Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q27

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Q26 Q28



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Iª q. 27 pr. Consideratis autem his quae ad divinae essentiae unitatem pertinent, restat considerare de his quae pertinent ad Trinitatem personarum in divinis. Et quia personae divinae secundum relationes originis distinguuntur, secundum ordinem doctrinae prius considerandum est de origine, sive de processione, secundo, de relationibus originis; tertio, de personis. Circa processionem quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum processio sit in divinis. Secundo, utrum aliqua processio in divinis generatio dici possit. Tertio, utrum praeter generationem aliqua alia processio possit esse in divinis. Quarto, utrum illa alia processio possit dici generatio. Quinto, utrum in divinis sint plures processiones quam duae. Whether there is procession in God?
Iª q. 27 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non possit esse aliqua processio. Processio enim significat motum ad extra. Sed in divinis nihil est mobile, neque extraneum. Ergo neque processio. Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be any procession in God. For procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is nothing mobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession in God.
Iª q. 27 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne procedens est diversum ab eo a quo procedit. Sed in Deo non est aliqua diversitas, sed summa simplicitas. Ergo in Deo non est processio aliqua. Objection 2. Further, everything which proceeds differs from that whence it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme simplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession.
Iª q. 27 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, procedere ab alio videtur rationi primi principii repugnare. Sed Deus est primum principium, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo in Deo processio locum non habet. Objection 3. Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the nature of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as shown above (2, 3). Therefore in God there is no procession.
Iª q. 27 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit dominus, Ioan. VIII, ego ex Deo processi. On the contrary, Our Lord says, "From God I proceeded" (John 8:42).
Iª q. 27 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod divina Scriptura, in rebus divinis, nominibus ad processionem pertinentibus utitur. Hanc autem processionem diversi diversimode acceperunt. Quidam enim acceperunt hanc processionem secundum quod effectus procedit a causa. Et sic accepit Arius, dicens filium procedere a patre sicut primam eius creaturam, et spiritum sanctum procedere a patre et filio sicut creaturam utriusque. Et secundum hoc, neque filius neque spiritus sanctus esset verus Deus. Quod est contra id quod dicitur de filio, I Ioan. ult., ut simus in vero filio eius, hic est verus Deus. Et de spiritu sancto dicitur, I Cor. VI, nescitis quia membra vestra templum sunt spiritus sancti? Templum autem habere solius Dei est. Alii vero hanc processionem acceperunt secundum quod causa dicitur procedere in effectum, inquantum vel movet ipsum, vel similitudinem suam ipsi imprimit. Et sic accepit Sabellius, dicens ipsum Deum patrem filium dici, secundum quod carnem assumpsit ex virgine. Et eundem dicit spiritum sanctum, secundum quod creaturam rationalem sanctificat, et ad vitam movet. Huic autem acceptioni repugnant verba domini de se dicentis, Ioan. V, non potest facere a se filius quidquam; et multa alia, per quae ostenditur quod non est ipse pater qui filius. Si quis autem diligenter consideret, uterque accepit processionem secundum quod est ad aliquid extra, unde neuter posuit processionem in ipso Deo. Sed, cum omnis processio sit secundum aliquam actionem, sicut secundum actionem quae tendit in exteriorem materiam, est aliqua processio ad extra; ita secundum actionem quae manet in ipso agente, attenditur processio quaedam ad intra. Et hoc maxime patet in intellectu, cuius actio, scilicet intelligere, manet in intelligente. Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex eius notitia procedens. Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat, et dicitur verbum cordis, significatum verbo vocis. Cum autem Deus sit super omnia, ea quae in Deo dicuntur, non sunt intelligenda secundum modum infimarum creaturarum, quae sunt corpora; sed secundum similitudinem supremarum creaturarum, quae sunt intellectuales substantiae; a quibus etiam similitudo accepta deficit a repraesentatione divinorum. Non ergo accipienda est processio secundum quod est in corporalibus, vel per motum localem, vel per actionem alicuius causae in exteriorem effectum, ut calor a calefaciente in calefactum; sed secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod manet in ipso. Et sic fides Catholica processionem ponit in divinis. I answer that, Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which signify procession. This procession has been differently understood. Some have understood it in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its cause; so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of both. In this sense neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true God: and this is contrary to what is said of the Son, "That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is true God" (1 John 5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, "Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost?" (1 Corinthians 6:19). Now, to have a temple is God's prerogative. Others take this procession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as moving it, or impressing its own likeness on it; in which sense it was understood by Sabellius, who said that God the Father is called Son in assuming flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost in sanctifying the rational creature, and moving it to life. The words of the Lord contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, "The Son cannot of Himself do anything" (John 5:19); while many other passages show the same, whereby we know that the Father is not the Son. Careful examination shows that both of these opinions take procession as meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession always supposes action, and as there is an outward procession corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the agent. This applies most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which remains in the intelligent agent. For whenever we understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object. This conception is signified by the spoken word; and it is called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice. As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God, not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual substances; while even the similitudes derived from these fall short in the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands procession as existing in God.
