Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D41

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica	Forty First Distinction Single Question Whether there is any Merit of Predestination or Reprobation
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem quadragesimam primam quaero utrum sit aliquod meritum praedestinationis vel reprobationis. Quod sic: Quia si sola voluntate - absque aliqua ratione - hunc praedestinaret et illum reprobaret, ergo videretur non esse summe bonus, quia non summe liberalis nec communicativus. posset enim bonum suum aeque communicare illi quem non praedestinat; ex quo - sine omni ratione in alio - illum praedestinavit ex sola liberalitate sua, ita posset istum praedestinare.	1. About the forty first distinction I ask whether there is any merit of predestination or reprobation. That there is: Because if by his will alone – without any reason – God were to predestine this person and reprobate that one, then he would seem not to be supremely good, because not supremely generous and communicative; for he could equally communicate his good to him whom he does not predestine; by the fact that – without any reason in something else – he has by his sole generosity predestined that person, so he could predestine this one.
2 Praeterea, si duo 'aequales in naturalibus' apprehendantur ab intellectu suo, et solo actu voluntatis - sine aliqua ratione ex parte eorum - istum reprobat et illum praedestinat, ergo videtur acceptio esse personarum: quia aequales sunt quantum est ex parte sua et ad finem aequaliter ordinabiles, non aequaliter amat ad illum ƿfinem; hoc enim videtur 'accipere personam' praeferre eam alteri ad illum finem, ad quem non est ex se magis praeferenda. Sed consequens est impossibile, et contra Petrum Act. 12: In veritate inquit - comperi quod non est personarum acceptio apud Deum.	2. Further, if two people, equal in natural endowments, are apprehended by his intellect, and by sole act of will – without any reason on their part – he reprobates this one and predestines that one, then there seems to be acceptance of persons; because although they are equal as concerns their own part and equally capable of being ordered to the end, he does not equally love them for that end; for ‘to have acceptance of persons’ seems to be to prefer this person to that one for the end for which he is not of himself more to be preferred. But the consequent is impossible, and contrary to Peter in Acts 10.34: “In truth,” he says, “I find that there is no acceptance of persons with God.”
3 Contra: Rom. 9: Cum nondum nati essent, aut egissent quidquam boni vel mali, ut secundum propositum electio gratiae remaneret, - quaere ibi.	3. On the contrary: Romans 9.11-13: “Although they were not yet born, or had done anything good or bad, so that the election of grace might remain according to his purpose,” – look there.
4 Praeterea, cap. 11: exemplificat de figulo, qui de eadem massa potest formare unum vas in honorem et aliud in contumeliam, ex quo videtur arguere a simili, de praedestinatione unius et reprobatione alterius.	4. Further, 9.21: he gives an example about a potter, who from the same mass of clay can form one vessel for honor and one for contempt – from which he seems to argue by similarity about the predestination of one and the reprobation of another.
	I. To the Question A. First Opinion, Proposed and Retracted by Augustine
5 Circa istam quaestionem sensit Augustinus aliquando quod etsi bona opera in praescientia Dei non sint ratio praedestinandi, ƿfides tamen in praescientia eius est ratio praedestinandi, - sicut per eum patet Super epistolam ad Romanos (illam scilicet, ubi vult quod propter fidem - quam praescivit - Iacob, qua sibi esset crediturus, et infidelitatem Esau, hunc praeelegit et illum non), et habetur in littera. Sed idem retractat ipse libro I Retractationum cap. 22, innuens contra se rationem 'quia fides est donum Dei sicut et alia opera bona' (quod probatur per Apostolum ad Cor.); unde dicit Augustinus quod 'illud non dixissem, si fidem inter dona Spiritus Sancti connumerari scivissem'.	5. About this question Augustine once thought that although good works in the fore-knowledge of God are not the reason of predestining, yet faith is in his foreknowledge the reason for predestining – as is plain from him On the Epistle to the Romans (the one namely where he intends that because of the faith – which God foreknew – by which Jacob would believe and because of the infidelity of Esau God preferred Jacob and not Esau), and is contained in the text [of Lombard]. But Augustine retracts this in Retractions I ch.23, indicating his reason against it ‘because faith is a gift of God just as are also other good works’ (which is proved by the Apostle 1 Corinthians 7.25); hence Augustine says that ‘I would not have said that, if I had known to number faith among the gifts of the Holy Spirit’.
	B. Second Opinion, Proposed by Peter Lombard
6 Magister videtur sentire quod omnino nullum sit meritum praedestinationis vel reprobationis; et videtur inniti auctoritati Apostoli praecise et dicto Augustini De praedestinatione sanctoƿrum: ((Non quia)) - inquit - ((futuros nos tales esse scivit, nos elegit, sed ut essemus tales per illam electionem)).	6. The master seems to think that there is altogether no merit of predestination or reprobation; and he seems to rely precisely on the authority of the Apostle [n.3] and on the statement of Augustine On the Predestination of the Saints ch.19 n.38: “Not because,” he says, “he knew that we would be such did he choose us, but so that we might become such through his choice.”
7 Et Magister adducit auctoritatem Augustini contra se, 83 Quaestionum quaestione 68 dicentis: ((Cui vult - inquit - miseretur, et quem vult indurat. Sed haec voluntas Dei iniusta esse non potest; venit enim de occultissimis meritis, quia etsi ipsi peccatores propter generale peccatum unam massam fecerint, non tamen inter eos nulla est diversitas: praecedit enim aliquid in peccatoribus, quo, quamvis nondum sint iustificati, digni tamen efficiantur iustificatione, - et iterum, praecedit in aliis peccatoribus, quo digni sint obtusione)).	7. And the Master adduces the authority of Augustine against himself [n.6] saying in 83 Diverse Questions q.68 n.4: “On whom he wills,” he says, “he has mercy, and whom he wills he hardens” [cf. Romans 9.18]; but this will of God cannot be unjust; for it comes from very hidden merits, because although sinners themselves, because of general sin, have made one mass, yet there is some diversity between them; for something precedes in sinners by which, although they are not yet justified, they are made worthy of justification – and again, there precedes in other sinners that whereby they are worthy of being dulled.”
8 Respondet Magister quod istam auctoritatem videtur retractasse in simili, retractando illud quod dixit ad Rom.; et hoc confirmat per hoc, quod quaedam quae subdiderat in eadem quaestione, retractat, sicut apparet I Retractationum cap. 25, - et illa videntur consonare cum ista sententia, ex quo videtur etiam quod istam sententiam retractaverit. ƿ	8. The Master replies that this authority [n.7] seems to have been retracted by Augustine by similarity when what he said on Romans was retracted [n.5]; and the Master confirms this by the fact Augustine retracts certain things he added in the same question [n.7], as is plain in Retractions I ch.26, – and what he added seems to agree with this opinion [n.7], from which it also seems he retracted this opinion.
