Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D5/P2-I

Second Part: On the Generation of the Son

Single Question: Whether the Son is generated from the substance of the Father

Latin	English
46 Secundo quaeritur de secunda parte distinctionis quintae, utrum Filius generetur de substantia Patris. Quod non: Quia VII De Trinitate cap. 11: ((Tres personas ex eadem substantia non dicimus )); substantia autem uniformiter videtur se habere ad quamlibet personam; ergo nulla persona est de illa substantia.	46. Second a question is raised about the second part of the fifth distinction, whether the Son is generated from the substance of the Father. That he is not: Because On the Trinity VII ch.6 n.11: "We do not say three persons out of the same substance;" but substance seems to be disposed uniformly to any of the persons; therefore no person is from the substance.
47 Item, constructio alicuius cum genitivo non notat maiorem distinctionem constructibilium quam praepositio cum suo casuali quando additur eidem constructibili; ergo non maior distinctio notatur hic 'Filius essentiae Patris' quam 'Filius de essentia Patris'; sed non conceditur quod sit 'Filius essentiae Patris', quia tunc essentia Patris generaret Filium.	47. Again, the construal of something with the genitive does not indicate a greater distinction of construable parts than does a preposition with its own case when it is added to the same construable; therefore no greater distinction is indicated in 'the Son is of the essence of the Father' than in 'the Son is from the essence of the Father'; but it is not conceded that 'the Son is of the essence of the Father' [n.43], because then the essence of the Father would generate the Son.
48 Item, cum dicitur Filius esse de substantia Patris, aut ly 'de' ƿnotat distinctionem, aut non: si sic, propositio falsa, quia essentia non distinguitur realiter a Filio; si non, ergo haec est vera 'Pater est de essentia Filii vel de essentia Patris', quod non conceditur.	48. Again, when the Son is said to be from the substance of the Father, either the 'from' indicates a distinction or it does not; if it does the proposition is false, because essence is not really distinguished from the Son; if it does not, then this proposition is true 'the Father is from the essence of the Son or from the essence of the Father', which is not conceded.
49 Oppositum: XV De Trirlitate cap. 19, Augustinus, tractans illud ad Colossenses, transtulit nos in regnum Filii caritatis suae: ((quod dictum est)) - inquit - ((Filii caritatis suae, nihil aliud est quam Filii substantiae suae)); ergo Filius est de substantia Patris.	49. To the opposite: Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.19 n.37 treating the saying in Colossians 1.13 'he has translated us to the kingdom of the Son of his charity' says: "what is called 'Son of his charity' is nothing other than Son of his substance;" therefore the Son is from the substance of the Father.
50 Praeterea, ad hoc est auctoritas Augustini Contra Maximinum, et ponitur in littera: ((Nullo modo verum Filium Dei cogitatis, si hunc de substantia Patris esse negatis)).	50. Further, there is for this the authority of Augustine AgainstMaximinus II ch.14 n.2, and it is in the text: "In no way are you thinking of the true Son of God if you deny that he is from the substance of the Father."
51 Item, filius in creaturis non est nisi qui gignitur de substantia patris: ideo enim in inanimatis non est paternitas nec filiatio, quia generant de materia aliena, - sicut ignis generat ignem de materia aeris; ergo non est vera filiatio nisi ubi substantia patris, vel aliquid de substantia patris, est materia respectu filii. ƿ	51. Again, a son in creatures is only he who is generated from the substance of the father; for that is why there is in inanimate things no paternity and no filiation, because they generate from foreign matter, - just as fire generates fire from the matter of air; therefore there is no true filiation save where the substance of the father, or something of the substance of the father, is the matter with respect to the son.

I. The Opinion of Others

Latin	English
52 In ista quaestione dicitur quod sicut in substantia creata generabili aliquid est potentiale, quod praesupponitur generationi, ut materia, - et aliquid inductum per generationem, ut forma, - et ex eis productum, quod est generatum, ita proportionaliter correspondent quasi tria similia in divinis: persona quippe est quasi compositum, et relatio quasi forma, et essentia quasi materia. Est ergo Filius genitus de substantia Patris sicut de quasi materia.	52. On this question it is said that, just as in created generable substance there is something potential, presupposed to generation, as matter, - and something introduced by generation, as form, - and something from these the product, which is generated, so proportionally in divine reality there correspond as it were three similar things; the person to be sure is the quasi-composite, and relation the quasi-form, and essence the quasi-matter. Therefore the Son is generated from the substance of the Father as from quasi-matter.
