Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q39

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Q38 Q40



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Iª q. 39 pr. Post ea quae de personis divinis absolute tractata sunt, considerandum restat de personis in comparatione ad essentiam, et ad proprietates, et ad actus notionales; et de comparatione ipsarum ad invicem. Quantum igitur ad primum horum, octo quaeruntur. Primo, utrum essentia in divinis sit idem quod persona. Secundo, utrum dicendum sit quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae. Tertio, utrum nomina essentialia praedicanda sint de personis in plurali vel in singulari. Quarto, utrum adiectiva notionalia, aut verba vel participia, praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus concretive acceptis. Quinto, utrum praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus in abstracto acceptis. Sexto, utrum nomina personarum praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus concretis. Septimo, utrum essentialia attributa sint approprianda personis. Octavo, quod attributum cuique personae debeat appropriari.
Iª q. 39 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in divinis essentia non sit idem quod persona. In quibuscumque enim essentia est idem quod persona seu suppositum, oportet quod sit tantum unum suppositum unius naturae, ut patet in omnibus substantiis separatis, eorum enim quae sunt idem re, unum multiplicari non potest, quin multiplicetur et reliquum. Sed in divinis est una essentia et tres personae, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo essentia non est idem quod persona. Objection 1. It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as person. For whenever essence is the same as person or "suppositum," there can be only one "suppositum" of one nature, as is clear in the case of all separate substances. For in those things which are really one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But in God there is one essence and three persons, as is clear from what is above expounded (28, 3; 30, 2). Therefore essence is not the same as person.
Iª q. 39 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, affirmatio et negatio simul et semel non verificantur de eodem. Sed affirmatio et negatio verificantur de essentia et persona, nam persona est distincta, essentia vero non est distincta. Ergo persona et essentia non sunt idem. Objection 2. Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same.
Iª q. 39 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, nihil subiicitur sibi ipsi. Sed persona subiicitur essentiae, unde suppositum vel hypostasis nominatur. Ergo persona non est idem quod essentia. Objection 3. Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is subject to essence; whence it is called "suppositum" or "hypostasis." Therefore person is not the same as essence.
Iª q. 39 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VII de Trin., cum dicimus personam patris, non aliud dicimus quam substantiam patris. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): "When we say the person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father."
Iª q. 39 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod considerantibus divinam simplicitatem, quaestio ista in manifesto habet veritatem. Ostensum est enim supra quod divina simplicitas hoc requirit, quod in Deo sit idem essentia et suppositum; quod in substantiis intellectualibus nihil est aliud quam persona. Sed difficultatem videtur ingerere quod, multiplicatis personis divinis, essentia retinet unitatem. Et quia, ut Boetius dicit, relatio multiplicat personarum Trinitatem, posuerunt aliqui hoc modo in divinis differre essentiam et personam, quo et relationes dicebant esse assistentes, considerantes in relationibus solum quod ad alterum sunt, et non quod res sunt. Sed, sicut supra ostensum est, sicut relationes in rebus creatis accidentaliter insunt, ita in Deo sunt ipsa essentia divina. Ex quo sequitur quod in Deo non sit aliud essentia quam persona secundum rem; et tamen quod personae realiter ab invicem distinguantur. Persona enim, ut dictum est supra, significat relationem, prout est subsistens in natura divina. Relatio autem, ad essentiam comparata, non differt re, sed ratione tantum, comparata autem ad oppositam relationem, habet, virtute oppositionis, realem distinctionem. Et sic remanet una essentia, et tres personae. I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (3, 3) that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as "suppositum," which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), "relation multiplies the Trinity of persons," some have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be "adjacent"; considering only in the relations the idea of "reference to another," and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above (28, 2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated (29, 4), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.
Iª q. 39 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in creaturis non potest esse distinctio suppositorum per relationes, sed oportet quod sit per essentialia principia, quia relationes non sunt subsistentes in creaturis. In divinis autem relationes sunt subsistentes, et ideo, secundum quod habent oppositionem ad invicem, possunt distinguere supposita. Neque tamen distinguitur essentia, quia relationes ipsae non distinguuntur ab invicem secundum quod sunt realiter idem cum essentia. Reply to Objection 1. There cannot be a distinction of "suppositum" in creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles; because in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between them they distinguish the "supposita"; and yet the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence.
Iª q. 39 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, inquantum essentia et persona in divinis differunt secundum intelligentiae rationem, sequitur quod aliquid possit affirmari de uno, quod negatur de altero, et per consequens quod, supposito uno, non supponatur alterum. Reply to Objection 2. As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other.
Iª q. 39 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod rebus divinis nomina imponimus secundum modum rerum creatarum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia naturae rerum creatarum individuantur per materiam, quae subiicitur naturae speciei, inde est quod individua dicuntur subiecta, vel supposita, vel hypostases. Et propter hoc etiam divinae personae supposita vel hypostases nominantur, non quod ibi sit aliqua suppositio vel subiectio secundum rem. Reply to Objection 3. Divine things are named by us after the way of created things, as above explained (13, 1,3). And since created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature, it follows that individuals are called "subjects," "supposita," or "hypostases." So the divine persons are named "supposita" or "hypostases," but not as if there really existed any real "supposition" or "subjection."
Iª q. 39 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit dicendum tres personas esse unius essentiae. Dicit enim Hilarius, in libro de Synod., quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt quidem per substantiam tria, per consonantiam vero unum. Sed substantia Dei est eius essentia. Ergo tres personae non sunt unius essentiae. Objection 1. It would seem not right to say that the three persons are of one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost "are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony." But the substance of God is His essence. Therefore the three persons are not of one essence.
Iª q. 39 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, non est affirmandum aliquid de divinis, quod auctoritate Scripturae sacrae non est expressum, ut patet per Dionysium, I cap. de Div. Nom. Sed nunquam in Scriptura sacra exprimitur quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt unius essentiae. Ergo hoc non est asserendum. Objection 2. Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted.
Iª q. 39 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, natura divina est idem quod essentia. Sufficeret ergo dicere quod tres personae sunt unius naturae. Objection 3. Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence. It suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature.
Iª q. 39 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, non consuevit dici quod persona sit essentiae, sed magis quod essentia sit personae. Ergo neque convenienter videtur dici quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae. Objection 4. Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore it does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one essence.
Iª q. 39 a. 2 arg. 5 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit quod non dicimus tres personas esse ex una essentia, ne intelligatur in divinis aliud esse essentia et persona. Sed sicut praepositiones sunt transitivae, ita et obliqui. Ergo, pari ratione, non est dicendum quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae. Objection 5. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say that the three persons are "from one essence [ex una essentia]," lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the persons in God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three persons are "of one essence [unius essentiae]."
Iª q. 39 a. 2 arg. 6 Praeterea, id quod potest esse erroris occasio, non est in divinis dicendum. Sed cum dicuntur tres personae unius essentiae vel substantiae datur erroris occasio. Quia, ut Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., una substantia patris et filii praedicata, aut unum qui duas nuncupationes habeat, subsistentem significat; aut divisam unam substantiam duas imperfectas fecisse substantias; aut tertiam priorem substantiam, quae a duobus et usurpata sit et assumpta. Non est ergo dicendum tres personas esse unius substantiae. Objection 6. Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion of error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence or substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (De Synod.): "One substance predicated of the Father and the Son signifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or one substance divided into two imperfect substances; or a third prior substance taken and assumed by the other two." Therefore it must not be said that the three persons are of one substance.
Iª q. 39 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro II contra Maximinum, quod hoc nomen homousion, quod in Concilio Nicaeno adversus Arianos firmatum est, idem significat quod tres personas esse unius essentiae. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word homoousion, which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians, means that the three persons are of one essence.