9 Sed contra istam responsionem Magistri - de retractatione auctoritatis ad Rom. - obiceretur per hoc, quod Augustinus librum illum Super epistolam ad Romanos edidit quando fuit presbyter, illum autem librum 83 Quaestionum non fecit compilari antequam esset episcopus; ergo non videtur quod retractando aliqua de primo libro, retractet aliqua de secundo, quia retractare dictum prius - quando minus sciebat - non est retractare dictum posterius, quando magis sciebat.	9. But against this response of the Master – about the retraction of his authority on Romans [n.8] – an objection might be made that Augustine published the book on Romans when he was priest, but the book 83 Questions he did not have compiled before he was bishop; therefore it does not seem that when he retracts something from the first book he is retracting something from the second, because to retract something said before – when he knew less – is not to retract something said later, when he knew more.
10 Sed istud argumentum non cogit, quia licet prius scripserit unum librum quam alium, simul tamen fecit librum Retractationum (et tunc habuit ambos libros illos editos), et potuit sententiam dictam in uno libro, retractare in aliis, sive prius editis sive posterius. Apparet enim quod omnes libros illos - de quibus facit mentionem - ediderat antequam edidit illum librum Retractationum, et tamen si in primo capitulo primi libri Rectractationum retractasset aliquam sententiam quam dixisset in aliquo alio libro, posterius quidem edito et retractato, non oporteret quod iterum repliƿcaret retractationem illius sententiae in aliquo capitulo assignato alii libro posterius edito. Unde dicit libro I cap. 3, retractans illam sententiam 'Deus, quem sensus ignorat': ((Addendum)) inquit - ((erat, ut diceretur 'mortalis corporis sensus')); et subdit: ((Nec assidue repetendum est quod et superius inde iam dixi, sed hoc recolendum est ubicumque ista sententia in meis libris invenitur)). Igitur sententia dicta in libro prius retractato et prius edito, magis retractat eandem sententiam ut dictam in libris posterius editis, quam e converso.	10. But this argument [n.9] is not compelling, because although he wrote one book before another, yet he produced the Retractions at one time (and at that time he had had both those books published), and an opinion stated in one book he could retract in other books, whether earlier or later published. For it appears that all those books – about which he makes mention – he had published before the book of Retractions, and yet if in the first chapter of the first book of the Retractions he had retracted another opinion which he had stated in some other book, published later indeed and retracted, he would not again have to repeat the retraction of the opinion in some chapter assigned to another book later published. Hence he says in book 1 chapter 3 retracting the opinion ‘God, whom sense does not know’: “An addition should have been made,” he says, “so that it would say ‘whom the sense of the mortal body’ does not know;” and he subjoins: “Nor need I continuously repeat what I also already said above, but this is to be recalled wherever this opinion is found in my writings.” Therefore when the opinion was asserted in a book retracted and published before, he retracts the same opinion as asserted in books published later rather than the reverse.
11 Sed aliter posset argui contra expositionem Magistri, - quod non invenitur ubi Augustinus illa verba retractat: quia, sicut ipsemet confitetur (et verum est), post illa verba quae adducit sequuntur alia verba, quae retractat (de illa quaestione 68) I Retractationum cap. 25, - et ista verba non retractat; videtur autem quod si intenderet ea esse retractanda, non inciperet a verbis sequentibus ista, omittendo ista. ƿ	11. But one can in another way argue against the exposition of the Master, – because no place is found where Augustine retracts those words; because, as the Master himself admits (and as is true), after the words he adduces [n.8] there are other words that follow that he retracts (from that question 68) in Retractions I ch.25 – and these other words he does not retract; but it seems that if he did intend those words to be retracted, he would not begin from the following words while omitting those.
	C. Third Opinion
12 Aliter ((dicitur quod quidquid Deus operatur circa creaturas, solo beneplacito suae voluntatis operatur, ut super hoc non sit aliqua ratio vel causa petenda.	12. [Exposition of the opinion] – In another way “it is said that whatever God does with respect to creatures, he does only by the good pleasure of his will, and for this no reason or cause needs to be sought.”
13 Quod confirmatur per illud quod dicitur ad Rom. 9, de Iacob et Esau: Cum nondum nati essent, aut egissent quidquam mali aut boni, ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, - non ex operibus; glossa. 'sicut non pro meritis praecedentibus, ita nec pro futuris, quia bona vel mala non erant futura nisi apposita gratia vel subtracta'.	13. “The point is confirmed by what is said in Romans 9.11-2 about Jacob and Esau: “When they were not yet born, or had done anything bad or good, so that the purpose of God by election might stand, – not from works;” the Gloss: ‘just as not for preceding merits, so not for future ones, because good and bad merits were not future without grace added or removed’.”
14 Quod etiam Apostolus declarat, subdens: Aut non habet potestatem figulus ex eadem massa etc. Unde sicut sola voluntas figuli est ratio quare de hac parte massae facit vas honorabile et de illa vas contumeliae, nulla discrepantia exsistente in tota massa (quemadmodum neque est in prima materia, quam tamen causa agens vestit in una parte forma nobiliore, in alia vero minus nobili), sic sola voluntas beneplaciti Dei est ratio quare de eadem massa - aequaliter vitiata in primo parente - istum eligit ad gloriam, illum vero dimittit in condemnationem; vel etiam si non fuisset massa vitiata et essent omnes aequales, non nisi gratuito unum eligeret, alterum ƿvero dimitteret, - utrobique faciendo gratiam illi quem eligeret (sed maiorem electo ex massa vitiata), et illi iustitiam quem ex massa damnata non eligeret, non autem iniustitiam illi quem secundum statum innocentiae exsistentem non eligeret)).	14. “Which also the Apostle makes clear when he subjoins, 9.21: “Or does not the potter have power from the same lump, etc.” Hence just as the will alone of the potter is the reason that from this part of the lump he makes an honorable vessel and from that part a vessel of contempt, while no difference exists in the lump (just as neither in prime matter, which however the agent cause clothes in one part with a nobler form but in another with a less noble one), thus the good pleasure alone of God is the reason that from the same mass – equally vitiated in our first parent – he chose this one for glory, but that one he leaves for condemnation; or even if the lump had not been vitiated but all were equal, he would only gratuitously choose one, while another he would leave – in both cases giving grace to him whom he chose (but a greater grace than for one chosen from the vitiated lump), and justice to him whom he did not choose from the damned mass, but not injustice to him whom, though existing in a state of innocence, he did not choose” [from Henry of Ghent].
15 Ulterius ((dicit ista positio quod contingit assignare rationem eius extrinsecam quare Deus de tota massa perdita voluit quosdam misericorditer liberare et quosdam non, nullam autem rationem quare potius hunc quam illum.	15. Further, “this position [n.12] says that there happens to be an extrinsic reason assigned that God from the whole lost lump wanted in mercy to free some and not others, but there is no reason that he chose this one rather than that.”