53 Istud probatur per rationem Augustini Contra Maximinum, quae ponitur in littera. Filius enim nullo modo est de nihilo: neque negative, ut aliquis dicitur 'loqui de nihilo' quando non loquitur; neque affirmando ly 'de' ut sit nota materialitatis vel quasi materialitatis, quia nihil non potest esse materia alicuius; ƿneque affirmando ly 'de' originaliter vel ordinaliter, id est post nihil. Quos tres modos intelligendi 'aliquid esse de nihilo' ponit Anselmu s Monologion cap. 8. Si nullo modo Filius est de nihilo, ergo de aliquo; ergo cum non de alio quam de substantia Patris, patet ergo quod est de substantia Patris.	53. This is proved by the reason of Augustine Against Maximinus, which is placed in the text [of Lombard I d.5 ch.1 n.63: "but it is none of these; therefore it is born either from nothing or from some substance"]. For the Son is in no way from nothing, whether negatively, as when someone says he is speaking 'of nothing' when he is not speaking, or whether by affirming the 'from' so as to make it a mark of materiality or quasi-materiality, because nothing cannot be the matter of anything, or whether by affirming the 'from' by way of origin or order, that is in the sense of after nothing. Which three ways of understanding 'something is from nothing' are put down by Anselm Monologion ch.8. If the Son is in no way from nothing, therefore from something; therefore since not from anything other than the substance of the Father, then plainly he is from the substance of the Father.
54 Et si respondeatur sicut Magister videtur respondere in littera, quod est de substantia Patris, id est de Patre, qui est substantia,- arguitur quod ista expositio non sit sufficiens, quia tantum exponit 'de' ut notet rationem principii originantis vel efficientis; et posito quod hoc modo sit de Patre, adhuc restat quaestio utrum de aliquo vel de nihilo sicut de materia vel de quasi materia, et cum non de nihilo sit (quia hoc modo creatura est de nihilo), ergo de aliquo, et stat argumentum.	54. And if one respond as the Master seems to respond in the text, that he is from the substance of the Father, that is, from the Father, who is substance, - the argument is that this response is not sufficient, because it only expounds the 'from' as it indicates the idea of originating or efficient principle; and once posited that he is in this way from the Father, the question still remains whether he is from something or from nothing as from matter or quasi-matter, and since he is not from nothing (because in this way the creature is from nothing), therefore from something, and the argument [n.53] stands.
55 Ad hoc etiam adducitur auctoritas Augustini VII De Trinitate cap. 4, quod Filius est 'Sapientia nata'. ƿ	55. For this [n.52] there is also adduced the authority of Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3, that the Son is 'born Wisdom'.
56 Si arguatur contra istam opinionem quod 'actus purus non potest esse quasi materia respectu generationis, quia nullo modo est in potentia', et praeterea, per rationem Magistri, 'cum sit una essentia trium personarum, generaretur Filius de essentia trium', - respondetur ad primum, dicendo quod ((aliquid est in potentia ad aliquid quod est absolutum, et differt ab ipso re vel intentione, et vadit de potentia in actum per motum et transmutationem rei vel rationis; alio modo aliquid est in potentia ad aliquid quod est respectus tantum, et differt ab ipso sola ratione, numquam vadens per transmutationem quamcumque de potentia in actum, sed semper naturaliter coniunctum actui. Primo modo, in creaturis, materia est in potentia ad formam tamquam ad differens re ab ipsa, et transiens de potentia ad actum per realem transmutationem in materia, - et similiter, forma generis est in potentia ad formam differentiae tamquam ad differens intentione ab ipsa, et transiens de potentia ad actum per transmutationem rationis: nullo tali modo divina essentia est in potentia ad aliquid, et de ista potentia habet veritatem medium in argumento, quia ista repugnat actui puro. Non sic est de potentia secundo modo, quia de ƿnatura formae divinae in quantum est actus purus, est etiam quod sit - secundo modo - in potentia ad plures respectus.	56. If one argue against this opinion [n.52] that 'pure act cannot be quasi-matter in respect of generation, because it is in no way in potency', and further, by the reason of the Master, 'since there is one essence of three persons, the Son is generated from the essence of the three', - the response to the first is by saying that "something is in potency to something which is absolute, and it differs from it in reality or in intention, and it goes from potency to act by a change and transmutation of the thing or the idea; in another way something is in potency to something which is a respect only, and it differs from it only in idea, never going through any transmutation from potency to act, and always naturally conjoined with act. In the first way, in creatures, matter is in potency to form as to something differing really from it, and it passes from potency to act by a real transmutation in the matter, - and likewise, the form of the genus is in potency to the form of the difference as to something different in intention from it, and it passes from potency to act by change of idea; in no such way [the first] is the divine essence in potency to anything, and it is about potency in this sense that the middle term in the argument is true, because this potency is repugnant to pure act. Things are not like this of potency in the second way, because it is from the nature of the divine form insofar as it is pure act; it is also the case that - in the second way - it is in potency to several respects."
