Authors/Ockham/Quodlibeta Septem/Quodlibeta Septem/Quodlibet III/Quaestio VI

Quodlibet III Quaestio 6

Latin	English
[p225] QUAESTIO 6 UTRUM FORMAE PARTUM ORGANICARUM ANIMALIS DISTINGUANTUR SPECIE PUTA CARNIS ET OSSIS	QUESTION 6 WHETHER THE FORMS OF THE ORGANIC PARTS OF AN ANIMAL ARE DISTINGUISHED BY SPECIES, SUCH AS FLESH AND BONE
Quod sic: Quia habent accidentia distincta specie; igitur distinguuntur specie.	That they are, because they have accidents distinct in species; therefore they are distinguished by species.
Contra: Una forma substantialis sufficit pro omnibus; igitur non sunt plures ponendae, quia pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate.	Against: One substantial form suffices for all; therefore there are no pluralities to be posited, because plurality is not to be posited without necessity.
[Ad quaestionem] Ad istam quaestionem dico quod neutra pars potest sufficienter probari ex propositionibus per se notis, patet de se; nec per experientiam, quia non potest probari per diversitatem accidentium et operationum, nec per identitatem; et aliam experientiam non habemus de substantia nisi per accidentia.	[To the question] To this question I say that neither part can be sufficiently proved from propositions known per se, [which is] is self-evident; nor by experience, because it cannot be proved by the diversity of accidents and operations, nor by identity; and we have no other experience of substance except through accidents.
Assumptum probatur, quia videmus frequenter quod substantiae diversae speciei sunt subiecta accidentium diversae speciei, et similiter accidentium eiusdem speciei.	The assumption is proved, because we frequently see that substances of different species are subjects of accidents of diverse species, and similarly of accidents of the same species.
Exemplum primi, de igne et aqua, quae differunt specie et tamen habent accidentia alterius speciei. Exemplum secundi: ignis et aer differunt specie, et tamen habent accidentia eiusdem speciei, puta calorem. Similiter homo et angelus differunt specie, et tamen intellectiones et volitiones eorum sunt eiusdem speciei.	An example of the first, of fire and water, which differ in species and yet have accidents of another species. An example of the second: fire and air differ in species, and yet have accidents of the same species, for example heat. Similarly, man and angel differ in species, and yet their intellections and volitions are of the same species.
[p226] Secundo videmus quod substantiae differunt specie, et sunt principia effectiva accidentium diversae speciei et similiter accidentium eiusdem speciei.	[p226] Secondly, we see that substances differ in species, and are the effective principles of accidents of a different species, and similarly of accidents of the same species.
Patet in eisdem exemplis. Patet enim ad sensum quod aqua calefacta, si relinquatur naturae suae, redit ad frigiditatem; et ilia frigiditas non potest causari ab aliquo nisi a forma substantiali aquae.	It is clear in the same examples. For it is clear to sense that heated water, if left to its nature, returns to coldness; and that coldness cannot be caused by anything but the substantial form of water.
Similiter volitio hominis et angeli respectu eiusdem obiecti, quae sunt eiusdem speciei, causantur a voluntate utriusque, quae differunt specie.	Similarly, the volition of man and angel with respect to the same object, which are of the same species, is caused by the will of both, which differ in species.
Tertio videmus quod substantiae sunt eiusdem speciei, et sunt subiecta accidentium diversae speciei et similiter accidentium eiusdem speciei. Exemplum primi: duo poma sunt eiusdem speciei, et tamen unum est naturaliter dulce et aliud amarum.	Thirdly, we see that substances are of the same species, and are subject to accidents of a different species, and similarly of accidents of the same species. An example of the first: two apples are of the same kind, and yet one is naturally sweet and the other bitter.
Similiter duo homines: unus est albus, alius niger; unus audax, alius timidus. Exemplum secundi: duo poma sunt eiusdem speciei, et utrumque aliquando est dulce et utrumque aliquando amarum.	Similarly, two men: one is white, the other black; one bold, the other timid. An example of the second: two apples are of the same kind, and both are sometimes sweet and both sometimes bitter.
Quarto videmus quod substantiae sunt eiusdem speciei, et sunt aliquando principia effectiva accidentium alterius speciei, aliquando accidentium eiusdem speciei.	Fourthly, we see that substances are of the same species, and are sometimes the effective principles of accidents of another species, and sometimes of accidents of the same species.