Iª q. 39 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, intellectus noster res divinas nominat, non secundum modum earum, quia sic eas cognoscere non potest; sed secundum modum in rebus creatis inventum. Et quia in rebus sensibilibus, a quibus intellectus noster scientiam capit, natura alicuius speciei per materiam individuatur; et sic natura se habet ut forma, individuum autem ut suppositum formae, propter hoc etiam in divinis, quantum ad modum significandi, essentia significatur ut forma trium personarum. Dicimus autem in rebus creatis formam quamcumque esse eius cuius est forma; sicut sanitatem vel pulchritudinem hominis alicuius. Rem autem habentem formam non dicimus esse formae, nisi cum adiectione alicuius adiectivi, quod designat illam formam, ut cum dicimus, ista mulier est egregiae formae, iste homo est perfectae virtutis. Et similiter, quia in divinis, multiplicatis personis, non multiplicatur essentia, dicimus unam essentiam esse trium personarum; et tres personas unius essentiae, ut intelligantur isti genitivi construi in designatione formae. I answer that, As above explained (13, 1,2), divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for in that way it knows them not; but in a way that belongs to things created. And as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect derives its knowledge, the nature of the species is made individual by the matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is the "suppositum" of the form; so also in God the essence is taken as the form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification. Now in creatures we say that every form belongs to that whereof it is the form; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we do not say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form, unless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: "That woman is of a handsome figure," or: "This man is of perfect virtue." In like manner, as in God the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not multiplied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and three persons of the one essence, provided that these genitives be understood as designating the form.
Iª q. 39 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantia sumitur pro hypostasi; et non pro essentia. Reply to Objection 1. Substance is here taken for the "hypostasis," and not for the essence.
Iª q. 39 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet tres personas esse unius essentiae non inveniatur in sacra Scriptura per haec verba, invenitur tamen quantum ad hunc sensum, sicut ibi, ego et pater unum sumus; et, ego in patre, et pater in me est. Et per multa alia haberi potest idem. Reply to Objection 2. Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so many words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless we find it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance, "I and the Father are one (Jn. 10:30)," and "I am in the Father, and the Father in Me (Jn. 10:38)"; and there are many other texts of the same import.
Iª q. 39 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia natura designat principium actus, essentia vero ab essendo dicitur, possunt dici aliqua unius naturae, quae conveniunt in aliquo actu, sicut omnia calefacientia, sed unius essentiae dici non possunt, nisi quorum est unum esse. Et ideo magis exprimitur unitas divina per hoc quod dicitur quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae, quam si diceretur quod sunt unius naturae. Reply to Objection 3. Because "nature" designates the principle of action while "essence" comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but only those things can be said to be of "one essence" which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are "of one essence," than by saying they are "of one nature."
Iª q. 39 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod forma, absolute accepta, consuevit significari ut eius cuius est forma, ut virtus Petri. E converso autem, res habens formam aliquam non consuevit significari ut eius, nisi cum volumus determinare sive designare formam. Et tunc requiruntur duo genitivi, quorum unus significet formam, et alius determinationem formae, ut si dicatur, Petrus est magnae virtutis, vel etiam requiritur unus genitivus habens vim duorum genitivorum, ut cum dicitur, vir sanguinum est iste, idest effusor multi sanguinis. Quia igitur essentia divina significatur ut forma respectu personae, convenienter essentia personae dicitur. Non autem e converso, nisi aliquid addatur ad designationem essentiae; ut si dicatur quod pater est persona divinae essentiae, vel quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae. Reply to Objection 4. Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say "the virtue of Peter." On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one signifying the form, and the other signifying the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say, "Peter is of great virtue [magnae virtutis]," or else one genitive must have the force of two, as, for instance, "he is a man of blood"--that is, he is a man who sheds much blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be said that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add some term to designate the essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the "divine essence"; or, the three persons are "of one essence."
Iª q. 39 a. 2 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod haec praepositio ex vel de non designat habitudinem causae formalis, sed magis habitudinem causae efficientis vel materialis. Quae quidem causae in omnibus distinguuntur ab his quorum sunt causae, nihil enim est sua materia, neque aliquid est suum principium activum. Aliquid tamen est sua forma, ut patet in omnibus rebus immaterialibus. Et ideo per hoc quod dicimus tres personas unius essentiae, significando essentiam in habitudine formae, non ostenditur aliud esse essentia quam persona, quod ostenderetur, si diceremus tres personas ex eadem essentia. Reply to Objection 5. The preposition "from" or "out of" does not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an efficient or material cause; which causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For nothing can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So, when we say, "three persons of one essence," taking essence as having the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different from person, which we should mean if we said, "three persons from the same essence."
Iª q. 39 a. 2 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod, sicut Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., male sanctis rebus praeiudicatur, si, quia non sanctae a quibusdam habentur, esse non debeant. Sic, si male intelligitur homousion, quid ad me bene intelligentem? Sit ergo una substantia ex naturae genitae proprietate, non sit autem ex portione, aut ex unione, aut ex communione. Reply to Objection 6. As Hilary says (De Synod.): "It would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do not think them holy. So if some misunderstand homoousion, what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The oneness of nature does not result from division, or from union or from community of possession, but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son."
Iª q. 39 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia, ut hoc nomen Deus, non praedicentur singulariter de tribus personis, sed pluraliter. Sicut enim homo significatur ut habens humanitatem, ita Deus significatur ut habens deitatem. Sed tres personae sunt tres habentes deitatem. Ergo tres personae sunt tres dii. Objection 1. It would seem that essential names, as the name "God," should not be predicated in the singular of the three persons, but in the plural. For as "man" signifies "one that has humanity," so God signifies "one that has Godhead." But the three persons are three who have Godhead. Therefore the three persons are "three Gods."
Iª q. 39 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, Gen. I, ubi dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, Hebraica veritas habet Elohim, quod potest interpretari dii, sive iudices. Et hoc dicitur propter pluralitatem personarum. Ergo tres personae sunt plures dii, et non unus Deus. Objection 2. Further, Gn. 1:1, where it is said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," the Hebrew original has "Elohim," which may be rendered "Gods" or "Judges": and this word is used on account of the plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are "several Gods," and not "one" God.
Iª q. 39 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, hoc nomen res, cum absolute dicatur, videtur ad substantiam pertinere. Sed hoc nomen pluraliter praedicatur de tribus personis, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Doctr. Christ., res quibus fruendum est, sunt pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Ergo et alia nomina essentialia pluraliter praedicari possunt de tribus personis. Objection 3. Further, this word "thing" when it is said absolutely, seems to belong to substance. But it is predicated of the three persons in the plural. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "The things that are the objects of our future glory are the Father, Son and Holy Ghost." Therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural of the three persons.
Iª q. 39 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, sicut hoc nomen Deus significat habentem deitatem, ita hoc nomen persona significat subsistentem in natura aliqua intellectuali. Sed dicimus tres personas. Ergo, eadem ratione, dicere possumus tres deos. Objection 4. Further, as this word "God" signifies "a being who has Deity," so also this word "person" signifies a being subsisting in an intellectual nature. But we say there are three persons. So for the same reason we can say there are "three Gods."
Iª q. 39 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, audi, Israel, dominus Deus tuus, Deus unus est. On the contrary, It is said (Dt. 6:4): "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God."