57 ((Differt ergo productio divina summe a productione naturali, quia in illa itur per transmutationem ad perfectionem, et ibi distat potentia ab actu, in ista autem nequaquam. Differt autem ista specialiter a productione naturali quae est generatio, quia illa est de imperfecto substantialiter, ista vero est de perfecta substantia, in quo plus convenit cum productione quae est alteratio, quia in illa subiectum - quod est in potentia 'secundum quid' - est aliquid exsistens in actu; sed differt in hoc quod subiectum in alteratione est in potentia ad aliquid absolutum, re differens ab ipso, in productione autem divina nequaquam, - et in hoc divina productio convenit plus cum productione speciei ex genere (sed differt), quia in hac productione genus est sicut subiectum et materia, et est in potentia ad aliquid absolutum, ut ad differentiam, quae tamen sola intentione differt ab ipso: hic autem subiectum est in potentia ad aliquid respectivum, quod differt ab ipso sola ratione; et ita licet illa productio speciei ex genere sit magis similis divinae quam alia, in multis tamen differt, quia productio speciei ex genere procedit ab esse incompleto ad completum, assumendo complementi determinationem per differentiam, ut secundum aliud et aliud re ƿdescendat in aliam et aliam speciem et sit tantum unum commune secundum rationem. In productione autem divina subiectum non est aliquid incompletum, determinatum per assumptam proprietatem, sed unum et idem esse singulare totaliter habet esse - per productianem - in diversis proprietatibus relativis, quod est commune non secundum rationem sed secundum communicationemn.	57. "Divine production, therefore, differs supremely from natural production, because in the latter there is a going through transmutation to perfection and the potency stands apart from act, but in the former not at all so. But the former differs specifically from the natural production which is generation, because the latter is from what is imperfect in substance, but the former is from perfect substance, wherein there is more agreement with the production that is alteration, because in this the subject - which is in potency 'in a certain respect' - is something existing in act; but it differs in this respect that the subject in the case of alteration is in potency to something absolute, really differing from it, but in divine production not at all so, - and in this regard divine production agrees more with the production of the species from the genus (but it differs), because in the case of this production the genus is as the subject and matter and it is in potency to something absolute, as to the difference, which however differs from it only in intention; but in divine production the subject is in potency to something respective, which differs from it only in idea; and so, although the production of the species from the genus is more like divine production than any other one is, yet it differs in many respects, because the production of the species from the genus proceeds from incomplete being to complete being, taking up the determination of the complement through the difference, so that according to this and that really different thing it descend to this and that different species and is in idea only one common thing. But in divine production the subject is not something incomplete, determined by the assumption of a property, but one and the same singular being has being totally - through production - in diverse relative properties, which is something common not in idea but in communication."
58 Ad secundum dicitur quod non est de substantia in quantum est trium, sed ut est substantia Patris.	58. To the second [n.56] it is said that the Son is not from the substance insofar as it is the substance of the three, but as it is the substance of the Father.
59 Huic opinioni additur ab aliis quod essentia divina dicitur generari subiective. Quod enim subicitur generationi, potest dici subiective generari, per Philosophum V Physicorum, ubi arguit quod generatio non est motus, per hoc argumentum: 'quod movetur, ƿest; quod generatur, non est; ergo quod generatur non movetur'. Accipit 'quod movetur' pro subiecto motus, non pro termino, quia dum motus est, terminus non est. Si autem acciperet 'quod generatur' pro termino generationis, non pro subiecto, argumentum non valeret, quia terminus motus non est: ergo oportet quod accipiat ibi 'quod generatur' pro eo quod subicitur generationi. Istud etiam probatur per Commentatorem, ibidem, commento 8 et 9 .	59. To this opinion [n.52] there is added by others [following Henry] that the divine essence is said to be generated subjectively. For what is subjected to generation can be said to be subjectively generated, from the Philosopher Physics 5.1.225a25-27, where he argues that generation is not motion through this argument: 'what is moved is; what is generated is not; therefore what is generated is not moved'. He takes 'what is moved' for the subject of motion, not for the term, because while it is motion it is not the term. But if he were to take 'what is generated' for the term of generation, not for the subject, the argument would not be valid, because the term is not motion; therefore he must be taking 'what is generated' there for that which is subject to generation. This is also proved by the Commentator, at the same place, com.8-9.
60 Pro ista opinione adducuntur rationes tales: Illud dicitur vere generari subiective, sive esse subiectum generationis, quod manet idem sub utroque termino generationis; essentia autem divina manet eadem in Patre et Filio; ergo ipsa erit vere subiectum ipsius.	60. For this opinion these sort of reasons are adduced: That is said to be truly subjectively generated, or to be the subject of generation, which remains the same under each term of the generation; but the divine essence remains the same in the Father and the Son; therefore it will truly be the subject of generation.
