transfuderit, sed totam naturam ei communicaverit, remanente distinctione solum secundum originem, ut ex dictis patet. I answer that, The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the Father's substance. For it was explained above (27, 2; 33, 2,3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly exist in God. Now, this is the difference between true "generation," whereby one proceeds from another as a son, and "making," that the maker makes something out of external matter, as a carpenter makes a bench out of wood, whereas a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a created workman makes a thing out of matter, so God makes things out of nothing, as will be shown later on (45, 1), not as if this nothing were a part of the substance of the thing made, but because the whole substance of a thing is produced by Him without anything else whatever presupposed. So, were the Son to proceed from the Father as out of nothing, then the Son would be to the Father what the thing made is to the maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of filiation would not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if the Son of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not be properly and truly called the Son, whereas the contrary is stated (1 John 5:20): "That we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ." Therefore the true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He made, but begotten. That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain likeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is the only true and natural Son of God, He is called the "only begotten," according to John 1:18, "The only begotten Son, Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him"; and so as others are entitled sons of adoption by their similitude to Him, He is called the "first begotten," according to Romans 8:29: "Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the first born of many brethren." Therefore the Son of God is begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as man is born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation passes into the substance of the one begotten, whereas the divine nature cannot be parted; whence it necessarily follows that the Father in begetting the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but communicates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only of origin remaining as explained above (40, 2).
Iª q. 41 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum filius dicitur natus de patre, haec praepositio de significat principium generans consubstantiale; non autem principium materiale. Quod enim producitur de materia, fit per transmutationem illius de quo producitur, in aliquam formam; divina autem essentia non est transmutabilis, neque alterius formae susceptiva. Reply to Objection 1. When we say that the Son was born of the Father, the preposition "of" designates a consubstantial generating principle, but not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter, is made by a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form.
Iª q. 41 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur filius genitus de essentia patris, secundum expositionem Magistri, V dist. I Sent., designat habitudinem principii quasi activi, ubi sic exponit, filius est genitus de essentia patris, idest de patre essentia; propter hoc quod Augustinus, XV libro de Trin., dicit, tale est quod dico, de patre essentia, ac si expressius dicerem, de patris essentia. Sed hoc non videtur sufficere ad sensum huiusmodi locutionis. Possumus enim dicere quod creatura est ex Deo essentia, non tamen quod sit ex essentia Dei. Unde aliter dici potest quod haec praepositio de semper denotat consubstantialitatem. Unde non dicimus quod domus sit de aedificatore, cum non sit causa consubstantialis. Possumus autem dicere quod aliquid sit de aliquo, quocumque modo illud significetur ut principium consubstantiale, sive illud sit principium activum, sicut filius dicitur esse de patre; sive sit principium materiale, sicut cultellus dicitur esse de ferro; sive sit principium formale, in his dumtaxat in quibus ipsae formae sunt subsistentes, et non advenientes alteri; possumus enim dicere quod Angelus aliquis est de natura intellectuali. Et per hunc modum dicimus quod filius est genitus de essentia patris; inquantum essentia patris, filio per generationem communicata, in eo subsistit. Reply to Objection 2. When we say the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains (Sent. i, D, v), this denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he expounds, "the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father"--that is, of the Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 13): "When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I said more explicitly, of the essence of the Father." This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the words. For we can say that the creature is from God Who is essence; but not that it is from the essence of God. So we may explain them otherwise, by observing that the preposition "of" [de] always denotes consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is "of" [de] the builder, since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say, however, that something is "of" another, if this is its consubstantial principle, no matter in what way it is so, whether it be an active principle, as the son is said to be "of" the father, or a material principle, as a knife is "of" iron; or a formal principle, but in those things only in which the forms are subsisting, and not accidental to another, for we can say that an angel is "of" an intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say that the Son is begotten 'of' the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the essence of the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the Son.
Iª q. 41 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur, filius est genitus de essentia patris, additur aliquid respectu cuius potest salvari distinctio. Sed cum dicitur quod tres personae sunt de essentia divina, non ponitur aliquid respectu cuius possit importari distinctio per praepositionem significata. Et ideo non est simile. Reply to Objection 3. When we say that the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, a term is added which saves the distinction. But when we say that the three persons are 'of' the divine essence, there is nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the preposition, so there is no parity of argument.