Iª q. 39 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nominum essentialium quaedam significant essentiam substantive, quaedam vero adiective. Ea quidem quae substantive essentiam significant, praedicantur de tribus personis singulariter tantum, et non pluraliter, quae vero adiective essentiam significant, praedicantur de tribus personis in plurali. Cuius ratio est, quia nomina substantiva significant aliquid per modum substantiae, nomina vero adiectiva significant aliquid per modum accidentis, quod inhaeret subiecto. Substantia autem, sicut per se habet esse, ita per se habet unitatem vel multitudinem, unde et singularitas vel pluralitas nominis substantivi attenditur secundum formam significatam per nomen. Accidentia autem, sicut esse habent in subiecto, ita ex subiecto suscipiunt unitatem et multitudinem, et ideo in adiectivis attenditur singularitas et pluralitas secundum supposita. In creaturis autem non invenitur una forma in pluribus suppositis nisi unitate ordinis, ut forma multitudinis ordinatae. Unde nomina significantia talem formam, si sint substantiva, praedicantur de pluribus in singulari, non autem si sint adiectiva. Dicimus enim quod multi homines sunt collegium vel exercitus aut populus, dicimus tamen quod plures homines sunt collegiati. In divinis autem essentia divina significatur per modum formae, ut dictum est quae quidem simplex est et maxime una, ut supra ostensum est. Unde nomina significantia divinam essentiam substantive, singulariter, et non pluraliter, de tribus personis praedicantur. Haec igitur est ratio quare Socratem et Platonem et Ciceronem dicimus tres homines; patrem autem et filium et spiritum sanctum non dicimus tres deos, sed unum Deum, quia in tribus suppositis humanae naturae sunt tres humanitates; in tribus autem personis est una divina essentia. Ea vero quae significant essentiam adiective, praedicantur pluraliter de tribus, propter pluralitatem suppositorum. Dicimus enim tres existentes vel tres sapientes, aut tres aeternos et increatos et immensos, si adiective sumantur. Si vero substantive sumantur, dicimus unum increatum, immensum et aeternum, ut Athanasius dicit. I answer that, Some essential names signify the essence after the manner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of adjectives. Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of the three persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives signify something by way of substance, while adjectives signify something by way of accident, which adheres to a subject. Now just as substance has existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity or multitude; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon the form signified by the name. But as accidents have their existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality from their subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of adjectives depends upon their "supposita." In creatures, one form does not exist in several "supposita" except by unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude. So if the names signifying such a form are substantives, they are predicated of many in the singular, but otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that many men are a college, or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are collegians. Now in God the divine essence is signified by way of a form, as above explained (2), which, indeed, is simple and supremely one, as shown above (3, 7; 11, 4). So, names which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons in the singular, and not in the plural. This, then, is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are "three men"; whereas we do not say the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are "three Gods," but "one God"; forasmuch as in the three "supposita" of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in the three divine Persons there is but one divine essence. On the other hand, the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of the three persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of "supposita." For we say there are three "existent" or three "wise" beings, or three "eternal," "uncreated," and "immense" beings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if taken in a substantive sense, we say "one uncreated, immense, eternal being," as Athanasius declares.
Iª q. 39 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet Deus significet habentem deitatem, est tamen alius modus significandi, nam Deus dicitur substantive, sed habens deitatem dicitur adiective. Unde, licet sint tres habentes deitatem, non tamen sequitur quod sint tres dii. Reply to Objection 1. Though the name "God" signifies a being having Godhead, nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name "God" is used substantively; whereas "having Godhead" is used adjectively. Consequently, although there are "three having Godhead," it does not follow that there are three Gods.
Iª q. 39 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod diversae linguae habent diversum modum loquendi. Unde, sicut propter pluralitatem suppositorum Graeci dicunt tres hypostases, ita et in Hebraeo dicitur pluraliter Elohim. Nos autem non dicimus pluraliter neque deos neque substantias, ne pluralitas ad substantiam referatur. Reply to Objection 2. Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So as by reason of the plurality of "supposita" the Greeks said "three hypostases," so also in Hebrew "Elohim" is in the plural. We, however, do not apply the plural either to "God" or to "substance," lest plurality be referred to the substance.
Iª q. 39 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc nomen res est de transcendentibus. Unde, secundum quod pertinet ad relationem, pluraliter praedicatur in divinis, secundum vero quod pertinet ad substantiam, singulariter praedicatur. Unde Augustinus dicit ibidem quod eadem Trinitas quaedam summa res est. Reply to Objection 3. This word "thing" is one of the transcendentals. Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God in the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the passage quoted, that "the same Trinity is a thing supreme."
Iª q. 39 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod forma significata per hoc nomen persona, non est essentia vel natura, sed personalitas. Unde, cum sint tres personalitates, idest tres personales proprietates, in patre et filio et spiritu sancto, non singulariter, sed pluraliter praedicatur de tribus. Reply to Objection 4. The form signified by the word "person" is not essence or nature, but personality. So, as there are three personalities--that is, three personal properties in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost--it is predicated of the three, not in the singular, but in the plural.
Iª q. 39 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia concretiva non possunt supponere pro persona, ita quod haec sit vera, Deus genuit Deum. Quia, ut sophistae dicunt, terminus singularis idem significat et supponit. Sed hoc nomen Deus videtur esse terminus singularis, cum pluraliter praedicari non possit, ut dictum est. Ergo, cum significet essentiam, videtur quod supponat pro essentia, et non pro persona. Objection 1. It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly say "God begot God." For, as the logicians say, "a singular term signifies what it stands for." But this name "God" seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be predicated in the plural, as above explained (3). Therefore, since it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person.
Iª q. 39 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, terminus in subiecto positus non restringitur per terminum positum in praedicato, ratione significationis; sed solum ratione temporis consignificati. Sed cum dico, Deus creat, hoc nomen Deus supponit pro essentia. Ergo cum dicitur, Deus genuit, non potest iste terminus Deus, ratione praedicati notionalis, supponere pro persona. Objection 2. Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense signified in the predicate. But when I say, "God creates," this name "God" stands for the essence. So when we say "God begot," this term "God" cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person.
Iª q. 39 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, si haec est vera, Deus genuit, quia pater generat; pari ratione haec erit vera, Deus non generat, quia filius non generat. Ergo est Deus generans, et Deus non generans. Et ita videtur sequi quod sint duo dii. Objection 3. Further, if this be true, "God begot," because the Father generates; for the same reason this is true, "God does not beget," because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets, and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that there are two Gods.
Iª q. 39 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, si Deus genuit Deum, aut se Deum, aut alium Deum. Sed non se Deum, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., nulla res generat seipsam. Neque alium Deum, quia non est nisi unus Deus. Ergo haec est falsa, Deus genuit Deum. Objection 4. Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God, that is Himself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself; for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), "nothing begets itself." Neither did He beget another God; as there is only one God. Therefore it is false to say, "God begot God."
Iª q. 39 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, si Deus genuit Deum, aut Deum qui est Deus pater, aut Deum qui non est Deus pater. Si Deum qui est Deus pater, ergo Deus pater est genitus. Si Deum qui non est Deus pater, ergo Deus est qui non est Deus pater, quod est falsum. Non ergo potest dici quod Deus genuit Deum. Objection 5. Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then God the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it cannot be said that "God begot God."
Iª q. 39 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod in symbolo dicitur Deum de Deo. On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, "God of God."
Iª q. 39 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod hoc nomen Deus, et similia, proprie secundum suam naturam supponunt pro essentia, sed ex adiuncto notionali trahuntur ad supponendum pro persona. Et haec opinio processisse videtur ex consideratione divinae simplicitatis, quae requirit quod in Deo idem sit habens et quod habetur, et sic habens deitatem, quod significat hoc nomen Deus, est idem quod deitas. Sed in proprietatibus locutionum, non tantum attendenda est res significata; sed etiam modus significandi. Et ideo, quia hoc nomen Deus significat divinam essentiam ut in habente ipsam, sicut hoc nomen homo humanitatem significat in supposito; alii melius dixerunt quod hoc nomen Deus ex modo significandi habet ut proprie possit supponere pro persona, sicut et hoc nomen homo. Quandoque ergo hoc nomen Deus supponit pro essentia, ut cum dicitur, Deus creat, quia hoc praedicatum competit subiecto ratione formae significatae, quae est deitas. Quandoque vero supponit personam, vel unam tantum, ut cum dicitur, Deus generat; vel duas, ut cum dicitur Deus spirat; vel tres, ut cum dicitur, regi saeculorum immortali, invisibili, soli Deo etc., I Tim. I. I answer that, Some have said that this name "God" and the like, properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which requires that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be the same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name God, is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no less than the thing signified. Hence as this word "God" signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man" signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person, as does the word "man." So this word "God" sometimes stands for the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified--that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person, either for only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when we say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said: "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. (1 Tim. 1:17).
Iª q. 39 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus, licet conveniat cum terminis singularibus in hoc, quod forma significata non multiplicatur; convenit tamen cum terminis communibus in hoc, quod forma significata invenitur in pluribus suppositis. Unde non oportet quod semper supponat pro essentia quam significat. Reply to Objection 1. Although this name "God" agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in several "supposita." So it need not always stand for the essence it signifies.
Iª q. 39 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit contra illos qui dicebant quod hoc nomen Deus non habet naturalem suppositionem pro persona. Reply to Objection 2. This holds good against those who say that the word "God" does not naturally stand for person.