61 Confirmatur ratio, quia in eodem est transmutatio et terminus sicut dispositio et forma ad quam disponit; ergo cum in ƿessentia sit relatio, quae est quasi terminus generationis, in ipsa etiam erit ipsa generatio.	61. A confirmation of the reason is that transmutation and the term are in the same thing as the disposition and the form to which the disposition disposes; therefore since in the essence there is relation, which is the quasi-term of generation, there will be in it generation itself.
62 Praeterea, omni potentiae activae correspondet aliqua passiva; ergo fecunditati Patris quasi activae correspondet aliqua potentia quasi passiva, de qua possit producere.	62. Further, to every active power there corresponds some passive power; therefore to the fecundity of the quasi-active Father there will correspond some quasi-passive power, from which it can produce.
63 Ultimo arguitur sic: Si ignis generaret ignem de sua substantia, adhuc substantia ignis generantis ita esset in potentia ad formam ignis generandi, sicut modo est materia aliena, de qua generat. Sic ergo in proposito, essentia Patris - de qua Pater generat- erit quasi materia respectu generationis 6.	63. Finally there is an argument like this: if fire were to generate fire from its own substance, the substance of the fire generating would still thus be in potency to the form of the fire to be generated, just as now there is foreign matter from which it generates. So it is in the proposed case, the essence of the Father - from which the Father generates -will be the quasi-matter with respect to generation.
64 Contra istam opinionem arguo. Primo sic: essentia est terminus formalis productionis et generationis Filii, ergo non quasi materia. Probatio antecedentis:	64. [Rejection of the opinion] - I argue against this opinion [n.52]. First in this way: essence is the formal term of the production and of the generation of the Son, therefore it is not quasi-matter. Proof of the antecedent:
65 Ioan. 10: Pater quod dedit mihi maius est omnibus; 'maius omniƿbus' non est nisi aliquid infinitum; hoc non est nisi essentia, - illam ergo dedit.	65. John 10.29: "What the Father gave me is greater than all things;" something 'greater than all things' is only something infinite; this is only essence, - so he gave essence.
66 Hoc etiam vult Augustinus XV De Trinitate cap. 26: ((Sicut naturam praestat Filio sine initio generatio, ita et Spiritui Sancto praestat essentiam sine initio de utroque processio)). Non conceditur autem formam aliquam dari productione sive communicari, sive praestari per generationem, nisi illa forma communicata sit formalis terminus productionis.	66. This is also the intention of Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.26 n.47: "Just as generation bestows nature on the Son without beginning, so procession from both also bestows essence on the Holy Spirit without beginning." But it is not conceded that any form was given or communicated by production or bestowed by generation unless the communicated form is the formal term of the production.
67 $aProbatur etiam alite illud antecedens: Primo, quia nulla entitas formaliter univoca, simpliciter perfectior formali termino, habetur per productionem; essentia est formaliter infinita, relatio non; igitur si relatio esset formalis terƿminus productionis, persona non haberet essentiam per productionem.	67. The antecedent is also proved in another way [n.64]: First, because no formally univocal entity, being simply more perfect than the formal term, is attained through production; the essence is formally infinite, the relation is not; therefore if the relation were the formal term of production, the person would not have the essence by production.
68 Secundo, quia in creaturis natura est formalis terminus productionis, non autem proprietas individualis vel hypostatica, - sicut patet II Physicorum, ubi habetur quod generatio est naturalis, sive dicitur natura, quia est ((via in naturam)). a$	68. Second, because in creatures nature is the formal term of production, but the individual or hypostatic property is not, - as is plain in Physics 2.1.193b12-13, where it is held that generation is natural, or is called nature, because it is "the way to nature" [n.28].
69 Similiter: aliter non esset ista productio generatio, sed magis esset mutatio ad relationem, quia productio ponitur in genere vel specie ex suo termino formali, sicut patet per Philosophum V Physicorum, - sicut alteratio ponitur in genere qualitatis, quia ibi est forma quae est formalis terminus alterationis; ergo si formalis terminus huiusmodi productionis esset relatio, ista productio poneretur in genere relationis et non esset generatio.	69. Similarly: otherwise [sc. if essence were not the formal term] this production would not be generation, but rather it would be a change to relation, because production is put in a genus or species from its formal term, as is plain from the Philosopher Physics 5.1.224b6-8, - as alteration is put in the genus of quality, because quality is there the form which is the formal term of alteration; therefore if the formal term of this sort of production were relation, this production would be put in the genus of relation, and it would not be generation.
