Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber11/lect3

Lecture 3

Latin	English
lib. 11 l. 3 n. 1 Postquam movit quaestiones, hic incipit colligere ea quae pertinent ad considerationem huius scientiae; et dividitur in duas partes. In prima ostendit de quibus haec scientia considerat. In secunda comparat hanc scientiam ad alias, ibi, omnis autem scientia. Prima dividitur in duas partes. In prima ostendit quod ad hanc scientiam pertinet considerare de omnibus entibus. In secunda, quod ad hanc pertinet considerare de principiis demonstrativis, ibi, quoniam autem. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod omnium est reductio aliqualiter ad unum. Secundo ostendit quod de omnibus reductis ad unum est consideratio huius scientiae, ibi, quemadmodum autem. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod necessarium est ad praesentem considerationem inquirere, utrum omnia reducantur aliqualiter ad unum; dicens, quod quia scientia philosophiae est de ente inquantum est ens, ita quod considerat de ente secundum universalem rationem entis, et non secundum rationem entis alicuius particularis; cum ens multipliciter et non uno modo dicatur, si ista multiplicitas esset pura aequivocatio, quae non diceretur secundum aliquid commune, non caderent omnia entia sub una scientia, quia non reducerentur aliquo modo ad unum genus. Oportet autem unam scientiam esse unius generis. Sed si ista multiplicitas habeat aliquod commune, omnia entia possunt esse sub una scientia. Unde ad quaestionem qua quaerebatur, utrum ista scientia sit una, cum sit de pluribus et diversis, necessarium est considerare, utrum omnia entia reducantur ad aliquid unum, vel non.	2194. Having raised the foregoing questions, Aristotle now begins to assemble the things that belong to the consideration of this science. This is divided into two parts. In the first (924)C 2194) he indicates the things which this science considers. In the second (956:C 2247) he compares this science with the others (“Every science”). The first part is divided into two members. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider all beings; and second (932:C 2206), that it has to consider the principles of demonstration (“And since the mathematician”). In considering the first part he does two things. First, he shows that all things are somehow reduced to one. Second (929:C 2202), he shows that the study of this science extends to all things insofar as they are somehow reduced to some one thing (“Now the mathematician”). In treating the first part he does two things. First, he shows that in view of the goal of our present study it is necessary to ask whether all things are somehow reduced to one. He says that, since the science of philosophy treats being as being in such a way as to consider being in terms of its universal character and not merely in terms of the intelligible character of any particular being, and since the term being is used in many senses and not just in one, if the many senses of being were purely equivocal without any common meaning, not all beings would fall under one science, because they would not in any way be reduced to one common class. And one science must deal with one class of things. But if the many senses of being have one common meaning, all beings can then fall under one science. Hence, in order to answer the question that was raised as to whether this science is one even though it treats many different things, we must consider whether or not all beings are reduced to some one thing.
lib. 11 l. 3 n. 2 Videtur itaque ostendit quod omnia reducuntur ad aliquid unum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo manifestat quoddam quod poterat esse dubium, ibi, quoniam autem fiunt. Prima dividitur in duas. In prima ostendit quod omnium reductio est ad unum. In secunda ostendit ad quod omnia reducantur, ibi, differt autem nihil. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod omnia entia reducuntur ad aliquod unum commune ens. Secundo, quod omnes contrarietates reducuntur ad unam contrarietatem, ibi, quoniam autem contraria omnia et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ens videtur dici modo praedicto, scilicet quod dicatur multipliciter secundum aliquid commune. Quod manifestat per duo exempla, scilicet medicativum et salubre.	2195. Therefore the term (925). Here he shows that all things are reduced to some one thing. In treating this he does two things. First (925:C 2195), he explains his thesis. Second (928:C 2200), he clears up a point that might present a difficulty (“Now since”). The first is divided into two parts. In the first he shows that all things are reduced to one. In the second (927:C 219q), he explains what this one thing is to which all things are reduced (“And it makes no difference”) - In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he shows that all beings are reduced to one common being; and second (926:C 2198), that all contrarieties are reduced to one contrariety (“And since every”). He accordingly says, first (925), that the term being is used in the way mentioned above; i.e., it is used of many things according to some common meaning. He makes this clear by means of two examples: the terms medical and healthy.
