Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II (Quaracchi)/D3/Question 2

QUESTION 2: Whether a material substance is of itself individual through something positive and intrinsic

Scotus argues that individuation comes about through something positive and intrinsic. Against the position of Henry of Ghent he argues nn. 49–56 that it is formally repugnant for a material substance (e.g. a stone) to be divided in to 'subjective parts' - i.e. many parts of a whole thing which any given one is that thing. But nothing is absolutely repugnant to a being through privation alone, but rather through something positive in it. For example, if not having sight is the removal of the proximate potentiality for seeing, this still does not produce any repugnancy to vision, which exists with the same positive nature.

Headings

• Arguments against
• Arguments for
• Henry of Ghent’s position – material substance is not individual through something positive
• Refutation of Henry of Ghent – an individual is not established formally through negation or privation
• Scotus’s Response
• Reply to the Main Argument

Question

Latin	English
[p233] [QUAESTIO II]	[Question 2: Whether a material substance is of itself individual through something positive and intrinsic]
[43] [Proponitur quaestio] Secundo quaerendum est: Utrum substantia materialis per aliquid positivum intrinsecum sit de se individua?	Secondly, we must ask whether a material substance is of itself individual through something positive and intrinsic.
[44]	[Arguments against]
(1) [Argumentum principale 1] Quod non; quia unum non dicit nisi privationem divisionis in se et privationem identitatis ad aliud; igitur cum singularitas vel individuatio non dicat nisi duplicem negationem, non oportet eius causam positivam quaerere, sed sufficit negatio.	That not: For ‘one’ only expresses the privation of division in itself and the privation of identity with another; therefore, since ‘singularity’ or ‘individuation’ only mean a double negation, we do not have to seek something positive as its cause, rather, the negation is sufficient.
[45] Prima propositio probatur, quia si unum diceret rationem positivam, non diceret eamdem (a) quam dicit ens, tunc enim esset nugatio dicendo ens unum; nec aliam rationem dicit, quia tunc in quocumque ente esset entitas addita entitati: quod est inconveniens.	The first proposition is proved: for if ‘one’ were to mean a positive aspect, it would mean the same thing as ‘being,’ and then saying ‘one being’ would be nugatory. Nor does it mean another [positive ] aspect other, for then in any given being there would be an entity added to an entity, which is absurd.
[46]	[Arguments for]
Contra. Prima substantia per se generatur, VII. Metaph., et per se operatur, I. Metaph., et ex hoc distinguitur a secunda, cui neutrum convenit (per se primo); ergo ista conveniunt primae substantiae per illud quod addit supra secundam substantiam: non autem conveniunt ista alicui formaliter per negationem; ergo prima substantia non addit tantum negationem supra secundam.	Against: Primary substance is generated per se and operates per se, and from this feature is distinguished from secondary substance, to which neither feature is appropriate per se; therefore, these features are appropriate to primary substance through that which it adds beyond secondary substance. But they are not appropriate to something formally by negation; therefore primary substance does not add only a negation above and beyond secondary substance.
[47] [Exponitur sententia tenens substantiam materialem non esse individuam per aliquod positivum]	[Henry of Ghent’s position – material substance is not individual through something positive]
Hic dicitur quod non individuatur per aliquod positivum; quia illud esset materia vel forma, vel aliquid consequens materiam vel formam; et hoc vel est absolutum vel respectivum. Non per materiam, ut post ostendetur. Nec per formam; quia quaeram de forma, per quid individuatur? Quia nec ex se ipsa, sicut nec natura, de qua dictum est supra; quaeram ergo per quid, et ulterius de illo alio, et sic in infinitum. Nec potest dari aliquid consequens absolutum, quia quaeram de illo eodem modo. Nec per respectivum, quia respectus praesupponit fundamentum, et sic non individuat ipsum. Ergo negatio est ratio. Unde ponit Henricus duplicem negationem esse. Vide in Quodlib. 5. quest. 8.	Regarding the question, it is said that individuation in created things comes about through a twofold negation. Not through matter, as is shown later, nor by form, because I ask about form: through what is it individuated? For neither from itself, just as [neither] through a nature, just as stated above. Therefore I ask through what, and then through what other, and so ad infinitum. Nor can there be granted some absolute consequence, for then I ask about that in the same way. Nor through relation, for a relation presupposes a basis, and this does not individuate in this way. Therefore negation is the reason. Thus Henry postulates a double negation.
