Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q21

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Iª q. 21 pr. Post considerationem divini amoris, de iustitia et misericordia eius agendum est. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum in Deo sit iustitia. Secundo, utrum iustitia eius veritas dici possit. Tertio, utrum in Deo sit misericordia. Quarto, utrum in omni opere Dei sit iustitia et misericordia.
Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit iustitia. Iustitia enim contra temperantiam dividitur. Temperantia autem non est in Deo. Ergo nec iustitia. Objection 1. It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God: neither therefore does justice.
Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, quicumque facit omnia pro libito suae voluntatis, non secundum iustitiam operatur. Sed, sicut dicit apostolus, ad Ephes. I, Deus operatur omnia secundum consilium suae voluntatis. Non ergo ei iustitia debet attribui. Objection 2. Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh all things according to the counsel of His will" (Ephesians 1:11). Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.
Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, actus iustitiae est reddere debitum. Sed Deus nulli est debitor. Ergo Deo non competit iustitia. Objection 3. Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.
Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, quidquid est in Deo, est eius essentia. Sed hoc non competit iustitiae, dicit enim Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., quod bonum essentiam, iustum vero actum respicit. Ergo iustitia non competit Deo. Objection 4. Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to God.
Iª q. 21 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo X, iustus dominus, et iustitias dilexit. On the contrary, It is said (Psalm 10:8): "The Lord is just, and hath loved justice."
Iª q. 21 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est species iustitiae. Una, quae consistit in mutua datione et acceptione, ut puta quae consistit in emptione et venditione, et aliis huiusmodi communicationibus vel commutationibus. Et haec dicitur a philosopho, in V Ethic., iustitia commutativa, vel directiva commutationum sive communicationum. Et haec non competit Deo, quia, ut dicit apostolus, Rom. XI, quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? Alia, quae consistit in distribuendo, et dicitur distributiva iustitia, secundum quam aliquis gubernator vel dispensator dat unicuique secundum suam dignitatem. Sicut igitur ordo congruus familiae, vel cuiuscumque multitudinis gubernatae, demonstrat huiusmodi iustitiam in gubernante; ita ordo universi, qui apparet tam in rebus naturalibus quam in rebus voluntariis, demonstrat Dei iustitiam. Unde dicit Dionysius, VIII cap. de Div. Nom., oportet videre in hoc veram Dei esse iustitiam, quod omnibus tribuit propria, secundum uniuscuiusque existentium dignitatem; et uniuscuiusque naturam in proprio salvat ordine et virtute. I answer that, There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?" (Romans 11:35). The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it."
Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutum moralium quaedam sunt circa passiones; sicut temperantia circa concupiscentias, fortitudo circa timores et audacias, mansuetudo circa iram. Et huiusmodi virtutes Deo attribui non possunt, nisi secundum metaphoram, quia in Deo neque passiones sunt, ut supra dictum est; neque appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt huiusmodi virtutes sicut in subiecto, ut dicit philosophus in III Ethic. Quaedam vero virtutes morales sunt circa operationes; ut puta circa dationes et sumptus, ut iustitia et liberalitas et magnificentia; quae etiam non sunt in parte sensitiva, sed in voluntate. Unde nihil prohibet huiusmodi virtutes in Deo ponere, non tamen circa actiones civiles sed circa actiones Deo convenientes. Ridiculum est enim secundum virtutes politicas Deum laudare, ut dicit philosophus in X Ethic. Reply to Objection 1. Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (20, 1), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.
Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum bonum intellectum sit obiectum voluntatis, impossibile est Deum velle nisi quod ratio suae sapientiae habet. Quae quidem est sicut lex iustitiae, secundum quam eius voluntas recta et iusta est. Unde quod secundum suam voluntatem facit, iuste facit, sicut et nos quod secundum legem facimus, iuste facimus. Sed nos quidem secundum legem alicuius superioris, Deus autem sibi ipsi est lex. Reply to Objection 2. Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power, God is a law unto Himself.
Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod unicuique debetur quod suum est. Dicitur autem esse suum alicuius, quod ad ipsum ordinatur; sicut servus est domini, et non e converso; nam liberum est quod sui causa est. In nomine ergo debiti, importatur quidam ordo exigentiae vel necessitatis alicuius ad quod ordinatur. Est autem duplex ordo considerandus in rebus. Unus, quo aliquid creatum ordinatur ad aliud creatum, sicut partes ordinantur ad totum, et accidentia ad substantias, et unaquaeque res ad suum finem. Alius ordo, quo omnia creata ordinantur in Deum. Sic igitur et debitum attendi potest dupliciter in operatione divina, aut secundum quod aliquid debetur Deo; aut secundum quod aliquid debetur rei creatae. Et utroque modo Deus debitum reddit. Debitum enim est Deo, ut impleatur in rebus id quod eius sapientia et voluntas habet, et quod suam bonitatem manifestat, et secundum hoc iustitia Dei respicit decentiam ipsius, secundum quam reddit sibi quod sibi debetur. Debitum etiam est alicui rei creatae, quod habeat id quod ad ipsam ordinatur, sicut homini, quod habeat manus, et quod ei alia animalia serviant. Et sic etiam Deus operatur iustitiam, quando dat unicuique quod ei debetur secundum rationem suae naturae et conditionis. Sed hoc debitum dependet ex primo, quia hoc unicuique debetur, quod est ordinatum ad ipsum secundum ordinem divinae sapientiae. Et licet Deus hoc modo debitum alicui det, non tamen ipse est debitor, quia ipse ad alia non ordinatur, sed potius alia in ipsum. Et ideo iustitia quandoque dicitur in Deo condecentia suae bonitatis; quandoque vero retributio pro meritis. Et utrumque modum tangit Anselmus, dicens, cum punis malos, iustum est, quia illorum meritis convenit; cum vero parcis malis, iustum est, quia bonitati tuae condecens est. Reply to Objection 3. To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. In this respect, God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is not directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10): "When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness."
Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet iustitia respiciat actum, non tamen per hoc excluditur quin sit essentia Dei, quia etiam id quod est de essentia rei, potest esse principium actionis. Sed bonum non semper respicit actum, quia aliquid dicitur esse bonum, non solum secundum quod agit, sed etiam secundum quod in sua essentia perfectum est. Et propter hoc ibidem dicitur quod bonum comparatur ad iustum, sicut generale ad speciale. Reply to Objection 4. Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the just, as the general to the special.
Iª q. 21 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustitia Dei non sit veritas. Iustitia enim est in voluntate, est enim rectitudo voluntatis, ut dicit Anselmus. Veritas autem est in intellectu, secundum philosophum in VI Metaphys. et in VI Ethic. Ergo iustitia non pertinet ad veritatem. Objection 1. It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13), it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore justice does not appertain to truth.
Iª q. 21 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, veritas, secundum philosophum in IV Ethic., est quaedam alia virtus a iustitia. Non ergo veritas pertinet ad rationem iustitiae. Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain to the idea of justice.
Iª q. 21 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo LXXXIV dicitur, misericordia et veritas obviaverunt sibi; et ponitur ibi veritas pro iustitia. On the contrary, it is said (Psalm 84:11): "Mercy and truth have met each other": where truth stands for justice.
Iª q. 21 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod veritas consistit in adaequatione intellectus et rei, sicut supra dictum est. Intellectus autem qui est causa rei, comparatur ad ipsam sicut regula et mensura, e converso autem est de intellectu qui accipit scientiam a rebus. Quando igitur res sunt mensura et regula intellectus, veritas consistit in hoc, quod intellectus adaequatur rei, ut in nobis accidit, ex eo enim quod res est vel non est, opinio nostra et oratio vera vel falsa est. Sed quando intellectus est regula vel mensura rerum, veritas consistit in hoc, quod res adaequantur intellectui, sicut dicitur artifex facere verum opus, quando concordat arti. Sicut autem se habent artificiata ad artem, ita se habent opera iusta ad legem cui concordant. Iustitia igitur Dei, quae constituit ordinem in rebus conformem rationi sapientiae suae, quae est lex eius, convenienter veritas nominatur. Et sic etiam dicitur in nobis veritas iustitiae. I answer that, Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above (16, 1). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art. Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.
Iª q. 21 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iustitia, quantum ad legem regulantem, est in ratione vel intellectu, sed quantum ad imperium, quo opera regulantur secundum legem, est in voluntate. Reply to Objection 1. Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed according to the law, it resides in the will.