lib. 11 l. 3 n. 3 Utrumque enim eorum dicitur secundum diversos modos, tamen per reductionem ad aliquod unum. Medicativum enim aliquid dicitur multipliciter, secundum quod hoc refertur sic ad medicamentum, et id aliter. Et similiter salubre dicitur multipliciter secundum quod hoc refertur sic ad sanitatem, et id aliter. Utrobique tamen idem est ad quod fit reductio licet diversis modis. Sicut sermo dicitur medicans, eo quod est a scientia medicativa. Cultellus autem dicitur medicativus, eo quod est utilis eidem scientiae sicut instrumentum. Et similiter hoc dicitur salubre, quia est significativum sanitatis, sicut urina. Hoc autem, quia est factivum sanitatis, sicut potio medicinalis. Et similiter est in aliis quae hoc eodem modo dicuntur.	2196. For both of these terms are used variously, yet in such a way that they are reduced or referred to some one thing. The term medical is used in many ways inasmuch as it is referred in one sense to a medicine and in another to something else. And similarly the term healthy is used in many ways inasmuch as it is referred in one sense to health and in another to something else. Yet in both cases the various senses have reference to the same thing, though in different ways. For example, a discussion is called medical because it comes from the science of medicine, and a knife is called medical because it is an instrument that is used by the same science. Similarly one thing is called healthy because it is a sign of health, as urine, and another because it causes health, as a medication. The same applies to other terms which are used in a similar way.
lib. 11 l. 3 n. 4 Manifestum est enim quod quae sic dicuntur, media sunt inter univoca et aequivoca. In univocis enim nomen unum praedicatur de diversis secundum rationem totaliter eamdem; sicut animal de equo et de bove dictum, significat substantiam animatam sensibilem. In aequivocis vero idem nomen praedicatur de diversis secundum rationem totaliter diversam. Sicut patet de hoc nomine, canis, prout dicitur de stella, et quadam specie animalis. In his vero quae praedicto modo dicuntur, idem nomen de diversis praedicatur secundum rationem partim eamdem, partim diversam. Diversam quidem quantum ad diversos modos relationis. Eamdem vero quantum ad id ad quod fit relatio. Esse enim significativum, et esse effectivum, diversum est. Sed sanitas una est. Et propter hoc huiusmodi dicuntur analoga, quia proportionantur ad unum. Et similiter est de multiplicitate entis. Nam ens simpliciter, dicitur id quod in se habet esse, scilicet substantia. Alia vero dicuntur entia, quia sunt huius quod per se est, vel passio, vel habitus, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Non enim qualitas dicitur ens, quia ipsa habeat esse, sed per eam substantia dicitur esse disposita. Et similiter est de aliis accidentibus. Et propter hoc dicit quod sunt entis. Et sic patet quod multiplicitas entis habet aliquid commune, ad quod fit reductio.	2197. It is evident that terms which are used in this way are midway between univocal and equivocal terms. In the case of univocity one term is predicated of different things with absolutely one and the same meaning; for example, the term animal, which is predicated of a horse and of an ox, signifies a living, sensory substance. In the case of equivocity the same term is predicated of various things with an entirely different meaning. This is clear in the case of the term dog, inasmuch as it is predicated both of a constellation and of a certain species of animal. But in the case of those things which are spoken of in the way mentioned previously, the same term is predicated of various things with a meaning that is partly the same and partly different—different regarding the different modes of relation, and the same regarding that to which it is related; for to be a sign of something and to be a cause of something are different, but health is one. Terms of this kind, then, are predicated analogously, because they have a proportion to one thing. The same holds true also of the many ways in which the term being is used; for being in an unqualified sense means what exists of itself, namely, substance; but other things are called beings because they belong to what exists of itself, namely, modifications or states or anything else of this kind. For a quality is called a being, not because it has an act of existence, but because a substance is said to be disposed by it. It is the same with other accidents. This is why he says that they belong to a being (or are of a being). It is evident, then, that the many senses of the term being have a common meaning to which they are reduced.
lib. 11 l. 3 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem ostendit quod reductio omnium contrarietatum fit ad unam primam. Quia enim omnium entium fit reductio ad aliquid unum commune, contrarietates autem entium, quae sunt oppositae differentiae, per se consequuntur entia, necesse est quod contrarietates reducantur ad aliquam primam contrarietatem quaecumque sit illa; sive pluralitas et unum, sive similitudo et dissimilitudo, sive quaecumque aliae sint primae differentiae entis. Et huiusmodi contrarietates debent considerari in scientia quae determinat de entibus.	2198. And since (926). Next he shows that all contrarieties are reduced to one first contrariety. Since all beings are reduced to one common meaning, and the contrarieties of beings, which are opposite differences, are in themselves a natural consequence of beings, it follows that contrarieties must be reduced to some primary contrariety, whatever it may be, whether it is plurality and unity, likeness and unlikeness, or whatever else are primary differences of beings. And contrarieties of this kind have to be considered in the science which establishes what is true about beings.
