Authors/Aristotle/praedicamenta/boethius

Greek	Latin	English
Κεφάλαιο 1[Επεξεργασία]	Scanned from: Aristoteles latinus. ARISTOTELES: CATEGORIAE	Translated by E. M. Edghill
↵[1a] Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον• τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος• ἐὰν γὰρ ↵ ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, ἴδιον ἑκατέρου λόγον ἀποδώσει.	C. I [01] Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod pingitur. Horum enim solum nomen commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa; si enim quis assignet quid est utrique eorum quo sint animalia, propriam assignabit utriusque rationem.	Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only.
συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς• τούτων γὰρ ἑκάτερον κοινῷ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται ζῷον, καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ↵ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός• ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὸν ἑκατέρου λόγον τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἀποδώσει.	Univoca vero dicuntur quorum et nomen commune est et secundum nomen eadem substantiae ratio, ut animal homo atque bos. Communi enim nomine utrique animalia nuncupantur, et est ratio substantiae eadem; si quis enim assignet utriusque rationem, quid utrique sit quo sint animalia, eandem assignabit rationem.	On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other.
παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὅσα ἀπό τινος διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ τοὔνομα προσηγορίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ↵ ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.	Denominativa vero dicuntur quaecumque ab aliquo, solo differentia casu, secundum nomen habent appellationem, ut a grammatica grammaticus et a fortitudine fortis.	Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the courageous man from the word 'courage'.
Κεφάλαιο 2[Επεξεργασία]	C. II [02]
Τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμπλοκήν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ• τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.	Eorum quae dicuntur alia quidem secundum complexionem dicuntur, alia vero sine complexione. Et ea quae secundum complexionem dicuntur sunt ut homo currit, homo vincit; ea vero quae sine complexione, ut homo, bos, currit, vincit.	Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the former 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'.
↵ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν .	Eorum quae sunt alia de subiecto quodam dicuntur, in subiecto vero nullo sunt, ut homo de subiecto quidem dicitur aliquo homine, in subiecto vero nullo est;	Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man, and is never present in a subject.
τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ↵ ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ὧ ἐστίν, οἷον ἡ τὶς γραμματικὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ τὶ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῶ σώματι, ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται .	alia autem in subiecto quidem sunt, de subiecto vero nullo dicuntur (in subiecto autem esse dico quod, cum in aliquo sit non sicut quaedam pars, impossibile est esse sine eo in quo est), ut quaedam grammatica in subiecto quidem est in anima, de subiecto vero nullo dicitur, et quoddam album in subiecto est in corpore (omnis enim color in corpore est);	Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject. Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything.
τὰ δὲ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τε ↵ λέγεται καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ λέγεται τῆς γραμματικῆς•	alia vero et de subiecto dicuntur et in subiecto sunt, ut scientia in subiecto quidem est in anima, de subiecto vero dicitur de grammatica;	Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar.
τὰ δὲ οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ↵ἵππος, οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται• ἁπλῶς δὲ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῶ κατ' οὐδενὸς ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ ἔνια οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι• ἡ γὰρ τὶς γραμματικὴ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν.	alia vero neque in subiecto sunt neque de subiecto dicuntur, ut aliquis homo vel aliquis equus; nihil enim horum neque in subiecto est neque de subiecto dicitur. Simpliciter autem quae sunt individua et numero singularia nullo de subiecto dicuntur, in subiecto autem nihil ea prohibet esse; quaedam enim grammatica in subiecto est.	There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.
Κεφάλαιο 3[Επεξεργασία]	C. III [03]
↵ Ὅταν ἕτερον καθ' ἑτέρου κατηγορῆται ὡς καθ' ὑποκειμένου, ὅσα κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου λέγεται, πάντα καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται• οἷον ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου• οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον κατηγορηθήσεται• ὁ γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ↵ ζῷον.	Quando alterum de altero praedicatur ut de subiecto, quaecumque de eo quod praedicatur dicuntur, omnia etiam de subiecto dicentur, ut homo de quodam homine praedicatur, animal vero de homine, ergo et de quodam homine animal praedicabitur; quidam enim homo et homo est et animal.	When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Thus, 'man' is predicated of the individual man; but 'animal' is predicated of 'man'; it will, therefore, be predicable of the individual man also: for the individual man is both 'man' and 'animal'.
τῶν ἑτερογενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα τεταγμένων ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει καὶ αἱ διαφοραί, οἷον ζῴου καὶ ἐπιστήμης• ζῴου μὲν γὰρ διαφοραὶ τό τε πεζὸν καὶ τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων• οὐ γὰρ ↵ διαφέρει ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης τῷ δίπους εἶναι. τῶν δέ γε ὑπ' ἄλληλα γενῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰς αὐτὰς διαφορὰς εἶναι• τὰ γὰρ ἐπάνω τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ γενῶν κατηγορεῖται, ὥστε ὅσαι τοῦ κατηγορουμένου διαφοραί εἰσι τοσαῦται καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἔσονται.	Diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diversae secundum speciem et differentiae sunt, ut animalis et scientiae; animalis quidem differentiae sunt ut gressibile et volatile et bipes, scientiae vero nulla harum est; neque enim scientia ab scientia differt in eo quod bipes est. Subalternorum vero generum nihil prohibet easdem esse differentias; superiora enim de subterioribus generibus praedicantur, quare quaecumque praedicati differentiae fuerint, eaedem erunt etiam subiecti.	If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus 'animal' and the genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two-footed', 'winged', 'aquatic', are differentiae of 'animal'; the species of knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of knowledge does not differ from another in being 'two-footed'. But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.
Κεφάλαιο 4[Επεξεργασία]	C. IV [04]
↵ Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποὺ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. ἔστι δὲ οὐσία μὲν ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος• ποσὸν δὲ οἷον δίπηχυ, τρίπηχυ• ποιὸν δὲ οἷον λευκόν, γραμματικόν• πρός τι δὲ ↵ οἷον διπλάσιον, ἥμισυ, μεῖζον• ποὺ δὲ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ, ἐν ἀγορᾷ• ποτὲ δὲ οἷον χθές, πέρυσιν• κεῖσθαι δὲ οἷον ἀνάκειται,κάθηται• ἔχειν δὲ οἷον ὑποδέδεται, ὥπλισται• ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον τέμνειν, καίειν• πάσχειν δὲ οἷον τέμνεσθαι, καίεσθαι. ἕκαστον ↵ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ καταφάσει λέγεται, τῇ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τούτων συμπλοκῇ κατάφασις γίγνεται• ἅπασα γὰρ δοκεῖ κατάφασις ἤτοι ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς ↵ οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λευκόν, τρέχει, νικᾷ.	Eorum quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur singulum aut substantiam significat aut quantitatem aut qualitatem aut ad aliquid aut ubi aut quando aut situm aut habitum aut facere aut pati. Est autem substantia quidem ut figuratim dicatur ut homo, equus; quantitas ut bicubitum, tricubitum; qualitas ut album; ad aliquid ut duplum, maius; ubi vero ut in Lycio; quando autem ut heri; situs vero ut sedet, iacet; habere autem ut calciatus, armatus; facere vero ut secare, urere; pati vero ut secari, uri. Singula igitur eorum quae dicta sunt ipsa quidem secundum se in nulla affirmatione dicuntur, horum autem ad se invicem complexione affirmatio fit. Videtur enim omnis affirmatio vel falsa esse vel vera; eorum autem quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur neque verum quicquam neque falsum est, ut homo, album, currit.	Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long', of quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', 'greater', fall under the category of relation; 'in a the market place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of place; 'yesterday', 'last year', under that of time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms indicating position, 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance', 'to cauterize', action; 'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', affection. No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any way composite such as 'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins', cannot be either true or false.
Κεφάλαιο 5[Επεξεργασία]	C. V [05] DE SUBSTANTIA
Οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἣ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ἵππος.	Substantia autem est, quae proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur, quae neque de subiecto praedicatur neque in subiecto est, ut aliqui homo vel aliqui equus.	Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse.
δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν αἱ πρώτως ↵ οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσιν, ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη• οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἴδει μὲν ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, γένος δὲ τοῦ εἴδους ἐστὶ τὸ ζῷον• δεύτεραι οὖν αὗται λέγονται οὐσίαι, οἷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον.	Secundae autem substantiae dicuntur, in quibus speciebus illae quae principaliter substantiae dicuntur insunt, hae et harum specierum genera; ut aliquis homo in specie quidem est in homine, genus vero speciei animal est; secundae ergo substantiae dicuntur, ut est homo atque animal.	But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species 'man', and the genus to which the species belongs is 'animal'; these, therefore-that is to say, the species 'man' and the genus 'animal,-are termed secondary substances.
—φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τῶν καθ' ↵ ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου• οἷον ἄνθρωπος καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, καὶ κατηγορεῖταί γε τοὔνομα, —τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορήσεις•— καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ↵ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορηθήσεται, —ὁ γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν•	Manifestum est autem ex his quae dicta sunt quoniam eorum quae de subiecto dicuntur necesse est et nomen et rationem de subiecto praedicari, ut homo de subiecto dicitur aliquo homine, et praedicatur nomen; namque hominem de aliquo homine praedicabis. Ratio quoque hominis de aliquo homine praedicabitur; quidam enim homo et homo est.	It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For instance, 'man' is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case the name of the species man' is applied to the individual, for we use the term 'man' in describing the individual; and the definition of 'man' will also be predicated of the individual man, for the individual man is both man and animal.
— ὥστε καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου κατηγορηθήσεται. τῶν δ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πλείστων οὔτε τοὔνομα οὔτε ὁ λόγος κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου• ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τοὔνομα μὲν οὐδὲν κω↵λύει κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύνατον• οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὂν τῷ σώματι κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, —λευκὸν γὰρ σῶμα λέγεται,— ὁδὲ λόγος τοῦ λευκοῦ οὐδέποτε κατὰ τοῦ σώματος κατηγορηθήσεται.	Quare et nomen et ratio praedicabitur de subiecto. Eorum vero quae sunt in subiecto, in pluribus quidem neque nomen de subiecto neque ratio praedicatur, in quibusdam vero nomen quidem nihil prohibet praedicari, rationem vero impossibile est; ut album, cum in subiecto sit corpore, praedicatur de subiecto (dicitur enim corpus album), ratio vero albi numquam de corpore praedicabitur.	Thus, both the name and the definition of the species are predicable of the individual. With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance, 'white' being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the colour white' is never predicable of the body.
—τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων λέγε↵ται τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν. τοῦτο δὲ φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα προχειριζομένων• οἷον τὸ ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, —εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μη↵δενὸς τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου ὅλως• — πάλιν τὸ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τινὶ σώματι• εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν τινὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι ὅλως•	Caetera vero omnia aut de subiectis dicuntur primis substantiis aut in eisdem subiectis sunt. Hoc autem manifestum est ex his quae singulatim proferuntur; ut animal de homine praedicatur, quare et de aliquo homine praedicabitur; nam si de nullo aliquorum hominum diceretur, nec de ipso homine praedicaretur omnino. Rursus color in corpore est; ergo et in aliquo corpore; nam si in nullo esset corporum singulorum, nec in corpore esset omnino.	Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes evident by reference to particular instances which occur. 'Animal' is predicated of the species 'man', therefore of the individual man, for if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be predicated of the species 'man' at all. Again, colour is present in body, therefore in individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be present in body at all.
ὥστε τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων τῶν ↵ πρώτων οὐσιῶν λέγεται ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν. μὴ οὐσῶν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι•	Quocirca caetera omnia aut de subiectis primis substantiis dicuntur aut in subiectis ipsis sunt. Si ergo primae substantiae non sunt, impossibile est aliquid esse caeterorum.
πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων τούτων λέγεται ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν• ὥστε μὴ οὐσῶν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι.	Omnia enim alia aut de ipsis subiectis dicuntur aut in subiectis ipsis sunt; quare, si primae substantiae non sunt, impossibile est aliquid esse caeterorum.	Thus everything except primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.
Τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν μᾶλλον οὐσία τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους• ἔγγιον γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἐστίν. ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τί ἐστι, γνωριμώτερον καὶ οἰ↵κειότερον ἀποδώσει τὸ εἶδος ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ τὸ γένος• οἷον τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον γνωριμώτερον ἂν ἀποδοίη ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ ζῷον, —τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ κοινότερον,— καὶ τὸ τὶ δένδρον ἀποδιδοὺς γνωριμώτερον ἀποδώσει δένδρον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ φυτόν.	Secundarum vero substantiarum magis est species substantia quam genus; propinquior enim est primae substantiae. Si enim quis primam substantiam quid sit assignet, evidentius et convenientius assignabit speciem proferens quam genus, ut de aliquo homine evidentius assignabit hominem proferens quam animal; illud enim magis est proprium alicuius hominis, hoc vero communius. Et aliquam arborem assignans, evidentius assignabit arborem nominans quam plantam.	Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was man than by stating that he was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will give a more instructive account by mentioning the species 'tree' than by mentioning the genus 'plant'.
↵ ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τούτων κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢ ἐν ταύταις εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα οὐσίαι λέγονται• ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ εἶδος πρὸς τὸ γένος ἔχει• —ὑπόκειται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος ↵ τῷ γένει• τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένη κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, τὰ δὲ εἴδη κατὰ τῶν γενῶν οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει•— ὥστε καὶ ἐκτούτων τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους μᾶλλον οὐσία.	Amplius primae substantiae, propterea quod aliis omnibus subiacent et omnia caetera vel de ipsis praedicantur vel in ipsis sunt, idcirco maxime substantiae dicuntur. Quemadmodum autem primae substantiae ad omnia caetera se habent, ita sese species habet ad genus; subiacet enim species generi; etenim genera de speciebus praedicantur, species vero de generibus non convertuntur. Quocirca etiam ex his species genere magis est substantia.	Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie every. else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present in them. Now the same relation which subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since the genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus.
—αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν ὅσα μή ἐστι γένη, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία ἐστίν• οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσει κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀν↵θρώπου τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἵππου τὸν ἵππον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία ἐστίν• οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐσία ἢ ὁ τὶς βοῦς.	Ipsarum vero specierum quae genera non sunt, nihilo plus alia ab alia substantia est; nihil enim convenientius proferetur si quis de aliquo homine hominem reddat quam si de aliquo equo proferat equum. Similiter autem et in primis substantiis nihilo plus alia ab alia substantia est; nihil enim magis aliquis homo quam aliquis bos substantia est.	Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one is more truly substance than another. We should not give a more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting the same method of definition. In the same way, of primary substances, no one is more truly substance than another; an individual man is not more truly substance than an individual ox.
Εἰκότως δὲ μετὰ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας μόνα τῶν ἄλ↵λων τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη δεύτεραι οὐσίαι λέγονται• μόνα γὰρ δηλοῖ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τῶν κατηγορουμένων• τὸν γὰρ τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστιν, τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἢ τὸ γένος ἀποδιδοὺς οἰκείως ἀποδώσει, —καὶ γνωριμώτερον ποιήσει ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον ἀποδιδούς•— τῶν δ' ἄλλων ὅ τι ἂν ↵ ἀποδιδῷ τις, ἀλλοτρίως ἔσται ἀποδεδωκώς, οἷον λευκὸν ἢ τρέχει ἢ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων ἀποδιδούς• ὥστε εἰκότως ταῦτα μόνα τῶν ἄλλων οὐσίαι λέγονται.	Recte autem post primas substantias solae omnium caeterorum species et genera dicuntur secundae esse substantiae; eorum enim quae praedicantur primas substantias solae significant. Aliquem enim hominem si quis assignet quid sit, si speciem quam genus protulerit, convenienter proferet, et manifestum faciet hominem quam animal proferens; caeterorum vero quicquid protulerit, aliena erit illa prolatio, ut album vel currit vel quodlibet huiusmodi si reddat. Quare recte hae solae praeter caetera substantiae dicuntur.	It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name 'secondary substance', for these alone of all the predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance. For it is by stating the species or the genus that we appropriately define any individual man; and we shall make our definition more exact by stating the former than by stating the latter. All other things that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these alone, apart from primary substances, should be called substances.
ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι κυριώτατα οὐσίαι ↵ λέγονται• ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἔχει• κατὰ τούτων γὰρ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ κατηγορεῖται• τὸν γὰρ τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐρεῖς γραμματικόν, ↵ οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ζῷον γραμματικὸν ἐρεῖς• ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	Amplius primae substantiae, propterea quod aliis omnibus subiacent, idcirco propriae substantiae dicuntur; quemadmodum autem primae substantiae ad omnia caetera sese habent, ita primarum substantiarum genera et species ad omnia reliqua sese habent; de istis enim omnibus caetera praedicantur: aliquem enim hominem dices grammaticum, ergo et hominem et animal grammaticum praedicabis; similiter autem et in aliis.	Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same relation that subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus to which the primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not included within these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all such. If we call an individual man 'skilled in grammar', the predicate is applicable also to the species and to the genus to which he belongs. This law holds good in all cases.
Κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρώτη οὐσία οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν. τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν ↵ φανερὸν μὲν καὶ οὕτως ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ• ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, —οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν•— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ζῷον καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ ζῷον ἐν ↵ τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ. ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων τὸ μὲν ὄνομα οὐδὲν κωλύει κατηγορεῖσθαί ποτε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύνατον• τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν κατηγορεῖται καὶ ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τοὔνομα, —τὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγον κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατη↵γορήσεις καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῴου.— ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐσία τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ.	Commune est autem omni substantiae in subiecto non esse. Prima enim substantia nec de subiecto dicitur nec in subiecto est; secundae vero substantiae sic quoque manifestum est quoniam non sunt in subiecto. Etenim homo de subiecto quidem aliquo homine dicitur, in subiecto vero nullo est; neque enim in aliquo homine homo est. Similiter autem et animal de subiecto quidem dicitur de aliquo homine, non est autem animal in aliquo homine. Amplius eorum quae sunt in subiecto nomen quidem de subiecto aliquotiens nihil prohibet praedicari, rationem vero impossibile est. Secundarum vero substantiarum de subiectis ratio praedicatur et nomen; rationem enim hominis et animalis de aliquo homine praedicabis. Quare non erit eorum substantia quae sunt in subiecto.	It is a common characteristic of all substance that it is never present in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary substances, it is clear from the following arguments (apart from others) that they are not present in a subject. For 'man' is predicated of the individual man, but is not present in any subject: for manhood is not present in the individual man. In the same way, 'animal' is also predicated of the individual man, but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that in which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the species and that of the genus with reference to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a subject.
—οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ οὐσίας τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν• τὸ γὰρ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, —οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ↵ ἐστὶ τὸ δίπουν οὐδὲ τὸ πεζόν.— καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ κατηγορεῖται ὁ τῆς διαφορᾶς καθ' οὗ ἂν λέγηται ἡ διαφορά• οἷον εἰ τὸ πεζὸν κατὰ ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ πεζοῦ κατηγορηθήσεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, —πεζὸν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.	Non est autem proprium substantiae hoc; sed differentia eorum est quae in subiecto non sunt; bipes enim et gressibile de subiecto quidem de homine praedicatur, in subiecto vero nullo est; non enim in homine est bipes neque gressibile. Et ratio quoque differentiae de illo dicitur de quo ipsa differentia praedicatur, ut si gressibile de homine dicatur, et ratio gressibilis de homine praedicabitur; est enim homo gressibile.	Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics 'terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are predicated of the species 'man', but not present in it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be predicated of that of which the differentia itself is predicated. For instance, if the characteristic 'terrestrial' is predicated of the species 'man', the definition also of that characteristic may be used to form the predicate of the species 'man': for 'man' is terrestrial.
—μὴ ταραττέτω δὲ ἡμᾶς τὰ μέρη τῶν οὐσιῶν ὡς ἐν ὑπο↵κειμένοις ὄντα τοῖς ὅλοις, μή ποτε ἀναγκασθῶμεν οὐκ οὐσίας αὐτὰ φάσκειν εἶναι• οὐ γὰρ οὕτω τὰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐλέγετο τὰ ὡς μέρη ὑπάρχοντα ἔν τινι.	Non nos vero conturbent substantiarum partes quae ita sunt in toto quasi in subiecto sint, ne forte cogamur dicere non eas esse substantias; non enim sic dicebantur esse ea quae sunt in subiecto ut quasi partes essent.	The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining the phrase 'being present in a subject', we stated' that we meant 'otherwise than as parts in a whole'.
Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς διαφοραῖς τὸ πάντα συνωνύμως ἀπ' αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι• πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων ↵ κατηγορίαι ἤτοι κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγοροῦνται ἢ κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν. ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας οὐδεμία ἐστὶ κατηγορία, —κατ' οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται•— τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν τὸ μὲν εἶδος κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ γένος καὶ κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου• ↵ ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγοροῦνται.	Inest autem substantiis et differentiis ab his omnia univoce praedicari. Omnia enim quae ab his praedicamenta sunt aut de individuis praedicantur aut de speciebus. Et a prima quidem substantia nulla est praedicatio (de nullo enim subiecto dicitur), secundarum vero substantiarum species quidem de individuo praedicatur, genus autem et de specie et de individuo; similiter autem et differentiae et de speciebus et de individuis praedicantur.	It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all propositions of which they form the predicate, they are predicated univocally. For all such propositions have for their subject either the individual or the species. It is true that, inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual. Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the species and of the individuals.
καὶ τὸν λόγον δὲ ἐπιδέχονται αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸν τῶν γενῶν, καὶ τὸ εἶδος δὲ τὸν τοῦ γένους. —ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου ↵ λέγεται, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται•— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν διαφορῶν λόγον ἐπιδέχεται τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ ἄτομα• συνώνυμα δέ γε ἦν ὧν καὶ τοὔνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός. ὥστε πάντα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν διαφορῶν συνωνύμως λέγεται.	Rationem quoque suscipiunt primae substantiae specierum et generum, et species generis (quaecumque enim de praedicato dicuntur, eadem et de subiecto dicentur); similiter autem et differentiarum rationem suscipiunt species et individua; univoca autem erant quorum et nomen commune est et ratio. Quare omnia a substantiis et differentiis univoce praedicantur.	Moreover, the definition of the species and that of the genus are applicable to the primary substance, and that of the genus to the species. For all that is predicated of the predicate will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the definition of the differentiae will be applicable to the species and to the individuals. But it was stated above that the word 'univocal' was applied to those things which had both name and definition in common. It is, therefore, established that in every proposition, of which either substance or a differentia forms the predicate, these are predicated univocally.
↵ Πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνει• ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενόν ἐστιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ↵ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον•	Omnis autem substantia videtur hoc aliquid significare. Et in primis quidem substantiis indubitabile et verum est quoniam hoc aliquid significat; individuum enim et unum numero est quod significatur. In secundis vero substantiis videtur quidem similiter ad appellationis figuram hoc aliquid significare, quando quis dixerit hominem vel animal;	All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, of 'man' or 'animal', our form of speech gives the impression that we are here also indicating that which is individual,
οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει, —οὐ γὰρ ἕν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὥσπερ ἡ πρώτη οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ζῷον•— οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ ποιόν τι σημαίνει, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκόν• οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο σημαίνει τὸ λευκὸν ἀλλ' ἢ ποιόν, τὸ δὲ ↵ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος περὶ οὐσίαν τὸ ποιὸν ἀφορίζει, —ποιὰν γάρ τινα οὐσίαν σημαίνει.— ἐπὶ πλεῖον δὲ τῷ γένει ἢ τῷ εἴδει τὸν ἀφορισμὸν ποιεῖται• ὁ γὰρ ζῷον εἰπὼν ἐπὶ πλεῖον περιλαμβάνει ἢ ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον.	non tamen verum est sed quale aliquid significat (neque enim unum est quod subiectum est quemadmodum prima substantia sed de pluribus homo dicitur et animal); non autem simpliciter qualitatem significat, quemadmodum album (nihil enim aliud significat album quam qualitatem), genus autem et species circa substantiam qualitatem determinant (qualem enim quandam substantiam significant). Plus autem genere quam specie determinatio fit: dicens enim animal plus complectitur quam hominem.	but the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary substance is; the words 'man', 'animal', are predicable of more than one subject. Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term 'white'; 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but species and genus determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. The determinate qualification covers a larger field in the case of the genus that in that of the species: he who uses the word 'animal' is herein using a word of wider extension than he who uses the word 'man'.
bk3b25|↵}τίον εἶναι. τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ οὐσίᾳ τί ἂν εἴη ἐναντίον; οἷον τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οὐδέ γε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ τῷ ζῴῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον. οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλων πολλῶν οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ• τῷ γὰρ διπήχει οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, ↵ οὐδὲ τοῖς δέκα, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί, εἰ μή τις τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ φαίη ἐναντίον εἶναι ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ• τῶν δὲ ἀφωρισμένων ποσῶν οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον ἐστίν.	Inest autem substantiis et nihil illis esse contrarium. Primae enim substantiae quid erit contrarium? Ut alicui homini; nihil enim est contrarium; at vero nec homini nec animali nihil est contrarium. Non est autem hoc substantiae proprium sed etiam multorum aliorum, ut quantitatis; bicubito enim nihil est contrarium, at vero nec decem nec alicui talium, nisi quis multa paucis dicat esse contraria vel magnum parvo; determinatorum vero nullum nulli est contrarium.	Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is true of many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that forms the contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of 'ten', or of any such term. A man may contend that 'much' is the contrary of 'little', or 'great' of 'small', but of definite quantitative terms no contrary exists.
Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον• λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὅτι οὐσία οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστι μᾶλλον οὐσία, ↵ —τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἔστιν,— ἀλλ' ὅτι ἑκάστη οὐσία τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον• οἷον εἰ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ οὐσία ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔσται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ οὔτε ἕτερος ἑτέρου. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερος ἑτέρου μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπος, ὥσπερ τὸ ↵ λευκόν ἐστιν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον λευκόν, καὶ καλὸν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον• καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, οἷον τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν ὂν μᾶλλον λευκὸν λέγεται νῦν ἢ πρότερον, καὶ ↵ θερμὸν ὂν μᾶλλον θερμὸν καὶ ἧττον λέγεται• ἡ δέ γε οὐσία οὐδὲν λέγεται, —οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μᾶλλον νῦν ἄνθρωπος ἢ πρότερον λέγεται, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν, ὅσα ἐστὶν οὐσία•— ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐπιδέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.	Videtur autem substantia non suscipere magis et minus; dico autem non quoniam substantia non est a substantia magis substantia (hoc enim dictum est quoniam est) sed quoniam unaquaeque substantia hoc ipsum quod est non dicitur magis et minus; ut, si est ipsa substantia homo, non erit magis et minus homo, nec ipse a se ipso nec ab altero. Neque enim est alter altero magis homo, quemadmodum album est alterum altero magis album, et bonum alterum altero magis bonum; et ipsum se ipso magis et minus dicitur, ut corpus, album cum sit, magis dicitur nunc quam primo, et calidum magis et minus dicitur; substantia vero non dicitur (neque homo magis dicitur nunc homo quam antea dicitur, nec caeterorum aliquid quae sunt substantia); quare non suscipiet substantia magis et minus.	Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly substance than another, for it has already been stated' that this is the case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees within itself. For instance, one particular substance, 'man', cannot be more or less man either than himself at some other time or than some other man. One man cannot be more man than another, as that which is white may be more or less white than some other white object, or as that which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than some other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being white, is said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm, is said to be warmer or less warm than at some other time. But substance is not said to be more or less that which it is: a man is not more truly a man at one time than he was before, nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less what it is. Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree.
Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν• οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ἂν ἔχοι τις προενεγκεῖν [ὅσα μή ἐστιν οὐσία], ὃ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἐστιν• οἷον τὸ χρῶμα, ὅ ἐστιν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ, οὐκ ἔσται ↵ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, οὐδὲ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις καὶ μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ οὐκ ἔσται φαύλη καὶ σπουδαία, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα μή ἐστιν οὐσία.	Maxime autem proprium substantiae videtur esse quod, cum sit idem et unum numero, contrariorum susceptibile est. Et in aliis quidem nullis hoc quisquam habeat proferre quae non sunt substantiae, quod unum numero contrariorum erit susceptibile; ut color, quod est unum et idem numero, non erit album et nigrum, nec eadem actio et una numero erit mala et bona; similiter autem et in aliis quaecumque substantiae non sunt.	The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this mark. Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can the same one action be good and bad: this law holds good with everything that is not substance.
ἡ δέ γε οὐσία ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ ὂν δεκτικὸν τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν• οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος, εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὤν, ὁτὲ μὲν λευκὸς ὁτὲ δὲ μέ↵λας γίγνεται, καὶ θερμὸς καὶ ψυχρός, καὶ φαῦλος καὶ σπουδαῖος. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ μή τις ἐνίσταιτο τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν δόξαν φάσκων τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι• ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος ἀληθής τε καὶ ψευδὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ, οἷον εἰ ἀληθὴς εἴη ὁ λόγος τὸ κα↵θῆσθαί τινα, ἀναστάντος αὐτοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ψευδὴς ἔσται•	Ipsa vero substantia, cum sit una et eadem numero, contrariorum susceptibilis est; ut quidam homo, unus et idem cum sit, aliquando albus aliquando niger fit, et calidus et frigidus, et improbus et probus. In aliis vero nullis tale aliquid videtur, nisi quis opponat orationem et opinionem dicens huiusmodi esse; eadem enim oratio et vera et falsa esse videtur, ut, si vera oratio est aliquem sedere, cum ipse surrexerit eadem ipsa erit falsa;	But one and the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. The same individual person is at one time white, at another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad. This capacity is found nowhere else, though it might be maintained that a statement or opinion was an exception to the rule. The same statement, it is agreed, can be both true and false. For if the statement 'he is sitting' is true, yet, when the person in question has risen, the same statement will be false.
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης• εἰ γάρ τις ἀληθῶςδοξάζοι τὸ καθῆσθαί τινα, ἀναστάντος αὐτοῦ ψευδῶς δοξάσει τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχων περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξαν. εἰ δέ τις καὶ τοῦτο παραδέχοιτο, ἀλλὰ τῷ γε τρόπῳ διαφέρει• τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ ↵ τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐτὰ μεταβάλλοντα δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν, — ψυχρὸν γὰρ ἐκ θερμοῦ γενόμενον μετέβαλεν (ἠλλοίωται γάρ), καὶ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ σπουδαῖον ἐκ φαύλου, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον αὐτὸ μεταβολὴν δεχόμενον τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἐστιν•— ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ δόξα αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκίνητα πάντῃ πάντως διαμένει, τοῦ δὲ πράγματος κινουμένου τὸ ἐναντίον περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται• ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος διαμένει ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ καθῆσθαί τινα, τοῦ δὲ πράγ↵ματος κινηθέντος ὁτὲ μὲν ἀληθὴς ὁτὲ δὲ ψευδὴς γίγνεται• ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης. ὥστε τῷ τρόπῳ γε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τῆς οὐσίας τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῆς μεταβολὴν δεκτικὴν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι,	similiter autem et in opinione; si quis enim uere opinabitur sedere aliquem, cum ipse surrexerit false opinabitur, eandem de eo retinens opinionem. Quod si quis etiam hoc recipiat, at modo ipso differt; eadem enim quae sunt in substantiis ipsa permutata contrariorum sunt susceptibilia (frigidum enim ex calido factum permutatum est, et nigrum ex albo et probum ex improbo, similiter autem et in aliis singula ipsa permutationem suscipientia contrariorum susceptibilia sunt), oratio vero et opinio ipsa quidem immobilia omnino semperque permanent, re vero mota contrarietas circa ea fit; oratio enim permanet eadem sedere aliquem, re vero mota aliquotiens quidem vera fit aliquotiens falsa; similiter autem et in opinione. Quapropter hoc modo proprium erit substantiae ut secundum propriam permutationem susceptibilis contrariorum sit -	The same applies to opinions. For if any one thinks truly that a person is sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this same opinion, if still held, will be false. Yet although this exception may be allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in the manner in which the thing takes place. It is by themselves changing that substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which was hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a different state. Similarly that which was white becomes black, and that which was bad good, by a process of change; and in the same way in all other cases it is by changing that substances are capable of admitting contrary qualities. But statements and opinions themselves remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the alteration in the facts of the case that the contrary quality comes to be theirs. The statement 'he is sitting' remains unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false, according to circumstances. What has been said of statements applies also to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which the thing takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that it should be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself changing that it does so.
—εἰ δή τις καὶ ταῦτα παραδέχοιτο, τὴν ↵ δόξαν καὶ τὸν λόγον δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο• ὁ γὰρ λόγος καὶ ἡ δόξα οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ δέχεσθαί τι τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὰ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ περὶ ἕτερόν τι τὸ πάθος γεγενῆσθαι• —τῷ γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, τούτῳ καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι λέ{{a|bk4b10|↵}γεται, οὐ τῷ αὐτὸν δεκτικὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων• ἁπλῶς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὑπ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε ὁ λόγος κινεῖται οὔτε ἡ δόξα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων μηδενὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένου•—	si quis etiam hoc suscipiat, opinionem et orationem contrariorum esse susceptibiles; non est autem hoc verum; etenim oratio et opinio non quod ea suscipiant aliquid contrariorum esse susceptibilia dicuntur sed quod circa alteram quandam passionem sint. - Eo enim quo res est vel non est, eo oratio vel vera vel falsa dicitur, non eo quod ipsa susceptibilis est contrarii. Simpliciter enim nihil neque oratio movetur neque opinio, quare non erunt susceptivae contrariorum nullo in eis facto.	If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that statements and opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities, his contention is unsound. For statements and opinions are said to have this capacity, not because they themselves undergo modification, but because this modification occurs in the case of something else. The truth or falsity of a statement depends on facts, and not on any power on the part of the statement itself of admitting contrary qualities. In short, there is nothing which can alter the nature of statements and opinions. As, then, no change takes place in themselves, these cannot be said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities.
ἡ δέ γε οὐσία τῷ αὐτὴν τὰ ἐναντία δέχεσθαι, τούτῳ δεκτικὴ τῶν ἐναντίων λέγεται• νόσον γὰρ καὶ ὑγίειαν ↵ δέχεται, καὶ λευκότητα καὶ μελανίαν, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων αὐτὴ δεχομένη τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὴ λέγεται. ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν οὐσίας εἴη τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν δεκτικὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων. περὶ μὲν οὖν οὐσίας τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.	Substantia vero, quod ipsa suscipiat contraria, eo dicitur contrariorum susceptibilis. Aegritudinem enim et sanitatem suscipit, et albedinem et nigredinem; et unumquodque talium ipsa suscipiens contrariorum esse dicitur susceptibilis. Quare proprium erit substantiae, cum sit idem et unum numero, susceptibilem contrariorum esse. Et de substantia quidem haec dicta sint.	But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within the substance itself that a substance is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for a substance admits within itself either disease or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this sense that it is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities. To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities, the modification taking place through a change in the substance itself. Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance.
Κεφάλαιο 6[Επεξεργασία]	C. VI [06] DE QUANTITATE
↵ Τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές• καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκε, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν. ἔστι δὲ διωρισμένον μὲν οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος, συνεχὲς δὲ γραμμή, ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ ↵ τόπος.	Quantitatis aliud est continuum, aliud disgregatum atque discretum; et aliud quidem ex habentibus positionem ad se invicem suis partibus constat, aliud vero ex non habentibus positionem. Est autem discreta quantitas ut numerus et oratio, continua vero ut linea, superficies, corpus, praeter haec vero tempus et locus.	Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some quantities are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the other parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part. Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and place.
—τῶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μορίων οὐδείς ἐστι κοινὸς ὅρος, πρὸς ὃν συνάπτει τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ• οἷον τὰ πέντε εἰ ἔστι τῶν δέκα μόριον, πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει τὰ πέντε καὶ τὰ πέντε, ἀλλὰ διώρισται• καὶ τὰ τρία γε καὶ τὰ ἑπτὰ πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει• οὐδ' ὅλως ἂν ↵ ἔχοις ἐπ' ἀριθμοῦ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον τῶν μορίων, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ διώρισται• ὥστε ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς τῶν διωρισμένων ἐστίν.	Partium enim numeri nullus est communis terminus ad quem partes ipsius coniungantur; ut quinarius, si est pars denarii, ad nullum communem terminum coniunguntur quinque et quinque sed disiuncti sunt; et tres et septem ad nullum communem terminum coniunguntur; neque omnino aliquis habebit in numero sumere communem terminum partium sed semper discretae sunt; quare numerus discretorum est.	In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary at which they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two fives have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three and seven also do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, would it ever be possible in the case of number that there should be a common boundary among the parts; they are always separate. Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity.
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ λόγος τῶν διωρισμένων ἐστίν• (ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ποσόν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος φανερόν• καταμετρεῖται γὰρ συλλαβῇ μακρᾷ καὶ βραχείᾳ• λέγω δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν μετὰ φω↵νῆς λόγον γιγνόμενον)• πρὸς οὐδένα γὰρ κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ μόρια συνάπτει• οὐ γὰρ ἔστι κοινὸς ὅρος πρὸς ὃν αἱ συλλαβαὶ συνάπτουσιν, ἀλλ' ἑκάστη διώρισται αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν.	Similiter est autem et oratio discretorum; (quoniam enim quantitas est et oratio manifestum est; mensuratur enim syllaba longa et brevis; dico vero illam quae fit cum uoce orationem); ad nullum enim communem terminum partes eius coniunguntur; neque enim est communis terminus ad quem syllabae coniunguntur sed unaquaeque discreta est secundum se ipsam.	The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident: for it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that speech which is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its parts have no common boundary. There is no common boundary at which the syllables join, but each is separate and distinct from the rest.
↵ —ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ συνεχές ἐστιν• ἔστι γὰρ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον πρὸς ὃν τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς συνάπτει, στιγμήν• καὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας γραμμήν, —τὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια πρός τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει.— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ↵ ἔχοις ἂν λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον, γραμμὴν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαν, πρὸς ἣν τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια συνάπτει.	Linea vero continua est; namque est sumere communem terminum ad quem partes ipsius coniunguntur, hoc est autem punctum, et superficiei linea (superficiei enim partes ad quendam communem terminum coniunguntur). Similiter autem et in corpore habebit quis sumere communem terminum, vel lineam vel superficiem, ad quem partes corporis coniunguntur.	A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the case of the line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of the plane, it is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a common boundary. Similarly you can find a common boundary in the case of the parts of a solid, namely either a line or a plane.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὁ τόπος τῶν τοιούτων• ὁ γὰρ νῦν χρόνος συνάπτει πρός τε τὸν παρεληλυθότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα. πάλιν ὁ τόπος τῶν συνεχῶν ἐστιν• τόπον γάρ τινα τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια κα↵τέχει, ἃ πρός τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει• οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ τοῦ τόπου μόρια, ἃ κατέχει ἕκαστον τῶν τοῦ σώματος μορίων, πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον συνάπτει πρὸς ὃν καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώμα—τος μόρια• ὥστε συνεχὲς ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ τόπος• πρὸς γὰρ ἕνα κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ μόρια συνάπτει.	Sunt autem talium et tempus et locus; praesens enim communis est terminus ad quem coniunguntur praeterita vel futura. Rursus locus continuorum est; locum enim quendam partes corporis retinent, quae ad quendam communem terminum coniunguntur; ergo et loci partes, quas tenent singulae partes corporis, ad eundem terminum coniunguntur ad quem et partes corporis iungebantur; quare continuum est et locus; ad unum enim communem terminum eius partes coniunguntur.	Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time, past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space, likewise, is a continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy a certain space, and these have a common boundary; it follows that the parts of space also, which are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity, for its parts have a common boundary.
↵ Ἔτι τὰ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκεν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν• οἷον τὰ μὲν τῆς γραμμῆς μόρια θέσιν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα, — ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν κεῖταί που, καὶ ἔχοις ἂν διαλαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδοῦναι οὗ ἕκαστον κεῖται ἐν τῷ ἐπιπέδῳ καὶ πρὸς ↵ ποῖον μόριον τῶν λοιπῶν συνάπτει•— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια θέσιν ἔχει τινά, —ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἀποδοθείη ἕκαστον οὗ κεῖται, καὶ ποῖα συνάπτει πρὸς ἄλληλα.— καὶ τὰ τοῦ στερεοῦ δὲ ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰ τοῦ τόπου.	Amplius alia sunt quae ex habentibus ad se invicem positionem suis partibus constant; ut lineae quidem partes habent ad se invicem positionem (singulae enim iacent alicubi, et possis cognoscere et designare ubi singulae in superficie iaceant et ad quam caeterarum partium coniungantur); similiter autem et superficiei partes habent aliquam positionem (similiter enim designabuntur singulae ubi iacent, et quae ad se invicem coniunguntur). Et soliditatis quoque et loci similiter.	Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position each to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear a relative position to each other, for each lies somewhere, and it would be possible to distinguish each, and to state the position of each on the plane and to explain to what sort of part among the rest each was contiguous. Similarly the parts of a plane have position, for it could similarly be stated what was the position of each and what sort of parts were contiguous. The same is true with regard to the solid and to space.
