Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D5/P2-III

III. To the Arguments of the Opinion of Others

Latin	English
142 Ad argumenta opinionis. - Ad primum, de Augustino Contra Maximinum: patet, quomodo Filius nullo modo est de nihilo, sed est vere de substantia Patris.	142. To the arguments for the opinion. To the first, from Augustine Against Maximinus [n.53]: it is plain how the Son is in no way from nothing, but is truly from the substance of the Father [nn.98-103].
143 Sed si quaeras, posita originatione et consubstantialitate, adhuc quaeritur: sicut de materia vel de quasi materia, de quo est Filius? Respondeo quod non est ibi materia nec quasi materia, et ideo non de aliquo sit. Et ultra - ergo de nihilo? - Non sequitur, sed sequitur: ergo de nulla materia. ƿSed dices, tunc est creatura. - Dico quod falsum est, quia creatura est post nihil, id est post non esse sui et cuiuscumque in ea; non ita Filius, - non tantum quia suum esse est aeternum, sed etiam quia sicut est secunda persona sic prius origine est suum esse formale in prima persona.	143. But if you ask, once origination and consubstantiality have been posited, there is still the question: is it as from matter or from quasi-matter that the Son is from? -I reply that there is no matter or quasi-matter there, and so let him not be from anything. And you ask further - therefore from nothing? - It does not follow; but what follows is that therefore he is not from any matter. But you will say, then he is a creature. - I say it is false, because a creature exists after nothing, that is, after the non-being of itself and of whatever is in it; not so the Son, - not only because his being is eternal, but also because, as he is the second person, so his formal being is prior in origin in the first person.
144 Ad aliud, de Augustino VII De Trinitate cap . 4: nihil valet ad propositum, sicut in quaestione praecedente expositum est.	144. To the other, from Augustine On the Trinity [n.55]: it is of no value for the proposed position [n.46], as was expounded in the preceding question [n.25].
145 Quod alii arguunt 'essentiam subiective generari', ex falso infertur falsum.	145. As for the argument of others that 'essence is subjectively generated' [n.59], from the false is inferred the false.
146 Ad argumenta eorum: Ad primum dico quod hic non sunt termini aliqui correspondentes generationi ut mutatio est, quia nihil est hic quasi aliquo modo prius sub privatione et postea sub forma. Generationis vero termini sunt privatio et forma ut generatio est mutatio, generatio autem ut productio terminum habet ipsum productum: non autem generatio sic habet terminum 'a quo' nisi loquendo de principio productivo, et sic termini generationis sunt producens et productum; et ex hoc non sequitur quod aliquid sit quasi subiectum, sed sequitur ex hoc - si generatio est univoca - quod aliquid ƿsit commune gignenti et genito, et hoc concedo, sed non commune ut materia sed ut forma vel actus, in utroque.	146. To the arguments they give [n.145]: To the first [n.60] I say that here there are not any terms corresponding to generation as it is change, because there is nothing here that is as it were in any way first under privation and later under form. But the terms of generation as generation is change are privation and form, but generation as production has as term the product itself [n.95]; now generation does not thus have a term 'from which' except by speaking of the productive principle, and thus the terms of generation are producer and product; and from this it does not follow that something is a quasi-subject, but there follows from it - if generation is univocal - that something is common to the generating and the generated, and this I concede, but it is not common as matter but as form or act, in both of them.
147 Cum arguitur post 'de generatione et termino', patet responsio, quod relatio non est in substantia sicut forma in materia, sed si persona est ibi relativa, tunc relatio est in essentia sicut proprietas suppositi est in natura: esse autem in aliquo ut suppositum vel ƿrationem suppositi in natura nihil infert de esse 'in' ut forma est in materia, licet, quando natura est imperfecta, proprietas individualis aliquo modo informet naturam, sicut dictum est in tertio articulo solutionis, in prima difficultate.	147. When the argument is next put 'about generation and term' [n.61], the response is plain, that relation is not in substance as form in matter, but if the person there is relative, then relation is in essence as the property of the supposit is in nature [sc. as Socrateity is in Socrates, nn.109, 113, 124]; but to be in something as a supposit or idea of supposit in nature entails nothing about being 'in' as form is in matter, although, when nature is imperfect, the individual property in some way informs nature, as was said in the third article of the solution, in the first difficulty [n.109].
148 Cum tertio arguitur quod 'omni potentiae activae correspondet potentia passiva' etc., respondeo: primae potentiae activae non correspondet aliqua potentia passiva, sicut patet de potentia creandi, et hoc, loquendo proprie de potentia passiva, ut in qua vel de qua aliquid producitur; potentiae tamen activae correspondet aliqua potentia passiva, quam ipsi vocant 'potentiam obiectivam', - quae est potentia producibilis, - et hoc modo concedo quod si Pater est fecundus active, quod Filius est producibilis, sed ex hoc non sequitur aliqua potentia quasi materiae, sicut non sequitur in creatione.	148. When it is argued third that 'to every active potency there corresponds a passive potency' etc. [n.62], I reply: to the first active power there does not correspond any passive power, as is plain about the power of creating, - and this speaking properly of passive power as that in which, or from which, something is produced; however to the active power there corresponds some passive power which they [followers of Henry] call 'objective power', - which is producible power, - and in this way I concede that if the Father is actively fecund, that the Son is producible, but from this does not follow some power of quasi-matter, just as it does not follow in the case of creation.
149 Cum ultimo arguitur 'de igne', dico, quod si ignis generaret de se, communicaret genito suam formam ut formalem terminum generationis; non autem esset substantia sua in potentia ad formam ƿgenerandi, si ipse ignis esset perfecte quid productivum, - tunc enim non requireret aliquam aliam causam concausantem. Ita est in proposito: primum principium - nec aliud principium (in eodem genere principii, nec in alio) - non requirit aliud aliquod concurrens secum ad principiandum.	149. When finally it is argued 'about fire' [n.62], I say that if fire were to generate from itself, it would communicate to the thing generated its form as formal term of the generation; but its substance would not be in potency to the form of generating, if fire itself were perfectly something productive, - for then there would not be required another co-causing cause. So it is in the proposed case: the first principle - and not another principle (in the same not another genus of principle) - does not require something else concurring with it to be principle.