Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D8/Q2

Translated by Peter Simpson

Latin	English
Quaestio 2
27 Iuxta hoc quaero utrum aliqua creatura sit simplex. Et arguo quod sic: compositum componitur ex partibus, et illae non ex aliis. ergo partes illae sunt in se simplices.	27. Following on from this I ask whether any creature is simple. And I argue yes as follows: the composite is composed from parts, and these not from other parts, therefore these other parts are in themselves simple.
28 Oppositum huius est VI De Trinitate cap. 6, ubi dicit Augustinus quod nulla creatura est in se simplex. ƿ	28. The opposite of this is in On the Trinity VI ch.6 n.8, where Augustine says that no creature is in itself simple.
29 Hic dicitur quod 'quaelibet creatura est composita ex actu et potentia': quia nulla est pura potentia, quia tunc non esset, - nec purus actus, quia tunc esset Deus.	29. There is said here that 'any creature at all is composed of act and potency'; that no creature is pure potency, because then it would not exist, - nor is any creature pure act, because then it would God.
30 Praeterea, 'quaelibet creatura est ens per participationem', ergo est composita ex participante et participato.	30. Further, that 'any creature at all is a being through participation', -therefore it is composed of participant and participated.
31 Contra istam conclusionem arguo, quia si in quolibet sit compositio ex re et re, accipio illam rem componentem et quaero si est simplex aut composita; si simplex, habetur propositum, - si composita, erit processus in infinitum in 'rebus'.	31. Against this conclusion I argue that if in anything at all there is composition of thing and thing, I take the thing that does the composing and I it is simple or composite; if it is simple, the proposition is gained [sc. that some creature is simple], - if it is composite, there will be a process in 'things' to infinity.
32 Concedo ergo quod aliqua creatura est simplex, hoc est non composita ex rebus. Tamen nulla creatura est perfecte simplex, quia aliquo modo composita est et componibilis. Quomodo composita, declaro sic, quia habet entitatem cum privatione alicuius gradus entitatis. Nulla enim creatura habet entitatem secundum totam perfectionem quae nata est esse entitatis in se, et ideo caret aliqua perfectione quae nata est competere entitati in se, et ideo 'privatur', - sicut talpa dicitur caeca 'quia nata est habere visum secundum rationem animalis, non secundum ratioƿnem talpae', secundum Philosophum V Metaphysicae cap. 'De privatione'. Componitur ergo non ex re et re positivis, sed ex re positiva et privatione, scilicet ex entitate aliqua quam habet, et carentia alicuius gradus perfectionis entitatis, - cuius ipsum non est capax, tamen ipsum ens est capax: sicut talpa secundum se non est nata videre, tamen secundum quod animal, nata est videre. Nec tamen ista compositio 'ex positivo et privativo' est in essentia rei, quia privatio non est de essentia alicuius positivi.	32. I concede then that some creature is simple, that is, not composed from things. However no creature is perfectly simple, because it is in some way composite and combinable. How it is composite I clarify thus, that it has entity along with privation some grade of entity. For no creature has entity according to the total perfection that is of a nature to belong to entity in itself, and therefore it lacks some perfection which is of a nature to belong to entity in itself, and so it is 'deprived', - just as a mole is said to be blind 'because it is of a nature to have sight according to the idea of animal, but not according to the idea of mole' according to the Philosopher at Metaphysics 5.22.1022b24-27. Therefore any creature is composed, not from positive thing and thing, but from positive thing and privation, namely from some entity, which it has, and from lack of some grade of perfection of entity - of which perfection it is itself not capable, though being itself is capable of it; just as a mole is, according to itself, not of a nature to see but is, according to that which is animal, of a nature to see. Nor yet is this composition 'from positive and privative' in the essence of the thing, because privation is not of the essence of anything positive.
33 Ad istam etiam sequitur compositio potentiae et actus obiective: quidquid enim est ens, et caret aliqua perfectione entis, est simpliciter possibile, et terminus potentiae simpliciter, cuius terminus non potest esse ens infinitum, quod est necesse esse.	33. On this composition there also follows composition of potency and act objectively; for anything that is a being and that lacks some perfection of being is simply possible and is the term of potency simply, whose term cannot be infinite being, which being is necessary existence.
