Authors/Thomas Aquinas/physics/L4/lect2

Lecture 2 Six dialectical reasons showing place does not exist

Latin	English
	Lecture 2 Six dialectical reasons showing place does not exist
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 1 Postquam philosophus posuit rationes ad ostendendum quod locus sit, hic ponit sex rationes ad ostendendum quod locus non sit. Principium autem ad investigandum de aliquo an sit, oportet accipere quid sit, saltem quid significetur per nomen. Et ideo dicit quod quamvis ostensum sit quod locus sit, tamen habet defectum, idest dubitationem, quid est, etsi est: utrum scilicet sit quaedam moles corporea, aut aliqua natura alterius generis.	415. After giving reasons to show that place exists, the Philosopher now gives six reasons showing that place does not exist. Now the way to begin investigating the question “whether a thing exists” is to settle on “what it is,” at least as to what its name means. Therefore he says [285 209 a2] that although it has been shown that place exists, there is a difficulty, i.e., a question, about what it is, even if it does exist: Is it a bodily mass or a nature of some other kind?
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 2 Et ex hoc sic argumentatur. Si locus est aliquid, oportet quod sit corpus: quia locus habet tres dimensiones, scilicet longitudinis, latitudinis et profunditatis: his autem determinatur corpus; quia omne quod habet tres dimensiones, est corpus. Sed impossibile est locum esse corpus: quia cum locus et locatum sint simul, sequeretur duo corpora esse simul; quod est inconveniens. Ergo impossibile est locum aliquid esse.	416. Hence, he argues thus: If place is anything it must be a body; for place has three dimensions, namely, length, width and depth; and such things determine a body because whatever has three dimensions is body. But place cannot be a body, because, since place and the body in it are together, there would be two bodies together, which is unacceptable. Therefore, it is impossible for place to be anything.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 3 Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius, si vere corporis locus est etc.: quae talis est. Si locus corporis vere est quoddam receptaculum corporis aliud a corpore, oportet quod etiam superficiei sit aliquod receptaculum aliud ab ipsa: et similiter est de aliis terminis quantitatis, quae sunt linea et punctus. Et hanc conditionalem sic probat. Propter hoc enim ostendebatur locus esse alius a corporibus, quia ubi nunc est corpus aeris, ibi prius erat corpus aquae: sed similiter ubi prius erat superficies aquae, nunc est superficies aeris: ergo locus superficiei est aliud a superficie. Et similis ratio est de linea et puncto. Argumentatur ergo a destructione consequentis, per hoc quod non potest esse aliqua differentia loci puncti a puncto: quia, cum locus non excedat locatum, locus puncti non potest esse nisi aliquod indivisibile. Duo autem indivisibilia quantitatis, ut duo puncta simul coniuncta, non sunt nisi unum: ergo eadem ratione neque locus superficiei erit aliud a superficie, neque locus corporis erit aliud a corpore.	417. He gives a second reason [286 209 a7]: If the place of a body is a receptacle distinct from the body, then the place of its surface must be a receptacle distinct from this surface, and similarly for the other limits of quantity, such as the line and the point. He proves this conditional proposition in the following manner: Place was proved to be distinct from bodies on the ground that where the body of air now is, there was the body of water previously; but similarly where the surface of the water was, there is now the surface of the air; therefore the place of the surface is distinct from the surface and the same holds for the line and the point. He argues therefore by the destruction of the consequent, starting from the fact that there can be no difference between the place of this point itself. For, since a place is not greater than the thing in place, the place of a point can be only an indivisible. Now two quantitative indivisibles, e.g., two points joined together, are just one point. For the same reason, therefore, neither the place of the surface will be different from the surface itself, nor the place of the body different from the body itself.