Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D11/Q2

Translated by Peter Simpson

Latin	English
Quaestio 2	Question 2
24 Secundo quaero utrum si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, posset stare distinctio realis ipsius a Filio. Arguo quod non: Quia, secundum Boethium De Trinitate, ((essentia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem)): ergo nulla persona distinguitur ab alia nisi quae relative refertur ad aliam; igitur si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, non posset stare distinctio realis ad ipsum, quia non referretur ad ipsum, - ergo etc.	24. Second I ask whether, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, a real distinction between him and the Son could stand. I argue that it could not: Because, according to Boethius On the Trinity ch.6: "the essence contains unity, relation multiplies the Trinity;" therefore no person is distinguished from another which is not referred by relation to another; therefore if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son no real distinction from him could stand, because there would be no reference to him, - therefore, etc.
25 Praeterea, Augustinus XI De civitate cap. 10: ((Ideo simplex est Deus, quia est hoc quod habet, excepto eo quod relative dicitur; sicut Pater habet Filium, et non est Filius)). Spiritus Sanctus ergo si non procederet a Filio, esset Filius, quia tunc non relative diceretur ad eum.	25. Further, Augustine The City of God XI ch.10 n.1: "God is for this reason simple, that he is that which he has, excepting what is said relatively; just as the Father has a Son and is not the Son." Therefore, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would be the Son, because he would then not be said relatively to him.
26 Contra: V De Trinitate cap. 17: ((Apparet quod Spiritus Sanctus non est filius, etsi exeat a Patre, quia exit non quomodo natus, sed quomodo datus)). ƿ	26. On the contrary: Augustine On the Trinity V ch.14 n.15: "It is clear that the Holy Spirit is not a son, although he exits from the Father, because he exits not as in some way born but as in some way given."
27 Hic dicitur quod quaestio nulla est, quia positio quae includit incompossibilia, non potest poni nec sustineri, quia in ea statim includitur redargutio, quod est inconveniens ultimum ad quod potest respondens deduci; tali enim positione posita, nulla regula disputationis potest salvari (videlicet concedendo sequens et negando repugnans), quia statim oportet concedere repugnantia quae includuntur in posito. Quod autem istud positum sit tale, probatur, quia summo necessario repugnat summum impossibile; quidquid est in Deo ad intra, est summe necessarium; ergo sibi repugnans est summum impossibile. Ergo positio supponens Spiritum Sanctum non procedere a Filio, est 'summe impossibile', quia oppositum eius est summe necessarium ad intra (videlicet ipsum procedere a Filio), et impossibile includens incompossibilia videtur esse impossibilius quam impossibile talia non includens; ergo etc. ƿ	27. [Opinion of others] - Here it is said that the question is null, because a position that involves incompossibles cannot be posited nor sustained, for the refutation is included in it all at once, which is the ultimate discordance to which a respondent can be reduced; for when such a position is set down, no rule of disputation can be kept to (namely by conceding what follows and denying what is repugnant), for at once must the repugnance be conceded that is included in the position set down. Now the proof that the position is of this sort is that the supremely impossible is repugnant to the supremely necessary; whatever is in God inwardly is supremely necessary; therefore what is repugnant thereto is supremely impossible. Therefore the position that supposes the Holy Spirit not to proceed from the Son is 'supremely impossible' because its opposite is supremely necessary inwardly (namely that he proceeds from the Son), and an impossible that includes incompossibles seems to be more impossible than an impossible that does not include such; therefore etc.
28 Contra istam positionem est hoc, quod ista positio videtur esse fuga quaestionis. Movetur enim quaestio ut inquiratur quid sit primum distinctivum reale Filii a Spiritu Sancto, utrum filiatio an sola spiratio activa, - quia si filiatio, ergo quantumcumque per impossibile circumscripta spiratione activa, adhuc remanet ratio distinguendi.	28. [Against the opinion] - Against this position [n.27] is that the position seems to be an avoiding of the question. For the question is being moved so as to inquire what the first real thing is that distinguishes the Son from the Holy Spirit, whether filiation or active inspiriting only, - because if it is filiation, then, however much active inspiriting is per impossibile removed, there remains still a reason for distinguishing.
