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Chapter 1

Greek Latin English
METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER NONUS Aristotle Metaphysics Book 9 (Θ)
[1045β] [27] περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πρώτως ὄντος καὶ πρὸς ὃ πᾶσαι αἱ ἄλλαι κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος ἀναφέρονται εἴρηται, περὶ τῆς οὐσίας (κατὰ γὰρ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον λέγεται τἆλλα [30] ὄντα, τό τε ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ τἆλλα τὰ οὕτω λεγόμενα: πάντα γὰρ ἕξει τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις): ἐπεὶ δὲ λέγεται τὸ ὂν τὸ μὲν τὸ τὶ ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἐντελέχειαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον, διορίσωμεν καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως [35] καὶ ἐντελεχείας, καὶ πρῶτον περὶ δυνάμεως ἣ λέγεται μὲν μάλιστα κυρίως, οὐ μὴν χρησιμωτάτη γέ ἐστι πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα νῦν: [1046α] [1] ἐπὶ πλέον γάρ ἐστιν ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῶν μόνον λεγομένων κατὰ κίνησιν. > De primo quidem igitur ente et ad quod omnes aliae cathegorie entis referuntur dictum est, de substantia. Nam secundum substantiae rationem dicuntur alia entia: quantitas, qualitas et alia sic dicta; omnia namque rationem habebunt substantiae, ut diximus in primis sermonibus. Quoniam vero dicitur ens hoc quidem eo quod quid aut qualitas aut quantitas, aliud secundum potentiam et actum et secundum opus, determinabimus et de potentia et actu. Et primum de potentia quae dicitur quidem maxime proprie, non tamen utilis est ad quod volumus nunc. In plus enim est potentia et actus eorum quae dicuntur secundum motum solum. Sed cum dixerimus de hac, in determinationibus de actu ostendemus et de aliis. Chapter 1. WE have treated of that which is primarily and to which all the other categories of being are referred-i.e. of substance. For it is in virtue of the concept of substance that the others also are said to be-quantity and quality and the like; for all will be found to involve the concept of substance, as we said in the first part of our work. And since being is in one way divided into individual thing, quality, and quantity, and is in another way distinguished in respect of potency and complete reality, and of function, let us now add a discussion of potency and complete reality. And first let us explain potency in the strictest sense, which is, how[46a]ever, not the most useful for our present purpose. For potency and actuality extend beyond the cases that involve a reference to motion. But when we have spoken of this first kind, we shall in our discussions of actuality _ explain the other kinds of potency as well.
ἀλλ᾽ εἰπόντες περὶ ταύτης, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας διορισμοῖς δηλώσομεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν λέγεται [5] πολλαχῶς ἡ δύναμις καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι, διώρισται ἡμῖν ἐν ἄλλοις: τούτων δ᾽ ὅσαι μὲν ὁμωνύμως λέγονται δυνάμεις ἀφείσθωσαν (ἔνιαι γὰρ ὁμοιότητί τινι λέγονται, καθάπερ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ δυνατὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα λέγομεν τῷ εἶναί πως ἢ μὴ εἶναι), ὅσαι δὲ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος, πᾶσαι ἀρχαί [10] τινές εἰσι, καὶ πρὸς πρώτην μίαν λέγονται, ἥ ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ παθεῖν ἐστὶ δύναμις, ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πάσχοντι ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς παθητικῆς ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο: ἡ δ᾽ ἕξις ἀπαθείας τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο ὑπ᾽ ἀρχῆς [15] μεταβλητικῆς. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστι πᾶσι τοῖς ὅροις ὁ τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως λόγος. πάλιν δ᾽ αὗται δυνάμεις λέγονται ἢ τοῦ μόνον ποιῆσαι ἢ [τοῦ] παθεῖν ἢ τοῦ καλῶς, ὥστε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τούτων λόγοις ἐνυπάρχουσί πως οἱ τῶν προτέρων δυνάμεων λόγοι. Quod quidem igitur dicitur multipliciter potentia et posse, determinatum est nobis in aliis. Harum autem quaecumque quidem equivoce dicuntur potentie praetermittantur. Quaedam enim similitudine quadam dicuntur, quemadmodum in geometria et possibilia et impossibilia dicimus eo quod aliquo modo > sunt aut non sunt. Quaecumque autem ad eandem speciem, omnes principia quaedam sunt, et ad primum unum dicuntur, quod est principium transmutationis in alio in quantum aliud est. Nam haec quidem patiendi potentia est, quae in ipso patiente principium mutationis passive ab alio in quantum aliud est. Haec autem habitus impassibilitatis eius quae in deterius et corruptionis ab alio in quantum * aliud a principio transmutativo. In hiis enim inest omnibus terminis prime potentie ratio. Iterum autem hae potentie dicuntur aut solum faciendi aut patiendi aut ipsius bene; quare in harum rationibus insunt aliqualiter priorum rationes potentiarum. We have pointed out elsewhere that potency and the word can have several senses. Of these we may neglect all the potencies that are so called by an equivocation. For some are called so by analogy, as in geometry we say one thing is or is not a power of another by virtue of the presence or absence of some relation between them. But all potencies that conform to the same type are originative sources of some kind, and are called potencies in reference to one primary kind of potency, which is an originative source of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other. For one kind is a potency of being acted on, i.e. the originative source, in the very thing acted on, of its being passively changed by another thing or by itself qua other; and another kind is a state of insusceptibility to change for the worse and to destruction by another thing or by the thing itself qua other by virtue of an originative source of change. In all these definitions is implied the formula if potency in the primary sense.-And again these so-called potencies are potencies either of merely acting or being acted on, or of acting or being acted on well, so that even in the formulae of the latter the formulae of the prior kinds of potency are somehow implied.
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὡς μία δύναμις [20] τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν (δυνατὸν γάρ ἐστι καὶ τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸ δύναμιν τοῦ παθεῖν καὶ τῷ ἄλλο ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ), ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἄλλη. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι (διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν τινὰ ἀρχήν, καὶ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἀρχήν τινα, πάσχει τὸ πάσχον, καὶ ἄλλο ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου: τὸ λιπαρὸν μὲν [25] γὰρ καυστὸν τὸ δ᾽ ὑπεῖκον ὡδὶ θλαστόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), ἡ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἡ οἰκοδομική, ἡ μὲν ἐν τῷ θερμαντικῷ ἡ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομικῷ: διὸ ᾗ συμπέφυκεν, οὐθὲν πάσχει αὐτὸ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ: ἓν γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο. Palam igitur quia est quidem ut una potentia faciendi et patiendi; nam possibile est et habere ipsum potentiam patiendi et eo quod aliud ab ipso. Est autem ut alia. Haec quidem enim * in patiente; propter habere enim quoddam principium, et esse * materiam principium quoddam, patitur patiens, et aliud ab alio. Crassum enim combustibile est, cedens autem sic impressibile, similiter autem et in aliis. Haec autem in faciente; ut calor et edificativa, haec quidem in calefactivo, haec autem in edificativo. Quapropter in quantum simul natum est, nihil patitur ipsum a se ipso; unum enim et non aliud. Obviously, then, in a sense the potency of acting and of being acted on is one (for a thing may be capable either because it can itself be acted on or because something else can be acted on by it), but in a sense the potencies are different. For the one is in the thing acted on; it is because it contains a certain originative source, and because even the matter is an originative source, that the thing acted on is acted on, and one thing by one, another by another; for that which is oily can be burnt, and that which yields in a particular way can be crushed; and similarly in all other cases. But the other potency is in the agent, e.g. heat and the art of building are present, one in that which can produce heat and the other in the man who can build. And so, in so far as a thing is an organic unity, it cannot be acted on by itself; for it is one and not two different things.
καὶ ἡ ἀδυναμία καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον [30] ἡ τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει ἐναντία στέρησίς ἐστιν, ὥστε τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσα δύναμις ἀδυναμίᾳ. ἡ δὲ στέρησις λέγεται πολλαχῶς: καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχον καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ, ἢ ὅλως ἢ ὅτε πέφυκεν, καὶ ἢ ὡδί, οἷον παντελῶς, ἢ κἂν ὁπωσοῦν. ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων δέ, ἂν πεφυκότα [35] ἔχειν μὴ ἔχῃ βίᾳ, ἐστερῆσθαι ταῦτα λέγομεν. Et impotentia et impossibile et quae tali potentie contraria est privatio; quare eiusdem et secundum idem omnis potentia * impotentia. Privatio autem dicitur multipliciter. Et enim non habens et aptum natum si non habet, aut omnino aut quando aptum natum est, et aut sic, puta perfecte, vel saltem quomodocumque. In quibusdam vero, si apta nata habere non habeant vi, privata esse haec dicimus. And impotence and impotent stand for the privation which is contrary to potency of this sort, so that every potency belongs to the same subject and refers to the same process as a corresponding impotence. Privation has several senses; for it means (1) that which has not a certain quality and (2) that which might naturally have it but has not it, either (a) in general or (b) when it might naturally have it, and either (a) in some particular way, e.g. when it has not it completely, or (b) when it has not it at all. And in certain cases if things which naturally have a quality lose it by violence, we say they have suffered privation.