[48](2) [Intellectus questionis] Contra ista: primo expono intellectum quaestionum motarum de ista materia: (a) Non enim quaero, quo natura est singularis vel individua, si ista significent intentionem secundam; quia tunc intentione secunda formaliter esset natura singularis, et effective ab intellectu causante illam intentionem secundam, conferente scilicet hanc naturam ad naturam, sicut subiicibile ad praedicabile.	Against this, I first state the understanding of the questions moved on this matter: For I do not ask how the nature is singular or individual, if these [i.e. ‘singular’ and ‘individual’] signify a second intention—for then by the second intention the nature would be formally singular by the second intention, and this would be brought about by the understanding causing that second intention, namely going from ‘this nature’ to ‘nature’ as from something capable ofbeing a subject to something predicable.
Nec etiam quaeritur de unitate numerali reali, quo formaliter natura est sic una; nam unitate numerali reali est res formaliter una, sive illa unitas convertatur cum ente, sive sit de genere quantitatis, sive dicat privationem, sive positionem.	Nor am I asking about the real numerical identity by which the nature is thus formally one; for by real numerical unity a thing is formally one, whether that unity converts with being or is in the genus of quantity, whether it expresses a privation or a postulating [of something].
Sed quia in entibus est aliquid indivisibile in partes subiectivas, hoc est, cui formaliter repugnat dividi in plura quorum quodlibet sit ipsum, quaeritur non quo formaliter illud sibi repugnat, quia sic repugnantia formaliter repugnat, sed quo ut fundamento proximo et intrinseco ista repugnantia insit isti.	But because there is something in beings that is unable to be divided into subjective parts, that is, something to which being divided into many parts of which any given one is that thing is formally repugnant, I am not asking about that by which it is formally repugnant (since it is formally repugnant by repugnance), but rather about that by which the repugnance is present in it as the proximate and intrinsic foundation of the repugnance.
Est ergo intellectus quaestionis de hac materia, quid sit in hoc lapide per quod sicut per fundamentum proximum simpliciter repugnat sibi dividi in plura, quorum quodlibet sit ipsum, qualis divisio est propria toti universali in suas partes subiectivas.	Therefore, the understanding of the question on this matter is: What is there in this stone through which, as by a proximate foundation, being divided into many things, each of which one is that thing, is absolutely repugnant to it, the way that there is a proper division of the universal whole into its subjective parts?
[49] [Ostenditur individuum non constitui formaliter per negationem vel privationem]	[Refutation of Henry of Ghent – an individual is not established formally through negation or privation]
Hoc modo intelligendo, probo quod non sit aliquod individuum formaliter per negationem vel privationem, sicut videtur ista positio ponere.	Understood in this way, I prove that something is not formally individual through negation or privation, as that position seems to postulate.
Primo quia nihil simpliciter repugnat p 97 alicui enti per solam privationem in eo, sed per aliquid positivum in eo; igitur dividi in partes subiectivas non repugnat lapidi, in eo quod est quoddam ens, per aliquas negationes.	First of all, nothing is absolutely repugnant to some being through a privation in it alone, but rather through something positive in it; hence, to be divided into subjective parts is not repugnant to a stone—in that it is some sort of being—through any negations.
[50] Probatio antecedentis: quia quantumcumque negatio tollat potentiam proximam ad agere et pati, ut per hoc idem ens in quo est negatio careat potentia proxima ad aliquid, non tamen ponit formalem repugnantiam illius entis ad aliquid; quia per possibile vel impossibile circumscriptis illis negationibus cum [p235] non sint, staret tale cum opposito illarum negationum, et ita cum illo cui dicitur repugnare per se: quod est impossibile.	Proof of the antecedent: because however much negation takes away proximate potentiality to acting and being acted upon, so that by this, that being in which there is the negation is not in proximate potentiality to something, yet it does not posit a formal repugnancy to that being with anything, since through ‘possible’ and ‘impossible,’ (ignoring those negations because they do not exist), such a being would stand with the opposite of those negations, and thus stand with that to which it is said to be repugnant per se—which is impossible.
