Authors/Aristotle/priora/Liber 2/C27

Chapter 27

Greek	Latin	English
	(PL 64 0710D) CAPUT XXVII. De eicote, hoc est consentaneo signo, indicio, et enthymemate.	27
Ἐνθύμημα δὲ ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς ἐξ εἰκότων ἢ σημείων,› 70a2 εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ σημεῖον οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν εἰκός ἐστι πρότασις ἔνδοξος· ὁ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἴσασιν οὕτω γινόμενον ἢ μὴ γινόμενον ἢ ὂν ἢ μὴ ὄν, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν εἰκός, οἷον τὸ μισεῖν τοὺς φθονοῦντας ἢ τὸ φιλεῖν τοὺς ἐρωμένους.	(0711A) Eicos autem et signum non idem est, sed eicos quidem est propositio probabilis. Quod enim ut in pluribus sciunt sic factum; vel non factum, aut esse vel non esse, hoc est eicos, ut odire invidentes, vel diligere amantes.	A probability and a sign are not identical, but a probability is a generally approved proposition: what men know to happen or not to happen, to be or not to be, for the most part thus and thus, is a probability, e.g. ‘the envious hate’, ‘the beloved show affection’.
σημεῖον δὲ βούλεται εἶναι πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴ ἢ ἀναγκαία ἢ ἔνδοξος· οὗ γὰρ ὄντος ἔστιν ἢ οὗ γενομένου πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον γέγονε τὸ πρᾶγμα, τοῦτο σημεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ εἶναι.	Signum autem vult esse propositio demonstrativa, vel necessaria, vel probabilis; nam quo existente est, vel quo facto prius vel posterius res, signum est vel fuisse vel esse.	A sign means a demonstrative proposition necessary or generally approved: for anything such that when it is another thing is, or when it has come into being the other has come into being before or after, is a sign of the other’s being or having come into being.
[ἐνθύμημα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς ἐξ εἰκότων ἢ σημείων] λαμβάνεται δὲ τὸ σημεῖον τριχῶς, ὁσαχῶς καὶ τὸ μέσον ἐν τοῖς σχήμασιν· ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἐν τῶι πρώτωι ἢ ὡς ἐν τῶι μέσωι ἢ ὡς ἐν τῶι τρίτωι, οἷον τὸ μὲν δεῖξαι κύουσαν διὰ τὸ γάλα ἔχειν ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος· μέσον γὰρ τὸ γάλα ἔχειν. ἐφ᾽ ὧι τὸ Α κύειν, τὸ Β γάλα ἔχειν, γυνὴ ἐφ᾽ ὧι Γ.	Enthymema ergo est syllogismus imperfectus ex eicotibus et signis. (0711B) Accipitur autem signum tripliciter, quoties et medium in figuris, aut enim ut in prima, aut ut in media, aut ut in tertia: ut ostendere quidem parientem esse, eo quod lac habeat, ex prima figura, medium enim lac habere, in quo A parere B, lac habere mulier in quo C.	Now an enthymeme is a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs, and a sign may be taken in three ways, corresponding to the position of the middle term in the figures. For it may be taken as in the first figure or the second or the third. For example the proof that a woman is with child because she has milk is in the first figure: for to have milk is the middle term. Let A represent to be with child, B to have milk, C woman.
τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ σπουδαῖοι, Πιττακὸς γὰρ σπουδαῖος, διὰ τοῦ ἐσχάτου. ἐφ᾽ ὧι Α τὸ σπουδαῖον, ἐφ᾽ ὧι Β οἱ σοφοί, ἐφ᾽ ὧι Γ Πιττακός. ἀληθὲς δὴ καὶ τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β τοῦ Γ κατηγορῆσαι· πλὴν τὸ μὲν οὐ λέγουσι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι, τὸ δὲ λαμβάνουσιν.	Quoniam autem sapientes, studiosi, nam Pittacus est studiosus, per postremam, in quo A studiosum, in quo B sapientes, in quo C Pittacus. Verum igitur A et B de C praedicari; sed hoc quidem non dicunt quia notum sit, illud vero sumunt.	The proof that wise men are good, since Pittacus is good, comes through the last figure. Let A stand for good, B for wise men, C for Pittacus. It is true then to affirm both A and B of C: only men do not say the latter, because they know it, though they state the former.
