Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1: Difference between revisions

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Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration
 


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1.  It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]).  And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent.  Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])).  But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so.  Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.


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2.  Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]].  But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way.  I prove the minor (premise).  First, that demonstration is not known by definition:  For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex.  Therefore, it is not known be definition.  Nor is it known by demonstration:  For, it would follow that it is made known by itself.  I prove that, of a highest demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration.  For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a highest demonstration. Therefore, a highest demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.


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3.  Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration.  And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument:  For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics.  Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.


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4.  Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division).  Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.


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5.  Lastly, it is argued:  Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it.  It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent):  Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things.  The antecedent is proven (as follows).  First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one knows many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),”<ref>Topics, 114b (trans. Barnes): “Thus, if to know a thing is to think of it, then also to know many things is to be thinking of many things; whereas this is not true; for it is possible to know many things but not to be thinking of them.”</ref> and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>
 


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6.  Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible:  For what is intelligible must move the intellect.  But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect.  So it is not intelligible.


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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).


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It should be noted that although “knowledge” may be said in many ways, yet we here intend to talk about demonstrative knowledge, namely knowledge acquired by demonstration or demonstrations.  Next it must be known that there are indeed three ways to be “knowable” through a demonstration.  Primarily and immediately knowable is the demonstrable conclusion, which is said to be known by it [the demonstration] because it is concluded from familiar premises.  In a second way, those things out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed are said to be “knowable.”  For, just as we say that we know a particular conclusion and that it was demonstrated to us, so we often say that a particular predicate is known and demonstrated of a particular subject.  Next, in a third way, the things signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions are knowable, and thus we say that we have knowledge about animals and stones, about god and intelligences, and so on about other things.
 


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That being noted, I easily lay out some conclusions.  The first is that there is no knowledge of demonstrations of the first kind, like the knowledge of demonstrable conclusions:  For no demonstration, and indeed no syllogism, is produced as the conclusion of any demonstration.


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The second conclusion is that there is no knowledge of demonstration of the second kind, like the knowledge of the terms out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed:  For demonstrations are not terms of conclusions, indeed they are rather composed out of several sentences and terms.  However, this conclusion must be qualified in such a way that one demonstration, or one syllogism, can be taken materially and supposed for itself, and thus a term can be produced, namely a subject or a predicate of some sentence or conclusion.  But never would a signifying demonstration be accepted as the term of conclusions or sentences.
 


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The third conclusion is that, understood in the third way, there is knowledge of demonstrations, indeed of all things of the world, like the knowledge of the things that are signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions.  For these terms “being”, “one”, “same”, “different”, “cause”, “caused”, “corruptible”, “incorruptible”, and similarly many others, signify all the things of the world, and yet many demonstrable conclusion can be composed out of these terms, in physics as well as in metaphysics.  Therefore, knowledge about all things is possessed through physics as well as metaphysics and, consequently, also about demonstrations.


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Turning to the knowledge of the book Posterior (Analytics), the last conclusion is that about the term “demonstration” knowledge of the third [sic] kind is possessed, like the knowledge of a term out of which a demonstrated conclusion is composed.  And this knowledge is presented and passed on in this book Posterior (Analytics), and neither in the Physics nor in the Metaphysics.  For indeed, in this book, many conclusions are demonstrated that are composed out of the term “demonstration” as the subject of sentences, e.g., that demonstration is from things that are true or that demonstration is from things that are necessary.


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By means of these insights, the arguments are easily answered.


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1.  Regarding the first [argument], I say that demonstration must be from things that are necessary, that is from necessary premises and conclusions, as the conclusion is called “necessary” in the same sense [as the premises], and also from incorruptible things because what is necessary is incorruptible in the same sense in which it is necessary (and on that there will be a special question below).  However, the things signified by the terms of a demonstrable conclusion can be corruptible and contingent in being.




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[2.]  Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined.  But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics].  And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book.  Nor are the objections made against this valid.  For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable.  Similarly, it is clear that of this term “highest demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through a highest demonstration.  Hence, it may be that a highest demonstration is familiar through itself.  Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term “highest demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.


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3.  Regarding the other argument, it must be known that this name “knowledge” as it is distinguished from “art” and “practical wisdom” is understood most narrowly, and it does not cover anything except speculative dispositions.  But art and practical wisdom are practical dispositions.  And so, conceiving this name narrowly, logic is not [a brach of] knowledge, but an art, namely [the art] of the construction of arguments.  However, often these names “art” and “practical wisdom” are used in a general way for all certain dispositions acquired by demonstration.  And in this way “art” is not distinguished from “knowledge”; therefore logic is an art and also [a branch of] knowledge.


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4.  Regarding the other argument, I say that logic is practical, as is the demonstrative art treated in the book Posterior [Analytics], since [it is] discussing what is done and teaching a doing:  it teaches to make and construct arguments in the right way.  But when it is said that a [branch of] knowledge that is directed at knowing is speculative, I say that this is true if it is directed at knowing as a proximate end. If it is, however, directed at something done by us as a proximate end, it is practical; it may be directed at knowing as a remote and final end.  Aristotle says this explicitly, in book six of the [Nicomachean] Ethics, laying out that practical wisdom is practical.  Although he lays out that it is ultimately directed at [theoretical] wisdom; it is practical because its proximate end is a deed.


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5.  Regarding the last [argument], I say that demonstration is intelligible, and I say that it is possible to understand several things at the same time.  Nor does Aristotle say in the opposite in book six of the Topics, except as an example.  As an example verification is not required, as is clear from the book Prior [Analytics].  But when Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that “someone who doesn’t understand one thing understands nothing,” that is certainly true because someone who understands one thousand things understand one and two things.