Chapter 2

Greek Latin English
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι, [1046β] [1] δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται ἄλογοι αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου: διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι δυνάμεις εἰσίν: ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαί εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο. > Quoniam autem haec quidem in inanimatis insunt principia talia, illa vero in animatis et in anima et anime in rationem habente, palam quia et potentiarum aliae erunt irrationabiles aliae cum ratione. Quapropter omnes artes et factive scientie potentie sunt; principia namque permutativa * in alio aut in quantum aliud. Chapter 2. Since some such originative sources are present in soulless things, and others in things possessed of soul, and in [46b] soul, and in the rational part of the soul, clearly some potencies will, be non-rational and some will be non-rational and some will be accompanied by a rational formula. This is why all arts, i.e. all productive forms of knowledge, are potencies; they are originative sources of change in another thing or in the artist himself considered as other.
καὶ αἱ μὲν [5] μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι μία ἑνός, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον᾽ ἡ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας. Et quae quidem cum ratione * omnes contrariorum sunt eaedem, et quae irrationabiles una unius; ut calidum calefaciendi solum, medicativa autem infirmitatis et sanitatis. And each of those which are accompanied by a rational formula is alike capable of contrary effects, but one non-rational power produces one effect; e.g. the hot is capable only of heating, but the medical art can produce both disease and health.
αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν, πλὴν οὐχ ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ἀμφοῖν ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς [10] τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος μᾶλλον, ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιστήμας εἶναι μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, εἶναι δὲ τοῦ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὰς τοῦ δὲ μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτάς: καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τοῦ δὲ τρόπον τινὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: ἀποφάσει γὰρ καὶ ἀποφορᾷ δηλοῖ τὸ ἐναντίον: ἡ γὰρ στέρησις [15] ἡ πρώτη τὸ ἐναντίον, αὕτη δὲ ἀποφορὰ θατέρου. Causa autem quia ratio est scientia; ratio autem eadem ostendit rem et privationem, tamen non similiter, et est ut amborum, est autem ut existentis magis. Quare necesse et tales scientias esse quidem contrariorum, esse vero huius quidem secundum se illius vero non secundum se; et enim ratio huius quidem secundum se illius vero modo quodam secundum accidens. Nam negatione et ablatione ostendit contrarium; etenim privatio prima contrarium, haec autem * ablatio alterius. The reason is that science is a rational formula, and the same rational formula explains a thing and its privation, only not in the same way; and in a sense it applies to both, but in a sense it applies rather to the positive fact. Therefore such sciences must deal with contraries, but with one in virtue of their own nature and with the other not in virtue of their nature; for the rational formula applies to one object in virtue of that object _ s nature, and to the other, in a sense, accidentally. For it is by denial and removal that it exhibits the contrary; for the contrary is the primary privation, and this is the removal of the positive term.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιστήμη δύναμις τῷ λόγον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως ἔχει ἀρχήν, τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν ὑγίειαν μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμαντικὸν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ ψυκτικὸν ψυχρότητα, ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιστήμων [20] ἄμφω. λόγος γάρ ἐστιν ἀμφοῖν μέν, οὐχ ὁμοίως δέ, καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ ἣ ἔχει κινήσεως ἀρχήν: ὥστε ἄμφω ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς κινήσει πρὸς ταὐτὸ συνάψασα: διὸ τὰ κατὰ λόγον δυνατὰ τοῖς ἄνευ λόγου δυνατοῖς ποιεῖ τἀναντία: μιᾷ γὰρ ἀρχῇ περιέχεται, τῷ λόγῳ. Quoniam autem contraria non fiunt in eodem, scientia autem * potentia in habendo rationem, et anima motus habet principium: salubre quidem sanitatem solum facit et calefactivum caliditatem et infrigidativum frigiditatem, sciens vero ambo. Est enim amborum quidem ratio, non similiter autem, et in anima quae habet motus principium; quare ambo ab eodem principio movebit ad ipsum copulans. Propter quod secundum rationem potentia sine ratione potentibus faciunt contraria; unum enim principium continetur ratione. Now since contraries do not occur in the same thing, but science is a potency which depends on the possession of a rational formula, and the soul possesses an originative source of movement; therefore, while the wholesome produces only health and the calorific only heat and the frigorific only cold, the scientific man produces both the contrary effects. For the rational formula is one which applies to both, though not in the same way, and it is in a soul which possesses an originative source of movement; so that the soul will start both processes from the same originative source, having linked them up with the same thing. And so the things whose potency is according to a rational formula act contrariwise to the things whose potency is non-rational; for the products of the former are included under one originative source, the rational formula.
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι [25] τῇ μὲν τοῦ εὖ δυνάμει ἀκολουθεῖ ἡ τοῦ μόνον ποιῆσαι ἢ παθεῖν δύναμις, ταύτῃ δ᾽ ἐκείνη οὐκ ἀεί: ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν εὖ ποιοῦντα καὶ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ μόνον ποιοῦντα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν. Palam autem quia ipsius bene potentiam sequitur solum faciendi aut patiendi potentia, hanc vero illa non semper. Necesse enim bene facientem facere, sed solum facientem non necesse et bene facere. It is obvious also that the potency of merely doing a thing or having it done to one is implied in that of doing it or having it done well, but the latter is not always implied in the former: for he who does a thing well must also do it, but he who does it merely need not also do it well.

Chapter 3

Greek Latin English
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἵ φασιν, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ [30] μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι, οἷον τὸν [31] μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Sunt autem quidam qui dicunt, ut Megarici, quando operatur solum posse, et quando non operatur non posse, ut non edificantem non posse edificare, sed edificantem quando edificat; similiter autem et in aliis. Chapter 3. There are some who say, as the Megaric school does, that a thing can act only when it is acting, and when it is not acting it cannot act, e.g. that he who is not building cannot build, but only he who is building, when he is building; and so in all other cases.
οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὔτ᾽ οἰκοδόμος ἔσται ἐὰν μὴ οἰκοδομῇ (τὸ γὰρ οἰκοδόμῳ [35] εἶναι τὸ δυνατῷ εἶναί ἐστιν οἰκοδομεῖν), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχειν τέχνας μὴ μαθόντα ποτὲ καὶ λαβόντα, [1047α] [1] καὶ μὴ ἔχειν μὴ ἀποβαλόντα ποτέ (ἢ γὰρ λήθῃ ἢ πάθει τινὶ ἢ χρόνῳ: οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ γε πράγματος φθαρέντος, ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔστιν), ὅταν παύσηται, οὐχ ἕξει τὴν τέχνην, πάλιν δ᾽ εὐθὺς οἰκοδομήσει πῶς λαβών; Quibus accidentia inconvenientia > non est difficile videre. Palam enim quia non est edificator si non edificet; nam edificatori esse est esse potentem edificare. Similiter autem et in aliis artibus. Si igitur impossibile est tales habere artes non discentem aliquando et accipientem, et non habere non abicientem aliquando (aut enim oblivione aut passione aliqua aut tempore; non enim utique re corrupta, semper enim est): quando cessaverit, non habebit artem, iterum qui statim edificabit aliqualiter accipiens. It is not hard to see the absurdities that attend this view. For it is clear that on this view a man will not be a builder unless he is building (for to be a builder is to be able to build), and so with the other arts. If, then, it is impossible to have such arts if one has not at some time learnt and acquired them, and it is then impossible not to [47a] have them if one has not sometime lost them (either by forgetfulness or by some accident or by time; for it cannot be by the destruction of the object, for that lasts for ever), a man will not have the art when he has ceased to use it, and yet he may immediately build again; how then will he have got the art?
καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα δὴ ὁμοίως: οὔτε γὰρ [5] ψυχρὸν οὔτε θερμὸν οὔτε γλυκὺ οὔτε ὅλως αἰσθητὸν οὐθὲν ἔσται μὴ αἰσθανομένων: ὥστε τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον συμβήσεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς. Et inanimata utique similiter. Neque enim frigidum neque calidum neque dulce * neque omnino sensibile nihil erit non sentientibus; quare Protagore rationem eis dicere continget. And similarly with regard to lifeless things; nothing will be either cold or hot or sweet or perceptible at all if people are not perceiving it; so that the upholders of this view will have to maintain the doctrine of Protagoras.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ αἴσθησιν ἕξει οὐδὲν ἂν μὴ αἰσθάνηται μηδ᾽ ἐνεργῇ. εἰ οὖν τυφλὸν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, πεφυκὸς δὲ καὶ ὅτε πέφυκε καὶ ἔτι ὄν, οἱ αὐτοὶ [10] τυφλοὶ ἔσονται πολλάκις τῆς ἡμέρας, καὶ κωφοί. At vero nec sensum habebit nihil, si non sentiat nec operetur. Si ergo cecum non habens visum, aptum vero natum et quando aptum natum est * et adhuc ens, iidem ceci erunt saepe die * et surdi. But, indeed, nothing will even have perception if it is not perceiving, i.e. exercising its perception. If, then, that is blind which has not sight though it would naturally have it, when it would naturally have it and when it still exists, the same people will be blind many times in the day-and deaf too.
ἔτι εἰ ἀδύνατον τὸ ἐστερημένον δυνάμεως, τὸ μὴ γιγνόμενον ἀδύνατον ἔσται γενέσθαι: τὸ δ᾽ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ὁ λέγων ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ψεύσεται (τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦτο ἐσήμαινεν), ὥστε οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἐξαιροῦσι καὶ κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν. [15] ἀεὶ γὰρ τό τε ἑστηκὸς ἑστήξεται καὶ τὸ καθήμενον καθεδεῖται: οὐ γὰρ ἀναστήσεται ἂν καθέζηται: ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἔσται ἀναστῆναι ὅ γε μὴ δύναται ἀναστῆναι. Amplius si impossibile quod privatum est potentia, quod non fit impossibile erit factum esse. Sed quod impossibile est factum esse dicens aut esse aut futurum esse, mentietur; nam impossibile hoc significavit. Quare hae rationes auferunt motum et generationem. Semper enim stans stabit et sedens sedebit, non enim surget si sedet; impossibile namque erit surgere quod non potest surgere. Again, if that which is deprived of potency is incapable, that which is not happening will be incapable of happening; but he who says of that which is incapable of happening either that it is or that it will be will say what is untrue; for this is what incapacity meant. Therefore these views do away with both movement and becoming. For that which stands will always stand, and that which sits will always sit, since if it is sitting it will not get up; for that which, as we are told, cannot get up will be incapable of getting up.
εἰ οὖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ταῦτα λέγειν, φανερὸν ὅτι δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια ἕτερόν ἐστιν (ἐκεῖνοι δ᾽ οἱ λόγοι δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν ταὐτὸ [20] ποιοῦσιν, διὸ καὶ οὐ μικρόν τι ζητοῦσιν ἀναιρεῖν), ὥστε ἐνδέχεται δυνατὸν μέν τι εἶναι μὴ εἶναι δέ, καὶ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι εἶναι δέ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν δυνατὸν βαδίζειν ὂν μὴ βαδίζειν, καὶ μὴ βαδίζειν δυνατὸν ὂν βαδίζειν. Si ergo non contingit haec dicere, palam quia potentia et actus alterum sunt (ille vero rationes potentiam et actum idem faciunt, propter quod et non parvum aliquid quaerunt destruere). Quare contingit possibile > quidem aliquid esse, non esse autem, et possibile non esse, esse autem. Similiter autem et in aliis cathegoriis: possibile vadere ens non vadere, et non vadens possibile esse vadere. But we cannot say this, so that evidently potency and actuality are different (but these views make potency and actuality the same, and so it is no small thing they are seeking to annihilate), so that it is possible that a thing may be capable of being and not he, and capable of not being and yet he, and similarly with the other kinds of predicate; it may be capable of walking and yet not walk, or capable of not walking and yet walk.
ἔστι δὲ δυνατὸν τοῦτο ᾧ ἐὰν ὑπάρξῃ [25] ἡ ἐνέργεια οὗ λέγεται ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν, οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀδύνατον. λέγω δὲ οἷον, εἰ δυνατὸν καθῆσθαι καὶ ἐνδέχεται καθῆσθαι, τούτῳ ἐὰν ὑπάρξῃ τὸ καθῆσθαι, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀδύνατον: καὶ εἰ κινηθῆναι ἢ κινῆσαι ἢ στῆναι ἢ στῆσαι ἢ εἶναι ἢ γίγνεσθαι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἢ μὴ γίγνεσθαι, ὁμοίως. Est autem possibile hoc cui si extiterit actus cuius dicitur habere potentiam, nihil erit impossibile. Dico autem puta si possibile sedere et contingit sedere, huic si inest sedere, nihil erit impossibile; et aut moveri aut movere aut statui aut statuere aut esse aut fieri aut non esse aut non fieri, similiter. And a thing is capable of doing something if there will be nothing impossible in its having the actuality of that of which it is said to have the capacity. I mean, for instance, if a thing is capable of sitting and it is open to it to sit, there will be nothing impossible in its actually sitting; and similarly if it is capable of being moved or moving, or of standing or making to stand, or of being or coming to be, or of not being or not coming to be.
[30] ἐλήλυθε δ᾽ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοὔνομα, ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων μάλιστα: δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἡ κίνησις εἶναι, διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν οὐκ ἀποδιδόασι τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἄλλας δέ τινας κατηγορίας, οἷον διανοητὰ καὶ ἐπιθυμητὰ εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα, [35] κινούμενα δὲ οὔ, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ὄντα ἐνεργείᾳ ἔσονται ἐνεργείᾳ. [1047β] [1] τῶν γὰρ μὴ ὄντων ἔνια δυνάμει ἐστίν: οὐκ ἔστι δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἐστίν. Venit autem actus * nomen, qui ad endelichiam compositus, et ad alia ex motibus maxime; videtur enim actus maxime motus esse. Quapropter et non existentibus non assignant moveri, alias autem quasdam cathegorias: puta intellectualia et concupiscibilia esse non entia, mota vero non. Hoc autem, quia non entia actu erunt actu. Non entium enim quaedam potentia sunt; non sunt autem, quia non endelichia sunt. The word actuality , which we connect with complete reality , has, in the main, been extended from movements to other things; for actuality in the strict sense is thought to be identical with movement. And so people do not assign movement to non-existent things, though they do assign some other predicates. E.g. they say that non-existent things are objects of thought and desire, but not that they are moved; and this because, while ex hypothesi they do not actually exist, they would have to exist actually if they [47b] were moved. For of non-existent things some exist potentially; but they do not exist, because they do not exist in complete reality.