34 Est etiam quaelibet creatura componibilis: Quod patet de accidente, quod est componibile cum subiecto. In substantia etiam patet, tam de forma quam de materia. De substantia etiam per se generabili et corruptibili, patet quod est receptiva accidentis; nulla ergo esset non receptiva nisi propter suam perfectionem. - Sed perfectissima intelligentia est receptiva accidentis, quia capax est suae intellectionis et volitionis, quae non est sua substantia: tum quia tunc esset formaliter beata se ipsa, cuius oppositum est probatum distinctione 1. Tum quia quaelibet intelƿligentia potest intelligere infinita, quia omne intelligibile; ergo si intellectio sua esset sua essentia, posset habere essentiam infinitam, quia haberet unam intellectionem infinitorum. Tum quia intellectio sua non dependeret ab aliquo obiecto nisi a quo dependeret suum 'esse', et ita nihil inferius se - nec etiam se - posset intelligere in genere proprio, sed tantum in obiecto superiore movente; immo nihil posset aliqua intelligentia intelligere nisi in Deo, quia ab alia intelligentia non causatur suum esse, - ergo nec eius intellectio. Tum quia verbum angeli esset personaliter distinctum ab eo, et idem sibi essentialiter, sicut probatum est distinctione 2 de Verbo divino.	34. It is also the case that any creature at all is combinable: This is plain about accident, which is combinable with a subject. In the case of substance too it is plain, about form as well matter. Also plain about substance per se generable and corruptible, because it is receptive of accident; no substance then would be non-receptive of accident save on account of its perfection. - But the most perfect intelligence [sc. creaturely intelligence] is receptive of accident, because it is capable of its own intellection and volition, which are not its substance; first, because then it would be formally blessed in itself, the opposite of which was proved in distinction 1 [I d.1 n.175]. Second, because any intelligence can understand infinite things, because these are all intelligible; therefore, if its own intellection were its essence, it could have an infinite essence, because it would have one intellection of infinite things. Third, because its own intellection would not depend on any object save that on which its own 'existence' would depend, and so it could understand nothing inferior to itself - not even itself - in its proper genus, but only in the superior object moving it; nay no intelligence could understand anything save in God, because its own existence is not caused by any other intelligence -therefore not its intellection either. Fourth, because the word of an angel would be personally distinct from it and essentially the same as it, as was proved in distinction 2 about the divine Word [I. d.2 n.355].
35 Ad argumentum principale Augustini concedo quod nulla creatura est vere simplex, quia composita - modo praedicto - ex positione et privatione, actu et potentia obiective, et componibilis alii creaturae.	35. [To the principal argument] - To the principal argument of Augustine [n.28] I concede that no creature is truly simple, because it is composite - in the aforesaid way - from positivity and privation [n.32], act and potency objectively [n.33], and combinable with some other creature [n.34].
36 Et per idem patet ad argumentum de prima opinione; non enim est actus purus qui caret aliquo gradu actualitatis, sicut non est lux pura quae caret aliquo gradu lucis, licet cum illa luce impura non misceatur aliqua alia entitas positiva sed tantum carentia perfectioris gradus lucis. ƿ	36. [To the argument of the opinion of others] - And from this is plain the response to the argument about the first opinion [n.29]; for no act is pure that lacks a grade of actuality, just as no light is pure that lacks a grade of light, even if there is not mixed with that impure light any positive entity but only a lack of a more perfect grade of light.
37 Ad secundum dico quod 'participare' est idem quodammodo quod 'partem capere', ita quod duplicem relationem importat - et partis ad totum et capientis ad captum. Prima est realis. Nec tamen sumitur pars pro eo quod est aliquid rei, sed extensive, prout omne minus dicitur pars maioris, omne autem 'finitum tale' est simpliciter 'minus tale' si aliquod tale natum est esse infinitum; quaelibet autem perfectio simpliciter nata est esse infinita, - ergo ubicumque est finita, ipsa est minor aliqua perfectione simili, et ita pars extensive.	37. To the second [n.30] I say that 'to participate' is in some way the same as 'to take part in', so that it involves a double relation - both of part to whole and of taker to taken. The first relation is real. Nor yet is part understood to be that which is something of the thing, but it is taken extensively, insofar as every less is said to be part of a more; but everything that is a 'finite such' is simply a 'less such', if anything such is of a nature to be infinite; but any perfection simply is of a nature to b infinite - therefore wherever there is a finite perfection it is less than some : perfection, and so it is a part extensively.
38 Secunda vero relatio - scilicet 'capientis ad captum' - est relatio rationis, sicut in creaturis inter dans et datum. Tripliciter tamen pars capitur: aut sic quod 'totum' captum est pars capientis, sicut species participat genus (quantum ad partes essentiales generis, non subiectivas), aut 'pars' capti est pars capientis, aut - tertio modo 'pars' capti est totum ipsum capiens. Primis duobus modis relatio capientis et capti potest concedi realis, tertio modo non: iste modus est in proposito, quia omnis perfectio limitata (quae tamen ex se non determinatur ad limitationem, quae est pars capta) est ipsa tota limitata, nisi quod ibi distingui potest suppositum capiens et natura capta - sed non est sic distinctio realis. ƿ	38. But the second relation - namely of taker to taken - is a relation reason, as in the case of creatures between the giver and the given. However a thing is taken in three ways; either such that the 'whole' taken is part of the taker, as the species participates the genus (as far as the essential parts of the genus are concerned, not the subjective ones), or 'part' of the taken is part of the taker, or -in the third way - 'part' of the taken is the whole taker itself. In the first two ways the relation of taker and taken can be conceded to be real, but not in the third way; this third way is the one in the intended proposition, because every limited perfection (which perfection is of itself, however, not determined to limitation, and it is the part taken) is the limited whole itself, except that a distinction can be made here between the supposit taking and the nature taken - but there is not thus a real distinction.