ἐπὶ δέ γε τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐπιβλέψαι ὡς τὰ μόρια ↵ θέσιν τινὰ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ κεῖταί που, ἢ ποῖά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα συνάπτει τῶν μορίων• οὐδὲ τὰ τοῦ χρόνου• ὑπομένει γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ χρόνου μορίων, ὃ δὲ μή ἐστιν ὑπομένον, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο θέσιν τινὰ ἔχοι; ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τάξιν τινὰ εἴποις ἂν ἔχειν τῷ τὸ μὲν πρότερον εἶναι τοῦ ↵ χρόνου τὸ δ' ὕστερον. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δὲ ὡσαύτως, τῷ πρότερον ἀριθμεῖσθαι τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο καὶ τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν• καὶ οὕτω τάξιν ἄν τινα ἔχοι, θέσιν δὲ οὐ πάνυ λάβοις ἄν.	In numero vero nullus habet perspicere quemadmodum partes habeant ad se invicem aliquam positionem vel ubi iaceant vel quae ad quam coniungantur; at vero nec temporis; nihil enim permanet ex partibus temporis, quod autem non est permanens, quomodo hoc habebit aliquem positionem? Sed magis ordinem quendam dices retinere idcirco quod temporis hoc quidem prius est, illud vero posterius. Et in numero quoque eo quod prius numeretur unus quam duo et duo quam tres; et sic habebunt aliquem ordinem, positionem vero non multum accipies.	But it would be impossible to show that the arts of a number had a relative position each to each, or a particular position, or to state what parts were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the case of time, for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and that which does not abide can hardly have position. It would be better to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one being prior to another. Similarly with number: in counting, 'one' is prior to 'two', and 'two' to 'three', and thus the parts of number may be said to possess a relative order, though it would be impossible to discover any distinct position for each.
καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ὡσαύτως• οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑπομένει τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' εἴρηταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι τοῦτο ↵ λαβεῖν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη θέσις τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ, εἴγε μηδὲν ὑπομένει. —τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων τῶν μορίων συνέστηκε, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν.	Et oratio similiter; nihil enim eius partium permanet sed dictum est et non est ultra hoc sumere, quare non erit ulla positio eius partium cuius permanet nihil. Igitur alia ex habentibus ad se invicem partibus positionem constant, alia vero ex non habentibus positionem.	This holds good also in the case of speech. None of its parts has an abiding existence: when once a syllable is pronounced, it is not possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts do not abide, they cannot have position. Thus, some quantities consist of parts which have position, and some of those which have not.
Κυρίως δὲ ποσὰ ταῦτα μόνα λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός• εἰς ταῦτα γὰρ ↵ βλέποντες καὶ τἆλλα ποσὰ λέγομεν, οἷον πολὺ τὸ λευκὸν λέγεται τῷ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν πολλὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις μακρὰ τῷ γε τὸν χρόνον πολὺν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ κίνησις πολλή• οὐ γὰρκαθ' αὑτὸ ἕκαστον τούτων ποσὸν λέγεται• οἷον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ ↵ τις πόση τις ἡ πρᾶξίς ἐστι, τῷ χρόνῳ ὁριεῖ ἐνιαυσίαν ἢ οὕτω πως ἀποδιδούς, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ποσόν τι ἀποδιδοὺς τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ὁριεῖ, —ὅση γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια ᾖ, τοσοῦτον καὶ τὸ λευκὸν φήσει εἶναι•— ὥστε μόνα κυρίως καὶ καθ' αὑτὰ ποσὰ λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ↵ ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός.	Proprie autem quantitates hae solae sunt quas diximus, alia vero omnia secundum accidens sunt; ad haec enim aspicientes et alias dicimus quantitates, ut multum dicitur album eo quod superficies multa sit, et actio longa eo quod tempus multum et longum sit, et motus multus; neque enim horum singulum per se quantitas dicitur; ut, si quis assignet quanta sit actio, tempore definiet, annuam vel sic aliquo modo assignans, et album quantum sit assignans superficie definiet (quanta enim fuerit superficies, tantum esse album dicet); quare solae proprie et secundum se ipsae quantitates dicuntur quae dictae sunt, aliorum vero nihil per se sed, si forte, per accidens.	Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong to the category of quantity: everything else that is called quantitative is a quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we have in mind some one of these quantities, properly so called, that we apply quantitative terms to other things. We speak of what is white as large, because the surface over which the white extends is large; we speak of an action or a process as lengthy, because the time covered is long; these things cannot in their own right claim the quantitative epithet. For instance, should any one explain how long an action was, his statement would be made in terms of the time taken, to the effect that it lasted a year, or something of that sort. In the same way, he would explain the size of a white object in terms of surface, for he would state the area which it covered. Thus the things already mentioned, and these alone, are in their intrinsic nature quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right, but, if at all, only in a secondary sense.
Ἔτι τῷ ποσῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, (ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀφωρισμένων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οἷον τῷ διπήχει ἢ τριπήχει ἢ τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τινί, —οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐναντίον), εἰ μὴ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ ↵ φαίη τις εἶναι ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ. τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι ποσὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρός τι• οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μέγα λέγεται ἢ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεται, οἷον ὄρος μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ μεγάλη τῷ τὴν μὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν μεῖζον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἔλατ↵τον τῶν ὁμογενῶν• οὐκοῦν πρὸς ἕτερον ἡ ἀναφορά, ἐπεὶ εἴγε καθ' αὑτὸ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἐλέγετο, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τὸ μὲν ὄρος μικρὸν ἐλέγετο, ἡ δὲ κέγχρος μεγάλη.	Quantitatibus vero nihil est contrarium (in his enim quae definita sunt manifestum est quoniam nihil est contrarium, ut bicubito vel tricubito vel superficiei vel alicui talium -- nihil enim est contrarium), nisi multa paucis dicat quis esse contraria vel magnum minori. Horum autem nihil est quantitas sed ad aliquid; nihil enim per se ipsum magnum dicitur vel paruum sed ad aliud refertur; nam mons quidem paruus dicitur, milium vero magnum eo quod hoc quidem sui generis maius sit, illud vero sui generis minus; ergo ad aliud est eorum relatio; nam, si per se ipsum parurum vel magnum diceretur, numquam mons quidem aliquando paruus, milium vero magnum diceretur.	Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of a surface, or of any such quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that 'much' was the contrary of 'little', and 'great' of 'small'. But these are not quantitative, but relative; things are not great or small absolutely, they are so called rather as the result of an act of comparison. For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain large, in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than others of its kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference here to an external standard, for if the terms 'great' and 'small' were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called small or a grain large.
πάλιν ἐν μὲν τῇ κώμῃ πολλούς φαμεν ἀνθρώπους εἶναι, ἐν Ἀθήναις δὲ ὀλίγους πολλαπλασίους αὐτῶν ὄντας, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ↵ πολλούς, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ ὀλίγους πολλῷ πλείους ὄντας.— ἔτι τὸ μὲν δίπηχυ καὶ τρίπηχυ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ποσὸν σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ μέγα ἢ μικρὸν οὐ σημαίνει ποσὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρός τι• πρὸς γὰρ ἕτερον θεωρεῖται τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν• ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ταῦτα τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν.	Rursus in uico quidem plures homines esse dicimus, in ciuitate vero paucos cum sint eorum multiplices, et in domo quidem multos, in theatro vero paucos cum sint plures. Amplius bicubitum vel tricubitum et unumquodque talium quantitatem significat, magnum vero vel paruum non significat quantitatem sed magis ad aliquid; quoniam ad aliud spectatur magnum et paruum; quare manifestum est quoniam haec ad aliquid sunt.	Again, we say that there are many people in a village, and few in Athens, although those in the city are many times as numerous as those in the village: or we say that a house has many in it, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre far outnumber those in the house. The terms 'two cubits long, "three cubits long,' and so on indicate quantity, the terms 'great' and 'small' indicate relation, for they have reference to an external standard. It is, therefore, plain that these are to be classed as relative.
↵ — ἔτι ἐάν τε τιθῇ τις αὐτὰ ποσὰ εἶναι ἐάν τε μὴ τιθῇ, οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίον οὐδέν• ὃ γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ λαβεῖν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέροντα, πῶς ἂν εἴη τούτῳ τι ἐναντίον;	Amplius, siue aliquis ponat ea esse quantitates siue non ponat, nihil illis erit contrarium; quod enim non est sumere per se ipsum sed ad solam alterius relationem, quomodo huic aliquid erit contrarium?	Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have no contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to something external?
—ἔτι εἰ ἔσται τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸνἐναντία, συμβήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι ↵ καὶ αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς εἶναι ἐναντία. συμβαίνει γὰρ ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ μέγα τε καὶ μικρὸν εἶναι, —ἔστι γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τοῦτο μικρόν, πρὸς ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο μέγα•— ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον εἶναι συμβαίνει, ὥστε ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι• ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δοκεῖ ↵ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι• οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας, δεκτικὴ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὔτι γε ἅμα νοσεῖ καὶ ὑγιαίνει, οὐδὲ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν ἐστὶν ἅμα, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεται.	Amplius, si sunt magnum et paruum contraria, contingit idem simul contraria suscipere et ea ipsa sibi esse contraria. Contingit enim simul idem paruum esse et magnum (est enim ad hoc quidem paruum, ad aliud vero hoc idem ipsum magnum); quare idem paruum et magnum et eodem tempore esse contingit, quare simul contraria suscipiet; sed nihil est quod videatur simul contraria posse suscipere; ut substantia, susceptibilis quidem contrariorum esse videtur sed nullus simul sanus est et aeger, nec albus et niger simul; nihilque aliud simul contraria suscipit.	Again, if 'great' and 'small' are contraries, it will come about that the same subject can admit contrary qualities at one and the same time, and that things will themselves be contrary to themselves. For it happens at times that the same thing is both small and great. For the same thing may be small in comparison with one thing, and great in comparison with another, so that the same thing comes to be both small and great at one and the same time, and is of such a nature as to admit contrary qualities at one and the same moment. Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment. For though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no one is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the same time both white and black. Nor is there anything which is qualified in contrary ways at one and the same time.
καὶ ↵ αὐτὰ δ' αὑτοῖς συμβαίνει ἐναντία εἶναι• εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, τὸ δ' αὐτό ἐστιν ἅμα μέγα καὶ μικρόν, αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἂν εἴη ἐναντίον• ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ εἶναι ἐναντίον. —οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ, ὥστε κἂν μὴ τῶν πρός τι ταῦτά τις ἐρεῖ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποσοῦ, οὐδὲν ↵ ἐναντίον ἕξει. —	Et eadem sibi ipsis contingit esse contraria; nam si est magnum et paruum contrarium, ipsum autem idem simul est paruum et magnum, ipsum sibi erit contrarium; sed impossibile est ipsum sibi esse contrarium. Non est igitur magnum paruo contrarium nec multa paucis; quare si quis haec non relativa esse dicat, quantitas tamen nihil contrarium habebit.	Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be contrary to themselves. For if 'great' is the contrary of 'small', and the same thing is both great and small at the same time, then 'small' or 'great' is the contrary of itself. But this is impossible. The term 'great', therefore, is not the contrary of the term 'small', nor 'much' of 'little'. And even though a man should call these terms not relative but quantitative, they would not have contraries.
μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ἐναντιότης τοῦ ποσοῦ περὶ τὸν τόπον δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν• τὸ γὰρ ἄνω τῷ κάτω ἐναντίον τιθέασι, τὴν πρὸς τὸ μέσον χώραν κάτω λέγοντες, διὰ τὸ πλείστην τῷ ↵ μέσῳ διάστασιν πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι. ἐοίκασι δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων ὁρισμὸν ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπιφέρειν• τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐναντία ὁρίζονται.	Maxime autem circa locum esse videtur contrarietas quantitatis; sursum enim ei quod est deorsum contrarium ponunt, regionem mediam deorsum dicentes propterea quod multa distantia est medietatis ad mundi terminos. Videntur autem et aliorum contrariorum definitionem ab his proferre; quae enim multum a se invicem distant in eodem genere contraria esse definiunt.	It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to admit of a contrary. For men define the term 'above' as the contrary of 'below', when it is the region at the centre they mean by 'below'; and this is so, because nothing is farther from the extremities of the universe than the region at the centre. Indeed, it seems that in defining contraries of every kind men have recourse to a spatial metaphor, for they say that those things are contraries which, within the same class, are separated by the greatest possible distance.
Οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ↵ ἧττον, οἷον τὸ δίπηχυ, —οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον δίπηχυ•— οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, οἷον τὰ τρία τῶν πέντε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον [πέντε ἢ] τρία λέγεται, οὐδὲ τὰ τρία τῶν τριῶν• οὐδέ γε ὁ χρόνος ἕτερος ἑτέρου μᾶλλον χρόνος λέγεται• οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅλως οὐδενὸς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον λέγεται• ὥστε ↵ τὸ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.	Non videtur autem quantitas suscipere magis et minus, ut bicubitum (neque enim est aliud alio magis bicubitum); neque in numero, ut ternarius quinario (nihil enim magis tria dicentur, nec tria potius quam tria); nec tempus aliud alio magis tempus dicitur; nec in his quae dicta sunt omnino aliquid magis et minus dicitur. Quare quantitas non suscipit magis et minus.	Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another. Similarly with regard to number: what is 'three' is not more truly three than what is 'five' is five; nor is one set of three more truly three than another set. Again, one period of time is not said to be more truly time than another. Nor is there any other kind of quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with regard to which variation of degree can be predicated. The category of quantity, therefore, does not admit of variation of degree.
Ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ποσῶν καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται, οἷον σῶμα καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται, καὶ ἀριθμὸς καὶ ἴσος καὶ ἄνισος λέγεται, καὶ χρόνος καὶ ἴσος καὶ ἄνισος• ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ↵ ἄλλων τῶν ῥηθέντων ἕκαστον ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ὅσα μή ἐστι ποσόν, οὐ πάνυ ἂν δόξαι ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι, οἷον ἡ διάθεσις ἴση τε καὶ ἄνισος οὐ πάνυ λέγεται ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁμοία, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον οὐ πάνυ, ἀλλ' ὅμοιον. ὥστε τοῦ ποσοῦ μά↵λιστα ἂν εἴη ἴδιον τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι.	Proprium autem maxime quantitatis est quod aequale et inaequale dicitur. Singulum enim earum quae dictae sunt quantitatum et aequale dicitur et inaequale, ut corpus aequale et inaequale, et numerus aequalis et inaequalis dicitur, et tempus aequale et inaequale; similiter autem et in aliis quae dicta sunt e singulis aequale et inaequale dicitur. In caeteris vero quae quantitatis non sunt, non multum videbitur aequale et inaequale dici, namque dispositio aequalis et inaequalis non multum dicitur sed magis similis, et album aequale et inaequale non multum sed simile. Quare quantitatis proprium est aequale et inaequale nominari.	The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and inequality are predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities is said to be equal or unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be equal or unequal to another; number, too, and time can have these terms applied to them, indeed can all those kinds of quantity that have been mentioned. That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be termed equal or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition or one particular quality, such as whiteness, is by no means compared with another in terms of equality and inequality but rather in terms of similarity. Thus it is the distinctive mark of quantity that it can be called equal and unequal.
Κεφάλαιο 7[Επεξεργασία]	C. VII [07] DE RELATIVIS VEL AD ALIQUID
Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον• οἷον τὸ μεῖζον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, —τινὸς γὰρ μεῖζον λέγεται,— καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἑτέρου λέγεται τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστίν, ↵ —τινὸς γὰρ διπλάσιον λέγεται•— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρός τι οἷον ἕξις, διάθεσις, αἴσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, θέσις• πάντα γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι• ἡ ↵ γὰρ ἕξις τινὸς ἕξις λέγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ θέσις τινὸς θέσις, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως.	Ad aliquid vero talia dicuntur quaecumque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud, ut maius hoc ipsum quod est ad aliud dicitur (aliquo enim maius dicitur), et duplex ad aliud dicitur hoc ipsum quod est (alicuius enim duplex dicitur); similiter autem et quaecumque alia talia sunt. At vero sunt etiam et haec ad aliquid, ut habitus, affectio, scientia, sensus, positio; haec enim omnia quae dicta sunt hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum dicuntur et non aliter; habitus enim alicuius habitus est, et scientia alicuius scientia, et positio alicuius positio, et alia quidem similiter.	Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing. For instance, the word 'superior' is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression 'double' has this external reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant. So it is with everything else of this kind. There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned.
πρός τι οὖν ἐστὶν ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον• οἷον ὄρος μέγα λέγεται πρὸς ἕτερον, —πρός τι γὰρ μέγα λέγεται τὸ ὄρος,— καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τινὶ ὅμοιον ↵ λέγεται, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡσαύτως πρός τι λέγεται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀνάκλισις καὶ ἡ στάσις καὶ ἡ καθέδρα θέσεις τινές, ἡ δὲ θέσις τῶν πρός τι• τὸ δὲ ἀνακε<κλ>ίσθαι ἢ ἑστάναι ἢ καθῆσθαι αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶ θέσεις, παρωνύμως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων θέσεων λέγεται.	Ad aliquid ergo sunt quaecumque id quod sunt aliorum dicuntur vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud; ut mons magnus dicitur ad montem alium (magnum enim ad aliquid dicitur), et simile alicui simile dicitur, et omnia talia similiter ad aliquid dicuntur. Est autem et accubitus et statio et sessio positiones quaedam, positio vero ad aliquid est; iacere autem vel stare vel sedere ipsa quidem non sunt positiones, denominative vero ex his quae dictae sunt positionibus nominantur.	Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the preposition 'of' or some other preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes have this external reference. It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid attitudes.
↵ Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, οἷον ἀρετὴ κακίᾳ ἐναντίον, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρός τι ὄν, καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοίᾳ. οὐ πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς πρός τι ὑπάρχει ἐναντίον• τῷ γὰρ διπλασίῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον οὐδὲ τῷ τριπλασίῳ οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί.	Inest autem et contrarietas in relatione, ut virtus malitiae contrarium est, cum sit utrumque ad aliquid, et scientia inscientiae. Non autem omnibus relativis inest contrarietas; duplici enim nihil est contrarium, neque vero triplici neque ulli talium.	It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives; 'double' and 'triple' have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term. Yet, again, it is not every relative term that admits of variation of degree. No term such as 'double' admits of this modification.
↵ —δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ πρός τι• ὅμοιον γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, καὶ ἄνισον μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρός τι ὄν• τό τε γὰρ ὅμοιον τινὶ ὅμοιον λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἄνισον τινὶ ἄνισον. οὐ πάντα δὲ ↵ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον• τὸ γὰρ διπλάσιον οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διπλάσιον οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.	Videntur autem et magis et minus relativa suscipere; simile enim magis et minus dicitur, et inaequale magis et minus dicitur, cum utrumque sit relativum (simile enim alicui simile dicitur et inaequale alicui intequale). Non autem omnia suscipiunt magis et minus; duplex enim non dicitur magis et minus duplex, nec aliquid talium.	It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. For 'like' and 'unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal', have the modifications 'more' and 'less' applied to them, and each of these is relative in character: for the terms 'like' and 'unequal' bear 'unequal' bear a reference to something external.
Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου λέγεται δοῦλος καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δού↵λου δεσπότης λέγεται, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ διπλασίου ἥμισυ, καὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἐλάττονος μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον μείζονος ἔλαττον• ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων• πλὴν τῇ πτώσει ἐνίοτε διοίσει κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ↵ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιστητόν, καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις αἰσθητοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν αἰσθήσει αἰσθητόν.	Omnia autem relativa ad convertentia dicuntur, ut servus domini servus dicitur et dominus servi dominus, et duplum dimidii duplum et dimidium dupli dimidium, et maius minore maius et minus maiore minus; similiter autem et in aliis; sed casu aliquotiens differt secundum locutionem, ut scientia scibilis rei dicitur scientia et scibile scientia scibile, et sensus sensibilis sensus et sensibile sensu sensibile.	All relatives have correlatives: by the term 'slave' we mean the slave of a master, by the term 'master', the master of a slave; by 'double', the double of its hall; by 'half', the half of its double; by 'greater', greater than that which is less; by 'less,' less than that which is greater. So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to express the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; by the perceptible, that which is apprehended by perception.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὐ δόξει ἀντιστρέφειν, ἐὰν μὴ οἰκείως πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἀποδοθῇ ἀλλὰ διαμάρτῃ ὁ ἀποδιδούς• οἷον τὸ πτερὸν ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ ὄρνιθος, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ὄρνις πτεροῦ• οὐ γὰρ οἰκείως τὸ ↵ πρῶτον ἀποδέδοται πτερὸν ὄρνιθος, —οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὄρνις, ταύτῃ τὸ πτερὸν αὐτῆς λέγεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ πτερωτόν ἐστιν• πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλων πτερά ἐστιν ἃ οὐκ εἰσὶν ὄρνιθες•— ὥστε ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ οἰκείως, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, οἷον τὸ πτερὸν πτερωτοῦ ↵ πτερὸν καὶ τὸ πτερωτὸν πτερῷ πτερωτόν.	At vero aliquotiens non videbitur convertere nisi convenienter ad quod dicitur assignetur sed peccet is qui assignat; ut ala si assignetur auis, non convertitur ut sit auis alae; neque enim convenienter prius assignatum est ala auis; neque enim in eo quod auis, in eo eius ala dicitur sed in eo quod alata est (multorum enim et aliorum alae sunt, quae non sunt aves); quare si assignetur convenienter, et convertitur; ut ala alati ala, et alatum ala alatum.	Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states that a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two will not be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the original statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to the bird qua bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature. If, then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having reference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as being such because of its wings.
—ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνοματοποιεῖν ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν μὴ κείμενον ᾖ ὄνομα πρὸς ὃ οἰκείως ἂν ἀποδοθείη• οἷον τὸ πηδάλιον πλοίου ἐὰν ἀπο—δοθῇ, οὐκ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσις, —οὐ γὰρ ᾗ πλοῖον ταύτῃ αὐτοῦ τὸ πηδάλιον λέγεται• ἔστι γὰρ πλοῖα ὧν οὐκ ↵ ἔστι πηδάλια•— διὸ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει• τὸ γὰρ πλοῖον οὐ λέγεται πηδαλίου πλοῖον. ἀλλ' ἴσως οἰκειοτέρα ἂν ἡ ἀπόδοσις εἴη, εἰ οὕτω πως ἀποδοθείη τὸ πηδάλιον πηδαλιωτοῦ πηδάλιον ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως, —ὄνομα γὰρ οὐ κεῖται•— καὶ ἀντιστρέφει γε, ἐὰν οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ• τὸ γὰρ πηδαλιωτὸν ↵ πηδαλίῳ πηδαλιωτόν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ οἰκειοτέρως ἂν ἀποδοθείη κεφαλωτοῦ ἢ ζῴου ἀποδιδομένη• οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ζῷον κεφαλὴν ἔχει• πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζῴων κεφαλὴν οὐκ ἔχει.	Aliquotiens autem forte et nomina fingere necesse erit, si non fuerit positum nomen ad quod convenienter assignetur; ut remus nauis si assignetur, non erit conveniens assignatio (neque enim in eo quod est nauis, in eo eius remus dicitur; sunt enim naues quarum remi non sunt); quare non convertitur; nauis enim non dicitur remi. Sed forte convenientior assignatio erit si sic quodam modo assignetur, remus remitae remus, vel aliquo modo aliter dictum sit (nomen enim non est positum); convertitur autem si convenienter assignetur (remitum enim remo remitum est). Similiter autem et in aliis, ut caput convenientius assignabitur capitati quam si animalis assignetur; neque enim in eo quod animal est caput habet (multa enim sunt animalium capita non habentia).	Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we define a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our definition will not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have this reference to a boat qua boat, as there are boats which have no rudders. Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally, for the word 'boat' cannot be said to find its explanation in the word 'rudder'. As there is no existing word, our definition would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like 'ruddered' as the correlative of 'rudder'. If we express ourselves thus accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the 'ruddered' thing is 'ruddered' in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all other cases. A head will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that which is 'headed', than as that of an animal, for the animal does not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head.
οὕτω δὲ ῥᾷστα ἂν ἴσως τις λαμβάνοι οἷς μὴ κεῖται ὀνόματα, εἰ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων καὶ ↵ τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντιστρέφουσι τιθείη τὰ ὀνόματα, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἀπὸ τοῦ πτεροῦ τὸ πτερωτὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πηδαλίου τὸ πηδαλιωτόν.	Sic autem facilius fortasse sumetur quibus nomen non est positum, si ab his quae prima sunt et [ab] his ad quae convertuntur nomina ponuntur, ut in his quae praedicta sunt ab ala alatum, a remo remitum.	Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the first is reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived the word 'winged' from 'wing' and from 'rudder'.
πάντα οὖν τὰ πρός τι, ἐάνπερ οἰκείως ἀποδιδῶται, πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται• ἐπεί, ἐάν γε πρὸς τὸ τυχὸν ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ ↵ λέγεται, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει. —λέγω δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν ὁμολογουμένως πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λεγομένων καὶ ὀνομάτων αὐτοῖς κειμένων οὐδὲν ἀντιστρέφει, ἐὰν πρός τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται• οἷον ὁ δοῦλος ἐὰν μὴ δεσπότου ἀποδοθῇ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου ἢ δίποδος ἢ ὁτου↵οῦν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει• οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσις.	Omnia ergo quae ad aliquid dicuntur, si convenienter assignentur, ad convertentia dicuntur. Nam, si ad quodlibet aliud assignentur et non ad illud dicantur, non convertuntur. Dico autem quoniam neque in his quae confesse conversim dicuntur et in quibus nomen est positum, nihil convertitur, si ad aliquid eorum quae sunt accidentia assignetur et non ad illud dicatur; ut servus si non domini assignetur sed hominis vel bipedis vel alicuius talium, non convertitur (non enim erit conveniens assignatio).	All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I add this condition because, if that to which they are related is stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there will be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of irrelevant significance. The term 'slave,' if defined as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which it is defined, for the statement is not exact.
—ἔτι ἐὰν μὲν οἰκείως ἀποδεδομένον ᾖ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, πάντων περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστίν, καταλειπομένου δὲ τούτου μόνου πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη οἰκείως, ἀεὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται• οἷον εἰ ὁ δοῦλος ↵ πρὸς δεσπότην λέγεται, περιαιρουμένων ἁπάντων ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστὶ τῷ δεσπότῃ, οἷον τὸ δίποδι εἶναι, τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικῷ, τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ, καταλειπο—μένου δὲ μόνου τοῦ δεσπότην εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται• ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος λέ↵γεται.	Amplius, si convenienter assignetur ad id quod dicitur, omnibus aliis circumscriptis quaecumque accidentia sunt, relicto vero solo illo ad quod assignatum est, semper ad ipsum dicetur; ut si servus ad dominum dicitur, circumscriptis omnibus quae sunt accidentia domino, ut esse bipedem vel scientiae susceptibilem vel hominem, relicto vero solo dominum esse, semper servus ad illud dicetur; servus enim domini servus dicitur.	Further, if one thing is said to be correlative with another, and the terminology used is correct, then, though all irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute left in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the correlative of 'the slave' is said to be 'the master', then, though all irrelevant attributes of the said 'master', such as 'biped', 'receptive of knowledge', 'human', should be removed, and the attribute 'master' alone left, the stated correlation existing between him and the slave will remain the same, for it is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave.
ἐὰν δέ γε μὴ οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ πρὸς ὅ ποτε λέγεται, περιαιρουμένων μὲν τῶν ἄλλων καταλειπομένου δὲ μόνου τοῦ πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη, οὐ ῥηθήσεται πρὸς αὐτό• ἀποδεδόσθω γὰρ ὁ δοῦλος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ πτερὸν ὄρνιθος, ↵ καὶ περιῃρήσθω τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ δεσπότῃ αὐτῷ εἶναι• οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ῥηθήσεται, —μὴ γὰρ ὄντος δεσπότου οὐδὲ δοῦλός ἐστιν•— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῦ ὄρνιθος περιῃρήσθω τὸ πτερωτῷ εἶναι• οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ πτερὸν τῶν πρός τι• μὴ γὰρ ὄντος πτερωτοῦ οὐδὲ πτερὸν ἔσται τινός.—	Si autem non convenienter reddatur ad id quod dicitur circumscriptis omnibus aliis, relicto vero solo ad quod redditum est, non dicetur ad illud; assignetur enim servus hominis et ala auis, et circumscribatur ab homine esse dominum; non enim iam servus ad hominem dicitur (cum enim dominus non sit, servus non est); similiter autem et de aui, circumscribatur alatam esse; non enim iam erit ala ad aliquid (cum enim non sit alatum, nec ala erit alicuius).	On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, when all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the stated correlation will be found to have disappeared. For suppose the correlative of 'the slave' should be said to be 'the man', or the correlative of 'the wing"the bird'; if the attribute 'master' be withdrawn from' the man', the correlation between 'the man' and 'the slave' will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute 'winged' be withdrawn from 'the bird', 'the wing' will no longer be relative; for if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that 'the wing' has no correlative.
↵ ὥστε δεῖ μὲν ἀποδιδόναι πρὸς ὅ ποτε οἰκείως λέγεται• κἂν μὲν ὄνομα ᾖ κείμενον ῥᾳδία ἡ ἀπόδοσις γίγνεται, μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως ὀνοματοποιεῖν. οὕτω δὲ ἀποδιδομένων φανερὸν ὅτι πάντα τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα ῥηθήσεται.	Quare oportet assignare ad id quod convenienter dicitur; et si sit nomen positum, facilis erit assignatio; si autem non sit, fortasse erit necessarium nomen fingere. Quod si ita reddantur, manifestum est quoniam omnia relativa conversim dicuntur.	Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are interdependent.
↵ Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι. καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πλείστων ἀληθές ἐστιν• ἅμα γὰρ διπλάσιόν τέ ἐστι καὶ ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστιν, καὶ δούλου ὄντος δεσπότης ἐστίν• ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. καὶ συναναιρεῖ δὲ ταῦτα ἄλ↵ληλα• μὴ γὰρ ὄντος διπλασίου οὐκ ἔστιν ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστι διπλάσιον• ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τοιαῦτα. —οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν πρός τι ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ τὸ ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι• τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τῆς ἐπιστήμης πρότερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι• ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προϋπαρ↵χόντων τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἐπιστήμας λαμβάνομεν•	Videtur autem ad aliquid simul esse natura. Et in aliis quidem pluribus verum est; simul enim est duplum et dimidium, et cum sit dimidium duplum est, et cum sit servus dominus est; similiter autem his et alia. Simul autem haec auferunt sese invicem; si enim non sit duplum non est dimidium, et si non sit dimidium duplum non est; similiter et in aliis quaecumque talia sunt. Non autem in omnibus relatiuis verum videtur esse simul naturaliter; scibile enim scientia prius esse videbitur; namque in pluribus subsistentibus iam rebus scientias accipimus; in paucis enim vel in nullis hoc quisque perspiciet, simul cum scibili scientiam factam.	Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and the half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of that of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master; these are merely instances of a general rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no double it follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with that of its object.
ἐπ' ὀλίγων γὰρ ἢ ἐπ' οὐδενὸς ἴδοι τις ἂν ἅμα τῷ ἐπιστητῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην γιγνομένην. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὸ ἐπιστητὸν οὐ συν—αναιρεῖ• ἐπιστητοῦ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ↵ —οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται ἐπιστήμη,— ἐπιστήμης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐπιστητὸν εἶναι• οἷον καὶ ὁ τοῦ κύκλου τετραγωνισμὸς εἴγε ἔστιν ἐπιστητόν, ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδέπω, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἔστιν.	Amplius scibile sublatum simul aufert scientiam, scientia vero non simul aufert scibile; nam, si scibile non sit, non est scientia, si scientia vero non sit, nihil prohibet esse scibile; ut circuli quadratura si est scibile, scientia quidem eius nondum est, illud vero scibile est.	Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse of this is not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything to know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object does not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring of the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge, though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge of it has not yet come into existence.
ἔτι ζῴου μὲν ἀναιρεθέντος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, τῶν δ' ἐπιστητῶν πολλὰ ἐνδέχεται ↵ εἶναι.—ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔχει• τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητὸν πρότερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως δοκεῖ εἶναι• τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ. αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις περὶ σῶμα καὶ ἐν σώματί εἰσιν, αἰσθητοῦ δὲ ἀναιρεθέντος ἀνῄ↵ρηται καὶ σῶμα, —τῶν γὰρ αἰσθητῶν καὶ τὸ σῶμα,— σώματος δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἀνῄρηται καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὥστε συναναιρεῖ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἡ δέ γε αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὔ• ζῴου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος αἴσθησις μὲν ↵ ἀνῄρηται, αἰσθητὸν δὲ ἔσται, οἷον σῶμα, θερμόν, γλυκύ, πικρόν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶν αἰσθητά.	Amplius animali quidem sublato non est scientia, scibilium vero plurima esse contingit. Similiter autem his sese habent et quae in sensu sunt; sensibile enim prius sensu esse videtur; sublatum enim sensibile simul aufert sensum, sensus vero sensibile non simul aufert. Sensus enim circa corpus et in corpore sunt; sensibili ergo sublato aufertur corpus (sensibilium enim et corpus est), cum autem corpus non sit sublatus est sensus; quare simul aufert sensibile sensum. Sensus vero sensibile non; sublato enim animali sublatus est sensus, sensibile autem permanet, ut corpus, calidum, dulce, amarum, et alia omnia quaecumque sunt sensibilia.	Again, if all animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of knowledge. This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception. If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception does not cancel the existence of the perceptible. For perception implies a body perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now if that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if the body does not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to exist. Thus the annihilation of the perceptible involves that of perception. But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain.
ἔτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἅμα τῷ αἰσθητικῷ γίγνεται, —ἅμα γὰρ ζῷόν τε γίγνεται καὶ αἴσθησις,— τὸ δέ γε αἰσθητὸν ἔστι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἴσθησιν εἶναι, —πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ↵ ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸ ζῷον συνίσταται, ἔστι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ζῷον ὅλως εἶναι ἢ αἴσθησιν,— ὥστε πρότερον ἂν τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὸ αἰσθητὸν εἶναι δόξειεν.	Amplius sensus quidem simul cum sensato fit (simul enim animal fit et sensus), sensibile vero ante est quam esset sensus (ignis enim et aqua et alia huiusmodi, ex quibus ipsum animal constat, ante sunt quam animal sit omnino vel sensus); quare prius quam sensus sensibile esse videbitur.	Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal. But the perceptible surely exists before perception; for fire and water and such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist before the animal is an animal at all, and before perception. Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists before perception.
Ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν πότερον οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τι λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, ἢ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται κατά τινας ↵ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀληθές ἐστιν• οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ μέρη πρός τι λέγεται• ὁ γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινός τις ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ὁ τὶς βοῦς τινός τις βοῦς• ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέρη• ἡ γὰρ τὶς χεὶρ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις χεὶρ ἀλλὰ τινὸς χείρ, ↵ καὶ ἡ τὶς κεφαλὴ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις κεφαλὴ ἀλλὰ τινὸς κεφαλή.	Habet autem dubitationem an ulla substantia ad aliquid dicatur, quemadmodum videtur, an hoc quidem contingit secundum quasdam secundarum substantiarum. Nam in primis quidem substantiis verum est; nam neque totae neque partes ad aliquid dicuntur; nam aliquis homo non dicitur alicuius aliquis homo, neque aliquis bos alicuius aliquis bos. Similiter autem et partes; quaedam enim manus non dicitur alicuius quaedam manus sed alicuius manus, et quoddam caput non dicitur alicuius quoddam caput sed alicuius caput.	It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative, as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case of certain secondary substances. With regard to primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such possibility, for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances are relative. The individual man or ox is not defined with reference to something external. Similarly with the parts: a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or head of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a particular person.
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν, ἐπί γε τῶν πλείστων• οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινὸς ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ὁ βοῦς τινὸς βοῦς, οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον τινὸς ξύλον, ἀλλὰ τινὸς κτῆμα λέγεται. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων φα↵νερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πρός τι, ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν ἔχει ἀμφισβήτησιν• οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ τινὸς λέγεται κεφαλὴ καὶ ἡ χεὶρ τινὸς λέγεται χεὶρ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι.	Similiter autem et in secundis substantiis, atque hoc quidem in pluribus; ut homo non dicitur alicuius homo, nec bos alicuius bos, nec lignum alicuius lignum sed alicuius possessio dicitur. Atque in huiusmodi quidem manifestum est quoniam non est ad aliquid; in aliquibus vero secundis substantiis habet aliquam dubitationem; ut caput alicuius caput dicitur et manus alicuius manus dicitur et singula huiusmodi; quare haec esse fortasse ad aliquid videbuntur.	It is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of secondary substances; the species 'man' and the species 'ox' are not defined with reference to anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so far as it is some one's property, not in so far as it is wood. It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there is a difference of opinion; thus, such terms as 'head' and 'hand' are defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a part, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative character.
—εἰ μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς ὁ τῶν πρός τι ὁρισμὸς ἀποδέδοται, ἢ τῶν πάνυ ↵ χαλεπῶν ἢ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τὸ λῦσαι ὡς οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τι λέγεται• εἰ δὲ μὴ ἱκανῶς, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὰ πρός τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν, ἴσως ἂν ῥηθείη τι πρὸς αὐτά.	Si igitur sufficienter eorum quae sunt ad aliquid definitio assignata est, aut nimis difficile aut impossibile est soluere quoniam nulla substantia eorum quae sunt ad aliquid dicitur; si autem non sufficienter sed sunt ad aliquid quibus hoc ipsum esse est ad aliquid quodam modo habere, fortasse aliquid contra ista dicetur.	Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete, if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found.
ὁ δὲ πρότερος ὁρισμὸς παρακολουθεῖ μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς πρός τι, οὐ μὴν τοῦτό γέ ἐστι τὸ πρός τι ↵ αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεσθαι. ἐκ δὲ τούτων δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἐάν τις εἰδῇ τι ὡρισμένως τῶν πρός τι, κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ὡρισμένως εἴσεται. φανερὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν• εἰ γὰρ οἶδέ τις τόδε τι ὅτι τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἶναι τοῖς πρός τι ταὐτὸ τῷ ↵ πρός τί πως ἔχειν, κἀκεῖνο οἶδε πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει• εἰ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅλως πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει, οὐδ' εἰ πρός τί πως ἔχει εἴσεται.	Prior vero definitio sequitur quidem omnia relativa, non tamen hoc eis est quod sint ad aliquid quod ea ipsa quae sunt aliorum dicuntur. Ex his ergo manifestum est quod, si quis aliquid eorum quae sunt ad aliquid definite sciet, et illud ad quod dicitur definite sciturus est. Si manifestum quidem etiam ex ipso est; nam si quis nouit quoniam hoc eorum quae sunt ad aliquid est, relatiuis autem hoc est esse, ad aliquid quodammodo habere, et illud nouit ad quod hoc aliquo modo habet; nam si omnino nescit ad quod aliquo modo habet, nec si ad aliquid quodammodo habet sciturus est.	The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not make it essentially relative. From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative. Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows that some particular thing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of which relation to something is a necessary condition of existence, he knows that also to which it is related. For if he does not know at all that to which it is related, he will not know whether or not it is relative.
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ δῆλον τὸ τοιοῦτον• οἷον τόδε τι εἰ οἶδεν ἀφωρισμένως ὅτι ἔστι ↵ διπλάσιον, καὶ ὅτου διπλάσιόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς ἀφωρισμένως οἶδεν, —εἰ γὰρ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀφωρισμένων οἶδεν αὐτὸ διπλάσιον, οὐδ' εἰ ἔστι διπλάσιον ὅλως οἶδεν• — ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τόδε τι εἰ οἶδεν ὅτι κάλλιόν ἐστι, καὶ ὅτου κάλλιόν ἐστιν ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι διὰ ταῦτα, (οὐκ ἀο↵ρίστως δὲ εἴσεται ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι χείρονος κάλλιον• ὑπόληψις γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο γίγνεται, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη• οὐ γὰρ ἔτι εἴσεται ἀκριβῶς ὅτι ἐστὶ χείρονος κάλλιον• εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, οὐδέν ἐστι χεῖρον αὐτοῦ)• ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ὃ ἂν εἰδῇ τις τῶν πρός τι ὡρισμένως, κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ ↵ λέγεται ὡρισμένως εἰδέναι.	Et in particularibus hoc manifestum est; ut, si hoc ad aliquid scit definite quoniam duplum est, et cuius duplum est definite nouit (nam si nullius definite nouit illud esse duplum, nec si omnino duplum est nouit); similiter autem et hoc [ad] aliquid si nouit quoniam melius est, et quo melius erit definite eum scire necesse est propter haec ipsa quae dicta sunt (non autem infinite quoniam hoc est peiore melius, opinio enim iam fit huiusmodi, non scientia; neque enim sciet integre quoniam est peiore melius; nam fortasse contingit nihil eo esse peius); quare manifestum est quoniam necesse est quod quis nouerit eorum quae sunt ad aliquid definite, etiam illud ad quod dicitur sciturum esse definite.	This is clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man knows definitely that such and such a thing is 'double', he will also forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double. For if there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, he does not know at all that it is double. Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less beautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowledge. For if he does not know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also definitely to which it is related.