Chapter 4

Greek Latin English
εἰ δέ ἐστι τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ εἰπεῖν ὅτι δυνατὸν μὲν [5] τοδί, οὐκ ἔσται δέ, ὥστε τὰ ἀδύνατα εἶναι ταύτῃ διαφεύγειν: λέγω δὲ οἷον εἴ τις φαίη δυνατὸν τὴν διάμετρον μετρηθῆναι οὐ μέντοι μετρηθήσεσθαι—ὁ μὴ λογιζόμενος τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι—ὅτι οὐθὲν κωλύει δυνατόν τι ὂν εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι μὴ εἶναι μηδ᾽ ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο ἀνάγκη ἐκ [10] τῶν κειμένων, εἰ καὶ ὑποθοίμεθα εἶναι ἢ γεγονέναι ὃ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν δυνατὸν δέ, ὅτι οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀδύνατον: συμβήσεται δέ γε, τὸ γὰρ μετρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατον. οὐ γὰρ δή ἐστι ταὐτὸ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον: τὸ γάρ σε ἑστάναι νῦν ψεῦδος μέν, οὐκ ἀδύνατον δέ. Si autem est quod dictum est possibile in quantum sequitur, palam quia non contingit verum esse aliquid dicere quia possibile hoc, non erit autem, ut et impossibilia esse sic diffugiant. Dico autem puta si quis dicat possibile dyametrum commensurari non tamen commensurabitur, non cogitans impossibile esse, quia nihil prohibet possibile aliquod ens esse aut fieri, non esse vero aut non futurum esse. Sed illud necesse ex positis sit, et supponamus esse aut fieri quod non est quidem possibile autem *, quia nihil erit impossibile. Non enim est idem * falsum et impossibile; nam te stare nunc falsum quidem est et non impossibile. Chapter 4. If what we have described is identical with the capable or convertible with it, evidently it cannot be true to say this is capable of being but will not be , which would imply that the things incapable of being would on this showing vanish. Suppose, for instance, that a man-one who did not take account of that which is incapable of being-were to say that the diagonal of the square is capable of being measured but will not be measured, because a thing may well be capable of being or coming to be, and yet not be or be about to be. But from the premisses this necessarily follows, that if we actually supposed that which is not, but is capable of being, to be or to have come to be, there will be nothing impossible in this; but the result will be impossible, for the measuring of the diagonal is impossible. For the false and the impossible are not the same; that you are standing now is false, but that you should be standing is not impossible.
ἅμα δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι, εἰ [15] τοῦ Α ὄντος ἀνάγκη τὸ Β εἶναι, καὶ δυνατοῦ ὄντος εἶναι τοῦ Α καὶ τὸ Β ἀνάγκη εἶναι δυνατόν: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀνάγκη δυνατὸν εἶναι, οὐθὲν κωλύει μὴ εἶναι δυνατὸν εἶναι. ἔστω δὴ τὸ Α δυνατόν. οὐκοῦν ὅτε τὸ Α δυνατὸν εἴη εἶναι, εἰ τεθείη τὸ Α, οὐθὲν ἀδύνατον εἶναι συνέβαινεν: τὸ δέ γε Β [20] ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ἀλλ᾽ ἦν ἀδύνατον. ἔστω δὴ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὴ ἀδύνατον [ἀνάγκη] εἶναι τὸ Β, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ Α εἶναι. ἀλλ᾽ ἦν ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον ἀδύνατον: καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα. ἂν ἄρα ᾖ τὸ Α δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ Β ἔσται δυνατόν, εἴπερ οὕτως εἶχον ὥστε τοῦ Α ὄντος ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ Β. ἐὰν δὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων [25] τῶν Α Β μὴ ᾖ δυνατὸν τὸ Β οὕτως, οὐδὲ τὰ Α Β ἕξει ὡς ἐτέθη: καὶ εἰ τοῦ Α δυνατοῦ ὄντος ἀνάγκη τὸ Β δυνατὸν εἶναι, εἰ ἔστι τὸ Α ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ τὸ Β. τὸ γὰρ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ Β εἶναι, εἰ τὸ Α δυνατόν, τοῦτο σημαίνει, ἐὰν ᾖ τὸ Α καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς ἦν δυνατὸν [30] εἶναι, κἀκεῖνο τότε καὶ οὕτως εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. Simul autem palam quia, si a ente necesse b esse, et possibili ente esse a, et b necesse * esse possibile. Si enim non necesse * possibile esse, nihil prohibet non esse possibile esse. Sit autem a possibile. Ergo quando a possibile erit esse, si * ponatur a, nihil impossibile esse accidit; b autem necesse esse. > sed erat impossibile. Sit itaque impossibile. Et si impossibile necesse esse a, necesse et b esse. Sed erat ergo primum impossibile * et secundum. Si igitur sit a possibile, et b erit possibile, siquidem sic se habebant, ergo a ente necesse * b esse. Si itaque sic se habentibus a b non est possibile b ita, nec a b habebunt ut positum est. Et si a possibili ente necesse b possibile esse, si est a, necesse esse b. Nam possibile esse ex necessitate b esse, si a possibile, hoc significat: si sit a et quando et ut erat possibile esse, et illud tunc et ita esse * necesse. At the same time it is clear that if, when A is real, B must be real, then, when A is possible, B also must be possible. For if B need not be possible, there is nothing to prevent its not being possible. Now let A be supposed possible. Then, when A was possible, we agreed that nothing impossible followed if A were supposed to be real; and then B must of course be real. But we supposed B to be impossible. Let it be impossible then. If, then, B is impossible, A also must be so. But the first was supposed impossible; therefore the second also is impossible. If, then, A is possible, B also will be possible, if they were so related that if A,is real, B must be real. If, then, A and B being thus related, B is not possible on this condition, and B will not be related as was supposed. And if when A is possible, B must be possible, then if A is real, B also must be real. For to say that B must be possible, if A is possible, means this, that if A is real both at the time when and in the way in which it was supposed capable of being real, B also must then and in that way be real.

Chapter 5

Greek Latin English
ἁπασῶν δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν οἷον τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τῶν δὲ ἔθει οἷον τῆς τοῦ αὐλεῖν, τῶν δὲ μαθήσει οἷον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προενεργήσαντας ἔχειν, ὅσαι ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ, τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας [35] καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν οὐκ ἀνάγκη. Omnibus autem potentiis existentibus hiis quidem cognatis, ut sensibus, hiis autem consuetudine, ut quae est fistulandi, aliis autem disciplinatu, ut quae est artium: has quidem * necesse eos qui preexercitati fuerint habere, quaecumque consuetudine * et ratione, * non tales autem et eas quae sunt in pati non necesse. Chapter 5. As all potencies are either innate, like the senses, or come by practice, like the power of playing the flute, or by learning, like artistic power, those which come by practice or by rational formula we must acquire by previous exercise but this is not necessary with those which are not of this nature and which imply passivity.
[1048α] [1] ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνατὸν τὶ δυνατὸν καὶ ποτὲ καὶ πὼς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ λόγον δύναται κινεῖν καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν μετὰ λόγου, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ἄλογοι, κἀκείνας μὲν ἀνάγκη ἐν ἐμψύχῳ [5] εἶναι ταύτας δὲ ἐν ἀμφοῖν, Quoniam autem possibile aliquid possibile et quando et quomodo et quaecumque alia necesse adesse in diffinitione, et haec quidem secundum rationem possunt movere et potentie ipsorum cum ratione, haec autem irrationabilia et potentie * irrationabiles, et illas quidem necesse in animato esse has vero in ambobus: Since that which is capable is capable of something and [48a] at some time and in some way (with all the other qualifications which must be present in the definition), and since some things can produce change according to a rational formula and their potencies involve such a formula, while other things are nonrational and their potencies are non-rational, and the former potencies must be in a living thing, while the latter can be both in the living and in the lifeless;
τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας δυνάμεις ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὡς δύνανται τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν πλησιάζωσι, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἐκείνας δ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη: tales quidem potentias necesse, quando ut possint passivum et activum appropinquant, hoc quidem facere illud vero pati, illas vero non necesse. as regards potencies of the latter kind, when the agent and the patient meet in the way appropriate to the potency in question, the one must act and the other be acted on, but with the former kind of potency this is not necessary.
αὗται μὲν γὰρ πᾶσαι μία ἑνὸς ποιητική, ἐκεῖναι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἅμα ποιήσει τὰ ἐναντία: τοῦτο δὲ [10] ἀδύνατον. Hae quidem enim omnes * una unius factiva, ille autem contrariorum, quare simul facient contraria; hoc autem impossibile. For the nonrational potencies are all productive of one effect each, but the rational produce contrary effects, so that if they produced their effects necessarily they would produce contrary effects at the same time; but this is impossible.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον: λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὄρεξιν ἢ προαίρεσιν. ὁποτέρου γὰρ ἂν ὀρέγηται κυρίως, τοῦτο ποιήσει ὅταν ὡς δύναται ὑπάρχῃ καὶ πλησιάζῃ τῷ παθητικῷ: ὥστε τὸ δυνατὸν κατὰ λόγον ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὀρέγηται οὗ ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, [15] τοῦτο ποιεῖν: ἔχει δὲ παρόντος τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ὡδὶ ἔχοντος [ποιεῖν]: εἰ δὲ μή, ποιεῖν οὐ δυνήσεται Necesse ergo alterum aliquid esse quod dominans *. Dico autem hoc appetitum aut proheresim. Quod enim desiderabit principaliter, hoc faciet quando ut possit extiterit et appropinquaverit > passivo. Quare potens secundum rationem omne necesse, quando desiderat cuius habet potentiam et ut habet, hoc facere. habet autem presente passivo et ita se habente facere. Si autem non, facere non poterit. There must, then, be something else that decides; I mean by this, desire or will. For whichever of two things the animal desires decisively, it will do, when it is present, and meets the passive object, in the way appropriate to the potency in question. Therefore everything which has a rational potency, when it desires that for which it has a potency and in the circumstances in which it has the potency, must do this. And it has the potency in question when the passive object is present and is in a certain state; if not it will not be able to act.
(τὸ γὰρ μηθενὸς τῶν ἔξω κωλύοντος προσδιορίζεσθαι οὐθὲν ἔτι δεῖ: τὴν γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχει ὡς ἔστι δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν, ἔστι δ᾽ οὐ πάντως ἀλλ᾽ ἐχόντων πῶς, ἐν οἷς ἀφορισθήσεται καὶ τὰ ἔξω κωλύοντα: [20] ἀφαιρεῖται γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσόντων ἔνια): 'Nullo namque exteriorum prohibente' adiungere nihil adhuc oportet. Potentiam enim habet [70 ut est potentia faciendi. Est autem non omnino sed habentium aliquo modo, in quibus excludentur quae exterius prohibent; removent enim haec eorum quae in determinatione apponuntur quaedam.) (To add the qualification if nothing external prevents it is not further necessary; for it has the potency on the terms on which this is a potency of acting, and it is this not in all circumstances but on certain conditions, among which will be the exclusion of external hindrances; for these are barred by some of the positive qualifications.)
διὸ οὐδ᾽ ἐὰν ἅμα βούληται ἢ ἐπιθυμῇ ποιεῖν δύο ἢ τὰ ἐναντία, οὐ ποιήσει: οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν οὐδ᾽ ἔστι τοῦ ἅμα ποιεῖν ἡ δύναμις, ἐπεὶ ὧν ἐστὶν οὕτως ποιήσει. [25] Propter quod nec si simul volunt aut cupiunt facere duo aut contraria, non facient; non enim ita simul habent ipsorum potentiam nec est simul faciendi potentia, quoniam quorum est sic faciet. And so even if one has a rational wish, or an appetite, to do two things or contrary things at the same time, one will not do them; for it is not on these terms that one has the potency for them, nor is it a potency of doing both at the same time, since one will do the things which it is a potency of doing, on the terms on which one has the potency.