29 Praeterea, licet positio quae statim ex intellectu suo includit contradictoria non possit admitti, tamen illa quae ex intellectu suo tantum unum contradictoriorum includit et aliud non nisi per consequentiam accidentalem vel per locos extrinsecos, bene videtur posse admitti, quia tali positione posita possunt sustineri regulae disputationis: potest enim concedi 'sequens consequentia essentiali', et negari repugnans; si autem inferatur aliquod 'repugnans' sequens per locum extrinsecum vel consequentia accidentali, negandum est sequi illud, quia propositio illa per quam talis consequentia teneret destrueretur ex positione. Nunc autem spiratio activa non est de per se intellectu Filii, ut persona est, sed quasi passio communis Patri et Filio; ergo ista circumscripta, ponendo Filium in esse Filii non ponuntur contradictoria ex primo intellectu positi, sed tantum alterum, scilicet quod Filius sit Filius, et reliquum non nisi quasi consequentia accidentali et per locum extrinƿsecum, ex remotione quasi passionis removendo quasi subiectum: igitur illa positio non sic includit opposita quin possit admitti.	29. Further, although a position that, as soon as it is understood, includes contradictories cannot be admitted, yet that which, when understood, includes only one of the contradictories, and the other only through an accidental consequence or through topics extrinsic, seems it can well be admitted, because when such a position is set down rules of disputation can be kept to; for 'what follows by an essential consequence' can be conceded and what is repugnant can be denied; but if something 'repugnant' is inferred that follows from an extrinsic topic or by an accidental consequence, one must deny that it follows, because the proposition by which such a consequence would hold would be destroyed by the position. But now active inspiriting is not of the per se understanding of the Son, as he is a person, but is a quasi-property common to the Father and the Son; therefore, with this removed, then, in the positing of the Son in the being of Son, there are no contradictories posited by the first understanding of the proposed supposition [sc. that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son], but only one of them, namely that the Son is Son, and the other exists only as it were by accidental consequence and by an extrinsic topic, from the removal of the quasi-passion by removing the quasi-subject; therefore the position does not so include opposites that it cannot be admitted.
30 Item, si aliquid inclusum essentialiter in aliquo, ponatur removeri ab eo, quod tamen non fuit ratio inhaerentiae alicuius praedicati, - bene potest quaeri an isto vel illo circumscripto insit tale praedicatum vel non; et quantumcumque positum includat contradictoria, non tamen repugnat huic posito quin altera pars huius quaesiti sit determinate danda: puta, si circumscribatur ab homine animalitas - quod tamen includit incompossibilia - et quaeratur an hoc circumscripto possit homo distingui ab asino, videtur determinate posse responderi quod sic, quia non per animalitatem conveniebat homini sic distingui, sed per rationalitatem. Ergo licet spiratio activa esset de ratione Filii, adhuc tamen - ipsa circumscripta - quaeri potest utrum Filius distinguatur a Spiritu Sancto vel non, quia non quaeritur nisi 'utrum praedicatum circumscriptum fuit praecisa causa distinctionis, vel aliud praedicatum non circumscriptum'.	30. Again, if something included essentially in something is posited as removed from it, which was yet not the reason for the inherence of any predicate, - one can well ask whether, with this or that removed, such a predicate would inhere or not; and however much the proposed supposition includes contradictories, it is yet not repugnant to this supposition that one part of the question is not determinately to be given; for example, if animality is removed from man - which however includes incompossibles -and the question is asked whether, with this removed, man can be distinguished from ass, a response that he can would seem determinately possible, because it does not belong to man to be distinguished from an ass by animality but by rationality. Therefore, even if active inspiriting were of the idea of the Son, yet one can still ask whether - with that removed - the Son may be distinguished from the Holy Spirit or not, because the question is only 'whether the removed predicate was the precise cause of the distinction, or whether some other predicate was that was not removed'.
31 Praeterea, aliud est ponere aliquid, et illo posito quaerere de aliquo proposito, - et aliud est quaerere de veritate alicuius condicionalis, quia quaerere de aliqua condicionali ad nihil obligat. Etsi igitur aliquam probabilitatem haberet opinio posito quod Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, etc., nullam tamen probabilitatem habet quando quaestio est sic proposita (sicut eam proposui): 'utrum si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, posset stare distinctio realis ipsius a Filio'. Ibi enim quaero de condicionali ƿquadam, an ad 'Spiritum Sanctum non procedere a Filio' sequatur essentialiter 'ipsum non distingui ab eo', ita quod oppositum consequentis non possit stare cum antecedente, loquendo de formali intellectu eorum.	31. Further, it is one thing to posit something and, with that posited, to ask about some proposition, - and another thing to ask about the truth of some conditional, because to ask about some conditional commits one to nothing. Although therefore the opinion [that the question cannot be posed, n.27] has some probability if one posited that the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son etc., yet it has none when the question is proposed (in the way I have proposed it) as follows: 'whether, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, a real distinction between him and the Son could stand'. For there I am asking about a certain conditional, whether on 'the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son' it essentially follows that 'he is not distinguished from the Son', so that the opposite of the consequent cannot stand with the antecedent, speaking of the formal understanding of them.