16 Ratio primi ponitur, ut scilicet bonitas eius - simplex exsistens in se - manifestetur multipliciter in rebus diversis simul, eo quod in nulla una, tota manifestari potest, quia divinam perfectionem non attingit illa; ut quemadmodum ad perfectionem universi requiruntur diversi gradus rerum in materialibus (etiam ex eadem materia, aequaliter se habente ad omnes formas), sic etiam propter eandem bonitatem manifestandam, ad perfectionem requiruntur diversi gradus in moralibus, quia in hoc bonitas sua manifestaretur quoad aliquem gradum supernaturalem: reprobos enim iuste puniendo manifestatur bonitas iustitiae, sicut in glorificatis manifestatur bonitas misericordiae eius.	16. “A reason is posited for the first, namely so that his goodness – existing simple in himself – might be manifested in manifold ways in diverse things at the same time, by the fact that in no one thing can the whole be manifested, because it does not reach the divine perfection; so just as for the perfection of the universe are required diverse grades of things in material reality (even from the same matter, equally disposed to all forms), so too for manifesting the same goodness diverse grades in moral reality are required for perfection, because in this his goodness as to any supernatural degree would be manifested; for in justly punishing the reprobate the goodness of his justice is manifested, as the goodness of his mercy is manifested in the glorified.”
17 Sic enim Deus permittit ista mala fieri, ne bona impediantur; (sed ut eveniant), et hoc tam in moralibus, ut in proposito, - quam ƿin naturalibus, ut in caeco nato (Ioan. 9), in quo Christus solam ostendit rationem esse ut gloria Dei manifestaretur in illo; sed hoc non est ex defectu visus in caecitate, sed ex eius illuminatione mirabili a Domino.	17. “For thus does God permit these evils to come to be, so that goods not be impeded (but that they may happen), and this both in moral reality, as in the issue at hand – and in natural reality, as in the man born blind (John 9.3), in whom Christ showed that the sole reason was that the glory of God might be manifest in him; but this is not from the defect of sight in the blindness, but from the marvelous illumining of him by the Lord.”
18 Et videtur quasi hanc rationem assignare Apostolus ad Rom. 9, dicens: Volens Deus ostendere iram iustitiae etc.; cui concordat exemplum de figulo, de eodem luto faciente vas unum in honorem et aliud in contumeliam, de quo II ad Tim. 2 dicit Apostolus: In magna autem domo non solum vasa aurea et argentea, sed etiam fictilia)).	18. “And it seems that this reason is assigned by the Apostle in Romans 9.22-23 when he says: “God wishing to show the anger of his justice etc.;” with which the example of the potter agrees, who makes from the same clay one vessel for honor and another for contempt [n.14], about which in 2 Timothy 2.20 the Apostle says: ‘Now in a large house not only gold and silver vessels, but also earthenware’.” [Henry of Ghent]
19 De secundo - scilicet in particulari - ((dicitur quod (sicut in naturalibus) cum prima materia tota sit uniformis, quare una pars est sub forma ignis et alia sub forma terrae, bene potest assignari ratio intrinseca (scilicet perfectio universi), et extrinseca (scilicet manifestatio potentiae et bonitatis Dei), sed quare haec pars materiae sit sub hac forma et illa sub illa et non e converso, nulla ratio esse potest nisi sola voluntas artificis sic determinantis: sicut in operibus humanis, quod hic lapis sic figuratur ut situetur in altari, ƿalter vero in cloaca (secundum quod Philosophus II Physicorum dicit aliquos lapides esse bene fortunatos, aliquos autem non), hoc a mera electione artificis dependet; sic dicunt in proposito, in particulari nulla est ratio quare hunc praeeligit et illum non)). Quod ((confirmatur per Augustinum super illud Ioan. Nemo venit ad me nisi Pater meus etc., ubi dicit: 'Quare hunc trahat et illum non trahat, noli velle diiudicare, si non vis errare')).	19. About the second [n.15] – namely in particular – “it is said that (as in natural reality), since the whole of prime matter is uniform, an intrinsic reason that one part is under the form of fire and another under the form of earth can be assigned (namely the perfection of the universe), and an extrinsic one (namely the manifestation of the power and goodness of God), but no reason can be assigned that this part of matter is under this form, and that part under that form and not conversely, save the sole will of the artificer who so determines things; just as in human works, that this stone is so fashioned as to be placed in an altar but another placed in a privy (according to what the Philosopher says Physics 2.197b9-11, that some stones are fortunate but others not), this depends on the mere choice of the artificer; so do they say in the issue at hand, that there is no reason in particular that he prefers this person and not that.” And this “is confirmed by Augustine on John 6.44: ‘No one comes to me unless my Father draw him etc.’, where Augustine says: ‘Why he draws this one and not that one, do not wish to judge if you do not wish to err’.” [from Aquinas].
20 ((Et dicunt quod ex hoc quod Deus sic inaequalia aequalibus facit, non est iniquitas, - quia in his quae fiunt ex gratia, sine debito, potest absque omni iniquitate dans dare prout vult, iuxta illud Matth. 20: Tolle quod tuum est, et vade; an non licet mihi, quod volo, facere? Tunc autem esset iniquitas, si esset datum ex debito)).	20. “And they say from this that the fact God thus makes inequality for equal things is not iniquity – because in things that happen by grace, without debt, the giver can without any iniquity give as he wishes, according to the remark of Matthew 20.14-15: ‘Take what is your own, and depart; am I not permitted to do what I wish?’ But it would then be iniquity if it were given from debt.” [Henry of Ghent]
21 Contra istam opinionem arguit quidam, - primo contra illam rationem quae assignatur in communi: Nam nullus defectus culpae sive poenae est de per se perfectione universi; ergo nec per se requiritur ad manifestationem divinae bonitatis. Et per hoc patet quod non est simile de differentiis reƿrum in esse naturali et morali, quia omnes species rerum - distinctae in esse naturali - sunt de perfectione universi; non sic autem de esse morali inter bonum et malum sive inter beatum et miserum.	21. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion, someone argues – first against the reason that is assigned in general [n.16]: For no defect of guilt or penalty belongs of itself to the perfection of the universe; therefore neither is it per se required for the manifestation of divine goodness. And from this it is plain that the differences of things in natural and moral being are not similar, because all the species of things – distinct in natural being – belong to the perfection of the universe; it is not so, as to moral being, between good and bad or between the blessed and the miserable.
22 Item, arguit quod si necessaria ad manifestationem divinae iustitiae sit damnatio aliquorum, ad hoc videtur sufficere damnatio daemonum: non enim videntur homines et daemones, et culpa et poena, differre specie in esse morali; pluralitas autem individuorum non est per se de perfectione universi. Aut si dicis quod alio modo manifestatur divina iustitia in istis et in illis, punitis, - contra: ita manifestaretur divina misericordia pluribus modis, si Deus glorificasset aliquos homines (aut si aliquos, vel homines vel angelos, beatificasset) sine meritis, quod non fecit; tamen magis videretur de perfectione divinae bonitatis pluribus modis manifestari Dei misericordiam quam Dei iustitiam.	22. Again, he argues that if the damnation of some is necessary for the manifestation of divine justice, the damnation of demons seems sufficient for this; for men and demons, and guilt and penalty, do not seem to differ by species in moral being; but a plurality of individuals does not per se belong to the perfection of the universe. Or if you say that in some way divine justice is manifested in these and those when punished – on the contrary: so would divine mercy be manifested in several ways, if God had glorified some men (or if he had beatified some, either men or angels) without merits, which he did not do; however it would seem to belong to the perfection of divine goodness for God’s mercy rather to be manifested in many ways than God’s justice.
