Authors/Thomas Aquinas/perihermenias/perihermenias II/L9

LECTURE 9

Latin	English
Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 9 n. 1 Determinat ubi ponenda sit negatio ad assumendam modalium contradictionem. Et circa hoc quatuor facit: primo, determinat veritatem summarie; secundo, assignat determinatae veritatis rationem, quae dicitur rationi ad oppositum inductae; ibi: fiunt enim etc.; tertio, explanat eamdem veritatem in omnibus modalibus; ibi: eius vero etc.; quarto, universalem regulam concludit; ibi: universaliter vero et cetera. Quia igitur negatio aut verbo aut modo apponenda est, et quod verbo non addenda est, declaratum est per locum a divisione; concludendo determinat: est ergo negatio eius quae est possibile esse, ea quae est non possibile esse, in qua negatur modus. Et eadem est ratio in enunciationibus de contingenti. Huius enim, quae est, contingens esse, negatio est, non contingens esse. Et in aliis, scilicet de necesse et impossibile idem est iudicium.	1. Aristotle now determines where the negation must be placed in order to obtain contradiction in modals. He first determines the truth summarily; secondly, he presents the argument for the truth of the position, which is also the answer to the reasoning induced for the opposite position, where he says, For just as "to be” and "not to be” are the determining additions in the former, and the things subjected are "white” and "man,” etc.; thirdly, he makes this truth evident in all the modals, where he says, The negation, then, of "possible not to be” is "not possible not to be,” etc.; fourthly, he arrives at a universal rule where he says, And universally, as has been said, "to be” and "not to be must be posited as the subject, etc. Since the negation must be added either to the verb or to the mode and it was shown above in virtue of an argument from division that it is not to be added to the verb, he concludes: Therefore, the negation of "possible to be” is "not possible to be”, that is, the mode is negated. The reasoning is the same with respect to enunciations of the contingent, for the negation of "contingent to be” is "not contingent to be.” And the judgment is the same in the others, i.e., the necessary and the impossible.
Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 9 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit: fiunt enim in illis appositiones etc., subdit huius veritatis rationem talem. Ad sumendam contradictionem inter aliquas enunciationes oportet ponere negationem super appositione, idest coniunctione praedicati cum subiecto; sed in modalibus appositiones sunt modi; ergo in modalibus negatio apponenda est modo, ut fiat contradictio. Huius rationis, maiore subintellecta, minor ponitur in littera per secundam similitudinem ad illas de inesse. Et dicitur quod quemadmodum in illis enunciationibus de inesse appositiones, idest praedicationes, sunt esse et non esse, idest verba significativa esse vel non esse (verbum enim semper est nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur), subiective vero appositionibus res sunt, quibus esse vel non esse apponitur, ut album, cum dicitur, album est, vel homo, cum dicitur, homo est; eodem modo hoc in loco in modalibus accidit: esse quidem subiectum fit, idest dictum significans esse vel non esse subiecti locum tenet; contingere vero et posse oppositiones, idest modi, praedicationes sunt. Et quemadmodum in illis de inesse penes esse et non esse veritatem vel falsitatem determinavimus, ita in istis modalibus penes modos. Hoc est enim quod subdit, determinantes, scilicet, fiunt ipsi modi veritatem, quemadmodum in illis esse et non esse, eam determinat.	2. When he says, For just as "to be” and "not to be” are the determining additions in the former, and the things subjected are "white” and "man,” etc., he gives the argument for the truth of his position. To obtain contradiction among any enunciations the negation must be applied to the determining addition, i.e., to the word that joins the predicate with the subject; but in modals the determining additions are the modes; therefore, to get a contradiction in modals, the negation must be added to the mode. The major of the argument is subsumed; the minor is stated in Aristotle’s wording by a further similitude to absolute enunciations. In absolute enunciations the determining additions, i.e., the predications, are "to be” and "not to be,” i.e., the verb signifying "to be” or "not to be” (for the verb is always a sign of those things that are predicated of another). The things subjected to the determining additions, i.e., to which to be” and "not to be” are applied, are "white,” in "White is, "or man,” in "Man is.” This happens in modals in the same way but in a manner appropriate to them. "To be” is as the subject, i.e., the dictum signifying "to be” or "not to be” holds the place of the subject; "is possible” and "is contingent,” i.e., the modes, are the predicates. And just as in absolute enunciations we determine truth or falsity with "to be” and "not to be,” so in modals with the modes. He makes this point when he says, determining additions, i.e., these modes effect truth just as "to be” and "not to be” determine truth and falsity in the others.
Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 9 n. 3 Et sic patet responsio ad argumentum in oppositum primo adductum, concludens quod negatio verbo apponenda sit, sicut illis de inesse. Dicitur enim quod cum modalis enunciet modum de dicto sicut enunciatio de inesse, esse vel esse tale, puta esse album de subiecto, eumdem locum tenet modus hic, quem ibi verbum; et consequenter super idem proportionaliter cadit negatio hic et ibi. Eadem enim, ut dictum est, proportio est modi ad dictum, quae est verbi ad subiectum. Rursus cum veritas et falsitas affirmationem et negationem sequantur, penes idem attendenda est affirmatio vel negatio enunciationis, et veritas vel falsitas eiusdem; sicut autem in enunciationibus de inesse veritas vel falsitas esse vel non esse consequitur, ita in modalibus modum. Illa namque modalis est vera quae sic modificat dictum sicut dicti compositio patitur, sicut illa de inesse est vera, quae sic significat esse sicut est. Est ergo negatio modo hic apponenda, sicut ibi verbo, cum sit eadem utriusque vis quoad veritatem et falsitatem enunciationis. Adverte quod modos, appositiones, idest, praedicationes vocavit, sicut esse in illis de inesse, intelligens per modum totum praedicatum enunciationis modalis, puta, est possibile. In cuius signum modos ipsos verbaliter protulit dicens: contingere vero et posse appositiones sunt. Contingit enim et potest, totum praedicatum modalis continent.	3. Thus the response to the argument for the opposite position, which he gave first, is evident. That argument concluded that the negation should be added to the verb as it is in absolute enunciations. But since the modal enunciates a mode of a dictum—as the absolute enunciation enunciates "to be” or "not to be” such, for instance, "to be white” of a subject—the mode holds the same place here that the verb does there. Consequently, the negation falls upon the same thing proportionally here and there, for the proportion of mode to dictum is the same as the proportion of verb to subject. Again, since truth and falsity follow upon affirmation and negation, the affirmation and negation of an enunciation and its truth and falsity must be controlled by the same thing. In absolute enunciations truth and falsity follow upon "to be” or "not to be,” hence in the modals they follow upon the mode; for that modal is true which modifies the dictum as the composition of the dictum permits, just as that absolute enunciation is true which signifies that something is as it is. Therefore, negation is added here to the mode just as it is added there to the verb, since the power of each is the same with respect to the truth and falsity of an enunciation. Notice that he calls the modes "determining additions,” i.e., predications—as "to be” is in absolute enunciations—understanding by the mode the whole predicate of the modal enunciation, for example, "is possible.” As a sign of this he expresses the modes themselves verbally when he says, "is possible” and "is contingent” are determining additions. For "is contingent” and "is possible” comprise the whole predicate of the modal enunciation.
Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 9 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit: eius vero quod est possibile est non esse etc., explanat determinatam veritatem in omnibus modalibus, scilicet de possibili, et necessario, et impossibili. Contingens convertitur cum possibili. Et quia quilibet modus facit duas modales affirmativas, alteram habentem dictum affirmatum, et alteram habentem dictum negatum; ideo explanat in singulis modis quae cuiusque affirmationis negatio sit. Et primo in illis de possibili. Et quia primae affirmativae de possibili (quae scilicet habet dictum affirmatum) scilicet possibile esse, negatio assignata fuit, non possibile esse; ideo ad reliquam affirmativam de possibili transiens ait: eius vero, quae est possibile non esse (ubi dictum negatur) negatio est non possibile non esse. Et hoc consequenter probat per hoc quod contradictoria huius, possibile non esse, aut est, possibile esse, aut illa, quam diximus, scilicet, non possibile non esse. Sed illa, scilicet, possibile esse, non est eius contradictoria. Non enim sunt sibi invicem contradicentes, possibile esse, et, possibile non esse, quia possunt simul esse verae. Unde et sequi sese invicem putabuntur: quoniam, ut supra dictum fuit, idem est, possibile esse, et, non esse, et consequenter sicut ad, posse esse, sequitur, posse non esse, ita e contra ad, posse non esse, sequitur, posse esse; sed contradictoria illius, possibile esse, quae non potest simul esse vera est, non possibile esse: hae enim, ut dictum est, opponuntur. Remanet ergo quod huius negatio, possibile non esse, sit illa, non possibile non esse: hae namque simul nunquam sunt verae vel falsae. Dixit quod possibile esse et non esse sequi se invicem putabuntur, et non dixit quod se invicem consequuntur: quia secundum veritatem universaliter non sequuntur se, sed particulariter tantum, ut infra dicetur; propter quod putabitur quod simpliciter se invicem sequantur. Deinde declarat hoc idem in illis de necessario. Et primo, in affirmativa habente dictum affirmatum, dicens: similiter eius quae est, necessarium esse, negatio non est ea, quae dicit necessarium non esse, ubi modus non negatur, sed ea quae est, non necessarium esse. Deinde subdit de affirmativa de necessario habente dictum negatum, et ait: eius vero, quae est, necessarium non esse, negatio est ea, quae dicit, non necessarium non esse. Deinde transit ad illas de impossibili, eumdem ordinem servans, et inquit: et eius, quae dicit, impossibile esse, negatio non est ea quae dicit, impossibile non esse, sed, non impossibile esse: ubi iam modus negatur. Alterius vero affirmativae, quae est, impossibile non esse, negatio est ea quae dicit non impossibile non esse. Et sic semper modo negatio addenda est.	4. When he says, The negation, then, of "possible not to be” is [not, "not possible to be” but] "not possible not to be,” etc., he makes this truth evident in all the modals, i.e., the possible, the necessary, and the impossible (the contingent being convertible with the possible). And since any mode makes two modal affirmatives, one having an affirmed dictum and the other having a negated dictum, he shows what the negation of each affirmation is in each mode. First he takes those of the possible. The negation of the first affirmative of the possible (the one with an affirmed dictum), i.e., "possible to be,” was assigned as "not possible to be.” Hence, going on to the remaining affirmative of the possible he says, The negation, then, of "possible not to be” [wherein the dictum is negated] is, "not possible not to be.” Then he a proves this. The contradictory of "possible not to be” is either "Possible to be” or "not possible not to be.” But the former, i.e., "possible to be,” is not the contradictory of "possible not to be,” for they can be at once true. Hence they are also thought to follow upon each other, for, as was said above, the same thing is possible to be and not to be. Consequently, just as "possible not to be” follows upon "possible to be,” so conversely "possible to be” follows upon "possible not to be.” But the contradictory of "possible to be,” which cannot be true at the same time, is "not possible to be,” for these, as has been said, are opposed. Therefore, the negation of "possible not to be” is, "not possible not to be,” for these are never at once true or false. Note that he says, Wherefore "possible to be” and "possible not to be” would appear to be consequent to each other, and not that they do follow upon each other, for it is not true that they follow upon each other universally, but only particularly (as will be said later); this is the reason they appear to follow upon each other simply. Then he manifests the same thing in the modals of the necessary, and first in the affirmative with an affirmed dictum: The case is the same with respect to the necessary. The negation of "necessary to be” is not, "necessary not to be” (in which the mode is not negated) but, "not necessary to be.” Next he adds the affirmative of the necessary with a negated dictum: and the negation of "necessary not to be is "not necessary not to be.” Next, he takes up the impossible, keeping the same order. The negation of "impossible to be” is not, "impossible not to be” but, "not impossible to be,” in which the mode is negated. The negation of the other affirmative, "impossible not to be” is "not impossible not to be.” The negation, therefore, is always added to the mode.
Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 9 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit: universaliter vero etc., concludit regulam universalem dicens quod, quemadmodum dictum est, dicta importantia esse et non esse oportet ponere in modalibus ut subiecta, negationem vero et affirmationem hoc, idest contradictionis oppositionem, facientem, oportet apponere tantummodo ad suum eumdem modum, non ad diversos modos. Debet namque illemet modus negari, qui prius affirmabatur, si contradictio esse debet. Et exemplariter explanans quomodo hoc fiat, subdit: et oportet putare has esse oppositas dictiones, idest affirmationes et negationes in modalibus, possibile et non possibile, contingens et non contingens. Item cum dixit negationem alio tantum modo ad modum apponi debere, non exclusit modi copulam, sed dictum. Hoc enim est singulare in modalibus quod eamdem oppositionem facit, negatio modo addita, et eius verbo. Contradictorie enim opponitur huic, possibile est esse, non solum illa, non possibile est esse, sed ista, possibile non est esse; meminit autem modi potius, et propter hoc quod nunc diximus, ut scilicet insinuaret quod negatio verbo modi postposita, modo autem praeposita, idem facit ac si modali verbo praeponeretur, et quia, cum modo numquam caret modalis enunciatio, semper negatio supra modum poni potest. Non autem sic de eius verbo: verbo enim modi carere contingit modalem, ut cum dicitur, Socrates currit necessario; et ideo semper verbo negatio aptari potest. Quod autem in fine addidit, verum et non verum, insinuat, praeter quatuor praedictos modos, alios inveniri, qui etiam compositionem enunciationis determinant, puta, verum et non verum, falsum et non falsum: quos tamen inter modos supra non posuit, quia, ut declaratum fuit, non proprie modificant.	5. Then he says, And universally, as has been said, "to be”and "not to be” must be posited as the subject, and those that produce affirmation and negation must be joined to "to be” and "not to be,” etc. Here he concludes with the universal rule. As has been said, the dictums denoting "to be” and "not to be” must be posited in the modals as subjects, and the one making this an affirmation and negation, i.e., the opposition of contradiction, must be added only to the selfsame mode, not to diverse modes, for the selfsame mode which was previously affirmed must be denied if there is to be a contradiction. He gives examples of how this is to be done when he adds, And these are the words that are to be considered opposed, i.e., affirmations and negations in modals, possible–not possible, contingent–not contingent. Moreover, when he said elsewhere but in another way that the negation must be applied only to the mode, he did not exclude the copula of the mode, but the copula of the dictum. For it is unique to modals that the same opposition is made by adding a negation to the mode and to its verb. The contradictory of "is possible to be,” for instance, is not only "is not possible to be,” but also "not is possible to be.” There are two reasons, however, for his mentioning the mode rather than the verb: first, for the reason we have just given, namely, so as to imply that the negation placed after the verb of the mode, the mode having been put first, accomplishes the same thing as if it were placed before the modal verb; and secondly, because the modal enunciation is never without a mode; hence the negation can always be put on the mode. However, it cannot always be put on the verb of a mode, for the modal enunciation may lack the verb of a mode as for example in "Socrates runs necessarily,” in which case the negation can always be adapted to the verb. In adding "true” and "not true” at the end he implies that besides the four modes mentioned previously there are others that also determine the composition of the enunciation, for example, "true” and "not true,” "false” and "not false”; nevertheless he did not posit these among the modes first given because, as was shown, they do not properly modify.