Iª q. 41 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum dicitur, sapientia est creata, potest intelligi, non de sapientia quae est filius Dei, sed de sapientia creata, quam Deus indidit creaturis, dicitur enim Eccli. I, ipse creavit eam, scilicet sapientiam, spiritu sancto, et effudit illam super omnia opera sua. Neque est inconveniens quod in uno contextu locutionis loquatur Scriptura de sapientia genita et creata, quia sapientia creata est participatio quaedam sapientiae increatae. Vel potest referri ad naturam creatam assumptam a filio, ut sit sensus, ab initio et ante saecula creata sum, idest, praevisa sum creaturae uniri. Vel, per hoc quod sapientia creata et genita nuncupatur, modus divinae generationis nobis insinuatur. In generatione enim, quod generatur accipit naturam generantis, quod perfectionis est, in creatione vero, creans non mutatur, sed creatum non recipit naturam creantis. Dicitur ergo filius simul creatus et genitus, ut ex creatione accipiatur immutabilitas patris, et ex generatione unitas naturae in patre et filio. Et sic exponitur intellectus huius Scripturae ab Hilario, in libro de Synod. Auctoritates autem inductae non loquuntur de spiritu sancto, sed de spiritu creato; qui quandoque dicitur ventus, quandoque aer, quandoque flatus hominis, quandoque etiam anima, vel quaecumque substantia invisibilis. Reply to Objection 4. When we say "Wisdom was created," this may be understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created wisdom given by God to creatures: for it is said, "He created her [namely, Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all His works" (Sirach 1:9-10). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in one text to speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for wisdom created is a kind of participation of the uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be referred to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense be, "From the beginning and before the world was I made"--that is, I was foreseen as united to the creature. Or the mention of wisdom as both created and begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine generation; for in generation what is generated receives the nature of the generator and this pertains to perfection; whereas in creation the Creator is not changed, but the creature does not receive the Creator's nature. Thus the Son is called both created and begotten, in order that from the idea of creation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. In this way Hilary expounds the sense of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The other passages quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the created spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of man, sometimes also the soul, or any other invisible substance.
Iª q. 41 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in divinis non sit potentia respectu actuum notionalium. Omnis enim potentia est vel activa, vel passiva. Sed neutra hic competere potest, potentia enim passiva in Deo non est, ut supra ostensum est; potentia vero activa non competit uni personae respectu alterius, cum personae divinae non sint factae, ut ostensum est. Ergo in divinis non est potentia ad actus notionales. Objection 1. It would seem that in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or passive; neither of which can be here applied, there being in God nothing which we call passive power, as above explained (25, 1); nor can active power belong to one person as regards another, since the divine persons were not made, as stated above (3). Therefore in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts.
Iª q. 41 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, potentia dicitur ad possibile. Sed divinae personae non sunt de numero possibilium, sed de numero necessariorum. Ergo respectu actuum notionalium, quibus divinae personae procedunt, non debet poni potentia in divinis. Objection 2. Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the divine persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary. Therefore, as regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons proceed, there cannot be power in God.
Iª q. 41 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, filius procedit ut verbum, quod est conceptio intellectus, spiritus autem sanctus procedit ut amor, qui pertinet ad voluntatem. Sed potentia in Deo dicitur per comparationem ad effectus, non autem per comparationem ad intelligere et velle, ut supra habitum est. Ergo in divinis non debet dici potentia per comparationem ad actus notionales. Objection 3. Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which belongs to the will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and not as regards intellect and will, as stated above (25, 1). Therefore, in God power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.
Iª q. 41 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, contra Maximinum haereticum, si Deus pater non potuit generare filium sibi aequalem, ubi est omnipotentia Dei patris? Est ergo in divinis potentia respectu actuum notionalium. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): "If God the Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of God the Father?" Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts.
Iª q. 41 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ponuntur actus notionales in divinis, ita necesse est ibi ponere potentiam respectu huiusmodi actuum, cum potentia nihil aliud significet quam principium alicuius actus. Unde, cum patrem intelligamus ut principium generationis, et patrem et filium ut principium spirationis, necesse est quod patri attribuamus potentiam generandi, et patri et filio potentiam spirandi. Quia potentia generandi significat id quo generans generat, omne autem generans generat aliquo, unde in omni generante oportet ponere potentiam generandi, et in spirante potentiam spirandi. I answer that, As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be also a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the principle of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of generation; and the Father and the Son to be the principle of spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father, and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power of generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every generator generates by something. Therefore in every generator we must suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power of spirating.