23 Praeterea, arguit iste quod non videtur quod Deus fieri per intentionem peccata permittat, ut ea postmodum puniat, quia non videtur quod per intentionem cuiusquam sint plus permittenda fieri ƿ'mala facta' quam facienda, quia nullum malum culpae vel poenae potest esse per se intentum in quantum malum. - Et si dicatur quod ((voluntas in permittendo nullo modo fertur super malum, sed solummodo super permissionem, ut intendat malum permittere in ratione partis)), arguit quod saltem ((non est manifestum qualiter ex intentione Deus velit unum et non alterum)). Unde non videtur quod ex intentione Deus malum permittat, sed solum ut bonum eveniat: hoc patet in caeco nato, quem Deus permisit nasci caecum, non ut glorificetur in caecitate eius sed in mirabili illuminatione; hoc etiam patet in naturalibus: Deus enim non intendit defectum, sed si causae secundae sint impotentes, permittit effectum esse talem qualem causae possunt producere; in hominibus etiam videmus quod qui permittit aliquem peccare, si posset prohibere vel impedire, peccat. Ergo non est ponendum in Deo.	23. In addition, he argues that it does not seem God intentionally permits sins to come to be so that he may later punish them, because it does not seem that by anyone’s intention ‘evils done’ are more to be permitted to come to be than evils to be done, because no evil of guilt or penalty can be intended per se insofar as it is evil. – And if it be said that “the will in giving permission is in no way borne to evil but only to permission, so as to intend to permit evil by reason of a part,” he argues that at any rate “it is not manifest how God by intention would wish one and not the other.” Hence it does not seem that God by intention permits evil, but only so that good may happen; this is plain in the man born blind, whom God permitted to be born blind, not so as to be glorified in the man’s blindness but in the marvelous illumining; this is also plain in natural things; for God does not intend defect, but if second causes are impotent, he permits the effect be of the sort that the causes can produce; in the case of men, too, we see that he who permits someone to sin himself sins if he could prohibit or impede it. Therefore this is not to be posited in God.
24 Praeterea, contra secundum membrum (scilicet quod nulla sit ratio in speciali), - quia illud exemplum non est simile: in materia enim ut nuda est, non potest esse differentia propter quam sic sit disposita ad talem vel talem formam (sicut nec in massa respectu diversorum vasorum), sed in hominibus videtur posse inveniri aliqua diversa dispositio propter quam huic congruat ƿpraedestinari et illi non, sicut in materia 'non ut nuda' est dispositio propinqua ut fiat sub alia forma (sicut patet de vino et aceto); non autem esset proxime disposita ad illam posteriorem, si non fuisset sub priore.	24. In addition, against the second member (namely that there is no reason in the special case [nn.15, 19]), – because the example is not similar; for in matter as it is bare, there cannot be a difference why it should be thus disposed to such or such a form (as neither in a lump of clay with respect to diverse vessels [n.14]), but in the case of men it seems possible for some diverse disposition to be found why being predestined should fit this person and not that person, just as in the case of matter ‘not as bare matter’ there is a proximate disposition for it to be under another form (as is plain about wine and vinegar), but it would not have been proximately disposed to the later form if it had not been under the prior form.
25 Et quod illi adducunt pro se Apostolum, dicit iste (secundum glossam ibi) quod Apostolus hoc dicit ((non propter inopiam reddendae rationis, sed ut reprimat temeritatem incapabilium)); ((nec est simile in exemplo Apostoli)) - de massa et figulo - ((nisi ex parte finis, non autem ex parte subiecti)), quia hic in electione potest esse differentia subiecti, ibi autem non: et quoad hoc, est congruentius exemplum Apostoli ad Tim. 2, quod ponit de vasis argenteis et aureis, ((quia ibi est differentia in subiecto, per quam vasa fictilia fiunt in maiorem contumeliam, lignea in minorem, aurea in honorem maiorem et argentea in honorem minorem)).	25. And as to the fact that they adduce Apostle [n.18] for themselves, he says (according to the Gloss there) that the Apostle says this “not because of wanting means for giving a reason but to repress the rashness of the incapable;” “nor is the case similar in the Apostle’s example” – about the lump of clay and the potter – “save on the part of the end, but not on the part of the subject,” because in the case of the end in choice there can be a difference of the subject, but not in the case of the subject; and as far as this is concerned, there is a more fitting example from the Apostle in 2 Timothy which he posits about silver and gold vessels [n.18], “because there is a difference there in the subject whereby earthen vessels are made for greater contempt, wooden vessels for lesser contempt, gold vessels for greater honor and silver vessels for lesser honor.”
	D. Fourth Opinion
26 Iste improbans istam opinionem, dicit aliter, et hoc sic: Actus divinus potest considerari ut est a Deo agente, vel ut recipitur in aliquod passum sive ut terminatur in aliquod obiectum. ƿ	26. [Exposition of the opinion] – He [Henry] rejects this opinion [nn.21-25] and speaks in another way, and this as follows: A divine act can be considered as it is from God the agent or as it is received in some passive thing or as it has a term in some object.
27 Primo modo nulla est ratio actionis divinae: neque ut finis, nisi bonitas sua, - neque ut efficiens, nisi voluntas sua.	27. In the first way there is no reason for the divine action; neither as end, save his goodness – nor as efficient cause, save his will.
28 Secundo modo tamen est assignare aliquam rationem, propter quam scilicet illud esse circa quod est actio - ut ens ad finem congruat fini.	28. In the second way, however, it is possible to assign some reason, namely for which the existence that the action concerns – as an entity for the end – agrees with the end.
29 Et quod aliqua talis ratio sit ex parte entis ad finem, ostendit tripliciter: Primo, quia in rebus omnino aequalibus electio nominari non potest; ergo si Deus aliqua eligit, aliqua est differentia electi, - aut non est electio.	29. And that there is some such reason on the part of the entity for the end is shown by him in three ways: First, because in things altogether equal choice cannot be talked of; therefore if God chooses some things, there is some difference in the thing chosen, – or there is no choice.
30 Secundo, quia in omnibus operibus misericordiae divinae videtur concurrere iustitia; igitur est aliqua congruentia ex parte illius circa quod operatur misericorditer.	30. Second, because in all the works of divine mercy it seems that justice concurs; therefore there is some congruence on the part of the thing he does mercifully.