Chapter 6

Greek Latin English
ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῆς κατὰ κίνησιν λεγομένης δυνάμεως εἴρηται, περὶ ἐνεργείας διορίσωμεν τί τέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ποῖόν τι. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δυνατὸν ἅμα δῆλον ἔσται διαιροῦσιν, ὅτι οὐ μόνον τοῦτο λέγομεν δυνατὸν ὃ πέφυκε κινεῖν ἄλλο ἢ κινεῖσθαι ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τρόπον τινά, ἀλλὰ [30] καὶ ἑτέρως, διὸ ζητοῦντες καὶ περὶ τούτων διήλθομεν. Quoniam autem de potentia quae secundum motum dicitur dictum est, de actu determinemus quid est actus et quale quid. Et enim possibile simul manifestum erit dividentibus, quia non solum hoc dicimus possibile quod aptum natum est movere aliud aut moveri ab alio aut simpliciter aut modo quodam, sed et aliter. Chapter 6. Since we have treated of the kind of potency which is related to movement, let us discuss actuality-what, and what kind of thing, actuality is. For in the course of our analysis it will also become clear, with regard to the potential, that we not only ascribe potency to that whose nature it is to move something else, or to be moved by something else, either without qualification or in some particular way, but also use the word in another sense, which is the reason of the inquiry in the course of which we have discussed these previous senses also.
ἔστι δὴ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα μὴ οὕτως ὥσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει: λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει οἷον ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθείη ἄν, καὶ ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἂν δυνατὸς ᾖ θεωρῆσαι: [35] τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. Quapropter quaerentes et de hiis supervenimus. Est autem actus existere rem non ita sicut dicimus potentia. Dicimus autem potentia ut in ligno Mercurium et in tota medietatem, quia auferetur utique, et scientem et non speculantem, si potens est speculari hoc * actu. Actuality, then, is the existence of a thing not in the way which we express by potentially ; we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line is in the whole, because it might be separated out, and we call even the man who is not studying a man of science, if he is capable of studying; the thing that stands in contrast to each of these exists actually.
δῆλον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ ὃ βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν, ὅτι ὡς τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδομικόν, [1048β] [1] καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς πρὸς τὸ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ μῦον μὲν ὄψιν δὲ ἔχον, καὶ τὸ ἀποκεκριμένον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὴν ὕλην, καὶ τὸ ἀπειργασμένον πρὸς τὸ ἀνέργαστον. ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς [5] θατέρῳ μορίῳ ἔστω ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀφωρισμένη θατέρῳ δὲ τὸ δυνατόν. Palam autem in singularibus inductione quod dicere volumus, et non oportet omnis terminum quaerere sed per proportionale * conspicere, > quia ut edificans ad edificabile, et vigilans ad dormiens, et videns ad claudens quidem oculum visum autem habens, et segregatum ex materia ad materiam, et elaboratum ad illaboratum est aliquid. Et huius differentiae alteri parti sit actus determinatus, alteri autem possibile. Our meaning can be seen in the particular cases by induction, and we must not seek a definition of everything but be content to grasp the analogy, that it is as that which is building is to that [48b] which is capable of building, and the waking to the sleeping, and that which is seeing to that which has its eyes shut but has sight, and that which has been shaped out of the matter to the matter, and that which has been wrought up to the unwrought. Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other.
λέγεται δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ οὐ πάντα ὁμοίως ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τῷ ἀνάλογον, ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πρὸς τοῦτο, τόδ᾽ ἐν τῷδε ἢ πρὸς τόδε: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς κίνησις πρὸς δύναμιν τὰ δ᾽ ὡς οὐσία πρός τινα ὕλην. Dicuntur autem actu non omnia similiter sed aut proportionaliter: ut hoc in hoc aut ad hoc, hoc in hoc aut ad hoc; haec quidem enim ut motus ad potentiam, illa vero ut substantia ad aliquam materiam. But all things are not said in the same sense to exist actually, but only by analogy-as A is in B or to B, C is in D or to D; for some are as movement to potency, and the others as substance to some sort of matter.
ἄλλως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον [10] καὶ τὸ κενόν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, λέγεται δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ <ἢ> πολλοῖς τῶν ὄντων, οἷον τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ βαδίζοντι καὶ ὁρωμένῳ. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀληθεύεσθαί ποτε (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὁρώμενον ὅτι ὁρᾶται, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὁρᾶσθαι δυνατόν): τὸ δ᾽ ἄπειρον οὐχ οὕτω δυνάμει ἔστιν ὡς [15] ἐνεργείᾳ ἐσόμενον χωριστόν, ἀλλὰ γνώσει. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑπολείπειν τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδίδωσι τὸ εἶναι δυνάμει ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν, τὸ δὲ χωρίζεσθαι οὔ. Aliter autem et infinitum et uacuum, et quaecumque talia, dicuntur potentia et actu multis entium, ut videnti et vadenti et visibili. Haec quidem enim contingit et simpliciter verificari aliquando; hoc quidem enim visibile quia videtur, illud vero quia videri possibile. Sed infinitum non ita potentia est tamquam actu futurum separabile, sed notitia. Eo enim quod non deficiat divisio assignant esse potentia hunc actum, in separari vero non. But also the infinite and the void and all similar things are said to exist potentially and actually in a different sense from that which applies to many other things, e.g. to that which sees or walks or is seen. For of the latter class these predicates can at some time be also truly asserted without qualification; for the seen is so called sometimes because it is being seen, sometimes because it is capable of being seen. But the infinite does not exist potentially in the sense that it will ever actually have separate existence; it exists potentially only for knowledge. For the fact that the process of dividing never comes to an end ensures that this activity exists potentially, but not that the infinite exists separately.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων ὧν ἔστι πέρας οὐδεμία τέλος ἀλλὰ τῶν περὶ τὸ τέλος, οἷον τὸ ἰσχναίνειν ἢ ἰσχνασία [20] [αὐτό], αὐτὰ δὲ ὅταν ἰσχναίνῃ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν κινήσει, μὴ ὑπάρχοντα ὧν ἕνεκα ἡ κίνησις, οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα πρᾶξις ἢ οὐ τελεία γε (οὐ γὰρ τέλος): ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη <ᾗ> ἐνυπάρχει τὸ τέλος καὶ [ἡ] πρᾶξις. οἷον ὁρᾷ ἅμα <καὶ ἑώρακε,> καὶ φρονεῖ <καὶ πεφρόνηκε,> καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν [25] οὐδ᾽ ὑγιάζεται καὶ ὑγίασται: εὖ ζῇ καὶ εὖ ἔζηκεν ἅμα, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν. εἰ δὲ μή, ἔδει ἄν ποτε παύεσθαι ὥσπερ ὅταν ἰσχναίνῃ, νῦν δ᾽ οὔ, ἀλλὰ ζῇ καὶ ἔζηκεν. τούτων δὴ <δεῖ> τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν, τὰς δ᾽ ἐνεργείας. πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχνασία μάθησις βάδισις οἰκοδόμησις: [30] αὗται δὴ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ᾽ οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ᾠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον, καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κεκίνηκεν: ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ ὁρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν [35] λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐνεργείᾳ τί τέ ἐστι καὶ ποῖον, ἐκ τούτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων δῆλον ἡμῖν ἔστω. Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end but all are relative to the end, e.g. the removing of fat, or fat-removal, and the bodily parts themselves when one is making them thin are in movement in this way (i.e. without being already that at which the movement aims), this is not an action or at least not a complete one (for it is not an end); but that movement in which the end is present is an action. E.g. at the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood, are thinking and have thought (while it is not true that at the same time we are learning and have learnt, or are being cured and have been cured). At the same time we are living well and have lived well, and are happy and have been happy. If not, the process would have had sometime to cease, as the process of making thin ceases: but, as things are, it does not cease; we are living and have lived. Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements, and the other actualities. For every movement is incomplete-making thin, learning, walking, building; these are movements, and incomplete at that. For it is not true that at the same time a thing is walking and has walked, or is building and has built, or is coming to be and has come to be, or is being moved and has been moved, but what is being moved is different from what has been moved, and what is moving from what has moved. But it is the same thing that at the same time has seen and is seeing, seeing, or is thinking and has thought. The latter sort of process, then, I call an actuality, and the former a movement.