τὸ δὲ κύειν, ὅτι ὠχρά, διὰ τοῦ μέσου σχήματος βούλεται εἶναι· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἕπεται ταῖς κυούσαις τὸ ὠχρόν, ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ καὶ ταύτηι, δεδεῖχθαι οἴονται ὅτι κύει. τὸ ὠχρὸν ἐφ᾽ οὗ τὸ Α, τὸ κύειν ἐφ᾽ οὗ Β, γυνὴ ἐφ᾽ οὗ Γ. Ἐὰν μὲν οὖν ἡ μία λεχθῆι πρότασις, σημεῖον γίνεται μόνον, ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἑτέρα προσληφθῆι, συλλογισμός, οἷον ὅτι Πιττακὸς ἐλευθέριος· οἱ γὰρ φιλότιμοι ἐλευθέριοι, Πιττακὸς δὲ φιλότιμος.	Peperisse autem quoniam pallida, per mediam figuram vult esse; quoniam enim sequitur parientes pallor, sequitur autem et hanc, ostensum esse arbitrantur quoniam peperit. Pallor in quo A, parere in quo B, mulier in quo C. Ergo si una quidem dicatur propositio, signum fit solum, si autem et altera sumitur, syllogismus. Ut Pittacus liberalis, nam ambitiosi liberales, Pittacus autem ambitiosus.	The proof that a woman is with child because she is pale is meant to come through the middle figure: for since paleness follows women with child and is a concomitant of this woman, people suppose it has been proved that she is with child. Let A stand for paleness, B for being with child, C for woman. Now if the one proposition is stated, we have only a sign, but if the other is stated as well, a syllogism, e.g. ‘Pittacus is generous, since ambitious men are generous and Pittacus is ambitious.’
ἢ πάλιν ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ ἀγαθοί· Πιττακὸς γὰρ ἀγαθός, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοφός. οὕτω μὲν οὖν γίνονται συλλογισμοί, πλὴν ὁ μὲν διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος ἄλυτος, ἂν ἀληθὴς ἦι (καθόλου γάρ ἐστιν), ὁ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἐσχάτου λύσιμος, κἂν ἀληθὲς ἦι τὸ συμπέρασμα, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι καθόλου μηδὲ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸν συλλογισμόν· οὐ γὰρ εἰ Πιττακὸς σπουδαῖος, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνάγκη σοφούς.	(0711C) Aut rursus, quoniam sapientes boni, Pittacus autem bonus, sed et sapiens, sic ergo fiunt syllogismi. Verum quidem per primam figuram insolubilis, si verus sit, universalis enim est. Qui autem per postremam, est solubilis, et si vera sit conclusio, eo quod non universalis, est in tertia, nec ad rem syllogismus, non enim si Pittacus est studiosus, propter hoc et alios necesse est esse sapientes.	Or again ‘Wise men are good, since Pittacus is not only good but wise.’ In this way then syllogisms are formed, only that which proceeds through the first figure is irrefutable if it is true (for it is universal), that which proceeds through the last figure is refutable even if the conclusion is true, since the syllogism is not universal nor correlative to the matter in question: for though Pittacus is good, it is not therefore necessary that all other wise men should be good.
ὁ δὲ διὰ τοῦ μέσου σχήματος ἀεὶ καὶ πάντως λύσιμος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ γίνεται συλλογισμὸς οὕτως ἐχόντων τῶν ὅρων· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἡ κύουσα ὠχρά, ὠχρὰ δὲ καὶ ἥδε, κύειν ἀνάγκη ταύτην. ἀληθὲς μὲν οὖν ἐν ἅπασιν ὑπάρξει τοῖς σημείοις, διαφορὰς δ᾽ ἔχουσι τὰς εἰρημένας.	Qui vero per mediam figuram est, semper et omnino solubilis, nunquam enim syllogismus fit, sic se habentibus terminis. Non enim si quae peperit pallida, pallida autem et haec, necesse est parere hanc; ergo verum est quidem in omnibus figuris, differentias autem habent iam dictas.	But the syllogism which proceeds through the middle figure is always refutable in any case: for a syllogism can never be formed when the terms are related in this way: for though a woman with child is pale, and this woman also is pale, it is not necessary that she should be with child. Truth then may be found in signs whatever their kind, but they have the differences we have stated.
