Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q17

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Q16 Q18



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Iª q. 17 pr. Deinde quaeritur de falsitate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum falsitas sit in rebus. Secundo, utrum sit in sensu. Tertio, utrum sit in intellectu. Quarto, de oppositione veri et falsi.
Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in rebus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., si verum est id quod est, falsum non esse uspiam concludetur, quovis repugnante. Objection 1. It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary."
Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, falsum dicitur a fallendo. Sed res non fallunt, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de vera Relig., quia non ostendunt aliud quam suam speciem. Ergo falsum in rebus non invenitur. Objection 2. Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things.
Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, verum dicitur in rebus per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, ut supra dictum est. Sed quaelibet res, inquantum est, imitatur Deum. Ergo quaelibet res vera est, absque falsitate. Et sic nulla res est falsa. Objection 3. Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above (16). But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.
Iª q. 17 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., quod omne corpus est verum corpus et falsa unitas; quia imitatur unitatem, et non est unitas. Sed quaelibet res imitatur divinam bonitatem, et ab ea deficit. Ergo in omnibus rebus est falsitas. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity." But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.
Iª q. 17 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum verum et falsum opponantur; opposita autem sunt circa idem; necesse est ut ibi prius quaeratur falsitas, ubi primo veritas invenitur, hoc est in intellectu. In rebus autem neque veritas neque falsitas est, nisi per ordinem ad intellectum. Et quia unumquodque secundum id quod convenit ei per se, simpliciter nominatur; secundum autem id quod convenit ei per accidens, non nominatur nisi secundum quid; res quidem simpliciter falsa dici posset per comparationem ad intellectum a quo dependet, cui comparatur per se; in ordine autem ad alium intellectum, cui comparatur per accidens, non posset dici falsa nisi secundum quid. Dependent autem ab intellectu divino res naturales, sicut ab intellectu humano res artificiales. Dicuntur igitur res artificiales falsae simpliciter et secundum se, inquantum deficiunt a forma artis, unde dicitur aliquis artifex opus falsum facere, quando deficit ab operatione artis. Sic autem in rebus dependentibus a Deo, falsitas inveniri non potest per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, cum quidquid in rebus accidit, ex ordinatione divini intellectus procedat, nisi forte in voluntariis agentibus tantum, in quorum potestate est subducere se ab ordinatione divini intellectus; in quo malum culpae consistit, secundum quod ipsa peccata falsitates et mendacia dicuntur in Scripturis, secundum illud Psalmi IV, ut quid diligitis vanitatem et quaeritis mendacium? Sicut per oppositum operatio virtuosa veritas vitae nominatur, inquantum subditur ordini divini intellectus; sicut dicitur Ioan. III, qui facit veritatem, venit ad lucem. Sed per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, ad quem comparantur res naturales per accidens, possunt dici falsae, non simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum rationem significati, ut dicatur illud esse falsum in rebus, quod significatur vel repraesentatur oratione vel intellectu falso. Secundum quem modum quaelibet res potest dici esse falsa, quantum ad id quod ei non inest, sicut si dicamus diametrum esse falsum commensurabile, ut dicit philosophus in V Metaphys.; et sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., quod tragoedus est falsus Hector. Sicut e contrario potest unumquodque dici verum, secundum id quod competit ei. Alio modo, per modum causae. Et sic dicitur res esse falsa, quae nata est facere de se opinionem falsam. Et quia innatum est nobis per ea quae exterius apparent de rebus iudicare, eo quod nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, qui primo et per se est exteriorum accidentium; ideo ea quae in exterioribus accidentibus habent similitudinem aliarum rerum, dicuntur esse falsa secundum illas res; sicut fel est falsum mel, et stannum est falsum argentum. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., quod eas res falsas nominamus, quae verisimilia apprehendimus. Et philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod falsa dicuntur quaecumque apta nata sunt apparere aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt. Et per hunc modum etiam dicitur homo falsus, inquantum est amativus falsarum opinionum vel locutionum. Non autem ex hoc quod potest eas confingere, quia sic etiam sapientes et scientes falsi dicerentur, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. I answer that, Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper operation of his art. In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?" (Psalm 4:3): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" (John 3:21). But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause--and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In this way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34.
Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod res comparata ad intellectum, secundum id quod est, dicitur vera, secundum id quod non est, dicitur falsa. Unde verus tragoedus est falsus Hector, ut dicitur in II Soliloq. Sicut igitur in his quae sunt, invenitur quoddam non esse; ita in his quae sunt, invenitur quaedam ratio falsitatis. Reply to Objection 1. A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not. Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.
Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod res per se non fallunt, sed per accidens. Dant enim occasionem falsitatis, eo quod similitudinem eorum gerunt, quorum non habent existentiam. Reply to Objection 2. Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are not.
Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod per comparationem ad intellectum divinum non dicuntur res falsae, quod esset eas esse falsas simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad intellectum nostrum, quod est eas esse falsas secundum quid. Reply to Objection 3. Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.
Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum, quod in oppositum obiicitur, dicendum quod similitudo vel repraesentatio deficiens non inducit rationem falsitatis, nisi inquantum praestat occasionem falsae opinionis. Unde non ubicumque est similitudo, dicitur res falsa, sed ubicumque est talis similitudo, quae nata est facere opinionem falsam, non cuicumque, sed ut in pluribus. Reply to Objection 4. To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in the majority of instances.
Iª q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sensu non sit falsitas. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., si omnes corporis sensus ita nuntiant ut afficiuntur, quid ab eis amplius exigere debemus, ignoro. Et sic videtur quod ex sensibus non fallamur. Et sic falsitas in sensu non est. Objection 1. It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that falsity is not in them.
Iª q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Metaphys., quod falsitas non est propria sensui, sed phantasiae. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.
Iª q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, in incomplexis non est verum nec falsum, sed solum in complexis. Sed componere et dividere non pertinet ad sensum. Ergo in sensu non est falsitas. Objection 3. Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.
Iª q. 17 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., apparet nos in omnibus sensibus similitudine lenocinante falli. On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."
Iª q. 17 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod falsitas non est quaerenda in sensu, nisi sicut ibi est veritas. Veritas autem non sic est in sensu, ut sensus cognoscat veritatem; sed inquantum veram apprehensionem habet de sensibilibus, ut supra dictum est. Quod quidem contingit eo quod apprehendit res ut sunt. Unde contingit falsitatem esse in sensu, ex hoc quod apprehendit vel iudicat res aliter quam sint. Sic autem se habet ad cognoscendum res, inquantum similitudo rerum est in sensu. Similitudo autem alicuius rei est in sensu tripliciter. Uno modo, primo et per se; sicut in visu est similitudo colorum et aliorum propriorum sensibilium. Alio modo, per se, sed non primo; sicut in visu est similitudo figurae vel magnitudinis, et aliorum communium sensibilium. Tertio modo, nec primo nec per se, sed per accidens; sicut in visu est similitudo hominis, non inquantum est homo, sed inquantum huic colorato accidit esse hominem. Et circa propria sensibilia sensus non habet falsam cognitionem, nisi per accidens, et ut in paucioribus, ex eo scilicet quod, propter indispositionem organi, non convenienter recipit formam sensibilem, sicut et alia passiva, propter suam indispositionem, deficienter recipiunt impressionem agentium. Et inde est quod, propter corruptionem linguae, infirmis dulcia amara esse videntur. De sensibilibus vero communibus et per accidens, potest esse falsum iudicium etiam in sensu recte disposito, quia sensus non directe refertur ad illa, sed per accidens, vel ex consequenti, inquantum refertur ad alia. I answer that, Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (16, 2), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really are. The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly, neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man. Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things.
Iª q. 17 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensum affici, est ipsum eius sentire. Unde per hoc quod sensus ita nuntiant sicut afficiuntur, sequitur quod non decipiamur in iudicio quo iudicamus nos sentire aliquid. Sed ex eo quod sensus aliter afficitur interdum quam res sit, sequitur quod nuntiet nobis aliquando rem aliter quam sit. Et ex hoc fallimur per sensum circa rem, non circa ipsum sentire. Reply to Objection 1. The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.
