Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber1

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Thomas Aquinas: Commentary on the Metaphysics Book 1 With English translation by John P. Rowan, Chicago, 1961

Introduction

Latin English
pr. 1 Sicut docet philosophus in politicis suis, quando aliqua plura ordinantur ad unum, oportet unum eorum esse regulans, sive regens, et alia regulata, sive recta. Quod quidem patet in unione animae et corporis; nam anima naturaliter imperat, et corpus obedit. Similiter etiam inter animae vires: irascibilis enim et concupiscibilis naturali ordine per rationem reguntur. Omnes autem scientiae et artes ordinantur in unum, scilicet ad hominis perfectionem, quae est eius beatitudo. Unde necesse est, quod una earum sit aliarum omnium rectrix, quae nomen sapientiae recte vindicat. Nam sapientis est alios ordinare. Quae autem sit haec scientia, et circa qualia, considerari potest, si diligenter respiciatur quomodo est aliquis idoneus ad regendum. Sicut enim, ut in libro praedicto philosophus dicit, homines intellectu vigentes, naturaliter aliorum rectores et domini sunt: homines vero qui sunt robusti corpore, intellectu vero deficientes, sunt naturaliter servi: ita scientia debet esse naturaliter aliarum regulatrix, quae maxime intellectualis est. Haec autem est, quae circa maxime intelligibilia versatur. Maxime autem intelligibilia tripliciter accipere possumus. Primo quidem ex ordine intelligendi. Nam ex quibus intellectus certitudinem accipit, videntur esse intelligibilia magis. Unde, cum certitudo scientiae per intellectum acquiratur ex causis, causarum cognitio maxime intellectualis esse videtur. When several things are ordained to one thing, one of them must rule or govern and the rest be ruled or governed, as the Philosopher, teaches in the Politics. This is evident in the union of soul and body, for the soul naturally commands and the body obeys. The same thing is true of the soul’s powers, for the concupiscible and irascible appetites are ruled in a natural order by reason. Now all the sciences and arts are ordained to one thing, namely, to man’s perfection, which is happiness. Hence one of these sciences and arts must be the mistress of all the others, and this rightly lays claim to the name wisdom; for it is the office of the wise man to direct others. We can discover which science this is and the sort of things with which it deals by carefully examining the qualities of a good ruler; for just as men of superior intelligence are naturally the rulers and masters of others, whereas those of great physical strength and little intelligence are naturally slaves, as the Philosopher says in the aforementioned book in a similar way that science which is intellectual in the highest degree should be naturally the ruler of the others. This science is the one which treats of the most intelligible objects. Now the phrase “most intelligible objects” can be understood in three ways. First, from the viewpoint of the order of knowing; for those things from which the intellect derives certitude seem to be more intelligible.
pr. 2 Unde et illa scientia, quae primas causas considerat, videtur esse maxime aliarum regulatrix. Secundo ex comparatione intellectus ad sensum. Nam, cum sensus sit cognitio particularium, intellectus per hoc ab ipso differre videtur, quod universalia comprehendit. Unde et illa scientia maxime est intellectualis, quae circa principia maxime universalia versatur. Quae quidem sunt ens, et ea quae consequuntur ens, ut unum et multa, potentia et actus. Huiusmodi autem non debent omnino indeterminata remanere, cum sine his completa cognitio de his, quae sunt propria alicui generi vel speciei, haberi non possit. Nec iterum in una aliqua particulari scientia tractari debent: quia cum his unumquodque genus entium ad sui cognitionem indigeat, pari ratione in qualibet particulari scientia tractarentur. Unde restat quod in una communi scientia huiusmodi tractentur; quae cum maxime intellectualis sit, est aliarum regulatrix. Tertio ex ipsa cognitione intellectus. Nam cum unaquaeque res ex hoc ipso vim intellectivam habeat, quod est a materia immunis, oportet illa esse maxime intelligibilia, quae sunt maxime a materia separata. Intelligibile enim et intellectum oportet proportionata esse, et unius generis, cum intellectus et intelligibile in actu sint unum. Ea vero sunt maxime a materia separata, quae non tantum a signata materia abstrahunt, sicut formae naturales in universali acceptae, de quibus tractat scientia naturalis, sed omnino a materia sensibili. Et non solum secundum rationem, sicut mathematica, sed etiam secundum esse, sicut Deus et intelligentiae. Therefore, since the certitude of science is acquired by the intellect knowing causes, a knowledge of causes seems to be intellectual in the highest degree. Hence that science which considers first causes also seems to be the ruler of the others in the highest degree. Second, this phrase can be understood by comparing the intellect with the senses; for while sensory perception is a knowledge of particulars, the intellect seems to differ from sense by reason of the fact that it comprehends universals. Hence that science is pre-eminently intellectual which deals with the most universal principles. These principles are being and those things which naturally accompany being, such as unity and plurality, potency and act. Now such principles should not remain entirely undetermined, since without them complete knowledge of the principles which are proper to any genus or species cannot be had. Nor again should they be dealt with in any one particular science, for, since a knowledge of each class of beings stands in need if such principles, they would with equal reason be investigated in every particular science. It follows, then, that such principles should be treated by one common science, which, since it is intellectual in the highest degree, is the mistress of the others. Third, this phrase can be understood from the viewpoint of the intellect’s own knowledge. For since each thing has intellective power by virtue of being free from matter, those things must be intelligible in the highest degree which are altogether separate, from matter. For the intellect and the intelligible object must be proportionate to each other and must belong to the same genus, since the intellect and the intelligible object are one in act. Now those things are separate from matter in the highest degree which abstract not only from signate matter (as the natural forms taken universally of which the philosophy of nature treats) but from sensible matter altogether; and these are separate from matter not only in their intelligible constitution (ratio), as the objects of mathematics, but also in being (esse), as God and the intelligences.
pr. 3 Unde scientia, quae de istis rebus considerat, maxime videtur esse intellectualis, et aliarum princeps sive domina. Haec autem triplex consideratio, non diversis, sed uni scientiae attribui debet. Nam praedictae substantiae separatae sunt universales et primae causae essendi. Eiusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias alicuius generis et genus ipsum: sicut naturalis considerat principia corporis naturalis. Unde oportet quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat considerare substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus, cuius sunt praedictae substantiae communes et universales causae. Ex quo apparet, quod quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria consideret, non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune. Hoc enim est subiectum in scientia, cuius causas et passiones quaerimus, non autem ipsae causae alicuius generis quaesiti. Nam cognitio causarum alicuius generis, est finis ad quem consideratio scientiae pertingit. Quamvis autem subiectum huius scientiae sit ens commune, dicitur tamen tota de his quae sunt separata a materia secundum esse et rationem. Quia secundum esse et rationem separari dicuntur, non solum illa quae nunquam in materia esse possunt, sicut Deus et intellectuales substantiae, sed etiam illa quae possunt sine materia esse, sicut ens commune. Hoc tamen non contingeret, si a materia secundum esse dependerent. Secundum igitur tria praedicta, ex quibus perfectio huius scientiae attenditur, sortitur tria nomina. Dicitur enim scientia divina sive theologia, inquantum praedictas substantias considerat. Metaphysica, inquantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia. Dicitur autem prima philosophia, inquantum primas rerum causas considerat. Sic igitur patet quid sit subiectum huius scientiae, et qualiter se habeat ad alias scientias, et quo nomine nominetur Therefore the science which considers such things seems to be the most intellectual and the ruler or mistress of the others. Now this threefold consideration should be assigned to one and the same science and not to different sciences, because the aforementioned separate substances are the universal and first causes of being. Moreover, it pertains to one and the same science to consider both the proper causes of some genus and the genus itself; for example, the philosophy of nature considers the principles of a natural body. Therefore, it must be the office of one and the same science to consider the separate substances and being in general (ens commune), which is the genus of which the aforementioned substances are the common and universal causes. From this it is evident that, although this science (metaphysics or first philosophy) studies the three things mentioned above, it does not investigate any one of them as its subject, but only being in general. For the subject of a science is the genus whose causes and properties we seek, and not the causes themselves of the particular genus studied; for a knowledge of the causes of some genus is the goal to which the investigation of a science attains. Now although the subject of this science is being in general, the whole of it is predicated of those things which are separate from matter both in their intelligible constitution and in being. For it is not only those things which can never exist in matter that are said to be separate from matter in their intelligible constitution and being, such as God and the intellectual substances, but also those which can exist without matter, as being in general. This could not be the case, however, if their being depended on matter. Therefore in accordance with the three things mentioned above from which this science derives its perfection, three names arise. It is called divine science or theology inasmuch as it considers the aforementioned substances. It is called metaphysics inasmuch as it considers being and the attributes which naturally accompany being (for things which transcend the physical order are discovered by the process of analysis, as the more common are discovered after the less common). And it is called first philosophy inasmuch as it considers the first causes of things. Therefore it is evident what the subject of this science is, and how it is related to the other sciences, and by what names it is designated.