Chapter 7

Greek Latin English
πότε δὲ δυνάμει ἔστιν ἕκαστον καὶ πότε οὔ, διοριστέον: οὐ γὰρ ὁποτεοῦν. [1049α] [1] οἷον ἡ γῆ ἆρ᾽ ἐστὶ δυνάμει ἄνθρωπος; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν ἤδη γένηται σπέρμα, καὶ οὐδὲ τότε ἴσως; Quod quidem igitur * actu et quid est et quale, ex hiis et similibus manifestum erit nobis. Quando autem potentia est unumquodque et quando non, determinandum *. Non enim quandocumque: ut terra, ergone est potentia homo? Aut non, sed magis cum iam fiat sperma. Sed neque hoc simpliciter forsan. Chapter 7. What, and what kind of thing, the actual is, may be taken as explained by these and similar considerations. But we must distinguish when a thing exists potentially and when it does not; for it is not at any and every time. [49a] E.g. is earth potentially a man? No-but rather when it has already become seed, and perhaps not even then.
ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ᾽ ὑπὸ ἰατρικῆς ἅπαν ἂν ὑγιασθείη οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τι ὃ δυνατόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν [5] ὑγιαῖνον δυνάμει. ὅρος δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐντελεχείᾳ γιγνομένου ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, ὅταν βουληθέντος γίγνηται μηθενὸς κωλύοντος τῶν ἐκτός, ἐκεῖ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ ὑγιαζομένῳ, ὅταν μηθὲν κωλύῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ: ὁμοίως δὲ δυνάμει καὶ οἰκία: εἰ μηθὲν κωλύει τῶν ἐν τούτῳ καὶ τῇ [10] ὕλῃ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι οἰκίαν, οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν ὃ δεῖ προσγενέσθαι ἢ ἀπογενέσθαι ἢ μεταβαλεῖν, τοῦτο δυνάμει οἰκία: καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως ὅσων ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως. καὶ ὅσων δὴ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι, ὅσα μηθενὸς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐμποδίζοντος ἔσται δι᾽ αὐτοῦ: οἷον τὸ σπέρμα οὔπω (δεῖ γὰρ [15] ἐν ἄλλῳ <πεσεῖν> καὶ μεταβάλλειν), ὅταν δ᾽ ἤδη διὰ τῆς αὑτοῦ ἀρχῆς ᾖ τοιοῦτον, ἤδη τοῦτο δυνάμει: ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς δεῖται, ὥσπερ ἡ γῆ οὔπω ἀνδριὰς δυνάμει (μεταβαλοῦσα γὰρ ἔσται χαλκός). Quemadmodum igitur nec a medicativa omne utique sanabitur nec a fortuna, sed est aliquid quod possibile est, et hoc est sanum potentia. Terminus autem eius quod ab intellectu actu fit ex potentia ente: quando volitum fit nullo exteriorum prohibente; ibi autem in eo quod sanatur: quando nihil prohibet eorum quae * in ipso. Similiter autem potentia et domus; si nihil prohibeat eorum quae * in hiis et materia fieri domum, > nec est quod oporteat adici aut removeri aut permutari: hoc * domus potentia. Et in aliis similiter quorumcumque extrinsecus principium est generationis. Et quorumcumque etiam in ipso habente: quaecumque nullo exteriorum impediente erunt per ipsum. Quale sperma nondum; oportet enim in alio et permutari. Quando vero iam per suum principium est tale, iam hoc est potentia. Illa vero altero egent principio, ut terra nondum est statua potentia; permutata enim erit es. It is just as it is with being healed; not everything can be healed by the medical art or by luck, but there is a certain kind of thing which is capable of it, and only this is potentially healthy. And (1) the delimiting mark of that which as a result of thought comes to exist in complete reality from having existed potentially is that if the agent has willed it it comes to pass if nothing external hinders, while the condition on the other side-viz. in that which is healed-is that nothing in it hinders the result. It is on similar terms that we have what is potentially a house; if nothing in the thing acted on-i.e. in the matter-prevents it from becoming a house, and if there is nothing which must be added or taken away or changed, this is potentially a house; and the same is true of all other things the source of whose becoming is external. And (2) in the cases in which the source of the becoming is in the very thing which comes to be, a thing is potentially all those things which it will be of itself if nothing external hinders it. E.g. the seed is not yet potentially a man; for it must be deposited in something other than itself and undergo a change. But when through its own motive principle it has already got such and such attributes, in this state it is already potentially a man; while in the former state it needs another motive principle, just as earth is not yet potentially a statue (for it must first change in order to become brass.)
ἔοικε δὲ ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι οὐ τόδε ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνινον—οἷον τὸ κιβώτιον οὐ ξύλον ἀλλὰ ξύλινον, [20] οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον γῆ ἀλλὰ γήϊνον, πάλιν ἡ γῆ εἰ οὕτως μὴ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ ἐκείνινον—ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο δυνάμει ἁπλῶς τὸ ὕστερόν ἐστιν. οἷον τὸ κιβώτιον οὐ γήϊνον οὐδὲ γῆ ἀλλὰ ξύλινον: τοῦτο γὰρ δυνάμει κιβώτιον καὶ ὕλη κιβωτίου αὕτη, ἁπλῶς μὲν τοῦ ἁπλῶς τουδὶ δὲ τοδὶ τὸ ξύλον. εἰ δέ τί ἐστι πρῶτον [25] ὃ μηκέτι κατ᾽ ἄλλο λέγεται ἐκείνινον, τοῦτο πρώτη ὕλη: οἷον εἰ ἡ γῆ ἀερίνη, ὁ δ᾽ ἀὴρ μὴ πῦρ ἀλλὰ πύρινος, τὸ πῦρ ὕλη πρώτη οὐ τόδε τι οὖσα. τούτῳ γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ καθ᾽ οὗ καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τῷ εἶναι τόδε τι ἢ μὴ εἶναι: οἷον τοῖς πάθεσι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄνθρωπος καὶ [30] σῶμα καὶ ψυχή, πάθος δὲ τὸ μουσικὸν καὶ λευκόν Videtur autem quod dicimus esse non hoc sed illinum, ut archa non lignum sed lignea, nec lignum terra sed terreum, iterum terra si sic non aliud sed illinum. Semper illud potentia simpliciter quod posterius est, ut archa non terrea nec terra sed lignea. Hoc enim potentia archa et materia arche haec, simpliciter quidem ipsius simpliciter, huius vero hoc lignum. Si vero aliquid est primum quod non adhuc de alio dicitur illinum, hoc prima materia est; ut si terra aerea est et aer non ignis sed igneus, ignis est prima materia, hoc aliquid existens. In hoc enim differt universale et subiectum: per esse hoc aliquid aut non; ut puta passionibus quod subicitur homo et corpus et anima, passio autem * musicum et album. It seems that when we call a thing not something else but thaten -e.g. a casket is not wood but wooden , and wood is not earth but earthen , and again earth will illustrate our point if it is similarly not something else but thaten -that other thing is always potentially (in the full sense of that word) the thing which comes after it in this series. E.g. a casket is not earthen nor earth , but wooden ; for this is potentially a casket and this is the matter of a casket, wood in general of a casket in general, and this particular wood of this particular casket. And if there is a first thing, which is no longer, in reference to something else, called thaten , this is prime matter; e.g. if earth is airy and air is not fire but fiery , fire is prime matter, which is not a this . For the subject or substratum is differentiated by being a this or not being one; i.e. the substratum of modifications is, e.g. a man, i.e. a body and a soul, while the modification is musical or pale .
(λέγεται δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς ἐγγενομένης ἐκεῖνο οὐ μουσικὴ ἀλλὰ μουσικόν, καὶ οὐ λευκότης ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ λευκόν, οὐδὲ βάδισις ἢ κίνησις ἀλλὰ βαδίζον ἢ κινούμενον, ὡς τὸ ἐκείνινον): dicitur autem musica adveniente illud non musica sed musicum, et non albedo * homo sed album, nec ambulatio aut motus sed ambulans aut motum, ut illinum. (The subject is called, when music comes to be present in it, not music but musical , and the man is not paleness but pale , and not ambulation or movement but walking or moving ,-which is akin to the thaten .)
ὅσα μὲν οὖν οὕτω, τὸ ἔσχατον οὐσία: ὅσα δὲ μὴ [35] οὕτως ἀλλ᾽ εἶδός τι καὶ τόδε τι τὸ κατηγορούμενον, τὸ ἔσχατον ὕλη καὶ οὐσία ὑλική. καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ συμβαίνει τὸ ἐκείνινον λέγεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὰ πάθη: [1049β] [1] ἄμφω γὰρ ἀόριστα. πότε μὲν οὖν λεκτέον δυνάμει καὶ πότε οὔ, εἴρηται. Quaecumque quidem igitur sic, ultimum substantia; quaecumque vero non sic sed species quaedam et hoc aliquid quod predicatur, ultimum materia et substantia materialis. Et recte itaque accidit illinum dici secundum materiam et passiones; ambo namque indeterminata. Quando quidem igitur dicendum est potentia et quando non, dictum est. Wherever this is so, then, the ultimate subject is a substance; but when this is not so but the predicate is a form and a this , the ultimate subject is matter and material substance. And it is only right that thaten should be used with reference both to the matter [49b] and to the accidents; for both are indeterminates. We have stated, then, when a thing is to be said to exist potentially and when it is not.