Iª q. 39 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliter se habet hoc nomen Deus ad supponendum pro persona, et hoc nomen homo. Quia enim forma significata per hoc nomen homo, idest humanitas, realiter dividitur in diversis suppositis, per se supponit pro persona; etiamsi nihil addatur quod determinet ipsum ad personam, quae est suppositum distinctum. Unitas autem sive communitas humanae naturae non est secundum rem, sed solum secundum considerationem, unde iste terminus homo non supponit pro natura communi, nisi propter exigentiam alicuius additi, ut cum dicitur, homo est species. Sed forma significata per hoc nomen Deus, scilicet essentia divina, est una et communis secundum rem. Unde per se supponit pro natura communi, sed ex adiuncto determinatur eius suppositio ad personam. Unde cum dicitur, Deus generat, ratione actus notionalis supponit hoc nomen Deus pro persona patris. Sed cum dicitur, Deus non generat, nihil additur quod determinet hoc nomen ad personam filii, unde datur intelligi quod generatio repugnet divinae naturae. Sed si addatur aliquid pertinens ad personam filii, vera erit locutio; ut si dicatur, Deus genitus non generat. Unde etiam non sequitur, est Deus generans et est Deus non generans, nisi ponatur aliquid pertinens ad personas; ut puta si dicamus, pater est Deus generans, et filius est Deus non generans. Et ita non sequitur quod sint plures dii, quia pater et filius sunt unus Deus, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. The word "God" stands for the person in a different way from that in which this word "man" does; for since the form signified by this word "man"--that is, humanity--is really divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person--that is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the human nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence this term "man" does not stand for the common nature, unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say, "man is a species"; whereas the form signified by the name "God"--that is, the divine essence--is really one and common. So of itself it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the person. So, when we say, "God generates," by reason of the notional act this name "God" stands for the person of the Father. But when we say, "God does not generate," there is no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something be added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, for instance, "God begotten does not beget," is true. Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a "God generator," and a "God not generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, "the Father is God the generator" and the "Son is God the non-generator" and so it does not follow that there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one God, as was said above (3).
Iª q. 39 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod haec est falsa, pater genuit se Deum, quia ly se, cum sit reciprocum, refert idem suppositum. Neque est contrarium quod Augustinus dicit, ad maximum, quod Deus pater genuit alterum se. Quia ly se vel est casus ablativi; ut sit sensus, genuit alterum a se. Vel facit relationem simplicem, et sic refert identitatem naturae, sed est impropria vel emphatica locutio, ut sit sensus, genuit alterum simillimum sibi. Similiter et haec est falsa, genuit alium Deum. Quia licet filius sit alius a patre, ut supra dictum est, non tamen est dicendum quod sit alius Deus, quia intelligeretur quod hoc adiectivum alius poneret rem suam circa substantivum quod est Deus; et sic significaretur distinctio deitatis. Quidam tamen concedunt istam, genuit alium Deum, ita quod ly alius sit substantivum, et ly Deus appositive construatur cum eo. Sed hic est improprius modus loquendi, et evitandus, ne detur occasio erroris. Reply to Objection 4. This is false, "the Father begot God, that is Himself," because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal term, refers to the same "suppositum." Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi ad Maxim.) that "God the Father begot another self [alterum se]," forasmuch as the word "se" is either in the ablative case, and then it means "He begot another from Himself," or it indicates a single relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however, either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really mean, "He begot another most like to Himself." Likewise also it is false to say, "He begot another God," because although the Son is another than the Father, as above explained (31, 2), nevertheless it cannot be said that He is "another God"; forasmuch as this adjective "another" would be understood to apply to the substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another God" is tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken as a substantive, and the word "God" be construed in apposition with it. This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to error.
Iª q. 39 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod haec est falsa, Deus genuit Deum qui est Deus pater, quia, cum ly pater appositive construatur cum ly Deus, restringit ipsum ad standum pro persona patris; ut sit sensus, genuit Deum qui est ipse pater, et sic pater esset genitus, quod est falsum. Unde negativa est vera, genuit Deum qui non est Deus pater. Si tamen intelligeretur constructio non esse appositiva, sed aliquid esse interponendum; tunc e converso affirmativa esset vera, et negativa falsa; ut sit sensus, genuit Deum qui est Deus qui est pater. Sed haec est extorta expositio. Unde melius est quod simpliciter affirmativa negetur, et negativa concedatur. Praepositivus tamen dixit quod tam negativa quam affirmativa est falsa. Quia hoc relativum qui in affirmativa potest referre suppositum, sed in negativa refert et significatum et suppositum. Unde sensus affirmativae est, quod esse Deum patrem conveniat personae filii. Negativae vero sensus est, quod esse Deum patrem non tantum removeatur a persona filii, sed etiam a divinitate eius sed hoc irrationabile videtur, cum, secundum philosophum, de eodem de quo est affirmatio, possit etiam esse negatio. Reply to Objection 5. To say, "God begot God Who is God the Father," is wrong, because since the word "Father" is construed in apposition to "God," the word "God" is restricted to the person of the Father; so that it would mean, "He begot God, Who is Himself the Father"; and then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false. Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, "He begot God Who is not God the Father." If however, we understand these words not to be in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is false; so that the meaning would be, "He begot God Who is God Who is the Father." Such a rendering however appears to be forced, so that it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative are false, because this relative "Who" in the affirmative proposition can be referred to the "suppositum"; whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the "suppositum." Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that "to be God the Father" is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the negative sense is that "to be God the Father," is to be removed from the Son's divinity as well as from His personality. This, however, appears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation.
Iª q. 39 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia in abstracto significata possint supponere pro persona, ita quod haec sit vera, essentia generat essentiam. Dicit enim Augustinus, VII de Trin., pater et filius sunt una sapientia, quia una essentia; et singillatim sapientia de sapientia, sicut essentia de essentia. Objection 1. It would seem that abstract essential names can stand for the person, so that this proposition is true, "Essence begets essence." For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): "The Father and the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken singly Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence."
Iª q. 39 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, generatis nobis vel corruptis, generantur vel corrumpuntur ea quae in nobis sunt. Sed filius generatur. Ergo, cum essentia divina sit in filio, videtur quod essentia divina generetur. Objection 2. Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is generated.
Iª q. 39 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, idem est Deus et essentia divina, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed haec est vera, Deus generat Deum, sicut dictum est. Ergo haec est vera, essentia generat essentiam. Objection 3. Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear from what is above explained (3, 3). But, as was shown, it is true to say that "God begets God." Therefore this is also true: "Essence begets essence."
Iª q. 39 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, de quocumque praedicatur aliquid, potest supponere pro illo. Sed essentia divina est pater. Ergo essentia potest supponere pro persona patris. Et sic essentia generat. Objection 4. Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence can stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.
Iª q. 39 a. 5 arg. 5 Praeterea, essentia est res generans, quia est pater, qui est generans. Si igitur essentia non sit generans, erit essentia res generans et non generans, quod est impossibile. Objection 5. Further, the essence is "a thing begetting," because the essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is not begetting, the essence will be "a thing begetting," and "not begetting": which cannot be.
Iª q. 39 a. 5 arg. 6 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., pater est principium totius deitatis. Sed non est principium nisi generando vel spirando. Ergo pater generat vel spirat deitatem. Objection 6. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Father is the principle of the whole Godhead." But He is principle only by begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the Godhead.
Iª q. 39 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod nulla res generat seipsam. Sed si essentia generat essentiam, non generat nisi seipsam, cum nihil sit in Deo, quod distinguatur a divina essentia. Ergo essentia non generat essentiam. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): "Nothing begets itself." But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only, since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence. Therefore the essence does not beget essence.
Iª q. 39 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc erravit abbas Ioachim, asserens quod, sicut dicitur, Deus genuit Deum, ita potest dici quod essentia genuit essentiam; considerans quod, propter divinam simplicitatem, non est aliud Deus quam divina essentia. Sed in hoc deceptus fuit, quia ad veritatem locutionum, non solum oportet considerare res significatas, sed etiam modum significandi ut dictum est. Licet autem, secundum re, sit idem Deus quod deitas, non tamen est idem modus significandi utrobique. Nam hoc nomen Deus, quia significat divinam essentiam ut in habente, ex modo suae significationis naturaliter habet quod possit supponere pro persona, et sic ea quae sunt propria personarum, possunt praedicari de hoc nomine Deus, ut dicatur quod Deus est genitus vel generans, sicut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen essentia non habet ex modo suae significationis quod supponat pro persona, quia significat essentiam ut formam abstractam. Et ideo ea quae sunt propria personarum, quibus ab invicem distinguuntur, non possunt essentiae attribui, significaretur enim quod esset distinctio in essentia divina, sicut est distinctio in suppositis. I answer that, Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in asserting that as we can say "God begot God," so we can say "Essence begot essence": considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity God is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong, because if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of its signification as above stated (4). Now although "God" is really the same as "Godhead," nevertheless the mode of signification is not in each case the same. For since this word "God" signifies the divine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can of its own nature stand for person. Thus the things which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of this word, "God," as, for instance, we can say "God is begotten" or is "Begetter," as above explained (4). The word "essence," however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the essence as an abstract form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the "supposita."