31 Et tertio (quasi similiter): videtur non esse vel esse meritum electionis vel reprobationis, et ita licet malitia ex parte receptivi non sit causa damnandi ex parte Dei (quia ((tunc Deus esset passivus)) et ((temporale esset causa aeterni))), tamen bene conceditur ex parte damnandi esse motiva ratio, propter quam recipiatur in ipso ista actio et sit circa ipsum; ergo a simili, videtur - ex alia ƿparte - quod absque imperfectione Dei in agendo, posset poni aliqua ratio ex parte praedestinati. Et innititur, in ista conclusione, auctoritati Augustini praeallegatae, 83 Quaestionum, quae non videtur retractata.	31. And third (as if in like way): there seems not to be or to be a merit of choice and reprobation, and so although malice on the part of him who receives [sc. damnation] is not the cause of damning on the part of God (because “then God would be passive” and “the temporal would be cause of the eternal”), yet it is well conceded that on the part of the act of damning there is a motive reason for the act’s receiving in itself this action and its being about this person; therefore by similarity it seems – on the other side [sc. choice] – that without imperfection of God in acting there could be posited some reason on the part of the person predestined. And it rests on this conclusion, the authority of Augustine cited before [n.7], 83 Questions, which does not seem to have been retracted.
32 Ulterius, in speciali dicit quae sit ista ratio: quia bonus usus liberi arbitrii, praevisus ex parte electi, - et malus usus liberi arbitrii, praevisus ex parte reprobati.	32. Further, in particular he says what this reason is: that it is the good use, foreseen, of freewill on the part of the elect person – and the bad use, foreseen, of freewill on the part of the reprobate.
33 Et hoc declarat sic: licet gratia principaliter operetur in actibus bonis, tamen liberum arbitrium cooperatur; quod probatur per Augustinum ((super illud Psalmi Adiuva nos, Deus, salutaris noster)), ubi dicit Augustinus: ((Cum adiuvari nos vult, neque ingratus est, nec tollit liberum arbitrium; qui enim adiuvatur, etiam per se ipsum aliquid operatur)). Quando ergo offertur gratia viatori, si recipiat gratiam oblatam et ei secundum usum liberi arbitrii bene cooperetur, meretur habere gratiam secundum gradum ulteriorem, - sicut exemplificat in multis gradibus intermediis, a statu peccati mortalis usque ad statum gloriae, quos non oportet modo omnes enumerare; et ita videtur quod totus bonus usus liberi arbitrii, pro omnibus statibus praevisus, possit esse ratio electionis aeternae ipsius bene usuri, et ita ex altera parte de malo usu et reprobatione. ƿ	33. And this is made clear as follows: although grace operates principally in good acts yet freewill cooperates; this is proved from Augustine “on the remark of Psalms ‘Help us, God, our savior” [On Psalms 78, 9 n.12] where Augustine says, “When he wants us to be helped, he is neither ungrateful nor does he take away freewill; for he who is helped also does something of himself.” When grace, then, is offered to the wayfarer, if he receives the offered grace and cooperates with it well in accord with his use of freewill, he merits grace according to a further degree – as he exemplifies in many intermediate degrees, from the state of mortal sin up to the state of glory, all which it is not necessary for us now to enumerate; and so it seems that the whole use of freewill, foreseen for all its states, can be the reason for eternal election of him who will use freewill well, and so on the other side about evil use and reprobation.
34 Et si obicitur contra istud quod bonus usus liberi arbitrii est per gratiam, ergo pertinet ad effectum praedestinationis et ita non est ratio eligendi, - respondetur quod bonus usus ((quodammodo non includitur sub praedestinatione, neque sub eius effectu (licet non sit sine eius effectu), nec sit distinctum quod est praedestinationis, ab eo quod est liberi arbitrii)).	34. And if it is objected against this that the good use of freewill is by grace, therefore it pertains to the effect of predestination and so is not a reason for election – the response is that the good use “is in a certain way included under predestination, but not under its effect (although it is not without its effect), nor is that which belongs to predestination distinct from that which belongs to freewill.”
35 Sic ergo secundum ipsum, et in communi, toti generi humano potest assignari bonus usus et malus usus, et de quocumque homine potest assignari ratio ex parte ipsius (non ((propter quam sic)), sed ((sine qua non))); tamen in speciali, circa determinatum hominem, ((non est hominis illam investigare, quamvis non desit et multiplex esse possit)). Tamen ((in speciali)) - secundum eum ((magna inopia reddendae rationis Apostolus laboravit, cum dixit (Rom. 11) O altitudo divitiarum)), quia in hoc ((consistit iudiciorum Dei abyssus multa)).	35. Thus, therefore, according to him, and in general, good use and bad use can be assigned for the whole human race, and about any man a reason can be assigned on his part (not “because of which it is so” but “without which it is not so”); yet in particular, about a definite man, “it is not for man to investigate the reason, although it is not lacking and could be multiple.” However “in particular” – according to him – “the Apostle labored under a want of means for giving a reason, when he said (Romans 11) ‘O the depth of the riches’,” because in this “consists a great abyss of God’s judgments.”
36 Sed contra istud arguo: Primo, quia Deus non praevidet istum bene usurum libero arbitrio, nisi quia vult vel praeordinat istum bene usurum eo, quia ƿsicut dictum est distinctione 39 - certa praevisio futurorum contingentium est ex determinatione voluntatis suae. Si ergo offerantur duo voluntati divinae aequales in naturalibus, quaero quare istum praeordinat bene usurum libero arbitrio et illum non: non est huius, ut videtur, assignare rationem nisi voluntatem divinam; et haec est prima distinctio inter eos, quod habeat per te sequi electio vel reprobatio; ergo in prima distinctione, pertinente ad praedestinationem et reprobationem, sola ratio est divina voluntas.	36. [Rejection of the opinion] – But against this I argue: First, that God does not foresee that this man will use freewill well, save because he wills or pre-ordains him to use it well, because – as was said in distinction 39 [in the interpolation above] – definite foreseeing of future contingents is from the determination of his will. If therefore two equal persons are offered to the divine will, I ask why he preordains this to use freewill well and not that one; it is not possible, as it seems, to assign a reason for this other than the divine will; and this is the first distinction among them, which for you [Henry] election or reprobation has to follow; therefore in the first distinction, pertaining to predestination or reprobation, the only reason is the divine will.
37 Praeterea, ista ratio quam ponit, non videtur communis omnibus praedestinatis et reprobatis: Primo quidem, quia non parvulis, in quibus non praevidet Deus usum bonum vel malum liberi arbitrii.	37. Besides, the reason that he posits [n.32], does not seem common to all the predestined and reprobate: First indeed because not for children, in whom God does not foresee good or bad use of freewill.