Chapter 8

Greek Latin English
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πρότερον διώρισται ποσαχῶς λέγεται, [5] φανερὸν ὅτι πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεώς ἐστιν. λέγω δὲ δυνάμεως οὐ μόνον τῆς ὡρισμένης ἣ λέγεται ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως πάσης ἀρχῆς κινητικῆς ἢ στατικῆς. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν ταὐτῷ [γίγνεται: ἐν ταὐτῷ γὰρ] γένει τῇ δυνάμει: ἀρχὴ γὰρ κινητική, ἀλλ᾽ [10] οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ αὐτό. πάσης δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης προτέρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ: χρόνῳ δ᾽ ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὔ. > Quoniam autem ipsum prius determinatum est quot modis dicitur, palam quia prior est actus potentia. Dico autem potentia non solum determinata quae dicitur principium permutativum in alio in quantum aliud *, sed totaliter omni principio motivo aut immobilitativo. Et enim natura in eodem fit, in eodem enim genere ipsi potentie; principium enim motivum, sed non in alio sed in eodem in quantum idem. Omni itaque tali prior est actus ratione et substantia; tempore vero est quidem ut *, est autem ut non. Chapter 8. From our discussion of the various senses of prior , it is clear that actuality is prior to potency. And I mean by potency not only that definite kind which is said to be a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself regarded as other, but in general every principle of movement or of rest. For nature also is in the same genus as potency; for it is a principle of movement-not, however, in something else but in the thing itself qua itself. To all such potency, then, actuality is prior both in formula and in substantiality; and in time it is prior in one sense, and in another not.
τῷ λόγῳ μὲν οὖν ὅτι προτέρα, δῆλον (τῷ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐνεργῆσαι δυνατόν ἐστι τὸ πρώτως δυνατόν, οἷον λέγω οἰκοδομικὸν τὸ δυνάμενον οἰκοδομεῖν, [15] καὶ ὁρατικὸν τὸ ὁρᾶν, καὶ ὁρατὸν τὸ δυνατὸν ὁρᾶσθαι: ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη τὸν λόγον προϋπάρχειν καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς γνώσεως): Ratione quidem igitur quia prior *, palam. Nam per contingere actu esse possibile est quod primo possibile, puta dico edificatorem potentem edificare, et speculatorem speculari, et visibile potens videri. Eadem autem * ratio et in aliis. Quare necesse rationem preexistere et notitiam notitia. (1) Clearly it is prior in formula; for that which is in the primary sense potential is potential because it is possible for it to become active; e.g. I mean by capable of building that which can build, and by capable of seeing that which can see, and by visible that which can be seen. And the same account applies to all other cases, so that the formula and the knowledge of the one must precede the knowledge of the other.
δὲ χρόνῳ πρότερον ὧδε: τὸ τῷ εἴδει τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργοῦν πρότερον, ἀριθμῷ δ᾽ οὔ. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι τοῦδε μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ [20] ἤδη ὄντος κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν καὶ τοῦ σίτου καὶ τοῦ ὁρῶντος πρότερον τῷ χρόνῳ ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὸ ὁρατικόν, ἃ δυνάμει μέν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος καὶ σῖτος καὶ ὁρῶν, ἐνεργείᾳ δ᾽ οὔπω: ἀλλὰ τούτων πρότερα τῷ χρόνῳ ἕτερα ὄντα ἐνεργείᾳ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα ἐγένετο: ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος [25] γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ μουσικοῦ, ἀεὶ κινοῦντός τινος πρώτου: τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ἤδη ἔστιν. εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγοις ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεται ἔκ τινος τι καὶ ὑπό τινος, καὶ τοῦτο τῷ εἴδει τὸ αὐτό. Tempore vero prius: specie idem agens * prius, sed numero non. Dico autem hoc, quia hoc quidem homine iam ente secundum actum et frumento et vidente prius est tempore materia et semen et visivum, quae potentia sunt homo et frumentum et videns, nondum autem actu. Sed hiis tempore priora altera * entia actu ex quibus haec facta sunt; semper enim ex potestate ente fit * actu ens ab * actu ente, ut homo ex homine, * musicus a musico, semper movente aliquo primo; movens autem actu iam est. Dictum est autem in sermonibus de substantia quia omne quod fit fit ex aliquo et ab aliquo, et hoc specie idem. (2) In time it is prior in this sense: the actual which is identical in species though not in number with a potentially existing thing is to it. I mean that to this particular man who now exists actually and to the corn and to the seeing subject the matter and the seed and that which is capable of seeing, which are potentially a man and corn and seeing, but not yet actually so, are prior in time; but prior in time to these are other actually existing things, from which they were produced. For from the potentially existing the actually existing is always produced by an actually existing thing, e.g. man from man, musician by musician; there is always a first mover, and the mover already exists actually. We have said in our account of substance that everything that is produced is something produced from something and by something, and that the same in species as it.
διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ [30] ἀδύνατον εἶναι οἰκοδόμον εἶναι μὴ οἰκοδομήσαντα μηθὲν ἢ κιθαριστὴν μηθὲν κιθαρίσαντα: ὁ γὰρ μανθάνων κιθαρίζειν κιθαρίζων μανθάνει κιθαρίζειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. Quapropter et videtur impossibile esse edificatorem esse qui non edificavit nihil aut citharedum qui non citharizavit; nam addiscens citharizare citharizans addiscit citharizare, similiter autem et alii. This is why it is thought impossible to be a builder if one has built nothing or a harper if one has never played the harp; for he who learns to play the harp learns to play it by playing it, and all other learners do similarly.
ὅθεν ὁ σοφιστικὸς ἔλεγχος ἐγίγνετο ὅτι οὐκ ἔχων τις τὴν ἐπιστήμην ποιήσει οὗ ἡ ἐπιστήμη: ὁ γὰρ μανθάνων οὐκ ἔχει. Unde sophisticus elenchus factus est quia non habens quis scientiam faciet cuius * scientia; addiscens enim non habet. And thence arose the sophistical quibble, that one who does not possess a science will be doing that which is the object of the science; for he who is learning it does not possess it.
[35] ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου γεγενῆσθαί τι καὶ τοῦ ὅλως κινουμένου κεκινῆσθαί τι (δῆλον δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως τοῦτο) [1050α] [1] καὶ τὸν μανθάνοντα ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τι τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἴσως. ἀλλ᾽ οὖν καὶ ταύτῃ γε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ οὕτω προτέρα τῆς δυνάμεως κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ χρόνον. Sed quia eius quod fit factum est aliquid et totaliter eius quod movetur motum est aliquid (palam autem in hiis quae de motu hoc), et discentem necesse habere > aliquid scientie forsan. Sed igitur et hac palam quia actus et sic prior potentia secundum generationem et tempus. But since, of that which is coming to be, some part must have come to be, and, of that which, in general, is changing, some part must have changed (this is shown in the [50a] treatise on movement), he who is learning must, it would seem, possess some part of the science. But here too, then, it is clear that actuality is in this sense also, viz. in order of generation and of time, prior to potency.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσίᾳ γε, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει [5] ὕστερα τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα (οἷον ἀνὴρ παιδὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος σπέρματος: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τὸ δ᾽ οὔ), At vero et substantia. Primum quidem quia quae generatione posteriora specie et substantia sunt priora, ut vir puero et homo spermate; hoc quidem enim iam habet speciem illud vero non. But (3) it is also prior in substantiality; firstly, (a) because the things that are posterior in becoming are prior in form and in substantiality (e.g. man is prior to boy and human being to seed; for the one already has its form, and the other has not),
καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἕνεκα ἡ γένεσις), τέλος δ᾽ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις [10] λαμβάνεται. Et quia omne ad principium uadit quod fit et finem. Principium enim cuius causa, finis vero causa generatio; finis autem actus, et huius gratia potentia sumitur. and because everything that comes to be moves towards a principle, i.e. an end (for that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and the becoming is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potency is acquired.
οὐ γὰρ ἵνα ὄψιν ἔχωσιν ὁρῶσι τὰ ζῷα ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ὁρῶσιν ὄψιν ἔχουσιν,