32 Contra istam positionem etiam sunt multae auctoritates. Una Augustini V De Trinitate cap. 6: 'Si Pater non esset innascibilis, nihil prohiberet eum genuisse Filium', - et tamen ista positio concomitanter includit incompossibilia, scilicet quod Pater sit innascibilis.	32. Against this position [the opinion stated in n.27] there are also many authorities. One is from Augustine On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7: "If the Father were not unborn, nothing would prevent him from having generated the Son," - and yet this position concomitantly includes incompossibles, namely that the Father is unborn [sc. since the Father is by definition unborn, to suppose him not unborn is to suppose incompossibles].
33 Et Richardus III De Trinitate cap. 16: ((Si una persona esset, nihil prohiberet eam habere plenitudinem sapientiae)), - cum tamen concomitanter ad plenitudinem sapientiae vel intellectus sequatur pluralitas personarum.	33. And Richard [of St. Victor] On the Trinity ch.16: "If there were just one person, nothing would prevent him having the fullness of wisdom," - although, however, on the fullness of wisdom or intellect there concomitantly follows a plurality of persons.
34 Ita etiam Philosophus IV Physicorum arguit: posito quod esset aliquod spatium et non haberet corpus sed sonum vel colorem, quaerit utrum esset vacuum; et respondet quod si natum esset recipere corpus, esset vacuum, - si non, non. Ergo tali positione posita, quae tamen per ipsum ponit incompossibilia (quia accidens - ut sonum et colorem - esse sine subiecto), potest quaeri de aliquo an sequatur, scilicet intelligendo de naturali consequentia, ƿquia etsi positum includat incompossibilia, non tamen omnia incompossibilia naturali consequentia, sed ad ipsum potest sequi aliquod contradictorium naturali consequentia et aliquod nullo modo nisi sicut ad impossibile quidlibet.	34. Thus too the Philosopher Physics 4.7.214a9-11 argues: supposing that there were some space, and it contained no body but sound or color, he asks whether it would be a vacuum; and he responds that if it was of a nature to receive a body, it would be a vacuum; if not, not. Therefore, with such a supposition in place, which however of itself posits incompossibles (because an accident - as sound or color - would be without a subject), one can ask about something whether it follows, namely by understanding it of natural consequence, - because although the posited supposition includes incompossibles, it does not however include all the incompossibles by natural consequence, but one of the contradictories can follow on it by natural consequence and the other contradictory not at all, save as on something or other impossible.
35 Ideo admittendo quaestionem, est una opinio, quae dicit quod si non procederet ab eo, nullo modo distingueretur ab eo, et habet pro se duas rationes:	35. Therefore, allowing of the question, there is one opinion that says that if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son he would in no way be distinguished from him, - and it has on its behalf two reasons.
36 Una est ista: relatio in divinis aut distinguit secundum suam quiditatem, aut secundum esse; non secundum esse, quia sic transit in essentiam; ergo secundum quiditatem. Sed secundum quiditatem, tantum respicit oppositum, ergo tantum distinguit ab opposito; sed posita illa hypothesi, non essent in Filio et Spiritu Sancto relationes oppositae; ergo etc. ƿ	36. One reason is this: relation in divine reality distinguishes either according to its quiddity or according to its being; not according to its being because thus it passes into essence; therefore according to its quiddity. But according to its quiddity it only has a respect to its opposite, therefore it only distinguishes from its opposite; but, on the supposition of this hypothesis, there would not be in Son and Holy Spirit opposite relations; therefore etc.
37 Secunda ratio est talis: si relationes disparatae possent sufficienter distinguere personas, cum tales duae sint in Patre - ut generatio activa et spiratio activa - Pater esset duae personae. Confirmatur ratio, quia tantam distinctionem videntur habere istae relationes - spiratio activa et generatio activa - quantam habent eorum relativa vel correlativa; igitur ita possunt haec distinguere sicut illa.	37. The second reason is this: if disparate relations could sufficiently distinguish persons, since there are two such relations in the Father - as active generation and active inspiriting -, the Father would be two persons. There is a confirmation for the reason in that these relations - active inspiriting and active generation - seem to have as great a distinction as do their relatives or correlatives; therefore the latter can distinguish just as can the former.