70 Probatio consequentiae primi enthymematis: Primo, quia illud quod est materia in generatione, est in potenƿtia ad terminum formalem, - et quod est quasi materia, est quasi in potentia; essentia nec vere nec 'quasi' est in potentia ad se ipsam; ergo etc.	70. Proof of the consequence of the first enthymeme [n.64]: First, because that which is matter in generation is in potency to the formal term, - and what is quasi-matter is quasi in potency; essence is neither truly nor quasi in potency to itself; therefore etc.
71 Similiter, probatur eadem consequentia, quia una persona tantum uno modo habendi habet essentiam, saltem non istis duobus modis habet eam - ut terminum formalem productionis et cum hoc quasi materiam et subiectum generationis. Probatio istius, quia si haberet eam ex vi productionis ut terminum formalem, haberet eam circumscripto omni alio; ergo non habet eam ut quasi materiam subiectam generationi: non enim habet deitatem aliquo modo, quo modo circumscripto haberet eam perfecte et esset verus Deus. Videtur etiam sequi quod habeat bis essentiam, et quod habeat eam prius naturaliter quam habeat eam si ratio quasi materiae praecedit aliquo modo rationem formalem termini generationis.	71. Likewise, the same consequence is proved because one person has essence in only one mode of having, or at any rate does not have it in these two modes - as formal term of production and, along with this, as quasi-matter and subject of generation. The proof of this is that, if by force of production, it had essence as formal term, it would have it when everything else is removed; therefore it would not have it as quasi-matter subject to generation; for it does not have essence in any way such that, with that way removed, it would have it perfectly and would be true God. The consequence also seems to be that it would have essence twice, and it would naturally have it before it has it, if the idea of quasi-matter in some way precedes the formal idea of the term of generation.
72 Item, secundo ad principale: essentiae ut de ea generatur ƿFilius necesse est assignare aliquod esse, quia principiare aliquod verum ens - in quocumque genere principii - non convenit alicui nisi realiter enti.	72. Again, second to the principal [n.52]: to the essence, as from it the Son is generated, some being must be assigned, because to be principle of some true being - in whatever genus of principle - does not belong to anything save to a real being.
73 Quaero igitur, quod esse convenit essentiae ut ipsa est de quo per impressionem generatur Filius: aut praecise esse ad se, quod est essentiae ut essentiae, - et tunc Filius est de essentia ut essentia, et hoc modo est trium personarum; aut convenit sibi esse in aliqua subsistentia. Et tunc quaero, in qua: aut ingenita, - et si hoc, cum in intellectu eius quod est 'esse de quo aliquid producitur' includatur hoc quod est 'esse illud in quo forma inducitur', et in intellectu eius quod est esse in quo includatur habere illud quod est in eo, et per consequens esse formaliter per ipsum, ergo si essentia ut est in Patre sit de quo Filius generatur (et per ƿimpressionem, secundum eos), sequitur quod ipsa ut in Patre erit illud in quo notitia genita imprimitur, et ita essentia ut in Patre erit formaliter Verbum sive noscens notitia genita, quod est inconveniens; si autem essentia, ut est in alia subsistentia a Patre, est de qua generatur Filius et 'in quantum est de qua' praecedit aliquo modo terminum generationis, ergo ante terminum generationis sunt duae subsistentiae, quod est inconveniens.	73. I ask therefore what being belongs to the essence as it is that from which the Son by impression is generated; either it is precisely being for itself, which is of essence as essence, - and then the Son is from the essence as essence, and essence in this way is of the three persons; or being in some subsistence belongs to it. And then I ask, in which? Either in ungenerated subsistence, - and if so, since in the understanding of that which is 'being from which something is produced' there is included that which is 'being that in which form is introduced', and in the understanding of that which is 'being in which' is included 'having that which is in it' and consequently 'being formally through it', -therefore if the essence as it is in the Father is that from which the Son is generated (and by impression, according to them) it follows that essence as it is in the Father will be that in which generated knowledge is imprinted, and so essence as it is in the Father will be formally the Word or generated knowledge knowing, which is discordant [sc. for the Word would not then be of the Father; I d.2 nn.273-280]; but if essence, as it is a subsistence other than the Father, is that from which the Son is generated and in some way precedes, 'insofar as it is that from which', the term of generation, then before the term of generation there are two subsistences, which is discordant.