Lecture 1

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 1 Huic autem scientiae Aristoteles prooemium praemittit, in quo duo tradit. Primo quidem ostendit circa quid haec scientia versetur. Secundo qualis sit ista scientia, ibi, quia vero non activa. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod huius scientiae, quae sapientia dicitur, est considerare causas. Secundo quales vel quas causas considerat, ibi, quoniam autem scientiam hanc. Circa primum praemittit quaedam ex quibus ad propositum arguit. Secundo ex praedictis rationem sumit, ibi, cuius autem gratia nunc. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit in communi scientiae dignitatem. Secundo, ostendit cognitionis ordinem, ibi, animalia quidem igitur et cetera. Scientiae autem dignitatem ostendit per hoc quod naturaliter desideratur ab omnibus tamquam finis. Unde circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit intentum. Secundo probat, ibi, signum autem. Proponit igitur primo, quod omnibus hominibus naturaliter desiderium inest ad sciendum. 1. Aristotle first sets down an introduction to this science, in which he treats of two things. First (2), he points out with what this science is concerned. Second (53), he explains what kind of science it is (“That this is not a practical science”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that the office of this science, which is called wisdom, is to consider the causes of things. Second (36), he explains with what causes or kinds of causes it is concerned (“But since we are in search”). In regard to the first he prefaces certain preliminary considerations form which he argues in support of his thesis. Second (35), he draws a conclusion from these considerations (“Now the reason for undertaking”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he makes clear the dignity of scientific knowledge in general. Second (9), he explains the hierarchy in knowing (“Animals by nature”). Now he establishes the dignity of scientific knowledge from the fact that it is naturally desired as an end by all men. Hence, in regard to this he does two things. First, he states what he intends [to prove]. Second (1), he proves it (“A sign of this”). Accordingly, he says, first, that the desire to know belongs by nature to all men.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 2 Cuius ratio potest esse triplex: primo quidem, quia unaquaeque res naturaliter appetit perfectionem sui. Unde et materia dicitur appetere formam, sicut imperfectum appetit suam perfectionem. Cum igitur intellectus, a quo homo est id quod est, in se consideratus sit in potentia omnia, nec in actum eorum reducatur nisi per scientiam, quia nihil est eorum quae sunt, ante intelligere, ut dicitur in tertio de anima: sic naturaliter unusquisque desiderat scientiam sicut materia formam. 2. Three reasons can be given for this: The first is that each thing naturally desires its own perfection. Hence matter is also said to desire form as any imperfect thing desires its perfection. Therefore, since the intellect, by which man is what he is, considered in itself is all things potentially, and becomes them actually only through knowledge, because the intellect is none of the things that exist before it understands them, as is stated in Book III of The Soul, so each man naturally desires knowledge just as matter desires form.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 3 Secundo, quia quaelibet res naturalem inclinationem habet ad suam propriam operationem: sicut calidum ad calefaciendum, et grave ut deorsum moveatur. Propria autem operatio hominis inquantum homo, est intelligere. Per hoc enim ab omnibus aliis differt. Unde naturaliter desiderium hominis inclinatur ad intelligendum, et per consequens ad sciendum. 3. The second reason is that each thing has a natural inclination to perform its proper operation, as something hot is naturally inclined to heat, and something heavy to be moved downwards. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand, for by reason of this he differs from all other things. Hence the desire of man is naturally inclined to understand, and therefore to possess scientific knowledge.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 4 Tertio, quia unicuique rei desiderabile est, ut suo principio coniungatur; in hoc enim uniuscuiusque perfectio consistit. Unde et motus circularis est perfectissimus, ut probatur octavo physicorum, quia finem coniungit principio. Substantiis autem separatis, quae sunt principia intellectus humani, et ad quae intellectus humanus se habet ut imperfectum ad perfectum, non coniungitur homo nisi per intellectum: unde et in hoc ultima hominis felicitas consistit. Et ideo naturaliter homo desiderat scientiam. Nec obstat si aliqui homines scientiae huic studium non impendant; cum frequenter qui finem aliquem desiderant, a prosecutione finis ex aliqua causa retrahantur, vel propter difficultatem perveniendi, vel propter alias occupationes. Sic etiam licet omnes homines scientiam desiderent, non tamen omnes scientiae studium impendunt, quia ab aliis detinentur, vel a voluptatibus, vel a necessitatibus vitae praesentis, vel etiam propter pigritiam vitant laborem addiscendi. Hoc autem proponit Aristoteles ut ostendat, quod quaerere scientiam non propter aliud utilem, qualis est haec scientia, non est vanum, cum naturale desiderium vanum esse non possit. 4. The third reason is that it is desirable for each thing to be united to its source, since it is in this that the perfection of each thing consists. This is also the reason why circular motion is the most perfect motion, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics, because its terminus is united to its starting-point. Now it is only by means of his intellect that man is united to the separate substances, which are the source of the human intellect and that to which the human intellect is related as something imperfect to something perfect. It is for this reason, too, that the ultimate happiness of man consists in this union. Therefore man naturally desires to know. The fact that some men do not devote any study to this science does not disprove this thesis; for those who desire some end are often prevented from pursuing it for some reason or other, either because of the difficulty of attaining it, or because of other occupations. And in this way, too, even though all men desire knowledge, still not all devote themselves to the pursuit of it because they are held back by other things, either by pleasures or the needs of the present life; or they may even avoid the effort that learning demands because they are lazy. Now Aristotle makes this statement in order to show that it is not pointless to search for a science that is not useful for anything else, as happens in the case of this science, since a natural desire cannot exist in vain.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 5 Deinde ostendit quod proposuerat, per signum: quia cum sensus ad duo nobis deserviant; scilicet ad cognitionem rerum, et ad utilitatem vitae; diliguntur a nobis propter seipsos, inquantum cognoscitivi sunt, et etiam propter hoc, quod utilitatem ad vitam conferunt. Et hoc patet ex hoc, quod ille sensus maxime ab omnibus diligitur, qui magis cognoscitivus est, qui est visus, quem diligimus non solum ad agendum aliquid, sed etiam si nihil agere deberemus. Cuius causa est, quia iste sensus, scilicet visus, inter omnes magis facit nos cognoscere, et plures differentias rerum nobis demonstrat. 5. Then he establishes his thesis by means of an example. Since our senses serve us in two respects: in knowing things and in meeting the needs of life, we love them for themselves inasmuch as they enable us to know and also assist us to live. This is evident from the fact that all men take the greatest delight in that sense which. is most knowing, i.e., the sense of sight, which we value not merely in order to do something, but even when we are not required to act at all. The reason is that this sense—that of sight—is the most knowing of all our senses and makes us aware of many differences between things.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 6 In quo manifestum est quod duas praeeminentias visus in cognoscendo ad alios sensus ponit. Unam quidem quia perfectius cognoscit. Quod quidem visui accidit, eo quod spiritualior est inter omnes sensus. Quanto enim aliqua vis cognoscitiva est immaterialior, tanto est perfectior in cognoscendo. Quod autem visus sit immaterialior, patet si consideretur eius immutatio, qua ab obiecto immutatur. Nam, cum omnia alia sensibilia immutent organum et medium sensus secundum aliquam materialem immutationem, sicut tactus obiectum calefaciendo et infrigidando, obiectum vero gustus, afficiendo sapore aliquo organum gustus mediante saliva, obiectum autem auditus per motum corporalem, obiectum autem odoratus per fumalem evaporationem, solum obiectum visus non immutat nec organum nec medium nisi spirituali immutatione. Non enim pupilla nec aer coloratur, sed solum speciem coloris recipiunt secundum esse spirituale. Quia igitur sensus in actu consistit in actuali immutatione sensus ab obiecto, manifestum est illum sensum spiritualiorem esse in sua operatione, qui immaterialius et spiritualius immutatur. Et ideo visus certius et perfectius iudicat de sensibilibus inter alios sensus. 6. In this part it is clear that he gives two reasons why sight is superior to the other senses in knowing. The first is that it knows in a more perfect way; and this belongs to it because it is the most spiritual of all the senses. For the more immaterial a power is, the more perfectly it knows. And evidently sight is a more immaterial sense, if we consider the modification produced in it by its object. For all other sensible objects change both the organ and medium of a sense by a material modification, for example, the object of touch by heating and cooling, the object of taste by affecting the organ of taste with some flavor through the medium of saliva, the object of hearing by means of motion in the body, and the object of smell by means of the evaporation of volatile elements. But the object of sight changes the organ and medium of sight only by a spiritual modification; because neither the pupil of the eye nor the air becomes colored, but these only receive the form of color in a spiritual mode of being. Therefore, because actual sensation consists in the actual modification of a sense by its object, it is evident that that sense which is changed in a more immaterial and spiritual way is more spiritual in its operation. Hence sight judges about sensible objects in a more certain and perfect way than the other senses do.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 7 Aliam autem praeeminentiam ponit, quia nobis plura demonstrat. Quod quidem accidit ex ratione sui obiecti. Tactus enim et gustus, et similiter odoratus et auditus sunt cognoscitivi illorum accidentium, in quibus distinguuntur inferiora corpora a superioribus. Visus autem est cognoscitivus illorum accidentium, in quibus communicant inferiora corpora cum superioribus. Nam visibile actu est aliquid per lucem, in qua communicant inferiora corpora cum superioribus, ut dicitur secundo de anima; et ideo corpora caelestia solo visu sunt sensibilia. 7. The other reason which he gives for the superiority of sight is that it gives us more information about things. This is attributable to the nature of its object, for touch and taste, and likewise smell and hearing, perceive those accidents by which lower bodies are distinguished from higher ones. But sight perceives those accidents which lower bodies have in common with higher ones. For a thing is actually visible by means of light, which is common both to lower and higher bodies, as is said in Book II of The Soul. Hence the celestial bodies are perceptible only by means of sight.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 8 Est autem alia ratio, quia visus plures differentias rerum demonstrat; quia sensibilia corpora praecipue per visum et tactum cognoscere videmur, et adhuc magis per visum. Cuius ratio ex hoc sumi potest: quod alii tres sensus sunt cognoscitivi eorum quae a corpore sensibili quodammodo effluunt, et non in ipso consistunt: sicut sonus est a corpore sensibili, ut ab eo fluens et non in eo manens: et similiter fumalis evaporatio cum qua et ex qua odor diffunditur. Visus autem et tactus percipiunt illa accidentia quae rebus ipsis immanent, sicut color et calidum et frigidum. Unde iudicium tactus et visus extenditur ad res ipsas, iudicium autem auditus et odoratus ad ea quae a rebus ipsis procedunt, non ad res ipsas. Et inde est quod figura et magnitudo et huiusmodi, quibus ipsa res sensibilis disponitur, magis percipitur visu et tactu, quam aliis sensibus. Et adhuc amplius magis visu quam tactu, tum propter hoc quod visus habet maiorem efficaciam ad cognoscendum, ut dictum est, tum propter hoc, quod quantitas et ea quae ad ipsam sequuntur, quae videntur esse sensibilia communia, proximius se habent ad obiectum visus quam ad obiectum tactus. Quod ex hoc patet, quod obiectum visus omne corpus habens aliquam quantitatem aliquo modo consequitur, non autem obiectum tactus. 8. There is also another reason. Sight informs us of many differences between things, for we seem to know sensible things best by means of sight and touch, but especially by means of sight. The reason for this can be drawn from the fact that the other three senses perceive those accidents which in a way flow from a sensible body and do not remain in it. Thus sound comes from a sensible body inasmuch as it flows away from it and does not remain in it. The same thing is true of the evaporation of volatile elements, with which and by which odor is diffused. But sight and touch perceive those accidents which remain in sensible bodies, such as color, warmth and coldness. Hence the judgment of sight and touch is extended to things themselves, whereas the judgment of hearing and smell is extended to those accidents which flow from things and not to things themselves. It is for this reason that figure and size and the like, by which a sensible being itself is disposed, are perceived more by sight and touch than by the other senses. And they are perceived more by sight than by touch, both because sight knows more efficaciously, as has been pointed out (C 6), and also because quantity and those [accidents] which naturally follow from it, which are seen to be the common sensibles, are more closely related to the object of sight than to that of touch. This is clear from the fact that the object of sight belongs in some degree to every body having some quantity, whereas the object of touch does not.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit animalia quidem prosequitur de ordine cognitionis. Et primo quantum ad bruta animalia. Secundo quantum ad homines, ibi, alia quidem igitur et cetera. Circa vero bruta animalia tangit primo quidem id in quo omnia animalia communicant. Secundo id in quo animalia differunt, et seinvicem excedunt, ibi, ex sensibus. Communicant autem omnia animalia in hoc quod naturaliter sensus habent. Nam ex hoc animal est animal, quod habet animam sensitivam, quae natura est animalis, sicut forma unicuique propria est natura eius. Quamvis autem omnia animalia sensum habeant naturaliter, non tamen omnia habent omnes sensus, sed solum perfecta. Omnia vero habent sensum tactus. Ipse enim est quodammodo fundamentum omnium aliorum sensuum. Non autem habent omnia sensum visus, quia sensus visus est omnibus aliis perfectior in cognoscendo, sed tactus magis necessarius. Est enim cognoscitivus eorum, ex quibus animal constat, scilicet calidi, frigidi, humidi et sicci. Unde sicut visus inter omnes est perfectior in cognoscendo, ita tactus est magis necessarius, utpote primus existens in via generationis. Ea enim quae sunt perfectiora, secundum hanc viam, sunt posteriora respectu illius individui, quod de imperfecto ad perfectionem movetur. 9. Animals by nature, then (2). Here he considers the hierarchy in knowledge. He does this, first (9), with respect to brute animals; and, then (14), with respect to men (“Thus other animals”). With respect to brute animals he mentions first what all animals have in common; and second (10), that by which they differ and surpass one another (“Now in some animals”). Now all animals are alike in the respect that they possess by nature the power of sensation. For an animal is an animal by reason of the fact that it has a sentient soul, which is the nature of an animal in the sense in which the distinctive form of each thing is its nature. But even though all animals are naturally endowed with sensory power, not all animals have all the senses, but only perfect animals. All have the sense of touch, for this sense in a way is the basis of all the other senses. However, not all have the sense of sight, because this sense knows in a more perfect way than all the other senses. But touch is more necessary; for it perceives the elements of which an animal is composed, namely, the hot, cold, moist and dry. Hence, just as sight knows in a more perfect way than the other senses, in a similar way touch is more necessary inasmuch as it is the first to exist in the process of generation. For those things which are more perfect according to this process come later in the development of the individual which is moved from a state of imperfection to one of perfection.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit ex sensibus ponit diversitatem cognitionis, quae est in brutis: et tangit etiam tres gradus cognitionis in huiusmodi animalibus. Quaedam enim sunt, quae licet sensum habeant, non tamen habent memoriam, quae ex sensu fit. Memoria enim sequitur phantasiam, quae est motus factus a sensu secundum actum, ut habetur in secundo de anima. In quibusdam vero animalibus ex sensu non fit phantasia, et sic in eis non potest esse memoria: et huiusmodi sunt animalia imperfecta, quae sunt immobilia secundum locum, ut conchilia. Cum enim animalibus cognitio sensitiva sit provisiva ad vitae necessitatem et ad propriam operationem, animalia illa memoriam habere debent, quae moventur ad distans motu progressivo: nisi enim apud ea remaneret per memoriam intentio praeconcepta, ex qua ad motum inducuntur, motum continuare non possent quousque finem intentum consequerentur. Animalibus vero immobilibus sufficit ad proprias operationes, praesentis sensibilis acceptio, cum ad distans non moveantur; et ideo sola imaginatione confusa habent aliquem motum indeterminatum, ut dicitur tertio de anima. 10. Now in some animals (3). Here he indicates the different kinds and three levels of knowing found among brute animals. For there are certain animals which have sensation, although they do not have memory which comes from sensation. For memory accompanies imagination, which is a movement caused by the senses in their act of sensing, as we find in Book II of The Soul. But in some animals imagination does not accompany sensation, and therefore memory cannot exist in them. This is found verified in imperfect animals which are incapable of local motion, such as shellfish. For since sensory cognition enables animals to make provision for the necessities of life and to perform their characteristic operations, then those animals which move towards something at a distance by means of local motion must have memory. For if the anticipated goal by which they are induced to move did not remain in them through memory, they could not continue to move toward the intended goal which they pursue. But in the case of immobile animals the reception of a present sensible quality is sufficient for them to perform their characteristic operations, since they do not move toward anything at a distance. Hence these animals have an indefinite movement as a result of confused [or indeterminate] imagination alone, as he points out in Book III of The Soul.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 11 Ex hoc autem, quod quaedam animalia memoriam habent, et quaedam non habent, sequitur quod quaedam sunt prudentia et quaedam non. Cum enim prudentia ex praeteritorum memoria de futuris provideat (unde secundum Tullium in secundo rhetoricae, partes eius ponuntur memoria, intelligentia, et providentia), in illis animalibus prudentia esse non potest, qui memoria carent. Illa vero animalia, quae memoriam habent, aliquid prudentiae habere possunt. Dicitur autem prudentia aliter in brutis animalibus, et aliter hominibus inesse. In hominibus quidem est prudentia secundum quod ex ratione deliberant quid eos oporteat agere; unde dicitur sexto Ethicorum, quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. Iudicium autem de rebus agendis non ex rationis deliberatione, sed ex quodam naturae instinctu, prudentia in aliis animalibus dicitur. Unde prudentia in aliis animalibus est naturalis aestimatio de convenientibus prosequendis, et fugiendis nocivis, sicut agnus sequitur matrem et fugit lupum. 11. Again, from the fact that some animals have memory and some do not, it follows that some are prudent and some not. For, since prudence makes provision for the future from memory of the past (and this is the reason why Tully in his Rhetoric, Book II, makes memory, understanding and foresight parts of prudence), prudence cannot be had by those animals which lack memory. Now those animals which have memory can have some prudence, although prudence has one meaning in the case of brute animals and another in the case of man. Men are prudent inasmuch as they deliberate rationally about what they ought to do. Hence it is saidin Book VI of the Ethics, that prudence is a rationally regulated plan of things to be done. But the judgment about things to be done which is not a result of any rational deliberation but of some natural instinct is called prudence in other animals. Hence in other animals prudence is a natural estimate about the pursuit of what is fitting and the avoidance of what is harmful, as a lamb follows its mother and runs away from a wolf .
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 12 Inter ea vero, quae memoriam habent, quaedam habent auditum et quaedam non. Quaecumque autem auditum non habent, ut apes, vel si quod aliud huiusmodi animal est, licet prudentiam habere possint, non tamen sunt disciplinabilia, ut scilicet per alterius instructionem possint assuescere ad aliquid faciendum vel vitandum: huiusmodi enim instructio praecipue recipitur per auditum: unde dicitur in libro de sensu et sensato, quod auditus est sensus disciplinae. Quod autem dicitur apes auditum non habere, non repugnat ei, quod videntur ex quibusdam sonis exterreri. Nam sicut sonus vehemens occidit animal, et scindit lignum, ut in tonitruo patet, non propter sonum, sed propter commotionem aeris vehementem in quo est sonus: ita animalia, quae auditu carent, iudicium de sonis non habendo possunt per sonos aereos exterreri. Illa vero animalia, quae memoriam et auditum habent, et disciplinabilia et prudentia esse possunt. 12. But among those animals which have memory some have hearing and some do not. And all those which cannot hear (as the bee or any other similar type of animal that may exist), even though they have prudence, are still incapable of being taught, i.e., in the sense that they can be habituated to the doing or avoiding of something through someone else’s instruction, because such instruction is received chiefly by means of hearing. Hence in The Senses and Their Objects it is stated that hearing is the sense by which we receive instruction. Furthermore, the statement that bees do not have hearing is not opposed in any way to the observation that they are frightened by certain sounds. For just as a very loud sound kills an animal and splits wood, as is evident in the case of thunder, not because of the sound but because of the violent motion of the air in which the sound is present, in a similar fashion those animals which lack hearing can be frightened by the sounding air even though they have no perception of sound. However, those animals which have both memory and hearing can be both prudent and teachable.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 13 Patet igitur tres esse gradus cognitionis in animalibus. Primus est eorum, quae nec auditum nec memoriam habent: unde nec disciplinabilia sunt, nec prudentia. Secundus est eorum quae habent memoriam, sed non auditum; unde sunt prudentia, et non disciplinabilia. Tertius est eorum, quae utrumque habent, et sunt prudentia et disciplinabilia. Quartus autem modus esse non potest, ut scilicet sit aliquod animal, quod habeat auditum, et non habeat memoriam. Sensus enim, qui per exterius medium suum sensibile apprehendunt, inter quos est auditus, non sunt nisi in animalibus quae moventur motu progressivo, quibus memoria deesse non potest, ut dictum est. 13. It is evident, then, that there are three levels of knowing in animals. The first level is that had by animals which have neither hearing nor memory, and which are therefore neither capable of being taught nor of being prudent. The second level is that of animals which have memory but are unable to hear, and which are therefore prudent but incapable of being taught. The third level is that of animals which have both of these faculties, and which are therefore prudent and capable of being taught. Moreover, there cannot be a fourth level, so that there would be an animal which had hearing but lacked memory. For those senses which perceive their sensible objects by means of an external medium—and hearing is one of these—are found only in animals which have locomotion and which cannot do without memory, as has been pointed out (10).
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit alia quidem ostendit gradus cognitionis humanae. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo namque ostendit in quo cognitio humana excedit praedictorum cognitionem. Secundo ostendit quomodo humana cognitio per diversos gradus distribuatur, ibi, fit autem ex memoria. Dicit ergo in prima parte, quod vita animalium regitur imaginatione et memoria: imaginatione quidem, quantum ad animalia imperfecta; memoria vero quantum ad animalia perfecta. Licet enim et haec imaginationem habeant, tamen unumquodque regi dicitur ab eo quod est principalius in ipso. Vivere autem hic non accipitur secundum quod est esse viventis, sicut accipitur in secundo de anima: cum dicitur, vivere viventibus est esse. Nam huiusmodi vivere animalis non est ex memoria et imaginatione, sed praecedit utrumque. Accipitur autem vivere pro actione vitae, sicut et conversationem hominum vitam dicere solemus. In hoc vero, quod cognitionem animalium determinat per comparationem ad regimen vitae, datur intelligi quod cognitio inest ipsis animalibus non propter ipsum cognoscere, sed propter necessitatem actionis. 14. Thus other animals (4). Here he explains the levels of human knowing; and in regard to this he does two things. First (14), he explains how human knowing surpasses the knowing of the abovementioned animals. Second (17), he shows how human knowing is divided into different levels (“Now in men”). Accordingly, in the first part (4) he says that the life of animals is ruled by imagination and memory: by imagination in the case of imperfect animals, and by memory in the case of perfect animals. For even though the latter also have imagination, still each thing is said to be ruled by that [power] which holds the highest place within it. Now in this discussion life does not mean the being of a living thing, as it is understood in Book II of The Soul, when he says that “for living things to live is to be”; for the life of an animal in this sense is not a result of memory or imagination but is prior to both of these. But life is taken to mean vital activity, just as we are also accustomed to speak of association as the life of men. But by the fact that he establishes the truth about the cognition of animals with reference to the management of life, we are given to understand that knowing belongs to these animals, not for the sake of knowing, but because of the need for action.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 15 Supra memoriam autem in hominibus, ut infra dicetur, proximum est experimentum, quod quaedam animalia non participant nisi parum. Experimentum enim est ex collatione plurium singularium in memoria receptorum. Huiusmodi autem collatio est homini propria, et pertinet ad vim cogitativam, quae ratio particularis dicitur: quae est collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio universalis intentionum universalium. Et, quia ex multis sensibus et memoria animalia ad aliquid consuescunt prosequendum vel vitandum, inde est quod aliquid experimenti, licet parum, participare videntur. Homines autem supra experimentum, quod pertinet ad rationem particularem, habent rationem universalem, per quam vivunt, sicut per id quod est principale in eis. 15. Now, as is stated below (18), in men the next thing above memory is experience, which some animals have only to a small degree. For an experience arises from the association of many singular [intentions] received in memory. And this kind of association is proper to man, and pertains to the cogitative power (also called particular reason), which associates particular intentions just as universal reason associates universal ones. Now since animals are accustomed to pursue or avoid certain things as a result of many sensations and memory, for this reason they seem to share something of experience, even though it be slight. But above experience, which belongs to particular reason, men have as their chief power a universal reason by means of which they live.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 16 Sicut autem se habet experimentum ad rationem particularem, et consuetudo ad memoriam in animalibus, ita se habet ars ad rationem universalem. Ideo sicut perfectum vitae regimen est animalibus per memoriam adiuncta assuefactione ex disciplina, vel quomodolibet aliter, ita perfectum hominis regimen est per rationem arte perfectam. Quidam tamen ratione sine arte reguntur; sed hoc est regimen imperfectum. 16. And just as experience is related to particular reason [in men], and customary activity to memory in animals, in a similar way art is related to universal reason. Therefore, just as the life of animals is ruled in a perfect way by memory together with activity that has become habitual through training, or in any other way whatsoever, in a similar way man is ruled perfectly by reason perfected by art. Some men, however, are ruled by reason without art; but this rule is imperfect.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 17 Deinde cum dicit fit autem ostendit diversos gradus humanae cognitionis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo comparat experimentum ad artem quidem. Secundo comparat artem speculativam ad activam, ibi, primum igitur conveniens et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit generationem artis et experimenti. Secundo praeeminentiam unius ad alterum, ibi, ad agere quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit utriusque praedictorum generationem. Secundo manifestat per exemplum, ibi, acceptionem quidem enim et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit generationem experimenti. Secundo artis generationem ibi, hominibus autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex memoria in hominibus experimentum causatur. Modus autem causandi est iste; quia ex multis memoriis unius rei accipit homo experimentum de aliquo, quo experimento potens est ad facile et recte operandum. Et ideo quia potentiam recte et faciliter operandi praebet experimentum, videtur fere esse simile arti et scientiae. Est enim similitudo eo quod utrobique ex multis una acceptio alicuius rei sumitur. Dissimilitudo autem, quia per artem accipiuntur universalia, per experimentum singularia, ut postea dicetur. 17. Now in men (5). Here he explains the different levels of human knowing; and in regard to this he does two things. First (17), he compares art with experience; and, second (31), he compares speculative art with practical art (“It is only fitting”). He treats the first point in two ways. First, he explains how art and experience originate. Second (20), he explains how one is superior to the other (“In practical matters”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains how each of the above originates. Second (18), he makes this clear by means of an example (“For to judge”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he describes how experience originates, and second (18), how art originates (“But in men, science”). He says first (5), then, that in men experience is caused by memory. The way in which it is caused is this: from several memories of a single thing a man acquires experience about some matter, and by means of this experience he is able to act easily and correctly. Therefore, because experience provides us with the ability to act easily and correctly, it seems to be almost the same as science and art. For they are alike inasmuch as in either case from many instances a single view of a thing is obtained. But they differ inasmuch as universals are grasped by art and singular things by experience, as is stated later (18).