Exemplum huius: si substantia intelligatur non quanta, non est divisibilis, hoc est non possibilis dividi potentia propinqua; non tamen repugnat sibi dividi, quia tunc repugnaret sibi recipere quantitatem, per quam formaliter posset dividi. Stante igitur natura substantiae corporeae, non repugnat sibi quod sit divisibilis.	An example of this: if a substance is understood not to be quantified, it is not divisible, that is, not possible to be divided by a more proximate potentiality, yet being divided is not repugnant to it, since the receiving quantity, through which it can formally be divided, would be repugnant to it. Therefore, by standing with the nature of the same corporeal substance, it would not be repugnant to it to be divisible.
Similiter si non habere visum tollat potentiam proximam ad videndum, non tamen facit repugnantiam ad videre, quia potest stare eadem natura positiva in qua fuit haec negatio, et potest sibi inesse oppositum illius negationis, sine repugnantia ex parte naturae.	Similarly, if not having sight were to remove the proximate potentiality for seeing, still, this does not produce a repugnancy to vision, since vision can obtain with the same positive nature (in which there was this negation), and the opposite of this negation can inhere in it free from any repugnancy on the part of the nature.
[51] Ita potest argui in proposito: cum iste ponat naturam ex se esse unam et individuam, nunquam tamen per aliquam negationem positam in natura repugnabit sibi formaliter dividi, et ita nunquam erit aliquod ens positivum in rebus quod erit complete individuum.	And so it can be argued in the present case : while that person postulates that “the nature is one and individual of itself,” yet it will never be repugnant to it to be formally divided through some negation posited in the nature, and so there will never be some positive being in things that will be completely individual.
[52] Et si aliquo modo instetur primae propositioni huius rationis, saltem assumo istam propositionem: nulla imperfectio repugnat alicui formaliter nisi propter aliquid positivum in eo, quia nulla imperfectio repugnat alicui nisi propter aliquam perfectionem, quae est aliquid positivum et entitas positiva: sed dividi est quaedam imperfectio, et ideo non potest competere naturae divinae; ergo &c.	And if an objection is raised in some way to the first proposition of the argument, I at least assume the proposition ‘No imperfection is formally repugnant to anything except on account of some perfection, which is something positive and a positive entity; but being divided is a sort of imperfection, and hence cannot belong to the divine nature—therefore etc.,
[53] Item, negatione non constituitur aliquid formaliter in entitate perfectiori quam sit illa entitas praesupposita negationi, alioquin negatio esset formaliter entitas positiva: sed prima substantia, per Philos. in Praedicamentis, est maxime substantia, et etiam magis substantia quam secunda; ergo non formaliter constituitur in entitate primae substantiae per negationem, in quantum distinguitur a secunda.	Likewise:something is not formally constituted by negation in an entity more perfect than is the entity presupposed by the negation, otherwise the negation would formally be a certain positive entity; but primary substance, according to Aristotle, is substance most of all, and it is also more substance than secondary substance. Thus it is not formally constituted in the entity of primary substance through a negation, inasmuch as it is distinguished from secondary substance.
[54] Item, de singulari per se primo praedicatur illud cuius est singulare: sed de aliquo ente accepto sub negatione non praedicatur per se aliqua entitas ratione totius subiecti, quia totum non est per se unum; si ratione partis, tunc non est praedicatio superioris de inferiori, sed eiusdem de se.	Likewise: that of which it is a singular is singular is predicated of it per se in the first mode; but of any being understood under negation no entity is predicated per se by reason of the whole subject, since the whole is not one per se. if by reason of a part, then it is not a predication of a higher of a lower, but of the same of itself).