Exemplum primi: duae voluntates hominum sunt eiusdem rationis, et tamen illud idem obiectum quod est volitum ab uno, est nolitum ab alio; et tam volitio quam nolitio causantur ab istis voluntatibus.	An example of the first: the two wills of men are of the same ratio, and yet the same object which is willed by one is not willed by another; and both willingness and unwillingness are caused by these wills.
Exemplum secundi: si voluntates duorum hominum diligant idem obiectum, hic accidens eiusdem speciei causatur ab utroque.	An example of the second: if the wills of two men love the same object, here an accident of the same kind is caused by both.
Similiter patet manifeste ex praedictis quod substantiae eiusdem speciei possunt esse principia diversarum operationum specie, et hoc immediate aliquando, et aliquando mediantibus diversis accidentibus.	Similarly, it is clear from what has been said that substances of the same species can be principles of different operations in the species [?], and this sometimes immediate, and sometimes by different accidents mediating.
Similiter substantiae diversae speciei possunt esse principia operationum diversae speciei et eiusdem speciei, et hoc non mediantibus aliis accidentibus sed immediate, sicut patet in exemplis praedictis.	Similarly, substances of different species can be the principles of operations of a different species and of the same species, and this by other mediating accidents but directly, as is clear from the examples mentioned above.
[p227] Cum igitur de substantiis non habeamus experientiam nisi per accidentia, et illa non probant sufficienter quod sit distinctio specifica vel unitas, manifestum est quod per nullam viam possumus sufficienter probare distinctionem specificam vel unitatem inter illas formas.	[p227] Since, then, we have no experience of substances except through accidents, and these do not sufficiently prove that there is a definite distinction or unity, it is clear that by no means can we sufficiently prove a specific distinction or unity between those forms.
[Positiones duae]
Unde illi 2 qui tenent quod formae carnis et ossis differunt specie, dicerent hoc propter diversitatem accidentium. Alii 3 tenentes quod sunt eiusdem speciei, dicerent quod omnis diversitas quae accidit eisdem, est propter diversitatem accidentium, quae non arguit diversitatem specificam in substantia. Quae pars est vera et quae falsa, simpliciter ignoro.	Hence those who hold that the forms of flesh and bones differ in appearance, would say this because of the diversity of accidents. Others, holding that they are of the same species, would say that every diversity that happens to them is due to the diversity of accidents, which does not argue for a specific diversity in substance. I simply ignore which part is true and which is false.
Contra: secundum Philosophum, VII Topicorum 4, illa principia quae non possunt habere effectus eiusdem rationis, sunt alterius rationis. Praeterea per omnem viam per quam arguimus differentiam specificam in aliis substantiis, possumus hic arguere; igitur etc.	Against: according to the Philosopher, VII Topics 4, those principles which cannot have effects of the same ratio, are of another ratio. Moreover, by every way in which we argue a specific difference in other substances, we can argue here; therefore, etc.
Ad primum dico quod illud est verum de principiis immediatis effectuum, non autem de principiis mediatis. Nunc autem qui teneret quod sunt eiusdem speciei, diceret quod accidentia carnis et ossis causant diversos effectus immediate, non autem substantiae nisi mediate. Unde diceret quod in omnem effectum in quem potest immediate una forma substantialis, potest alia, licet non mediate.	To the first I say that this is true of the immediate principles of effects, but not of mediate principles. But now he who would maintain that they are of the same species, would say that the accidents of the flesh and bones cause different effects immediately, but not the substance except mediately. Hence he would say that in every effect which one substantial form can immediately, another can [can what?], though not mediately.
[p228] Ad aliud5 dico quod nullam rationem evidentem demonstrative probantem distinctionem specificam inter quascumque substantias habemus, quia nec ex per se notis nec per experientiam, sicut ostensum est; sed probamus hoc partim per experientiam, partim per rationes probabiles. Ad argumenta principalia, patet ex dictis.	To the other point, I say that we have no clear reason demonstratively proving a specific distinction between any substances, because neither from things known in themselves nor through experience, as has been shown; but we prove this partly by experience, partly by probable reasons. As to the beginning arguments, it is clear from what has been said.