Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 26

Latin	English
CAP. 26. QUOD PROPOSITIONES DUBITABILES DE INESSE, HABENTES PRO SUBIECTO NOMEN CONNOTATIVUM VEL RESPECTIVUM VEL HUIUSMODI, QUANDOQUE POSSUNT DEMONSTRARI QUANDOQUE NON.	Chapter 26. That doubtful propositions of essence, having for subject a connotative or respective noun or of such a mode, when they can be demonstrated and when not.
ƿ Si autem propositio dubitabilis in qua praedicatur esse exsistere per propositionem de inesse vel de possibili habeat pro subiecto nomen connotativum vel respectivum vel negativum vel unum compositum ex multis nominibus, quandoque potest demonstrari, quandoque non.	Now if there is a dubitable proposition in which existential being is predicated by an assertoric or de possibili proposition, and the proposition has for a subject a connotative, relative, or negative name, or one composed from many names, sometimes it can be demonstrated and sometimes it cannot.
Talis enim propositio semper aequivalet uni propositioni in qua praedicatur passio de subiecto, saltem large sumendo passionem. Sicut ista proposito ‘eclipsis est’ aequivalet isti ‘aliquid eclipsatur’; et ista ‘calefactivum est’ aequivalet isti ‘aliquid est calefactivum’; et ista ‘habens tres angulos aequales duobus rectis’ aequivalet isti ‘aliquid est habens tres angulos aequales duobus rectis’.	For such a proposition is always equivalent to a single proposition in which an attribute is predicated of a subject, at least when we take "attribute" broadly. Thus the proposition, "An eclipse exists" is equivalent to "Something is eclipsed"; and "A heatable thing exists," is equivalent "Something is heatable"; and "Something having three angles equal to two right angles exists," is equivalent to "Something is a thing having three angles equal to two right angles."
Et ideo sicut dicendum est de propositionibus quibus aequivalent, quod sunt demonstrabiles vel non sunt demonstrabiles, ita dicendum est de istis. Et si, large accipiendo demonstrationem, dicatur quod quaelibet talis habens pro subiecto aliquid communius quam sit subiectum primum talis passionis est syllogizabilis per primum subiectum tamquam per medium, et per consequens demonstrabilis, potest dici quod quaelibet talis est demonstrabilis, saltem large accipiendo demonstrationem.	And therefore, just as it is to be said of the propositions to which they are equivalent, that they are demonstrable or not demonstrable, so it is to be said of these. And if, taking the demonstration broadly, it is said that every such having for its subject something more common than the first subject of such an attribute is syllogizable through the first subject as through a medium, and consequently demonstrable, it can be said that every such is demonstrable, at least taking the demonstration broadly.
Si tamen dicatur quod nulla est demonstratio nisi quando maior potest prius tempore cognosci quam conclusio, ita quod maior potest esse nota et conclusio potest ignorari et tamen apprehendi, potest dici quod aliquae tales propositiones sunt demonstrabiles et aliquae non.	If, however, it is said that there is no demonstration except when the greater can be known in time before the conclusion, so that the greater can be known and the conclusion can be ignored and yet apprehended, it can be said that some such propositions are demonstrable and some not.
Puta, quando passiones sunt demonstrabiles de suis primis subiectis, tunc sunt tales propositiones demonstrabiles, quando autem passiones non sunt demonstrabiles de suis subiectis primis, tunc non sunt demonstrabiles.	For example, when attributes are demonstrable from their first subjects, then such propositions are demonstrable, but when attributes are not demonstrable from their first subjects, then they are not demonstrable.
Unde ista ‘calefactivum est vel esse potest’ demonstrari non potest, sed tantum scitur per experientiam, sine syllogismo in quo potest maior esse nota et conclusio apprehendi et ignorari.	Whence this 'heat is or can be' cannot be demonstrated, but is only known through experience, without a syllogism in which the greater known and the conclusion can be grasped and ignored.