Non enim ut visum habeant vident animalia sed ut videant visum habent. For animals do not see in order that they may have sight, but they have sight that they may see.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἰκοδομικὴν ἵνα [12] οἰκοδομῶσι καὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν ἵνα θεωρῶσιν: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ θεωροῦσιν ἵνα θεωρητικὴν ἔχωσιν, εἰ μὴ οἱ μελετῶντες: οὗτοι δὲ οὐχὶ θεωροῦσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὡδί, ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν δέονται θεωρεῖν. Similiter autem et edificandi scientiam ut edificent et theoricam ut speculentur, sed non speculantur ut theoricam habeant, nisi meditantes; hii autem non speculantur sed in quantum sic, aut quia non egent speculari. And similarly men have the art of building that they may build, and theoretical science that they may theorize; but they do not theorize that they may have theoretical science, except those who are learning by practice; and these do not theorize except in a limited sense, or because they have no need to theorize.
[15] ἔτι ἡ ὕλη ἔστι δυνάμει ὅτι ἔλθοι ἂν εἰς τὸ εἶδος: ὅταν δέ γε ἐνεργείᾳ ᾖ, τότε ἐν τῷ εἴδει ἐστίν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ὧν κίνησις τὸ τέλος, Amplius materia est potentia, donec veniat ad speciem; quando vero actu est, tunc est in specie. Similiter autem et in aliis, et quorum motus est finis. Further, matter exists in a potential state, just because it may come to its form; and when it exists actually, then it is in its form. And the same holds good in all cases, even those in which the end is a movement. And so, as teachers think they have achieved their end when they have exhibited the pupil at work, nature does likewise.
διὸ ὥσπερ οἱ διδάσκοντες ἐνεργοῦντα ἐπιδείξαντες οἴονται τὸ τέλος ἀποδεδωκέναι, καὶ ἡ φύσις ὁμοίως. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτω γίγνεται, ὁ [20] Παύσωνος ἔσται Ἑρμῆς: ἄδηλος γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἰ ἔσω ἢ ἔξω, ὥσπερ κἀκεῖνος. τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τέλος, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια τὸ ἔργον, διὸ καὶ τοὔνομα ἐνέργεια λέγεται κατὰ τὸ ἔργον καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν. Propter quod sicut docentes operantem ostendentes putant finem reddidisse, et natura similiter. Nam si non fit ita, Passonos Mercurius erit; non manifestus enim, et scientia si interius aut exterius, quemadmodum ille. Opus enim finis, actus autem opus. Propter quod et nomen dicitur actus secundum opus et tendit versus endelichiam. For if this is not the case, we shall have Pauson's Hermes over again, since it will be hard to say about the knowledge, as about the figure in the picture, whether it is within or without. For the action is the end, and the actuality is the action. And so even the word actuality is derived from action , and points to the complete reality.
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἔσχατον ἡ χρῆσις (οἷον ὄψεως ἡ ὅρασις, καὶ οὐθὲν [25] γίγνεται παρὰ ταύτην ἕτερον ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως), ἀπ᾽ ἐνίων δὲ γίγνεταί τι (οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδόμησιν), ὅμως οὐθὲν ἧττον ἔνθα μὲν τέλος, ἔνθα δὲ μᾶλλον τέλος τῆς δυνάμεώς ἐστιν: ἡ γὰρ οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, καὶ ἅμα γίγνεται καὶ ἔστι τῇ οἰκίᾳ. [30] ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν (οἷον ἥ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ καὶ ἡ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφαινομένῳ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ὅλως ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ): ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον [35] παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια (οἷον ἡ ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία: [1050β] [1] ζωὴ γὰρ ποιά τίς ἐστιν). Quoniam vero est horum quidem ultimum usus, ut visus visio, et praeter hanc nullum fit alterum a visu opus, a quibusdam vero fit aliquid, ut ab edificatoria domus praeter edificationem; tamen non minus hic quidem finis, hic autem magis finis potentie est. Nam edificatio in edificato, et simul fit et est cum domo. Quorumcumque ergo > aliquid alterum est quod fit praeter usum, horum actus in facto est, ut edificatio in edificato et contextio in contexto; similiter autem et in aliis, et totaliter motus in eo quod movetur. Quorum vero non est aliud aliquod opus praeter actionem, in ipsis existit actio, ut visio in vidente et speculatio in speculante et vita in anima (quare et felicitas; vita namque qualis quaedam est). And while in some cases the exercise is the ultimate thing (e.g. in sight the ultimate thing is seeing, and no other product besides this results from sight), but from some things a product follows (e.g. from the art of building there results a house as well as the act of building), yet none the less the act is in the former case the end and in the latter more of an end than the potency is. For the act of building is realized in the thing that is being built, and comes to be, and is, at the same time as the house. Where, then, the result is something apart from the exercise, the actuality is in the thing that is being made, e.g. the act of building is in the thing that is being built and that of weaving in the thing that is being woven, and similarly in all other cases, and in general the movement is in the thing that is being moved; but where there is no product apart from the actuality, the actuality is present in the agents, e.g. the act of seeing is in the seeing subject and that of theorizing in the theorizing subject and the life is in the soul (and [50b] therefore well-being also; for it is a certain kind of life).
ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐνέργειά ἐστιν. κατά τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φανερὸν ὅτι πρότερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως, καὶ ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, τοῦ χρόνου [5] ἀεὶ προλαμβάνει ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας ἕως τῆς τοῦ ἀεὶ κινοῦντος πρώτως. Quare manifestum quod substantia et species actus quidam est. Secundum hanc itaque rationem palam quia prior substantia est actus potentia. Et ut diximus, tempore semper preaccipitur actus alius ante alium usque ad eum qui est semper moventis primum. Obviously, therefore, the substance or form is actuality. According to this argument, then, it is obvious that actuality is prior in substantial being to potency; and as we have said, one actuality always precedes another in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ κυριωτέρως: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀΐδια πρότερα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῶν φθαρτῶν, ἔστι δ᾽ οὐθὲν δυνάμει ἀΐδιον. At vero et magis proprie; nam sempiterna priora substantia sunt corruptibilibus, est autem nihil potentia sempiternum. But (b) actuality is prior in a stricter sense also; for eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things, and no eternal thing exists potentially.
λόγος δὲ ὅδε: πᾶσα δύναμις ἅμα τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς ἐστιν: τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸν ὑπάρχειν οὐκ [10] ἂν ὑπάρξειεν οὐθενί, τὸ δυνατὸν δὲ πᾶν ἐνδέχεται μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. τὸ ἄρα δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐνδέχεται καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι: τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα δυνατὸν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι: τὸ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι φθαρτόν, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται [15] ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ εἶναι, ἢ κατὰ τόπον ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ ποιόν: ἁπλῶς δὲ τὸ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν. Ratio vero haec. Omnis potentia simul contradictionis est; quod quidem enim non possibile existere non utique existet in aliquo, possibile autem omne contingit non actu esse. Quod ergo possibile esse contingit esse et non esse: idem igitur possibile esse et non esse. Possibile vero non esse contingit non esse. Contingens autem non esse corruptibile, aut simpliciter aut hoc ipsum quod dicitur contingere non esse, aut secundum locum aut secundum quantum aut secundum quale; simpliciter autem * quod * secundum substantiam. The reason is this. Every potency is at one and the same time a potency of the opposite; for, while that which is not capable of being present in a subject cannot be present, everything that is capable of being may possibly not be actual. That, then, which is capable of being may either be or not be; the same thing, then, is capable both of being and of not being. And that which is capable of not being may possibly not be; and that which may possibly not be is perishable, either in the full sense, or in the precise sense in which it is said that it possibly may not be, i.e. in respect either of place or of quantity or quality; in the full sense means in respect of substance .
οὐθὲν ἄρα τῶν ἀφθάρτων ἁπλῶς δυνάμει ἔστιν ἁπλῶς (κατά τι δὲ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον ποιὸν ἢ πού): ἐνεργείᾳ ἄρα πάντα: Nihil ergo incorruptibilium simpliciter potentia est ens simpliciter (aliquid autem nihil prohibet, ut quale aut ubi); actu ergo * omnia. Nothing, then, which is in the full sense imperishable is in the full sense potentially existent (though there is nothing to prevent its being so in some respect, e.g. potentially of a certain quality or in a certain place); all imperishable things, then, exist actually.
οὐδὲ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων (καίτοι ταῦτα πρῶτα: εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν, οὐθὲν ἂν ἦν): Nec eorum quae ex necessitate sunt; et quidem ipsa prima; nam si haec non essent, nihil utique esset. Nor can anything which is of necessity exist potentially; yet these things are primary; for if these did not exist, nothing would exist.
[20] οὐδὲ δὴ κίνησις, εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἀΐδιος: οὐδ᾽ εἴ τι κινούμενον ἀΐδιον, οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ δύναμιν κινούμενον ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ποθὲν ποί (τούτου δ᾽ ὕλην οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑπάρχειν), Neque utique motus, si quis est sempiternus; nec si quid motum sempiternum, non est secundum potentiam motum nisi unde quo; huius autem mate>riam nihil prohibet existere. Nor does eternal movement, if there be such, exist potentially; and, if there is an eternal mobile, it is not in motion in virtue of a potentiality, except in respect of whence and whither (there is nothing to prevent its having matter which makes it capable of movement in various directions).
διὸ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἥλιος καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μή ποτε στῇ, ὃ φοβοῦνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως. οὐδὲ κάμνει τοῦτο δρῶντα: οὐ [25] γὰρ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀντιφάσεως αὐτοῖς, οἷον τοῖς φθαρτοῖς, ἡ κίνησις, ὥστε ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς κινήσεως: ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ὕλη καὶ δύναμις οὖσα, οὐκ ἐνέργεια, αἰτία τούτου. Propter quod semper agit sol et astra et totum caelum; non est autem timendum ne quando stet, quod timent qui * de natura. Neque laborant hoc agentia. Non enim super potentiam contradictionis ipsis, ut corruptibilibus, motus, ut laboriosa sit * continuatio motus; nam substantia materia et potentia, non actu, causa huius. And so the sun and the stars and the whole heaven are ever active, and there is no fear that they may sometime stand still, as the natural philosophers fear they may. Nor do they tire in this activity; for movement is not for them, as it is for perishable things, connected with the potentiality for opposites, so that the continuity of the movement should be laborious; for it is that kind of substance which is matter and potency, not actuality, that causes this.
μιμεῖται δὲ τὰ ἄφθαρτα καὶ τὰ ἐν μεταβολῇ ὄντα, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ. καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ: [30] καθ᾽ αὑτὰ γὰρ καὶ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν. Imitantur autem incorruptibilia et quae in transmutatione sunt entia, ut terra, ignis. Et enim haec semper agunt; nam secundum se et in ipsis habent motum. Imperishable things are imitated by those that are involved in change, e.g. earth and fire. For these also are ever active; for they have their movement of themselves and in themselves.
αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι δυνάμεις, ἐξ ὧν διώρισται, πᾶσαι τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς εἰσιν: τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον ὡδὶ κινεῖν δύναται καὶ μὴ ὡδί, ὅσα γε κατὰ λόγον: αἱ δ᾽ ἄλογοι τῷ παρεῖναι καὶ μὴ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἔσονται αἱ αὐταί. Potentiae vero aliae, ex quibus diffinitum est, omnes contradictionis sunt. Nam possibile sic movere potest et non sic, quaecumque secundum rationem; irrationabiles vero per adesse et non contradictionis erunt eaedem. But the other potencies, according to our previous discussion, are all potencies for opposites; for that which can move another in this way can also move it not in this way, i.e. if it acts according to a rational formula; and the same non-rational potencies will produce opposite results by their presence or absence.
εἰ ἄρα τινὲς εἰσὶ φύσεις [35] τοιαῦται ἢ οὐσίαι οἵας λέγουσιν οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὰς ἰδέας, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιστῆμον ἄν τι εἴη ἢ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη καὶ κινούμενον ἢ κίνησις: [1051α] [1] ταῦτα γὰρ ἐνέργειαι μᾶλλον, ἐκεῖναι δὲ δυνάμεις τούτων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρότερον ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς μεταβλητικῆς, φανερόν. Si ergo alique sunt nature tales aut substantiae quales dicunt qui * in rationibus ydeas, multo magis sciens utique erit aliquid quam per se scientia et motum quam motus; haec enim 105u1 actus magis, illa autem rpotentie horum1. Quod quidem igitur est prius actus potentia et omni principio mutabili, palam. If, then, there are any entities or substances such as the dialecticians say the Ideas are, there must be something much more scientific than science-itself and something more [51a] mobile than movement-itself; for these will be more of the nature of actualities, while science-itself and movement-itself are potencies for these. Obviously, then, actuality is prior both to potency and to every principle of change.

Chapter 9

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ὅτι δὲ καὶ βελτίων καὶ τιμιωτέρα τῆς σπουδαίας [5] δυνάμεως ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι λέγεται, ταὐτόν ἐστι δυνατὸν τἀναντία, οἷον τὸ δύνασθαι λεγόμενον ὑγιαίνειν ταὐτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν, καὶ ἅμα: ἡ αὐτὴ γὰρ δύναμις τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν, καὶ ἠρεμεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ καταβάλλειν, [10] καὶ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι καὶ καταπίπτειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν δύνασθαι τἀναντία ἅμα ὑπάρχει: τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία ἅμα ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας δὲ ἅμα ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν (οἷον ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν), ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη τούτων θάτερον εἶναι τἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι ὁμοίως ἀμφότερον ἢ οὐδέτερον: [15] ἡ ἄρα ἐνέργεια βελτίων. Quod autem et melior et honorabilior studiosa potentia actus, ex hiis est palam. Quaecumque enim secundum posse dicuntur, idem est potens contraria, ut rquod dicitur posse1 conualescere idem est et languens, et simul; eadem enim potentia convalescendi et laborandi, et quiescendi et movendi, et edificandi et destruendi, et edificari et corruendi. Posse quidem igitur contraria simul existit; contraria > vero impossibile est * existere, ut sanum esse et laborare. Quare necesse horum alterum esse bonum, posse vero similiter utrumque aut neutrum. Actus ergo melior est. Chapter 9. That the actuality is also better and more valuable than the good potency is evident from the following argument. Everything of which we say that it can do something, is alike capable of contraries, e.g. that of which we say that it can be well is the same as that which can be ill, and has both potencies at once; for the same potency is a potency of health and illness, of rest and motion, of building and throwing down, of being built and being thrown down. The capacity for contraries, then, is present at the same time; but contraries cannot be present at the same time, and the actualities also cannot be present at the same time, e.g. health and illness. Therefore, while the good must be one of them, the capacity is both alike, or neither; the actuality, then, is better.
ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι χεῖρον τῆς δυνάμεως: τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον ταὐτὸ ἄμφω τἀναντία. Necesse autem et in malis finem et actum esse deteriorem potentia; quod enim potens: idem ambo contraria. Also in the case of bad things the end or actuality must be worse than the potency; for that which can is both contraries alike.
δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν παρὰ τὰ πράγματα: ὕστερον γὰρ τῇ φύσει τὸ κακὸν τῆς δυνάμεως. Palam ergo quia non est aliquid quod malum praeter res *; posterius enim ipsi nature malum quam potentia. Clearly, then, the bad does not exist apart from bad things; for the bad is in its nature posterior to the potency.
οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς [20] καὶ τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὐθὲν ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἁμάρτημα οὔτε διεφθαρμένον (καὶ γὰρ ἡ διαφθορὰ τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν). Non ergo nec in eis quae * a principio et sempiternis nihil est neque malum neque peccatum neque corruptum; et enim corruptio * malorum. And therefore we may also say that in the things which are from the beginning, i.e. in eternal things, there is nothing bad, nothing defective, nothing perverted (for perversion is something bad).
εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργείᾳ: διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὑρίσκουσιν. εἰ δ᾽ ἦν διῃρημένα, φανερὰ ἂν ἦν: νῦν δ᾽ ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει. διὰ τί δύο ὀρθαὶ τὸ τρίγωνον; ὅτι αἱ [25] περὶ μίαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι ἴσαι δύο ὀρθαῖς. εἰ οὖν ἀνῆκτο ἡ παρὰ τὴν πλευράν, ἰδόντι ἂν ἦν εὐθὺς δῆλον διὰ τί. ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὀρθὴ καθόλου διὰ τί; ἐὰν ἴσαι τρεῖς, ἥ τε βάσις δύο καὶ ἡ ἐκ μέσου ἐπισταθεῖσα ὀρθή, ἰδόντι δῆλον τῷ ἐκεῖνο εἰδότι. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς [30] ἐνέργειαν ἀγόμενα εὑρίσκεται: αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι ἡ νόησις ἐνέργεια: ὥστ᾽ ἐξ ἐνεργείας ἡ δύναμις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες γιγνώσκουσιν (ὕστερον γὰρ γενέσει ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν). Inveniuntur autem et dyagramata actu; nam dividentes inveniunt. Si vero essent divisa, manifesta utique essent; nunc autem insunt potentia. Propter quid duo recti trigonum? quia qui circa unum punctum anguli * equales duobus rectis. Si ergo educeretur quae iuxta costam, videnti utique statim esset palam. Propter quid in semicirculo rectus universaliter? Quia si * equales tres, * quae bases due et quae ex medio superstans recta, videnti palam ei qui illud scivit. Quare palam quia potentia entia ad actum reducta inveniuntur. Causa vero quia intelligentia est actus. Quare ex actu potentia, et propter > hoc facientes cognoscunt; posterius enim generatione qui secundum numerum actus. It is an activity also that geometrical constructions are discovered; for we find them by dividing. If the figures had been already divided, the constructions would have been obvious; but as it is they are present only potentially. Why are the angles of the triangle equal to two right angles? Because the angles about one point are equal to two right angles. If, then, the line parallel to the side had been already drawn upwards, the reason would have been evident to any one as soon as he saw the figure. Why is the angle in a semicircle in all cases a right angle? If three lines are equal the two which form the base, and the perpendicular from the centre-the conclusion is evident at a glance to one who knows the former proposition. Obviously, therefore, the potentially existing constructions are discovered by being brought to actuality; the reason is that the geometer's thinking is an actuality; so that the potency proceeds from an actuality; and therefore it is by making constructions that people come to know them (though the single actuality is later in generation than the corresponding potency).