38 Auctoritas adducitur Anselmi, libro suo De processione Spiritus Sancti, sed quia ipsum adducunt utrique pro se et fit magna altercatio de intentione eius, quae fuerit, ideo hic nolo multum circa intentionem eius immorari. ƿ	38. Anselm's authority is adduced, in his book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit ch.2, but since each side adduces him on their own behalf and there is much disagreement about what his intention was, I do not for this reason wish here to dwell much on his intention.
39 Contra istam opinionem sunt rationes, quae sumuntur ex duobus mediis: primum medium est ex ratione formalis constitutivi, secundum ex distinctione emanationum.	39. Against this opinion are the reasons that are taken from two middle terms: the first middle is from the idea of what is formally constitutive, the second from the distinction of emanations.
40 Ex primo horum arguitur sic: quocumque formaliter aliquid constituitur in esse, eodem distinguitur, quia eodem est aliquid ens et unum (unitate conveniente tali entitati), et si unum, igitur in se indistinctum et ab aliis distinctum; sed Filius constituitur in 'esse personali' filiatione, ergo et ea ƿformaliter distinguitur ab omni alia persona; ergo per impossibile vel per incompossibile circumscripto quocumque alio, et maxime 'posteriore' filiatione, remanebit Filius filiatione distinctus personaliter a quacumque persona. - Assumptum patet, quia Filius non constituitur in 'esse personali' spiratione activa, quia illa est communis Patri et Filio; et non sunt in eo proprietates positivae aliae quam generatio passio et spiratio actio; ergo etc.	40. [From the idea of what is formally constitutive] - The argument from the first of these is as follows: by whatever something is formally constituted in being, by that it is distinguished, because it is by the same thing that anything is a being and is one (with the unity fitting such an entity), and, if it is one, then it is not distinct from itself and is distinct from others; but the Son is constituted in 'personal being' by filiation, therefore he is by it formally distinguished from every other person; therefore, after everything else, and especially 'later' filiation, per impossibile or per incompossibile has been removed, the Son will by filiation remain distinct in person from any other person. - The assumption is plain, because the Son is not constituted in 'personal being' by active inspiriting, because that is common to the Father and the Son; and there are not in him other positive properties besides passive generation and active inspiriting; therefore etc.
41 Respondetur quod formali constitutivo non distinguitur aliquid a quocumque, sed tantum ab illis cum quibus maxime convenit et a quibus non distinguitur aliquo modo nisi illo formali. Exemplum: homo rationalitate non distinguitur a lapide, sed a speciebus animalis, cum quibus maxime convenit et a quibus in paucissimis videtur distingui; a lapide autem distinguitur animalitate, quia lapis est inanimatus, quae animalitas non est formale constitutivum eius. - Ita dicitur in proposito, quod Filius cum Patre convenit in spiratione activa, et in hoc distinguitur a Spiritu Sancto; proprio autem suo formali (scilicet filiatione) distinguitur a Patre, cum quo maxime convenit: quare etc. ƿ	41. A response is that something is not distinguished by what is formally constitutive from anything at all, but only from things with which it most agrees and from which it is not distinguished in any save that formal way. An example: man is distinguished by rationality, not from a stone, but from the species of animal, with which he most agrees and from which he seems to be in very few things distinct; but he is distinguished from a stone by animality, because a stone is inanimate, but this animality is not formally constitutive of man. - So is it said in the intended proposition, that the Son agrees with the Father in active inspiriting, and is in this respect distinguished from the Holy Spirit; but by his own proper formality (namely filiation) he is distinguished from the Father, with whom he most agrees; wherefore etc.
