Intentional inexistence

As is well known, to those who know, the modern conception of intentionality was first suggested by Franz Brentano in 1874.

Jedes psychische Phänomen ist durch das charakterisiert, was die Scholastiker des Mittelalters die intentionale (auch wohl mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes genannt haben, und was wir, obwohl mit nicht ganz unzweideutigen Ausdrücken, die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt, die Richtung auf ein Objekt (worunter hier nicht eine Realität zu verstehen ist), oder die immanente Gegenständlichkeit nennen würden. Jedes enthält etwas als Objekt in sich, obwohl nicht jedes in gleicher Weise. In der Vorstellung ist etwas vorgestellt, in dem Urteile ist etwas anerkannt oder verworfen, in der Liebe geliebt, in dem Hasse gehasst, in dem Begehren begehrt usw.	Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing [Realität]), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.
Diese intentionale Inexistenz ist den psychischen Phänomenen ausschließlich eigentümlich. Kein physisches Phänomen zeigt etwas Ähnliches.“	This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it.
Und somit können wir die psychischen Phänomene definiren, indem wir sagen, sie seien solche Phänomene, welche intentional einen Gegenstand in sich enthalten.	We could, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.

In a footnote, he claims that "Thomas Aquinas teaches that what is thought is intentionally in the thinker, the object of love in the lover, and what is desired in the desiring subject, and he uses this for theological ends. When Scripture speaks of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, he explains this as an intentional indwelling through love. And he even attempts to find an analogy for the mystery of the Trinity and the procession ad infra of the Word and the Spirit in the intentional inexistence which occurs in thinking and loving." Andrew Murray has made a useful contribution to the literature by examining the use of the term intentionale or strictly esse intentionale in the works of Thomas Aquinas. The texts (with dates) are below in parallel Latin-English, translations by Murray. In none of these passages is there reference to the object of love in the lover, what is desired in the desiring subject, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, the procession ad infra of the Word and the Spirit etc.