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 18 Deinde cum dicit hominibus autem ponit generationem artis: et dicit, quod ex experientia in hominibus fit scientia et ars: et probat per auctoritatem Poli, qui dicit, quod experientia facit artem, sed inexperientia casum. Quando enim aliquis inexpertus recte operatur, a casu est. Modus autem, quo ars fit ex experimento, est idem cum modo praedicto, quo experimentum fit ex memoria. Nam sicut ex multis memoriis fit una experimentalis scientia, ita ex multis experimentis apprehensis fit universalis acceptio de omnibus similibus. Unde plus habet hoc ars quam experimentum: quia experimentum tantum circa singularia versatur, ars autem circa universalia. 18. But in men science and art (6). Here he describes the way in which art arises. He says that in men science and art come from experience, and he proves this on the authority of Polus, whp says that “Experience causes art and inexperience luck.” For when an inexperienced person acts correctly, this happens by chance. Furthermore, the way in which art arises from experience is the same as the way spoken of above in which experience arises from memory. For just as one experiential cognition comes from many memories of a thing, so does one universal judgment abour all similar things come from the apprehension of many experiences. Hence art has this [unified view] more than experience, because experience is concerned only with singulars, whereas art has to do with universals.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 19 Quod consequenter per exempla exponit, cum dicit, acceptionem quidem etc.: quia cum homo accepit in sua cognitione quod haec medicina contulit Socrati et Platoni tali infirmitate laborantibus, et multis aliis singularibus, quidquid sit illud, hoc ad experientiam pertinet: sed, cum aliquis accipit, quod hoc omnibus conferat in tali specie aegritudinis determinata, et secundum talem complexionem, sicut quod contulit febricitantibus et phlegmaticis et cholericis, id iam ad artem pertinet. 19. Thereupon he makes this clear by means of examples (“But in men”). For when a man has learned that this medicine has been beneficial to Socrates and Plato, and to many other individuals who were suffering from some particular disease, whatever it may be, this is a matter of experience; but when a man learns that this particular treatment is beneficial to A men who have some particular kind of disease and some particular kind of physical constitution, as it has benefited the feverish, both the phlegmatic and the bilious, this is now a matter of art.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 20 Deinde cum dicit ad agere comparat artem ad experimentum per modum praeeminentiae. Et secundum hoc duo facit. Primo comparat quantum ad actionem. Secundo quantum ad cognitionem, ibi, sed tamen scire et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod quantum ad actum pertinet, experientia nihil videtur differre ab arte. Cum enim ad actionem venitur, tollitur differentia, quae inter experimentum et artem erat per universale et singulare: quia sicut experimentum circa singularia operatur, ita et ars; unde praedicta differentia erat in cognoscendo tantum. Sed quamvis in modo operandi ars et experimentum non differant, quia utraque circa singularia operatur, differunt tamen in efficacia operandi. Nam experti magis proficiunt in operando illis qui habent rationem universalem artis sine experimento. 20. In practical matters (7). He compares art to experience from the viewpoint of pre-eminence; and in regard to this he does two things. First (20), he compares them from the viewpoint of action; and, second (23), from the viewpoint of knowledge (“Yet we think”). He says then that in practical matters experience seems to differ in no way from art; for when it comes to acting, the difference between experience and art, which is a difference between the universal and the singular, disappears, because art operates with reference to singulars just as experience does. Therefore the aforesaid difference pertains only to the way in which they come to know. But even though art and experience do not differ in the way in which they act, because both act on singular things, nevertheless they differ in the effectiveness of their action. For men of experience act more effectively than those who have the universal knowledge of an art but lack experience.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 21 Cujus causa est, quia actiones sunt circa singularia, et singularium sunt omnes generationes. Universalia enim non generantur nec moventur nisi per accidens, inquantum hoc singularibus competit. Homo enim generatur hoc homine generato. Unde medicus non sanat hominem nisi per accidens; sed per se sanat Platonem aut Socratem, aut aliquem hominem singulariter dictum, cui convenit esse hominem, vel accidit inquantum est curatus. Quamvis enim esse hominem per se conveniat Socrati, tamen curato et medicato per accidens convenit: haec est enim per se, Socrates est homo: quia si Socrates definiretur, poneretur homo in eius definitione, ut in quarto dicetur. Sed haec est per accidens, curatus vel sanatus est homo. 21. The reason is that actions have to do with singular things, and all processes of generation belong to singular things. For universals are generated or moved only by reason of something else, inasmuch as this belongs to singular things. For man is generated when this man is generated. Hence a physician heals man only incidentally, but properly he heals Plato or Socrates, or some man that can be individually named, to whom the nature man belongs, or rather to whom it is accidental inasmuch as he is the one healed. For even though the nature man belongs essentially to Socrates, still it belongs only accidentally to the one healed or cured; for the proposition “Socrates is a man” is an essential one, because, if Socrates were defined, man would be given in his definition, as will be said below in Book IV.” But the proposition “What is healed or cured is man” is an accidental one.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 22 Unde cum ars sit universalium, experientia singularium, si aliquis habet rationem artis sine experientia, erit quidem perfectus in hoc quod universale cognoscat; sed quia ignorat singulare cum experimento careat, multotiens in curando peccabit: quia curatio magis pertinet ad singulare quam ad universale, cum ad hoc pertineat per se, ad illud per accidens. 22. Hence, since art has to do with universals and experience with singulars, if anyone has the theoretical knowledge of an art but lacks experience, he will be perfect insofar as he knows the universal; but since he does not know the singular, because he lacks experience, he will very often make mistakes in healing. For healing belongs to the realm of the singular rather than to that of the universal, because it belongs to the former essentially and to the latter accidentally.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 23 Deinde cum dicit sed tamen comparat experimentum ad artem quantum ad cognitionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit praeeminentiam artis ad experimentum. Secundo probat, ibi, hoc autem est quia hi quidem et cetera. Proponit autem praeeminentiam artis et scientiae quantum ad tria. Scilicet quantum ad scire, quod quidem magis arbitramur esse per artem quam per experimentum. Item quantum ad obviare, quod in disputationibus accidit. Nam habens artem potest disputando obviare his quae contra artem dicuntur, non autem habens experimentum. Item quantum ad hoc quod artifices plus accedunt ad finem sapientiae, quam experti, tamquam magis sit, idest contingat, scire sapientiam sequentem omnia, idest dum sequitur universalia. Ex hoc enim artifex sapientior iudicatur, quam expertus quia universalia considerat. Vel aliter. Tamquam magis sit scire secundum sapientiam omnia sequentem, idest universalia. Alia litera, tamquam magis secundum scire sapientia omnia sequente: quasi dicat: tamquam sapientia sequente omnia idest consequente ad unumquodque, magis sit secundum scire, quam secundum operari: ut scilicet dicantur sapientes magis qui magis sciunt, non qui magis sunt operativi. Unde alia litera hunc sensum habet planiorem, qui sic dicit: tamquam secundum illud quod est scire magis, omnes sequuntur sapientiam. 23. Yet we think (8). Here he compares art with experience from the viewpoint of knowing; and in regard to this he does two things. First (23), he states how art is superior to experience; and second (24), he proves this (“Now this is because”). He claims that art and science are superior to experience in three respects. First, they are superior from the viewpoint of scientific knowledge, which we think is attained by art rather than by experience. Second, they are superior from the viewpoint of meeting objections, which occurs in disputes. For in a dispute the one who has an art is able to meet the objections raised against that art, but one who has experience [alone] cannot do this. Third, they are superior from this point of view, that those who have an art come nearer to the goal of wisdom than men of experience, “Implying that it is,” i.e., happens to be, “more truly to know if wisdom pursues all things,” i.e., insofar as it pursues universals. For one who has an art is judged wiser than one who has experience, by reason of the fact that he considers universals. Or in another version: “Implying that it is more according to wisdom to know as one pursuing all things,” i.e., universals. Another reading has: “As more conformable to knowing, since wisdom pursues all things,” as if to say: “As more dependent upon knowing” than upon doing, “since wisdom pursues all things,” i.e., it seeks to reach each single thing; so that those are rather called wise who are more knowing, not those who are more men of action. Hence another reading expresses this meaning more clearly, saying: “Implying that all pursue wisdom more with respect to knowing.”
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 24 Consequenter cum dicit hoc autem probat praedictam praeeminentiam tripliciter. Prima probatio talis est. Illi, qui sciunt causam et propter quid, scientiores sunt et sapientiores illis qui ignorant causam, sed solum sciunt quia. Experti autem sciunt quia, sed nesciunt propter quid. Artifices vero sciunt causam, et propter quid, et non solum quia: ergo sapientiores et scientiores sunt artifices expertis. 24. Now this is (9). Then he proves the superiority of art and science mentioned above, and he does this by means of three arguments. The first runs thus: those who know the cause and reason why a thing is so are more knowing and wiser than those who merely know that it is so but do not know why. Now men of experience know that something is so but do not know the reason, whereas men who have an art know not merely that something is so but also know its cause and reason. Hence those who have an art are wiser and more knowing than those who have experience.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 25 Primo primam probat cum dicit, unde et architectores et cetera. Probatio talis est. Illi qui sciunt causam et propter quid comparantur ad scientes tantum quia, sicut architectonicae artes ad artes artificum manu operantium. Sed architectonicae artes sunt nobiliores: ergo et illi qui sciunt causas et propter quid, sunt scientiores et sapientiores scientibus tantum quia. 25. For this reason too (9). Here he proves the first aspect of superiority, and this runs as follows. Those who know the cause and reason why a thing is so are compared to those who merely know that it is so as the architectonic arts are to the arts of manual laborers. But the architectonic arts are nobler. In a similar way, then, those who know the causes and reasons of things are more knowing than those who merely know that things are so.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 26 Huius probationis prima ex hoc apparet, quia architectores sciunt causas factorum. Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est, quod architector dicitur quasi principalis artifex: ab archos quod est princeps, et techne quod est ars. Dicitur autem ars principalior illa, quae principaliorem operationem habet. Operationes autem artificum hoc modo distinguuntur: quia quaedam sunt ad disponendum materiam artificii, sicut carpentarii secando ligna et complanando disponunt materiam ad formam navis. Alia est operatio ad inductionem formae; sicut cum aliquis ex lignis dispositis et praeparatis navem compaginat. Alia est operatio in usum rei iam constitutae; et ista est principalissima. Prima autem est infima, quia prima ordinatur ad secundam, et secunda ad tertiam. Unde navisfactor est architector respectu eius qui praeparat ligna. Gubernator autem, qui utitur navi iam facta, est architector respectu navis factoris. 26. The first part of this proof becomes clear from the fact that architects, or master artists, know the causes of the things that are done. In order to understand this we must note that architect means chief artist, from a???? meaning chief, and te??? meaning art. Now that art is said to be a chief art which performs a more important operation. Indeed, the operations of artists are distinguished in this way; for some operations are directed to disposing the material of the artifact. Carpenters, for example, by cutting and planing the wood, dispose matter for the form of a ship. Another operation is directed to introducing this form into the matter, for example, when someone builds a ship out of wood which has been disposed and prepared. A third operation is directed to the use of the finished product, and this is the highest operation. But the first operation is the lowest because it is directed to the second and the second to the third. Hence the shipbuilder is a superior artist compared with the one who prepares the wood; and the navigator, who uses the completed ship, is a superior artist comparedwith the shipbuilder.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 27 Et, quia materia est propter formam, et talis debet esse materia quae formae competat, ideo navisfactor scit causam, quare ligna debeant esse sic disposita; quod nesciunt illi qui praeparant ligna. Similiter, cum tota navis sit propter usum ipsius, ille qui navi utitur, scit quare talis forma debeat esse; ad hoc enim debet talis esse, ut tali usui conveniens sit. Et sic patet, quod ex forma artificii sumitur causa operationum, quae sunt circa dispositionem materiae. Et ex usu sumitur causa operationum, quae sunt circa formam artificiati. 27. Further, since matter exists for the sake of form, and ought to be such as to befit the form, the shipbuilder knows the rea son why the wood should be shaped in some particular way; but those who prepare the wood do not know this. And in a similar way, since the completed ship exists in order to be used, the one who uses the ship knows why it should have some particular form; for the form should be one that befits its use. Thus it is evident that the reason for the operations which dispose the matter is taken from the design of the product in the artist’s mind, and the reason for the operations which produce the form of the artifact is taken from the use [to which the artifact is put].
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 28 Et sic manifestum est, quod architectores factorum causas sciunt. Illos vero, scilicet manu artifices, iudicamus vel denominamus, sicut quaedam inanimatorum. Et hoc non ideo quia faciunt operationes artificiales, sed quia quae faciunt, incognita faciunt. Sciunt enim quia, sed causas non cognoscunt; sicut etiam ignis exurit absque aliqua cognitione. Est igitur quantum ad hoc similitudo inter inanimata et manu artifices, quod sicut absque causae cognitione inanimata operantur ut ordinata ab aliquo superiori intellectu in proprium finem, ita et manu artifices. Sed in hoc est differentia: quia inanimata faciunt unumquodque suorum operum per naturam, sed manu artifices per consuetudinem: quae licet vim naturae habeat inquantum ad unum inclinat determinate, tamen a natura differt in hoc, quod est circa ea quae sunt ad utrumlibet secundum humanam cognitionem. Naturalia enim non consuescimus, sicut dicitur in secundo Ethicorum. Nec etiam cognitione carentium est consuescere. Haec autem quae dicta sunt, sic sunt consideranda tamquam ex eis appareat, quod aliqui non sunt sapientiores secundum quod est practicos, id est operatores esse, quod convenit expertis; sed secundum quod aliqui habent rationem de agendis, et cognoscunt causas agendorum, ex quibus rationes sumuntur: quod convenit architectoribus. 28. It is evident, then, that the master artists know the causes of the things which are done. In fact we judge and speak about the others, i.e., the manual laborers, as we do about certain inanimate things. This is not because they do not perform artful operations, but because the things which they do they do without knowing the cause; for they know that something is to be done but not why it is, just as fire burns without knowing why. Hence there is a likeness between inanimate things and manual laborers from this point of view, that, just as inanimate things act without knowing the causes, inasmuch as they are directed to their proper end by a superior intellect, so also do manual laborers. But they differ in this respect, that inanimate things perform each of their operations as a result of their nature, whereas manual laborers perform theirs through habit. And while habit is practically the same as nature inasmuch as it is inclined to one definite effect, still habit differs from nature inasmuch as it is open to opposites by reason of human knowledge. For we do not habituate natural bodies, as is stated in Book II of the Ethics; nor, indeed, is it possible to cause habits in things that lack knowledge. Now the statements that have been made, as is evident from the statements themselves, must be interpreted as meaning that some men are wiser, not insofar as they are “practical,” i.e., men of action, as befits men of experience, but insofar as they have a plan for things to be done and know their causes, which are the basis of such a plan; and this befits master artists.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 29 Deinde cum dicit et omnino ponit secundam rationem: quae talis est. Signum scientis est posse docere: quod ideo est, quia unumquodque tunc est perfectum in actu suo, quando potest facere alterum sibi simile, ut dicitur quarto Meteororum. Sicut igitur signum caliditatis est quod possit aliquid calefacere, ita signum scientis est, quod possit docere, quod est scientiam in alio causare. Artifices autem docere possunt, quia cum causas cognoscant, ex eis possunt demonstrare: demonstratio autem est syllogismus faciens scire, ut dicitur primo posteriorum. Experti autem non possunt docere, quia non possunt ad scientiam perducere cum causam ignorent. Et si ea quae experimento cognoscunt aliis tradant, non recipientur per modum scientiae, sed per modum opinionis vel credulitatis. Unde patet quod artifices sunt magis sapientes et scientes expertis. 29. In general a sign of scientific knowledge (10). Here he gives the second argument, which is as follows: a sign of knowledge is the ability to teach, and this is so because each thing is perfect in its activity when it can produce another thing similar to itself, as is said in Book IV of Meteors. Therefore, just as the possession of heat is indicated by the fact that a thing can heat something else, in a similar way the possession of knowledge is indicated by the fact that one can teach, that is, cause knowledge in another. But men who have an art can teach, for since they know causes they can demonstrate from these; and demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge, as is said in Book I of the Posterior Analytics. But men who have experience [only] cannot teach; for since they do not know the causes, they cannot cause knowledge in someone else. And if they do teach others the things which they know by experience, these things are not learned after the manner of scientific knowledge but after that of opinion or belief. Hence, it is clear that men who have an art are wiser and more knowing than those who have experience.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 30 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit tertiam rationem; quae talis est. Cognitiones singularium magis sunt propriae sensibus quam alicui alteri cognitioni, cum omnis cognitio singularium a sensu oriatur. Sed tamen, nec unum, idest nullum sensum dicimus sapientiam, scilicet propter hoc quod licet aliquis sensus cognoscat quia, tamen, non propter quid cognoscit. Tactus enim iudicat quod ignis calidus est, non tamen apprehendit propter quid: ergo experti qui habent singularium cognitionem causam ignorantes, sapientes dici non possunt. 30. Furthermore, we do not hold (11). Here he gives the third argument, which is as follows: knowing singular things is proper to the senses rather than to any other type of knowing [power], since our entire knowledge of singular things originates with the senses. Yet we do not hold that “any one of these,” i.e., any one of the senses, is wisdom, because even though each sense knows that a thing is so, it does not know why it is so; for touch judges that fire is hot but does not know why it is hot. Therefore men of experience, who have a knowledge of singular things but do not know their causes, cannot be called wise men.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 31 Deinde cum dicit primum quidem comparat artem activam speculativae. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod ars speculativa magis est sapientia quam activa. Secundo respondet cuidam obiectioni, ibi, in moralibus. Ostendit autem quod primo dictum est, tali ratione. In quibuscumque scientiis vel artibus invenitur id propter quod homines scientes prae aliis hominibus in admiratione vel honore habentur, illae scientiae sunt magis honorabiles, et magis dignae nomine sapientiae. Quilibet autem inventor artis habetur in admiratione, propter hoc quod habet sensum et iudicium et discretionem causae ultra aliorum hominum sensum, et non propter utilitatem illorum quae invenit: sed magis admiramur, sicut sapientem et ab aliis distinguentem. Sapientem quidem, quantum ad subtilem inquisitionem causarum rei inventae: distinguentem vero, quantum ad investigationem differentiarum unius rei ad aliam. Vel aliter, ab aliis distinguentem, ut passive legatur, quasi in hoc ab aliis distinguatur. Unde alia litera habet, differentem. Ergo scientiae aliquae sunt magis admirabiles et magis dignae nomine sapientiae propter eminentiorem sensum, et non propter utilitatem. 31. It is only fitting (12). Here he compares practical art with speculative art; and in regard to this he does three things. First (20), he shows that a speculative art is wisdom to a greater degree than a practical art. Second (ibid.), he answers an objection (“The difference”). He proves his first statement by this argument: in any of the sciences or arts we find that men with scientific knowledge are more admired and are held in higher esteem than all other men, because their knowledge is held to be nobler and more worthy of the name of wisdom. Now the discoverer of any art at all is admired because he perceives, judges and discerns a cause beyond the perceptions of other men, and not because of the usefulness of his discoveries. We admire him rather “as being wise, and as distinguishing [a thing] from others.” As being wise, indeed, in the subtle way in which he investigates the causes of his discoveries, and as distinguishing [a thing] from others insofar as he investigates the ways in which one thing differs from another. Or, according to another interpretation, “as being distinct from the others” is to be read passively, as being distinguished in this respect from others. Hence another text has “one who is different.” Some sciences, then, are more admirable and worthy of the name of wisdom because their observations are more outstanding, not because they are useful.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 32 Cum igitur plures artes sint repertae quantum ad utilitatem, quarum quaedam sunt ad vitae necessitatem, sicut mechanicae; quaedam vero ad introductionem in aliis scientiis, sicut scientiae logicales: illi artifices dicendi sunt sapientiores, quorum scientiae non sunt ad utilitatem inventae, sed propter ipsum scire, cuiusmodi sunt scientiae speculativae. 32. Therefore, since many useful arts have been discovered (some to provide the necessities of life, as the mechanical arts, and others to introduce us to the sciences, as the logical disciplines), those artists must be said to be wiser whose sciences were discovered not for the sake of utility but merely for the sake of knowing, that is to say, the speculative sciences.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 33 Et quod speculativae scientiae non sint inventae ad utilitatem, patet per hoc signum: quia, iam partis, id est acquisitis vel repertis omnibus huiusmodi, quae possunt esse ad introductionem in scientiis, vel ad necessitatem vitae, vel ad voluptatem, sicut artes quae sunt ordinatae ad hominum delectationem: speculativae non sunt propter huiusmodi repertae, sed propter seipsas. Et quod non sint ad utilitatem inventae, patet ex loco quo inventae sunt. In locis enim illis primo repertae sunt, ubi primo homines studuerunt circa talia. Alia litera habet, et primum his locis ubi vacabant, id est ab aliis occupationibus quiescentes studio vacabant quasi necessariis abundantes. Unde et circa Aegyptum primo inventae sunt artes mathematicae, quae sunt maxime speculativae, a sacerdotibus, qui sunt concessi studio vacare, et de publico expensas habebant, sicut etiam legitur in Genesi. 33. That the speculative sciences were not discovered for the sake of utility is made clear by this fact, that after all sciences of this kind “had already been developed,” i.e., acquired or discovered, which can serve as introductions to the other sciences, or provide the necessities of life, or give pleasure (as those arts whose object is to delight man), the speculative sciences were discovered, not for this kind of end, but for their own sake. The fact that they were not discovered for the sake of utility becomes evident from the place in which they were discovered. For they originated in those places where men first applied themselves to such things. Another version reads, “And first in those places where men had leisure,” i.e., they had time for study because they were released from other occupations as a result of the abundance of things necessary [for life]. Hence the mathematical arts, which are speculative in the highest degree, were first discovered in Egypt by the priests, who were given time for study, and whose expenses were defrayed by the community, as we also read in Genesis (47:22)
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 34 Sed quia usus nomine artis fuerat et sapientiae et scientiae quasi indifferenter, ne aliquis putet haec omnia esse nomina synonyma idem penitus significantia hanc opinionem removet, et remittit ad librum Moralium, idest ad sextum Ethicorum, ubi dictum est, in quo differant scientia et ars et sapientia et prudentia et intellectus. Et ut breviter dicatur, sapientia et scientia et intellectus sunt circa partem animae speculativam, quam ibi scientificum animae appellat. Differunt autem, quia intellectus est habitus principiorum primorum demonstrationis. Scientia vero est conclusionis ex causis inferioribus. Sapientia vero considerat causas primas. Unde ibidem dicitur caput scientiarum. Prudentia vero et ars est circa animae partem practicam, quae est ratiocinativa de contingentibus operabilibus a nobis. Et differunt: nam prudentia dirigit in actionibus quae non transeunt ad exteriorem materiam, sed sunt perfectiones agentis: unde dicitur ibi quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. Ars vero dirigit in factionibus, quae in materiam exteriorem transeunt, sicut aedificare et secare: unde dicitur quod ars est recta ratio factibilium. 34. But because the names “wisdom,” “science” and “art” have been used indifferently, lest someone should think that these terms are synonymous, he excludes this opinion and refers to his work on morals, i.e., to Book VI of the Ethics, where he has explained the difference between art, wisdom, science, prudence, and understanding. And to give the distinction briefly—wisdom, science and understanding pertain to the speculative part of the soul, which he speaks of in that work as the scientific part of the soul. But they differ in that understanding is the habit of the first principles of demonstration, whereas science has to do with conclusions drawn from subordinate causes, and wisdom with first causes. This is the reason it is spoken of there as the chief science. But prudence and art belong to the practical part of the soul, which reasons about our contingent courses of action. And these also differ; for prudence directs us in actions which do not pass over into some external matter but are perfections of the one acting (which is the reason why prudence is defined in that work as the reasoned plan of things to be done), but art directs us in those productive actions, such as building and cutting, which pass over into external matter (which is the reason why art is defined as the reasoned plan of things to be made). Wisdom deals with causes.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 35 Deinde cum dicit cuius autem ostendit ex praehabitis principale propositum; quod scilicet sapientia sit circa causas. Unde dicit quod hoc est cuius gratia nunc sermonem facimus, idest ratiocinationem praedictam: quia scientia illa quae denominatur sapientia, videtur esse circa primas causas, et circa prima principia. Quod quidem patet ex praehabitis. Unusquisque enim tanto sapientior est, quanto magis accedit ad causae cognitionem: quod ex praehabitis patet; quia expertus est sapientior eo qui solum habet sensum sine experimento. Et artifex est sapientior experto quocumque. Et inter artifices architector est sapientior manu artifice. Et inter artes etiam et scientias, speculativae sunt magis scientiae quam activae. Et haec omnia ex praedictis patent. Unde relinquitur quod illa scientia, quae simpliciter est sapientia, est circa causas. Et est similis modus arguendi, sicut si diceremus: illud quod est magis calidum, est magis igneum: unde quod simpliciter est ignis, est calidum simpliciter. 35. From what has been said he proves his major thesis, that is to say, that wisdom deals with the causes of things. He says that the reason “for undertaking this investigation,” i.e., the above piece of reasoning, is that the science which is called wisdom seems to be about first causes and principles. This is evident from the foregoing; for the more a man attains to a knowledge of the cause, the wiser he is. This is also evident from the foregoing; because the man of experience is wiser than one who has sensation alone without experience; and the artist is wiser than any man of experience; and among artists the architect is wiser than the manual laborer. And similarly among the arts and sciences the speculative are more scientific than the practical. All these things are dear from the foregoing remarks. It follows, then, that that science which is wisdom in an absolute sense is concerned with the causes of things. The method of arguing would be similar if we were to say that that which is hotter is more afire, and therefore that that which is afire in an absolute sense is hot in an absolute sense.