Iª q. 41 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut secundum actus notionales non procedit aliqua persona ut facta, ita neque potentia ad actus notionales dicitur in divinis per respectum ad aliquam personam factam, sed solum per respectum ad personam procedentem. Reply to Objection 1. As a person, according to notional acts, does not proceed as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts has no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the person as proceeding.
Iª q. 41 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod possibile, secundum quod necessario opponitur, sequitur potentiam passivam, quae non est in divinis. Unde neque in divinis est aliquid possibile per modum istum, sed solum secundum quod possibile continetur sub necessario. Sic autem dici potest quod, sicut Deum esse est possibile, sic filium generari est possibile. Reply to Objection 2. Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a consequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence, in God there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only in the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary; and in this latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to be, so also is it possible that the Son should be generated.
Iª q. 41 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod potentia significat principium. Principium autem distinctionem importat ab eo cuius est principium. Consideratur autem duplex distinctio in his quae dicuntur de Deo, una secundum rem, alia secundum rationem tantum. Secundum rem quidem, Deus distinguitur per essentiam a rebus quarum est per creationem principium, sicut una persona distinguitur ab alia, cuius est principium, secundum actum notionalem. Sed actio ab agente non distinguitur in Deo nisi secundum rationem tantum, alioquin actio esset accidens in Deo. Et ideo respectu illarum actionum secundum quas aliquae res procedunt distinctae a Deo, vel essentialiter vel personaliter, potest Deo attribui potentia, secundum propriam rationem principii. Et ideo, sicut potentiam ponimus creandi in Deo, ita possumus ponere potentiam generandi vel spirandi. Sed intelligere et velle non sunt tales actus qui designent processionem alicuius rei a Deo distinctae, vel essentialiter vel personaliter. Unde respectu horum actuum, non potest salvari ratio potentiae in Deo, nisi secundum modum intelligendi et significandi tantum; prout diversimode significatur in Deo intellectus et intelligere, cum tamen ipsum intelligere Dei sit eius essentia, non habens principium. Reply to Objection 3. Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must observe a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real distinction, God by His essence is distinct from those things of which He is the principle by creation: just as one person is distinct from the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in God the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise action would be an accident in God. And therefore with regard to those actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are distinct from God, either personally or essentially, we may ascribe power to God in its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to God the power of creating, so we may ascribe the power of begetting and of spirating. But "to understand" and "to will" are not such actions as to designate the procession of something distinct from God, either essentially or personally. Wherefore, with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe power to God in its proper sense, but only after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we designate by different terms the intellect and the act of understanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His very essence which has no principle.
Iª q. 41 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod potentia generandi vel spirandi significet relationem, et non essentiam. Potentia enim significat principium, ut ex eius definitione patet, dicitur enim potentia activa esse principium agendi, ut patet in V Metaphys. Sed principium in divinis respectu personae dicitur notionaliter. Ergo potentia in divinis non significat essentiam, sed relationem. Objection 1. It would seem that the power of begetting, or of spirating, signifies the relation and not the essence. For power signifies a principle, as appears from its definition: for active power is the principle of action, as we find in Metaph. v, text 17. But in God principle in regard to Person is said notionally. Therefore, in God, power does not signify essence but relation.
Iª q. 41 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, in divinis non differt posse et agere. Sed generatio in divinis significat relationem. Ergo et potentia generandi. Objection 2. Further, in God, the power to act [posse] and 'to act' are not distinct. But in God, begetting signifies relation. Therefore, the same applies to the power of begetting.
Iª q. 41 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, ea quae significant essentiam in divinis, communia sunt tribus personis. Sed potentia generandi non est communis tribus personis, sed propria patri. Ergo non significat essentiam. Objection 3. Further, terms signifying the essence in God, are common to the three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to the three persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not signify the essence.
Iª q. 41 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod, sicut Deus potest generare filium, ita et vult. Sed voluntas generandi significat essentiam. Ergo et potentia generandi. On the contrary, As God has the power to beget the Son, so also He wills to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence. Therefore, also, the power to beget.