τὴν δέ γε κεφαλὴν καὶ τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων αἵ εἰσιν οὐσίαι αὐτὸ μὲν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὡρισμένως ἔστιν εἰδέναι, πρὸς ὃ δὲ λέγεται οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον• τίνος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ κεφαλὴ ἢ τίνος ἡ χεὶρ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδέναι ὡρισμένως• ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι• ↵ εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι τῶν πρός τι, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὅτι οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν. ἴσως δὲ χαλεπὸν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι μὴ πολλάκις ἐπεσκεμμένον, τὸ μέντοι διηπορηκέναι ἐφ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄχρηστόν ἐστιν.	Caput vero et manum et eorum singula quae substantiae sunt, hoc ipsum quidem quod sunt potest sciri definite, ad quod autem dicantur non necesse est; cuius enim hoc caput vel cuius haec manus non est dicere definite; quare haec non erunt eorum quae sunt ad aliquid; quod si non sunt eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, verum erit nullam esse substantiam relativam. Fortasse autem difficile sit de huiusmodi rebus confidenter declarare nisi saepius pertractata sint; dubitare autem de singulis non erit inutile.	Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related. It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus these are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be true to say that no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not without advantage.
Κεφάλαιο 8[Επεξεργασία]	C. VIII [08] DE QUALI ET QUALITATE
↵ Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ' ἣν ποιοί τινες λέγονται•	Qualitatem vero dico secundum quam quales quidam dicimur.	By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such.
ἔστι δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων. ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν. διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ μονιμώτερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον εἶναι• τοιαῦται δὲ αἵ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί• ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπι↵στήμη δοκεῖ τῶν παραμονίμων εἶναι καὶ δυσκινήτων, ἐὰν καὶ μετρίως τις ἐπιστήμην λάβῃ, ἐάνπερ μὴ μεγάλη μεταβολὴ γένηται ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου• ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή• οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ εὐκίνητον δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐδ' εὐμε↵τάβολον.	Est autem qualitas eorum quae multipliciter dicuntur. Et una quidem species qualitatis habitus affectioque dicantur. Differt autem habitus affectione quod permanentior et diuturnior est; tales vero sunt scientiae vel uirtutes; scientia enim videtur esse permanentium et eorum quae difficile moueantur, si quis vel mediocriter scientiam sumat, nisi forte grandis permutatio facta sit vel ab aegritudine vel ab aliquo huiusmodi; similiter autem et uirtus, et iustitia vel castitas et singula talium non videntur facile posse moueri neque facile permutari.	Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of quality let us call 'habit' or 'disposition'. Habit differs from disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established. The various kinds of knowledge and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even when acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character and difficult to displace, unless some great mental upheaval takes place, through disease or any such cause. The virtues, also, such as justice, self-restraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged or dismissed, so as to give place to vice.
διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἅ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα, οἷον θερμότης καὶ κατάψυξις καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα• διάκειται μὲν γάρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γιγνόμενος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς τὸ νο↵σεῖν• ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ μή τις καὶ αὐ—τῶν τούτων τυγχάνοι διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἤδη πεφυσιωμένη καὶ ἀνίατος ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητος οὖσα, ἣν ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξιν ἤδη προσαγορεύοι.	Affectiones vero dicuntur quae sunt facile mobiles et cito permutabiles, ut calor et infrictio et aegritudo et sanitas et alia huiusmodi; affectus est enim quodammodo circa eas homo, cito autem permutatur ut ex calido frigidus fiat et ex sanitate in aegritudinem; similiter autem et in aliis, nisi forte in his quoque contingit per temporis longitudinem in naturam cuiusque translata et insanabilis vel difficile mobilis, quam iam quilibet habitudinem uocet.	By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat, cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a man is disposed in one way or another with reference to these, but quickly changes, becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well. So it is with all other dispositions also, unless through lapse of time a disposition has itself become inveterate and almost impossible to dislodge: in which case we should perhaps go so far as to call it a habit.
φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι ταῦτα βούλονται ἕξεις ↵ λέγειν ἅ ἐστι πολυχρονιώτερα καὶ δυσκινητότερα• τοὺς γὰρ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μὴ πάνυ κατέχοντας ἀλλ' εὐκινήτους ὄντας οὔ φασιν ἕξιν ἔχειν, καίτοι διάκεινταί γέ πως κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον. ὥστε διαφέρει ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ τὸ μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερόν τε καὶ ↵ δυσκινητότερον.	Manifestum est autem quoniam haec uolunt habitus nominari, quae sunt diuturniora et difficile mobilia; namque in disciplinis non multum retinentes sed facile mobiles dicunt habitum non habere, quamuis sint ad disciplinam peius meliusue dispositi. Quare differt habitus affectione, quod hoc quidem facile mobile est, illud vero diuturnius et difficile mobile.	It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits which are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace; for those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to have such and such a 'habit' as regards knowledge, yet they are disposed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge. Thus habit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter in ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter.
—εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ διαθέσεις οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕξεις• οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕξεις ἔχοντες καὶ διάκεινταί πως κατὰ ταύτας, οἱ δὲ διακείμενοι οὐ πάντως καὶ ἕξιν ἔχουσιν.	Sunt autem habitus etiam affectiones, affectiones vero non necessario habitus; qui enim retinent habitum et quodammodo affecti sunt ad ea vel peius vel melius; qui autem affecti sunt, non omnino retinent habitum.	Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the corresponding habit.
Ἕτερον δὲ γένος ποιότητος καθ' ὃ πυκτικοὺς ἢ δρομι↵κοὺς ἢ ὑγιεινοὺς ἢ νοσώδεις λέγομεν, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται. οὐ γὰρ τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως ἢ μηδὲν πάσχειν• οἷον πυκτικοὶ ἢ δρομικοὶ λέγονται οὐ τῷ ↵ διακεῖσθαί πως ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως, ὑγιεινοὶ δὲ λέγονται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ῥᾳδίως, νοσώδεις δὲ τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ↵ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν ἔχει• τὸ μὲν γὰρ σκληρὸν λέγεται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ ῥᾳδίως διαιρεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μαλακὸν τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου.	Aliud vero genus qualitatis est secundum quod pugillatores vel cursores vel salubres vel insalubres dicimus, et simpliciter quaecumque secundum potentiam naturalem vel impotentiam dicuntur. Non enim quoniam sunt affecti aliquo modo, unumquodque huiusmodi dicitur sed quod habeant potentiam naturalem vel facere quid facile vel nihil pati; ut pugillatores vel cursores dicuntur non quod sint affecti sed quod habeant potentiam hoc facile faciendi, salubres autem dicuntur eo quod habeant potentiam naturalem ut nihil a quibuslibet accidentibus patiantur, insalubres vero quod habeant impotentiam nihil patiendi. Similiter autem et durum et molle sese habent; durum enim dicitur quod habeat potentiam non citius secari, molle vero quod eiusdem ipsius habeat impotentiam.	Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity. Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue of his disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind. Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity to accomplish something with ease. Men are called healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity. Similarly with regard to softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing by reason of the lack of that capacity.
Τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη• ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιάδε οἷον γλυκύτης τε καὶ πικρότης καὶ ↵ στρυφνότης καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ, ἔτι δὲ θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ λευκότης καὶ μελανία. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὗ—ται ποιότητές εἰσιν φανερόν• τὰ γὰρ δεδεγμένα ποιὰ λέγεται κατ' αὐτάς• οἷον τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκύτητα δεδέχθαι λέγεται γλυκύ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν τῷ λευκότητα δε↵δέχθαι• ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει.	Tertium vero genus qualitatis est passibiles qualitates et passiones. Sunt autem huiusmodi ut dulcedo vel amaritudo et omnia his cognata, amplius calor et frigus et albedo et nigredo. Et quoniam hae qualitates sunt, manifestum est; quaecumque enim ista susceperint qualia dicuntur secundum ea; ut mel, quoniam dulcedinem suscepit, dicitur dulce, et corpus album quod albedinem susceperit; similiter autem sese habet etiam in caeteris.	A third class within this category is that of affective qualities and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities. It is evident that these are qualities, for those things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence. Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains whiteness; and so in all other cases.
παθητικαὶ δὲ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα τὰς ποι↵ότητας πεπονθέναι τι• οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλι τῷ πεπονθέναι τι λέγεται γλυκύ, οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν• ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα πεπον↵θέναι τι, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστην τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται• ἥ τε γὰρ γλυκύτης πάθος τι κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἡ θερμότης κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι.	Passibiles vero qualitates dicuntur non quo ea quae illas susceperint qualitates aliquid patiantur; neque enim mel, quoniam aliquid passum sit, idcirco dicitur dulce, nec aliud aliquid huiusmodi; similiter autem his et calor et frigus passibiles dicuntur non quo ea quae eas suscipiunt qualitates aliquid patiantur sed quoniam singulum eorum quae dicta sunt secundum sensus qualitatum passionis perfectiva sunt, passibiles qualitates dicuntur; dulcedo enim passionem quandam secundum gustum efficit, et calor secundum tactum; similiter autem et alia.	The term 'affective quality' is not used as indicating that those things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey is not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this what is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and cold are called affective qualities, not because those things which admit them are affected. What is meant is that these said qualities are capable of producing an 'affection' in the way of perception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these qualities.
λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι χροιαὶ ↵ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῖς εἰρημένοις παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτὰς ἀπὸ πάθους γεγενῆσθαι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν γίγνονται διὰ πάθος πολλαὶ μεταβολαὶ χρωμάτων, δῆλον• αἰσχυνθεὶς γάρ τις ἐρυθρὸς ἐγένετο καὶ φοβηθεὶς ὠχρὸς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων• ὥστε καὶ εἴ τις φύσει τῶν ↵ τοιούτων τι παθῶν πέπονθεν, τὴν ὁμοίαν χροιὰν εἰκός ἐστιν ἔχειν αὐτόν• ἥτις γὰρ νῦν ἐν τῷ αἰσχυνθῆναι διάθεσις τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐγένετο, καὶ κατὰ φυσικὴν σύστασιν ἡ αὐτὴ γένοιτ' ἂν διάθεσις, ὥστε φύσει καὶ τὴν χροιὰν ὁμοίαν γίγνεσθαι.	Albedo autem et nigredo et alii colores non similiter his quae dicta sunt passibiles qualitates dicuntur sed hoc quod hae ipsae ab aliquibus passionibus innascuntur.Quoniam ergo fiunt propter aliquam passionem multae colorum mutationes, manifestum est; erubescens enim aliquis rubicundus factus est et timens pallidus et unumquodque talium.Quare vel si quis naturaliter aliquid talium passionum passus est, similem colorem eum habere oportet; quae enim affectio nunc ad uerecundiam circa corpus facta est, et secundum naturalem constitutionem eadem affectio fit, quare naturaliter color similis fit.	Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because they themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposition of bodily elements, which in the former instance was momentarily present in the case of an access of shame, might be a result of a man's natural temperament, so as to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic.
—ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων ↵ συμπτωμάτων ἀπό τινων παθῶν δυσκινήτων καὶ παραμονίμων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε ποιότητες λέγονται• εἴτε γὰρ ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν συστάσει ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία γεγένηται, ποιότης λέγεται, —ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα,— εἴτε διὰ νόσον μακρὰν ἢ διὰ καῦμα [τὸ αὐτὸ] ↵ συμβέβηκεν ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποκαθ—ίστανται ἢ καὶ διὰ βίου παραμένουσι, ποιότητες καὶ αὐταὶ λέγονται, —ὁμοίως γὰρ ποιοὶ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα.	Quaecumque igitur talium casuum ab aliquibus passionibus difficile mobilibus et permanentibus principium ceperunt, qualitates dicuntur; siue enim [vel] secundum naturalem substantiam pallor aut nigredo facta est, qualitas dicitur (quales enim secundum eas dicimur), siue propter aegritudinem longam vel propter aestum contingit vel nigredo vel pallor, et non facile praeterit et in uita permanet, qualitates et ipsae dicuntur (similiter enim quales secundum eas dicimur).	All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the same way we are said to be such and such because of these.
— ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ῥᾳδίως διαλυομένων καὶ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίγνεται πάθη λέγεται• οὐ γὰρ λέγονται ↵ ποιοί τινες κατὰ ταῦτα• οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὸ αἰσχυνθῆναι ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι ὠχρίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι• ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ.	Quaecumque vero ex his quae facile soluuntur et cito transeunt fiunt, passiones dicuntur; non enim dicimur secundum eas quales; neque enim qui propter uerecundiam rubicundus factus est rubicundus dicitur, nec cui pallor propter timorem uenit pallidus sed magis quod aliquid passus sit; quare passiones huiusmodi dicuntur, qualitates vero minime.	Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such virtue of them. The man who blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather to have been affected. Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities.
bk9b35|↵}γεται. ὅσα τε γὰρ ἐν τῇ γενέσει εὐθὺς ἀπό τινων παθῶν γεγένηται ποιότητες λέγονται, οἷον ἥ τε μανικὴ ↵ ἔκστασις καὶ ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα• ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται, ὀργίλοι τε καὶ μανικοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσαι ἐκστάσεις μὴ φυσικαί, ἀλλ' ἀπό τινων ἄλλων συμπτωμάτων γεγένηνται δυσαπάλλακτοι ἢ καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητοι, ποιό↵τητες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα• ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται. ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταχὺ καθισταμένων γίγνεται πάθη λέγεται, οἷον εἰ λυπούμενος ὀργιλώτερός ἐστιν• οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ὀργίλος ὁ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει ὀργιλώτερος ὤν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι• ὥστε πάθη μὲν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ↵ ποιότητες δὲ οὔ.	Similiter autem his et secundum animam passibiles qualitates et passiones dicuntur. Quaecumque enim mox in nascendo ab aliquibus passionibus fiunt, qualitates dicuntur, ut dementia vel ira vel alia huiusmodi; quales enim secundum eas dicimur, id est iracundi et dementes. Similiter autem et quaecumque alienationes non naturaliter sed ab aliquibus aliis casibus factae sunt difficile praetereuntes et omnino immobiles, etiam huiusmodi qualitates sunt; quales enim secundum eas dicimur. Quaecumque enim ex his quae citius praetereunt fiunt, passiones dicuntur, ut si quis contristatus iracundior est; non enim dicitur iracundus qui in huiusmodi passione iracundior est sed magis aliquid passus; quare passiones quidem huiusmodi dicuntur, qualitates vero minime.	In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of the soul. That temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or irascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal psychic states which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other elements, and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and such. Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be affected. Such conditions are therefore termed, not qualities, but affections.
Τέταρτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος σχῆμά τε καὶ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχουσα μορφή, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις εὐθύτης καὶ καμπυλότης καὶ εἴ τι τούτοις ὅμοιόν ἐστιν• καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων ποιόν τι λέγεται• τῷ γὰρ τρίγωνον ἢ τε↵τράγωνον εἶναι ποιόν τι λέγεται, καὶ τῷ εὐθὺ ἢ καμπύλον. καὶ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν δὲ ἕκαστον ποιόν τι λέγεται.	Quartum vero genus qualitatis est forma et circa aliquid constans figura; ad haec quoque rectitudo vel curuitas, et si quid his simile est; secundum enim unumquodque eorum quale quid dicitur; quod enim est triangulum vel quadratum quale quid dicitur, et quod est rectum vel curuum. Et secundum figuram vero unumquodque quale dicitur.	The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved; in fact a thing's shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of it.
τὸ δὲ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον δόξειε μὲν ἂν ποιὸν σημαίνειν, ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλότρια τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι τῆς περὶ τὸ ποιὸν διαιρέσεως• θέσιν γάρ τινα μᾶλλον ↵ φαίνεται τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον δηλοῦν• πυκνὸν μὲν γὰρ τῷ τὰ μόρια σύνεγγυς εἶναι ἀλλήλοις, μανὸν δὲ τῷ διεστάναι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων• καὶ λεῖον μὲν τῷ ἐπ' εὐθείας πως τὰ μόρια κεῖσθαι, τραχὺ δὲ τῷ τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχειν τὸ δὲ ἐλλείπειν.	Rarum vero et spissum vel asperum vel lene putabitur quidem qualitatem significare, videntur autem aliena esse huiusmodi a qualitatis diuisione; quandam enim quodammodo positionem videtur partium utrumque monstrare; spissum quidem eo quod partes sibi ipsae propinquae sint, rarum vero quod distent a se invicem; et lene quidem quod in rectum sibi partes iaceant, asperum vero cum haec quidem pars superet, illa vero sit inferior.	Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a class different from that of quality. For it is rather a certain relative position of the parts composing the thing thus qualified which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms. A thing is dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices between the parts; smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; rough, because some parts project beyond others.
↵ — ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλος ἄν τις φανείη τρόπος ποιότητος, ἀλλ' οἵ γε μάλιστα λεγόμενοι σχεδὸν τοσοῦτοί εἰσιν.	Et fortasse alii quoque appareant qualitatis modi sed qui maxime dicuntur hi sunt.	There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated.
Ποιότητες μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ εἰρημέναι, ποιὰ δὲ τὰ κατὰ ταύτας παρωνύμως λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ' αὐτῶν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πλείστων καὶ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ πάντων πα↵ρωνύμως λέγεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς λευκότητος ὁ λευκὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὁ δίκαιος, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	Qualitates ergo sunt haec quae dicta sunt, qualia vero quae secundum haec denominatiue dicuntur, vel quomodolibet ab his.In pluribus quidem et paene in omnibus denominatiue dicuntur, ut ab albedine albus et a grammatica grammaticus et a iustitia iustus, similiter autem et in caeteris.	These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, indeed in almost all cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of the quality. Thus the terms 'whiteness', 'grammar', 'justice', give us the adjectives 'white', 'grammatical', 'just', and so on.
ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ κεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται παρωνύμως ἀπ' αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι• οἷον ὁ δρομικὸς ἢ ὁ πυκτικὸς ὁ ↵ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν λεγόμενος ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς ποιότητος ↵ παρωνύμως λέγεται• οὐ γὰρ κεῖται ὀνόματα ταῖς δυνάμεσι καθ' ἃς οὗτοι ποιοὶ λέγονται, ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καθ' ἃς πυκτικοὶ ἢ παλαιστρικοὶ οἱ κατὰ διάθεσιν λέγονται, —πυκτικὴ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται καὶ παλαιστρική, ποιοὶ δὲ ἀπὸ ↵ τούτων παρωνύμως οἱ διακείμενοι λέγονται.— ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνόματος κειμένου οὐ λέγεται παρωνύμως τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν ποιὸν λεγόμενον, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος• τῷ γὰρ ἀρετὴν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, ἀλλ' οὐ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς• οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῶν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.	In aliquibus vero propterea quod qualitatibus nomina non sunt posita impossibile est ab his denominatiue dici, ut cursor vel pugillator, si secundum potentiam naturalem dicitur, a nulla qualitate denominatiue dicitur; neque enim positum est nomen illis potestatibus: secundum quas isti quales dicuntur, quemadmodum etiam in disciplinis secundum quas vel pugillatores vel palaestrici secundum affectionem dicuntur (pugillatoria enim disciplina dicitur et palaestrica, quales vero ab his denominatiue qui ad eas sunt affecti dicuntur). Aliquando autem et posito nomine denominatiue non dicitur id quod secundum ipsam quale quid dicitur, ut a uirtute probus dicitur; hoc enim quod habet uirtutem probus dicitur sed non denominatiue a uirtute; non est autem hoc in multis.	There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the name given to the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, is not derived from that of any quality; for lob those capacities have no name assigned to them. In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from the science, with reference to which men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called 'boxing' or 'wrestling' as the case may be, and the name given to those disposed in this way is derived from that of the science. Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that which takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his character from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the name given him is not derived from the word 'integrity'. Yet this does not occur often.
ποιὰ ↵ οὖν λέγεται τὰ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ' αὐτῶν.	Qualia ergo dicuntur quaecumque ex his quae dictae sunt qualitatibus denominatiue dicuntur vel quolibet alio ab ipsis modo.	We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent on it.
Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, οἷον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον καὶ λευκότης μελανίᾳ καὶ τἆλλα ὡσαύτως, καὶ τὰ κατ' αὐτὰς δὲ ποιὰ λεγόμενα, οἷον τὸ ↵ ἄδικον τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι. οὐκ ἐπὶ πάν—των δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον• τῷ γὰρ πυῤῥῷ ἢ ὠχρῷ ἢ ταῖς τοιαύταις χροιαῖς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον ποιοῖς οὖσιν.	Inest autem et contrarietas secundum qualitatem, ut iustitia iniustitiae contrarium est et albedo nigredini et alia similiter; et secundum eas qualia quae dicuntur, ut iustum iniusto et album nigro. Non autem hoc in omnibus est; rubeo enim et pallido et huiusmodi coloribus nihil est contrarium cum qualitates sint.	One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is contrary to that which is just, that which is white to that which is black. This, however, is not always the case. Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no contraries.