Iª q. 27 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de processione quae est motus localis, vel quae est secundum actionem tendentem in exteriorem materiam, vel in exteriorem effectum, talis autem processio non est in divinis, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. This objection comes from the idea of procession in the sense of local motion, or of an action tending to external matter, or to an exterior effect; which kind of procession does not exist in God, as we have explained.
Iª q. 27 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod id quod procedit secundum processionem quae est ad extra, oportet esse diversum ab eo a quo procedit. Sed id quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili, non oportet esse diversum, imo, quanto perfectius procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit. Manifestum est enim quod quanto aliquid magis intelligitur, tanto conceptio intellectualis est magis intima intelligenti, et magis unum, nam intellectus secundum hoc quod actu intelligit, secundum hoc fit unum cum intellecto. Unde, cum divinum intelligere sit in fine perfectionis, ut supra dictum est, necesse est quod verbum divinum sit perfecte unum cum eo a quo procedit, absque omni diversitate. Reply to Objection 2. Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas, whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent; since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood. Thus, as the divine intelligence is the very supreme perfection of God (14, 2), the divine Word is of necessity perfectly one with the source whence He proceeds, without any kind of diversity.
Iª q. 27 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod procedere a principio ut extraneum et diversum, repugnat rationi primi principii, sed procedere ut intimum et absque diversitate, per modum intelligibilem, includitur in ratione primi principii. Cum enim dicimus aedificatorem principium domus, in ratione huius principii includitur conceptio suae artis, et includeretur in ratione primi principii, si aedificator esset primum principium. Deus autem, qui est primum principium rerum, comparatur ad res creatas ut artifex ad artificiata. Reply to Objection 3. To proceed from a principle, so as to be something outside and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable with the idea of a first principle; whereas an intimate and uniform procession by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of a first principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the house, in the idea of such a principle is included that of his art; and it would be included in the idea of the first principle were the builder the first principle of the house. God, Who is the first principle of all things, may be compared to things created as the architect is to things designed.
Iª q. 27 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod processio quae est in divinis, non possit dici generatio. Generatio enim est mutatio de non esse in esse, corruptioni opposita; et utriusque subiectum est materia. Sed nihil horum competit divinis. Ergo non potest generatio esse in divinis. Whether any procession in God can be called generation?Objection 1. It would seem that no procession in God can be called generation. For generation is change from non-existence to existence, and is opposed to corruption; while matter is the subject of both. Nothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist in God.
Iª q. 27 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, in Deo est processio secundum modum intelligibilem, ut dictum est. Sed in nobis talis processio non dicitur generatio. Ergo neque in Deo. Objection 2. Further, procession exists in God, according to an intelligible mode, as above explained (1). But such a process is not called generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called in God.