Iª q. 39 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, ad exprimendam unitatem essentiae et personae, sancti doctores aliquando expressius locuti sunt quam proprietas locutionis patiatur. Unde huiusmodi locutiones non sunt extendendae, sed exponendae, ut scilicet nomina abstracta exponantur per concreta, vel etiam per nomina personalia, ut, cum dicitur, essentia de essentia, vel sapientia de sapientia, sit sensus, filius, qui est essentia et sapientia, est de patre, qui est essentia et sapientia. In his tamen nominibus abstractis est quidam ordo attendendus, quia ea quae pertinent ad actum, magis propinque se habent ad personas, quia actus sunt suppositorum. Unde minus impropria est ista, natura de natura, vel sapientia de sapientia, quam essentia de essentia. Reply to Objection 1. To express unity of essence and of person, the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus, for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even by personal names; as when we find "essence from essence"; or "wisdom from wisdom"; we should take the sense to be, "the Son" who is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom. Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain order should be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the persons because actions belong to "supposita." So "nature from nature," and "wisdom from wisdom" are less inexact than "essence from essence."
Iª q. 39 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in creaturis generatum non accipit naturam eandem numero quam generans habet, sed aliam numero, quae incipit in eo esse per generationem de novo, et desinit esse per corruptionem, et ideo generatur et corrumpitur per accidens. Sed Deus genitus eandem naturam numero accipit quam generans habet. Et ideo natura divina in filio non generatur, neque per se neque per accidens. Reply to Objection 2. In creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either directly or accidentally.
Iª q. 39 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet Deus et divina essentia sint idem secundum rem, tamen, ratione alterius modi significandi, oportet loqui diversimode de utroque. Reply to Objection 3. Although God and the divine essence are really the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them.
Iª q. 39 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod essentia divina praedicatur de patre per modum identitatis, propter divinam simplicitatem, nec tamen sequitur quod possit supponere pro patre, propter diversum modum significandi. Ratio autem procederet in illis, quorum unum praedicatur de altero sicut universale de particulari. Reply to Objection 4. The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification being different. This objection would hold good as regards things which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.
Iª q. 39 a. 5 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod haec est differentia inter nomina substantiva et adiectiva, quia nomina substantiva ferunt suum suppositum, adiectiva vero non, sed rem significatam ponunt circa substantivum. Unde sophistae dicunt quod nomina substantiva supponunt; adiectiva vero non supponunt, sed copulant. Nomina igitur personalia substantiva possunt de essentia praedicari, propter identitatem rei, neque sequitur quod proprietas personalis distinctam determinet essentiam; sed ponitur circa suppositum importatum per nomen substantivum. Sed notionalia et personalia adiectiva non possunt praedicari de essentia, nisi aliquo substantivo adiuncto. Unde non possumus dicere quod essentia est generans. Possumus tamen dicere quod essentia est res generans, vel Deus generans, si res et Deus supponant pro persona, non autem si supponant pro essentia. Unde non est contradictio, si dicatur quod essentia est res generans, et res non generans, quia primo res tenetur pro persona, secundo pro essentia. Reply to Objection 5. The difference between substantive and adjectival names consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them, whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is considered in the light of "suppositum," whereas the adjective indicates something added to the "suppositum." Therefore substantive personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a distinct essence; but it belongs to the "suppositum" implied in the substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that the "essence is begetting"; yet we can say that the "essence is a thing begetting," or that it is "God begetting," if "thing" and God stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no contradiction in saying that "essence is a thing begetting," and "a thing not begetting"; because in the first case "thing" stands for person, and in the second it stands for the essence.
Iª q. 39 a. 5 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod deitas, inquantum est una in pluribus suppositis, habet quandam convenientiam cum forma nominis collectivi. Unde cum dicitur, pater est principium totius deitatis, potest sumi pro universitate personarum; inquantum scilicet, in omnibus personis divinis, ipse est principium. Nec oportet quod sit principium sui ipsius, sicut aliquis de populo dicitur rector totius populi, non tamen sui ipsius. Vel potest dici quod est principium totius deitatis, non quia eam generet et spiret, sed quia eam, generando et spirando, communicat. Reply to Objection 6. So far as Godhead is one in several "supposita," it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So when we say, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead," the term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say that He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration.
Iª q. 39 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod personae non possint praedicari de nominibus essentialibus concretis, ut dicatur, Deus est tres personae, vel est Trinitas. Haec enim est falsa, homo est omnis homo, quia pro nullo suppositorum verificari potest, neque enim Socrates est omnis homo, neque Plato, neque aliquis alius. Sed similiter ista, Deus est Trinitas, pro nullo suppositorum naturae divinae verificari potest, neque enim pater est Trinitas, neque filius, neque spiritus sanctus. Ergo haec est falsa, Deus est Trinitas. Objection 1. It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, "God is three persons"; or "God is the Trinity." For it is false to say, "man is every man," because it cannot be verified as regards any particular subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man. In the same way this proposition, "God is the Trinity," cannot be verified of any one of the "supposita" of the divine nature. For the Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to say, "God is the Trinity," is false.
Iª q. 39 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, inferiora non praedicantur de suis superioribus nisi accidentali praedicatione, ut cum dico, animal est homo, accidit enim animali esse hominem. Sed hoc nomen Deus se habet ad tres personas sicut commune ad inferiora, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo videtur quod nomina personarum non possint praedicari de hoc nomine Deus, nisi accidentaliter. Objection 2. Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except by accidental predication; as when I say, "animal is man"; for it is accidental to animal to be man. But this name "God" as regards the three persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the persons cannot be predicated of this name "God," except in an accidental sense.
Iª q. 39 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in sermone de fide, credimus unum Deum unam esse divini nominis Trinitatem. On the contrary, Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [Serm. ii, in coena Domini], "We believe that one God is one divinely named Trinity."
Iª q. 39 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, licet nomina personalia vel notionalia adiectiva non possint praedicari de essentia; tamen substantiva possunt, propter realem identitatem essentiae et personae. Essentia autem divina non solum idem est realiter cum una persona, sed cum tribus. Unde et una persona, et duae, et tres possunt de essentia praedicari; ut si dicamus, essentia est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Et quia hoc nomen Deus per se habet quod supponat pro essentia, ut dictum est, ideo, sicut haec est vera, essentia est tres personae, ita haec est vera, Deus est tres personae. I answer that, As above explained (5), although adjectival terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated, owing to the real identity of essence and person. The divine essence is not only really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the three persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of the essence as if we were to say, "The essence is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost." And because this word "God" can of itself stand for the essence, as above explained (4, ad 3), hence, as it is true to say, "The essence is the three persons"; so likewise it is true to say, "God is the three persons."
Iª q. 39 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, hoc nomen homo per se habet supponere pro persona; sed ex adiuncto habet quod stet pro natura communi. Et ideo haec est falsa, homo est omnis homo, quia pro nullo supposito verificari potest. Sed hoc nomen Deus per se habet quod stet pro essentia. Unde, licet pro nullo suppositorum divinae naturae haec sit vera, Deus est Trinitas, est tamen vera pro essentia. Quod non attendens, Porretanus eam negavit. Reply to Objection 1. As above explained this term "man" can of itself stand for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the universal human nature. So it is false to say, "Man is every man"; because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject.On the contrary, this word "God" can of itself be taken for the divine essence. So, although to say of any of the "supposita" of the divine nature, "God is the Trinity," is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the divine essence. This was denied by Porretanus because he did not take note of this distinction.