Iª q. 17 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod falsitas dicitur non esse propria sensui, quia non decipitur circa proprium obiectum. Unde in alia translatione planius dicitur, quod sensus proprii sensibilis falsus non est. Phantasiae autem attribuitur falsitas, quia repraesentat similitudinem rei etiam absentis; unde quando aliquis convertitur ad similitudinem rei tanquam ad rem ipsam, provenit ex tali apprehensione falsitas. Unde etiam philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit quod umbrae et picturae et somnia dicuntur falsa, inquantum non subsunt res quarum habent similitudinem. Reply to Objection 2. Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things that are not present in substance.
Iª q. 17 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, quod falsitas non sit in sensu sicut in cognoscente verum et falsum. Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.
Iª q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in intellectu. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., omnis qui fallitur, id in quo fallitur, non intelligit. Sed falsum dicitur esse in aliqua cognitione, secundum quod per eam fallimur. Ergo in intellectu non est falsitas. Objection 1. It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the intellect.
Iª q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus semper est rectus. Non ergo in intellectu est falsitas. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the intellect.
Iª q. 17 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de anima, quod ubi compositio intellectuum est, ibi verum et falsum est. Sed compositio intellectuum est in intellectu. Ergo verum et falsum est in intellectu. On the contrary, It is said in De Anima iii, 21, 22 that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood." But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect.
Iª q. 17 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut res habet esse per propriam formam, ita virtus cognoscitiva habet cognoscere per similitudinem rei cognitae. Unde, sicut res naturalis non deficit ab esse quod sibi competit secundum suam formam, potest autem deficere ab aliquibus accidentalibus vel consequentibus; sicut homo ab hoc quod est habere duos pedes, non autem ab hoc quod est esse hominem, ita virtus cognoscitiva non deficit in cognoscendo respectu illius rei cuius similitudine informatur; potest autem deficere circa aliquid consequens ad ipsam, vel accidens ei. Sicut est dictum quod visus non decipitur circa sensibile proprium, sed circa sensibilia communia, quae consequenter se habent ad illud, et circa sensibilia per accidens. Sicut autem sensus informatur directe similitudine propriorum sensibilium, ita intellectus informatur similitudine quidditatis rei. Unde circa quod quid est intellectus non decipitur, sicut neque sensus circa sensibilia propria. In componendo vero vel dividendo potest decipi, dum attribuit rei cuius quidditatem intelligit, aliquid quod eam non consequitur, vel quod ei opponitur. Sic enim se habet intellectus ad iudicandum de huiusmodi, sicut sensus ad iudicandum de sensibilibus communibus vel per accidens. Hac tamen differentia servata, quae supra circa veritatem dicta est, quod falsitas in intellectu esse potest, non solum quia cognitio intellectus falsa est, sed quia intellectus eam cognoscit, sicut et veritatem, in sensu autem falsitas non est ut cognita, ut dictum est. Quia vero falsitas intellectus per se solum circa compositionem intellectus est, per accidens etiam in operatione intellectus qua cognoscit quod quid est, potest esse falsitas, inquantum ibi compositio intellectus admiscetur. Quod potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod intellectus definitionem unius attribuit alteri; ut si definitionem circuli attribuat homini. Unde definitio unius rei est falsa de altera. Alio modo, secundum quod partes definitionis componit ad invicem, quae simul sociari non possunt, sic enim definitio non est solum falsa respectu alicuius rei, sed est falsa in se. Ut si formet talem definitionem, animal rationale quadrupes, falsus est intellectus sic definiendo, propterea quod falsus est in formando hanc compositionem, aliquod animal rationale est quadrupes. Et propter hoc, in cognoscendo quidditates simplices non potest esse intellectus falsus, sed vel est verus, vel totaliter nihil intelligit. I answer that, Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said (2) that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (16, 2), that falsity can exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above (2). But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at all.