Iª q. 21 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod veritas illa de qua loquitur philosophus ibi, est quaedam virtus per quam aliquis demonstrat se talem in dictis vel factis, qualis est. Et sic consistit in conformitate signi ad significatum, non autem in conformitate effectus ad causam et regulam, sicut de veritate iustitiae dictum est. Reply to Objection 2. The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.
Iª q. 21 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod misericordia Deo non competat. Misericordia enim est species tristitiae, ut dicit Damascenus. Sed tristitia non est in Deo. Ergo nec misericordia. Objection 1. It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.
Iª q. 21 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, misericordia est relaxatio iustitiae. Sed Deus non potest praetermittere id quod ad iustitiam suam pertinet. Dicitur enim II ad Tim. II, si non credimus, ille fidelis permanet, seipsum negare non potest, negaret autem seipsum, ut dicit Glossa ibidem, si dicta sua negaret. Ergo misericordia Deo non competit. Objection 2. Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (2 Timothy 2:13): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.
Iª q. 21 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo CX, miserator et misericors dominus. On the contrary, it is said (Psalm 110:4): "He is a merciful and gracious Lord."
Iª q. 21 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod misericordia est Deo maxime attribuenda, tamen secundum effectum, non secundum passionis affectum. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod misericors dicitur aliquis quasi habens miserum cor, quia scilicet afficitur ex miseria alterius per tristitiam, ac si esset eius propria miseria. Et ex hoc sequitur quod operetur ad depellendam miseriam alterius, sicut miseriam propriam, et hic est misericordiae effectus. Tristari ergo de miseria alterius non competit Deo, sed repellere miseriam alterius, hoc maxime ei competit, ut per miseriam quemcumque defectum intelligamus. Defectus autem non tolluntur, nisi per alicuius bonitatis perfectionem, prima autem origo bonitatis Deus est, ut supra ostensum est. Sed considerandum est quod elargiri perfectiones rebus, pertinet quidem et ad bonitatem divinam, et ad iustitiam, et ad liberalitatem, et misericordiam, tamen secundum aliam et aliam rationem. Communicatio enim perfectionum, absolute considerata, pertinet ad bonitatem, ut supra ostensum est. Sed inquantum perfectiones rebus a Deo dantur secundum earum proportionem, pertinet ad iustitiam, ut dictum est supra. Inquantum vero non attribuit rebus perfectiones propter utilitatem suam, sed solum propter suam bonitatem, pertinet ad liberalitatem. Inquantum vero perfectiones datae rebus a Deo, omnem defectum expellunt, pertinet ad misericordiam. I answer that, Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (6, 4). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown above (6, 1, 4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already said (1); in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by God expel defects, it belongs to mercy.
Iª q. 21 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum igitur dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de misericordia, quantum ad passionis affectum. Reply to Objection 1. This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion.
Iª q. 21 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus misericorditer agit, non quidem contra iustitiam suam faciendo, sed aliquid supra iustitiam operando, sicut si alicui cui debentur centum denarii, aliquis ducentos det de suo, tamen non contra iustitiam facit, sed liberaliter vel misericorditer operatur. Et similiter si aliquis offensam in se commissam remittat. Qui enim aliquid remittit, quodammodo donat illud, unde apostolus remissionem donationem vocat, Ephes. V, donate invicem, sicut et Christus vobis donavit. Ex quo patet quod misericordia non tollit iustitiam, sed est quaedam iustitiae plenitudo. Unde dicitur Iac. II, quod misericordia superexaltat iudicium. Reply to Objection 2. God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one another, as Christ has forgiven you" (Ephesians 4:32). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy exalteth itself above judgement" (James 2:13).
Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non in omnibus Dei operibus sit misericordia et iustitia. Quaedam enim opera Dei attribuuntur misericordiae, ut iustificatio impii, quaedam vero iustitiae, ut damnatio impiorum. Unde dicitur Iac. II, iudicium sine misericordia fiet ei qui non fecerit misericordiam. Non ergo in omni opere Dei apparet misericordia et iustitia. Objection 1. It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy" (James 2:13). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear.
Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, apostolus, ad Rom. XV, conversionem Iudaeorum attribuit iustitiae et veritati; conversionem autem gentium, misericordiae. Ergo non in quolibet opere Dei est iustitia et misericordia. Objection 2. Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (Rm. 15). Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.
Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, multi iusti in hoc mundo affliguntur. Hoc autem est iniustum. Non ergo in omni opere Dei est iustitia et misericordia. Objection 3. Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.
Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, iustitiae est reddere debitum, misericordiae autem sublevare miseriam, et sic tam iustitia quam misericordia aliquid praesupponit in suo opere. Sed creatio nihil praesupponit. Ergo in creatione neque misericordia est, neque iustitia. Objection 4. Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.
Iª q. 21 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XXIV, omnes viae domini misericordia et veritas. On the contrary, It is said (Psalm 24:10): "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth."
Iª q. 21 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est quod in quolibet opere Dei misericordia et veritas inveniantur; si tamen misericordia pro remotione cuiuscumque defectus accipiatur; quamvis non omnis defectus proprie possit dici miseria, sed solum defectus rationalis naturae, quam contingit esse felicem; nam miseria felicitati opponitur. Huius autem necessitatis ratio est, quia, cum debitum quod ex divina iustitia redditur, sit vel debitum Deo, vel debitum alicui creaturae, neutrum potest in aliquo opere Dei praetermitti. Non enim potest facere aliquid Deus, quod non sit conveniens sapientiae et bonitati ipsius; secundum quem modum diximus aliquid esse debitum Deo. Similiter etiam quidquid in rebus creatis facit, secundum convenientem ordinem et proportionem facit; in quo consistit ratio iustitiae. Et sic oportet in omni opere Dei esse iustitiam. Opus autem divinae iustitiae semper praesupponit opus misericordiae, et in eo fundatur. Creaturae enim non debetur aliquid, nisi propter aliquid in eo praeexistens, vel praeconsideratum, et rursus, si illud creaturae debetur, hoc erit propter aliquid prius. Et cum non sit procedere in infinitum, oportet devenire ad aliquid quod ex sola bonitate divinae voluntatis dependeat, quae est ultimus finis. Utpote si dicamus quod habere manus debitum est homini propter animam rationalem; animam vero rationalem habere, ad hoc quod sit homo; hominem vero esse, propter divinam bonitatem. Et sic in quolibet opere Dei apparet misericordia, quantum ad primam radicem eius. Cuius virtus salvatur in omnibus consequentibus; et etiam vehementius in eis operatur, sicut causa primaria vehementius influit quam causa secunda. Et propter hoc etiam ea quae alicui creaturae debentur, Deus, ex abundantia suae bonitatis, largius dispensat quam exigat proportio rei. Minus enim est quod sufficeret ad conservandum ordinem iustitiae, quam quod divina bonitas confert, quae omnem proportionem creaturae excedit. I answer that, Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine will--which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness confers; because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion.
Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quaedam opera attribuuntur iustitiae et quaedam misericordiae, quia in quibusdam vehementius apparet iustitia, in quibusdam misericordia. Et tamen in damnatione reproborum apparet misericordia, non quidem totaliter relaxans, sed aliqualiter allevians, dum punit citra condignum. Et in iustificatione impii apparet iustitia, dum culpas relaxat propter dilectionem, quam tamen ipse misericorditer infundit, sicut de Magdalena legitur, Luc. VII, dimissa sunt ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit multum. Reply to Objection 1. Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved. In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" (Luke 7:47).
Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod iustitia et misericordia Dei apparet in conversione Iudaeorum et gentium, sed aliqua ratio iustitiae apparet in conversione Iudaeorum, quae non apparet in conversione gentium, sicut quod salvati sunt propter promissiones patribus factas. Reply to Objection 2. God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account of the promises made to the fathers.
Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in hoc etiam quod iusti puniuntur in hoc mundo, apparet iustitia et misericordia; inquantum per huiusmodi afflictiones aliqua levia in eis purgantur, et ab affectu terrenorum in Deum magis eriguntur; secundum illud Gregorii, mala quae in hoc mundo nos premunt, ad Deum nos ire compellunt. Reply to Objection 3. Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils that press on us in this world force us to go to God."
Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet creationi non praesupponatur aliquid in rerum natura, praesupponitur tamen aliquid in Dei cognitione. Et secundum hoc etiam salvatur ibi ratio iustitiae, inquantum res in esse producitur, secundum quod convenit divinae sapientiae et bonitati. Et salvatur quodammodo ratio misericordiae, inquantum res de non esse in esse mutatur. Reply to Objection 4. Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence.

Notes

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