—ἔτι ἐὰν τῶν ἐναντίων θάτερον ᾖ ποιόν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔσται ποιόν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον προχειριζομένῳ τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας, οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ↵ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον, ποιὸν δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ποιὸν ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀδικία• οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν ἐφαρμόζει τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε πρός τι οὔτε πού, οὐδ' ὅλως τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ποιόν• ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἐναν↵τίων.	Amplius: si ex contrariis unum fuerit quale, et reliquum erit quale. Hoc autem manifestum est omnia alia praedicamenta proferenti, ut si est iustitia iniustitiae contrarium, qualitas est autem iustitia, nihilo minus qualitas erit iniustitia; nullum enim aliud praedicamentum convenit iniustitiae, nec quantitas nec relatio nec ubi nec omnino aliquid huiusmodi, nisi sola qualitas; similiter autem et in aliis secundum qualitatem contrariis.	If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply the names used to denote the other categories; for instance, granted that justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality, injustice will also be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any other category but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice. So it is with all other contraries falling under the category of quality.
Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὰ ποιά• λευκὸν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται, καὶ δίκαιον ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον. καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνει, —λευκὸν γὰρ ὂν ἔτι ἐνδέχεται λευκότερον γενέσθαι•	Suscipit autem qualitas magis et minus; album et enim magis et minus alterum altero dicitur, et iustum alterum altero magis. Et idem ipsum sumit intentionem (album enim cum sit, contingit illud fieri albius);	Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter.
— οὐ ↵ πάντα δέ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα• δικαιοσύνη γὰρ δικαιοσύνης εἰ λέγεται μᾶλλον ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων. ἔνιοι γὰρ διαμφισβητοῦσι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων• δικαιοσύνην μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης οὐ πάνυ φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεσθαι, οὐδὲ ὑγίειαν ὑγιείας, ↵ ἧττον μέντοι ἔχειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου ὑγίειάν φασι, καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἧττον ἕτε↵ρον ἑτέρου, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γραμματικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας διαθέσεις. ἀλλ' οὖν τά γε κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμενα ἀναμφισβητήτως ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον• γραμματικώτερος γὰρ ἕτερος ἑτέρου λέγεται καὶ δικαιότερος καὶ ↵ ὑγιεινότερος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως.	hoc autem in omnibus non est sed in pluribus; dubitabit enim quis an iustitia magis esse iustitia dicatur; similiter autem et in aliis affectionibus. Quidam vero in hoc dubitant; dicunt enim iustitiam iustitia non nimis magis vel minus dici, nec sanitatem sanitate; minus autem habere alterum altero sanitatem dicunt, et iustitiam minus alterum altero habere, similiter et grammaticam et alias disciplinas. Sed secundum eas qualia quae dicuntur indubitate suscipiunt magis et minus; magis enim grammaticus alter altero dicitur et iustior et sanior, et in aliis similiter.	Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to all those qualities which are dispositions. There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility of variation here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people vary in the degree in which they possess these qualities, and that this is the case with grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed as dispositions. However that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for one man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy or just, than another, and so on.
τρίγωνον δὲ καὶ τετράγωνον οὐ δοκεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπιδέχεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων σχημάτων οὐδέν• τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιδεχόμενα τὸν τοῦ τριγώνου λόγον καὶ τὸν τοῦ κύκλου πάνθ' ὁμοίως τρίγωνα ἢ κύκλοι εἰσίν, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἐπιδεχομένων οὐδὲν ↵ ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον ῥηθήσεται• οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τετράγωνον τοῦ ἑτε—ρομήκους κύκλος ἐστίν• οὐδέτερον γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται τὸν τοῦ κύκλου λόγον. ἁπλῶς δέ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιδέχηται ἀμφότερα τὸν τοῦ προκειμένου λόγον, οὐ ῥηθήσεται τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου μᾶλλον. οὐ πάντα οὖν τὰ ποιὰ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.	Triangulum vero et quadratum non videtur magis suscipere, nec aliquid aliarum formarum.Quaecumque enim definitionem trianguli suscipiunt et circuli, omnia similiter triangula vel circuli sunt, de his autem quae non suscipiunt nihil magis alterum altero dicitur; nihil enim quadratum magis quam parte altera longior forma circulus est; nullum enim ipsorum suscipit circuli rationem. Simpliciter autem, si utraque non suscipiunt propositi rationem, non dicitur alterum altero magis. Non igitur omnia qualia suscipiunt magis et minus.	The qualities expressed by the terms 'triangular' and 'quadrangular' do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any that have to do with figure. For those things to which the definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to which the same definition is not applicable, cannot be said to differ from one another in degree; the square is no more a circle than the rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the circle appropriate. In short, if the definition of the term proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of degree.
↵ Τῶν μὲν οὖν εἰρημένων οὐδὲν ἴδιον ποιότητος, ὅμοια δὲ καὶ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιότητας λέγεται• ὅμοιον γὰρ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ καθ' ὃ ποιόν ἐστιν. ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη ποιότητος τὸ ὅμοιον ἢ ἀνόμοιον λέγεσθαι κατ' αὐτήν.	Ex his ergo quae dicta sunt nihil est proprium qualitatis.Simile autem et dissimile secundum solas dicuntur qualitates; simile enim alterum alteri non est secundum aliud nisi secundum hoc quod quale est. Quare proprium erit qualitatis secundum eam simile et dissimile dici.	Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive feature. One thing is like another only with reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark of quality.
↵ Οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταράττεσθαι μή τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρός τι συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι• τὰς γὰρ ἕξεις καὶ τὰς διαθέσεις τῶν πρός τι εἶναι. σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ γένη πρός τι λέγεται, τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα οὐδέν• ἡ μὲν γὰρ ↵ ἐπιστήμη, γένος οὖσα, αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, —τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται.— τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα οὐδὲν αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐ λέγεται τινὸς γραμματικὴ οὐδ' ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς μουσική, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα κατὰ τὸ γένος καὶ αὗται πρός τι λέγεται• οἷον ἡ ↵ γραμματικὴ λέγεται τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς γραμματική, καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς μουσική• ὥστε αἱ καθ' ἕκαστα οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι.	At vero non decet conturbari ne quis nos dicat de qualitate propositionem facientes multa de relatiuis interposuisse; habitudines enim et affectiones eorum quae sunt ad aliquid esse diximus. Paene enim ea quae sunt in omnibus his generibus ad aliquid dicuntur, eorum vero quae sunt singulatim nihil; scientia enim, quae genus est, hoc ipsum quod est alterius dicitur (alicuius enim scientia dicitur), singulorum vero nihil hoc ipsum quod est alterius dicitur, ut grammatica non dicitur alicuius grammatica nec musica alicuius musica sed si forte secundum genus proprium et istae dicuntur alicuius; ut grammatica alicuius dicitur scientia, non alicuius grammatica, et musica alicuius scientia, non alicuius musica; quare singula non sunt relativa.	We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were relative. In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge of something. But particular branches of knowledge are not thus explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all, are relative only in virtue of their genera; thus grammar is said be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, not the music of something. Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative.
λεγόμεθα δὲ ποιοὶ ταῖς καθ' ἕκαστα• ταύτας γὰρ καὶ ἔχομεν, —ἐπιστήμονες γὰρ λεγόμεθα τῷ ἔχειν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐπιστημῶν τινά•— ὥστε ↵ αὗται ἂν καὶ ποιότητες εἴησαν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστα, καθ' ἅς ποτε καὶ ποιοὶ λεγόμεθα• αὗται δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι.— ἔτι εἰ τυγχάνει τὸ αὐτὸ ποιὸν καὶ πρός τι ὄν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς γένεσιν αὐτὸ καταριθμεῖσθαι. <.........>	Dicimur autem quales secundum singula; haec enim et habemus (scientes enim dicimur quod habemus singulas scientias); quare haec erunt etiam qualitates, quae singulatim sunt, secundum quas et quales dicimur; haec autem non sunt eorum quae sunt ad aliquid. Amplius si contingat idem et quale esse et relatiuum, nihil est inconveniens in utrisque hoc generibus annumerare.	And it is because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are said to be such and such. It is these that we actually possess: we are called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch. Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which we are sometimes said to be such and such, are themselves qualities, and are not relative. Further, if anything should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads.
Κεφάλαιο 9[Επεξεργασία]	C. IX [9] DE FACERE ET PATI
↵ Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἐναντιό—τητα καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον• τὸ γὰρ θερμαίνειν τῷ ψύχειν ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι τῷ ψύχεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι τῷ λυπεῖσθαι• ὥστε ἐπιδέχεται ἐναντιότητα. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ↵ τὸ ἧττον• θερμαίνειν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἔστι, καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον• ἐπιδέχεται οὖν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν. <........> Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτων τοσαῦτα λέγεται•	Suscipit autem et facere et pati contrarietatem et magis et minus; calefacere enim et frigidum facere contraria sunt, et calefieri et frigidum fieri, et delectari et contristari; quare suscipit contrarietatem facere et pati. Et magis autem et minus; est enim calefacere et magis et minus, et calefieri magis et minus, et contristari. Suscipiunt ergo et magis et minus facere et pati. Ac de his quidem haec dicta sunt.	Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of degree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being heated of being cooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus they admit of contraries. They also admit of variation of degree: for it is possible to heat in a greater or less degree; also to be heated in a greater or less degree. Thus action and affection also admit of variation of degree. So much, then, is stated with regard to these categories.
εἴρηται δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κεῖσθαι ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, ὅτι παρωνύμως ἀπὸ ↵ τῶν θέσεων λέγεται. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, τοῦ τε ποτὲ καὶ τοῦ ποὺ καὶ τοῦ ἔχειν, διὰ τὸ προφανῆ εἶναι οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλο λέγεται ἢ ὅσα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐῤῥήθη, ὅτι τὸ ἔχειν μὲν σημαίνει τὸ ὑποδεδέσθαι, τὸ ὡπλίσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποὺ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὅσα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐῤῥήθη.	Dictum est autem et de situ in relatiuis, quoniam denominatiue a positionibus dicitur. De reliquis vero, id est quando et ubi et habere, propterea quod manifesta sunt, nihil de his ultra dicitur quam quod in principio dictum est, quod habere significat calciatum esse vel armatum, ubi vero in Lycio, vel alia quaecumque de his dicta sunt. Igitur de his generibus quae proposuimus sufficienter dictum est.	We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their names from those of the corresponding attitudes. As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily intelligible, I say no more about them than was said at the beginning, that in the category of state are included such states as 'shod', 'armed', in that of place 'in the Lyceum' and so on, as was explained before. The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with.
↵ —ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τῶν προτεθέντων γενῶν ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρημένα• περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ποσαχῶς εἴωθε ἀντιτίθεσθαι, ῥητέον.]
Κεφάλαιο 10[Επεξεργασία]	C. X [10] DE OPPOSITIS
Λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικεῖσθαι τετραχῶς, ἢ ὡς τὰ πρός τι, ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, ἢ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις. ἀντίκειται δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν ↵ τοιούτων, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ὡς μὲν τὰ πρός τι οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον τῷ ἡμίσει, ὡς δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οἷον τὸ κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ὡς δὲ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν οἷον τυφλότης καὶ ὄψις, ὡς δὲ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις οἷον κάθηται—οὐ κάθηται.	Quotiens solent opponi, dicendum est. Dicitur autem alterum alteri opponi quadrupliciter, aut ut ad aliquid, aut ut contraria, aut ut habitus et privatio, aut ut affirmatio et negatio. Opponitur autem unumquodque istorum, ut sit figuratim dicere, ut relativa ut duplum medio, ut contraria ut bonum malo, ut secundum privationem et habitum ut caecitas et visus, ut affirmatio et negatio ut sedet -- non sedet.	We must next explain the various senses in which the term 'opposite' is used. Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives. Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of the word 'opposite' with reference to correlatives is afforded by the expressions 'double' and 'half'; with reference to contraries by 'bad' and 'good'. Opposites in the sense of 'privatives' and 'positives' are' blindness' and 'sight'; in the sense of affirmatives and negatives, the propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit'.
Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται αὐτὰ ἅπερ ↵ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς αὐτά• οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦ ἡμίσεος αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ διπλάσιον λέγεται• καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται, καὶ λέγεταί γε ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ• καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν δὲ αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀν↵τικείμενον λέγεται τὴν ἐπιστήμην• τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τινὶ λέγεται ἐπιστητὸν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.	Quaecumque igitur ut relativa opponuntur, ea ipsa quae sunt oppositorum dicuntur, aut quomodolibet aliter ad ea; ut duplum medii, hoc ipsum quod est, dicitur duplum; et scientia scibilis rei scientia ut ad aliquid opponitur, et dicitur scientia, hoc ipsum quod est, scibilis; et scibile, hoc ipsum quod est, ad oppositum dicitur, scilicet scientiam (scibile enim aliqua scientia scibile dicitur).	(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference being indicated by the preposition 'of' or by some other preposition. Thus, double is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the double of something. Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing known, in the same sense; and the thing known also is explained by its relation to its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained as that which is known by something, that is, by knowledge.
Ὅσα οὖν ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται• τὰ δὲ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, αὐτὰ μὲν ἅπερ ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα λέ↵γεται, ἐναντία μέντοι ἀλλήλων λέγεται• οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ κακοῦ λέγεται ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἐναντίον, οὔτε τὸ λευκὸν τοῦ μέλανος λευκόν, ἀλλ' ἐναντίον. ὥστε διαφέρουσιν αὗται αἱ ἀντιθέσεις ἀλλήλων.	Quaecumque ergo opponuntur ut ad aliquid, ea ipsa quae sunt oppositorum vel alio quolibet modo ad se invicem dicuntur. Illa vero quae ut contraria, ipsa quidem quae sunt nullo modo ad invicem dicuntur, contraria vero sibi invicem dicuntur; neque enim bonum mali dicitur bonum sed contrarium; nec album nigri album sed contrarium.Quare differunt istae oppositiones invicem.	Such things, then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of being correlatives are explained by a reference of the one to the other. (ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other. The good is not spoken of as the good of the had, but as the contrary of the bad, nor is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the contrary of the black. These two types of opposition are therefore distinct.
—ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ↵ ὥστε ἐν οἷς πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον• [ὧν δέ γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον πάντως.] οἷον νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου πέφυκε ↵ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ τοῦ ζῴου σώματι ἢ νόσον ἢ ὑγίειαν• καὶ περιττὸν δὲ καὶ ἄρτιον ἀριθμοῦ κατηγορεῖται, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὑπάρχειν ἢ περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον•	Quaecumque vero contrariorum talia sunt ut in quibus nata sunt fieri et de quibus praedicantur, necessarium sit alterum ipsorum inesse, nihil eorum medium est (quorum autem non est necessarium alterum inesse, horum omnium est aliquid medium); ut aegritudo et sanitas in corpore animalis nata est fieri, et necesse est alterum ipsorum inesse animalis corpori, aut aegritudinem aut sanitatem; et par quidem et impar de numero praedicatur, et necesse est horum alterum numero inesse, vel par vel impar;	Those contraries which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally present, or of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain either the one or the other of them, have no intermediate, but those in the case of which no such necessity obtains, always have an intermediate. Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body of an animal. Odd and even, again, are predicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the other should be present in numbers.
καὶ οὐκ ἔστι γε τούτων οὐδὲν ἀνὰ μέσον, οὔτε νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας οὔτε περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου. ὧν ↵ δέ γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον• οἷον μέλαν καὶ λευκὸν ἐν σώματι πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τῷ σώματι, — οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἤτοι λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἐστίν•— καὶ φαῦλον δὲ καὶ σπουδαῖον κατηγορεῖται μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀνθρώπου καὶ κατ' ↵ ἄλλων πολλῶν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν κατηγορεῖται• οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἤτοι φαῦλα ἢ σπουδαῖά ἐστιν.	et non est horum aliquid medium, neque aegritudinis neque sanitatis, neque imparis neque paris. Quorum autem nor est necessarium alterum inesse, horum est aliquid medium; ut album et nigrum in corpore natum est fieri, et non est necesse alterum eorum inesse corpori (non enim omne corpus vel album vel nigrum est); et probum et improbum dicitur quidem de homine et de aliis pluribus, non est autem necesse alterum inesse his de quibus praedicatur; non enim omnia aut proba sunt aut improba.	Now there is no intermediate between the terms of either of these two pairs. On the other hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an intermediate. Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body, inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or black. Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of many other things, but it is not necessary that either the one quality or the other should be present in that of which they are predicated: it is not true to say that everything that may be good or bad must be either good or bad.
καὶ ἔστι γέ τι τούτων ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον τοῦ μὲν λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ ὠχρὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα χρώματα, τοῦ δὲ φαύλου καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ οὔτε φαῦλον οὔτε ↵ σπουδαῖον.	Et est aliquid horum medium, ut albi et nigri venetum vel pallidum vel quicumque alii colores sunt, foedi vero et pulchri quod neque pulchrum est neque foedum.	These pairs of contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white and black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between; the intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one nor the other.
ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα κεῖται τοῖς ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ ὠχρόν• ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ ὀνόματι μὲν οὐκ εὔπορον τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀποδοῦναι, τῇ δὲ ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἀποφάσει τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ὁρίζεται,οἷον τὸ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν καὶ ↵ οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον.	In aliquibus quidem medietatibus posita sunt nomina, ut albi et nigri venetum et pallidum; in aliquibus vero non est nomine assignare medietatem, utriusque vero negatione definitur, ut nec bonum nec malum, nec iustum nec iniustum.	Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all the other colours that come between white and black; in other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust.
Στέρησις δὲ καὶ ἕξις λέγεται μὲν περὶ ταὐτόν τι, οἷον ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ τυφλότης περὶ ὀφθαλμόν• καθόλου δὲ εἰπεῖν, ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ἡ ἕξις γίγνεσθαι, περὶ τοῦτο λέγεται ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν. ἐστερῆσθαι δὲ τότε λέγομεν ἕκαστον τῶν τῆς ἕξεως δεκτικῶν, ↵ ὅταν ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν μηδαμῶς ὑπάρχῃ• νωδόν τε γὰρ λέγομεν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὀδόντας, καὶ τυφλὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν• τινὰ γὰρ ἐκ γενετῆς οὔτε ὄψιν οὔτε ὀδόντας ἔχει, ἀλλ' οὐ λέγεται νωδὰ οὐδὲ τυφλά.	Privatio vero et habitus dicuntur quidem circa idem aliquid, ut uisio et caecitas circa oculum; uniuersaliter autem dicere est in quo nascitur habitus fieri, circa hoc dicitur utrumque eorum.Privari vero tunc dicimus unumquodque habitus susceptibilium, quando in quo natum est inesse vel quando natum est habere nullo modo habet.Edentulum enim dicimus non qui non habet dentes, nec caecum qui non habet uisionem sed qui, quando contigit habere, non habet (multa enim ex natiuitate neque dentes habent neque uisionem sed non dicuntur edentula neque caeca).	(iii) 'privatives' and 'Positives' have reference to the same subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to that to which the particular 'positive' is natural. We say that that is capable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation when the faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that in which, and at the time at which, it should naturally be present. We do not call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature it should. For there are some creatures which from birth are without sight, or without teeth, but these are not called toothless or blind.
↵ τὸ δὲ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν οὐκ ἔστι στέρησις καὶ ἕξις• ἕξις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, στέρησις δὲ ἡ τυφλότης, τὸ δὲ ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄψις, οὐδὲ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τυφλότης• στέρησις γάρ τις ἡ τυφλότης ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τυφλὸν εἶναι ἐστερῆσθαι, οὐ στέρησίς ἐστιν. ἔτι εἰ ἦν ἡ τυφλότης ταὐ↵τὸν τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι, κατηγορεῖτο ἂν ἀμφότερα κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ• ἀλλὰ τυφλὸς μὲν λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τυφλότης ↵ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐδαμῶς λέγεται.	Privari vero et habere habitum non est habitus et privatio; habitus enim est visus, privatio vero caecitas, habere autem visum non est visus, nec caecum esse caecitas (privatio enim quaedam est caecitas, caecum vero esse privari, non privatio est).Nam si idem esset caecitas et caecum esse, utraque de eodem praedicarentur; nunc vero minime sed caecus quidem dicitur homo, caecitas vero nullo modo dicitur.	To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the corresponding 'privative' or 'positive'. 'Sight' is a 'positive', 'blindness' a 'privative', but 'to possess sight' is not equivalent to 'sight', 'to be blind' is not equivalent to 'blindness'. Blindness is a 'privative', to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is not a 'privative'. Moreover, if 'blindness' were equivalent to 'being blind', both would be predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said to be blind, he is by no means said to be blindness.
ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δοκεῖ, τὸ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχειν ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις• ὁ γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός• ὡς γὰρ ἡ τυφλότης τῇ ὄψει ἀντίκειται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τῷ ↵ὄψιν ἔχειν ἀντίκειται.	Opponi quidem et ista videntur, privari scilicet et habere habitum, quemadmodum privatio et habitus; idem enim modus est oppositionis; <...>.	To be in a state of 'possession' is, it appears, the opposite of being in a state of 'privation', just as 'positives' and 'privatives' themselves are opposite. There is the same type of antithesis in both cases; for just as blindness is opposed to sight, so is being blind opposed to having sight.
(οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις• ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατάφασις λόγος ἐστὶ καταφατικὸς καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις λόγος ἀποφατικός, τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ ἀπόφασιν οὐδέν ἐστι ↵ λόγος.	Non est autem nec quod sub affirmatione vel negatione est negatio vel affirmatio; affirmatio enim oratio est affirmativa et negatio oratio negativa, eorum vero quae sunt sub affirmatione yel negatione nihil est oratio.	That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or denial. By 'affirmation' we mean an affirmative proposition, by 'denial' a negative. Now, those facts which form the matter of the affirmation or denial are not propositions;
λέγεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀντικεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις• καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός• ὡς γάρ ποτε ἡ κατάφασις πρὸς τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀντίκειται, οἷον τὸ κάθηται—οὐ κάθηται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὑφ' ἑκάτερον πρᾶγμα ἀντίκειται, τὸ καθῆσθαι—↵ μὴ καθῆσθαι.)	Dicuntur autem et ista sibi opponi ut affirmatio et negatio; nam etiam in his modus oppositionis idem est; quemadmodum enim affirmatio ad negationem opponitur, ut sedet - non sedet, sic res quae sub utrisque est sibi opponitur sedere et non sedere.	yet these two are said to be opposed in the same sense as the affirmation and denial, for in this case also the type of antithesis is the same. For as the affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the two propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit', so also the fact which constitutes the matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, to his not sitting.
—ὅτι δὲ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις οὐκ ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι, φανερόν• οὐ γὰρ λέγεται αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου• ἡ γὰρ ὄψις οὐκ ἔστι τυφλότητος ὄψις, οὐδ' ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεται• ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ τυφλότης ↵ λέγοιτ' ἂν τυφλότης ὄψεως, ἀλλὰ στέρησις μὲν ὄψεως ἡ τυφλότης λέγεται, τυφλότης δὲ ὄψεως οὐ λέγεται. ἔτι τὰ πρός τι πάντα πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τυφλότης εἴπερ ἦν τῶν πρός τι, ἀντέστρεφεν ἂν κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται• ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει• οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ἡ ὄψις ↵ τυφλότητος ὄψις.	Quoniam autem privatio et habitus non sic opponuntur ut ad aliquid, manifestum est; neque enim dicitur hoc ipsum quod est oppositi; visus enim non est caecitatis visus, nec alio ullo modo ad ipsum dicitur; similiter autem nec caecitas dicitur caecitas visus sed privatio visus caecitas dicitur <...>. Amplius omnia quaecumque ad aliquid dicuntur conversim dicuntur, quare etiam caecitas, si esset eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, converteretur illud ad quod dicitur; sed non convertuntur; neque enim dicitur visus caecitatis.	It is evident that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by reference to the other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any other preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is not said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight. Relatives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that with which it was correlative. But this is not the case. Sight is not called the sight of blindness.
Ὅτι δὲ οὐδ' ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν λεγόμενα καὶ ἕξιν ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐναντίων, ὧν μηδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν οἷς πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται, θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἀεί• ↵ τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦν ἀνὰ μέσον, ὧν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τῷ δεκτικῷ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ἐπὶ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου•	Quoniam autem neque ut contraria opponuntur ea quae secundum privationem et habitum dicuntur, ex his manifestum est. Quorum enim contrariorum nihil est medium, necesse est, in quibus nata sunt fieri aut de quibus praedicari, alterum ipsorum inesse semper; horum enim nihil erat medium, quorum necesse erat alterum inesse eorum susceptibili, ut in aegritudine et sanitate et impari atque pari.	That those terms which fall under the heads of 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated; for it is those, as we proved,' in the case of which this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate. Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even, as instances.
ὧν δὲ ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον, οὐδέποτε ἀνάγκη παντὶ ὑπάρχειν θάτερον• οὔτε γὰρ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἀνάγκη πᾶν εἶναι τὸ δεκτικόν, οὔτε θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρόν, —τούτων γὰρ ↵ ἀνὰ μέσον τι οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑπάρχειν•— ἔτι δὲ καὶ τούτων ἦν τι ἀνὰ μέσον ὧν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ δεκτικῷ, εἰ μὴ οἷς φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι καὶ τῇ χιόνι τὸ λευκῇ• —ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, καὶ οὐχ ↵ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν• οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ τὴν χιόνα μέλαιναν•— ὥστε παντὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάγκη ↵ τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷς φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν.	Quorum autem est aliquid medium nunquam necesse est omni inesse alterum; nam neque album aut nigrum necesse est omne esse eorum susceptibili, nec frigidum nec calidum (nihil enim prohibet aliquam ipsorum inesse medietatem); erat etiam istorum medietas, quorum non necesse esset alterum inesse eorum susceptibili, nisi forte aliquibus naturaliter contigerit unum ipsorum inesse, ut igni calidum esse et niui album (in his autem necesse est definite unum ipsorum inesse, et non hoc aut illud; neque enim potest ignis esse frigidus nec nix esse nigra); quare non necesse est omnibus eorum susceptibilibus alterum horum inesse sed solis his quibus naturaliter unum inest, et his definite unum, non autem hoc aut illud.	But those contraries which have an intermediate are not subject to any such necessity. It is not necessary that every substance, receptive of such qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot, for something intermediate between these contraries may very well be present in the subject. We proved, moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case of which the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the two contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white, it is necessary determinately that one of the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present in the subject; for fire cannot be cold, or snow black. Thus, it is not the case here that one of the two must needs be present in every subject receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of which the one forms a constitutive property. Moreover, in such cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and not either the one or the other, which must be present.
ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως οὐδέ—τερον τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθές• οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀεὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ ἀναγ↵καῖον θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, —τὸ γὰρ μήπω πεφυκὸς ὄψιν ἔχειν οὔτε τυφλὸν οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχειν λέγεται, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν τοιούτων ἐναντίων ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον•	In privatione vero et habitu neutrum verum est eorum quae dicta sunt, neque enim semper eorum susceptibili necesse est alterum ipsorum inesse; quod enim nondum natum est habere visum neque caecum neque visum habere dicitur,	In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', on the other hand, neither of the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not necessary that a subject receptive of the qualities should always have either the one or the other; that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight is natural is not said either to be blind or to see.
— ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὧν τι ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον• ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ποτε παντὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν• ὅταν γὰρ ἤδη πε↵φυκὸς ᾖ ἔχειν ὄψιν, τότε ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ἔχον ὄψιν ῥηθήσεται, καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀφωρισμένως θάτερον, ἀλλ' ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν, —οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ὄψιν ἔχον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν• — ἐπὶ δέ γε τῶν ἐναντίων, ὧν ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον τι, οὐδέποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἦν παντὶ θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ τισίν, ↵ καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἕν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι κατ' οὐδέτερον τῶν τρόπων ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν ἀντικείμενα.	<...> habens visum dicitur; et horum non definite alterum sed aut hoc aut illud (neque enim necesse est aut caecum aut habentem visum esse sed aut hoc aut illud); in contrariis vero, quorum est medietas, numquam necesse est omni alterum inesse sed aliquibus, et his definite unum. Quare manifestum est quoniam secundum neutrum modum quemadmodum contraria opponuntur [ita sibi sunt] ea quae sunt secundum privationem et habitum opposita.	Thus 'positives' and 'privatives' do not belong to that class of contraries which consists of those which have no intermediate. On the other hand, they do not belong either to that class which consists of contraries which have an intermediate. For under certain conditions it is necessary that either the one or the other should form part of the constitution of every appropriate subject. For when a thing has reached the stage when it is by nature capable of sight, it will be said either to see or to be blind, and that in an indeterminate sense, signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent; for it is not necessary either that it should see or that it should be blind, but that it should be either in the one state or in the other. Yet in the case of those contraries which have an intermediate we found that it was never necessary that either the one or the other should be present in every appropriate subject, but only that in certain subjects one of the pair should be present, and that in a determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in either of the senses in which contraries are opposed.
—ἔτι ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ δεκτικοῦ δυνατὸν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι, εἰ μή τινι φύσει ↵ τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι• καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον δυνατὸν νοσῆσαι καὶ τὸ λευκὸν μέλαν γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμόν, καὶ ἐκ σπουδαίου γε φαῦλον καὶ ἐκ φαύλου σπουδαῖον δυνατὸν γενέσθαι• —ὁ γὰρ φαῦλος εἰς βελτίους διατριβὰς ἀγόμενος καὶ λόγους κἂν μικρόν γέ τι ἐπι↵δοίη εἰς τὸ βελτίω εἶναι• ἐὰν δὲ ἅπαξ κἂν μικρὰν ἐπίδοσιν λάβῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι ἢ τελείως ἂν μεταβάλοι ἢ πάνυ πολλὴν ἂν ἐπίδοσιν λάβοι• ἀεὶ γὰρ εὐκινητότερος πρὸς ἀρετὴν γίγνεται, κἂν ἡντινοῦν ἐπίδοσιν εἰληφὼς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ᾖ, ὥστε καὶ πλείω εἰκὸς ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν• καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον τε↵λείως εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἕξιν ἀποκαθίστησιν, ἐάνπερ μὴ χρόνῳ ἐξείργηται•	Amplius in contrariis, cum sit eorum susceptibile, potest fieri in alterna mutatio, nisi cui naturaliter unum insit, ut igni calido esse; quod enim sanum est potest aegrescere, et album nigrum fieri, et frigidum calidum, et ex probo improbum et ex improbo probum fieri potest (improbus enim in meliorem consuetudinem sermonemque perductus vel parum sese dabit in melius; sin vero vel semel paruam intentionem sumat, manifestum est quoniam aut perfectissime permutetur aut magnam sumat intentionem; semper enim mobilior ad uirtutem fit, si quamlibet a principio sumpserit intentionem, quare erit possibile maiorem illum intentionem sumere; et hoc saepius factum perfecte in contrariam habitudinem consistere, nisi tempore prohibeatur).	Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should be changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its identity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive property of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it is possible that that that which is healthy should become diseased, that which is white, black, that which is cold, hot, that which is good, bad, that which is bad, good. The bad man, if he is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may make some advance, however slight, and if he should once improve, even ever so little, it is plain that he might change completely, or at any rate make very great progress; for a man becomes more and more easily moved to virtue, however small the improvement was at first. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he will make yet greater progress than he has made in the past; and as this process goes on, it will change him completely and establish him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of time.
— ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως ἀδύνατον εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι• ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν στέρησιν γίγνεται μεταβολή, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἕξιν ἀδύνατον• οὔτε γὰρ τυφλὸς γενόμενός ↵ τις πάλιν ἔβλεψεν, οὔτε φαλακρὸς ὢν κομήτης ἐγένετο, οὔτε νωδὸς ὢν ὀδόντας ἔφυσεν.	In privatione vero et habitu impossibile est ad invicem fieri mutationem; ab habitu enim ad privationem fit permutatio, a privatione vero ad habitum impossibile est; neque enim factus aliquis caecus rursus uidit, nec caluus rursus crinitus factus est, nec edentulus dentes creauit.	In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', however, change in both directions is impossible. There may be a change from possession to privation, but not from privation to possession. The man who has become blind does not regain his sight; the man who has become bald does not regain his hair; the man who has lost his teeth does not grow a new set.
Ὅσα δὲ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται, ↵ φανερὸν ὅτι κατ' οὐδένα τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων ἀντίκειται• ἐπὶ μόνων γὰρ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν εἶναι. οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ θάτερον μὲν ἀληθὲς εἶναι θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν ↵ πρός τι, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ στερήσεως• οἷον ὑγίεια καὶ νόσος ἐναντία, καὶ οὐδέτερόν γε οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν• ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν οὐδέτερον οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδος• οὐδέ γε τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν, οἷον ἡ ὄψις καὶ ↵ ἡ τυφλότης• ὅλως δὲ τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν• πάντα δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λέγεται.	Quaecumque vero ut affirmatio et negatio opponuntur, manifestum est quoniam secundum nullum modum eorum qui dict sunt opponuntur; in his enim solis necesse est hoc quidem esse verum illud vero falsum. Nam neque in contrariis necesse est semper alterum esse verum, alterum vero falsum, nec in relatiuis, neque in habitu et privatione; ut sanitas et aegritudo contraria sunt sed neutrum ipsorum neque verum neque falsum est; similiter autem et duplum et medium quae ut ad aliquid opponuntur, non est eorum alterum falsum alterum verum; nec vero ea quae secundum habitum et privationem sunt, ut visus et caecitas. Omnino autem nihil eorum quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur aut verum aut falsum est; omnia autem quae diximus sine complexione dicuntur.	(iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong manifestly to a class which is distinct, for in this case, and in this case only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the other false. Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of correlatives, nor in the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', is it necessary for one to be true and the other false. Health and disease are contraries: neither of them is true or false. 'Double' and 'half' are opposed to each other as correlatives: neither of them is true or false. The case is the same, of course, with regard to 'positives' and 'privatives' such as 'sight' and 'blindness'. In short, where there is no sort of combination of words, truth and falsity have no place, and all the opposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δόξειεν ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν ἐναντίων λεγομένων, —τὸ γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν Σωκράτη τῷ νοσεῖν Σω↵κράτη ἐναντίον ἐστίν,— ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ θάτερον μὲν ἀληθὲς θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος εἶναι• ὄντος μὲν γὰρ Σωκράτους ἔσται τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος, μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ• οὔτε γὰρ τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη οὔτε τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἀληθὲς αὐτοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους.	At vero magis hoc videtur contingere in his quae secundum complexionem dicuntur (sanum enim esse Socratem et aegrotare Socratem contraria sunt) sed nec in his quoque necesse est semper alterum verum esse, alterum autem falsum; cum enim sit Socrates, est hoc quidem verum illud vero falsum, cum autem non sit, utraque falsa sunt; nam neque aegrotare neque sanum esse verum est cum ipse Socrates non sit omnino.	At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would seem to claim this characteristic. 'Socrates is ill' is the contrary of 'Socrates is well', but not even of such composite expressions is it true to say that one of the pair must always be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist, both will be false; for neither 'Socrates is ill' nor 'Socrates is well' is true, if Socrates does not exist at all.
↵ ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως μὴ ὄντος γε ὅλως οὐδέτερον ἀληθές, ὄντος δὲ οὐκ ἀεὶ θάτερον ἀληθές• τὸ γὰρ ὄψιν ἔχειν Σωκράτη τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι Σωκράτη ἀντίκειται ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, καὶ ὄντος γε οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος, —ὅτε γὰρ μήπω ↵ πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ,— μὴ ὄντος δὲ ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους καὶ οὕτω ψευδῆ ἀμφότερα, καὶ τὸ ὄψιν αὐτὸν ἔχειν καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι.	In privatione vero, cum non sit, neutrum verum est, et cum sit, non semper alterum verum est; visum enim habere Socratem et caecum esse Socratem opponun¬tur ut habitus et privatio, et cum sit, non est necesse alterum verum esse vel falsum (quando enim non est natus ut habeat, utraque falsa sunt), cum autem non sit omnino Socrates, sic quoque utraque falsa sunt, et habere eum visum et eum esse caecum.	In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', if the subject does not exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the subject exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other false. For 'Socrates has sight' is the opposite of 'Socrates is blind' in the sense of the word 'opposite' which applies to possession and privation. Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should be true and the other false, for when he is not yet able to acquire the power of vision, both are false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent.
ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς καταφάσεως καὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἀεί, ἐάν τε ᾖ ἐάν τε μὴ ᾖ, τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἔσται ψεῦδος τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀληθές• τὸ γὰρ νοσεῖν Σωκρά↵τη καὶ τὸ μὴ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη, ὄντος τε αὐτοῦ φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, καὶ μὴ ὄντος ὁμοίως• τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοσεῖν μὴ ὄντος ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ μὴ νοσεῖν ἀληθές• ὥστε ἐπὶ μόνων τούτων ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀεὶ θάτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος εἶναι, ὅσα ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπό↵φασις ἀντίκειται.	In affirmatione vero vel negatione semper, vel si sit vel si non sit, alterum ipsorum verum, alterum falsum erit; aegrotare enim Socratem et non aegrotare Socratem, cum sit idem ipse, manifestum est quoniam alterum eorum verum vel falsum est, cum non sit, similiter (namque aegrotum esse, cum non sit, falsum est, non aegrotare vero verum est). Quare in solis his erit semper alterum ipsorum verum esse vel falsum, quaecumque ut affirmatio et negatio opponuntur.	But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject exists or not, one is always false and the other true. For manifestly, if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions 'Socrates is ill', 'Socrates is not ill', is true, and the other false. This is likewise the case if he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to say that he is ill is false, to say that he is not ill is true. Thus it is in the case of those opposites only, which are opposite in the sense in which the term is used with reference to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good, that one of the pair must be true and the other false.
Κεφάλαιο 11[Επεξεργασία]	C. XI [11]
Ἐναντίον δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθῷ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακόν, —τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον τῇ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπαγωγῇ, οἷον ὑγιείᾳ νόσος καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ ↵ ἀδικία καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ δειλία, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,— κακῷ δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν, ὁτὲ δὲ κακόν• τῇ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ κακῷ ὄντι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναντίον κακὸν ὄν• ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐναντία ἑκατέρῳ οὖσα ἀγαθόν. ἐπ' ὀλίγων δ' ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ ↵ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν.	Contrarium autem est bono quidem ex necessitate malum (hoc autem manifestum est ex unaqunque inductione, ut sanitati aegritudo et iustitiae iniustitia et fortitudini timiditas, similiter autem et in aliis), malo vero aliquotiens bonum contrarium est, aliquotiens malum (diminutioni enim, quae mala est, superfluitas quae et ipsa mala est contrarium est). In paucis autem hoc aliquis videbit, in pluribus autem semper malo bonum contrarium est.	That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. But the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil. For defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being an evil, and the mean. which is a good, is equally the contrary of the one and of the other. It is only in a few cases, however, that we see instances of this: in most, the contrary of an evil is a good.
—ἔτι τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν θάτερον ᾖ, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι• ὑγιαινόντων γὰρ ἁπάντων ὑγίεια μὲν ἔσται, νόσος δὲ οὔ• ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λευκῶν ὄντων ἁπάν↵των λευκότης μὲν ἔσται, μελανία δὲ οὔ. ἔτι εἰ τὸ Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνειν τῷ Σωκράτη νοσεῖν ἐναντίον ἐστίν, μὴ ἐνδέχεται δὲ ἅμα ἀμφότερα τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῦ ἑτέρου τῶν ἐναντίων ὄντος καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι• ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνειν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη.	Amplius in contrariis non est necesse, si alterum fuerit, et reliquum esse; sanis enim omnibus, sanitas quidem erit, aegritudo vero minime; similiter et albis omnibus albedo quidem erit, nigredo vero non erit. Amplius, si Socratem sanum esse et Socratem aegrotare contrarium est, et non contingit simul eidem utraque inesse, numquam continget, cum alterum contrariorum sit, reliquum esse; nam cum sit sanum esse Socratem, non erit aegrotare Socratem.	In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy there will be health and no disease, and again, if everything turns white, there will be white, but no black. Again, since the fact that Socrates is ill is the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two contrary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same individual at the same time, both these contraries could not exist at once: for if that Socrates was well was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be one.
↵ Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταὐτὸν ἢ εἴδει ἢ γένει πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι τὰ ἐναντία• νόσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου, λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία ἁπλῶς ἐν σώματι, δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν ψυχῇ.	Manifestum est autem quoniam circa idem vel specie vel genere nata sunt fieri contraria; aegritudo namque et sanitas circa corpus animalis, albedo vero et nigredo simpliciter circa corpus, et iustitia et iniustitia in anima.	It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in subjects which belong to the same species or genus. Disease and health require as their subject the body of an animal; white and black require a body, without further qualification; justice and injustice require as their subject the human soul.
ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ↵ εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι• λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέλαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, —χρῶμα γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ γένος,— δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοιςγένεσιν, —τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή, τοῦ δὲ κακία τὸ γένος,— ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ κακὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη ↵ τινῶν ὄντα.	Necesse est autem omnia contraria aut in eodem genere esse aut in contrariis generibus, vel ipsa esse genera; album quidem et nigrum in eodem genere (color enim ipsorum genus est), iustitia vero et iniustitia in contrariis generibus (huius enim uirtus, huius uitium genus est); bonum vero et malum non sunt in aliquo genere sed ipsa sunt genera.	Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera or be themselves genera. White and black belong to the same genus, colour; justice and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice; while good and evil do not belong to genera, but are themselves actual genera, with terms under them.
Κεφάλαιο 12[Επεξεργασία]	C. XII [12] DE PRIORE
Πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται τετραχῶς• πρῶτον μὲν καὶ κυριώτατα κατὰ χρόνον, καθ' ὃ πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου καὶ παλαιότερον λέγεται, —τῷ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον πλείω εἶναι καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ παλαιότερον λέγεται•	Prius alterum altero dicitur quadrupliciter. Primo quidem et proprie secundum tempus, secundum quod scilicet antiquius alterum altero et senius dicimus (eo enim quod plus est temporis longaeuius et antiquius dicitur).	There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be 'prior' to another. Primarily and most properly the term has reference to time: in this sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is older or more ancient than another, for the expressions 'older' and 'more ancient' imply greater length of time.
— δεύτερον ↵ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, οἷον τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο πρότερον• δυεῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθὺς τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ἑνὸς δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δύο εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ ἀκολούθησις τοῦ εἶναι τὸ λοιπόν, πρότερον δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ἀφ' οὗ μὴ ἀν↵τιστρέφει ἡ τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησις.	Secundo quod non convertitur secundum subsistendi consequentiam, ut unus duobus prius est (cum enim duo sint, consequitur mox unum esse, cum vero sit unum non est necesse duo esse; quare non convertitur ab uno consequentia alterius subsistentiae); prius autem videtur esse illud a quo non convertitur subsistentiae consequentia.	Secondly, one thing is said to be 'prior' to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense 'one' is 'prior' to 'two'. For if 'two' exists, it follows directly that 'one' must exist, but if 'one' exists, it does not follow necessarily that 'two' exists: thus the sequence subsisting cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, that when the sequence of two things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the other depends is called 'prior' to that other.
τρίτον δὲ κατά τινα τάξιν πρότερον λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων• ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον τῇ τάξει, —τὰ γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρότερα τῶν διαγραμμά↵των τῇ τάξει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γραμματικῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα πρότερα τῶν συλλαβῶν,— ἐπί τε τῶν λόγων ὁμοίως, —τὸ γὰρ προοίμιον τῆς διηγήσεως πρότερον τῇ τάξει ἐστίν.—	Tertio vero secundum quendam ordinem prius dicitur, quemadmodum et in disciplinis et in orationibus; in demonstratiuis enim disciplinis inest prius et posterius secundum ordinem (elementa enim priora sunt descriptionibus secundum ordinem, et in grammatica elementa priora sunt syllabis), et in orationibus similiter (exordium enim narratione prius est ordine).	In the third place, the term 'prior' is used with reference to any order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in sciences which use demonstration there is that which is prior and that which is posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are prior to the propositions; in reading and writing, the letters of the alphabet are prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case of speeches, the exordium is prior in order to the narrative.
ἔτι παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον ↵ πρότερον εἶναι τῇ φύσει δοκεῖ• εἰώθασι δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐντιμοτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπωμένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν προτέρους φάσκειν εἶναι• ἔστι μὲν δὴ σχεδὸν ἀλλοτριώτατος τῶν τρόπων οὗτος. Οἱ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενοι τοῦ προτέρου τρόποι το↵σοῦτοί εἰσιν.	Amplius praeter haec omnia, quod melius et honorabilius est, prius natura esse videtur; solent autem plures honoratiores [magis] et quos ipsi maxime uenerantur priores esse dicere; est autem hic modus paene alienissimus.Atque hi quidem qui dicuntur modi prioris isti sunt.	Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which is better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority. In common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love as 'coming first' with them. This sense of the word is perhaps the most far-fetched. Such, then, are the different senses in which the term 'prior' is used.
δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους ἕτερος εἶναι προτέρου τρόπος• τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρεφόντων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν τὸ αἴτιον ὁπωσοῦν θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι πρότερον εἰκότως φύσει λέγοιτ' ἄν. ὅτι δ' ἔστι τινὰ τοιαῦτα, δῆλον•	Videtur autem praeter eos qui dicti sunt alter esse prioris modus; eorum enim quae convertuntur secundum essentiae consequentiam, quod alterius quomodolibet causa est digne prius natura dicitur. Quoniam autem sunt quaedam talia, manifestum est;	Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another. For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be by nature 'prior' to the effect. It is plain that there are instances of this.
τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶ↵ναι ἀκολούθησιν πρὸς τὸν ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον• εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος• καὶ ἀντιστρέφει γε, —εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος•— ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς λόγος οὐδαμῶς αἴτιος τοῦ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὸ μέντοι ↵ πρᾶγμα φαίνεταί πως αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον• τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδὴς λέγεται. ὥστε κατὰ πέντε τρόπους πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγοιτ' ἄν.	nam esse hominem convertitur secundum subsistentiae consequentiam ad verum de eo sermonem; nam, si est homo, verus sermo est quo dicimus quoniam est homo, et convertitur (nam, si verus est: sermo quo dicimus quoniam est homo, hominem esse necesse est); est autem verus sermo nullo modo causa subsistendi rem, res autem videtur quodammodo causa esse ut sermo verus sit; nam, quoniam est res vel non est, verus sermo vel falsus dicitur. Quare secundum quinque modos prius alterum altero dicitur.	The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is, and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is, the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then he is. The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man's being does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition, for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the man's being or not being. Thus the word 'prior' may be used in five senses.
Κεφάλαιο 13[Επεξεργασία]	C. XIII [13] DE HIS QUAE SIMUL SUNT
Ἅμα δὲ λέγεται ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κυριώτατα ὧν ἡ ↵ γένεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ• οὐδέτερον γὰρ πρότερον οὐδὲ ὕστερόν ἐστιν• ἅμα δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ταῦτα λέγεται. φύσει δὲ ἅμα ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον θάτερον θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναί ἐστιν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τοῦ ἡμίσεος• ἀντιστρέφει μὲν ↵ γὰρ ταῦτα, —διπλασίου γὰρ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστιν,— οὐδέτερον δὲ οὐδετέρῳ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναί ἐστιν.	Simul autem dicuntur simpliciter et proprie quorum generatio in eodem tempore est; neutrum enim neutro prius est aut posterius; simul autem secundum tempus ista dicuntur.Naturaliter autem simul sunt quaecumque convertuntur quidem secundum subsistendi consequentiam, si nullo modo alterum alteri subsistendi causa sit, ut duplum et medium; convertuntur enim ista (nam cum sit duplum est medium, et cum sit medium est duplum), neutrum vero neutri subsistendi causa est.	The term 'simultaneous' is primarily and most appropriately applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is simultaneous with that of the other; for in such cases neither is prior or posterior to the other. Such things are said to be simultaneous in point of time. Those things, again, are 'simultaneous' in point of nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is the cause of the other's being. This is the case with regard to the double and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, if there is a double, there is also a half, and if there is a half, there is also a double, while at the same time neither is the cause of the being of the other.
καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἀντιδιῃρημένα ἀλλήλοις ἅμα τῇ φύσει λέγεται. ἀντιδιῃρῆσθαι δὲ λέγεται ↵ ἀλλήλοις τὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν, οἷον τὸ πτηνὸν τῷ πεζῷ καὶ τῷ ἐνύδρῳ• ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντιδιῄρηται ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ὄντα• τὸ γὰρ ζῷον διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα, εἴς τε τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον, καὶ οὐδέν γε τούτων πρότερον ἢ ὕστερόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἅμα τῇ φύσει τὰ ↵ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖ εἶναι• (διαιρεθείη δ' ἂν καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων εἰς εἴδη πάλιν, οἷον τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον.)	Et ea quae ex eodem genere in contrarium dividuntur simul natura esse dicuntur. In contrarium vero dividi dicuntur secundum eandem diuisionem, ut volatile, gressibile et aquatile; haec enim in contrarium dividuntur, cum ex eodem genere sint; animal enim dividitur in volatile, gressibile et aquatile, et nullum horum prius est vel posterius sed simul haec videntur esse natura.Dividitur autem et unumquodque eorum in species iterum secundum eandem diuisionem, ut gressibile animal et volatile et aquatile.	Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be 'simultaneous' in nature. I mean those species which are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of division. Thus the 'winged' species is simultaneous with the 'terrestrial' and the 'water' species. These are distinguished within the same genus, and are opposed each to each, for the genus 'animal' has the 'winged', the 'terrestrial', and the 'water' species, and no one of these is prior or posterior to another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be 'simultaneous' in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial, the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into subspecies.
ἔσται οὖν κἀκεῖνα ἅμα τῇ φύσει, ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσίν ἐστιν• τὰ δὲ γένη τῶν εἰ↵δῶν ἀεὶ πρότερα• οὐ γὰρ ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν• οἷον ἐνύδρου μὲν ὄντος ἔστι ζῷον, ζῴου δὲ ὄντοςοὐκ ἀνάγκη ἔνυδρον εἶναι.	Erunt igitur et illa simul natura, quaecumque ex eodem ipso genere secundum eandem subdiuisionem sunt, genera autem semper priora sunt; non enim convertuntur secundum substantiae consequentiam, ut aquatile quidem cum sit est animal, animal vero cum sit, non necesse est esse aquatile.	Those species, then, also will be 'simultaneous' point of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of differentiation. But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being cannot be reversed. If there is the species 'water-animal', there will be the genus 'animal', but granted the being of the genus 'animal', it does not follow necessarily that there will be the species 'water-animal'.
—ἅμα οὖν τῇ φύσει λέγεται ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον τὸ ↵ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ τοῦ εἶναί ἐστιν, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἀντιδιῃρημένα ἀλλήλοις• ἁπλῶς δὲ ἅμα, ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.	Simul ergo natura esse dicuntur quaecumque convertuntur quidem secundum essentiae consequentiam, nullo autem modo alterum alteri subsistendi causa est, et ex eodem genere quae in contrarium sibi dividuntur; simpliciter autem simul sunt quorum generatio in eodem tempore est.	Those things, therefore, are said to be 'simultaneous' in nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is in any way the cause of the other's being; those species, also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed within the same genus. Those things, moreover, are 'simultaneous' in the unqualified sense of the word which come into being at the same time.
Κεφάλαιο 14[Επεξεργασία]	C. XIV [14] DE MOTU
Κινήσεως δέ ἐστιν εἴδη ἕξ• γένεσις, φθορά, αὔξησις, μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή. ↵ αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κινήσεις φανερὸν ὅτι ἕτεραι ἀλλήλων εἰσίν• οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ γένεσις φθορὰ οὐδέ γε ἡ αὔξησις μείωσις οὐδὲ ἡ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι•	Motus vero sunt species sex: generatio, corruptio, crementum, diminutio, commutatio, secundum locum translatio. Alii quidem motus manifestum est quoniam a se invicem diversi sunt; neque enim est generatio corruptio, nec crementum diminutio nec secundum locum translatio; similiter autem et caeterae.	There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place. It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of movement are distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from destruction, increase and change of place from diminution, and so on.
ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν, μήποτε ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον κατά τινα τῶν λοιπῶν ↵ κινήσεων ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστιν• σχεδὸν γὰρ κατὰ πάντα τὰ πάθη ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι συμβέβηκεν ἡμῖν οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων κοινωνοῦσιν• οὔτε γὰρ αὔξεσθαι ἀναγκαῖον τὸ κατὰ πάθος κινούμενον οὔτε μειοῦσθαι, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσθ' ἑτέρα ἂν ↵ εἴη παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας κινήσεις ἡ ἀλλοίωσις• εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἡ αὐτή, ἔδει τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον εὐθὺς καὶ αὔξεσθαι ἢ μειοῦσθαι ἤ τινα τῶν ἄλλων ἀκολουθεῖν κινήσεων• ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐξόμενον ἤ τινα ἄλλην κίνησιν κινούμενον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι•	In commutatione vero est aliqua dubitatio, ne forte necesse sit quod commutatur secundum aliquem reliquorum motuum commutari. Hoc autem non est verum; paene enim secundum omnes passiones vel multas commutari nobis contingit nullo aliorum motuum communicante; nam neque crescere necesse est quod secundum passionem movetur nec diminui, similiter autem et in aliis: quare diversus erit motus ab aliis commutationibus (nam si idem esset, oporteret omne quod commutatur mox aut crescere aut minui aut aliquem aliorum motuum consequi; sed non est necesse). Similiter autem et quod crescit vel secundum quemlibet alterum motum mutatur.	But in the case of alteration it may be argued that the process necessarily implies one or other of the other five sorts of motion. This is not true, for we may say that all affections, or nearly all, produce in us an alteration which is distinct from all other sorts of motion, for that which is affected need not suffer either increase or diminution or any of the other sorts of motion. Thus alteration is a distinct sort of motion; for, if it were not, the thing altered would not only be altered, but would forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution or some one of the other sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter of fact is not the case. Similarly that which was undergoing the process of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion would, if alteration were not a distinct form of motion, necessarily be subject to alteration also.
ἀλλ' ἔστι τινὰ αὐξανόμενα ἃ οὐκ ↵ ἀλλοιοῦται• οἷον τὸ τετράγωνον γνώμονος περιτεθέντος ηὔξηται μέν, ἀλλοιότερον δὲ οὐδὲν γεγένηται• ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. ὥσθ' ἕτεραι ἂν εἴησαν αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλων.	Sed sunt quaedam quae crescunt et non commutantur, ut quadratum circumposito gnomone creuit quidem sed commutatum non est; similiter autem et in aliis huiusmodi. Quare a se invicem motus isti diversi sunt.	But there are some things which undergo increase but yet not alteration. The square, for instance, if a gnomon is applied to it, undergoes increase but not alteration, and so it is with all other figures of this sort. Alteration and increase, therefore, are distinct.
↵ Ἔστι δὲ ἁπλῶς μὲν κίνησις ἠρεμίᾳ ἐναντίον• ταῖς δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα, γενέσει μὲν φθορά, αὐξήσει δὲ μείωσις• τῇ δὲ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῇ ἡ κατὰ τόπον ἠρεμία μάλιστα ἔοικεν ἀντικεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ ἄρα ἡ εἰς τὸν ἐναντίον ↵ τόπον μεταβολή, οἷον τῇ κάτωθεν ἡ ἄνω, τῇ ἄνωθεν ἡκάτω. τῇ δὲ λοιπῇ τῶν ἀποδοθεισῶν κινήσεων οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἐναντίον, ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲν εἶναι αὐτῇ ἐναντίον, εἰ μή τις καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης τὴν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἠρεμίαν ἀντιθείη <ἢ> τὴ<ν> εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολή<ν>, ↵ καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῆς τὴν κατὰ τόπον ἠρεμίαν ἢ τὴν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τόπον μεταβολήν, —ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις μεταβολὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν•— ὥστε ἀντίκειται τῇ <κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν κινήσει ἡ> κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἠρεμία <ἢ> ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολή, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν γίγ↵νεσθαι τῷ μέλαν γίγνεσθαι• ἀλλοιοῦται γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολῆς γιγνομένης.	Simpliciter autem motus quieti contrarius est; singulis vero motibus, generationi quidem corruptio, diminutio vero cremento, secundum locum translationi secundum locum quies. Maxime autem videtur opponi in contrarium locum permutatio, ut de eo quod est deorsum ad id quod est sursum et de eo quod est sursum ad id quod est deorsum.Reliquo vero de his qui assignati sunt motui non est facile assignare quid sit contrarium, videtur autem neque esse aliquid ei contrarium, nisi quis opponat secundum qualitatem quietem secundum qualitatem translationi quae in contrarium, quemadmodum etiam in ea quae est secundum locum translatione secundum locum quietem vel in contrarium locum translationem (est enim commutatio translatio secundum qualitatem).Quare opponitur ei secundum qualitatem quies vel in contrarium qualitatis translatio, ut album fieri quod est nigrum; commutatur enim, in contrarium qualitatis facta translatione.	Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the different forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms; thus destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution of increase, rest in a place, of change of place. As for this last, change in the reverse direction would seem to be most truly its contrary; thus motion upwards is the contrary of motion downwards and vice versa. In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its contrary. It appears to have no contrary, unless one should define the contrary here also either as 'rest in its quality' or as 'change in the direction of the contrary quality', just as we defined the contrary of change of place either as rest in a place or as change in the reverse direction. For a thing is altered when change of quality takes place; therefore either rest in its quality or change in the direction of the contrary may be called the contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this way becoming white is the contrary of becoming black; there is alteration in the contrary direction, since a change of a qualitative nature takes place.
Κεφάλαιο 15[Επεξεργασία]	C. XV [15] DE HABERE
Τὸ ἔχειν κατὰ πλείονας τρόπους λέγεται• ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἕξιν καὶ διάθεσιν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ποιότητα, —λεγόμεθα γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετήν•— ἢ ὡς ποσόν, ↵ οἷον ὃ τυγχάνει τις ἔχων μέγεθος, —λέγεται γὰρ τρίπηχυ μέγεθος ἔχειν ἢ τετράπηχυ•— ἢ ὡς τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, οἷον ἱμάτιον ἢ χιτῶνα• ἢ ὡς ἐν μορίῳ, οἷον ἐν χειρὶ δακτύλιον• ἢ ὡς μέρος, οἷον χεῖρα ἢ πόδα• ἢ ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ, οἷον ὁ μέδιμνος τοὺς πυροὺς ἢ τὸ κεράμιον τὸν οἶνον, —οἶνον ↵ γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ κεράμιον λέγεται, καὶ ὁ μέδιμνος πυρούς• ταῦτ' οὖν ἔχειν λέγεται ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ•— ἢ ὡς κτῆμα• ἔχειν γὰρ οἰκίαν καὶ ἀγρὸν λεγόμεθα. λεγόμεθα δὲ καὶ γυναῖκα ἔχειν καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἄνδρα• ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλοτριώτατος ὁ νῦν ῥηθεὶς τρόπος τοῦ ἔχειν εἶναι• οὐδὲν ↵ γὰρ ἄλλο τῷ ἔχειν γυναῖκα σημαίνομεν ἢ ὅτι συνοικεῖ. ἴσως δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς φανείησαν τοῦ ἔχειν τρόποι, οἱ δὲ εἰωθότες λέγεσθαι σχεδὸν ἅπαντες κατηρίθμηνται.	Habere secundum plures modos dicitur aut enim ut habitum vel affectionem vel aliam aliquam qualitatem (dicimur enim scientiam habere et uirtutem); aut ut quantitatem, ut quam quisque habet magnitudinem (dicitur enim bicubitam vel tricubitam habere magnitudinem); aut circa corpus uestitum aut tunicam; aut in parte (ut in manu anulum); aut partem (ut manum vel pedem); aut in uase (ut modius triticum vel dolium uinum; uinum enim dolium habere dicitur, et modius triticum; haec igitur habere dicuntur ut in uase); vel ut possessionem (habere enim domum vel agrum dicimur). Dicimur vero et habere uxorem et uxor uirum; videtur autem alienissimus esse habendi modus qui nunc dictus est; nihil enim aliud habere uxorem significat quam cohabitare. Fortasse autem et alii habendi modi videbuntur; qui autem solent dici paene omnes sunt annumerati.	The term 'to have' is used in various senses. In the first place it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other quality, for we are said to 'have' a piece of knowledge or a virtue. Then, again, it has reference to quantity, as, for instance, in the case of a man's height; for he is said to 'have' a height of three or four cubits. It is used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man being said to 'have' a coat or tunic; or in respect of something which we have on a part of ourselves, as a ring on the hand: or in respect of something which is a part of us, as hand or foot. The term refers also to content, as in the case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is said to 'have' wine, and a corn-measure wheat. The expression in such cases has reference to content. Or it refers to that which has been acquired; we are said to 'have' a house or a field. A man is also said to 'have' a wife, and a wife a husband, and this appears to be the most remote meaning of the term, for by the use of it we mean simply that the husband lives with the wife. Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most ordinary ones have all been enumerated.