38 Et si dicas, etsi non praevideat usum talem, tamen praevidet istum bene fuisse usurum si supervixisset, et illum fuisse male usurum si supervixisset (et ideo istum perducit ad baptismum et illum non, et iste salvatur et ille damnatur), - hoc ipse ita improbat, quia propter bonum usum praevisum alicuius, si supervixisset, non acceptatur vel reprobatur; tunc enim - secundum eum adultus moriens in gratia, non praemiaretur secundum merita quae iam habet, sed secundum illa quae praevidetur habiturus, si supervixisset. ƿ	38. And if you say that, although he does not foresee such use, yet he foresees that this one would have used it well had he survived, and that one would have used it badly if he had survived (and therefore he leads the former to baptism and the latter not, and the former is saved and the latter damned), – this he himself thus rejects, because on account of the foreseen good use by someone, if he had survived, he is not accepted or reprobated; for then – according to him – an adult dying in grace would not pre-merit according to the merits he already has, but according to those that he is foreseen to have, if he had survived.
39 Similiter loquamur de angelis praedestinatis et non praedestinatis: quem usum liberi arbitrii praevidet Deus in isto - si offeratur gratia - quem non praevidet in illo, propter quem praedestinat istum et illum reprobat?	39. Let us speak likewise of the predestined and non-predestined angels; which use of freewill does God foresee in this one – if grace is offered – which he does not foresee in that one, because of which he predestines this one and reprobates that one?
	E. Scotus’ own Opinion
40 Potest dici aliter quod praedestinationis nulla est ratio, ex parte etiam praedestinati, aliquo modo prior ipsa praedestinatione; reprobatione tamen est aliqua prior, non quidem propter quam Deus effective reprobat in quantum est a Deo actio (sicut argutum est in praemissa opinione, quia 'tunc Deus esset passivus'), sed propter quam ista actio sic terminatur ad istud obiectum et non ad illud.	40. [Exposition of the opinion] – One can say in a different way that there is no reason of predestination, even on the part of the predestined, that is in anyway prior to the predestination itself; but some reason is prior to reprobation, not indeed a reason for which God by efficient causality reprobates, insofar as the action is from God (as was argued in the previous opinion, because then ‘God would be passive’ [n.31]), but a reason for which this action thus has this object as term and not that one.
41 Primum probatur, quia ordinate volens finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, prius vult finem quam aliquod entium ad finem, et propter finem vult alia; ergo cum in toto processu quo creatura beatificabilis perducitur ad perfectum finem, finis ultimus sit perfecta beatitudo, Deus - volens huic aliquid istius ordinis - primo vult huic creaturae beatificabili finem, et quasi posterius vult sibi alia, quae sunt in ordine illorum quae pertinent ad illum finem. Sed gratia, fides, merita et bonus usus liberi arbitrii, omnia ista sunt ad istum finem (licet quaedam remotius et quaedam propinquius). Ergo prius vult Deus isti beatitudinem quam aliquod istorum; et prius vult ei quodcumque istorum quam praevideat ipsum habituƿrum quodcumque istorum, ergo propter nullum istorum praevisum vult ei beatitudinem.	41. The proof of the first point is that he who in ordered way wills the end and what is for the end wills the end first before any of the things for the end, and he wills other things for the end; therefore since, in the whole process by which a creature capable of beatification is led to the perfect end, the ultimate end is perfect beatitude, God – willing something of this order for this person – first wills the end for this creature capable of beatification and as it were afterwards wills him other things, which are in the order of things that pertain to the end. But grace, faith, merits and good use of freewill, all these things are for the end (although some more remotely and others more near to it). Therefore God wills beatitude for this person first before any of the other things; and he wills for him each of these others first before he foresees that he will have each of them, therefore not because of foreseeing any of these does he will him beatitude.
42 Secundum probatur, quia damnatio non videtur bona nisi quia iusta, nam - secundum Augustinum Super Genesim XI 'non prius est Deus ultor quam aliquis peccator' (videtur enim esse crudelitas punire aliquem, non praeexsistente in eo culpa); ergo a simili, non vult Deus prius punire quam videat aliquem esse peccatorem. Non ergo primus actus voluntatis divinae, circa Iudam, est velle damnare Iudam prout Iudas offertur in puris naturalibus (quia tunc videtur velle damnare sine culpa), sed videtur quod oportet Iudam offerri voluntati divinae sub ratione peccatoris antequam velit ipsum damnare. Reprobatio ergo habet ex parte obiecti rationem, scilicet peccatum finale praevisum.	42. The proof of the second point is that damnation does not seem to be good save because it is just, for – according to Augustine On Genesis XI ch.17 n.22 – ‘God is not avenger before someone is sinner’ (for it seems to be cruelty to punish someone when there is no guilt pre-existing in him); therefore by similarity, God does not wish to punish before he sees someone to be a sinner. Therefore the first act of the divine will about Judas is not to will to damn Judas as Judas is presented in his purely natural state (because then God seems to damn without guilt), but he sees that Judas must be presented to the divine will under the idea of sinner before he wills to damn him. Therefore reprobation has its reason on the part of the object, namely foreseen final sin.
43 Hoc confirmatur auctoritate Augustini in libro De praedestinatione sanctorum et ponitur in littera.	43. This is confirmed by the authority of Augustine in his book On the Predestination of the Saints ch.19 n.38 and it is put in the text.
44 Contra istud. Petrus et Iudas aequales in naturalibus, voliti a Deo in esse exsistentiae, in illo instanti in quo offeruntur voluntati divinae in exsistentia naturali et aequales: Deus - per te - primo vult Petro beatitudinem; quaero tunc quid velit Iudae? Si damnationem, habeo propositum 'ergo ƿreprobat sine omni ratione', - si beatitudinem, ergo praedestinat Iudam.	44. [Objections against the opinion] – Against this [n.41]. Peter and Judas, equal in natural state, willed by God in being of existence, in the instant in which they are presented to the divine will in natural existence and equal: God – for you [sc. Scotus] – first wills beatitude for Peter; why then did he will what for Judas? If damnation I have the conclusion intended ‘therefore he reprobates without any reason’, – if beatitude, then he predestines Judas.
45 Dici potest quod in illo instanti nihil vult Iudae; tantum est ibi negatio volitionis gloriae. Et similiter, quasi in secundo instanti naturae, quando vult Petro gratiam, adhuc nullus actus positivus voluntatis divinae est circa Iudam, sed tantum negativus. In tertio instanti, quando vult permittere Petrum esse de massa perditionis sive dignum perditione (et hoc sive propter peccatum originale sive propter actuale), tunc vult permittere Iudam simili modo esse filium perditionis; et hic est primus actus positivus - uniformis quidem circa Petrum et Iudam, sed ex isto actu est istud verum 'Iudas erit finaliter peccator', positis illis negationibus, scilicet quod non vult sibi dare gratiam nec gloriam. In quarto ergo instanti offertur Iudas ut peccator finaliter, voluntati divinae, et tunc ipse vult iuste punire et reprobare Iudam.	45. One can say that in that instant God wishes nothing for Judas; there is only a negation there of volition for glory. And likewise, as if in the second instant of nature, when he wills grace for Peter, there is still no positive act of the divine will about Judas, but only a negative one. In the third instant, when he wills to permit Peter to be of the mass of perdition or worthy of perdition (and this either because of original sin or actual sin), then he wishes Judas in a like way to be a son of perdition; and here is the first positive act – a uniform one indeed – about Peter and Judas, but by this act this statement is true ‘Judas will be finally a sinner’, with the negations in place, namely that God does not will to give him grace or glory. In the fourth instant, then, Judas is presented to the divine will as finally a sinner, and then God wills to punish him justly and reprobate Judas.