42 Contra illud, et primo, quia quidlibet habens aliquod esse distinguitur distinctione conveniente illi esse, a quocumque alio, per aliquid quod est de ratione eius in quantum habet tale esse. Filius ergo personaliter distinguitur per aliquid quod est de ratione eius in quantum est persona, spiratio autem activa non est de ratione eius, sed Filio iam posito, est quasi proprietas adventicia. Ex hoc patet quod exemplum adductum non est ad propositum, quia etsi homo distinguatur a lapide non per rationale primo, distinguitur tamen per aliquid quod est de essentia sua, ita quod inconveniens esset ipsum per nihil quod est de essentia sua a lapide distingui, sed tantum per risibilitatem. Ita ergo est in proposito. ƿ	42. Against this [n.41], and first that anything possessing a certain existence is, by a distinction that belongs to that existence, distinguished from anything else through something that is of the idea of that in which it has such existence. Therefore the Son is distinguished as a person through something which is of his idea insofar as he is a person, but active inspiriting is not of the idea of the Son, but, once the Son is already posited, it is as it were an adventitious property. From this it is plain that the example adduced is not to the purpose, because, although man is not distinguished from stone first by rationality, yet he is distinguished by something that is of his essence, so that it would be discordant for him to be distinguished from a stone through nothing that is of his essence but through risibility. So it is then in the intended proposition.
43 Secundo sic: per formale constitutivum distinguitur constitutum ab omni alio, etiam si per impossibile quodcumque aliud ab illo circumscribatur, quia per illud distinguitur primo - id est adaequate - ab omni non tali; sed quodcumque non habens illam formam constitutivam, est non tale; ergo per illam distinguitur ab omni alio non habente illam.	43. Secondly in this way: what is constituted is distinguished by what is formally constitutive of it from everything else, even if per impossibile all things other than it were removed, because by it is it first distinguished - that is adequately - from everything not such; but anything that does not have that constitutive form is not such; therefore by that form is it distinguished from everything else that does not have it.
44 Ista ratio declaratur, quia licet homo non tantum per rationale distinguatur a lapide sed etiam per animalitatem, non etiam primo distinguitur a lapide per rationalitatem, id est non adaequate (quia tunc quodlibet distinctum a lapide esset rationale), sed adaequate in genere 'corporis' primo distinguitur a lapide per 'animatum', tamen circumscribendo per intellectum ab homine quodcumque aliud a rationalitate, per illud solum distingueretur essentialiter a quocumque non rationali, et ita a lapide, qui non est rationalis. Non igitur tantum illud distinguit realiter quod distinguit adaequate, sed etiam illud quod solum si poneretur, esset incompossibile illi a quo distinguitur.	44. This reason [n3] is made clear by the fact that, although man is distinguished from a stone not only by rationality but also by animality, he is not distinguished by rationality first as well, that is, he is not adequately distinguished by rationality (because then anything distinct from a stone would be rational), but he is first distinguished in the genus of 'body' from a stone by 'animality'; however, after by intellect removing from man whatever is other than rationality, he would yet by that alone be essentially distinguished from whatever is not rational, and so from a stone, which is not rational. Therefore it is not only what distinguishes adequately that distinguishes really but also what, merely if it were posited, would be incompossible with that from which it is distinguished.
45 Confirmatur ista ratio principalis sumpta ex proprio constitutivo, quia si Pater per impossibile non spiraret sed Filius, adhuc tamen Pater paternitate distingueretur a Filio et a Spiritu Sancto, sicut paternitate constituitur in esse personali.	45. For this reason, taken from what is properly constitutive [n.40], there is a confirmation in that, if the Father per impossibile did not inspirit but the Son did, the Father would still be distinguished from the Son and from the Holy Spirit by paternity, just as he is by paternity constituted in his personal existence.
46 Ex secundo medio, scilicet ex distinctione emanationum, arguitur sic: generatio distinguitur a spiratione, et hoc circumscripto per impossibile omni alio a ratione ƿgenerationis et spirationis, aut saltem circumscripto hoc quod spiratio actio esset a Filio, dum tamen staret distinctio principiorum generandi et spirandi; igitur et quolibet tali circumscripto staret distinctio Filii et Spiritus Sancti.	46. [From the distinction of emanations] - From the second middle term, namely from the distinction of emanations [n.39], the argument is as follows: generation is distinguished from inspiriting, and this when per impossibile everything other than the idea of generation and inspiriting is removed, or at any rate when the fact is removed that active inspiriting would be from the Son, provided however that the distinction of the principles of generating and inspiriting would stand; therefore also, when all such is removed, the distinction between Son and Holy Spirit would stand.