Iª q. 27 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, omne genitum accipit esse a generante. Esse ergo cuiuslibet geniti est esse receptum. Sed nullum esse receptum est per se subsistens. Cum igitur esse divinum sit esse per se subsistens, ut supra probatum est, sequitur quod nullius geniti esse sit esse divinum. Non est ergo generatio in divinis. Objection 3. Further, anything that is generated derives existence from its generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence. But no derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the divine existence is self-subsisting (3, 4), it follows that no generated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is no generation in God.
Iª q. 27 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo II, ego hodie genui te. On the contrary, It is said (Psalm 2:7): "This day have I begotten Thee."
Iª q. 27 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod processio verbi in divinis dicitur generatio. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod nomine generationis dupliciter utimur. Uno modo, communiter ad omnia generabilia et corruptibilia, et sic generatio nihil aliud est quam mutatio de non esse ad esse. Alio modo, proprie in viventibus, et sic generatio significat originem alicuius viventis a principio vivente coniuncto. Et haec proprie dicitur nativitas. Non tamen omne huiusmodi dicitur genitum, sed proprie quod procedit secundum rationem similitudinis. Unde pilus vel capillus non habet rationem geniti et filii, sed solum quod procedit secundum rationem similitudinis, non cuiuscumque, nam vermes qui generantur in animalibus, non habent rationem generationis et filiationis, licet sit similitudo secundum genus, sed requiritur ad rationem talis generationis, quod procedat secundum rationem similitudinis in natura eiusdem speciei, sicut homo procedit ab homine, et equus ab equo. In viventibus autem quae de potentia in actum vitae procedunt, sicut sunt homines et animalia, generatio utramque generationem includit. Si autem sit aliquod vivens cuius vita non exeat de potentia in actum, processio, si qua in tali vivente invenitur, excludit omnino primam rationem generationis; sed potest habere rationem generationis quae est propria viventium. Sic igitur processio verbi in divinis habet rationem generationis. Procedit enim per modum intelligibilis actionis, quae est operatio vitae, et a principio coniuncto, ut supra iam dictum est, et secundum rationem similitudinis, quia conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei intellectae, et in eadem natura existens, quia in Deo idem est intelligere et esse, ut supra ostensum est. Unde processio verbi in divinis dicitur generatio, et ipsum verbum procedens dicitur filius. I answer that, The procession of the Word in God is called generation. In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a twofold meaning: one common to everything subject to generation and corruption; in which sense generation is nothing but change from non-existence to existence. In another sense it is proper and belongs to living things; in which sense it signifies the origin of a living being from a conjoined living principle; and this is properly called birth. Not everything of that kind, however, is called begotten; but, strictly speaking, only what proceeds by way of similitude. Hence a hair has not the aspect of generation and sonship, but only that has which proceeds by way of a similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice; for a worm which is generated from animals has not the aspect of generation and sonship, although it has a generic similitude; for this kind of generation requires that there should be a procession by way of similitude in the same specific nature; as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse from a horse. So in living things, which proceed from potential to actual life, such as men and animals, generation includes both these kinds of generation. But if there is a being whose life does not proceed from potentiality to act, procession (if found in such a being) excludes entirely the first kind of generation; whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs to living things. So in this manner the procession of the Word in God is generation; for He proceeds by way of intelligible action, which is a vital operation:--from a conjoined principle (as above described):--by way of similitude, inasmuch as the concept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived:--and exists in the same nature, because in God the act of understanding and His existence are the same, as shown above (14, 4). Hence the procession of the Word in God is called generation; and the Word Himself proceeding is called the Son.
Iª q. 27 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de generatione secundum rationem primam, prout importat exitum de potentia in actum. Et sic non invenitur in divinis, ut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. This objection is based on the idea of generation in the first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to act; in which sense it is not found in God.