46 Nec mirum quod non ponitur similis processus praedestinationis et reprobationis, quia bona omnia attribuuntur Deo principaliter, mala autem nobis; et ita Deum 'praedestinare sine ratione' congruit bonitati suae, sed ipsum 'velle damnare' non videtur immediate sibi posse attribui respectu obiecti ut cogniti in puris naturalibus suis, sed tantum respectu obiecti ut cogniti in peccato mortali finali.	46. Nor is it surprising that a like process for predestination and reprobation is not posited, because all goods are attributed to God principally, but evils to us; and thus, that God ‘predestines without reason’ agrees with his goodness, but that ‘he wills to damn’ does not seem able immediately to be attributed to him with respect to the object as known in its pure natural state, but only in respect of the object as known in final mortal sin.
47 Potest confirmari ista responsio per simile: ponamus duos, ex parte sui aeque gratiosos, quorum alterum diligo et alium non, et illum quem diligo, praeordino ad aliquod bonum per quod possit mihi placere, illum autem quem non diligo, non praeordino ad tale bonum. Si ita esset quod in potestate mea esset permittere ƿeos posse offendere, possem velle permittere utrumque offendere, et ex quo illum perducere non volo ad illud per quod possit mihi placere, praescirem offensam eius perpetuam (et ita me iuste posse punire eum), praescirem autem offensam alterius remittendam sive committendam ad quod vellem.	47. This response can be confirmed by a likeness: let us posit two people, equally graced on their own part, one of whom I love and the other of whom I do not, – and him whom I love I pre-ordain to some good through which he can please me, but him whom I do not love I do not pre-ordain to such good. If things were so that it was in my power to permit them to offend, I could will to permit both to offend – and from the fact that I do not will to lead the latter to that by which he could please me, I would fore-know that his offense would be perpetual (and thus that I could justly punish him), but I would foreknow that the offense of the other was to be remitted or committed to what I will.
48 Sed adhuc contra istud instatur: Quia Deus certitudinaliter non praevidet Iudam esse malum, seeundum istam viam, nam sola permissio alicuius actus et certitudo de permissione non facit certitudinem de isto actu, quia oportet habere aliquam causam effectivam; igitur ex hoc solo quod Deus praescit se velle permittere Iudam peccare, non est certus Iudam peccaturum esse; vel loquamur de angelo bono et malo (qui non erant in peccato originali): ex hoc - inquam - solo, non videtur quod sciat Luciferum peccare, et ex hoc (ut videtur) non offertur sibi Lucifer ut peccator.	48. But still there is an instance against this: Because God does not with certitude see that Judas is bad according to this way [n.47] – for the sole permission of some act and certitude about the permission do not make for certitude about this act, because it has to have some efficient cause; therefore from the sole fact that God fore-knows he wishes to permit Judas to sin, it is not certain that Judas will sin; or let us speak of a good and bad angel (who were not in original sin): from this fact alone – I say – it does not seem God knows that Lucifer sins, and from this (as it seems) Lucifer is not presented to him as sinner.
49 Praeterea, quid est istud 'velle permittere Luciferum peccare'? Si hoc est aliquis actus positivus voluntatis respectu peccati, igitur videtur quod vult eum peccare. Si non est actus positivus respectu actus peccati sed respectu actus permissionis, tunc erit actus reflexus, - et tunc erit quaerere de ipsa permissione, quis actus sit: ƿsi actus positivus voluntatis, ergo videtur adhuc quod Deus habeat actum positivum respectu peccati quod permittit.	49. In addition, what is this ‘will to permit Lucifer to sin’? If this is some positive act of the will with respect to the sin, then it seems God wills him to sin. If it is not a positive act with respect to the act of sin but with respect to the act of permission, then it will be a reflex act, – and then it will be necessary to ask, as to the permission, what act it is; if a positive act of will, then it still seems God has a positive act with respect to the sin that he permits.
50 Primum istorum solvitur per hoc quod Deus praescit se cooperaturum Lucifero ad substantiam illius actus qui erit peccatum (hoc autem praescit, quia vult cooperari illi, si est peccatum commissionis), vel praescit non se cooperaturum ad actum aliquem si non vult ipsum (et hoc, si ille actus primus est peccatum omissionis); et sciendo se cooperaturum ad talem substantiam actus (non eum circumstantiis debitis), vel non cooperaturum ei ad actum negativum (et per consequens, quem omitteret), scit istum peccaturum: ita quod scit 'hunc peccaturum' non solum quia scit se permissurum hoc, sed quia scit se cooperaturum huic ad substantiam actus non circumstantionati, et per consequens iste committeret, - vel non cooperaturum ei ad actum negativum, et per consequens iste omitteret.	50. The first of these [n.48] is solved by the fact God fore-knows that he will cooperate with Lucifer in the substance of the act that will be a sin (but he fore-knows this, because he wills to co-operate with him if it is a sin of commission), or he fore-knows that he will not co-operate in some act if he does not will it (and this if that first act is a sin of omission); and knowing that he will co-operate in such substance of the act (without the due circumstances), or will not co-operate with Lucifer in a negative act (and consequently in an act he will omit), he knows that he will sin; such that he knows ‘this one will sin’ not only because he knows he himself will permit it, but because he knows he will co-operate with him in the substance of an act that is lacking in due circumstances, and consequently that the latter would commit it – or he knows that he will not co-operate with him in a negative act, and consequently that the latter will omit it.
51 Secundum argumentum difficultatem quaerit, tangentem divinam voluntatem, - de qua non modo, sed alias.	51. The second argument [n.49] raises a difficulty touching on the divine will, – about which I will speak not here but elsewhere [d.47 nn.8-9].
	F. Conclusion about the Five Opinions
52 De istis opinionibus omnibus: quia Apostolus videtur, disputans de materia ista ad Rom. in fine, quasi totum inscrutabile reƿlinquere (O altitudo, inquiens, divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei, et quis novit sensum Domini, aut quis consiliarius eius fuit?), ideo ne scrutando de profundo - secundum sententiam Magistri eatur in profundum, eligatur quae magis placet, dum tamen salvetur libertas divina (sine aliqua iniustitia) et alia quae salvanda sunt circa Deum ut liberaliter eligentem; et qui aliquam opinionem tenuerit, respondeat ad illa quae tacta sunt contra eam.	52. About all these opinions [nn.5-6, 12-20, 26-35, 40-43]: because the Apostle, when disputing about this matter in Romans 11.33-34, seems to leave the whole thing as it were inscrutable (‘O depth’, he says, ‘of the riches of the wisdom and the knowledge of God,’ and ‘who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor?’), therefore lest by investigating the depths – according to the opinion of the Master – one should fall into the depths, let that be chosen which pleases more, provided however that the divine liberty (without any injustice) be preserved, as well as the other things that must be preserved about God as freely choosing; and he who holds another opinion, let him respond to the things touched on above against him.