lib. 11 l. 3 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit differt autem ostendit quid sit illud commune ad quod fit reductio omnium entium; et dicit quod nihil differt utrum fiat reductio ad ens vel unum. Si enim dicatur quod ens et unum non sunt idem, sed differunt ratione secundum quod unum addit indivisibilitatem supra ens; tamen manifestum est quod adinvicem convertuntur; quia omne unum est aliqualiter ens, et omne ens est aliqualiter unum. Et sicut substantia est proprie et per se ens, ita proprie et per se unum. Quomodo autem unum ad ens se habeat, supra dictum est in quarto et decimo.	2199. And it makes (927). Then he indicates what this common thing is to which all things are reduced. He says that it makes no difference whether things are reduced to being or to unity; for if it is said that being and unity are not the same conceptually but differ inasmuch as unity adds the note of indivisibility to being, none the less it is evident that they are interchangeable; for everything that is one is somehow a being, and everything that is a being is somehow one; because, just as a substance is a being properly and of itself, so too it is one properly and of itself. The way in which unity is related to being has been explained above in Book IV (301-04:C 548-60) and in Book X (832:C 1974).
lib. 11 l. 3 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem removet quamdam dubitationem; dicens, quod omnia contraria pertinent ad considerationem unius scientiae. Et huius ratio potissima videtur esse, quia in omnibus contrariis unum dicitur secundum privationem, quod cognoscitur ex suo opposito. Remanet dubitatio quomodo contraria dicuntur secundum privationem inter quae est medium, cum in oppositis privative non sit medium.	2200. Now since (928). Then he removes a difficulty. He says that, since all contraries are investigated by one science (and the most cogent reason seems to be that in each pair of contraries one contrary is used privatively, and this is known from its opposite term), the difficulty arises how contraries which have an intermediate can be predicated as privations, since in the case of opposites which are privatively opposed there is no intermediate.
lib. 11 l. 3 n. 8 Et ad hoc respondendum est quod in talibus contrariis, alterum contrariorum non ponitur privatio quasi tollens totam rationem alterius oppositi; sed quia est privatio ultimae speciei; inquantum scilicet tollit completam rationem totius speciei. Sicut si aliquis dicitur iustus, eo quod est obediens legibus secundum habitum aliquem, non semper dicetur iniustus eo quod sit privatus tota ratione iustitiae, quod in nullo obediat legibus; sed quia persuasus est, ut in aliis deficiat ab obedientia legis. Et sic inest ei privatio iustitiae, inquantum deficit a perfecta ratione iustitiae. Et propter hoc potest habere medium; quia non omnis qui caret iustitia, totaliter iustitia privatur, sed aliqua parte. Et hoc est medium quod diversificatur secundum magis et minus. Et similiter est in aliis contrariis. Sed privatio visus dicitur in hoc, quod totaliter aliquis caret visu. Et ideo inter caecitatem et visionem non est medium.	2201. The answer to this must be that in the case of such contraries one opposite is not posited as a privation removing all the intelligible notes of the other but as the privation of the last species inasmuch as it detracts from the complete intelligible constitution of the whole species. For instance, if someone is said to be just because he habitually obeys the laws, he will not always be said to be unjust, as if he were deprived of the entire notion of justice, which would be the case if he obeyed the laws in no way—but rather because he fails to obey them in some respects. Hence the privation of justice will be found in him to the extent that he falls short of the perfection of justice. It is for this reason that he can be in an intermediate state, because not everyone who lacks justice is completely deprived of it but only of some part of it. And this intermediate state is one that differs in degree. The same holds true of other contraries. The privation of sight, however, is said to consist in the total lack of sight, and therefore there is no intermediate state between blindness and sight.