47 Probatio consequentiae, quia impossibile est unam personam duabus productionibus totalibus accipere esse: nulla enim productione vel distinctione accipit esse, qua per impossibile circumscripta non minus acciperet esse; sed si productione hac et illa acciperet esse - et utraque complete, quia utraque esset perfecta ergo utraque circumscripta haberet esse per alteram complete, et ita neutra et utraque acciperet esse.	47. The proof of the consequence is that it is impossible for one person to receive existence from two total productions; for a person receives existence from no production or distinction such that, if the production or distinction were per impossibile removed, the person would no less receive existence; but if it received existence from this production and from that - and from each completely, because each would be perfect - then, when either was removed, it would have existence completely through the other, and so it would receive being from neither and from each.
48 Ad istam rationem ponuntur aliquae responsiones, ad anteceƿdens, et quia de hoc tractabitur distinctione 13, modo non insisto. Conclusiones istarum rationum concedo, et magis patebit propositum declarata illa distinctione emanationum.	48. To this reasoning certain responses, as to the antecedent, are made, and because this matter will be treated of in distinction 13 [I d.13 n.7], I do not now enter on it. The conclusions of the above reasonings [nn.40, 46] I concede, and the intended proposition will become clearer when the distinction of the emanations has been made clear [d.13].
49 Ad auctoritatem Boethii concedo quod 'relatio multiplicat trinitatem', et tamen non tantum distinguit a relatione opposita sed a qualibet relatione disparata cui formaliter non est idem; quia sicut in genere qualitatis albedo non tantum distinguitur ab altera qualitate contraria sed etiam ab omni alia disparata, quia non est albedo formaliter dulcedo nec odor (et si aliqua disparata esset imcompossibilis alteri disparatae in eodem supposito, non tantum distingueretur natura a natura, sed etiam requireretur distinctio suppositorum), ita aliqua relatio disparata, ab alia relatione disparata distinguitur, absque aliqua alia incompossibilitate. $a Confirmatur: generatio activa distinguitur a spiratione ut est in Patre, quia Filius non habet spirationem magis distinctam a generatione activa quam sit spiratio Patris, quia eadem est spiratio Patris et Filii. a$ Aliquae tamen non tantum habent distinctionem sed etiam ƿincompossibilem rationem (sive incompossibilitatem) in eodem supposito, quales sunt relationes disparatae accipiendi naturam, quia persona quae disparatis modis acciperet naturam, non unico modo haberet naturam.	49. To the authority from Boethius [n.24] I concede that 'relation multiplies the Trinity', and yet it distinguishes not only from the opposite relation but also from any disparate relation with which it is formally not the same; because, just as in the genus of quality whiteness is distinguished not only from the other opposite quality [sc. blackness] but also from every other disparate one, because whiteness is not formally sweetness nor smell (and if any disparate quality were incompossible with another disparate one in the same supposit, not only would the nature be distinguished from the nature but there would also be required a distinction of supposits), so any disparate relation is distinguished from any other disparate relation, without any other incompossibility. There is a confirmation: active generation is distinguished from inspiriting as it exists in the Father, because the Son does not have an inspiriting more distinct from active generation than the inspiriting of the Father is distinct from it, because the Son's inspiriting is the same as the Father's. However some relations have not only a distinction but also an incompossible idea (or an incompossibility) in the same supposit, of which sort are the disparate relations of receiving the nature, because a person that received the nature in disparate ways would not have the nature in a single way.
50 Ad Augustinum De civitate dico quod quaelibet persona hoc est quod habet, nisi quod relativum habet correlativum, et non est ipsum. Posita autem illa hypothesi, Spiritus Sanctus non haberet Filium ut correlativum et spirantem, et ideo non sequitur quod Spiritus Sanctus esset Filius, quia non haberet Filium nec sicut intrinsece nec sicut correlativum, originans. Excipit autem Augustinus, quod illud quod habetur non est habens quando habetur ut correlativum; non ergo accipit Augustinus, nisi quod habetur vel eo modo quo Filius dicitur habere deitatem, vel quo dicitur habere Patrem: unus modus est habere formaliter vel essentialiter, alius modus est habere correlative vel originaliter.	50. To Augustine on The City of God I say that any person is that which he has, except that the relative has the correlative and is not it itself. But once the hypothesis in question is in place [n.24], the Holy Spirit would not have the Son as correlative and as inspiriter, and so it does not follow that the Holy Spirit would be the Son because he would not have the Son either as intrinsic or as correlative originator. But Augustine makes an exception when he says that that which is had does not have when it is had as a correlative; so Augustine does not take things otherwise than that what is had is had either in the way in which the Son is said to have deity, or in the way in which he is said to have a Father; one way is to have it formally or essentially, the other way is to have it correlatively or originally.