Latin	English
1: In IV Sententia d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 3 obj. 2 et ad 2. (twice). (1252-56) Praeterea, immutatio naturalis praecedit immutationem animalem, sicut esse naturale praecedit esse intentionale, sed corpora gloriosa ratione impassibilitatis non immutabuntur immutatione naturali, ergo nec immutatione animali, quae requiritur ad sentiendum. Ad secundum dicendum, quod omne passivum recipit actionem agentis secundum suum modum, si ergo aliquid sit quod natum sit immutari ab activo, naturali et spirituali immutatione, immutatio naturalis praecedit immutationem spiritualem, sicut esse naturale praecedit esse intentionale, si autem natum sit immutari tantum spiritualiter, non oportet quod immutetur naturaliter; sicut est de aere, qui non est receptivus coloris secundum esse naturale, sed solum secundum esse spirituale; et ideo hoc solum modo immutatur; sicut e converso corpora inanimata immutantur per qualitates sensibiles solum naturaliter, et non spiritualiter, in corporibus autem gloriosis non poterit esse aliqua immutatio naturalis; et ideo ibi erit spiritualis immutatio tantum. (In IV Sent. d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 3 obj. 2 et ad 2. Busa pp. 639, 641.)	Objection. Besides, natural change precedes animate change, just as natural being precedes intentional being. But, by reason of impassibility, glorious bodies will not be changed by natural change, nor, therefore, by animate change, which is required for sensing. Reply. To the second it must be said that every passive thing receives the action of an agent according to its own manner. If, therefore, there should be something which is designed by nature to be changed by an active principle by natural and spiritual change, the natural change precedes the spiritual change, just as natural being precedes intentional being. But if it should be designed by nature to be changed only spiritually, it is not necessary that it be changed naturally, as is the case with air, which is not receptive of colours according to natural being, but only according to spiritual being, and so is changed only in this way. Conversely, inanimate bodies are changed only naturally by means of sensible qualities, and not spiritually. But in glorious bodies there will not be able to be any natural change, and so there there will be only spiritual change.
2: De veritate 22, 3 ad 4. (1256-59) Ad quartum dicendum quod appetens bonum non quaerit habere bonum secundum esse intentionale qualiter habetur a cognoscente, sed secundum esse naturale; et ideo per hoc quod animal habet bonum ut cognoscens ipsum, non excluditur quin possit eum appetere. (De ver. 22, 3 ad 4. Leonine p. 619.)	To the fourth it must be said that one desiring a good does not seek to have the good according to intentional being in the way it is had by a knower, but according to natural being; and for that reason, from the fact that an animal possesses a good as knowing it, it is not prevented from seeking it.
3: Summa theologiae I 56, 2 ad 3. (twice). (1265-1268) Ad tertium dicendum quod unus angelus cognoscit alium per speciem eius in intellectu suo existentem, quae differt ab angelo cuius similitudo est, non secundum esse materiale et immateriale, sed secundum esse naturale et intentionale. Nam ipse angelus est forma subsistens in esse naturali: non autem species eius quae est in intellectu alterius angeli, sed habet ibi esse intelligibile tantum. Sicut etiam et forma coloris in pariete habet esse naturale, in medio autem deferente habet esse intentionale tantum. (ST I 56, 2 ad 3. B. A. C. I, p. 408.)	To the third it must be said that one angel knows another through [the other angel’s] species existing in its own intellect, which species differs from the angel whose likeness it is, not according to material and immaterial being, but according to natural and intentional being. For the angel itself is a form subsisting in natural being. Not so its species which is in the intellect of another angel; there it has only intelligible being. Likewise just as the form of colour in a wall has natural being, in the conveying medium it has only intentional being.
4: Summa theologiae I 67, 3. (1265-68) Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod lumen in aere non habet esse naturale, sicut color in pariete; sed esse intentionale, sicut similitudo coloris in aere.——Sed hoc non potest esse, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia lumen denominat aerem: fit enim aer luminosus in actu. Color vero non denominat ipsum: non enim dicitur aer coloratus.——Secundo, quia lumen habet effectum in natura: quia per radios solis calefiunt corpora. Intentiones autem non causant transmutationes naturales. (ST I 67, 3. B. A. C. I, pp. 488-489.)	I reply that some have said that light in the air does not have natural being, as does colour in a wall, but intentional being like the likeness of colour in air. But this cannot be for two reasons. First because light designates air, for air becomes luminous in act. But colour does not designate itself, for air is not said to be coloured. Second, because light has an effect in nature, because bodies are heated by means of the rays of the sun. Intentions, however, do not cause natural changes.
5: De spiritualibus creaturis 1 ad 11. (ens) (1267-1269) Ad undecimum dicendum quod species intelligibilis quae est in intellectu angeli intelligentis, differt ab angelo intellecto non secundum abstractum a materia et materiae concretum, sed sicut ens intentionale ab ente quod habet esse ratum in natura; sicut differt species coloris in oculo a colore qui est in pariete. (De spir. creat. a. 1 ad 11. Marietti p. 372.)	To the eleventh it must be said that the intelligible species, which is in the intellect of an angel that understands, differs from the angel understood not according to “what is abstracted from matter” and “what is concrete of matter”, but as an intentional being from a being which has being fixed in nature, as the species of colour in an eye differs from the colour which is in a wall.
6: In II De anima cap. 14. (twice). (1267-1268) Alii uero dixerunt quod lux est forma substancialis solis, et lumen defluens a luce habet esse intentionale, sicut species colorum in aere. Vtrumque autem horum est falsum: primum quidem, quia nulla forma substancialis est per se sensibilis, set solo intellectu comprehensibilis (et si dicatur quod id quod uidetur in sole non est lux set splendor, non erit contendendum de nomine, dummodo hoc quod dicimus lucem, scilicet quod visu apprehenditur, non sit forma substancialis); secundum etiam falsum est, quia que habent solum esse intentionale non faciunt transmutationem naturalem, radii autem corporum celestium transmutant totam naturam inferiorem. Vnde dicimus quod, sicut corpora elementia habent qualitates actiuas per quas agunt, ita lux est qualitas actiua corporis celestis per quam agit, et est tercia specie qualitatis sicut et calor. (In II De anima cap. 14 (De natura luminis). Leon. pp. 128-129.)	But others have said that light is the substantial form of the sun, and that brightness flowing from light has intentional being just as the species of colours in the air. But each of these is false: the first because no substantial form is per se sensible but is comprehensible by the intellect alone. (And if it be said that that which is seen in the sun is not light but splendour, there will be no need to quarrel over the name, provided that this which we call light, namely what is apprehended by vision, be not a substantial form.) The second is also false because things which have only intentional being do not cause a natural change. The rays of celestial bodies, however, change the whole of inferior nature. Whence we say that, just as elementary bodies have active qualities through which they act, so light is an active quality of a celestial body through which it acts, and it is in the third species of quality just as even heat.
7: In II De anima cap. 24. (1267-68) Quandoque uero forma recipitur in paciente secundum alium modum essendi quam sit in agente, quia dispositio materialis pacientis ad recipiendum non est similis dispositioni materiali que erat in agente, et ideo forma recipitur in paciente sine materia in quantum paciens assimilatur agenti secundum formam et non secundum materiam; et per hunc modum sensus recipit formam sine materia, quia alterius modi esse habet forma in sensu et in re sensibili: nam in re sensibili habet esse naturale, in sensu autem habet esse intentionale siue spirituale; et ponit conueniens exemplum de sigillo et cera, non enim eadem est dispositio cere ad ymaginem, que erat in ferro et auro. (In II De anima cap. 24. (Dubitatio). Leon. pp. 169.)	But sometimes form is received in a patient according to a mode of being other than it may be in the agent because the material disposition of the patient for receiving is not like the material disposition that was in the agent. Therefore the form is received in the patient without matter in so far as the patient is assimilated to the agent according to form and not according to matter. And in this manner, sense receives form without matter because form has a different mode of being in the sense and in the sensible thing. For in the sensible thing it has natural being, but in the sense it has intentional or spiritual being. And [Aristotle] puts forward a fitting example of the seal and wax [De anima II,12], for the disposition of wax to an image is not the same as it was in iron or gold.
8: In De sensu cap. 4. (1268-69) . . . actus enim sunt in susceptiuis secundum modum ipsorum, et ideo color est quidem in corpore colorato sicut qualitas completa in suo esse naturali, in medio autem est incomplete secundum quoddam esse intentionale. (In De sensu cap. 4 (438b2-7). Leon. p. 28.)	For acts are in receptive bodies according to their own mode, and so colour is in a coloured body as a perfect quality in its natural being. In the medium, however, it exists imperfectly according to a certain intentional being.
9: In De sensu cap. 18. (1268-69) Corpus enim naturale recipit formas secundum esse naturale et materiale, secundum quod habent contrarietatem, et ideo non potest idem corpus simul recipere albedinim et nigredinem; set sensus et intellectus recipiunt formas rerum spiritualiter et inmaterialiter secundum esse quoddam intentionale, prout non habent contrarietatem, unde sensus et intellectus simul potest recipere species sensibilium contrariorum. (In De sensu cap. 18 (dubia 1). Leon. p. 99.)	For a natural body receives forms according to natural and material being in as far as they have contrariety. And therefore the same body is not able to receive white and black at the same time. But sense and intellect receive the forms of things spiritually and immaterially according to a certain intentional being, in so far as they do not have contrariety. Whence sense and intellect can receive the species of sensible contraries at the same time.