Lecture 2

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit quod sapientia sit quaedam scientia circa causas existens, hic vult ostendere circa quales causas et circa qualia principia sit. Ostendit autem quod est circa causas maxime universales et primas; et argumentatur a definitione sapientiae. Unde circa hoc tria facit. Primo colligit definitionem sapientiae ex his quae homines de homine sapiente et sapientia opinantur. Secundo ostendit quod omnia ista conveniunt universali scientiae, quae considerat causas primas et universales, ibi, istorum autem et cetera. Tertio concludit propositum, ibi, ex omnibus ergo et cetera. Circa primum ponit sex opiniones hominum communes quae de sapientia habentur. Primam, ibi, primum itaque et cetera. Quae talis est: quod communiter omnes accipimus sapientem maxime scire omnia, sicut eum decet, non quod habeat notitiam de omnibus singularibus. Hoc enim est impossibile, cum singularia sint infinita, et infinita intellectu comprehendi non possint. 36. Having shown that wisdom is a knowledge of causes, the Philosopher’s aim here is to establish with what kinds of causes and what kinds of principles it is concerned. He shows that it is concerned with the most universal and primary causes, and he argues this from the definition of wisdom. In regard to this he does three things. First, he formulates a definition of wisdom from the different opinions which men have about the wise man and about wisdom. Second (44), he shows that all of these are proper to that universal science which considers first and universal causes (“Now of these”). Third (50), he draws the conclusion at which he aims (“In view of everything”). In regard to the first he gives six common opinions which men have entertained about wisdom. He states the first where he says “But since we are in search”; and this opinion is this: in general we all consider those especially to be wise who know all things, as the case demands, without having a knowledge of every singular thing. For this is impossible, since singular things are infinite in number, and an infinite number of things cannot be comprehended by the intellect.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit postea difficilia secundam ponit: et est ista, quod illum sapientem ponimus esse, qui est potens ex virtute sui intellectus cognoscere difficilia, et illa quae non sunt levia communiter hominibus ad sciendum; quia commune est omnibus sentire, idest sensibilia cognoscere. Unde hoc est facile, et non est sophon, idest aliquid sapientis et ad sapientem pertinens: et sic patet, quod id quod proprie ad sapientem pertinet, non leviter ab omnibus cognoscitur. 37. Next, we say that (15). Here he gives the second opinion, which is this: we hold that man to be wise who is capable, by reason of his intellect, of knowing difficult things, and those which are not easy for ordinary men to understand. For sensory perception, i.e., the knowing of sensible things, is common to all men, and is therefore easy and so not a matter of wisdom. That is to say, it is neither a mark nor the office of a wise man. Thus it is clear that whatever pertains properly to wisdom is not easily known by all.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit adhuc certiorem tertiam ponit: et est, quod nos dicimus illum sapientem esse qui de his quae scit, habet certitudinem magis quam alii communiter habeant. 38. Again, [we consider] (16). Here he gives the third opinion, namely, that we say that he is wise who, regarding what he knows, is more certain than other men generally are.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit et magis quartam ponit: et est talis. Illum dicimus magis sapientem in omni scientia, qui potest assignare causas cuiuslibet quaesiti, et per hoc docere. 39. And in every branch (17). Here he gives the fourth opinion, namely, that that man is said to be wiser in every science who can give the causes of anything that is brought into question, and can teach by means of this.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit sed et hanc quintam ponit: et est, quod illa de numero scientiarum est sapientia, quae per se est magis eligibilis et voluntaria, idest volita gratia scientiae, et propter ipsum scire, quam illa scientia, quae est causa quorumque aliorum contingentium quae possunt ex scientia generari; cuiusmodi est necessitas vitae, delectatio et huiusmodi alia. 40. Again, among the sciences (18). Here he gives the fifth opinion, which is this: among the many sciences that science which is more desirable and willed for its own sake, i.e., chosen for the sake of knowledge and for knowledge itself alone, is more of the nature of wisdom than one which is for the sake of any of the other contingent effects which can be caused by knowledge, such as the necessities of life, pleasure, and so forth.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit et hanc sextam ponit: et est talis, quod istam sapientiam, de qua facta est mentio, oportet esse vel dicimus esse magis antiquiorem, idest digniorem, famulante scientia. Quod quidem ex praehabitis intelligi potest. Nam in artibus mechanicis famulantes sunt illae, quae exequuntur manu operando praecepta superiorum artificum, quos supra architectores et sapientes nominavit. 41. And we think (19). Here he gives the sixth opinion, namely, that this wisdom, of which mention has been made, must be or is said to be “rather the more basic,” i.e., nobler, than “a subordinate science.” This can be understood from the foregoing. For in the field of the mechanical arts, subordinate artists are those who execute by manual operations the commands of superior artists, whom he referred to above as master artists and wise men.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 7 Et quod magis conveniat ratio sapientiae scientiis imperantibus quam famulantibus, probat per duo. Primo, quia scientiae famulantes ordinantur a superioribus scientiis. Artes enim famulantes ordinantur in finem superioris artis, sicut ars equestris ad finem militaris. Sed sapientem secundum omnem opinionem non decet ordinari ab alio, sed ipsum potius alios ordinare. Item inferiores architectores persuadentur a superioribus, inquantum credunt superioribus artificibus circa operanda vel fienda. Credit enim navisfactor gubernatori docenti qualis debet esse forma navis. Sapienti autem non convenit ut ab alio persuadeatur, sed quod ipse aliis persuadeat suam scientiam. 42. That the notion of wisdom belongs to sciences which give orders rather than to those which take them, he proves by two arguments. The first is that subordinate sciences are directed to superior sciences. For subordinate arts are directed to the end of a superior art, as the art of horsemanship to the end of the military art. But in the opinion of all it is not fitting that a wise man should be directed by someone else, but that he should direct others The second is that inferior artists are induced to act by superior artists inasmuch as they rely upon superior artists for the things which they must do or make. Thus the shipbuilder relies upon the instructions of the navigator for the kind of form which a ship ought to have. However, it does not befit a wise man that he should be induced to act by someone else, but that he should use his knowledge to induce others to act.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 8 Istae igitur sunt tales opiniones, quas homines accipiunt de sapientia et sapiente. Ex quibus omnibus potest quaedam sapientiae descriptio formari: ut ille sapiens dicatur, qui scit omnia etiam difficilia per certitudinem et causam, ipsum scire propter se quaerens, alios ordinans et persuadens. Et sic patet quasi maior syllogismi. Nam omnem sapientem oportet talem esse; et e converso, quicumque est talis, sapiens est. 43. These, then, are the kind of opinions which men have of wisdom and the wise; and from all of these a description of wisdom can be formulated, so that the wise man is described as one who knows all, even difficult matters, with certitude and through their cause; who seeks this knowledge for its own sake; and who directs others and induces them to act. And in this way the major premise of the syllogism becomes evident. For every wise man must be such, and conversely whoever is such is wise. These six attributes are found in the metaphysician.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit istorum autem ostendit quod omnia praedicta conveniunt ei qui cognoscit primas causas et universales; et eo ordine prosequitur quo supra posuit. Unde primo posuit quod habenti scientiam universalem maxime insit omnia scire; quod erat primum. Quod sic patet. Quicumque enim scit universalia, aliquo modo scit ea quae sunt subiecta universalibus, quia scit ea in illa: sed his quae sunt maxime universalia sunt omnia subiecta, ergo ille qui scit maxime universalia, scit quodammodo omnia. 44. Now of these (20). Here he shows that all of the above attributes come together in the man who knows the first and universal causes of things; and he follows the same order as he did above. Thus he held first that knowledge of all things in the highest degree belongs to him who has universal knowledge. This was the first opinion, and it is made clear in this way: Whoever knows universals knows in some respect the things which are subordinate to universals, because he knows the universal in them.’ But all things are subordinate to those which are most universal. Therefore the one who knows the most universal things, knows in a sense all things.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit sed fere autem ostendit eidem inesse secundum, tali ratione. Illa quae sunt maxime a sensibilibus remota, difficilia sunt hominibus ad cognoscendum; nam sensitiva cognitio est omnibus communis, cum ex ea omnis humana cognitio initium sumat. Sed illa quae sunt maxime universalia, sunt sensibilibus remotissima, eo quod sensus singularium sunt: ergo universalia sunt difficillima hominibus ad cognoscendum. Et sic patet quod illa scientia est difficillima, quae est maxime de universalibus. 45. But the things (21). Here he proves that the second attribute belongs to the same person, by the following argument. Those things which are farthest removed from the senses are difficult for men to know; for sensory perception is common to all men since all human knowledge originates with this. But those things which are most universal are farthest removed from sensible things, because the senses have to do with singular things. Hence universals are the most difficult for men to know. Thus it is clear that that science is the most difficult which is most concerned with universals.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 11 Sed contra hoc videtur esse quod habetur primo physicorum. Ibi enim dicitur quod magis universalia sunt nobis primo nota. Illa autem quae sunt primo nota, sunt magis facilia. Sed dicendum, quod magis universalia secundum simplicem apprehensionem sunt primo nota, nam primo in intellectu cadit ens, ut Avicenna dicit, et prius in intellectu cadit animal quam homo. Sicut enim in esse naturae quod de potentia in actum procedit prius est animal quam homo, ita in generatione scientiae prius in intellectu concipitur animal quam homo. Sed quantum ad investigationem naturalium proprietatum et causarum, prius sunt nota minus communia; eo quod per causas particulares, quae sunt unius generis vel speciei, pervenimus in causas universales. Ea autem quae sunt universalia in causando, sunt posterius nota quo ad nos, licet sint prius nota secundum naturam, quamvis universalia per praedicationem sint aliquo modo prius quo ad nos nota quam minus universalia, licet non prius nota quam singularia; nam cognitio sensus qui est cognoscitivus singularium, in nobis praecedit cognitionem intellectivam quae est universalium. Facienda est etiam vis in hoc quod maxime universalia non dicit simpliciter esse difficillima, sed fere. Illa enim quae sunt a materia penitus separata secundum esse, sicut substantiae immateriales, sunt magis difficilia nobis ad cognoscendum, quam etiam universalia: et ideo ista scientia, quae sapientia dicitur, quamvis sit prima in dignitate, est tamen ultima in addiscendo. 46. But the statement which appears in Book I of the Physics seems to contradict this. For it is said there that more universal things are known first by us; and those things which are known first are those which are easier. Yet it must be said that those things which are more universal according to simple apprehension are known first; for being is the first thing that comes into the intellect, as Avicenna says, and animal comes into the intellect before man does. For just as in the order of nature, which proceeds from potentiality to actuality, animal is prior to man, so too in the genesis of knowledge the intellect conceives animal before it conceives man. But with respect to the investigations of natural properties and causes, less universal things are known first, because we discover universal causes by means of the particular causes which belong to one genus or species. Now those things which are universal in causing are known subsequently by us (notwithstanding the fact that they are things which are primarily knowable according to their nature), although things which are universal by predication are known to us in some way before the less universal (notwithstanding the fact that they are not known prior to singular things). For in us sensory knowledge, which is cognitive of singular things, precedes intellective knowledge, which is about universals. And some importance must also be attached to the fact that he does not say that the most universal things are the most difficult absolutely, but “just about.” For those things which are entirely separate from matter in being, as immaterial substances, are more difficult for us to know than universals. Therefore, even though this science which is called wisdom is the first in dignity, it is still the last to be learned.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit scientiarum vero ostendit tertium eidem inesse, tali ratione. Quanto aliquae scientiae sunt priores naturaliter, tanto sunt certiores: quod ex hoc patet, quia illae scientiae, quae dicuntur ex additione ad alias, sunt minus certae scientiis quae pauciora in sua consideratione comprehendunt ut arithmetica certior est geometria, nam ea quae sunt in geometria, sunt ex additione ad ea quae sunt in arithmetica. Quod patet si consideremus quid utraque scientia considerat ut primum principium scilicet unitatem et punctum. Punctus enim addit supra unitatem situm: nam ens indivisibile rationem unitatis constituit: et haec secundum quod habet rationem mensurae, fit principium numeri. Punctus autem supra hoc addit situm. Sed scientiae particulares sunt posteriores secundum naturam universalibus scientiis, quia subiecta earum addunt ad subiecta scientiarum universalium: sicut patet, quod ens mobile de quo est naturalis philosophia, addit supra ens simpliciter, de quo est metaphysica, et supra ens quantum de quo est mathematica: ergo scientia illa quae est de ente, et maxime universalibus, est certissima. Nec illud est contrarium, quia dicitur esse ex paucioribus, cum supra dictum sit, quod sciat omnia. Nam universale quidem comprehendit pauciora in actu, sed plura in potentia. Et tanto aliqua scientia est certior, quanto ad sui subiecti considerationem pauciora actu consideranda requiruntur. Unde scientiae operativae sunt incertissimae, quia oportet quod considerent multas singularium operabilium circumstantias. 47. Again, the most certain (22). Here he shows that the third attribute belongs to the same science, by this argument: the more any sciences are prior by nature, the more certain they are. This is clear from the fact that those sciences which are said to originate as a result of adding something to the other sciences are less certain than those which take fewer things into consideration; for example, arithmetic is more certain than geometry because the objects considered in geometry are a result of adding to those considered in arithmetic. This becomes evident if we consider what these two sciences take as their first principle, namely, the point and the unit. For the point adds to the unit the notion of position, because undivided being constitutes the intelligible structure of the unit; and insofar as this has the function of a measure it becomes the principle of number. And the point adds to this the notion of position. However, particular sciences are subsequent in nature to universal sciences, because their subjects add something to the subjects of universal sciences. For example, it is evident that mobile being, with which the philosophy of nature deals, adds to being pure and simple, with which metaphysics is concerned, and to quantified being, with which mathematics is concerned. Hence that science which treats of being and the most universal things is the most certain. Moreover, the statement here that this science deals with fewer principles is not opposed to the one made above, that it knows all things; for the universal takes in fewer inferiors actually, but many potentially. And the more certain a science is, the fewer actual things it has to consider in investigating its subject-matter. Hence the practical sciences are the least certain, because they must consider the many circumstances attending individual effects.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit est et doctrinalis ostendit quartum eidem inesse, tali ratione. Illa scientia est magis doctrix vel doctrinalis, quae magis considerat causas: illi enim soli docent, qui causas de singulis dicunt; quia scire per causam est, et docere est scientiam in aliquo causare. Sed illa scientia quae universalia considerat, causas primas omnium causarum considerat: unde patet quod ipsa est maxime doctrix. 48. Moreover, that science (23). Here he proves that the fourth attribute belongs to the same science, by this argument: that science is more instructive, or better able to teach, which is concerned to a greater degree with causes. For only those teach who assign the causes of every single thing, because scientific knowledge comes about through some cause, and to teach is to cause knowledge in another. But that science which considers universals considers the first of all the causes. Hence it is evidently the best fitted to teach.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit et noscere ostendit quintum eidem inesse, tali ratione. Illarum scientiarum maxime est scire et cognoscere earum causa, idest propter seipsas et non propter alias, quae sunt de maxime scibilibus: sed illae scientiae quae sunt de primis causis, sunt de maxime scibilibus: igitur illae scientiae maxime sui gratia desiderantur. Primam sic probat. Qui desiderat scire propter scire, magis desiderat scientiam: sed maxima scientia est de maxime scibilibus: ergo illae scientiae sunt magis desideratae propter seipsas quae sunt de magis scibilibus. Secundam probat sic. Illa, ex quibus et propter quae alia cognoscuntur, sunt magis scibilia his quae per ea cognoscuntur: sed per causas et principia alia cognoscuntur et non e converso, et cetera. 49. Again, understanding (24). Here he proves that the fifth attribute belongs to the same science, by this argument: it is the office of those sciences which deal with things that are most knowable, most properly to know and understand for their own sake, i.e., for the sake of those sciences themselves and not for something else. But it is the sciences that deal with first causes which consider the most knowable things. Therefore those sciences are desired most for their own sake. He proves the first premise thus: One who most desires knowledge for the sake of knowledge most desires scientific knowledge. But the highest kind of knowledge is concerned with things that are most knowable. Therefore those sciences are desired most for their own sake which have to do with things that are most knowable. He proves the second premise thus: Those things from which and by reason of which other things are known are more knowable than the things which are known by means of them. But these other things are known through causes and principles, and not vice versa, etc.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 15 Deinde cum dicit maxime vero ostendit sextum inesse eidem: et est ratio talis. Illa scientia se habet ad alias ut principalis, sive ut architectonica ad servilem sive ad famulantem, quae considerat causam finalem, cuius causa agenda sunt singula; sicut apparet in his, quae supra diximus. Nam gubernator, ad quem pertinet usus navis, qui est finis navis, est quasi architector respectu navisfactoris, qui ei famulatur. Sed praedicta scientia maxime considerat causam finalem rerum omnium. Quod ex hoc patet, quia hoc cuius causa agendo sunt singula, est bonum uniuscuiusque, idest particulare bonum. Finis autem bonum est in unoquoque genere. Id vero, quod est finis omnium, idest ipsi universo, est hoc quod est optimum in tota natura: et hoc pertinet ad considerationem praedictae scientiae: ergo praedicta est principalis, sive architectonica omnium aliarum. 50. But that science (25). Here he proves that the sixth attribute belongs to the same science, by the following argument: that science which considers the final cause, or that for the sake of which particular things are done, is related to the other sciences as a chief or master science is to a subordinate or ancillary one, as is evident from the foregoing remarks. For the navigator, to whom the use, or end, of the ship belongs, is a kind of master artist in relation to the shipbuilder who serves him. But the aforesaid science is concerned most with the final cause of all things. This is dear from the fact that that for the sake of which all particular things are done is the good of each, i.e., a particular good. But the end in any class of things is a good; and that which is the end of all things, i.e., of the universe itself, is the greatest good in the whole of nature. Now this belongs to the consideration of the science in question, and therefore it is the chief or architectonic science with reference to all the others.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 16 Deinde cum dicit ex omnibus concludit ex praedictis conclusionem intentam; dicens, quod ex omnibus praedictis apparet, quod in eamdem scientiam cadit nomen sapientiae, quod quaerimus; scilicet in illam scientiam, quae est theorica, idest speculativa primorum principiorum et causarum. Hoc autem manifestum est quantum ad sex primas conditiones, quae manifeste pertinent consideranti universales causas. Sed, quia sexta conditio tangebat finis considerationem, quae apud antiquos non manifeste ponebatur esse causa, ut infra dicetur; ideo specialiter ostendit, quod haec conditio est eiusdem scientiae, quae scilicet est considerativa primarum causarum; quia videlicet ipse finis, qui est bonum, et cuius causa fiunt alia, est una de numero causarum. Unde scientia, quae considerat primas et universales causas, oportet etiam quod consideret universalem finem omnium, quod est optimum in tota natura. 51. In view of everything (26). Here he draws from the foregoing arguments his intended conclusion, saying that it is clear from everything that has been said that the name wisdom which we are investigating belongs to the same science which considers or speculates about first principles and causes. This is evident from the six primary conditions which clearly pertain to the science that considers universal causes. But because the sixth condition touched on the consideration of the end, which was not clearly held to be a cause among the ancient philosophers, as will be said below (1177), he therefore shows in a special way that this condition belongs to the same science, namely, the one which considers first causes. For the end, which is a good and that for the sake of which other things are done, is one of the many causes. Hence the science which considers first and universal causes must also be the one which considers the universal end of all things, which is the greatest good in the whole of nature.

Lecture 3