Iª q. 27 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod intelligere in nobis non est ipsa substantia intellectus, unde verbum quod secundum intelligibilem operationem procedit in nobis, non est eiusdem naturae cum eo a quo procedit. Unde non proprie et complete competit sibi ratio generationis. Sed intelligere divinum est ipsa substantia intelligentis, ut supra ostensum est, unde verbum procedens procedit ut eiusdem naturae subsistens. Et propter hoc proprie dicitur genitum et filius. Unde et his quae pertinent ad generationem viventium, utitur Scriptura ad significandam processionem divinae sapientiae, scilicet conceptione et partu, dicitur enim ex persona divinae sapientiae, Proverb. VIII, nondum erant abyssi, et ego iam concepta eram; ante colles ego parturiebar. Sed in intellectu nostro utimur nomine conceptionis, secundum quod in verbo nostri intellectus invenitur similitudo rei intellectae, licet non inveniatur naturae identitas. Reply to Objection 2. The act of human understanding in ourselves is not the substance itself of the intellect; hence the word which proceeds within us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature as the source whence it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot be properly and fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence is the very substance itself of the one who understands (14, 4). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same nature; and so is properly called begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture employs terms which denote generation of living things in order to signify the procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and birth; as is declared in the person of the divine Wisdom, "The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived; before the hills, I was brought forth." (Proverbs 8:24). In our way of understanding we use the word "conception" in order to signify that in the word of our intellect is found the likeness of the thing understood, although there be no identity of nature.
Iª q. 27 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non omne acceptum est receptum in aliquo subiecto, alioquin non posset dici quod tota substantia rei creatae sit accepta a Deo, cum totius substantiae non sit aliquod subiectum receptivum. Sic igitur id quod est genitum in divinis, accipit esse a generante, non tanquam illud esse sit receptum in aliqua materia vel subiecto (quod repugnat subsistentiae divini esse); sed secundum hoc dicitur esse acceptum, inquantum procedens ab alio habet esse divinum, non quasi aliud ab esse divino existens. In ipsa enim perfectione divini esse continetur et verbum intelligibiliter procedens, et principium verbi; sicut et quaecumque ad eius perfectionem pertinent, ut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. Not everything derived from another has existence in another subject; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance of created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could receive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated in God receives its existence from the generator, not as though that existence were received into matter or into a subject (which would conflict with the divine self-subsistence); but when we speak of His existence as received, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine existence from another; not, however, as if He were other from the divine nature. For in the perfection itself of the divine existence are contained both the Word intelligibly proceeding and the principle of the Word, with whatever belongs to His perfection (4, 2).
Iª q. 27 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit in divinis alia processio a generatione verbi. Eadem enim ratione erit aliqua alia processio ab illa alia processione, et sic procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. Standum est igitur in primo, ut sit una tantum processio in divinis. Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word?Objection 1. It would seem that no other procession exists in God besides the generation of the Word. Because, for whatever reason we admit another procession, we should be led to admit yet another, and so on to infinitude; which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the first, and hold that there exists only one procession in God.
Iª q. 27 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, in omni natura invenitur tantum unus modus communicationis illius naturae, et hoc ideo est, quia operationes secundum terminos habent unitatem et diversitatem. Sed processio in divinis non est nisi secundum communicationem divinae naturae. Cum igitur sit una tantum natura divina, ut supra ostensum est, relinquitur quod una sit tantum processio in divinis. Objection 2. Further, every nature possesses but one mode of self-communication; because operations derive unity and diversity from their terms. But procession in God is only by way of communication of the divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one divine nature (11, 4 ), it follows that only one procession exists in God.
Iª q. 27 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, si sit in divinis alia processio ab intelligibili processione verbi, non erit nisi processio amoris, quae est secundum voluntatis operationem. Sed talis processio non potest esse alia a processione intellectus intelligibili, quia voluntas in Deo non est aliud ab intellectu, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo in Deo non est alia processio praeter processionem verbi. Objection 3. Further, if any other procession but the intelligible procession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the procession of love, which is by the operation of the will. But such a procession is identified with the intelligible procession of the intellect, inasmuch as the will in God is the same as His intellect (19, 1). Therefore in God there is no other procession but the procession of the Word.