74 Si dicit 'in quantum est de qua generatur Filius' nullam habet exsistentiam in persona, sicut et materia 'in quantum est de qua generatur genitum' non habet esse in aliquo supposito, sed tantum habet esse in potentia in supposito generando, - hoc nihil valet, quia ut dictum est, principianti realiter aliquod ens in quocumque genere principii, oportet tribuere aliquod reale esse; et ideo materiae ut principiat compositum, licet sibi non competat esse compositi quod est eius participatione, tamen convenit sibi esse suum proprium, quod est prius naturaliter quam sit pars compositi. Ita ergo hic, oportet essentiae 'in quantum est de qua ƿFilius generatur' dare esse vel in supposito vel esse essentiae secundum se, et stat argumentum.	74. If essence 'insofar as it is that from which the Son is generated' has no existence in a person, just as matter too 'insofar as it is that from which the generated is generated' does not have being in any supposit but only has being in potency in the supposit to be generated, - this is worthless, because, as was said, to what is really principle of some being, in whatever genus of principle, there must be attributed some real being [n.72]; and so to matter as it is principle of the composite, although there does not belong to it the being of the composite that exists by participating it, yet there does belong to it its own proper being, which naturally is before it is part of the composite. So here, then, there must be given to the essence 'insofar as it is that from which the Son is generated' either being in a supposit or the being of essence in itself, and the argument stands [n.73].
75 Si dicatur aliter, quod 'in quantum est Patris' est illud de quo generatur Filius, et tamen per generationem, in quantum scilicet actu formatur notitia genita, est actu alterius suppositi, - hoc improbatum est in argumento, quia in intellectu eius quod est 'esse de quo' per impressionem, includitur 'esse in quo', et ita esse formaliter tale secundum impressum illud; similiter, tunc communicatio essentiae alteri supposito praecederet secundum intellectum productionem, ita quod communicatio non fieret per productionem, sed quasi fieret ante terminum productionis, - sicut illud quod est quasi materia generationis, praeintelligitur aliquo modo ipsi termino; similiter, licet aliquid quod non est de se alicuius suppositi in actu, per generationem fiat actu alicuius suppositi, sicut materia quae non est alicuius suppositi, fiat alicuius suppositi, - tamen quod illud quod est unius suppositi fiat alterius suppositi praecise per hoc quod est materia, videtur impossibile absque omni actione quae sit ad ipsam.	75. If it be said in another way that 'insofar as it is of the Father' it is that from which the Son is generated, and yet by generation, namely insofar as generated knowledge is actually formed, it is actually of another supposit, - this has been rejected in the argument, because in the understanding of that which is 'to be from which' by impression there is included 'to be in which', and so to be formally such according to the thing impressed; likewise, in that case the communication of essence to another supposit would, in understanding, precede the production, such that the communication would not happen by production but would as it were happen before the term of production, - just as that which is the quasi-matter of generation is pre-understood in some way to its term; likewise, although something which is from itself not of some supposit in act may come by generation to be actually of some supposit, - just as matter which is not of some supposit may come to be of some supposit, - yet that that which is of one supposit should come to be of another supposit precisely by that which is matter seems impossible without any action which is directed to the matter.
76 Praeterea, tertio: quando ad productionem effectus concurrunt activum et passivum, prior est naturaliter respectus activi ad passivum quam utriusque ad productum. ƿ	76. Further, third: when the active and passive element come together in the production of an effect, the respect of the active to the passive is naturally prior to the respect of either to the product.
77 Probatio, quia oportet causas diversas eiusdem prius naturaliter approximari ad invicem quam producant effectum, - et patet per exemplum de igne calefactivo et ligno calefactibili, et genito calore.	77. Proof, because diverse causes of the same thing must be naturally brought into proximity with each other before they produce the effect, - and it is plain from the example of heating fire and heatable wood and generated heat.
78 $a Item, isti respectus, videlicet activi ad passivum et eiusdem ad productum, non omnino ex aequo conveniunt activo, nec ille 'ad productum' est prior: ergo est posterior. - Antecedens huius enthymematis, quantum ad utramque partem, sic probatur, - quia activum agit in passivum se solo in ratione causae, non producit nisi alio concurrente in ratione concausantis; et si omnino neges prioritatem respectus ad respectum, non potes negare quin necessario sit respectus activi ad passivum non posterior respectu utriusque ad productum. a$ ƿ	78. Again, these respects, namely of the active to the passive and of the active to the product, do not belong altogether equally to the active element, - and the respect to the product is not prior; therefore it is posterior. The antecedent of this enthymeme, as to each part, is proved thus, - because the active acts on the passive by itself alone by reason of cause; and if you altogether deny the priority of respect to respect, you cannot deny that necessarily the respect of the active to the passive is not posterior to the respect of each to the product.