Iª q. 39 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur, Deus vel divina essentia est pater, est praedicatio per identitatem, non autem sicut inferioris de superiori, quia in divinis non est universale et singulare. Unde, sicut est per se ista, pater est Deus, ita et ista, Deus est pater; et nullo modo per accidens. Reply to Objection 2. When we say, "God," or "the divine essence is the Father," the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in regard to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and singular. Hence, as this proposition, "The Father is God" is of itself true, so this proposition "God is the Father" is true of itself, and by no means accidentally.
Iª q. 39 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia non sint approprianda personis. Quod enim potest vergere in errorem fidei, vitandum est in divinis, quia, ut Hieronymus dicit, ex verbis inordinate prolatis incurritur haeresis. Sed ea quae sunt communia tribus personis appropriare alicui, potest vergere in errorem fidei, quia potest intelligi quod vel illi tantum personae conveniant cui appropriantur; vel quod magis conveniant ei quam aliis. Ergo essentialia attributa non sunt approprianda personis. Objection 1. It would seem that the essential names should not be appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome says, "careless words involve risk of heresy" [In substance Ep. lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are common to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated to the persons.
Iª q. 39 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, essentialia attributa, in abstracto significata, significant per modum formae. Sed una persona non se habet ad aliam ut forma, cum forma ab eo cuius est forma, supposito non distinguatur. Ergo essentialia attributa, maxime in abstracto significata, non debent appropriari personis. Objection 2. Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another; since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially when expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons.
Iª q. 39 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, proprium prius est appropriato, proprium enim est de ratione appropriati. Sed essentialia attributa, secundum modum intelligendi, sunt priora personis, sicut commune est prius proprio. Ergo essentialia attributa non debent esse appropriata. Objection 3. Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons.
Iª q. 39 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I Cor. I, Christum, Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam. On the contrary, the Apostle says: "Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24).
Iª q. 39 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, ad manifestationem fidei, conveniens fuit essentialia attributa personis appropriari. Licet enim Trinitas personarum demonstratione probari non possit, ut supra dictum est, convenit tamen ut per aliqua magis manifesta declaretur. Essentialia vero attributa sunt nobis magis manifesta secundum rationem, quam propria personarum, quia ex creaturis, ex quibus cognitionem accipimus, possumus per certitudinem devenire in cognitionem essentialium attributorum; non autem in cognitionem personalium proprietatum, ut supra dictum est. Sicut igitur similitudine vestigii vel imaginis in creaturis inventa utimur ad manifestationem divinarum personarum, ita et essentialibus attributis. Et haec manifestatio personarum per essentialia attributa, appropriatio nominatur. Possunt autem manifestari personae divinae per essentialia attributa dupliciter. Uno modo, per viam similitudinis, sicut ea quae pertinent ad intellectum, appropriantur filio, qui procedit per modum intellectus ut verbum. Alio modo, per modum dissimilitudinis, sicut potentia appropriatur patri, ut Augustinus dicit, quia apud nos patres solent esse propter senectutem infirmi; ne tale aliquid suspicemur in Deo. I answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons. For although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration, as was above expounded (32, 1), nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us. Now the essential attributes of God are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason than the personal properties; because we can derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal properties, as was above explained (32, 1). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons, so also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes. And such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the essential attributes is called "appropriation." The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who proceeds by way of intellect, as Word. In another way by dissimilitude; as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble; lest anything of the kind be imagined of God.
Iª q. 39 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod essentialia attributa non sic appropriantur personis ut eis esse propria asserantur, sed ad manifestandum personas per viam similitudinis vel dissimilitudinis, ut dictum est. Unde nullus error fidei sequitur, sed magis manifestatio veritatis. Reply to Objection 1. The essential attributes are not appropriated to the persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to make the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation of the truth.
Iª q. 39 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, si sic appropriarentur essentialia attributa personis, quod essent eis propria, sequeretur quod una persona se haberet ad aliam in habitudine formae. Quod excludit Augustinus, in VII de Trin., ostendens quod pater non est sapiens sapientia quam genuit, quasi solus filius sit sapientia; ut sic pater et filius simul tantum possint dici sapiens, non autem pater sine filio. Sed filius dicitur sapientia patris, quia est sapientia de patre sapientia, uterque enim per se est sapientia, et simul ambo una sapientia. Unde pater non est sapiens sapientia quam genuit, sed sapientia quae est sua essentia. Reply to Objection 2. If the essential attributes were appropriated to the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would follow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be called wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His own essence.
Iª q. 39 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet essentiale attributum, secundum rationem propriam, sit prius quam persona, secundum, modum intelligendi; tamen, inquantum habet rationem appropriati, nihil prohibet proprium personae esse prius quam appropriatum. Sicut color posterior est corpore, inquantum est corpus, prius tamen est naturaliter corpore albo, inquantum est album. Reply to Objection 3. Although the essential attribute is in its proper concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding; nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is appropriated. Thus color is posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally prior to "white body," considered as white.
Iª q. 39 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter a sacris doctoribus sint essentialia personis attributa. Dicit enim Hilarius, in II de Trin., aeternitas est in patre, species in imagine, usus in munere. In quibus verbis ponit tria nomina propria personarum, scilicet nomen patris; et nomen imaginis, quod est proprium filio, ut supra dictum est; et nomen muneris, sive doni, quod est proprium spiritus sancti, ut supra habitum est. Ponit etiam tria appropriata, nam aeternitatem appropriat patri, speciem filio, usum spiritui sancto. Et videtur quod irrationabiliter. Nam aeternitas importat durationem essendi, species vero est essendi principium, usus vero ad operationem pertinere videtur. Sed essentia et operatio nulli personae appropriari inveniuntur. Ergo inconvenienter videntur ista appropriata personis. Objection 1. It would seem that the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father, the species in the Image; and use is in the Gift." In which words he designates three names proper to the persons: the name of the "Father," the name "Image" proper to the Son (35, 2), and the name "Bounty" or "Gift," which is proper to the Holy Ghost (38, 2). He also designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates "eternity" to the Father, "species" to the Son, and "use" to the Holy Ghost. This he does apparently without reason. For "eternity" imports duration of existence; "species," the principle of existence; and 'use' belongs to the operation. But essence and operation are not found to be appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms are not fittingly appropriated to the persons.
Iª q. 39 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus in I de Doctr. Christ., sic dicit, in patre est unitas, in filio aequalitas, in spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia. Et videtur quod inconvenienter. Quia una persona non denominatur formaliter per id quod appropriatur alteri, non enim est sapiens pater sapientia genita, ut dictum est. Sed, sicut ibidem subditur, tria haec unum omnia sunt propter patrem, aequalia omnia propter filium, connexa omnia propter spiritum sanctum. Non ergo convenienter appropriantur personis. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "Unity is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the concord of equality and unity." This does not, however, seem fitting; because one person does not receive formal denomination from what is appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten, as above explained (37, 2, ad 1). But, as he subjoins, "All these three are one by the Father; all are equal by the Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost." The above, therefore, are not fittingly appropriated to the Persons.
Iª q. 39 a. 8 arg. 3 Item, secundum Augustinum, patri attribuitur potentia, filio sapientia, spiritui sancto bonitas. Et videtur hoc esse inconveniens. Nam virtus ad potentiam pertinet. Virtus autem invenitur appropriari filio, secundum illud I ad Cor. I, Christum, Dei virtutem; et etiam spiritui sancto, secundum illud Luc. VI, virtus de illo exibat, et sanabat omnes. Non ergo potentia patri est approprianda. Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed "power," to the Son "wisdom," to the Holy Ghost "goodness." Nor does this seem fitting; for "strength" is part of power, whereas strength is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to the text, "Christ the strength [Douay: power] of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is likewise appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words, "strength [Douay: virtue] came out from Him and healed all" (Lk. 6:19). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father.
Iª q. 39 a. 8 arg. 4 Item, Augustinus, in libro de Trin., dicit, non confuse accipiendum est quod ait apostolus, ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso - ex ipso dicens propter patrem; per ipsum propter filium; in ipso propter spiritum sanctum. Sed videtur quod inconvenienter. Quia per hoc quod dicit in ipso, videtur importari habitudo causae finalis, quae est prima causarum. Ergo ista habitudo causae deberet appropriari patri, qui est principium non de principio. Objection 4. Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "What the Apostle says, "From Him, and by Him, and in Him," is not to be taken in a confused sense." And (Contra Maxim. ii) "'from Him' refers to the Father, 'by Him' to the Son, 'in Him' to the Holy Ghost.'" This, however, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words "in Him" seem to imply the relation of final cause, which is first among the causes. Therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the Father, Who is "the principle from no principle."