Iª q. 27 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod spiritus sanctus procedit a patre, ut dicitur Ioan. XV. Ipse autem est alius a filio, secundum illud Ioan. XIV, rogabo patrem meum, et alium Paracletum dabit vobis. Ergo in divinis est alia processio praeter processionem verbi. On the contrary, The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (John 15:26); and He is distinct from the Son, according to the words, "I will ask My Father, and He will give you another Paraclete" (John 14:16). Therefore in God another procession exists besides the procession of the Word.
Iª q. 27 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in divinis sunt duae processiones, scilicet processio verbi, et quaedam alia. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod in divinis non est processio nisi secundum actionem quae non tendit in aliquid extrinsecum, sed manet in ipso agente. Huiusmodi autem actio in intellectuali natura est actio intellectus et actio voluntatis. Processio autem verbi attenditur secundum actionem intelligibilem. Secundum autem operationem voluntatis invenitur in nobis quaedam alia processio, scilicet processio amoris, secundum quam amatum est in amante, sicut per conceptionem verbi res dicta vel intellecta, est in intelligente. Unde et praeter processionem verbi, ponitur alia processio in divinis, quae est processio amoris. I answer that, There are two processions in God; the procession of the Word, and another. In evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God, only according to an action which does not tend to anything external, but remains in the agent itself. Such an action in an intellectual nature is that of the intellect, and of the will. The procession of the Word is by way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the will within ourselves involves also another procession, that of love, whereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the conception of the word, the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent. Hence, besides the procession of the Word in God, there exists in Him another procession called the procession of love.
Iª q. 27 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non est necessarium procedere in divinis processionibus in infinitum. Processio enim quae est ad intra in intellectuali natura, terminatur in processione voluntatis. Reply to Objection 1. There is no need to go on to infinitude in the divine processions; for the procession which is accomplished within the agent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the will.
Iª q. 27 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod quidquid est in Deo, est Deus, ut supra ostensum est, quod non contingit in aliis rebus. Et ideo per quamlibet processionem quae non est ad extra, communicatur divina natura, non autem aliae naturae. Reply to Objection 2. All that exists in God, is God (3, 3, 4); whereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the divine nature is communicated by every procession which is not outward, and this does not apply to other natures.
Iª q. 27 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet in Deo non sit aliud voluntas et intellectus, tamen de ratione voluntatis et intellectus est, quod processiones quae sunt secundum actionem utriusque, se habeant secundum quendam ordinem. Non enim est processio amoris nisi in ordine ad processionem verbi, nihil enim potest voluntate amari, nisi sit in intellectu conceptum. Sicut igitur attenditur quidam ordo verbi ad principium a quo procedit, licet in divinis sit eadem substantia intellectus et conceptio intellectus; ita, licet in Deo sit idem voluntas et intellectus, tamen, quia de ratione amoris est quod non procedat nisi a conceptione intellectus, habet ordinis distinctionem processio amoris a processione verbi in divinis. Reply to Objection 3. Though will and intellect are not diverse in God, nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order. For the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect. So as there exists a certain order of the Word to the principle whence He proceeds, although in God the substance of the intellect and its concept are the same; so, although in God the will and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect, there is a distinction of order between the procession of love and the procession of the Word in God.
Iª q. 27 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod processio amoris in divinis sit generatio. Quod enim procedit in similitudine naturae in viventibus, dicitur generatum et nascens. Sed id quod procedit in divinis per modum amoris, procedit in similitudine naturae, alias esset extraneum a natura divina, et sic esset processio ad extra. Ergo quod procedit in divinis per modum amoris, procedit ut genitum et nascens. Whether the procession of love in God is generation?Objection 1. It would seem that the procession of love in God is generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in God by way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it would be extraneous to the divine nature, and would be an external procession. Therefore what proceeds in God by way of love, proceeds as generated and born.