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 1 Ostenso circa quae versatur consideratio huius scientiae, ostendit qualis sit scientia ista. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit dignitatem huius scientiae. Secundo ostendit ad quem terminum ista scientia pervenire conetur, ibi, oportet vero aliqualiter et cetera. Circa primum facit quatuor. Primo ostendit quod non est scientia activa, sed speculativa. Secundo, quod ipsa est libera maxime, ibi, sed ut dicimus et cetera. Tertio, quod non est humana, ibi, propter quod et iuste. Quarto, quod est honorabilissima, ibi, nec ea aliam. Primum ostendit dupliciter. Primo per rationem. Secundo per signum, ibi, testatur autem hoc et cetera.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 2 Primo ergo ponit talem rationem. Nulla scientia in qua quaeritur ipsum scire propter seipsum, est scientia activa, sed speculativa: sed illa scientia, quae sapientia est, vel philosophia dicitur, est propter ipsum scire: ergo est speculativa et non activa. Minorem hoc modo manifestat. Quicumque quaerit fugere ignorantiam sicut finem, tendit ad ipsum scire propter seipsum: sed illi, qui philosophantur, quaerunt fugere ignorantiam sicut finem: ergo tendunt in ipsum scire propter seipsum. 53. First, he gives this argument. No science in which knowledge itself is sought for its own sake is a practical science, but a speculative one. Bot that science which is wisdom, or philosophy as it is called, exists for the sake of knowledge itself. Hence it is speculative and not practical. He proves the minor premise in this way. Whoever seeks as an end to escape from ignorance tends toward knowledge for itself. But those who philosophize seek as an end to escape from ignorance. Therefore they tend towards knowledge for itself.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 3 Quod autem ignorantiam fugere quaerant, patet ex hoc, quia illi, qui primo philosophati sunt, et qui nunc philosophantur, incipiunt philosophari propter admirationem alicuius causae: aliter tamen a principio, et modo: quia a principio admirabantur dubitabilia pauciora, quae magis erant in promptu, ut eorum causae cognoscerentur: sed postea ex cognitione manifestorum ad inquisitionem occultorum paulatim procedentes incoeperunt dubitare de maioribus et occultioribus, sicut de passionibus lunae, videlicet de eclypsi eius, et mutatione figurae eius, quae variari videtur, secundum quod diversimode se habet ad solem. Et similiter dubitaverunt de his quae sunt circa solem, ut de eclypsi eius, et motu ipsius, et magnitudine eius. Et de his quae sunt circa astra, sicut de quantitate ipsorum, et ordine, et aliis huiusmodi, et de totius universi generatione. Quod quidam dicebant esse generatum casu, quidam intellectu, quidam amore. 54. That they seek to escape from ignorance is made clear from the fact that those who first philosophized and who now philosophize did so from wonder about some cause, although they did this at first differently than now. For at first they wondered about less important problems, which were more obvious, in order that they might know their cause; but later on, progressing little by little from the knowledge of more evident matters to the investigation of obscure ones, they began to raise questions about more important and hidden matters, such as the changes undergone by the moon, namely, its eclipse, and its change of shape, which seems to vary inasmuch as it stands in different relations to the sun. And similarly they raised questions about the phenomena of the sun, such as its eclipse, its movement and size; and about the phenomena of the stars, such as their size, arrangement, and so forth; and about the origin of the whole universe, which some said was produced by chance, others by an intelligence, and others by love.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 4 Constat autem, quod dubitatio et admiratio ex ignorantia provenit. Cum enim aliquos manifestos effectus videamus, quorum causa nos latet, eorum tunc causam admiramur. Et ex quo admiratio fuit causa inducens ad philosophiam, patet quod philosophus est aliqualiter philomythes, idest amator fabulae, quod proprium est poetarum. Unde primi, qui per modum quemdam fabularem de principiis rerum tractaverunt, dicti sunt poetae theologizantes, sicut fuit Perseus, et quidam alii, qui fuerunt septem sapientes. Causa autem, quare philosophus comparatur poetae, est ista, quia uterque circa miranda versatur. Nam fabulae, circa quas versantur poetae, ex quibusdam mirabilibus constituuntur. Ipsi etiam philosophi ex admiratione moti sunt ad philosophandum. Et quia admiratio ex ignorantia provenit, patet quod ad hoc moti sunt ad philosophandum ut ignorantiam effugarent. Et sic deinde patet, quod scientiam, persecuti sunt, idest studiose quaesierunt, solum ad cognoscendum, et non causa alicuius usus idest utilitatis. 55. Further, he points out that perplexity and wonder arise from ignorance. For when we see certain obvious effects whose cause we do not know, we wonder about their cause. And since wonder was the motive which led men to philosophy, it is evident that the philosopher is, in a sense, a philo-myth, i.e., a lover of myth, as is characteristic of the poets. Hence the first men to deal with the principles of things in a mythical way, such as Perseus and certain others who were the seven sages, were called the theologizing poets. Now the reason why the philosopher is compared to the poet is that both are concerned with wonders. For the myths with which the poets deal are composed of wonders, and the philosophers themselves were moved to philosophize as a result of wonder. And since wonder stems from ignorance, they were obviously moved to philosophize in order to escape from ignorance. It is accordingly evident from this that “they pursued” knowledge, or diligently sought it, only for itself and not for any utility or usefulness.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 5 Notandum est autem, quod cum prius nomine sapientiae uteretur, nunc ad nomen philosophiae se transfert. Nam pro eodem accipiuntur. Cum enim antiqui studio sapientiae insistentes sophistae, idest sapientes vocarentur, Pythagoras interrogatus quid se esse profiteretur, noluit se sapientem nominare, sicut sui antecessores, quia hoc praesumptuosum videbatur esse; sed vocavit se philosophum, idest amatorem sapientiae. Et exinde nomen sapientis immutatum est in nomen philosophi, et nomen sapientiae in nomen philosophiae. Quod etiam nomen ad propositum aliquid facit. Nam ille videtur sapientiae amator, qui sapientiam non propter aliud, sed propter seipsam quaerit. Qui enim aliquid propter alterum quaerit, magis hoc amat propter quod quaerit, quam quod quaerit. 56. Now we must note that, while this science was first designated by the name wisdom, this was later changed to the name philosophy, since they mean the same thing. For while the ancients who pursued the study of wisdom were called sophists, i.e., wise men, Pythagoras, when asked what he professed himself to be, refused to call himself a wise man as his predecessors had done, because he thought this was presumptuous, but called himself a philosopher, i.e., a lover of wisdom. And from that time the name “wise man” was changed to “philosopher,” and “wisdom” to “philosophy.” This name also contributes something to the point under discussion, for that man seems to be a lover of wisdom who seeks wisdom, not for some other reason, but for itself alone. For he who seeks one thing on account of something else, has greater love for that on whose account he seeks than for that which he seeks.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit testatur autem probat idem per signum; dicens, quod hoc quod dictum est, scilicet quod sapientia vel philosophia non sit propter aliquam utilitatem quaesita, sed propter ipsam scientiam, testatur accidens, idest eventus, qui circa inquisitores philosophiae provenit. Nam cum eis cuncta fere existerent, quae sunt ad necessitatem vitae, et quae sunt ad pigritiam, idest ad voluptatem, quae in quadam vitae quiete consistit, et quae sunt etiam ad eruditionem necessaria, sicut scientiae logicales, quae non propter se quaeruntur, sed ut introductoriae ad alias artes, tunc primo incoepit quaeri talis prudentia, idest sapientia. Ex quo patet, quod non quaeritur propter aliquam necessitatem aliam a se, sed propter seipsam: nullus enim quaerit hoc quod habetur. Unde, quia omnibus aliis habitis ipsa quaesita est, patet quod non propter aliquid aliud ipsa quaesita est, sed propter seipsam. 57. And what has happened (28). Here he proves the same point by means of an example. The statement (he says) that wisdom or philosophy is not sought for any utility but for knowledge itself is proved by “what has happened,” i.e., by what has occurred in the case of those who have pursued philosophy. For when nearly all those [arts] were discovered which are necessary for life, “leisure” (i.e., for the sort of pleasure which consists in a life of ease), and learning, such as the logical sciences, which are not sought for themselves but as introductions to the other arts, then man began for the first time to seek this kind of prudence, namely, wisdom. And from this it is clear that wisdom is not sought because of any necessity other than itself but for itself a one; for no one seeks something which he already possesses. Hence, because wisdom was sought after all other knowledge had been discovered, it is evident that it was not sought for some reason other than itself but for itself.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit sed ut dicimus hic probat secundum, scilicet quod ipsa sit libera; et utitur tali ratione. Ille homo proprie dicitur liber, qui non est alterius causa, sed est causa suiipsius. Servi enim dominorum sunt, et propter dominos operantur, et eis acquirunt quicquid acquirunt. Liberi autem homines sunt suiipsorum, utpote sibi acquirentes et operantes. Sola autem haec scientia est propter seipsam: ergo ipsa sola est libera inter scientias. 58. But just as (29). Here he proves the second attribute, namely, that wisdom is free; and he uses the following argument: that man is properly said to be free who does not exist for someone else but for himself. For slaves exist for their masters, work for them, and acquire for them whatever they acquire. But free men exist for themselves inasmuch as they acquire things for themselves and work for themselves. But only this science exists for itself; and therefore among all the sciences only this science is free.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 8 Et notandum, quod hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo quod hoc quod dicitur haec sola demonstret in genere omnem scientiam speculativam. Et tunc verum est quod solum hoc genus scientiarum propter seipsum quaeritur. Unde et illae solae artes liberales dicuntur, quae ad sciendum ordinantur: illae vero quae ordinantur ad aliquam utilitatem per actionem habendam, dicuntur mechanicae sive serviles. Alio modo, ut demonstret specialiter istam philosophiam, sive sapientiam, quae est circa altissimas causas; quia inter causas altissimas etiam est finalis causa, ut supra dictum est. Unde oportet, quod haec scientia consideret ultimum et universalem finem omnium. Et sic omnes aliae scientiae in eam ordinantur sicut in finem; unde sola ista maxime propter se est. 59. Now we must note that this can be understood in two ways. In one way, the expression “only this” may indicate every speculative science as a class. And then it is true that only this class of science is sought for itself. Hence, only those arts which are directed to knowing are called free [or liberal] arts, whereas those which are directed to some useful end attained by action are called mechanical or servile arts. Understood in another way, the expression may specifically indicate this philosophy or wisdom which deals with the highest causes; for the final cause is also one of the highest causes, as was stated above (51). Therefore this science must consider the highest and universal end of all things. And in this way all the other sciences are subordinated to it as an end. Hence only this science exists in the highest degree for itself. Why this science is super-human
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit propter quod hic probat tertium scilicet quod non sit humana. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo excludit quorumdam errorem, ibi, quare secundum Simonidem et cetera. Ostendit autem propositum suum tali ratione. Scientia, quae est maxime libera, non potest esse ut possessio naturae illius, quae multipliciter est ministra vel ancilla: humana autem natura in multis, idest quantum ad multa est ministra: ergo praedicta scientia non est humana possessio. Dicitur autem humana natura ministra, inquantum multipliciter necessitatibus subditur. Ex quo provenit, quod quandoque praetermittit id quod est secundum se quaerendum, propter ea quae sunt necessaria vitae; sicut dicitur in tertio topicorum, quod philosophari melius est quam ditari, licet ditari quandoque sit magis eligendum, puta indigenti necessariis. Ex quo patet, quod illa sapientia tantum propter seipsam quaeritur, quae non competit homini ut possessio. Illud enim habetur ab homine ut possessio, quod ad nutum habere potest, et quo libere potest uti. Ea autem scientia, quae propter se tantum quaeritur, homo non potest libere uti, cum frequenter ab ea impediatur propter vitae necessitatem. Nec etiam ad nutum subest homini, cum ad eam perfecte homo pervenire non possit. Illud tamen modicum quod ex ea habetur, praeponderat omnibus quae per alias scientias cognoscuntur. 60. For this reason (30). Here he proves the third attribute, namely, that this science is not a human [possession]. In regard to this he does two things. First, he proves his thesis. Second (61), he criticizes an erroneous view held by certain men (“Hence, according to Simonides”). He proves his thesis by the following argument. A science which is free in the highest degree cannot be a possession of that nature which is servile and subordinate in many respects. But human nature is servile “in many respects,” i.e., in many ways. Therefore this science is not a human possession. Now human nature is said to be servile insofar as it stands in need of many things. And on this account it happens that man sometimes neglects what should be sought for its own sake because of the things necessary for life. Thus it is said in Book III of the Topics that it is better to philosophize than to become wealthy, although sometimes becoming wealthy is more desirable, that is, to one lacking life’s necessities. From this it is clear that that wisdom is sought for itself alone which does not belong to man as his proper possession. For man has as his possession what he can have at his command and use freely. But that science which is sought for itself alone, man cannot use freely, since he is often kept from it because of the necessities of life. Nor again is it subject to man’s command, because man cannot acquire it perfectly. Yet that very small part of it which he does have outweighs all the things known through the other sciences.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit quare secundum hic excludit errorem cuiusdam Simonidis poetae, qui dicebat, quod soli Deo competit hunc honorem habere, quod velit illam scientiam, quae est propter seipsam quaerenda, et non propter aliud. Sed non est dignum viro, quod non quaerat illam scientiam quae est secundum suam conditionem, quae scilicet ordinatur ad necessaria vitae, quibus homo indiget. 61. Hence, according to Simonides (31). Here he rejects the error of a certain poet, Simonides, who said that it is proper to God alone to have the honor of desiring that knowledge which ought to be sought for its own sake and not for the sake of something else. But it is not fitting that man should not seek that knowledge which is in keeping with his own condition, namely, that which is directed to the necessities of life required by man.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 11 Iste autem error Simonidis proveniebat ex aliquorum poetarum errore, qui dicebant, quod res divina invidet, et ex invidia ea quae ad honorem suum pertinent non vult Deus ab omnibus acceptari. Et si in aliis Deus hominibus invidet, multo magis est iustum in hoc, scilicet in scientia propter se quaesita, quae est honorabilissima inter omnia. Et secundum eorum opinionem, sequitur, quod omnes imperfecti sunt infortunati. Fortunatos enim esse homines dicebant ex providentia deorum, qui eis bona sua communicabant. Unde ex invidia deorum sua bona communicare nolentium, sequitur, quod homines extra perfectionem huius scientiae remanentes sint infortunati. 62. Now Simonides’ error came from that of certain poets who said that the Deity is envious, and that since He is envious He does not desire that the things which pertain to His honor should be shared by all. And if God is envious of men in other things, He is rightly more so in this case, i.e., in the case of the science which is sought for its own sake, which is the most honorable of all the sciences. And according to the opinion of these men it follows that all who are imperfect are unfortunate’ for they said that men are fortunate as a result of the providence of the gods, who communicate their goods to men. Hence as a result of the envy of the gods, who are unwilling to communicate their goods, it follows that men, who remain outside the perfection of this science, are unfortunate.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 12 Sed radix huius opinionis est falsissima; quia non est conveniens, quod aliqua res divina invideat. Quod ex hoc patet, quia invidia est tristitia de prosperitate alicuius. Quod quidem accidere non potest, nisi quia bonum alterius aestimatur ab invido ut proprii boni diminutio. Deo autem non convenit esse tristem, cum non sit alicui malo subiectus. Nec etiam per bonum alterius eius bonum diminui potest; quia ex eius bonitate, sicut ex indeficienti fonte, omnia bona effluunt. Unde etiam Plato dixit, quod a Deo est omnis relegata invidia. Sed poetae non solum in hoc, sed in multis aliis mentiuntur, sicut dicitur in proverbio vulgari. 63. But the basis of this opinion is most false, because it is not fitting that any divine being should be envious. This is evident from the fact that envy is sadness at someone else’s prosperity. But this can occur only because the one who is envious thinks that someone else’s good diminishes his own. Now it is impossible that God’ should be sad, because He is not subject to evil of any kind. Nor can His goodness be diminished by someone else’s goodness, since every good flows from His goodness as from an unfailing spring. Hence Plato also said that there is no envy of any kind in God.’ But the poets have lied not only in this matter but in many others, as is stated in the common proverb. Why this science is most honorable
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit nec ea aliam ostendit quartum, scilicet quod haec scientia sit honorabilissima, tali ratione. Illa scientia est maxime honorabilis, quae est maxime divina, sicut etiam Deus honorabilior est rebus omnibus: sed ista scientia est maxime divina: ergo est honorabilissima. Minor sic probatur. Aliqua scientia dicitur esse divina dupliciter; et haec sola scientia utroque modo divina dicitur. Uno modo scientia divina dicitur quam Deus habet. Alio modo, quia est de rebus divinis. Quod autem haec sola habeat utrumque, est manifestum; quia, cum haec scientia sit de primis causis et principiis, oportet quod sit de Deo; quia Deus hoc modo intelligitur ab omnibus, ut de numero causarum existens, et ut quoddam principium rerum. Item talem scientiam, quae est de Deo et de primis causis, aut solus Deus habet, aut si non solus, ipse tamen maxime habet. Solus quidem habet secundum perfectam comprehensionem. Maxime vero habet, inquantum suo modo etiam ab hominibus habetur, licet ab eis non ut possessio habeatur, sed sicut aliquid ab eo mutuatum. 64. Nor must we think (32). Here he proves the fourth attribute, namely, that this is the most honorable science, by the following argument. That science which is most divine is most honorable, just as God Himself is also the most honorable of all things. But this science is the most divine, and is therefore the most honorable. The minor premise is proved in this way: a science is said to be divine in two ways, and only this science is said to be divine in both ways. First, the science which God has is said to be divine; and second, the science which is about divine matters is said to be divine. But it is evident that only this science meets both of these requirements, because, since this science is about first causes and principles, it must be about God; for God is understood in this way by all inasmuch as He is one of the causes and a principle of things. Again, such a science which is about God and first causes, either God alone has or, if not He alone, at least He has it in the highest degree. Indeed, He alone has it in a perfectly comprehensive way. And He has it in the highest degree inasmuch as it is also had by men in their own way, although it is not had by them as a human possession, but as something borrowed from Him.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 14 Ex his autem ulterius concludit, quod omnes aliae scientiae sunt necessariae magis quam ista ad aliquam vitae utilitatem: minus enim sunt propter se quaesitae. Sed nulla aliarum dignior ista potest esse. 65. From these considerations he draws the further conclusion that all other sciences are more necessary than this science for use in practical life, for these sciences are sought least of all for themselves. But none of the other sciences can be more excellent than this one. The relation between wonder and wisdom
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 15 Deinde cum dicit oportet vero hic ponit terminum, in quem proficit ista scientia; et dicit quod ordo eius consistit vel terminatur ad contrarium eius quod erat in illis qui prius istam scientiam quaerebant. Sicut etiam in generationibus naturalibus et motibus accidit. Nam unusquisque motus terminatur ad contrarium eius a quo motus incipit. Unde, cum inquisitio sit motus quidam ad scientiam, oportet quod terminetur ad contrarium eius a quo incipit. Initiata est autem (ut praedictum est) inquisitio huius scientiae ab admiratione de omnibus: quia primi admirabantur pauciora, posteriores vero occultiora. Quae quidem admiratio erat, si res ita se haberet sicut automata mirabilia, idest quae videntur mirabiliter a casu accidere. Automata enim dicuntur quasi per se accidentia. Admirantur enim homines praecipue quando aliqua a casu eveniunt hoc modo, ac si essent praevisa vel ex aliqua causa determinata. Casualia enim non a causa sunt determinata, et admiratio est propter ignorantiam causae. Et ideo cum homines nondum poterant speculari causas rerum, admirabantur omnia quasi quaedam casualia. Sicut admirantur circa conversiones solis, quae sunt duae; scilicet duos tropicos, hyemalem et aestivalem. Nam in tropico aestivali incipit sol converti versus meridiem, cum prius versus Septemtrionem tenderet. In tropico autem hyemali e converso. Et etiam circa hoc quod diameter non est commensurabilis lateri quadrati. Cum enim non mensurari videatur esse solius indivisibilis, sicut sola unitas est quae non mensuratur a numero, sed ipsa omnes numeros mensurat, mirum videtur si aliquid quod non est indivisibile non mensuratur; ac per hoc id quod non est minimum non mensuratur. Constat autem, quod diametrum quadrati et latus eius non sunt indivisibilia, sive minima. Unde mirum videtur si non sunt commensurabilia. 66. But it is necessary (33). He now gives the goal toward which this science moves. He says that its progression comes to rest, or is terminated, in the contrary of what was previously found in those who first sought this science, as also happens in the case of natural generations and motions. For each motion is terminated in the contrary of that from which the motion begins. Hence, since investigation is a kind of movement towards knowledge, it must be terminated in the contrary of that from which it begins. But, as was stated above (53), the investigation of this science began with man’s wonder about all things, because the first philosophers wondered about less important matters and subsequent philosophers about more hidden ones. And the object of their wonder was whether the case was like that of strange chance occurrences, i.e., things which seem to happen mysteriously by chance. For things which happen as if by themselves are called chance occurrences. For men wonder most of all when things happen by chance in this way, supposing that they were foreseen or determined by some cause. For chance occurrences are not determined by a cause, and wonder results from ignorance of a cause. Therefore when men were not yet able to recognize the causes of things, they wondered about all things as if they were chance occurrences; just as they wondered about changes in the course of the sun, which are two in number, namely, the solstices, that of winter and that of summer. For at the summer solstice the sun begins to decline toward the south, after previously declining toward the north. But at the winter solstice the opposite occurs. And they wondered also that the diagonal of a square is not commensurable with a side. For since to be immeasurable seems to belong to the indivisible alone (just as unity alone is what is not measured by number but itself measures all numbers), it seems to be a matter of wonder that something which is not indivisible is immeasurable, and consequently that what is not a smallest part is immeasurable. Now it is evident that the diagonal of a square and its side are neither indivisible nor smallest parts. Hence it seems a matter of wonder if they are not commensurable.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 16 Cum ergo philosophiae inquisitio ab admiratione incipiat, oportet ad contrarium finire vel proficere; et ad id proficere quod est dignius, ut proverbium vulgare concordat, quo dicitur, quod semper proficere est in melius. Quid enim sit illud contrarium et dignius, patet in praedictis mirabilibus; quia quando iam homines discunt causas praedictorum, non mirantur. Ut geometer non admiratur si diameter sit incommensurabilis lateri. Scit enim causam huius; quia scilicet proportio quadrati diametri ad quadratum lateris non est sicut proportio numeri quadrati ad numerum quadratum, sed sicut proportio duorum ad unum. Unde relinquitur, quod proportio lateris ad diametrum non sit sicut proportio numeri ad numerum. Et ex hoc patet quod commensurari non possunt. Illae enim solae lineae sunt commensurabiles, quarum proportio ad invicem est sicut proportio numeri ad numerum. Erit ergo finis huius scientiae in quem proficere debemus, ut causas cognoscentes, non admiremur de earum effectibus. 67. Therefore, since philosophical investigation began with wonder, it must end in or arrive at the contrary of this, and this is to advance to the worthier view, as the common proverb agrees, which states that one must always advance to the better. For what that opposite and worthier view is, is evident in the case of the above wonders, because when men have already learned the causes of these things they do not wonder. Thus the geometrician does not wonder if the diagonal is incommensurable with a side. For he knows the reason for this, namely, that the proportion of the square of the diagonal to the square of a side is not as the proportion of the square of a number to the square of a number, but as the proportion of two to one. Hence it follows that the proportion of a side to the diagonal is not as the proportion of number to number. And from this it is evident that they cannot be made commensurable. For only those lines are commensurable which are proportioned to each other as number to number. Hence the goal of this science to which we should advance will be that in knowing the causes of things we do not wonder about their effects.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 17 Patet igitur ex praedictis quae sit natura huius scientiae, quia est speculativa, libera, non humana, sed divina: et quae est eius intentio, qua oportet habere quaestionem et totam methodum et totam hanc artem. Intendit enim circa primas et universales rerum causas, de quibus etiam inquirit et determinat. Et propter harum cognitionem ad praedictum terminum pervenit, ut scilicet non admiretur cognitis causis. 68. From what has been said, then, it is evident what the nature of this science is, namely, that it is speculative and free, and that it is not a human possession but a divine one; and also what its aim is, for which the whole inquiry, method, and art must be conducted. For its goal is the first and universal causes of things, about which it also makes investigations and establishes the truth. And by reason of the knowledge of these it reaches this goal, namely, that there should be no wonder because the causes of things are known.