Chapter 10

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ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὂν λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν τὸ μὲν κατὰ [35] τὰ σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ ἐνέργειαν τούτων ἢ τἀναντία, [1051β] [1] τὸ δὲ [κυριώτατα ὂν] ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, Quoniam autem ens dicitur et non ens hoc quidem secundum figuras cathegoriarum, illud vero secundum potentiam aut actum horum aut contraria, hoc autem * maxime proprie aut * verum aut falsum. Chapter 10. The terms being and non-being are employed firstly with reference to the categories, and secondly with reference to the potency or actuality of these or their non-[51b]potency or nonactuality, and thirdly in the sense of true and false.
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τῷ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ διῃρῆσθαι, ὥστε ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διῃρημένον οἰόμενος διῃρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως [5] ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα, πότ᾽ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀληθὲς λεγόμενον ἢ ψεῦδος; τοῦτο γὰρ σκεπτέον τί λέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς οἴεσθαι ἀληθῶς σε λευκὸν εἶναι εἶ σὺ λευκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σὲ εἶναι λευκὸν ἡμεῖς οἱ φάντες τοῦτο ἀληθεύομεν. Hoc autem in rebus est componi aut dividi, unde verus est divisum putans dividi et compositum componi, mentitur autem econtrario habens res * quandocumque est aut non est. Quare quod verum dicitur aut falsum, hoc * perscrutandum * quid dicimus. Non enim propter nos existimare te vere album esse es tu albus, sed propter te esse album nos hoc dicentes verum dicimus. This depends, on the side of the objects, on their being combined or separated, so that he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is in error. This being so, when is what is called truth or falsity present, and when is it not? We must consider what we mean by these terms. It is not because we think truly that you are pale, that you are pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth.
εἰ δὴ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ σύγκειται καὶ ἀδύνατα διαιρεθῆναι, [10] τὰ δ᾽ ἀεὶ διῄρηται καὶ ἀδύνατα συντεθῆναι, τὰ δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται τἀναντία, τὸ μὲν εἶναί ἐστι τὸ συγκεῖσθαι καὶ ἓν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι τὸ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ πλείω εἶναι: περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἡ αὐτὴ γίγνεται ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς δόξα καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐνδέχεται ὁτὲ [15] μὲν ἀληθεύειν ὁτὲ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι: περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐ γίγνεται ὁτὲ μὲν ἀληθὲς ὁτὲ δὲ ψεῦδος, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. Si igitur haec quidem semper componuntur et impossibilia dividi, haec vero semper divisa sunt et impossibilia componi, haec autem contingunt contraria, esse quidem est componi et unum esse, et non esse non componi sed plura esse: circa contingentia quidem igitur eadem fit falsa et vera opinio et oratio eadem et contingit quandoque veram esse et contingit quandoque esse falsam; circa impossibilia vero aliter se habere non fit * aliquando verum et aliquando falsum, sed semper haec vera et falsa. If, then, some things are always combined and cannot be separated, and others are always separated and cannot be combined, while others are capable either of combination or of separation, being is being combined and one, and not being is being not combined but more than one. Regarding contingent facts, then, the same opinion or the same statement comes to be false and true, and it is possible for it to be at one time correct and at another erroneous; but regarding things that cannot be otherwise opinions are not at one time true and at another false, but the same opinions are always true or always false.
περὶ δὲ δὴ τὰ ἀσύνθετα τί τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος; οὐ γάρ ἐστι σύνθετον, ὥστε εἶναι μὲν ὅταν συγκέηται, μὴ εἶναι δὲ [20] ἐὰν διῃρημένον ᾖ, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν <τὸ> ξύλον ἢ τὸ ἀσύμμετρον [21] τὴν διάμετρον: οὐδὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὁμοίως ἔτι ὑπάρξει καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνων. ἢ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ αὐτό, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι, Circa incomposita vero quid esse aut non esse, et verum et falsum? Non enim est compositum, ut sit quidem quando componitur et non sit quando divisum fuerit, sicut album lignum aut incommensurabilem dyametrum; nec verum et falsum similiter adhuc existet et in illis. Aut sicut nec verum in > hiis idem, sic nec esse. But with regard to incomposites, what is being or not being, and truth or falsity? A thing of this sort is not composite, so as to be when it is compounded, and not to be if it is separated, like that the wood is white or that the diagonal is incommensurable ; nor will truth and falsity be still present in the same way as in the previous cases. In fact, as truth is not the same in these cases, so also being is not the same;
ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, τὸ μὲν θιγεῖν καὶ φάναι ἀληθές (οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸ κατάφασις [25] καὶ φάσις), τὸ δ᾽ ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν (ἀπατηθῆναι γὰρ περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς μὴ συνθετὰς οὐσίας, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι: Sed est * verum quidem * aut falsum: * attingere quidem et representare verum (non enim idem affirmatio et representatio), ignorare autem non attingere. Decipi enim circa quod quid est non est sed aut secundum accidens; similiter autem et circa compositas substantias, non enim est decipi. but (a) truth or falsity is as follows – contact and assertion are truth (assertion not being the same as affirmation), and ignorance is non-contact. For it is not possible to be in error regarding the question what a thing is, save in an accidental sense; and the same holds good regarding non-composite substances (for it is not possible to be in error about them).
καὶ πᾶσαι εἰσὶν ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐ δυνάμει, ἐγίγνοντο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐφθείροντο, νῦν δὲ τὸ ὂν αὐτὸ οὐ γίγνεται οὐδὲ φθείρεται, [30] ἔκ τινος γὰρ ἂν ἐγίγνετο: ὅσα δή ἐστιν ὅπερ εἶναί τι καὶ ἐνέργειαι, περὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ νοεῖν ἢ μή: ἀλλὰ τὸ τί ἐστι ζητεῖται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ἢ μή): Et omnes sunt actu, non potentia; generarentur enim utique et corrumperentur. Nunc autem ens ipsum non generatur nec corrumpitur; ex aliquo enim utique generaretur. Quaecumque igitur sunt quod vere esse aliquid et actu, circa haec non est decipi sed aut intelligere aut non. And they all exist actually, not potentially; for otherwise they would have come to be and ceased to be; but, as it is, being itself does not come to be (nor cease to be); for if it had done so it would have had to come out of something. About the things, then, which are essences and actualities, it is not possible to be in error, but only to know them or not to know them. But we do inquire what they are, viz. whether they are of such and such a nature or not.
τὸ δὲ εἶναι ὡς τὸ ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ ὡς τὸ ψεῦδος, ἓν μέν ἐστιν, εἰ σύγκειται, ἀληθές, τὸ [35] δ᾽ εἰ μὴ σύγκειται, ψεῦδος: τὸ δὲ ἕν, εἴπερ ὄν, οὕτως ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως, οὐκ ἔστιν: [1052α] [1] τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς τὸ νοεῖν ταῦτα: τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἀπάτη, ἀλλὰ ἄγνοια, οὐχ οἵα ἡ τυφλότης: ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυφλότης ἐστὶν ὡς ἂν εἰ τὸ νοητικὸν ὅλως μὴ ἔχοι τις. Sed quod quid est quaeritur de ipsis, si talia sunt aut non. Esse vero ut verum et non esse ut falsum: unum quidem est si componitur, verum, hoc autem si non componitur, falsum. Unum autem, si vere ens, sic est, si vero non ita, non est. Verum autem intelligere ipsa; falsum vero non est, nec deceptio, sed ignorantia. Non qualis caecitas; caecitas enim est ut utique si intellectivum omnino non habeat aliquis. (b) As regards the being that answers to truth and the non-being that answers to falsity, in one case there is truth if the subject and the attribute are really combined, and falsity if they are not combined; in the other case, if the object is existent it exists in a particular way, and if it does [52a] not exist in this way does not exist at all. And truth means knowing these objects, and falsity does not exist, nor error, but only ignorance-and not an ignorance which is like blindness; for blindness is akin to a total absence of the faculty of thinking.
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι περὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων [5] οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπάτη κατὰ τὸ ποτέ, εἴ τις ὑπολαμβάνει ἀκίνητα. οἷον τὸ τρίγωνον εἰ μὴ μεταβάλλειν οἴεται, οὐκ οἰήσεται ποτὲ μὲν δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν ποτὲ δὲ οὔ (μεταβάλλοι γὰρ ἄν), ἀλλὰ τὶ μὲν τὶ δ᾽ οὔ, οἷον ἄρτιον ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον εἶναι μηθένα, ἢ τινὰς μὲν τινὰς δ᾽ οὔ: ἀριθμῷ δὲ περὶ ἕνα οὐδὲ [10] τοῦτο: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τινὰ μὲν τινὰ δὲ οὒ οἰήσεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἀληθεύσει ἢ ψεύσεται ὡς ἀεὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος. Palam etiam et quia de immobilibus non est deceptio secundum quando, si quis putet immobilia. Ut trigonum si non permutari putat, non opinabitur quandoque duos rectos habere quandoque non; permutaretur enim utique. Sed aliquid quidem aliquid vero non; ut parem numerum primum esse nullum, aut aliquos quidem aliquos autem non. Numero vero circa unum nec hoc; non enim est: aliquem quidem aliquem vero non putabit, sed verum dicet aut mentietur ut semper sic se habente. It is evident also that about unchangeable things there can be no error in respect of time, if we assume them to be unchangeable. E.g. if we suppose that the triangle does not change, we shall not suppose that at one time its angles are equal to two right angles while at another time they are not (for that would imply change). It is possible, however, to suppose that one member of such a class has a certain attribute and another has not; e.g. while we may suppose that no even number is prime, we may suppose that some are and some are not. But regarding a numerically single number not even this form of error is possible; for we cannot in this case suppose that one instance has an attribute and another has not, but whether our judgement be true or false, it is implied that the fact is eternal.



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