Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

Latin	English
IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM	John Buridan Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics
LIBER PRIMUS	Book One
PROOEMIUM	Preface
Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".	To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*. It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the Metaphysics: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”
Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".	Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”
In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.	In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the Ethics*. So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the Ethics*, is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.
Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.	From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this (art), and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this (art). Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.
Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.	In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by means of which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.
Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.	Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” (logica vetus). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”
Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.	The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book Categories, whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the Liber Sex Principiorum. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book On Interpretation.
Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.	The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book Prior Analytics. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.
Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.	Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.
Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.	And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books Topics and Sophistical Refutations. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books Rhetoric and Poetics. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s Topics. Boethius’s book On Division is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.
Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.	But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books Topics and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.
Quaestio 1a	Question 1a
UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA	Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration
1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.	1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.
2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.	2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. Posterior Analytics]). But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.
3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.	3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.
4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.	4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.
5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.	5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one understands many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”
6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.	6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.
In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.	Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).
Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.
Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.
Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.
Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.
Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.
Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.
1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.
Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.
3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.
4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.
5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.
6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.