79 Ergo si in Patre est fecunditas activa et aliquid quasi materia concurrens ad productum, prior est respectus Patris ut productivi ad illud quasi materiam quam sit utriusque eorum ad Filium, aut saltem erit necessario concomitans; et ex hoc ultra: cum res non praeexigat naturaliter - nec necessario simul requirat - illud quod est praecise ens rationis, sequitur quod ista relatio quae naturaliter praeexigitur quasi activi ad passivum sit realis, et ita in Patre erit relatio realis ad aliquid in ipso, prior relatione eius ad Filium, vel saltem alia ab illa, quod videtur inconveniens.	79. Therefore if in the Father there is active fecundity and some quasi-matter that come together for the product, the respect of the Father as productive for that quasi-matter is prior to the respect of each of them to the Son, or at any rate it will be necessarily concomitant; and from this further: since the thing does not naturally pre-require - nor does it necessarily require at the same time - that which is precisely a being of reason, it follows that the naturally pre-required relation of the quasi-active element to the passive be real, and so in the Father there will be a real relation to something in himself, prior to his relation to the Son, or at least different from it, which seems discordant.
80 Item, quarto: potentia prima causativa effective se sola causat, excludendo omnem aliam causam - eiusdem generis et alterius generis - in ratione causae materialis.	80. Again, fourth: the first power that is effectively causative causes by itself alone, excluding every other cause - both of the same genus and of a different genus - in idea of material cause.
81 Et ratio est, quia causalitas materialis non dicit perfectionem simpliciter; et ideo licet reductio fiat ad aliquod primum in illo genere, illud tamen non est simpliciter primum, sed totum illud genus reducitur ad aliquid primum in alio genere, quod non includit imperfectionem, - puta ad aliquid primum in genere efficientis. ƿPatet etiam hoc antecedens per hoc quod potentia creativa, per se, sine aliquo principio materiali ut 'quo', producit productum.	81. And the reason is that material causality does not state perfection simply; and therefore, although a reduction be made to something first in that genus, yet that something is not simply first, but the whole genus is reduced to something first in another genus, which something does not include imperfection, - to wit to something first in the genus of efficient cause. This antecedent [n.80] is also plain by the fact that creative power per se, without any material principle as the 'in which', produces the product.
82 Ex hoc infertur a simili quod potentia productiva prima se ipsa sola producit, et sine aliquo alio principio productivo concurrente, et sine alio quasi materia: similis enim ratio videtur de principio productivo et causativo, quia si poneretur aliquod principium quasi materiale, non esset - in quantum tale est - summae perfectionis, et ita videretur reducendum in ratione principii ad principium productivum active.	82. From this is inferred by similarity that the first productive power produces by itself alone, and without any other productive principle concurring, and without any quasi-matter; for the reason seems similar about the productive and causative principle, that if some quasi-material principle were posited, it would not be - insofar as it is such -of supreme perfection, and so it would seem to be needing to be reduced, in idea of principle, to an actively productive principle.
83 Item, quinto, Augustinus Contra Maximinum libro III cap. 15: ƿ((Spiritus Sanctus non est de aliqua materia, vel de nihilo, sed inde est unde procedit )); ita ergo concedit Spiritum Sanctum non esse de nihilo sed de substantia Patris et Filii, sicut concedit Filium esse de substantia Patris.	83. Again, fifth, Augustine Against Maximinus II ch.14 says: "the Holy Spirit is not from any matter, nor from nothing, but he is thence whence he proceeds;" so Augustine concedes, therefore, that the Holy Spirit is not from nothing but from the substance of the Father and the Son, just as he concedes that the Son is from the substance of the Father.
84 Et hoc probatur ratione, quia simili modo, relatio Spiritus Sancti est in deitate sicut relatio Filii; sed essentia non se habet respectu relationis Spiritus Sancti quasi materia receptiva eius - ut videtur - secundum illam opinionem, quia ponit Verbum generari per impressionem in illud de quo gignitur, Spiritum autem Sanctum produci quasi per expressionem, vel exsufflationem sui, de voluntate formata de qua producitur. Quod autem producitur per expulsionem vel expressionem de aliquo 'de quo', non habet illud 'dequo' pro materia in productione sui, quia omnis materia - productionis et producti - est in qua recipitur forma producti, quod non est expulsione de illo. Est ergo Spiritus Sanctus non de nihilo, nec tamen de quasi materia suae productionis.	84. And this is proved by reason, that in a similar way the relation of the Holy Spirit is in deity as is the relation of the Son; but the essence is not disposed in respect of the Holy Spirit as matter receptive of him according to that opinion - as it seems -, because it posits that the Word is generated by impression on that from which it is generated, but that the Holy Spirit is produced as by expression, or exhalation of itself, from the formed will from which it is produced. But what is produced by expulsion or expression from some 'from which' does not have that 'from which' as the matter in its production, because all matter - of the production and of the product - is that in which the form of the product is received, which is not by expulsion from it. The Holy Spirit therefore is not from nothing, nor yet from the quasi-matter of its production.