Lecture 4

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 1 Posito prooemio, in quo ostendit intentionem huius scientiae et dignitatem et terminum, incipit prosequi scientiam praefatam: et dividitur in duas partes. Primo ostendit quid priores philosophi de causis rerum tradiderunt. Secundo veritatem huius scientiae incipit prosequi in secundo libro, ibi, de veritate quidem theoria et cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in duas. Primo ponit opiniones philosophorum de causis rerum. Secundo improbat eas quantum ad hoc quod male dixerunt ibi, ergo quicumque et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo resumit enumerationem causarum, quam in secundo physicorum diffusius fuerat prosecutus. Secundo prosequitur opinionem philosophorum, ibi, accipiemus tamen et cetera. 69. Having set forth a preface in which he indicates the aim of this science, its dignity and goal, Aristotle begins to deal with this science; and this is divided into two parts. In the first (70), he explains what the first philosophers had to say about the causes of things. In the second (274), he begins to pursue the truth of this science. He does this in Book II (“Theoretical, i.e., speculative, knowledge”). The first part is divided into two members. First, he gives the opinions of the philosophers about the causes of things. Second (181), he criticizes them insofar as their statements are unsatisfactory (“Therefore all those”). In regard to the firsthe does two things. First, he takes up again the enumeration of causes which was treated in greater detail in Book II of the Physics. Second (72), he presents the opinions of the philosophers (“However, let us examine”). The four causes, & three characteristics of final cause
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 2 Dicit ergo, quod quia hoc manifestum est, scilicet quod sapientia est causarum speculatrix, debemus incipere a causis rerum scientiam sumendo. Quod etiam ex ratione scientiae congruum videtur; quia tunc unumquodque scire dicimus aliquem, quando putamus non ignorare causam. Causae autem quadrupliciter dicuntur: quarum una est ipsa causa formalis, quae est ipsa substantia rei, per quam scitur quid est unaquaeque res. Constat enim, ut dictum est secundo physicorum, quod non dicimus aliquid esse alicuius naturae priusquam acceperit formam. Et quod forma sit causa, patet; quia quaestionem qua dicitur quare est aliquid, reducimus tamquam ad rationem ultimam ad causam formalem, incipiendo a formis proximis et procedendo usque ad ultimam. Patet autem, quod quare quaerit de causa et principio. Unde patet quod forma est causa. Alia vero causa est materialis. Tertia vero causa est efficiens, quae est unde principium motus. Quarta causa est finalis, quae opponitur causae efficienti secundum oppositionem principii et finis. Nam motus incipit a causa efficiente, et terminatur ad causam finalem. Et hoc est etiam cuius causa fit aliquid, et quae est bonum uniuscuiusque naturae. 70. Accordingly, he says, first, that since it is evident that wisdom speculates about causes, we ought to begin by acquiring knowledge from the causes of things. This also seems to be in keeping with the intelligible structure of science, because we say that we know each thing scientifically when we think we are not ignorant of its cause. Now causes are spoken of in four ways. (1) One of these is the formal cause, which is the very substance of a thing by which we know what each thing is. For it is well known, as is stated in Book II of the Physics, that we do not say that anything has a nature before it has received a form. Now it is clear that a form is a cause, because the question “Why is something so?” we reduce to its formal cause as its ultimate explanation, beginning with proximate forms and proceeding to the ultimate form. But evidently the “why?” asks about a cause and principle. Hence it is evident that a form is a cause. (2) A second cause is the material cause. (3) A third is the efficient cause, which is the source of motion. (4) A fourth is the final cause, which is opposite to the efficient cause as a goal is to a starting-point; for motion begins with the efficient cause and terminates with the final cause. This [latter] cause is also that for the sake of which a thing comes to be, and the good of each nature.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 3 Sic igitur causam finalem per tria notificat; scilicet quia est terminus motus, et per hoc opponitur principio motus, quod est causa efficiens: et quia est primum in intentione, ratione cuius dicitur cuius causa: et quia est per se appetibile, ratione cuius dicitur bonum. Nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Unde exponens quo modo causa finalis efficienti opponatur, dicit quod est finis generationis et motus, quorum principium est causa efficiens. Per quae duo videtur duplicem finem insinuare. Nam finis generationis est forma ipsa, quae est pars rei. Finis autem motus est aliquid quaesitum extra rem quae movetur. De his dicit sufficienter se tractasse in libro physicorum, ne ab eo ad praesens diffusior expositio causarum quaereretur. 71. He makes the final cause known by three considerations: (1) It is the goal of motion, and thus is opposite to the source of motion, which is the efficient cause. (2) It is first in intention, and for this reason is said to be that for the sake of which [something is done]. (3) It is desirable of itself, and for this reason is called a good; for the good is what all desire. Hence, in explaining how the final cause is opposite to the efficient cause, he says that it is the goal [or end] of every process of generation and motion, whose starting-point is the efficient cause. By these two types of change he seems to imply that there is a twofold goal: (1) For the goal of a process of generation is the form itself, which is a part of a thing. (2) But the goal of motion is something sought for outside the thing moved. He says that he has treated these causes at sufficient length in the Physics, lest he should be asked to make a more extensive treatment of them.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit accipiemus tamen hic ponit opinionem philosophorum de causis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo assignat rationem, quare hoc faciendum sit. Secundo incipit prosequi suam intentionem, ibi, primum igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod quamvis de causis tractatum sit in physicis, tamen nunc accipiendum est opiniones philosophorum, qui prius venerunt ad perscrutandum naturam entium, qui prius philosophati sunt de veritate quam Aristoteles; quia et ipsi causas et principium ponunt. Nobis igitur, qui eis supervenimus, considerare eorum opiniones, erit aliquid prius, idest aliquod praeambulum, methodo, idest in arte, quae nunc a nobis quaeritur. Unde et litera Boetii habet, accedentibus igitur ad opus scientiae prae opere viae quae nunc est aliquid erit: alia litera habet, supervenientibus igitur quae nunc est aliquid erit vitae opus via, et legenda est sic, nobis igitur supervenientibus ei, quae nunc est via, idest in praesenti methodo et arte, consideranda erit horum opinio, quasi aliquod vitae opus, idest necessarium sicut opera quae sunt ad vitae conservationem, ut intelligatur quasi quadam metaphora uti in loquendo, per vitae opus, quodlibet necessarium accipiens. Utilitas autem est illa, quia aut ex praedictis eorum inveniemus aliud genus a causis praenumeratis, aut magis credemus his, quae modo diximus de causis, quod, scilicet sint quatuor. 72. However, let us examine (35). Here he states what the philosophers had to say about the causes; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the reasons why this must be done; and, second (36:C 73), he begins to carry out his plan ("Most of those"). Accordingly, he says that even though there is a treatise on the causes in the Physics it is still necessary to consider the opinions of the philosophers who first undertook an investigation of the natures of existing things, and have philosophized about the truth before him; because they too set down causes and principles. Therefore, for us who have come later, a consideration of their opinions will be "a first [step]," or preamble, "to the investigation," i.e., to the art which we are now seeking. Hence the text of Boethius also says: "Therefore as we enter upon the task of this science, their opinions will constitute a prearn ble to the road that is now to be travelled." Another text has: "Therefore to us who are beginning this inquiry it will be a certain vital work in the investigation that now confronts us, " and it must be read in this way: "Therefore, as we enter upon our present course," i.e., upon the present study and art, it will be necessary to consider the opinion of these men "as a work of life," that is to say, as necessary, like works which are done for the preservation of life, so that this reading is interpreted as a metaphorical way of speaking, meaning by "work of life" anything necessary. Now this is useful, because from the opinions of these men we will either discover another class of causes over and above those already enumerated, or be more convinced of the things that have just been stated about the causes, namely, that there are four classes of them.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit primum igitur hic incipit antiquorum philosophorum opiniones prosequi; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo recitat aliorum opiniones. Secundo reprobat, ibi, ergo quicumque. Circa primum duo facit. Primo recitat singulorum opinionem de causis. Secundo colligit in summa quae dicta sunt, ibi, breviter igitur et cetera. Prima pars dividitur in duas. Prima ponit opiniones praetermittentium causam formalem. Secundo ponit opinionem Platonis, qui primo causam formalem posuit, ibi, post dictas vero philosophias et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opinionem illorum, qui posuerunt principia aliquas res manifestas. Secundo illorum, qui adinvenerunt extrinseca principia, ibi, Leucippus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo tangit opiniones antiquorum de causa materiali. Secundo de causa efficiente, ibi, procedentibus autem sic. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit quid senserunt de causa materiali. Et primo ponit opiniones ponentium causam materialem in generali. Secundo prosequitur eorum opiniones in speciali, ibi, Thales et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit quid senserunt de causa materiali. Secundo quid senserunt de rerum generatione, quod ex primo sequebatur, ibi, et propter hoc nec generari et cetera. 73. Most of those (36). Here he begins to deal with the opinions of the ancient philosophers; and in regard to this he does two things. First (36), he states their opinions; and, second (86:C 181) he finds fault with them ("Therefore all those"). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he states the opinions which each one of the philosophers held about the causes. Second (79:C 170, he summarizes the discussion ("We have examined"). The first part is divided into two members. In the first (36:C 74), he gives the opinions of those who omitted the formal cause. In the second (69:C 151), he gives the opinion of Plato, who was the first to posit a formal cause ("After the philosophies"). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the opinion of those who claimed that certain evident things are principles. Second (55:C , 12), he gives the opinions of those who devised extrinsic principles ("Leucippus"). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he touches on the opinions which the ancient philosophers held about the material cause; and, second (45:C 93), on their opinions about the efficient cause ("But as men"). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he states in a general way the views of those who posited a material cause. Second (38:C 77), he examines their views in detail ("Thales, the originator"). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he states their opinions about the material cause. Second (37:C 75), he states their opinions about the generation of things, which follow from the first ("And for this reason").
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 6 Dicit ergo primo, quod plurimi eorum qui primo philosophati sunt de rerum naturis, posuerunt principia omnium esse sola illa, quae reducuntur ad speciem causae materialis. Et ad hoc dicendum accipiebant quatuor conditiones materiae, quae ad rationem principii pertinere videntur. Nam id ex quo res est, principium rei esse videtur: huiusmodi autem est materia; nam ex materia dicimus materiatum esse, ut ex ferro cultellum. Item illud ex quo fit aliquid, cum sit et principium generationis rei, videtur esse causa rei, quia res per generationem procedit in esse. Ex materia autem primo res fit, quia materia rerum factioni praeexistit. Et ex ipsa etiam non per accidens aliquid fit. Nam ex contrario vel privatione aliquid per accidens dicitur fieri, sicut dicimus quod ex nigro sit album. Tertio illud videtur esse rerum principium, in quod finaliter omnia per corruptionem resolvuntur. Nam sicut principia sunt prima in generatione, ita sunt ultima in resolutione. Et hoc etiam materiae manifeste contingit. Quarto, cum principia oportet manere, id videtur esse principium, quod in generatione et corruptione manet. Materia autem, quam dicebant esse substantiam rei, manet in omni transmutatione; sed passiones mutantur, ut forma, et omnia quae adveniunt supra substantiam materiae. Et ex his omnibus concludebant, quod materia est elementum et principium omnium eorum quae sunt. 74. Accordingly he says, first (36), that most of those who first philosophized about the natural world held that the principles of all things are merely those which are referred to the class of material cause. In regard to this it must be said that they took the four conditions of matter which seem to belong to the notion of a principle. For, (1) that of which a thing is composed seems to be a principle of that thing. But matter is such a thing; for we say that a thing that has matter is of its matter, as a knife is of iron. (2) That from which a thing comes to be, being also a principle of the process of generation of that thing, seems to be one of its causes, because a thing comes into being by way of generation. But a thing first comes to be from matter, because the matter of things precedes their production. And a thing does not come from matter in an accidental way; for a thing is generated in an accidental way from its contrary or privation, as when we say that white comes from black. (3) Third, that into which all things are ultimately dissolved by corruption seems to be a principle of things. For just as principles are first in the process of generation, in a similar way they are last in the process of dissolution; and obviously this too pertains to matter. (4) Fourth, since a principle must remain in existence, then that which remains throughout the process of generation and corruption seems to be a principle. Now the matter which they said is the substance of a thing remains throughout every transmutation, although its attributes, such as its form and everything that accrues to it over and above its material substance, are changed. From all these considerations they concluded that matter is the element and principle of all beings.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit et propter hic ponit secundarium quod ponebant quasi ex praecedentibus sequens, scilicet nihil simpliciter generari vel corrumpi in entibus. Nam quando fit aliqua mutatio circa passiones substantia manente, non dicimus aliquid esse generatum vel corruptum simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid: sicut cum Socrates fit bonus aut musicus, non dicitur fieri simpliciter, sed fieri hoc. Et similiter quando deponit huiusmodi habitum, non dicitur corrumpi simpliciter sed secundum quid. Materia autem quae est rerum substantia secundum eos, semper manet. Omnis autem mutatio fit circa aliqua quae adveniunt ei, ut passiones. Et ex hoc concludebant quod nihil generatur vel corrumpitur simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid. 75. And for this reason (37). Then he gives, as a secondary point, what they held as following from the above, namely, that in the world nothing is generated or corrupted in an absolute sense. For when some change occurs with regard to a thing’s attributes, and its substance remains unchanged, we do not say that it is generated or corrupted in an absolute sense, but only in a qualified one; for example, when Socrates becomes good or musical, we do not say that he simply comes to be, but comes to be this. And similarly when he loses a state of this kind, we do not say that he is corrupted in an absolute sense, but only in a qualified one. But matter, which is the substance of things according to them, always remains; and every change affects some of a thing’s accidents, such as its attributes. From this they concluded that nothing is generated or corrupted in an absolute sense, but only in a qualified one.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 8 Quamvis autem sic convenirent in ponendo causam materialem, tamen differebant in eius positione quantum ad duo: scilicet quantum ad pluralitatem: quia quidam ponebant unam, quidam plures: et quantum ad speciem, quia quidam ponebant ignem, quidam aquam et cetera. Similiter ponentium plura, quidam haec, quidam illa principia materialia rebus attribuebant. 76. Yet even though they all agreed on this point, in positing a material cause, nevertheless they differed in their position in two respects: first, with respect to the number of material causes, because some held that there is one, and others many; and second, with respect to its nature, because some held that it is fire, others water, and so on. Similarly, among those who posited many material causes, some assigned certain ones as the material principles of things, and some the others.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit Thales quidem. Hic incipit recitare opiniones singulorum, de causa materiali. Et primo ponit opinionem ponentium unam causam materialem. Secundo ponentium plures, ibi, Empedocles vero. Circa primum tria facit. Quia primo ponit opinionem ponentium aquam esse principium omnium. Secundo ponentium aerem, ibi, Anaximenes et cetera. Tertio ponentium ignem, ibi, Hyppasus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opinionem Thaletis, qui dicebat aquam esse rerum principium. Secundo ponit opinionis probationem, ibi, forsan enim et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod Thales princeps talis philosophiae, idest speculativae, dixit aquam esse primum rerum principium. Dicitur autem Thales speculativae philosophiae princeps fuisse, quia inter septem sapientes, qui post theologos poetae fuerunt, ipse solus ad considerandum rerum causas se transtulit, aliis sapientibus circa moralia occupatis. Nomina septem sapientum sunt ista. Primus Thales Milesius tempore Romuli, et apud Hebraeos tempore Achaz regis Israel. Secundus fuit Pittacus Mitylenaeus, apud Hebraeos regnante Sedechia, et apud Romanos Tarquinio prisco. Alii quinque fuerunt Solon Atheniensis, Chilon Lacedaemonius, Periander Corinthius, Cleobulus Lydius, Bias Priennensis, qui fuerunt omnes tempore Babylonicae captivitatis. Quia igitur inter hos solus Thales rerum naturas scrutatus est, suasque disputationes literis mandans emicuit, ideo hic princeps huius scientiae dicitur. 77. Thales, the originator (38). Here he begins to give the opinions of each of the philosophers about the material cause. First, he gives the opinions of those who posited one material cause; and second (88), the opinions of those who posited many (“Empedocles”). In regard to the first he does three things. First, he gives the opinions of those who claimed that water is the principle of all things; second (86), he gives the opinion of those who made air the principle of things (“Anaximenes”); and third (87), the opinion of those who claimed that fire is the principle of things (“Hippasus”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the opinion of Thales, who said that water is the principle of things; and second (79), the reason for this opinion (“For presumably”). He says then that Thales, the originator of this kind of philosophy, i.e., speculative philosophy, said that water is the first principle of all things. Thales is said to have been the originator of speculative philosophy because he was the only one of the seven wise men, who came after the theological poets, to make an investigation into the causes of things, the other sages being concerned with moral matters. The names of the seven wise men are as follows. The first was Thales of Miletus, who lived during the time of Romulus and when Achaz, King of Israel, was reigning over the Hebrews. The second was Pittacus of Mitylene, who lived when Sedecias was reigning over the Hebrews and when Tarquinius Priscus was reigning over the Romans. The other five sages were Solon of Athens, Chilo of Lacedaemon, Periander of Corinth, Cleobulus of Lydia, and Bias of Prienne, all of whom lived during the period of the Babylonian captivity. Hence, since Thales alone among these men investigated the natures of things and distinguished himself by committing his arguments to writing, he is described here as the originator of this science.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 10 Nec debet inconveniens videri, si opiniones hic tangit eorum, qui solum de scientia naturali tractaverunt; quia secundum antiquos qui nullam substantiam cognoverunt nisi corpoream et mobilem, oportebat quod prima philosophia esset scientia naturalis, ut in quarto dicetur. Ex hac autem positione ulterius procedebat ad hoc, quod terra esset super aquam fundata, sicut principiatum supra suum principium. 78. Nor should it be thought unfitting if he touches here on the opinions of those who have treated only the philosophy of nature; because according to the ancients, who knew no other substance except the corporeal and mobile, it was necessary that first philosophy be the philosophy of nature, as is stated in Book IV. And from this position Thales next adopted this one, that the earth rests upon water, as anything having a principle is based on its principle.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit forsan enim hic ponit rationes quibus Thales potuit induci ad praedictam positionem. Et primo ostendit quomodo ad hoc inducebatur ratione. Secundo quomodo inducebatur primorum auctoritate, ibi, sunt et aliqui antiquiores et cetera. Inducebatur autem duplici ratione. Una quae sumitur ex consideratione causae ipsius rei. Alia quae sumitur ex consideratione generationis rerum, ibi, et quia cunctorum et cetera. Haec ergo media sunt ordinata. Nam ex primo sequitur secundum. Quod enim est aliis principium essendi, est etiam primum principium ex quo res generantur. Tertium sequitur ex secundo. Nam unumquodque per corruptionem resolvitur in id ex quo generatum est. Quartum autem sequitur ex secundo et tertio. Nam quod praecedit generationem rerum, et remanet post corruptionem, oportet esse semper manens. 79. For presumably he took (39). Here he gives the reasons by which Thales could be led to the above position. First, he shows how he was led to this position by his own reasoning; and second (82), by the authority of his predecessors (“Moreover, there are some”). Now he was led by two lines of reasoning; one is taken from the cause itself of a thing, and the other from a consideration of the generation of things (“And on the fact”). Therefore these premises are related. For the second follows from the first, because that which is a principle of being of other things is also the first principle from which things are generated. The third follows from the second, because by corruption each thing is dissolved into that from which it was generated. The fourth follows from the second and the third; for that which precedes the generation of things and remains after they have been corrupted must always remain in being.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 12 Primo modo utebatur tribus signis ad ostendendum aquam esse principium essendi rebus: quorum primum est, quia nutrimentum viventium oportet esse humidum. Ex eodem autem viventia nutriuntur et sunt; et sic humor videtur esse principium essendi. Secundum signum est, quia esse cuiuslibet rei corporeae, et maxime viventis, per proprium et naturalem calorem conservatur: calor autem ex humore fieri videtur, cum ipse humor sit quasi caloris materia: unde ex hoc videtur quod humor sit rebus principium essendi. Tertium signum est, quia vita animalis in humido consistit. Unde propter desiccationem naturalis humidi, animal moritur, et per eius conservationem, animal sustentatur. Vivere autem viventibus est esse. Unde ex hoc etiam patet quod humor sit rebus principium essendi. Et haec etiam tria signa seinvicem consequuntur. Ideo enim animal humido nutritur, quia calor naturalis humido sustentatur; et ex his duobus sequitur, quod vivere animalis sit semper per humidum. Id autem ex quo aliquid fit, idest ex quo aliquid esse consequitur, est principium omnibus quae ex illo esse habent. Et propter hoc accepit hanc opinionem quod humor esset omnibus principium. 80. In the first line of reasoning he uses three indications to show that water is the principle of being of things. The first of these is that the nutriment of living things must be moist. But living things derive nourishment and being from the same principle; and thus moisture appears to be the principle of being of things. The second indication is that the being of any physical thing, and especially of a living one, is conserved by its proper and natural heat. But heat seems to be generated from moisture, since moisture itself is in a sense the matter of heat. Hence from this it appears that moisture is a principle of being of things. The third indication is that animal life depends on moisture. Hence an animal dies as a result of its natural moisture being dried up and is kept in existence as a result of its moisture being preserved. But in living things to live is to be. Hence it is also evident from this that moisture is a principle of being of things. These three indications also have a natural connection with one another. For an animal is nourished by moisture, because its natural heat is sustained by moisture. And from these two it follows that animal life is always due to moisture. But that from which a thing comes to be, i.e., from which a thing gets its being, is a principle of everything that derives being from it. And for this reason he adopted this opinion that moisture is the principle of all things.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 13 Similiter etiam accepit signum ex rerum generatione, quia generationes viventium, quae sunt nobilissima in entibus, fiunt ex seminibus. Semina autem sive spermata omnium viventium habent humidam naturam. Unde ex hoc etiam apparet, quod humor est generationis rerum principium. Si autem omnibus praedictis coniungatur quod aqua est humiditatis principium, sequitur quod aqua sit primum rerum principium. 81. In a similar way he also draws an indication of this from the generation of things, because the processes of generation of living things, which are the noblest of [natural] beings, come from seed. But the seed or spermata of all living things have a moist nature. Hence from this it also appears that moisture is a principle of generation of things. Again, if we add to all of the above points the fact that water is the principle of moisture, it follows that water is the first principle of things.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit sunt autem hic ostendit quomodo Thales inducebatur ad praedictam positionem per auctoritates antiquorum. Et dicit quod aliqui fuerunt antiquiores Thalete et multum ante generationem hominum qui erant tempore Aristotelis, qui fuerunt primo theologizantes, qui visi sunt hanc opinionem de natura habuisse, scilicet quod aqua est principium omnium. 82. Moreover, there are (40). Here he shows how Thales was led to the above position by the authority of the ancients. He says that prior to Thales and many years before the men of Aristotle’s time there were some men, the first to speculate about the gods, who seem to have held this opinion about nature, namely, that water is the principle of all things.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 15 Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod apud Graecos primi famosi in scientia fuerunt quidam poetae theologi, sic dicti, quia de divinis carmina faciebant. Fuerunt autem tres, Orpheus, Museus et Linus, quorum Orpheus famosior fuit. Fuerunt autem tempore, quo iudices erant in populo Iudaeorum. Unde patet, quod diu fuerunt ante Thaletem, et multo magis ante Aristotelem qui fuit tempore Alexandri. Isti autem poetae quibusdam aenigmatibus fabularum aliquid de rerum natura tractaverunt. Dixerunt enim quod Oceanus, ubi est maxima aquarum aggregatio, et Thetis, quae dicitur dea aquarum, sunt parentes generationis: ex hoc sub fabulari similitudine dantes intelligere aquam esse generationis principium. 83. With a view to making this clear, we must bear in mind that among the Greeks the first who were famous for their learning were certain theological poets, so called because of the songs which they wrote about the gods. These poets, who were three in number, Orpheus, Museus and Linus, of whom Orpheus was the more famous, lived during the time when the judges ruled over the Jewish people. Hence it is dear that they lived long before Thales and much longer before Aristotle, who lived during the time of Alexander. These poets dealt to some extent with the nature of things by means of certain figurative representations in myths. For they said that Oceanus [i.e., the ocean], where the greatest aggregation of waters is found, and Tethys, which is the name they gave to the goddess of the waters, are the parents of generation, implying by this, under the form of a myth, that water is the principle of generation.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 16 Hanc sententiam alia fabulosa narratione velaverunt, dicentes, quod sacramentum vel iuramentum deorum erat per aquam quamdam, quam poetae dicunt Stygem, et dicunt eam esse paludem infernalem. Ex hoc autem quod deos dicebant iurare per aquam, dederunt intelligere, quod aqua erat nobilior ipsis deis, quia sacramentum vel iuramentum fit id quod est honorabilius. Hos autem quod est prius, est honorabilius. Perfectum enim praecedit imperfectum natura et tempore simpliciter, licet in uno aliquo imperfectio perfectionem praecedat tempore. Unde per hoc patet quod aquam existimabant priorem esse ipsis diis, quos intelligebant esse corpora caelestia. Et quia isti antiquissimi aquam dixerunt esse rerum principium, si aliqua opinio fuit prior ista de naturalibus, non est nobis manifesta. Sic igitur patet quid Thales de prima causa rerum dicitur existimasse. 84. They cloaked this view in another fabulous story, saying that the oath or vow of the gods was by a certain body of water, which the poets call Styx and describe as an underground swamp. And when they said that the gods swore by water, they implied that water was nobler than the gods themselves, because an oath or vow is taken on what is most honorable. Now that which is prior is more honorable; for the perfect is prior absolutely to the imperfect, both in nature and in time, although in a particular being imperfection is prior temporally to perfection. Hence, from this it is evident that they thought that water is prior to the gods themselves, whom they thought to be celestial bodies. And since these earliest thinkers said that water is the principle of things, if there was any opinion about natural bodies prior to theirs, we do not know what it was. Thus what Thales is said to have thought about the first cause of things is now clear.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 17 Quidam autem philosophus, qui vocatur Hyppon, non fuit dignatus aliquid superaddere his propter suae scientiae vel intelligentiae imperfectionem. Unde in libro de anima ponitur inter grossiores, ubi dicitur quod posuit aquam esse animam et principium rerum, sumens argumentum ex rerum seminibus, ut hic dictum est de Thalete. Unde patet quod nihil addit supra Thaletis sententiam. Vel potest intelligi quod quia imperfecte dixit, non reddidit se dignum, ut eius sententia hic contineretur cum aliis. 85. A certain philosopher named Hippo was not credited with adding anything to those mentioned because of the imperfection of his knowledge or understanding. Hence, in The Soul, Hippo is placed among the ruder [thinkers]; for in that work it is stated that Hippo, basing his argument on the seeds of things, as was said here of Thales, held water to be the soul and principle of things. Hence it is clear that he adds nothing to Thales’ view. Or the statement can mean that, since he spoke imperfectly, he did not make himself worthy to have his doctrine included here with the others.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 18 Deinde cum dicit Anaximenes autem hic ponuntur opiniones ponentium aerem esse principium, qui fuerunt Diogenes et Anaximenes ponentes aerem priorem aqua esse naturaliter, et principium omnium simplicium corporum, scilicet quatuor elementorum, et per consequens omnium aliorum. Fuit autem Anaximenes tertius a Thalete. Fuit autem discipulus Anaximandri, qui fuit discipulus Thaletis. Diogenes vero discipulus Anaximenis fuisse dicitur. Haec tamen differentia fuit inter opinionem Diogenis et Anaximenis: quia Anaximenes aerem simpliciter posuit principium rerum, Diogenes autem dixit quod aer rerum principium esse non posset, nisi quia compos erat divinae rationis. Ex quo provenit opinio quae tangitur primo de anima. Ratio autem quare aerem ponebat rerum principium, potuit sumi ex respiratione, per quam vita animalium reservatur; et quia ex immutatione aeris videntur variari generationes et corruptiones rerum. 86. Anaxinienes and Diogenes (41). Here he gives the opinions of those who held that air is the principle of things, namely, Diogenes and Anaximenes, who held that air is naturally prior to water and is the principle of all simple bodies, i.e., of the four elements, and thus of all other things. Anaximenes is the third philosopher after Thales and the disciple of Anaximander, who was the disciple of Thales; and Diogenes is said to have been the disciple of Anaximenes. Yet there is this difference between the opinion of Diogenes and that of Anaximenes: Artaximenes held that air is the principle of things in an absolute sense, whereas Diogenes said that air could be the principle of things only if it possessed a divine nature. From this comes the opinion which is touched on in The Soul, Book I. Now the reason why he held that air is the principle of things could be taken from the process of respiration, by which the life of animals is conserved, and because the processes whereby things are generated and corrupted seem to be modified as a result of changes in the air.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 19 Deinde cum dicit Hyppasus autem hic ponit quod duo philosophi Hyppasus et Heraclitus posuerunt ignem esse primum principium ut materiam. Et potuerunt moveri ex eius subtilitate, sicut infra dicetur. 87. Hippasus of Metopontium (42). Here he states that the two philosophers, Hippasus and Heraclitus, held that fire is the material principle of things. And they could have been influenced by its subtileness, as is said below.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 20 Deinde cum dicit Empedocles vero hic ponit opiniones ponentium plura principia materialia. Et primo Empedoclis, qui posuit plura finita. Secundo Anaxagorae, qui posuit plura infinita, ibi, Anaxagoras vero et cetera. Ponit ergo primo, opinionem Empedoclis quantum ad hoc quod tria praedicta elementa, scilicet aquam, aerem et ignem dicit esse rerum principia, addens eis quartum, scilicet terram. 88. Empedocles (43). Here he gives the opinions of those who posited many material principles. First, he gives the opinion of Empedocles, who held that there are a limited number of such principles; and second 90), that of Anaxagoras, who held that there are an infinite number (“Anaxagoras”). First (43), he gives Empedocles’ opinion regarding the three elements mentioned above, water, air, and fire, which he says are the principles of things, adding to them a fourth, earth.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 21 Secundo quantum ad hoc, quod ista etiam elementa dixit semper manere et non generari nec corrumpi, sicut illi qui posuerunt unam causam materialem; sed per congregationem horum et divisionem secundum multitudinem et paucitatem dixit ex eis alia generari et corrumpi, inquantum ista quatuor per concretionem in unum et disgregationem ex uno dividuntur. 89. Second, he gives Empedocles’ opinion about the permanence of these elements; for, like those who hold that there is one material cause, he holds that these elements always remain and are neither generated nor corrupted. However, he said that other things are generated from and dissolved into these elements according as a greater or smaller number of them are combined or separated out, i.e., inasmuch as these four are united by the process of combination and lose their unity by the process of separation.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 22 Deinde cum dicit Anaxagoras vero hic ponit opinionem Anaxagorae, qui fuit alter discipulus Anaximenis, qui fuit condiscipulus Diogenis: patria quidem Clazomenius, prior aetate quam Empedocles, sed factis sive operibus posterior, vel quia posterius philosophari incoepit, vel quia in numero principiorum minus bene dixit quam Empedocles. Dixit enim principia materialia esse infinita, cum sit dignius finita principia et pauciora accipere, quod fecit Empedocles, ut dicitur in primo physicorum. Non enim solum dixit principia rerum esse ignem et aquam et alia elementa, sicut Empedocles; sed omnia quae sunt consimilium partium, ut caro, os, medulla et similia, quorum infinitas minimas partes principia rerum posuit, ponens in unoquoque infinitas partes singulorum inesse propter id quod in inferioribus unum ex alio generari posse invenit, cum generationem rerum non diceret esse nisi per separationem a mixto, ut planius explicavit primo physicorum. 90. Anaxagoras (44). Here he gives the opinion of Anaxagoras, who was the other disciple of Anaximenes and the classmate of Diogenes. A native of Clazomenae, he was prior to Empedocles in years but later in his activity or work, either because he began to philosophize later, or because his explanation of the number of principles is less satisfactory than that of Empedocles. For he said that there are an infinite number of material principles, whereas it is better to take a limited and smaller number, as Empedocles did, as is stated in Book I of the Physics. For Anaxagoras not only said that fire, water, and the other elements are the principles of things, as Empedocles did, but also claimed that all things having like parts, such as flesh, bones, marrow and so forth, whose smallest parts are infinite in number, are the principles of things. For he claimed that in each being there are an infinite number of parts of each type of thing, because he found that in the case of inferior things one of these can be generated from another. He said, in fact, that things could be generated only by being separated out from a mixture, as Aristotle has explained more fully in the Physics, Book I.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 23 Secundo etiam Anaxagoras convenit cum Empedocle in hoc, scilicet quod generatio et corruptio rerum non est nisi per concretionem et discretionem partium praedictarum infinitarum, et quod aliter nec generari nec corrumpi contingit aliquid. Sed huiusmodi rerum principia infinita, ex quibus rerum substantiae efficiuntur, permanere dixit sempiterna. 91. Second, Anaxagoras also agrees with Empedocles on this point, namely, that things are generated and corrupted only insofar as the parts of these infinite principles are combined or separated out, and that if this were not the case nothing would be generated or corrupted. But he said that the infinite number of principles of this kind, from which the substances of things are produced, always remain in being.
lib. 1 l. 4 n. 24 Concludit ergo Aristoteles quod ex praedictis philosophorum opinionibus aliquis cognoscet solam causam, quae continetur sub specie causae materialis. 92. From the opinions of these philosophers, then, Aristotle concludes that the only cause which these men recognized was the one which belongs to the class of material cause.