↵ Ἢ δὴ οὕτω διαιρετέον τὸ σημεῖον, τούτων δὲ τὸ μέσον τεκμήριον ληπτέον (τὸ γὰρ τεκμήριον τὸ εἰδέναι ποιοῦν φασὶν εἶναι, τοιοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα τὸ μέσον), ἢ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἄκρων σημεῖον λεκτέον, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου τεκμήριον· ἐνδοξότατον γὰρ καὶ μάλιστα ἀληθὲς τὸ διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος.	An igitur sic dividendum signum? (0712A) horum autem medium indicium sumendum, nam indicium dicunt esse quod scire facit, tale autem maxime medium, an vero quae quidem ab extremitatibus signa dicenda, quae autem ex medio indicium? probabilissimum enim et maxime veram est quod est per primam figuram.	We must either divide signs in the way stated, and among them designate the middle term as the index (for people call that the index which makes us know, and the middle term above all has this character), or else we must call the arguments derived from the extremes signs, that derived from the middle term the index: for that which is proved through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.
	(PL 64 0712A) CAPUT XXVIII. De syllogismo physiognomico.
Τὸ δὲ φυσιογνωμονεῖν δυνατόν ἐστιν, εἴ τις δίδωσιν ἅμα μεταβάλλειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὅσα φυσικά ἐστι παθήματα· μαθὼν γὰρ ἴσως μουσικὴν μεταβέβληκέ τι τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ὀργαὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν φύσει κινήσεων.	Naturas autem cognoscere possibile est, si quis concedat simul transmutare corpus et animam, quaecunque sunt naturales passiones; discens enim aliquis fortasse musicam, transmutavit secundum quid animam, sed non earum quae natura nobis insunt, haec est passio, sed ut irae et concupiscentiae, et naturalium motionum.	It is possible to infer character from features, if it is granted that the body and the soul are changed together by the natural affections: I say ‘natural’, for though perhaps by learning music a man has made some change in his soul, this is not one of those affections which are natural to us; rather I refer to passions and desires when I speak of natural emotions.
εἰ δὴ τοῦτό τε δοθείη καὶ ἓν ἑνὸς σημεῖον εἶναι, καὶ δυναίμεθα λαμβάνειν τὸ ἴδιον ἑκάστου γένους πάθος καὶ σημεῖον, δυνησόμεθα φυσιογνωμονεῖν. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἰδίαι τινὶ γένει ὑπάρχον ἀτόμωι πάθος, οἷον τοῖς λέουσιν ἀνδρεία, ἀνάγκη καὶ σημεῖον εἶναί τι· συμπάσχειν γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ὑπόκειται. καὶ ἔστω τοῦτο τὸ μεγάλα τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ἔχειν· ὁ καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπάρχειν γένεσι μὴ ὅλοις ἐνδέχεται.	(0712B) Si igitur et hoc det, et unum unius signum esse, et possumus sumere proprium uniuscuiusque generis passionem et signum, poterimus naturas cognoscere. Si enim est proprie alicui generi individuo existens passio, ut si leonibus fortitudo, necesse est et signum esse aliquod, compati enim sibi invicem positum est, et sit hoc magnas summitates habere, quod et aliis generibus, non totis contingit.	If then this were granted and also that for each change there is a corresponding sign, and we could state the affection and sign proper to each kind of animal, we shall be able to infer character from features. For if there is an affection which belongs properly to an individual kind, e.g. courage to lions, it is necessary that there should be a sign of it: for ex hypothesi body and soul are affected together. Suppose this sign is the possession of large extremities: this may belong to other kinds also though not universally.
τὸ γὰρ σημεῖον οὕτως ἴδιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ὅλου γένους ἴδιόν ἐστι [πάθοσ], καὶ οὐ μόνου ἴδιον, ὥσπερ εἰώθαμεν λέγειν. ὑπάρξει δὴ καὶ ἐν ἄλλωι γένει τοῦτο, καὶ ἔσται ἀνδρεῖος [ὁ] ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄλλο τι ζῶιον. ἕξει ἄρα τὸ σημεῖον· ἓν γὰρ ἑνὸς ἦν.	Nam signum sic proprium est, quoniam totius generis propria passio est, et non solius proprium, sicut solemus dicere. Erit ergo et in alio genere hoc, et erit fortis homo, et aliquod aliud animal; habebit ergo signum, unum enim unius erat.	For the sign is proper in the sense stated, because the affection is proper to the whole kind, though not proper to it alone, according to our usual manner of speaking. The same thing then will be found in another kind, and man may be brave, and some other kinds of animal as well. They will then have the sign: for ex hypothesi there is one sign corresponding to each affection.