Iª q. 39 a. 8 arg. 5 Item, invenitur veritas appropriari filio, secundum illud Ioan. XIV, ego sum via, veritas et vita. Et similiter liber vitae, secundum illud Psalmi XXXIX, in capite libri scriptum est de me, Glossa, idest apud patrem, qui est caput meum. Et similiter hoc quod dico, qui est, quia super illud Isa. LXV, ecce ego, ad gentes, dicit Glossa, filius loquitur, qui dixit Moysi, ego sum qui sum. Sed videtur quod propria sint filii, et non appropriata. Nam veritas, secundum Augustinum, in libro de vera religione, est summa similitudo principii, absque omni dissimilitudine, et sic videtur quod proprie conveniat filio, qui habet principium. Liber etiam vitae videtur proprium aliquid esse, quia significat ens ab alio, omnis enim liber ab aliquo scribitur. Hoc etiam ipsum qui est videtur esse proprium filio. Quia si, cum Moysi dicitur, ego sum qui sum, loquitur Trinitas, ergo Moyses poterat dicere, ille qui est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, misit me ad vos. Ergo et ulterius dicere poterat, ille qui est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, misit me ad vos, demonstrando certam personam. Hoc autem est falsum, quia nulla persona est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Non ergo potest esse commune Trinitati, sed est proprium filii. Objection 5. Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to Jn. 14:6, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"; and likewise "the book of life," according to Ps. 39:9, "In the beginning of the book it is written of Me," where a gloss observes, "that is, with the Father Who is My head," also this word "Who is"; because on the text of Is. 65:1, "Behold I go to the Gentiles," a gloss adds, "The Son speaks Who said to Moses, I am Who am." These appear to belong to the Son, and are not appropriated. For "truth," according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 36), "is the supreme similitude of the principle without any dissimilitude." So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son, Who has a principle. Also the "book of life" seems proper to the Son, as signifying "a thing from another"; for every book is written by someone. This also, "Who is," appears to be proper to the Son; because if when it was said to Moses, "I am Who am," the Trinity spoke, then Moses could have said, "He Who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you," so also he could have said further, "He Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you," pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false; because no person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.
Iª q. 39 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus noster, qui ex creaturis in Dei cognitionem manuducitur, oportet quod Deum consideret secundum modum quem ex creaturis assumit. In consideratione autem alicuius creaturae, quatuor per ordinem nobis occurrunt. Nam primo, consideratur res ipsa absolute, inquantum est ens quoddam. Secunda autem consideratio rei est, inquantum est una. Tertia consideratio rei est, secundum quod inest ei virtus ad operandum et ad causandum. Quarta autem consideratio rei est, secundum habitudinem quam habet ad causata. Unde haec etiam quadruplex consideratio circa Deum nobis occurrit. Secundum igitur primam considerationem, qua consideratur absolute Deus secundum esse suum, sic sumitur appropriatio Hilarii, secundum quam aeternitas appropriatur patri, species filio, usus spiritui sancto. Aeternitas enim, inquantum significat esse non principiatum, similitudinem habet cum proprio patris, qui est principium non de principio. Species autem, sive pulchritudo, habet similitudinem cum propriis filii. Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, integritas sive perfectio, quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas, unde quae habent colorem nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur. Quantum igitur ad primum, similitudinem habet cum proprio filii, inquantum est filius habens in se vere et perfecte naturam patris. Unde, ad hoc innuendum, Augustinus in sua expositione dicit, ubi, scilicet in filio, summa et prima vita est, et cetera. Quantum vero ad secundum, convenit cum proprio filii, inquantum est imago expressa patris. Unde videmus quod aliqua imago dicitur esse pulchra, si perfecte repraesentat rem, quamvis turpem. Et hoc tetigit Augustinus cum dicit, ubi est tanta convenientia, et prima aequalitas, et cetera. Quantum vero ad tertium, convenit cum proprio filii, inquantum est verbum, quod quidem lux est, et splendor intellectus, ut Damascenus dicit. Et hoc tangit Augustinus cum dicit, tanquam verbum perfectum cui non desit aliquid, et ars quaedam omnipotentis Dei, et cetera. Usus autem habet similitudinem cum propriis spiritus sancti, largo modo accipiendo usum, secundum quod uti comprehendit sub se etiam frui; prout uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, et frui est cum gaudio uti, ut Augustinus, X de Trin., dicit. Usus ergo quo pater et filius se invicem fruuntur, convenit cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est amor. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, illa dilectio, delectatio, felicitas vel beatitudo, usus ab illo appellatus est. Usus vero quo nos fruimur Deo, similitudinem habet cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est donum. Et hoc ostendit Augustinus cum dicit, est in Trinitate spiritus sanctus, genitoris genitique suavitas, ingenti largitate atque ubertate nos perfundens. Et sic patet quare aeternitas, species et usus personis attribuantur vel approprientur, non autem essentia vel operatio. Quia in ratione horum, propter sui communitatem, non invenitur aliquid similitudinem habens cum propriis personarum. Secunda vero consideratio Dei est, inquantum consideratur ut unus. Et sic Augustinus patri appropriat unitatem, filio aequalitatem, spiritui sancto concordiam sive connexionem. Quae quidem tria unitatem importare manifestum est, sed differenter. Nam unitas dicitur absolute, non praesupponens aliquid aliud. Et ideo appropriatur patri, qui non praesupponit aliquam personam, cum sit principium non de principio. Aequalitas autem importat unitatem in respectu ad alterum, nam aequale est quod habet unam quantitatem cum alio. Et ideo aequalitas appropriatur filio, qui est principium de principio. Connexio autem importat unitatem aliquorum duorum. Unde appropriatur spiritui sancto, inquantum est a duobus. Ex quo etiam intelligi potest quod dicit Augustinus, tria esse unum propter patrem, aequalia propter filium, connexa propter spiritum sanctum. Manifestum est enim quod illi attribuitur unumquodque, in quo primo invenitur, sicut omnia inferiora dicuntur vivere propter animam vegetabilem, in qua primo invenitur ratio vitae in istis inferioribus. Unitas autem statim invenitur in persona patris, etiam, per impossibile, remotis aliis personis. Et ideo aliae personae a patre habent unitatem. Sed remotis aliis personis, non invenitur aequalitas in patre, sed statim, posito filio, invenitur aequalitas. Et ideo dicuntur omnia aequalia propter filium, non quod filius sit principium aequalitatis patri; sed quia, nisi esset patri aequalis filius, pater aequalis non posset dici. Aequalitas enim eius primo consideratur ad filium, hoc enim ipsum quod spiritus sanctus patri aequalis est, a filio habet. Similiter, excluso spiritu sancto, qui est duorum nexus, non posset intelligi unitas connexionis inter patrem et filium. Et ideo dicuntur omnia esse connexa propter spiritum sanctum, quia, posito spiritu sancto, invenitur unde pater et filius possint dici connexi. Secundum vero tertiam considerationem, qua in Deo sufficiens virtus consideratur ad causandum, sumitur tertia appropriatio, scilicet potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis. Quae quidem appropriatio fit et secundum rationem similitudinis, si consideretur quod in divinis personis est, et secundum rationem dissimilitudinis, si consideretur quod in creaturis est. Potentia enim habet rationem principii. Unde habet similitudinem cum patre caelesti, qui est principium totius divinitatis. Deficit autem interdum patri terreno, propter senectutem. Sapientia vero similitudinem habet cum filio caelesti, inquantum est verbum, quod nihil aliud est quam conceptus sapientiae. Deficit autem interdum filio terreno, propter temporis paucitatem. Bonitas autem, cum sit ratio et obiectum amoris, habet similitudinem cum spiritu divino, qui est amor. Sed repugnantiam habere videtur ad spiritum terrenum, secundum quod importat violentam quandam impulsionem; prout dicitur Isa. XXV, spiritus robustorum quasi turbo impellens parietem. Virtus autem appropriatur filio et spiritui sancto, non secundum quod virtus dicitur ipsa potentia rei, sed secundum quod interdum virtus dicitur id quod a potentia rei procedit, prout dicimus aliquod virtuosum factum esse virtutem alicuius agentis. Secundum vero quartam considerationem, prout consideratur Deus in habitudine ad suos effectus, sumitur illa appropriatio ex quo, per quem, et in quo. Haec enim praepositio ex importat quandoque quidem habitudinem causae materialis, quae locum non habet in divinis, aliquando vero habitudinem causae efficientis. Quae quidem competit Deo ratione suae potentiae activae, unde et appropriatur patri, sicut et potentia. Haec vero praepositio per designat quidem quandoque causam mediam; sicut dicimus quod faber operatur per martellum. Et sic ly per quandoque non est appropriatum, sed proprium filii, secundum illud Ioan. I, omnia per ipsum facta sunt; non quia filius sit instrumentum, sed quia ipse est principium de principio. Quandoque vero designat habitudinem formae per quam agens operatur; sicut dicimus quod artifex operatur per artem. Unde, sicut sapientia et ars appropriantur filio, ita et ly per quem. Haec vero praepositio in denotat proprie habitudinem continentis. Continet autem Deus res dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum suas similitudines; prout scilicet res dicuntur esse in Deo, inquantum sunt in eius scientia. Et sic hoc quod dico in ipso, esset appropriandum filio. Alio vero modo continentur res a Deo, inquantum Deus sua bonitate eas conservat et gubernat, ad finem convenientem adducendo. Et sic ly in quo appropriatur spiritui sancto, sicut et bonitas. Nec oportet quod habitudo causae finalis, quamvis sit prima causarum, approprietur patri, qui est principium non de principio, quia personae divinae, quarum pater est principium, non procedunt ut ad finem, cum quaelibet illarum sit ultimus finis; sed naturali processione, quae magis ad rationem naturalis potentiae pertinere videtur. I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God. According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary applies, according to which "eternity" is appropriated to the Father, "species" to the Son, "use" to