	II. To the Principal Arguments
53 Ad primum argumentum principale respondeo: summa bonitas potest stare cum liberali communicatione, licet non sit illa aequalis omnibus. Potest enim 'summe bonus' liberalitate se libere communicare, et ut ostendat se non necessario liberalem sed liberalem 'libere communicativum', potest aliquibus duobus apprehensis aequalibus - velle 'bonum non aequaliter communicare'; nec in hoc fit iniustitia aliqua (sicut dicit tertia opinio), quia nihil est debitum.	53. To the first principal argument [n.1] I reply: the supreme goodness can stand with free communication, although it not be equal for everyone. For someone ‘supremely good’ can with generosity freely communicate himself, and in order to show that he is not generous by necessity but is generous as ‘freely communicative’ he can for two persons – apprehended as equal – will ‘to communicate a good non-equally’; nor is any injustice committed in this (as the third opinion asserts [n.20]), because nothing is due.
54 Ad secundum: quando duo sunt aeque volibilia ad aliquem finem, et ex parte sui habent rationem illam propter quam volenda ƿsunt ab aliqua voluntate, voluntas, praeacceptans unum illorum altero ad illum finem, peccat secundum acceptionem personarum; talis est omnis voluntas creata, quia respectu illius bonitas amabilis est ratio recte amandi. Non sic voluntas increata respectu alicuius boni alterius ab essentia sua: nullum enim aliud bonum, quia bonum, ideo amatum ab illa voluntate, sed e converso; et ideo non potest accipere personas, quia non est in eis bonitas quae sit ratio amandi.	54. To the second [n.2]: when two things are equally will-able for some end, and they have on their own part the reason for which they are to be willed by some will, a will that prefers one of them to the other for that end sins by acceptance of persons; such is every created will, because with respect to it the lovable good is the reason for right loving. The uncreated will is not so with respect to any good other than its own essence; for no other good thing is, because it is good, loved for that reason by that will, but conversely; and it cannot accept persons, because the good that is the reason for loving is not in them.
55 Ad primum in oppositum. Qui vult tenere aliam viam potest dicere sicut dicit quarta opinio, quod Apostolus in hoc redarguit praesumptuosos, inquirentes illa quorum non sunt capaces, - non autem propter inopiam reddendae rationis, saltem in communi, licet in particulari nesciatur quod malum praevidet Deus in isto, propter quod reprobet eum; et in istis specialibus peccatis, praevisis, est altitudo divitiarum et sunt iudicia incomprehensibilia. - Cui videtur concordare vocabulum illud 'iudicii', quia iudicium est de particulari agibili: usitate enim non dicimus de principiis practicis - sive de legibus statutis - esse 'iudicia', sed de aliquo particulari actu iudicatur secundum principia practica sive leges statutas; et ideo non obstante quod sit principium practicum, statutum per divinam voluntatem, quod 'omnis, praevisus finaƿliter malus, damnetur', tamen de particularibus assumendis sub ('iste praevidetur sic finaliter malus et ille sic', et quasi ex hoc iudicatur iste reprobatus propter hoc et ille propter illud), ista iudicia sunt inscrutabilia: non enim scit homo, nec potest scire, in quod peccatum vult Deus permittere istum cadere respectu cuius sit non volitio conferendi gratiam, ut sic offeratur tamquam finaliter peccator in illo peccato et sic propter illud peccatum praevisum reprobetur. De bonis autem potest poni quod nulla est ratio, sicut dictum est in quinta opinione.	55. To the first argument for the opposite [not nn.3-4 but Rep IA d.41 nn.7, 81]. He who wants to hold another way [sc. other than Scotus’, nn.40-42] can say as the fourth way says [nn.25, 35] that the Apostle in this passage [[[Authors/bible/romans/c11#v33|Romans 11.33]]] is rebuking the presumptuous who inquire into things they have no capacity for, – not because of being in want of a reason to give, at any rate in general, although it not be known in particular the evil that God foresees in someone for which he reprobates him; and in these special sins, that are foreseen, there is ‘a depth of riches’ and that ‘the judgments are past finding out’. – With which agrees that word ‘judgment’, because judgment is about particular doables; for we do not usually say, when speaking of practical principle – or about established laws –, that they are ‘judgments’, but we do so when a judgment is made about some particular in accord with the practical principles or the established laws; and so notwithstanding that there is a practical principle, established by the divine will, that ‘everyone foreseen to be finally evil will be damned’, yet about the particulars to be assumed under it (‘this person is foreseen to be finally evil in this way, that one in that’, and as it were for this reason the former is reprobate for that evil and the latter for that other one), these judgments are inscrutable; for man does not know, nor can know, into what sin God wills to permit him to fall with respect to which there is a non-volition to confer grace, so that thus he be presented as finally a sinner in that sin and thus because of that foreseen sin he will be reprobated. But about the good it can be posited that there is no reason, as was said in the fifth opinion [nn.40-41].
56 Et si contra hoc arguas quod saltem circa bonos non erunt iudicia Dei inscrutabilia (facile enim est dicere de eis quod 'quia vult, ideo salvat'), - potest dici quod de eis, in quantum praedestinat, non est iudicium, neque de facto in exsistentia neque quasi in praescientia divina; iudicium enim est de aliquo facto vel praeviso. Sed de malis, licet non sit iudicium de facto (quia non peccaverunt), tamen condemnatio potest dici iudicium de eis in praescientia Dei (ubi dicuntur 'mali'), et tunc inscrutabilitas iudiciorum potest referri ad malos ex parte quorum ponitur aliqua ratio, licet illae rationes ex parte diversorum - propter quas quasi ex parte eorum feruntur iudicia - sint inscrutabiles et per hoc iudicia inscrutabilia.	56. And if you argue against this that at any rate about the good the judgments will not be inscrutable (for it is easy to say about them that ‘because he wills, therefore he saves’), – it can be said about them, insofar as he predestines, that there is no judgment, neither of the fact in existence nor of it in divine foreknowledge as it were; for judgment is about something done or foreseen. But about the evil, although there is no judgment about the fact (because they have not sinned), yet condemnation can be said to be a judgment about them in God’s foreknowledge (when they are called ‘evil’), and then the inscrutability of the judgments can be referred to the evil on whose part some reason is posited, although those reasons on the part of diverse things – because of which the judgments are as it were on their part passed – are inscrutable and for this reason the judgments are inscrutable.
57 Ad aliud: Augustinus facit pro quinta opinione, quia probat ex parte praedestinatorum nullam esse rationem.	57. To the other one [nn.6, 43]: Augustine responds to it for the fifth opinion [n.43], because he proves that on the part of the predestined there is no reason.