εἰ τοίνυν ταῦτ᾽ ἐστί, καὶ δυνησόμεθα τοιαῦτα σημεῖα συλλέξαι ἐπὶ τούτων τῶν ζώιων ἃ μόνον ἓν πάθος ἔχει τι ἴδιον, ἕκαστον δ᾽ ἔχει σημεῖον, ἐπείπερ ἓν ἔχειν ἀνάγκη, δυνησόμεθα φυσιογνωμονεῖν.	(0712C) Si ergo haec sunt, poterimus talia signa colligere in iis animalibus quae solum unam passionem habent aliquam propriam, unaquaeque autem habet signum, et quoniam unum habere necesse est, poterimus naturas cognoscere.	If then this is so, and we can collect signs of this sort in these animals which have only one affection proper to them-but each affection has its sign, since it is necessary that it should have a single sign-we shall then be able to infer character from features.
εἰ δὲ δύο ἔχει ἴδια ὅλον τὸ γένος, οἷον ὁ λέων ἀνδρεῖον καὶ μεταδοτικόν, πῶς γνωσόμεθα πότερον ποτέρου σημεῖον τῶν ἰδίαι ἀκολουθούντων σημείων; ἢ εἰ ἄλλωι τινὶ μὴ ὅλωι ἄμφω, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ ὅλοις ἑκάτερον, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἔχηι τὸ δὲ μή· εἰ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος μὲν ἐλευθέριος δὲ μή, ἔχει δὲ τῶν δύο τοδί, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λέοντος τοῦτο σημεῖον τῆς ἀνδρείας.	Si vero duo habet propria totum genus, ut leo, forte et communicativum, quomodo cognoscemus utrum utrius sit signum, eorum signorum quae proprie sequuntur? An si et alii alicui non toti ambo, et in quibus non totis utrumque, quando hoc quidem habet, illud autem non? nam si fortis quidem, liberalis autem non, habet autem duorum hoc, palam quoniam et in leone hoc signum fortitudinis.	But if the kind as a whole has two properties, e.g. if the lion is both brave and generous, how shall we know which of the signs which are its proper concomitants is the sign of a particular affection? Perhaps if both belong to some other kind though not to the whole of it, and if, in those kinds in which each is found though not in the whole of their members, some members possess one of the affections and not the other: e.g. if a man is brave but not generous, but possesses, of the two signs, large extremities, it is clear that this is the sign of courage in the lion also.
Ἔστι δὴ τὸ φυσιογνωμονεῖν τῶι ἐν τῶι πρώτωι σχήματι τὸ μέσον τῶι μὲν πρώτωι ἄκρωι ἀντιστρέφειν, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου ὑπερτείνειν καὶ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν, οἷον ἀνδρεία τὸ Α, τὰ ἀκρωτήρια μεγάλα ἐφ᾽ οὗ Β, τὸ δὲ Γ λέων. ὧι δὴ τὸ Γ, τὸ Β παντί, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις. ὧι δὲ τὸ Β, τὸ Α παντὶ καὶ οὐ πλείοσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντιστρέφει· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται ἓν ἑνὸς σημεῖον.	Est vero naturas cognoscere in prima quidem figura, eo quod medium priori extremitati convertitur, tertiam autem transcendit, et non convertitur, ut sit fortitudo A, summitates magnas habere in quo B, C autem leo; ergo cui C, B omni, sed et aliis, cui autem B, A omni, et non pluribus, sed; convertitur si autem non, non erit unum unius signum.	To judge character from features, then, is possible in the first figure if the middle term is convertible with the first extreme, but is wider than the third term and not convertible with it: e.g. let A stand for courage, B for large extremities, and C for lion. B then belongs to everything to which C belongs, but also to others. But A belongs to everything to which B belongs, and to nothing besides, but is convertible with B: otherwise, there would not be a single sign correlative with each affection.