Iª q. 27 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut similitudo est de ratione verbi, ita est etiam de ratione amoris, unde dicitur Eccli. XIII, quod omne animal diligit simile sibi. Si igitur ratione similitudinis verbo procedenti convenit generari et nasci, videtur etiam quod amori procedenti convenit generari. Objection 2. Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so does it belong to love. Hence it is said, that "every beast loves its like" (Sirach 13:19). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by way of likeness, it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of generation.
Iª q. 27 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, non est in genere quod non est in aliqua eius specie. Si igitur in divinis sit quaedam processio amoris, oportet quod, praeter hoc nomen commune, habeat aliquod nomen speciale. Sed non est aliud nomen dare nisi generatio. Ergo videtur quod processio amoris in divinis sit generatio. Objection 3. Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus. So if there is a procession of love in God, there ought to be some special name besides this common name of procession. But no other name is applicable but generation. Therefore the procession of love in God is generation.
Iª q. 27 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quia secundum hoc sequeretur quod spiritus sanctus, qui procedit ut amor, procederet ut genitus. Quod est contra illud Athanasii, spiritus sanctus a patre et filio non factus nec creatus nec genitus, sed procedens. On the contrary, Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Ghost Who proceeds as love, would proceed as begotten; which is against the statement of Athanasius: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding."
Iª q. 27 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod processio amoris in divinis non debet dici generatio. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod haec est differentia inter intellectum et voluntatem, quod intellectus fit in actu per hoc quod res intellecta est in intellectu secundum suam similitudinem, voluntas autem fit in actu, non per hoc quod aliqua similitudo voliti sit in voluntate, sed ex hoc quod voluntas habet quandam inclinationem in rem volitam. Processio igitur quae attenditur secundum rationem intellectus, est secundum rationem similitudinis, et intantum potest habere rationem generationis, quia omne generans generat sibi simile. Processio autem quae attenditur secundum rationem voluntatis, non consideratur secundum rationem similitudinis, sed magis secundum rationem impellentis et moventis in aliquid. Et ideo quod procedit in divinis per modum amoris, non procedit ut genitum vel ut filius, sed magis procedit ut spiritus, quo nomine quaedam vitalis motio et impulsio designatur, prout aliquis ex amore dicitur moveri vel impelli ad aliquid faciendum. I answer that, The procession of love in God ought not to be called generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect and the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual by the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the intellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of the object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination to the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets its own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of similitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an object. So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name expresses a certain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described as moved or impelled by love to perform an action.
Iª q. 27 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quidquid est in divinis, est unum cum divina natura. Unde ex parte huius unitatis non potest accipi propria ratio huius processionis vel illius, secundum quam una distinguatur ab alia, sed oportet quod propria ratio huius vel illius processionis accipiatur secundum ordinem unius processionis ad aliam. Huiusmodi autem ordo attenditur secundum rationem voluntatis et intellectus. Unde secundum horum propriam rationem sortitur in divinis nomen utraque processio, quod imponitur ad propriam rationem rei significandam. Et inde est quod procedens per modum amoris et divinam naturam accipit, et tamen non dicitur natum. Reply to Objection 1. All that exists in God is one with the divine nature. Hence the proper notion of this or that procession, by which one procession is distinguished from another, cannot be on the part of this unity: but the proper notion of this or that procession must be taken from the order of one procession to another; which order is derived from the nature of the will and intellect. Hence, each procession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and intellect; the name being imposed to signify what its nature really is; and so it is that the Person proceeding as love receives the divine nature, but is not said to be born.
Iª q. 27 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo aliter pertinet ad verbum, et aliter ad amorem. Nam ad verbum pertinet inquantum ipsum est quaedam similitudo rei intellectae, sicut genitum est similitudo generantis, sed ad amorem pertinet, non quod ipse amor sit similitudo, sed inquantum similitudo est principium amandi. Unde non sequitur quod amor sit genitus, sed quod genitum sit principium amoris. Reply to Objection 2. Likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object understood, as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator; but it belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness, but because likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not follow that love is begotten, but that the one begotten is the principle of love.