Iª q. 41 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod potentia generandi significat relationem in divinis. Sed hoc esse non potest. Nam illud proprie dicitur potentia in quocumque agente, quo agens agit. Omne autem producens aliquid per suam actionem, producit sibi simile quantum ad formam qua agit sicut homo genitus est similis generanti in natura humana, cuius virtute pater potest generare hominem. Illud ergo est potentia generativa in aliquo generante, in quo genitum similatur generanti. Filius autem Dei similatur patri gignenti in natura divina. Unde natura divina in patre, est potentia generandi in ipso. Unde et Hilarius dicit, in V de Trin., nativitas Dei non potest eam ex qua profecta est, non tenere naturam; nec enim aliud quam Deus subsistit, quod non aliunde quam de Deo subsistit. Sic igitur dicendum est quod potentia generandi principaliter significat divinam essentiam, ut Magister dicit, VII dist. I Sent.; non autem tantum relationem. Nec etiam essentiam inquantum est idem relationi, ut significet ex aequo utrumque. Licet enim paternitas ut forma patris significetur, est tamen proprietas personalis, habens se ad personam patris, ut forma individualis ad aliquod individuum creatum. Forma autem individualis, in rebus creatis, constituit personam generantem, non autem est quo generans generat, alioquin Socrates generaret Socratem. Unde neque paternitas potest intelligi ut quo pater generat, sed ut constituens personam generantis, alioquin pater generaret patrem. Sed id quo pater generat, est natura divina, in qua sibi filius assimilatur. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod generatio est opus naturae, non sicut generantis, sed sicut eius quo generans generat. Et ideo potentia generandi significat in recto naturam divinam, sed in obliquo relationem. I answer that, Some have said that the power to beget signifies relation in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is properly called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that produces something by its action, produces something like itself, as to the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter in his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the power to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power of begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter. Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is in Him the power of begetting. And so Hilary says (De Trin. v): "The birth of God cannot but contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot subsist other than God, Who subsists from no other source than God." We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies principally the divine essence as the Master says (Sent. i, D, vii), and not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as identified with the relation, so as to signify both equally. For although paternity is signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal property, being in respect to the person of the Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature. Now the individual form in things created constitutes the person begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither can paternity be understood as that by which the Father begets, but as constituting the person of the Father, otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by which the Father begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like to Him. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that generation is the "work of nature," not of nature generating, but of nature, as being that by which the generator generates. And therefore the power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly, but the relation indirectly.
Iª q. 41 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod potentia non significat ipsam relationem principii, alioquin esset in genere relationis, sed significat id quod est principium; non quidem sicut agens dicitur principium, sed sicut id quo agens agit, dicitur principium agens autem distinguitur a facto, et generans a generato, sed id quo generans generat, est commune genito et generanti; et tanto perfectius, quanto perfectior fuerit generatio. Unde, cum divina generatio sit perfectissima, id quo generans generat, est commune genito et generanti, et idem numero, non solum specie, sicut in rebus creatis. Per hoc ergo quod dicimus quod essentia divina est principium quo generans generat, non sequitur quod essentia divina distinguatur; sicut sequeretur, si diceretur quod essentia divina generat. Reply to Objection 1. Power does not signify the relation itself of a principle, for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it signifies that which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in which we call the agent a principle, but in the sense of being that by which the agent acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and the generator from that which it generates: but that by which the generator generates is common to generated and generator, and so much more perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since, therefore, the divine generation is most perfect, that by which the Begetter begets, is common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity, and not only of species, as in things created. Therefore, from the fact that we say that the divine essence "is the principle by which the Begetter begets," it does not follow that the divine essence is distinct (from the Begotten): which would follow if we were to say that the divine essence begets.
Iª q. 41 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sic est idem in divinis potentia generandi cum generatione, sicut essentia divina cum generatione et paternitate est idem re, sed non ratione. Reply to Objection 2. As in God, the power of begetting is the same as the act of begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as the act of begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of reason.
Iª q. 41 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dico potentiam generandi, potentia significatur in recto, et generatio in obliquo; sicut si dicerem essentiam patris. Unde quantum ad essentiam quae significatur, potentia generandi communis est tribus personis, sed quantum ad notionem quae connotatur, propria est personae patris. Reply to Objection 3. When I speak of the "power of begetting," power is signified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say, the "essence of the Father." Wherefore in respect of the essence, which is signified, the power of begetting is common to the three persons: but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the person of the Father.
Iª q. 41 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus notionalis ad plures personas terminari possit, ita quod sint plures personae genitae vel spiratae in divinis. Cuicumque enim inest potentia generandi, potest generare. Sed filio inest potentia generandi. Ergo potest generare. Non autem seipsum. Ergo alium filium. Ergo possunt esse plures filii in divinis. Objection 1. It would seem that a notional act can be directed to several Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or spirated in God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But the Son has the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He cannot beget Himself: therefore He can beget another son. Therefore there can be several Sons in God.