lib. 11 l. 3 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit quemadmodum autem ostendit quod de omnibus entibus reductis ad unum, sit consideratio huius scientiae. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo exemplo geometriae ostendit, quod ad unam scientiam pertinet considerare omnia quae reducuntur ad ens; dicens quod sicut mathematica habet considerationem circa ea quae sunt ex ablatione, idest circa abstracta, quae quidem abstractio fit non ex hoc quod ponat ea de quibus considerat in rerum natura esse separata a sensibilibus, sed quia considerat ea absque consideratione sensibilium. Speculatur enim mathematica auferens a sua consideratione omnia sensibilia, sicut levitatem, gravitatem, duritiem, mollitiem, caliditatem et frigiditatem, et omnes alias sensibiles contrarietates, et derelinquit in sua consideratione solummodo quantum et continuum, sive sit continuum ad unam tantum dimensionem, ut linea, sive ad duas, ut superficies, sive ad tres, ut corpus; et considerat primo passiones horum inquantum sunt continua, et non secundum aliquid aliud. Non enim considerat passiones superficiei secundum quod est superficies lignea vel lapidea. Et similiter rationes eorum adinvicem. Considerando figuras etiam considerat accidentia quae existunt in figuris, et considerat mensurationes et incommensurationes quantitatum, ut patet in decimo Euclidis, et rationes, idest proportiones earum, ut patet in quinto. Sed tamen de omnibus his est una scientia quae est geometria.	2202. Now the mathematician (929). Here he shows that the investigations of this science extend to all beings insofar as they are reduced to one thing. In treating this he makes a tripartite division. First, he shows by an example from geometry that it is the office of one science to consider all things which are reduced to being. He says that the science of mathematics studies “those things which are gotten by taking something away,” i.e., abstract things. It makes this abstraction, not because it supposes that the things which it considers are separate in reality from sensible things, but because it considers them without considering sensible qualities. For the science of mathematics carries on its investigations by removing from the scope of its study all sensible qualities, such as lightness, heaviness, hardness, softness, heat and cold, and all other sensible qualities, and retains as its object of study only the quantified and the continuous, whether it is continuous in one dimension, as a line, or in two, as a surface, or in three, as a body. And it is primarily interested in the properties of these inasmuch as they are continuous and not in any other respect; for it does not consider the properties of surface inasmuch as it is the surface of wood or of stone. Similarly it considers the relationships between its objects. And in considering figures it also studies their accidents, and how quantities are commensurable or incommensurable, as is clear in Book X of Euclid, “and their ratios,” or proportions, as is clear in Book V of the same work. Yet there is one science of all these things, and this is geometry.
lib. 11 l. 3 n. 10 Et sicut est de mathematico, ita est de philosopho qui considerat ens, et praetermittit considerare omnia particularia entia, et considerat ea tantum quae pertinent ad ens commune; quae licet sint multa, tamen, de omnibus est una scientia, inquantum scilicet reducuntur omnia in unum, ut dictum est.	2203. Now what was true for the mathematician is also true for the philosopher who studies being. He passes over a study of all particular beings and considers them only inasmuch as they pertain to being in general. And though these are many, there is nevertheless a single science of all of them inasmuch as all are reduced to one thing, as has been pointed out.
lib. 11 l. 3 n. 11 Secundo ibi, huic enim ostendit cuius scientiae sit praedicta considerare: dicens, quod considerare accidentia entis inquantum est ens, non est alterius scientiae, quam huius philosophiae. Si enim esset alterius, maxime videretur esse naturalis scientiae et dialecticae, quae videntur maxime inter scientias esse communes. Naturalis quidem secundum opinionem antiquorum, qui non ponebant alias substantias, nisi sensibiles: sic enim sequeretur, quod ad naturalem pertineret considerare de omnibus substantiis, et per consequens de omnibus entibus, quae reducuntur ad substantiam. Dialectica autem videtur esse communis, et similiter sophistica, quia considerant quaedam accidentia entibus, scilicet intentiones, et rationes generis et speciei, et alia huiusmodi. Unde relinquitur quod philosophus consideret praedicta inquantum sunt accidentia entis.	2204. For an investigation (930). Second, he indicates what science it is that considers the above-mentioned things. He says that the study of the attributes of being as being does not belong to any other science but only to this branch of philosophy. If it did belong to another science, it would mostly seem to belong to the philosophy of nature or to dialectics, which seemingly are the most common of the sciences. Now according to the opinion of the ancient philosophers who did not posit any substances other than sensible ones, it would seem to be the philosophy of nature that is the common science. In this way it would follow that it is the function of the philosophy of nature to consider all substances, and consequently all beings, which are reduced to substance.-But dialectics would seem to be the common science, and also sophistry, because these consider certain accidents of beings, namely, intentions and the notions of genus and species and the like. It follows, then, that it is the philosopher who has to consider the above-mentioned things, inasmuch as they are accidents of being.
lib. 11 l. 3 n. 12 Tertio ibi, quoniam autem ex dictis infert conclusionem principaliter intentam; dicens quod quia ens dicitur multipliciter secundum aliquid unum, et omnia contraria reducuntur ad primam contrarietatem entis, et talia sic reducta in unum possunt cadere sub una scientia, ut dictum est; per hoc solvitur dubitatio prius mota, utrum scilicet multorum differentium genere sit una scientia.	2205. And since every (931). Third, from what has been said, he draws his thesis as his chief conclusion. He says that, since being is used in many senses in reference to some one thing, and since all contrarieties are referred to the first contrariety of being, such things organized in this way can fall under one science, as has been pointed out. Thus he solves the question previously raised: whether there is one science of things which are many and generically different.