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6.  Regarding the confirmation, I say that not everything that is intelligible moves the intellect.  Indeed, if I have a general and specific concept of a human, and I understand all humans in the world, nevertheless a human who is in Rome never moves my intellect, or my senses.  However, I admit that my intellect must be moved by something intelligible, and not by all of them.  And in general I say that it is not necessary that everything that moves is nobler than what is moved, but [just] the principally moving thing and the principally moved thing.  Our intellect, however, is something that is nobler and, of course, not in itself a sensible object.
 


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Latest revision as of 09:48, 2 March 2023

←Index Q2→


Latin English
IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

LIBER PRIMUS

Book One

PROOEMIUM

Preface

Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*.[1] It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible for complete knowledge of something to co-exist with any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that it is never possible to doubt without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the Metaphysics[2]: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huiusmodi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until its causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause, however, all such doubt is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it was well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum ipsam felicitantem influendo. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae forma⟨liter⟩ et intrinsece et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae ⟨materialiter⟩ et ⟨ex⟩[in]trinsece; secundum +quoddam+ obiectum est causa prima, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that perfects the soul by its inherence; second, the object that makes the soul happy by its influence. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom form[ally] and intrinsically and in the first subject of this wisdom [materially] and [ex]trinsically; +the second+ object is the first cause, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the Ethics*.[3] So it is said that human happiness is concerned with the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the Ethics*,[4] is wisdom, and it has the best object, and that is the first cause.

Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huiusmodi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ⟨ut habetur⟩ primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

From all of this it is clear that, among the other arts, the one that contributes most to acquiring human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind, seeing as demonstration is a syllogism that makes one know something, as is said in the first [book] of this [work, i.e. Posterior Analytics], and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said in the first [book] of this [work, i.e. Posterior Analytics]. Therefore, this demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut apparea[n]t excellenti[or]a artis demonstrativae super alias artes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta logicae sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars +faciendi+ instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huiusmodi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this, one must know that logic is usually defined thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that in doubtful matters truth is not distinguished from falsehood except by arguments that proceed from things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing definition is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of making the means by which one can distinguish truth from falsehood in doubtful matters. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

Ideo sciendum est quod [idem] artifex ⟨non⟩ potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo [non] oportet materiam ⟨cognoscere⟩[contingere] ex ⟨qua⟩[quibus] facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones. Ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars de ipsis ar⟨gumen⟩tibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus componendis, et vocatur 'nova ars' vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huiusmodi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus et ipso toto; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his product. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter is terms and sentences. And because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called the “old logic” (logica vetus). The other part looks at the arguments themselves that are to be composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts and to the whole, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” and “ancient.”

Vetus logica dividitur, quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad istius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

The old logic is divided, because the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book Categories, whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, and which is supplemented by the Liber Sex Principiorum. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book On Interpretation.

Logica nova dividitur, prima enim pars determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionis, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatio⟨ne⟩, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

The new logic is divided, for the first part treats of argumentation as inferring a conclusion from premises, and this is treated in the book Prior Analytics. The other part investigates argumentation as proving a conclusion, not just inferring it. And this part is handed down in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book which treats of argumentation as inferring a conclusion is called the book of “Priors” inasmuch as proof presupposes inference. Hence, inference is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior to and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is inferential but not the other way around.

Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae probationes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad certam scientiam acquirendam; et istae sunt demonstrationes de quibus ⟨tractatur⟩[traditur] in libro Posteriorum. Aliae probationes generantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huiusmodi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logicae quae vocatur dialectica.

Next, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which different proofs are directed. For some proofs are directed at acquiring certain knowledge; and these are demonstrations, which are treated of in the book of Posterior [Analytics]. Other proofs are generated in order to generate an opinion for us according to which we assent to things that were previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialectic.

Et ista dialectica dividitur, quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libro Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et per consequens logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

And this dialectic is divided, seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical bodies of knowledge, or at least subsequently directed at theoretical bodies of knowledge as much as at practical ones. And this part is treated in the books Topics and Sophistical Refutations. The other part is restricted to moral practices, or to moral knowledge, and this is handed down in the books Rhetoric and Poetics. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s Topics. Boethius’s book On Division is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et ille liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica ⟨praecedit⟩[recipit] artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum [per] rationes demonstrativas per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes aliae ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

But you should know that the book in which the demonstrative art is handed down is called the book of “Posterior [Analytics]” inasmuch as, as I already said, the book Topics and this book Posterior [Analytics] follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior [Analytics]. And again in the natural order of teaching the art of dialectic precedes the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side [of a question] with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, this book in which such an art is handed down is called “Posterior [Analytics].” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately raise, regarding the first book, the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

Quaestio 1a

Question 1a

UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA


1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.
2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.
3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.
4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.
5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.


6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.
In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.
Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.


Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.
Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.


Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.
Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.
Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.
1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.


Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.
3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.
4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.
5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.
6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.


Notes

  1. ↑ The sentence is not in Aristotle, but Aquinas uses it in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics ( 1 l. 4 n. 10 and lib. 1 l. 8 n. 4), and Aquinas points to AnaPost 71b20.
  2. ↑ 982b 17
  3. ↑ Here Buridan may have EN, book 10, 1177a18-1179b18, in mind.
  4. ↑ See EN, book 6, 1177a.
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