Iª q. 27 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Deum nominare non possumus nisi ex creaturis, ut dictum est supra. Et quia in creaturis communicatio naturae non est nisi per generationem, processio in divinis non habet proprium vel speciale nomen nisi generationis. Unde processio quae non est generatio, remansit sine speciali nomine. Sed potest nominari spiratio, quia est processio spiritus. Reply to Objection 3. We can name God only from creatures (13, 1). As in creatures generation is the only principle of communication of nature, procession in God has no proper or special name, except that of generation. Hence the procession which is not generation has remained without a special name; but it can be called spiration, as it is the procession of the Spirit.
Iª q. 27 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sint plures processiones in divinis quam duae. Sicut enim scientia et voluntas attribuitur Deo, ita et potentia. Si igitur secundum intellectum et voluntatem accipiuntur in Deo duae processiones, videtur quod tertia sit accipienda secundum potentiam. Whether there are more than two processions in God?Objection 1. It would seem that there are more than two processions in God. As knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power. Therefore, if two processions exist in God, of intellect and will, it seems that there must also be a third procession of power.
Iª q. 27 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, bonitas maxime videtur esse principium processionis, cum bonum dicatur diffusivum sui esse. Videtur igitur quod secundum bonitatem aliqua processio in divinis accipi debeat. Objection 2. Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of procession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there must be a procession of goodness in God.
Iª q. 27 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, maior est fecunditatis virtus in Deo quam in nobis. Sed in nobis non est tantum una processio verbi, sed multae, quia ex uno verbo in nobis procedit aliud verbum; et similiter ex uno amore alius amor. Ergo et in Deo sunt plures processiones quam duae. Objection 3. Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity than in us. But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but there are many: for in us from one word proceeds another; and also from one love proceeds another. Therefore in God there are more than two processions.
Iª q. 27 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod in Deo non sunt nisi duo procedentes, scilicet filius et spiritus sanctus. Ergo sunt ibi tantum duae processiones. On the contrary, In God there are not more than two who proceed--the Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore there are in Him but two processions.
Iª q. 27 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod processiones in divinis accipi non possunt nisi secundum actiones quae in agente manent. Huiusmodi autem actiones in natura intellectuali et divina non sunt nisi duae, scilicet intelligere et velle. Nam sentire, quod etiam videtur esse operatio in sentiente, est extra naturam intellectualem, neque totaliter est remotum a genere actionum quae sunt ad extra; nam sentire perficitur per actionem sensibilis in sensum. Relinquitur igitur quod nulla alia processio possit esse in Deo, nisi verbi et amoris. I answer that, The divine processions can be derived only from the actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is intellectual, and in the divine nature these actions are two, the acts of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected by the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word, and of Love.
Iª q. 27 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod potentia est principium agendi in aliud, unde secundum potentiam accipitur actio ad extra. Et sic secundum attributum potentiae non accipitur processio divinae personae, sed solum processio creaturarum. Reply to Objection 1. Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but is indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures.
Iª q. 27 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum, sicut dicit Boetius in libro de Hebd., pertinet ad essentiam et non ad operationem, nisi forte sicut obiectum voluntatis. Unde, cum processiones divinas secundum aliquas actiones necesse sit accipere, secundum bonitatem et huiusmodi alia attributa non accipiuntur aliae processiones nisi verbi et amoris, secundum quod Deus suam essentiam, veritatem et bonitatem intelligit et amat. Reply to Objection 2. As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), goodness belongs to the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the object of the will. Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain actions; no other processions can be understood in God according to goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love, according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and goodness.
Iª q. 27 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, Deus uno simplici actu omnia intelligit, et similiter omnia vult. Unde in eo non potest esse processio verbi ex verbo, neque amoris ex amore, sed est in eo solum unum verbum perfectum, et unus amor perfectus. Et in hoc eius perfecta fecunditas manifestatur. Reply to Objection 3. As above explained (14, 5; 19, 5), God understands all things by one simple act; and by one act also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession of Word from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His perfect fecundity.

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