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 4 Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: quid enim forte ponemus esse locum? et cetera: quae talis est. Omne quod est, vel est elementum, vel est ex elementis; sed locus neutrum horum est; ergo locus non est. Mediam probat sic. Omne quod est elementum vel ex elementis, est de numero corporeorum vel incorporeorum; sed locus non est de numero incorporeorum, quia habet magnitudinem; nec de numero corporeorum quia non est corpus, ut probatum est; ergo neque est elementum, neque ex elementis. Et quia posset aliquis dicere quod, licet non sit corpus, est tamen elementum corporeum; ad hoc excludendum subiungit quod sensibilium corporum sunt elementa corporea: quia elementa non sunt extra genus elementatorum. Nam ex intelligibilibus principiis, quae sunt incorporea, non constituitur aliqua magnitudo. Unde si locus non sit corpus, non potest esse elementum corporeum.	418. He gives a third reason [287 209 a13]: whatever is, either in an element or composed of elements; but place is neither of these; therefore place does not exist. The middle [minor] premise he proves thus: Whatever is an element or composed of elements is either corporeal or incorporeal; but place is not incorporeal, for it has magnitude, nor is it corporeal, because it is not a body, as we have already shown. Therefore it is neither an element nor composed of elements. Now since someone might say that even though it is not a body, it is nevertheless a bodily element, he excludes this by adding that all sensible bodies have corporeal elements, because the elements are not outside the genus of their compounds. For no magnitude results from intelligible principles which are incorporeal. Hence if place is not a body, it cannot be a corporeal element.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 5 Quartam rationem ponit ibi: amplius et cuius utique etc.: quae talis est. Omne quod est, aliquo modo est causa respectu alicuius; sed locus non potest esse causa secundum aliquem quatuor modorum. Neque enim est causa sicut materia, quia ea quae sunt non constituuntur ex loco, quod est de ratione materiae; neque sicut causa formalis, quia tunc omnia quae habent unum locum, essent unius speciei, cum principium speciei sit forma; neque iterum sicut causa finalis rerum, quia magis videntur esse loca propter locata, quam locata propter loca; neque iterum est causa efficiens vel motiva, cum sit terminus motus. Videtur igitur quod locus nihil sit.	419. He gives the fourth reason [288 209 a18]: Everything that exists is somehow a cause in relation to something else; but place cannot be a cause in any of the four ways. It is not a cause as matter, because things that exist are not composed out of place and that is implied in the very notion of matter, nor is it a formal cause, for then all things that have the same place would be of the same species, since the principle of the species is the form. It is not like the final cause in things, since places seem to be for the sake of the things in place rather than they for the sake of the places. Finally, it is not an efficient or moving cause, since place is the terminus of a motion. Therefore it seems place is nothing.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 6 Quintam rationem ponit ibi: amplius et ipse, si est aliquid eorum etc., quae est ratio Zenonis: et est talis. Omne quod est, est in loco; si igitur locus est aliquid, sequitur quod sit in loco, et ille locus in alio loco, et sic in infinitum: quod est impossibile; ergo locus non est aliquid.	420. He gives the fifth reason [289 209 a23], which is Zeno’s reason: Whatever exists is in place; hence if place is anything it follows that it is itself in place and that place in another place and so on ad infinitum. But this is impossible; consequently, place is not anything.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 7 Sextam rationem ponit ibi: amplius, sicut omne corpus etc.: quae talis est. Omne corpus est in loco, et in omni loco est corpus, ut a multis probabiliter existimatur: ex quo accipitur quod locus non sit minor neque maior quam locatum. Cum ergo locatum crescit, oportet quod crescat et locus; sed hoc videtur impossibile, cum locus sit quoddam immobile; non ergo locus aliquid est. Et ultimo epilogat quod per huiusmodi rationes non solum dubitatur quid sit locus, sed etiam an sit. Huiusmodi autem rationes solventur per ea quae sequuntur.	421. He gives the sixth reason [290 209 a26]: Every body is in a place and in every place is a body (according to the opinion of many). From this it is taken that place is neither smaller nor larger than the thing in place. When therefore a thing in place grows, its place also should grow. However, this seems impossible, for place is an immobile something. Therefore place is not anything. In summary he says that for reasons of this sort doubts are raised not only as to the nature of place, but also as to its very existence. However, these reasons will be answered by what follows.