Iª q. 41 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, contra Maximinum, filius non genuit creatorem. Neque enim non potuit, sed non oportuit. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 12): "The Son did not beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved Him not."
Iª q. 41 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, Deus pater est potentior ad generandum quam pater creatus. Sed unus homo potest generare plures filios. Ergo et Deus, praecipue cum potentia patris, uno filio generato, non diminuatur. Objection 3. Further, God the Father has greater power to beget than has a created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore God can also: the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished after begetting the Son.
Iª q. 41 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod in divinis non differt esse et posse. Si igitur in divinis possent esse plures filii, essent plures filii. Et ita essent plures personae quam tres in divinis, quod est haereticum. On the contrary, In God "that which is possible," and "that which is" do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be more than three Persons in God; which is heretical.
Iª q. 41 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Athanasius dicit, in divinis est tantum unus pater, unus filius, unus spiritus sanctus. Cuius quidem ratio quadruplex assignari potest. Prima quidem ex parte relationum, quibus solum personae distinguuntur. Cum enim personae divinae sint ipsae relationes subsistentes, non possent esse plures patres vel plures filii in divinis, nisi essent plures paternitates et plures filiationes. Quod quidem esse non posset nisi secundum materialem rerum distinctionem, formae enim unius speciei non multiplicantur nisi secundum materiam, quae in divinis non est. Unde in divinis non potest esse nisi una tantum filiatio subsistens; sicut et albedo subsistens non posset esse nisi una. Secunda vero ex modo processionum. Quia Deus omnia intelligit et vult uno et simplici actu. Unde non potest esse nisi una persona procedens per modum verbi, quae est filius; et una tantum per modum amoris, quae est spiritus sanctus. Tertia ratio sumitur ex modo procedendi. Quia personae ipsae procedunt naturaliter, ut dictum est, natura autem determinatur ad unum. Quarta ex perfectione divinarum personarum. Ex hoc enim est perfectus filius, quod tota filiatio divina in eo continetur, et quod est tantum unus filius. Et similiter dicendum est de aliis personis. I answer that, As Athanasius says, in God there is only "one Father, one Son, one Holy Ghost." For this four reasons may be given. The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or several Sons in God, unless there were more than one paternity, or more than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except owing to a material distinction: since forms of one species are not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God. Wherefore there can be but one subsistent filiation in God: just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness. The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there can be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which person is the Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of love, which person is the Holy Ghost. The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said (2), and nature is determined to one. The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons. For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation is contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is similar in regard to the other persons.
Iª q. 41 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis simpliciter concedendum sit quod potentiam quam habet pater, habeat filius; non tamen concedendum est quod filius habeat potentiam generandi, si generandi sit gerundivum verbi activi, ut sit sensus quod filius habeat potentiam ad generandum. Sicut, licet idem esse sit patris et filii, non tamen convenit filio esse patrem, propter notionale adiunctum. Si tamen hoc quod dico generandi, sit gerundivum verbi passivi, potentia generandi est in filio, idest ut generetur. Et similiter si sit gerundivum verbi impersonalis, ut sit sensus, potentia generandi, idest qua ab aliqua persona generatur. Reply to Objection 1. We can grant, without distinction, that the Son has the same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has the power "generandi" [of begetting] thus taking "generandi" as the gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has the "power to beget." Just as, although Father and Son have the same being, it does not follow that the Son is the Father, by reason of the notional term added. But if the word "generandi" [of being begotten] is taken as the gerundive of the passive verb, the power "generandi" is in the Son--that is, the power of being begotten. The same is to be said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the sense be "the power of generation"--that is, a power by which it is generated by some person.
Iª q. 41 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus in verbis illis non intendit dicere quod filius posset generare filium, sed quod hoc non est ex impotentia filii, quod non generet, ut infra patebit. Reply to Objection 2. Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the Son could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not because He could not, as we shall see later on (42, 6, ad 3).
Iª q. 41 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod immaterialitas et perfectio divina requirit ut non possint esse plures filii in divinis, sicut dictum est. Unde quod non sint plures filii, non est ex impotentia patris ad generandum. Reply to Objection 3. Divine perfection and the total absence of matter in God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have explained. Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to any lack of begetting power in the Father.

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