Iª q. 17 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia quidditas rei est proprium obiectum intellectus, propter hoc tunc proprie dicimur aliquid intelligere, quando, reducentes illud in quod quid est, sic de eo iudicamus, sicut accidit in demonstrationibus, in quibus non est falsitas. Et hoc modo intelligitur verbum Augustini, quod omnis qui fallitur, non intelligit id in quo fallitur, non autem ita, quod in nulla operatione intellectus aliquis fallatur. Reply to Objection 1. Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.
Iª q. 17 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus semper est rectus, secundum quod intellectus est principiorum, circa quae non decipitur, ex eadem causa qua non decipitur circa quod quid est. Nam principia per se nota sunt illa quae statim, intellectis terminis, cognoscuntur, ex eo quod praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti. Reply to Objection 2. The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.
Iª q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod verum et falsum non sint contraria. Verum enim et falsum opponuntur sicut quod est et quod non est, nam verum est id quod est, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed quod est et quod non est, non opponuntur ut contraria. Ergo verum et falsum non sunt contraria. Objection 1. It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things.
Iª q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, unum contrariorum non est in alio. Sed falsum est in vero, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro Soliloq., tragoedus non esset falsus Hector, si non esset verus tragoedus. Ergo verum et falsum non sunt contraria. Objection 2. Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries.
Iª q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, in Deo non est contrarietas aliqua, nihil enim divinae substantiae est contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civit. Dei. Sed Deo opponitur falsitas, nam idolum in Scriptura mendacium nominatur, Ierem. VIII, apprehenderunt mendacium; Glossa, idest idola. Ergo verum et falsum non sunt contraria. Objection 3. Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (Jeremiah 8:5), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.
Iª q. 17 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit philosophus, in II Periherm., ponit enim falsam opinionem verae contrariam. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.
Iª q. 17 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod verum et falsum opponuntur ut contraria, et non sicut affirmatio et negatio, ut quidam dixerunt. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod negatio neque ponit aliquid, neque determinat sibi aliquod subiectum. Et propter hoc, potest dici tam de ente quam de non ente; sicut non videns, et non sedens. Privatio autem non ponit aliquid, sed determinat sibi subiectum. Est enim negatio in subiecto, ut dicitur IV Metaphys., caecum enim non dicitur nisi de eo quod est natum videre. Contrarium vero et aliquid ponit, et subiectum determinat, nigrum enim est aliqua species coloris. Falsum autem aliquid ponit. Est enim falsum, ut dicit philosophus, IV Metaphys., ex eo quod dicitur vel videtur aliquid esse quod non est, vel non esse quod est. Sicut enim verum ponit acceptionem adaequatam rei, ita falsum acceptionem rei non adaequatam. Unde manifestum est quod verum et falsum sunt contraria. I answer that, True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries.
Iª q. 17 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod id quod est in rebus, est veritas rei sed id quod est ut apprehensum, est verum intellectus, in quo primo est veritas. Unde et falsum est id quod non est ut apprehensum. Apprehendere autem esse et non esse, contrarietatem habet, sicut probat philosophus, in II Periherm., quod huic opinioni, bonum est bonum, contraria est, bonum non est bonum. Reply to Objection 1. What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good."
Iª q. 17 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod falsum non fundatur in vero sibi contrario, sicut nec malum in bono sibi contrario; sed in eo quod sibi subiicitur. Et hoc ideo in utroque accidit, quia verum et bonum communia sunt, et convertuntur cum ente, unde, sicut omnis privatio fundatur in subiecto quod est ens, ita omne malum fundatur in aliquo bono, et omne falsum in aliquo vero. Reply to Objection 2. Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth.
Iª q. 17 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia contraria et opposita privative nata sunt fieri circa idem, ideo Deo, prout in se consideratur, non est aliquid contrarium, neque ratione suae bonitatis, neque ratione suae veritatis, quia in intellectu eius non potest esse falsitas aliqua. Sed in apprehensione nostra habet aliquid contrarium, nam verae opinioni de ipso contrariatur falsa opinio. Et sic idola mendacia dicuntur opposita veritati divinae, inquantum falsa opinio de idolis contrariatur verae opinioni de unitate Dei. Reply to Objection 3. Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.

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