51 Ad rationes pro prima opinione. Ad primam dico quod tam secundum quiditatem quam secundum esse, manet relatio ibi. Quocumque enim modo manet secundum quiditatem, manet secundum esse eius quod est 'esse ad aliud', ƿquia quiditas relationis non potest esse sine 'esse ad aliud', quia intelligendo relationem sine 'esse ad aliud' non intelligitur relatio sed absolutum, quia - secundum Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 8 - si est ad aliud, non est substantia, et ita si est substantia sive ad se, iam non est relatio; quocumque enim modo transit, esse et quiditas transit, quia sicut 'esse ad aliud' - quod est esse relationis - vere est idem essentiae, ita etiam quiditas relationis est idem essentiae: nihil enim est ibi quod non est idem. Manet ergo et quiditas et esse, quia relatio non est formaliter essentia divina, quia sicut dicit Augustinus VII De Trinitate cap. 4, ((non eo Verbum quo sapientia)); transit autem utrumque, quia cum hoc quod non est formaliter idem, est vere idem, sicut saepe dictum est.	51. To the reasons for the first opinion [n.35]. To the first [n.36] I say that the relation remains there both according to quiddity and according to being. For in whatever way it remains according to quiddity, in that way it remains according to the being of that which is 'being toward another', because the quiddity of relation cannot be without 'being toward another', because by understanding a relation without 'being toward another' one understands not a relation but something absolute, because - according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.8 n.9 - if it is toward another it is not substance, and so if it is substance or toward itself, it is now not relation; for in whatever way the relation passes into essence, the being and the quiddity pass into it, because just as 'being toward another' - which is the being of relation - is truly the same as the essence, so also the quiddity of the relation is the same as the essence; for nothing is there which is not the same. Therefore both the being and the quiddity remain, because relation is not formally the divine essence, because, as Augustine says On the Trinity V ch.2 n.1: "he is not Word by that which he is wisdom;" but both pass into the essence because, along with the fact that they are not formally the same, they are truly the same, as has often been said [I d.2 n.410, d.4 n.10, d.5 nn.43-45, 117-118, 138].
52 Cum ergo dicis 'aut distinguitur secundum esse, aut secundum quiditatem', - dico quod secundum quiditatem et secundum 'esse ad aliud'. Et cum dicis 'sic transit, ergo non sic distinguit', consequentia non valet, quia transit secundum identitatem, quia non oportet veram identitatem esse formalem, quia formalis ratio huius transeuntis non est formaliter ratio illius essentiae in quam transit; ƿet ideo huic rationi formali competit quod est huic proprium: est autem ei proprium distingui realiter ab omni relatione, tam opposita quam disparata ei incompossibili, et ideo cum hoc quod vere transit, vere manet, quantum sufficit ad distinctionem realem tam ab opposito relative quam etiam a relatione disparata sibi incompossibili.	52. When, therefore, you say 'it is distinguished either according to its quiddity or according to its being' [n.36], - I say that it is distinguished according to quiddity and according to 'being toward another'. And when you say 'thus it passes into essence, therefore it does not thus distinguish' [ibid.], the consequence is not valid, because it passes according to identity, because true identity does not have to be formal identity, because the formal idea of that which passes is not formally the idea of the essence into which it passes; and therefore to this formal idea belongs what is proper to it; but it is proper to it to be distinguished really from every relation, both an opposite one and a disparate one incompossible with it, and therefore, along with the fact that it truly passes, it truly remains, as much as is sufficient for being really distinguished both from the opposite relative and also from a disparate relation incompossible with it.
53 Ad secundum, cum dicitur de duabus proprietatibus in Patre, responsum est distinctione 2 quaestione 3 Non enim oportet tantam esse distinctionem vel incompossibilitatem productionum activarum, quanta est productionum passivarum, quia incompossibile est idem duabus oppositis productionibus produci et accipere esse; non est autem incompossibile idem duabus productionibus activis communicare esse distinctis personis.	53. To the second, when the two properties in the Father are talked of [n.37], the response is in distinction 2 question 3 [I d.2 nn.221-237]. For there need not be as much distinction or incompossibility of active productions as of passive productions, because it is incompossible for the same thing to be produced by, and to receive being from, two opposite productions [ibid. n.357]; but it is not incompossible for the same thing to communicate being to distinct persons by two active productions.