85 Ergo propter hoc quod est Filium non esse de nihilo, vel relaƿtionem eius fundari in essentia, - non oportet essentiam ut est 'de qua Filius generatur' esse materiam respectu generationis Filii.	85. Therefore, because of the fact that the Son is not from nothing, or that his relation is founded in the essence, - the essence as 'that from which the Son is generated' should not be matter with respect to the generation of the Son [nn.52-53].
86 $a Item, ad idem: Filium esse de substantia Patris necessario requiritur ad hanc generationem quantum ad exsistentiam realem generationis; sed ad illam exsistentiam non necessario requiritur substantiam Patris esse quasi materiam; igitur etc.	86. Again, to the same [i.e. the principal issue, Henry's opinion, n.52]: That the Son is from the substance of the Father is necessarily required for this generation, as to the real existence of generation; but for that existence it is not necessarily required that the substance of the Father be quasi-matter; therefore etc.
87 Patet maior, per Augustinum Contra Maximinum: ((Nullo modo verum Dei Filium cogitatis, si hunc esse de substantia Patris negatis)). Minor, - nullum ens rationis, praecise, necessario requiritur ad hanc generationem ut exsistentem; substantiam Patris esse materiam praecise dicit ens rationis circa substantiam, alioquin circumscripta negotiatione intellectus, erit ex se quasi materia, vel materia realiter, vel similitudo realis ad materiam.	87. The major is plain from Augustine AgainstMaximinus [ibid.]: "In no way are you thinking of the true Son of God if you deny that he is from the substance of the Father [n.50]." The minor is plain, - no being of reason is precisely, necessarily required for this generation as it is existent [n.79]; that the substance of the Father is matter states precisely a being of reason about the substance, otherwise, with the activity of our intellect removed, he will be of himself quasi-matter, or matter really, or a real likeness to matter.
88 Item, nihil convenit illi essentiae in quo materia distinguitur ƿa forma, sed quodlibet conveniens sibi vel est proprium formae vel commune: ergo in nullo est ita quasi materia sicut quasi forma.	88. Again, to the [divine] essence belongs nothing in which matter is distinguished from form, but whatever belongs to it is either proper to the form or common [sc. to both matter and form]; therefore it is in no respect quasi-matter in the way it is quasi-form.
89 Antecedens patet, quia esse idem in generante et genito non est proprium materiae: immo anima est eadem in corde generante et parte genita, - materia numquam, in creatura, quia sufficienter actuatur per unicam formam; in propagatione, materia geniti fuit aliquid, sed non fuit materia sub forma propagantis: hic est deceptio 'quia eadem materia est corrupti et geniti' - quasi ideo sit generantis et geniti eadem.	89. The antecedent is plain, because to be the same thing in generator and generated is not proper to matter; nay rather the soul [sc. which is form of the body] is the same in the heart generating as in a part generated [n.135], - matter never, in the case of the creature, because it is sufficiently actuated by the single form; in propagation, the matter of the generated was something, but it was not the matter under the form of the propagator; there is a deception here in the remark [from Henry] 'because there is the same matter of the thing corrupted and the thing generated' - as if therefore it was the same in the generator and the generated.
90 Item, incompossibilia simpliciter non possunt esse actus eiusdem simpliciter: bene tamen 'idem' potest esse actus incompossibilium, sicut anima partium organicarum.	90. Again, things simply incompossible cannot be the act of something simply the same; however the 'same' can well be the act of incompossibles, as the soul is of the organic parts [n.133].
91 Item, compositum per hoc constituitur quia potentiale actuatur actu compositi et determinatur: ergo essentia referetur et determinabitur. - Confirmatur: sicut qualitas non est actus nisi secundum quam actuatum est 'quale', ita relatio nullius est actus nisi secundum quam ipsum refertur. Essentia non refertur. ƿ	91. Again, the composite is constituted by the fact that the potential is actuated and determined by the act of the composite; therefore the essence will be referred and determined [sc. to and by something else]. There is a confirmation: just as quality is not act save as the thing actuated is qualified, so the relation of anything is not actuated save as it is referred [to something]. Essence is not referred [to something].
92 Item, alia ratio - quae in tertia dubitatione in fine - quod suppositum diceretur relatum secundum illud fundamentum. - Instantia: 'secundum deitatem Pater est similis Filio'. Tamen haec relatio non est actus fundamenti ut est formaliter distincta a fundamento, secundum te. a$	92. Again, another reason - which is in the third doubt at the end [n.137] - that the supposit would be said to be a related thing according to its foundation. - An instance [of Henry against this]: 'the Father is like the Son in deity'. However, this relation is not the act of the foundation as the relation is formally distinct from the foundation, according to you [sc. Henry].