the Holy Ghost. For "eternity" as meaning a "being" without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the Father, Who is "a principle without a principle." Species or beauty has a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes three conditions, "integrity" or "perfection," since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due "proportion" or "harmony"; and lastly, "brightness" or "clarity," whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color. The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin. vi, 10): "Where--that is, in the Son--there is supreme and primal life," etc. The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), "Where there exists wondrous proportion and primal equality," etc. The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): "As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak, the art of the omnipotent God," etc. "Use" has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the "use" be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of "to enjoy"; according as "to use" is to employ something at the beck of the will, and "to enjoy" means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11). So "use," whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other, agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "That love, that delectation, that felicity or beatitude, is called use by him" (Hilary). But the "use" by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): "In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweetness of the Begettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His immense bounty and wealth." Thus it is clear how "eternity," "species," and "use" are attributed or appropriated to the persons, but not essence or operation; because, being common, there is nothing in their concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons. The second consideration of God regards Him as "one." In that view Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates "unity" to the Father, "equality" to the Son, "concord" or "union" to the Holy Ghost. It is manifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For "unity" is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else; and for this reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any other person is not presupposed since He is the "principle without principle." "Equality" implies unity as regards another; for that is equal which has the same quantity as another. So equality is appropriated to the Son, Who is the "principle from a principle." "Union" implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And from this we can understand what Augustine means when he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) that "The Three are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by reason of the Son; and are united by reason of the Holy Ghost." For it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first: just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul, because therein we find the first trace of life. Now "unity" is perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an impossible hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other persons derive their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be removed, we do not find equality in the Father, but we find it as soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the Son were the principle of equality in the Father, but that, without the Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because His equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the Son. Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be excluded, we cannot understand the oneness of the union between the Father and the Son. So all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son are said to be united. According to the third consideration, which brings before us the adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be a third kind of appropriation, of "power," "wisdom," and "goodness." This kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as regards what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dissimilitude if we consider what is in creatures. For "power" has the nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly Father, Who is the principle of the whole Godhead. But in an earthly father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age. "Wisdom" has likeness to the heavenly Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom. In an earthly son this is sometimes absent by reason of lack of years. "Goodness," as the nature and object of love, has likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems repugnant to the earthly spirit, which often implies a certain violent impulse, according to Is. 25:4: "The spirit of the strong is as a blast beating on the wall." "Strength" is appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, not as denoting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from power; for instance, we say that the strong work done by an agent is its strength. According to the fourth consideration, i.e. God's relation to His effects, there arise appropriation of the expression "from Whom, by Whom, and in Whom." For this preposition "from" [ex] sometimes implies a certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in God; and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which can be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition "by" [per] sometimes designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say that a smith works "by" a hammer. Hence the word "by" is not always appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly, according to the text, "All things were made by Him" (Jn. 1:3); not that the Son is an instrument, but as "the principle from a principle." Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form "by" which an agent works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence, as wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the expression "by Whom." The preposition "in" strictly denotes the habitude of one containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in one way by their similitudes; thus things are said to be in God, as existing in His knowledge. In this sense the expression "in Him" should be appropriated to the Son. In another sense things are contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness preserves and governs them, by guiding them to a fitting end; and in this sense the expression "in Him" is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is "goodness." Nor need the habitude of the final cause (though the first of causes) be appropriated to the Father, Who is "the principle without a principle": because the divine persons, of Whom the Father is the principle, do not proceed from Him as towards an end, since each of Them is the last end; but They proceed by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a natural power.
Iª q. 39 a. 8 ad 1 Ad illud vero quod de aliis quaeritur, dicendum quod veritas, cum pertineat ad intellectum, ut supra dictum est, appropriatur filio, non tamen est proprium eius. Quia veritas, ut supra dictum est, considerari potest prout est in intellectu, vel prout est in re. Sicut igitur intellectus et res essentialiter sumpta sunt essentialia et non personalia, ita et veritas. Definitio autem Augustini inducta, datur de veritate secundum quod appropriatur filio. Liber autem vitae in recto quidem importat notitiam, sed in obliquo vitam, est enim, ut supra dictum est, notitia Dei de his qui habituri sunt vitam aeternam. Unde appropriatur filio, licet vita approprietur spiritui sancto, inquantum importat quendam interiorem motum, et sic convenit cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est amor. Esse autem scriptum ab alio, non est de ratione libri inquantum est liber; sed inquantum est quoddam artificiatum. Unde non importat originem, neque est personale, sed appropriatum personae. Ipsum autem qui est appropriatur personae filii, non secundum propriam rationem, sed ratione adiuncti, inquantum scilicet in locutione Dei ad Moysen, praefigurabatur liberatio humani generis, quae facta est per filium. Sed tamen, secundum quod ly qui sumitur relative, posset referre interdum personam filii, et sic sumeretur personaliter, ut puta si dicatur, filius est genitus qui est; sicut et Deus genitus personale est. Sed infinite sumptum est essentiale. Et licet hoc pronomen iste, grammatice loquendo, ad aliquam certam personam videatur pertinere; tamen quaelibet res demonstrabilis, grammatice loquendo, persona dici potest, licet secundum rei naturam non sit persona; dicimus enim iste lapis, et iste asinus. Unde et, grammatice loquendo, essentia divina, secundum quod significatur et supponitur per hoc nomen Deus, potest demonstrari hoc pronomine iste; secundum illud Exod. XV, iste Deus meus, et glorificabo eum. Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since "truth" belongs to the intellect, as stated above (16, 1), it is appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His. For truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are referred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth as appropriated to the Son. The "book of life" directly means knowledge but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained (24, 1), it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although life is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of the Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by another is not of the essence of a book considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So this does not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to a person. The expression "Who is" is appropriated to the person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, inasmuch as, in God's word to Moses, was prefigured the delivery of the human race accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word "Who" is taken in a relative sense, it may sometimes relate to the person of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken personally; as, for instance, were we to say, "The Son is the begotten 'Who is,'" inasmuch as "God begotten is personal." But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although the pronoun "this" [iste] seems grammatically to point to a particular person, nevertheless everything that we can point to can be grammatically treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not a person; as we may say, "this stone," and "this ass." So, speaking in a grammatical sense, so far as the word "God" signifies and stands for the divine essence, the latter may be designated by the pronoun "this," according to Ex. 15:2: "This is my God, and I will glorify Him."

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