[55] Praeterea, licet ista positio videatur esse falsa in se, propter argumenta iam facta, si intelligat individuum consti[p236]tui in entitate et unitate singularitatis per negationem, tamen videtur omnino superflua, et non respondere ad questionem; quia ipsa posita, adhuc remanet eadem quaestio; nam de duplici negatione quam ponit quaero, quae est ratio quare negatio ista convenit illi? Si istam duplicem negationem dicit esse per se sicut per se causam, dat causam suipsius. Si non dat causam huius, non respondetur ad quaestionem; quaeritur enim illud per quod repugnat oppositum istarum negationum, et per consequens per quid insunt istae negationes.	Furthermore, although the position seems to be false in itself, according to the arguments already given, if [Henry] understands an individual to be constituted in the entity and unity of singularity by negation, yet it also seems entirely superfluous and not answering the question, for even supposing his position the same question still remains—for I ask about the twofold negation that he supposes, what is the reason why this negation agrees to it? If he says that twofold negation is the per se cause, then it is not a reply to the question; for it was asked for that through which the opposite of those negations is repugnant, and, as a consequence, through what those negations exist.
[56] Similiter quaero, unde negatio sit haec, cum sit eiusdem rationis in isto et in illo? Nam sicut in Socrate est duplex negatio opposita illi quae est in Platone, ita in Platone est negatio duplex eiusdem rationis. Unde ergo Socrates est singularis hac singularitate propria et determinata, et non singularitate Platonis? Non potest dici nisi dicatur unde negatio sit haec negatio, et hoc non potest esse nisi per aliquid positivum.	Similarly, I ask why a negation is this, since the same account belongs to it in this item and in that item? For just as there is a twofold negation in Socrates opposite to that which is in Plato, so in Plato there is a negation of a twofold account. From what, therefore, is Socrates singular by his proper and determinate singularity and not by the singularity of Plato? Nothing can be said unless it is said why the negation is this negation, and this can only be through something positive.
[57] [Corollarium]	[Scotus’s Response]
Concedo igitur conclusionem istarum rationum: quod necesse est per aliquod positivum intrinsecum huic lapidi, tamquam per rationem propriam, repugnare sibi dividi in partes subiectivas: et illud positivum erit quod dicitur esse per se causa individuationis; quia per individuationem intelligo istam indivisibilitatem sive repugnantiam ad divisibilitatem.	Therefore, I grant the conclusions of the arguments, that it is necessary that - through something positive and intrinsic to this stone, as though by some proper reason - it is repugnant to it to be divided into subjective parts; and that positive item will be that which is said to be the per se cause of individuation, for I understand by ‘individuation’ such indivisibility or repugnancy to divisibility.
[Solvitur argumentum principale]	[Reply to the Main Argument]
[58] Ad argumentum ad oppositum, licet assumptum sit falsum, de quo forte alias, tamen si verum esset quod unum significaret formaliter illam duplicem negationem, non sequitur quod non habeat aliquam causam positivam per quam insit ei illa duplex negatio; nam et unitas specifica pari ratione significaret duplicem negationem, et tamen nullus negat entitatem positivam esse rationem unitatis specificae, a qua entitate positiva sumitur ratio differentiae specificae.	To the main argument: even though the assumption is false (of which perhaps more elsewhere), nevertheless, if it were true that ‘one’ formally signifies that twofold negation, it does not follow that it does not have some positive cause through which that twofold negation inheres in it. For specific unity, by equal reasoning, would signify a twofold negation, and yet nobody denies that a positive entity in the nature of specific entity, from which positive entity the nature of the specific differentia is taken.
Et istud est bonum argumentum pro solutione quaestionis et pro opinione; quia cum in qualibet unitate minore unitate numerali sit dare entitatem positivam, quae sit ratio per se illius unitatis et illius repugnantiae ad multitudinem oppositam, maxime vel aequaliter erit hoc dare p 98 in unitate perfectissima, quae est unitas numeralis.	And this is a good argument for the resolution of the question and for the view, for if in any given unity less than numerical unity there is allowed a positive entity, which is the per se reason of that unity and of the repugnancy with the opposed multiplicity, then all the more, or equally, will such a thing be allowed in the most perfect unity, which is numerical unity.