Lecture 5

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 1 Postquam posuit opinionem de causa materiali, hic ponit opinionem de causa efficiente: quae est unde principium motus. Et dividitur in duas. Primo ponit opiniones eorum, qui simpliciter assignaverunt causam motus et generationis. Secundo prosequitur opinionem illorum, qui posuerunt causam efficientem, quae est etiam principium boni et mali in rebus, ibi, post hos et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit rationem cogentem ad ponendum causam moventem. Secundo ostendit qualiter ad positionem diversi diversimode se habuerunt, ibi, igitur omnino qui talem et cetera. Dicit ergo: quidam philosophi sic processerunt in causa materiali ponenda; sed et ipsa rei evidens natura dedit eis viam ad veritatis cognitionem vel inventionem, et coegit eos quaerere dubitationem quamdam quae inducit in causam efficientem, quae talis est. Nulla res vel subiectum transmutat seipsum, sicut lignum non transmutat seipsum ut ex eo lectus fiat: nec aes est sibi causa transmutandi, ut ex eo fiat statua: sed oportet aliquid aliud esse quod est eis mutationis causa, quod est artifex. Sed ponentes causam materialem unam vel plures, dicebant ex ea sicut ex subiecto fieri generationem et corruptionem rerum: ergo oportet quod sit aliqua alia causa mutationis; et hoc est quaerere aliud genus principii et causae, quod nominatur, unde principium motus et cetera. 93. Having given the philosophers opinions about the material cause, Aristotle now gives their opinions about the efficient cause, which is the source of motion. This is divided into two parts. First, he gives the opinion of those who assigned without qualification a cause of motion and generation. Second (97), he examines the opinion of those who posited an efficient cause, which is also the principle of good and evil in the world (“After these men”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the reasoning which compelled them to posit an efficient cause. Second (94), he shows the different positions which different men have held regarding this (“Now in general”). He says (45), then, that some philosophers have proceeded in this way in positing a material cause, but that the very nature of reality clearly provided them with a course for understanding or discovering the truth, and compelled them to investigate a problem which led them to the efficient cause. This problem is as follows: no thing or subject changes itself; for example, wood does not change itself so that a bed comes from it, nor does bronze cause itself to be changed in such a way that a statue comes from it; but there must be some other principle which causes the change they undergo, and this is the artist. But those who posited a material cause, whether one or more than one, said that the generation and corruption of things come from this cause as a subject. Therefore there must be some other cause of change, and to seek this is to seek another class of principle and cause, which is called the source of motion.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit igitur omnino hic ostendit quod ad praedictam rationem tripliciter philosophi se habuerunt. Illi enim, qui istam viam a principio tetigerunt, et dixerunt unam causam materialem, non multum se gravabant in solutione huius quaestionis: erant enim contenti ratione materiae, causam motus penitus negligentes. 94. Now in general (46). He shows here that the philosophers have adopted three positions with respect to the foregoing issue. For those who adopted this course from the very beginning, and said that there is one material cause, were not greatly concerned with the solution of this problem. For they were content with their view of matter and neglected the cause of motion altogether.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 3 Alii vero dicentes omnia unum esse, quasi per praedictam rationem devicti, non valentes pervenire ad assignandam causam motus, negaverunt totaliter motum. Unde dixerunt, quod totum universum est unum ens immobile. In quo differebant a primis naturalibus, qui dicebant unam causam esse omnium rerum substantiam, quae tamen movetur per rarefactionem et condensationem, ut sic ex uno plura quodammodo fierent: licet non dicerent quod mutaretur secundum generationem et corruptionem simpliciter: hoc enim quod nihil simpliciter generaretur vel corrumperetur fuit antiqua opinio ab omnibus confessa, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed istis posterioribus proprium fuit differentiae quod totum est unum immobile, sicut omni motu carens. Hi fuerunt Parmenides et Melissus, ut infra dicetur. Ergo patet quod illis, qui dicunt totum unum immobile, non contigerit intelligere eos talem causam scilicet causam motus, quia ex quo motum subtrahunt, frustra quaerunt causam motus nisi tantum Parmenides: quia iste etsi poneret unum secundum rationem, ponebat tamen plura secundum sensum, ut infra dicetur. Unde inquantum plura ponebat, conveniebat ei ponere plures causas, quarum una esset movens, et alia mota: quia sicut pluralitatem secundum sensum ponebat, ei oportebat quod poneret motum secundum sensum. Nam ex uno subiecto non potest intelligi pluralitas constituta, nisi per aliquem modum motus. 95. But others, who said that all things are one, being defeated as it were by this issue, as they were unable to go so far as to assign a cause of motion, denied motion altogether. Hence they said that the whole universe is one immobile being. In this respect they differed from the first philosophers of nature, who said that one cause is the substance of all things although it is moved by rarefaction and condensation, so that in this way many things come to be in some measure from one principle. However, they did not say that this principle is subject to generation and corruption in an absolute sense. For the view that nothing was generated or corrupted without qualification is an ancient one admitted by all of them, as is clear from what was said above (75). But it was peculiar to these later thinkers to say that the whole of reality is one immobile being, devoid of every kind of motion. These men were Parmenides and Melissus, as will be explained below (138). Hence it is evident that it was impossible for those who said that the whole is one immobile being to conceive of “such a cause,” i.e., a cause of motion. For, by the very fact that they did away with motion, they sought in vain for a cause of motion. An exception was Parmenides; for even though he held that there is only one thing according to reason, he held that there are many things according to the senses, as will be stated below (101). Hence, inasmuch as Parmenides held that there are many things, it was in keeping with his position to hold that there are many causes, one of which would be a mover and the others something moved. For just as he held that there are many things according to the senses, in a similar way it was necessary for him to hold that there is motion according to the senses, because a plurality of things can be understood to be produced from one subject only by some kind of motion.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 4 Tertii fuerunt qui plures facientes rerum substantias, consenserunt praedictae rationi ponentes causam motus. Ponebant enim calidum vel frigidum causas, vel ignem et terram: quorum igne utebantur ut habente mobilem, idest motivam naturam; aqua vero et terra et aere contrario, vel ut habentibus naturam passivam: et sic ignis erat ut causa efficiens, alia vero ut causa materialis. 96. Third, there were those who, in making the substances of things many, assented to the aforesaid reasoning by positing a cause of motion. For they maintained that the hot or the cold, i.e., fire or earth, are causes; and of these they used fire as having a mobile, i.e., an active, nature, but water, earth and air they used in the opposite way, i.e., as having a passive nature. Thus fire was a sort of efficient cause, but the others a sort of material cause.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit post hos hic ponit opiniones ponentium causam efficientem non solum ut principium motus, sed etiam ut principium boni vel mali in rebus. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo narrat eorum opiniones. Secundo ostendit in quo in ponendo causas defecerunt, ibi, isti quidem. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opinionis rationes, ex quibus movebantur ad ponendum aliam causam a praedictis. Secundo ostendit quomodo diversimode causam posuerunt, ibi, dicens et aliquis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod post praedictos philosophos qui solum unam causam materialem posuerunt, vel plures corporales, quarum una erat activa, alia ut passiva: et post alia prima principia ab eis posita, iterum fuerunt ab ipsa veritate coacti, ut aiebamus, idest sicut supra dictum est, ut quaererent principium, habitum idest consequenter se habens ad praedicta, scilicet causam boni, quae quidem est causa finalis, licet ab eis non poneretur nisi per accidens, ut infra patebit. Ponebatur enim ab eis solum causa boni per modum causae efficientis. Et ad hoc cogebantur, quia praemissa principia non sufficiebant ad generandum naturam entium, in qua quidem inveniuntur aliqua bene se habere. Quod demonstrat conservatio corporum in propriis locis, extra quae corrumpuntur. Et ulterius utilitates, quae proveniunt ex partibus animalium, quae hoc modo dispositae inveniuntur secundum quod congruit ad bonum esse animalis. 97. After these men (47). Here he gives the opinion of those who posited an efficient cause, not only as a principle of motion, but also as a principle of good and evil in things. In regard to this he does two things. First, he expounds their views. Second (107), he shows in what respect they failed in assigning the causes of things (“These thinkers”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the reasons for their position by which they were induced to posit another cause besides the foregoing one. Second (100), he shows how they posited this kind of cause in different ways (“And when someone”). He says first, then, that after the foregoing philosophers who held that there is only one material cause, or many bodies, one of which was active and the others passive, and after the other first principles given by them, men were again compelled by the truth itself ‘ “as we have said,” i.e., as was stated above (93), to seek the “next” principle, i.e., the one which naturally follows the foregoing one, namely, the cause of good, which is really the final cause, although it was held by them only incidentally, as will be see below (177). For they held that there is a cause of goodness in things only after the manner of an efficient cause. They were compelled to do this because the foregoing principles were not sufficient to account for the generation of the natural world, in which some things are found to be well disposed . The fact that bodies are conserved in their proper places and are corrupted outside of them proves this; and so do the benefits resulting from the parts of animals, which are found to be disposed in this manner according as this is in keeping with an animal’s good state of being.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 6 Huiusmodi autem bonae dispositionis vel habitudinis, quam quaedam res iam habent, quaedam vero adipiscuntur per aliquam factionem, non sufficienter ponitur causa vel ignis, vel terra, vel aliquod talium corporum: quia ista corpora determinate agunt ad unum secundum necessitatem propriarum formarum, sicut ignis calefacit et tendit sursum, aqua vero infrigidat et tendit deorsum. Praedictae autem utilitates, et bonae dispositiones rerum exigunt habere causam non determinatam ad unum tantum, cum in diversis animalibus diversimode inveniantur partes dispositae, et in unoquoque secundum congruentiam ipsorum naturae. 98. But neither fire nor earth nor any such bodies were held to be adequate causes of this kind of good disposition or state of being which some things already have but others acquire by some kind of production. For these bodies act in one definite way according to the necessity of their proper forms, as fire heats things and tends upward, and water cools things and tends downward. But the aforesaid benefits and good states of being of things must have a cause which is not limited to one effect only, since the parts of different animals are found to be disposed in different ways, and in each one insofar as it is in keeping with its nature.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 7 Unde non est conveniens, quod ignis vel terra vel aliquod huiusmodi sit causa praedictae bonae habitudinis rerum: nec fuit conveniens, quod ipsi hoc aestimaverint: nec iterum bene se habet dicere, quod sint automata idest per se evenientia et casualia, et quod a fortuna tantum immutetur eorum causalitas: licet aliqui eorum hoc dixerint, ut Empedocles et quicumque posuerunt causam materialem tantum: sicut patet secundo physicorum. Quod tamen patet etiam esse falsum, per hoc quod huiusmodi bonae dispositiones inveniuntur vel semper, vel in maiori parte. Ea autem quae sunt a casu vel a fortuna, non sunt sicut semper, sed nec sicut frequenter, sed ut raro. Et propter hoc necessarium fuit alterum invenire principium bonae dispositionis rerum, praeter quatuor elementa. Alia litera habet, nec ipsi automato et fortunae; et est idem sensus quod prius. 99. Hence, it is not reasonable that fire or earth or the like should be the cause of the aforesaid good state of being which things have, nor was it reasonable that these men should have thought this to be the case. Nor again would it be reasonable to say that these things are chance occurrences, i.e., that they are accidental or come about by chance, and that their causality is changed only fortuitously; although some of these thinkers had said this, as Empedocles and all those who posited a material cause, as is evident in Book II of the Physics. However, this is also seen to be false by reason of the fact that good dispositions of this kind are found either always or for the most part, whereas things that come about by chance or fortune do not occur always or for the most part but seldom. For this reason, then, it was necessary to discover besides the four elements some other principle which would account for the good dispositions of things. Another text has “Nor would it be right that these should be attributed to chance occurrence and fortune,” but this means the same as the above.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit dicens et hic ponit in speciali opiniones de praedicto principio. Et primo ponit opiniones ponentium unam causam. Secundo ponentium duas, ibi, quoniam vero contraria bonis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opiniones ponentium causam primam efficientem intellectum. Secundo ponentium amorem, ibi, suspicatus est autem et cetera. Dicit ergo quod post praedictam rationem apparuit aliquis dicens intellectum esse in tota natura, sicut est in animalibus, et ipsum esse causam mundi et ordinis totius, idest universi, in quo ordine consistit bonum totius, et uniuscuiusque. Et hic purificavit priores philosophos, ad puram veritatem eos reducens qui inconvenientia dixerunt, huiusmodi causam non tangentes. Hanc autem sententiam manifeste tangit Anaxagoras, licet causam huiusmodi sententiam proferendi dederit ei primo quidam alius philosophus, scilicet Hermotimus Clazomenius. Unde patet quod illi qui sunt opinati sic, simul posuerunt idem rebus esse principium, quod bene haberent se, et quod esset unde principium motus est. 100. And when someone said (48). Here he gives in detail the opinions about the aforesaid principle. First, he gives the opinions of those who held that there is one [efficient] cause; and second (104), the opinions of those who held that there are two such causes (“But since there would seem”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the views of those who held that the first efficient cause is an intellect; and second (101), the opinions of those who held that it is love (“Now someone might”). He says, then, that after the foregoing doctrine someone appeared who said that there is an intellect present in nature at large, just as there is in animals, and that this is the cause of the world and the order of the whole, i.e., of the universe, in which order the good of the entire universe and that of every single part consists. And this man atoned for the first philosophers by reducing to pure truth those who said unreasonable things and did not mention this kind of cause. Now Anaxagoras clearly stated this doctrine, although another philosopher —Hermotimus of Clazomenae—first gave him the idea of proposing this opinion. Hence it is evident that those who held this opinion claimed at the same time that the principle by which things are well disposed and the one which is the source of motion in things, are one and the same.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit suspicatus est ponit opinionem ponentium amorem esse principium primum; quem tamen non ita expresse vel plane, posuerunt. Et ideo dicit, quod suspicio fuit apud aliquos, quod Hesiodus quaesivisset huiusmodi principium bonae habitudinis rerum, vel quicumque alius posuit amorem vel desiderium in rebus. Cum enim Parmenides universi generationem monstrare tentaret, dixit, quod amor deorum providit omnibus, ut mundus constitueretur. Nec est contra sensum eius, qui posuit unum ens immobile, quod hic dicit; quia hic ponebat plura secundum sensum, licet unum secundum rationem, ut supra dictum est, et infra dicetur. Deos autem corpora caelestia appellabat, vel forte aliquas substantias separatas. 101. Now someone might (49). Here he gives the opinion of those who claimed that love is the first principle, although they did not hold this very explicitly or clearly. Accordingly, he says that some suspected that Hesiod had sought for such a principle to account for the good disposition of things, or anyone else who posited love or desire in nature. For when Parmenides attempted to explain the generation of the universe, he said that in the establishing of the universe “Love, the first of all the gods, was made.” Nor is this opposed to his doctrine that there is one immobile being, of which Aristotle speaks here; because this man held that there are many things according to the senses, although there is only one thing according to reason, as was stated above and will be stated below. Moreover, he called the celestial bodies, or perhaps certain separate substances, gods.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 10 Sed Hesiodus dixit quod primo omnium fuit chaos, et deinde facta est terra latior, ut esset receptaculum aliorum: posuerunt enim receptaculum et locum principium esse, ut dicitur quarto physicorum. Et posuit rerum principium amorem, qui condocet omnia immortalia. Et hoc ideo, quia communicatio bonitatis ex amore provenire videtur. Nam beneficium est signum et effectus amoris. Unde, cum ex rebus immortalibus huiusmodi corruptibilia esse habeant, et omnem bonam dispositionem, oportet hoc amori immortalium attribuere. Immortalia autem posuit vel ipsa corpora caelestia, vel ipsa principia materialia. Sic autem posuit chaos et amorem, quasi necessarium sit in rerum existentiis esse non solum materiam motuum, sed et ipsam causam agentem, quae res moveat et congreget; quod videtur ad amorem pertinere. Nam et in nobis amor ad actiones movet, et quia est omnium affectionum principium. Nam et timor et tristitia et spes, non nisi ex amore procedunt. Quod autem amor congreget, ex hoc patet; quia ipse amor est unio quaedam amantis et amati, dum amans amatum quasi se reputat. Iste autem Hesiodus ante philosophorum tempora fuit in numero poetarum. 102. But Hesiod said that first of all there was chaos, and then broad earth was made, to be the receptacle of everything else; for it is evident that the receptacle [or void] and place are principles, as is stated in Book IV of the Physics. And he also held that love, which instructs all the immortals, is a principle of things. He did this because the communication of goodness seems to spring from love, for a good deed is a sign and effect of love. Hence, since corruptible things derive their being and every good disposition from immortal beings of this kind, this must be attributed to the love of the immortals. Furthermore, he held that the immortals are either the celestial bodies themselves, or material principles themselves. Thus he posited chaos and love as though there had to be in existing things not only a material cause of their motions, but also an efficient cause which moves and unites them, which seems to be the office of love. For love moves us to act, because it is the source of all the emotions, since fear, sadness and hope proceed only from love. That love unites things is clear from this, that love itself is a certain union between the lover and the thing loved, seeing that the lover regards the beloved as himself. This man Hesiod is to be numbered among the poets who lived before the time of the philosophers.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 11 Quis autem horum sit prior, idest potior in scientia, utrum ille qui dixit amorem esse primum principium, vel qui dixit intellectum, posterius poterit iudicari, scilicet ubi agetur de Deo. Et hoc iudicium distributionem vocat: quia per hoc unicuique suus gradus attribuitur dignitatis. Alia translatio planius habet: hos quidem igitur quomodo congruat transire, et quis de hoc sit prior, posterius poterit iudicari. 103. Now, as to which one of these thinkers is prior, i.e., more competent in knowledge, whether the one who said that love is the first principle, or the one who said hat intellect is, can be decided later on, that is, where God is discussed. He calls this decision an arrangement, because the degree of excellence belonging to each man is allotted to him in this way. Another translation states this more clearly: “Therefore, in what order it is fitting to go over these thinkers, and who in this order is prior, can be decided later on.”

Lecture 6

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 1 Hic ponit opinionem ponentium contrarietatem in huiusmodi, et rationem eos moventem, quae talis erat. In rerum natura videbantur aliqua esse contraria bonis, quia in natura non solum invenitur ordinatum et bonum, sed aliquando inordinatum et turpe: non potest autem dici quod mala non habeant causam, sed accidant a casu: quia mala sunt plura melioribus, et prava sunt plura bonis simpliciter: quae autem sunt a casu sine causa determinata non sunt ut in pluribus, sed ut in paucioribus. Unde, cum contrariorum sint contrariae causae, oportet non solum causam rerum ponere amorem, ex quo proveniunt ordinationes et bona: sed et odium, ex quo proveniunt inordinationes et turpia vel mala: ut sic singula mala et bona proprias causas habeant. 104. Here Aristotle gives the opinion of those who posited contrariety in beings of this kind, and the reason which moved them, which is as follows. There would seem to be in nature things which are contrary to those that are good, because in nature one finds not only things which are ordered and good, but sometimes things which are disordered and base. Now it cannot be said that evil things have no cause but happen by chance, because evil things are more numerous than good ones, and base things more numerous than those which are unqualifiedly noble. But those things which come to be by chance without a definite cause do not occur for the most part but in the smaller number of cases. Hence, since contrary effects have contrary causes, it was necessary to hold as a cause of things not only love, from which the order and good in things originate, but also hate, which is the source of disorder and baseness or evil in things, so that in this way particular instances of evil and good have their own type of causes.
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 2 Et quod ista fuerit ratio movens Empedoclem patet, si quis assequatur sententiam eius, et accipiat sententiam, quam dicere voluit, et non ad verba, quae imperfecte et quasi balbutiendo dixit. Dixit enim quod amoris est congregare, odii disgregare: sed quia ex congregatione est rerum generatio, ex qua rebus est esse et bonum: per segregationem vero est corruptio, quae est via ad non esse et malum, iam patet quod voluit amorem esse causam aggregatorum, idest bonorum, et odium esse causam malorum. Et ita si quis dicat, quod Empedocles fuit primus, qui dixit bonum et malum esse principia, forsitan bene dixit. 105. That this was the reason which moved Empedocles is evident if anyone grasps what he says, taking his statement according to its meaning rather than according to the words which he used imperfectly and, as it were, in a faltering way. For he said that it is the office of love to bring the elements together, and of hate to separate them. But since the generation of things is a result of the coming together [of the elements], by reason of which there is being and good in things, and their corruption a result of the separation [of the elements], which is the way to non-being and evil, it is now evident that he wanted love to be the cause of things which come to be by aggregation, i.e., of good things, and hate the cause of evil things. Thus if one were to say that Empedocles was the first to maintain that good and evil are principles, he would perhaps speak correctly.
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 3 Si tamen secundum Empedoclem fuit hoc quod bonum est causa omnium bonorum, et malum omnium malorum. Quod enim aliquorum malorum posuit causam malam, scilicet corruptionis, et aliquorum bonorum bonum, scilicet generationis, manifestum est: sed quia non sequebatur quod omnia bona essent per amicitiam, nec omnia mala per odium, cum distinctio partium mundi adinvicem esset per odium, et confusio per amicitiam, ideo non usquequaque posuit bonum causam bonorum, et malum causam malorum. 106. That is to say, this would follow if Empedocles did hold that good is the cause of all good things, and evil the cause of all evil things. For it is evident that he posited evil as the cause of some evil things, namely, of corruption, and good as the cause of some good things, namely, of generation. But because it would not follow that all good things would be caused by friendship or all evil things by hate, since the parts of the world would be differentiated by hate and fused together by friendship, therefore he did not always hold that good is the cause of good things, and evil the cause of evil things.
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit isti quidem hic ostendit, quod in ponendo praedictas causas deficiebant. Et primo loquitur generaliter de eis. Secundo specialiter, ibi, Anaxagoras autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod praedicti philosophi, scilicet Anaxagoras et Empedocles, usque ad hoc pervenerunt, quod posuerunt duas causas illarum quatuor, quae sunt determinatae in physicis, scilicet materiam et causam motus; sed obscure et non manifeste tradiderunt, quia non exprimebant quod illa, quae causas esse ponebant, ad ista causarum genera reducerentur. Sed in hoc quod de causis posuerunt duas, convenienter assimilabantur bellatoribus non eruditis, qui ab adversariis circumducti faciunt aliquando bonos ictus, sed non per artem, sed a casu. Quod ex hoc patet, quia etsi aliquando accidit eis, non tamen semper aut frequenter. Similiter etiam praedicti philosophi non sunt usi dicere quod dicunt, nec usi sunt scientibus, idest sicut scientes. Unde alia translatio habet, sed nec illi scientiam, nec hi assimilati sunt scientibus dicere quod dicunt. Quod ex hoc patet, quia cum praedictas causas posuissent, fere non sunt eis usi, quia in paucis utebantur. Unde videtur quod non ex arte, sed quadam inducti necessitate eas casualiter induxerunt. 107. These thinkers (51). Here he shows that in giving these causes the philosophers treated them inadequately. First, he mentions them in a general way. Second (108), he treats each one individually (“Anaxagoras”). He says first, then, that these philosophers—Anaxagoras and Empedocles—arrived at a doctrine of two of the causes which have been established in the Physics, namely, matter and the cause of motion, although they treated these obscurely and with no clarity, because they did not explain that those principles which they held to be the causes of things could be reduced to these classes of causes. But insofar as they posited two of these causes, they may be likened to untrained warriors who, ttiough encircled by the enemy, sometimes strike good blows, not by art but by chance. This is evident from the fact that, even though they happen to do this sometimes, this does not occur always or for the most part. In like manner, too, these philosophers were not accustomed to express themselves accurately, nor was it their custom to speak with awareness, i.e., as men who know. Hence another translation has, “But these men neither have science, nor are they to be compared with men who realize what they are saying.” This is shown by the fact that, although they had proposed these causes, they hardly ever used them, because they employed them in few instances. Hence it seems that they introduced them not as a result of art but by accident, because they were moved to, do so by necessity.
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit Anaxagoras autem hic ostendit in quo specialiter eorum uterque defecerit. Et primo de Anaxagora. Secundo de Empedocle, ibi, et Empedocles. Dicit ergo primo, quod Anaxagoras utitur intellectu ad mundi generationem; in quo videtur artificialiter loqui, non dubitans de causis generationis mundi, ex necessitate attrahit, idest producit ipsum intellectum, non valens reducere mundi generationem in aliquam aliam causam distinguentem res, nisi in aliquod in se distinctum et immixtum, cuiusmodi est intellectus. Sed in omnibus aliis assignat causas magis ex omnibus aliis, quam ex intellectu, sicut in specialibus rerum naturis. 108. Anaxagoras (52). Here he shows in what particular respect the view of each is unsatisfactory. First, he speaks of Anaxagoras; and second (109), of Empedocles (“Empedocles”). He says first, then, that Anaxagoras uses “intellect” to generate the world, and in so doing he seems to speak of it in an artificial way. For when he inquires about the causes of the world’s generation, he drags it in of necessity, i.e., he invents this intelligence only because he is unable to attribute the generation of the world to any other cause which would differentiate things except to one which is essentially distinct and unmixed, and intellect is a thing of this kind. But in all other cases he draws his causes from any other source rather than intellect, for example, in the case of the particular natures of things.
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit et Empedocles hic ostendit in quo deficiat Empedocles. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit in quo deficit. Secundo quid proprium prae aliis dixit, ibi, Empedocles igitur. Dicit ergo primo, quod Empedocles in determinando de particularibus rerum naturis, plus utitur causis a se positis, scilicet quatuor elementis, et odio et amore, quam Anaxagoras, quia singulorum generationem et corruptionem in praedictas causas reducit, non autem Anaxagoras in intellectum. Sed in duobus deficit. Primo, quia non sufficienter huiusmodi causas tradit. Utitur enim eis quasi dignitatibus per se notis, quae non sunt per se nota, ut dicitur primo physicorum: dum scilicet supponebat quasi per se notum, quod lis determinato tempore dominabatur in elementis, et alio tempore determinato amor. 109. Empedocles (53). Here he shows in what respect Empedocles’ doctrine is inadequate; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows in what respect Empedocles’ doctrine is inadequate. Second (111), he explains what Empedocles himself held in contrast to the other philosophers (“In contrast” ) He says, first (53), that Empedocles, in dealing with the particular natures of things, “makes greater use of the causes” posited by him (the four elements, and love and hate) than Anaxagoras did, because he reduced the generation and corruption of particular things to these causes, and not to intelligence as Anaxagoras did. But Empedocles failed in two ways. First, he failed because he does not treat causes of this kind adequately enough; for he uses things which are not self-evident as though they were self-evident axioms, as is stated in the Physics, Book W that is, insofar as he assumed that they are self-evident, because at one definite time strife has dominion over the elements and at another, love.
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 7 Secundo, quia in his quae quaerit, non invenitur illud quod est ab eo confessum, idest suppositum quasi principium, scilicet quod amor congreget et odium disgreget; quia in multis locis oportet quod e contrario amor secernat, idest dividat, et odium concernat, idest congreget; quia quando ipsum universum in partes suas per odium, distrahitur, idest deiicitur, quod est in generatione mundi, tunc omnes partes ignis in unum conveniunt, et similiter singulae partes aliorum elementorum, concernunt, idest adinvicem coniunguntur. Sic igitur odium, non solum partes ignis dividit a partibus aeris, sed etiam partes ignis coniungit adinvicem. E contrario autem, cum elementa in unum conveniunt per amorem, quod accidit in destructione universi, tunc necesse est ut partes ignis adinvicem separentur, et similiter singulorum partes adinvicem secernantur. Non enim posset ignis commisceri aeri nisi partes ignis adinvicem separarentur, et similiter partes aeris nisi invicem se elementa praedicta penetrarent, ut sic amor sicut coniungit extranea, ita dividat similia, secundum quod sequitur ex eius positione. 110. Second, he failed because in the matters which he investigates, one does not find what he has professed, i.e., what he held as a principle, namely, that love combines things and that strife separates them, because in many places love must on the contrary “separate” or divide things, and strife “bring them together,” i.e., unite them. For when the universe itself “is separated out,” i.e., divided into its parts, by hate, as occurs when the world is generated, all particles of fire are then combined into one whole, and so also are the individual particles of the other elements “brought together,” i.e., joined to each other. Hence, strife not only separates the particles of fire from those of air, but also brings together the particles of fire. But, on the other hand, when the elements come together through love, which occurs when the universe is destroyed the particles of fire must then be separated from each other, and so also must the particles of the other elements. For fire can be mixed with air only if the particles of fire are separated from each other; and the same is true of the particles of air only if these elements penetrate one another, so that love not only unites unlike things but also separates like things, according to what follows from his position.
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit Empedocles quidem hic ostendit quomodo Empedocles prae aliis philosophis proprium posuit. Et dicit quod duo prae aliis posuit. Unum est quod causam unde motus divisit in duas contrarias partes. Aliud est quod causam materialem dixit esse quatuor elementa: non quod utatur quatuor elementis ut quatuor, sed ut duobus, quia ignem comparat aliis tribus dicens, quod ignis habet naturam activam, et alia passivam. Et hoc potest aliquis sumere ex elementis rerum ab ipso traditis, vel elementis principiis suae doctrinae quae posuit. Alia litera habet ex versibus, quia dicitur metrice suam philosophiam scripsisse. Et huic concordat alia translatio quae dicit, ex rationibus. Hic igitur, ut dictum est et sic tot primus posuit principia, quia quatuor, et ea quae dicta sunt. 111. In contrast (54). Here he shows in what respect Empedocles’ own doctrine differs from that of the other philosophers. He says that Empedocles maintained two things in contrast to the others. First, he divided the cause which is the source of motion into two contrary parts. Second, he held the material cause to be constituted of four elements—not that he uses the four elements as four, but rather as two, because he contrasts fire with the other three, saying that fire is active in nature and the others passive in nature. Anyone can gather this from the elements of things treated by him, or from his “basic sayings” in the sense of the rudiments of the doctrine which he propounded. Another version reads “from his verses,” because he is said to have written his philosophy in meters. And still another version, which says “from his statements,” agrees with this. As has been stated, then, this philosopher was the first to stipulate in this way that the principles of things are so many in number, namely, four, and to speak of those which have been mentioned.

Lecture 7

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 1 Hic incipit ponere positiones eorum, qui posuerunt de principiis positiones extraneas non manifestas. Et primo illorum qui posuerunt plura principia rerum. Secundo illorum, qui posuerunt tantum unum ens, ibi, sunt autem aliqui et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opinionem Leucippi et Democriti, qui posuerunt principia rerum corporea. Secundo ponit opinionem Pythagoricorum, qui posuerunt principia rerum incorporea, ibi, in his autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opinionem Democriti et Leucippi de causa materiali rerum. Secundo de causa diversitatis, quomodo scilicet ex materia plures res diversificantur, in quo etiam apparet causa generationis et corruptionis rerum: in quo etiam cum antiquis philosophis conveniebant, ibi, et quemadmodum in unum et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod duo philosophi, qui amici dicuntur, quia in omnibus se sequebantur, scilicet Democritus et Leucippus, posuerunt rerum principia plenum et inane, sive vacuum; quorum plenum est ens, et vacuum sive inane non ens. 112. Here he begins to give the positions of those who held strange and obscure views about the principles of things. First, he gives the position of those who held that there are many principles of things; and second (134) the position of those who held that there is only one being (“But there are some”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the opinion of Leucippus and Democritus, who held that the principles of things are corporeal. Second (119), he gives the opinion of the Pythagoreans, who held that the principles of things are incorporeal entities (“But during the time”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the opinion of Democritus and Leucippus about the material cause of things; and second (115), their opinion about the cause of diversity, that is, how matter is differentiated into many things. In this discussion the cause of the generation and corruption of things also becomes evident; and this is a point on which these men agreed with the ancient philosophers (“And just as those who”). He says, then, that two philosophers, Democritus and Leucippus, who are called friends because they followed each other in all things, held that the principles of things are the full and the void or empty, of which the full is being, and the void or empty, non-being.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 2 Ad huius autem opinionis evidentiam recolendum est hoc quod philosophus dicit in primo de generatione, ubi diffusius eam tradit. Cum enim quidam philosophi posuissent omnia esse unum ens continuum, immobile: quia nec motus sine vacuo esse potest, ut videtur, nec etiam rerum distinctio, ut dicebant, cum continuitatis privationem, ex qua oportet intelligere corporum diversitatem, nisi per vacuum non possent comprehendere, vacuum autem nullo modo esse ponerent, supervenit Democritus, qui eorum rationi consentiens, diversitatem autem et motum a rebus auferre non valens, vacuum esse posuit, et omnia corpora ex quibusdam indivisibilibus corporibus esse composita: propter hoc, quia non videbatur sibi quod ratio posset assignari quare ens universum magis in una parte esset divisum quam in alia; ne poneret totum esse continuum, praeelegit ponere ubique totum et totaliter esse divisum; quod esse non posset si remaneret aliquod divisibile indivisum. Huiusmodi autem indivisibilia corpora invicem coniungi non possunt, nec esse ut ponebat, nisi vacuo mediante: quia nisi vacuum inter duo eorum interveniret, oporteret ex eis duobus unum esse continuum quod ratione praedicta non ponebat. Sic igitur uniuscuiusque corporis magnitudinem constitutam dicebat ex illis indivisibilibus corporibus implentibus indivisibilia spatia, et ex quibusdam spatii vacuis ipsis indivisibilibus corporibus interiacentibus, quae quidem poros esse dicebat. 113. Now in order to clarify this opinion we must recall what the Philosopher says in Book I of Generation, where he treats it more fully. For certain philosophers had held that everything is one continuous immobile being, because it seems that there cannot be motion without a void, or any distinction between things, as they said. And though they could not comprehend the privation of continuity, by reason of which bodies must be understood to be differentiated, except by means of a void, they claimed that the void existed in no way. Democritus, who came after them, and who agreed with their reasoning but was unable to exclude diversity and motion from things, held that the void existed, and that all bodies are composed of certain indivisible bodies [i.e., the atoms]. He did this because it seemed to him that no reason could be given why the whole of being should be divided in one part rather than another. And lest he should hold that the whole of being is continuous, he therefore chose to maintain that this whole is divided everywhere and in its entirety; and this could not be the case if anything divisible remained undivided. And according to him indivisible bodies of this kind can neither exist nor be joined together except by means of the void. For if the void did not come between any two of them, one continuous whole would result from the two; which he did not hold for the above reason. Hence he said that the continuous quantity of each body is constituted both of those indivisible bodies filling indivisible spaces and of certain empty spaces, which he called pores, coming between these indivisible bodies.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 3 Ex quo patet quod cum vacuum sit non ens, et plenum sit ens, non magis ponebat rei constitutionem ens quam non ens: quia nec corpora magis quam vacuum, nec vacuum magis quam corpora; sed ex duobus simul dicebat, ut dictum est corpus constitui. Unde praedicta duo ponebat rerum causas sicut materiam. 114. And since the void is non-being and the full is being, it is evident from this that he did not hold that a thing was constituted by being rather than non-being, because the [indivisible] bodies did not constitute things more than the void, or the void more than bodies; but he said that a body is composed at once of these two things, as is clear in the text. Hence he held that these two things are the causes of beings as their matter.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit et quemadmodum hic ostendit in quo conveniebant praedicti philosophi cum antiquis philosophis, qui ponebant unam tantum materiam. Ostendit autem quod conveniebant cum eis in duobus. Primo quidem, quia sicut sunt ponentes unam materiam, et ex illa materia una generabant aliam secundum diversas materiae passiones, quae sunt rarum et densum, quae accipiebant ut principia omnium aliarum passionum; ita et isti, scilicet Democritus et Leucippus, dicebant, quod causae differentes erant aliorum, scilicet corporum constitutorum ex indivisibilibus, videlicet quod per aliquas differentias illorum indivisibilium corporum et pororum diversa entia constituebantur. 115. And just as those (56). Here he shows in what respect these philosophers agreed with the ancients who claimed that there is only one matter. He indicates agreement in two respects. First, just as the ancient philosophers held that there is one matter, and from that one matter generated something else according to the different attributes of matter (i.e., the rare and dense, which they accepted as the principles of all other attributes), in a similar way these philosophers—Democritus and Leucippus—said that there were different causes of different things (namely, of the bodies composed of these indivisible bodies), i.e., that different beings were produced as a result of certain differences of these indivisible bodies and their pores.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 5 Eas autem differentias dicebant esse, unam secundum figuram, quae attenditur ex hoc quod aliquid est angulatum, circulare et rectum: aliam secundum ordinem quae est secundum prius et posterius: aliam secundum positionem, quae est secundum ante et retro, dextrum et sinistrum, sursum et deorsum. Et sic dicebant quod unum ens differt ab alio vel rhysmo idest figura, vel diathyge idest ordine, vel trope idest positione. 116. Now they said that these differences are, first, differences in shape, which is noted from this that things are angular, circular or square; second, differences in arrangement, i.e., insofar as the indivisible bodies are prior or subsequent; and, third, differences in position, i.e., insofar as these bodies are in front or behind, right or left, or above and below. Hence they said that one being differs from another “either by rhythm,” which is shape, “or by inter-contact,” which is arrangement, “or by turning,” which is position.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 6 Et hoc probat per exemplum in literis Graecis, in quibus una litera differt ab alia figura: sicut et in nostris differt una ab altera: a enim differt ab n, figura; an vero et na, differunt secundum ordinem, nam una ante aliam ordinatur. Una etiam differt ab altera positione, ut z ab n, sicut et apud nos videmus quod semivocales post liquidas poni non possunt ante quas ponuntur mutae in eadem syllaba. Sicut ergo propter triplicem diversitatem in literis ex eisdem literis diversimode se habentibus fit tragoedia et comoedia, ita ex eisdem corporibus indivisibilibus diversimode habentibus fiunt diversae species rerum. 117. He illustrates this by using the letters of the Greek alphabet, which differ from each other in shape just as in our alphabet one letter also differs from another; for A differs from N in shape. Again, AN differs from NA in arrangement, because one letter is placed before the other. And one letter also differs from another in position, as Z from IN, just as in our language we also see that semivowels cannot stand after liquids preceded by mutes in the same syllable. Therefore, just as tragedy and comedy come from the same letters as a result of the letters being disposed in different ways because of this threefold difference, in a similar fashion different species of things are produced from the same indivisible bodies as a result of the latter being disposed in different ways.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 7 Aliud vero in quo conveniebant isti philosophi cum antiquis est, quod sicut antiqui neglexerunt ponere causam ex qua motus inest rebus, ita et isti, licet illa indivisibilia corpora dicerent esse per se mobilia. Sic ergo patet quod per praedictos philosophos nihil dictum est nisi de duabus causis, scilicet de causa materiali ab omnibus, et de causa movente a quibusdam. 118. The second respect in which these philosophers agreed with the ancients is this: just as the ancient philosophers neglected to posit a cause which accounts for motion in things, so also did these men, although they would say that these indivisible bodies are capable of self-motion. Thus it is evident that these philosophers mentioned only two of the causes, i.e., all of them spoke of the material cause) and some of the efficient cause.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit in his autem hic ponit opiniones Pythagoricorum ponentium numeros esse substantias rerum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit opiniones de rerum substantia. Secundo de rerum principiis, ibi, sed cuius gratia advenimus. Circa primum ponit duo, ex quibus inducebantur ad ponendum numeros esse rerum substantias. Secundum ponit ibi, amplius autem harmoniarum et cetera. Dicit ergo quod Pythagorici philosophi fuerunt, in his, idest, contemporanei aliquibus dictorum philosophorum, et ante hos, quia fuerunt quidam quibusdam priores. Sciendum est autem duo fuisse philosophorum genera. Nam quidam vocabantur Ionici, qui morabantur in illa terra, quae nunc Graecia dicitur: et isti sumpserunt principium a Thalete, ut supra dictum est. Alii philosophi fuerunt Italici, in illa parte Italiae quae quondam magna Graecia dicebatur, quae nunc Apulia et Calabria dicitur: quorum philosophorum princeps fuit Pythagoras natione Samius, sic dictus a quadam Calabriae civitate. Et haec duo philosophorum genera simul concurrerunt. Et propter hoc dicit quod fuerunt, in his et ante hos. 119. But during the time of these (57). Here he gives the opinions of the Pythagoreans, who held that numbers are the substances of things. In regard to this he does two things. First, he gives their opinions about the substance of things; and second (124), their opinions about the principles of things (“But the reason”). In regard to the first he gives two reasons by which they were led to assert that numbers are the substances of things. He gives the second reason (121) where he says “Moreover, since they considered.” He says that the Pythagoreans were philosophers who lived “during the time of these,” i.e., they were contemporaries of some of the foregoing philosophers; “and prior to them,” because they preceded some of them. Now it must be understood that there were two groups of philosophers. One group was called the Ionians, who inhabited the land which is now called Greece. This group originated with Thales, as was pointed out above (77). The other group of philosophers were the Italians, who lived in that part of Italy which was once called Greater Greece and is now called Apulia and Calabria. The leader of these philosophers was Pythagoras, a native of Samos, so called from a certain city of Calabria. These two groups of philosophers lived at the same time, and this is why he says that they lived “During the time of these and prior to them.”
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 9 Isti autem Italici philosophi, qui et Pythagorici dicuntur, primi produxerunt quaedam mathematica, ut ea rerum sensibilium substantias et principia esse dicerent. Dicit ergo, primi, quia Platonici eos sunt secuti. Ex hoc autem moti sunt ut mathematica introducerent, quia erant nutriti in eorum studio. Et ideo principia mathematicorum credebant esse principia omnium entium. Consuetum est enim apud homines, quod per ea quae noverunt, de rebus iudicare velint. Et quia inter mathematica numeri sunt priores, ideo conati sunt speculari similitudines rerum naturalium, et quantum ad esse et quantum ad fieri, magis in numeris quam in sensibilibus elementis, quae sunt terra et aqua et huiusmodi. Sicut enim praedicti philosophi passiones rerum sensibilium adaptant passionibus rerum naturalium, per quamdam similitudinem ad proprietates ignis et aquae et huiusmodi corporum: ita mathematici adaptabant proprietates rerum naturalium ad numerorum passiones, quando dicebant quod aliqua passio numerorum est causa iustitiae, et aliqua causa animae et intellectus, et aliqua causa temporis, et sic de aliis. Et sic passiones numerorum intelliguntur esse rationes et principia quaedam omnium apparentium in rebus sensibilibus, et quantum ad res voluntarias, quod designatur per iustitiam, et quantum ad formas substantiales rerum naturalium, quod designatur per intellectum et animam: et quantum ad accidentia, quod designatur per tempus. 120. These Italian philosophers, also called Pythagoreans, were the first to develop certain mathematical entities, so that they said that these are the substances and principles of sensible things. He says that they were “the first” because the Platonists were their successors. They were moved to bring in mathematics because they were brought up in the study of these sciences, and therefore they thought that the principles of mathematics are the principles of all existing things. For men are wont to judge about things in terms of what they already know. And since among mathematical entities numbers are first, these men therefore tried to see resemblances of natural things, both as regards their being and generation, in numbers rather than in the sensible elements—earth, water and the like. For just as the foregoing philosophers adapted the attributes of sensible things to those of natural things because of a certain resemblance which they bear to the properties of fire, water, and bodies of this kind, in a similar fashion these mathematicians adapted the properties of natural things to the attributes of numbers when they said that some one attribute of number is the cause of justice, another the cause of soul and intellect, and still another the cause of opportunity, and so on for other things. And in this way the attributes of numbers are understood to be the intelligible structures and principles of all things appearing in the sensible world, both in the realm of voluntary matters, signified by justice, and in that of the substantial forms of natural things, signified by soul and intellect, and in that of accidents, signified by opportunity.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit secundum motivum. Considerabant enim passiones harmoniarum, consonantiarum musicalium et earum rationes, scilicet proportiones, ex natura numerorum. Unde cum soni consonantes sint quaedam sensibilia, eadem ratione sunt conati et cetera alia sensibilia secundum rationem et secundum totam naturam assimilare numeris, ita quod numeri sunt primi in tota natura. 121. Moreover, since they (58). Here he gives the second reason which motivated them. For they thought of the attributes of harmonies, musical consonants and their ratios, i.e., proportions, in terms of the nature of numbers. Hence, since harmonious sounds are certain sensible things, they attempted by the same reasoning to liken all other sensible things, both in their intelligible structure and in their whole nature, to numbers, so that numbers are the first things in the whole of nature.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 11 Et propter hoc etiam aestimaverunt quod principia numerorum essent principia omnium entium existentium, et totum caelum nihil aliud esse dicebant nisi quamdam naturam et harmoniam numerorum, idest proportionem quamdam numeralem, similem proportioni, quae consideratur in harmoniis. Unde quaecumque habebant confessa, idest manifesta, quae poterant adaptare numeris et harmoniis adaptabant, et quantum ad caeli passiones, sicut sunt motus et eclypses et huiusmodi et quantum ad partes, sicut sunt diversi orbes: et quantum ad totum caeli ornatum, sicut sunt diversae stellae et diversae figurae in constellationibus. 122. For this reason too they thought that the principles of numbers are the principles of all existing things, and they said that the whole heaven is merely a kind of nature and harmony of numbers, i.e., a kind of numerical proportion similar to the proportion found in harmonies. Hence, whatever they had “revealed,” i.e., had shown, which they could adapt to numbers and harmonies, they also adapted both to the changes undergone by the heavens, as its motion, eclipses and the like; and to its parts, as the different orbs; and to the whole arrangement of the heavens, as the different stars and different figures in the constellations.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 12 Et si aliquid deficiebat in rebus manifestis quod non videretur numeris adaptari, advocabant, idest ipsi de novo ponebant continuatum esse eis omne negotium, idest ad hoc quod totum negotium eorum quod erat adaptare sensibilia ad numeros, continuaretur, dum omnia sensibilia numeris adaptarent, sicut patet in uno exemplo. In numeris enim denarius videtur esse perfectus, eo quod est primus limes, et comprehendit in se omnium numerorum naturam: quia omnes alii numeri non sunt nisi quaedam repetitio denarii. Propter quod Plato usque ad decem faciebat numerum, ut dicitur quarto physicorum. Unde et Pythagoras, sphaeras, quae moventur in caelo, dixit decem, quamvis novem solum harum sint apparentes: quia deprehenduntur septem motibus planetarum, octava ex motu stellarum fixarum, nona vero ex motu diurno, qui est motus primus. Sed et Pythagoras addit decimam quae esset antictona idest in contrarium mota in inferioribus sphaeris, et per consequens in contrarium sonans. Dicebat enim ex motu caelestium corporum fieri quamdam harmoniam: unde sicut harmonia fit ex proportione sonorum contrariorum, scilicet gravis et acuti, ita ponebat quod in caelo erat unus motus in oppositam partem aliis motibus, ut fieret harmonia. Et secundum hanc positionem motus diurnus pertinebat ad decimam sphaeram, quae est ab oriente in occidentem, aliis sphaeris revolutis e contrario ab occidente in orientem. Nona vero secundum eum esse poterat, quae primo revolvebat omnes sphaeras inferiores in contrarium primi motus. De his autem quae ad opinionem istam Pythagorae pertinent, determinatum est diffusius et certius in ultimis libris huius scientiae.

Lecture 8

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 8 n. 1 Hic ponit opinionem Pythagoricorum de principiis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quid circa rerum principia aestimabant. Secundo ad quod genus causae principia ab eis posita reducuntur, ibi, ab his igitur ambobus et cetera. Ponit autem circa primum tres opiniones. Secunda incipit ibi, eorumdem autem alii et cetera. Tertia ibi, quemadmodum videtur. Dicit ergo primo, quod huius gratia venit ad opiniones Pythagoricorum recitandas, ut ostenderet per eorum opiniones, quae sunt rerum principia, et quomodo rerum principia ab eis posita incidunt in causas suprapositas. Videntur enim Pythagorici ponere numerum esse principium entium sicut numerum, et passiones numeri esse sicut passiones entium, et sicut habitus; ut per passiones intelligamus accidentia cito transeuntia, per habitus accidentia permanentia. Sicut ponebant quod passio alicuius numeri secundum quam dicitur aliquis numerus par, erat iustitia propter aequalitatem divisionis, quia talis numerus aequaliter per media dividitur usque ad unitatem, sicut octonarius in duos quaternarios, quaternarius vero in duos binarios, et binarius in duas unitates. Et simili modo alia accidentia rerum assimilabant accidentibus numerorum. 124. Here he states what the Pythagoreans had to say about the principles of things. In regard to this he does two things. First, he expounds their opinions about the principles of things; and second (132), he indicates to what class of cause the principles laid down by them are reduced (“From both of these”). In regard to the first he gives three opinions. The second (127) begins at the words “But other members”; and the third (131), where he says “Alcmaeon of Croton.” He says first (59), then, that the reason he came to examine the opinions of the Pythagoreans is that he might show from their opinions what the principles of things are and how the principles laid down by them fall under the causes given above. For the Pythagoreans seem to hold that number is the principle of existing things as matter,1 and that the attributes of number are the attributes and states of existing things. By “attributes” we mean transient accidents, and by “states,” permanent accidents. They also held that the attribute of any number according to which any number is said to be even is justice, because of the equality of division, since such a number is evenly divided into two parts right down to the unit. For example, the number eight is divided into two fours, the number four into two twos, and the number two into two units. And in a similar way they likened the other accidents of things to the accidents of numbers.
lib. 1 l. 8 n. 2 Principia vero numerorum dicebant esse par et impar, quae sunt primae numerorum differentiae. Paremque numerum dicebant esse principium infinitatis, imparem vero principium finitatis, sicut exponitur in tertio physicorum: quia infinitum in rebus praecipue videtur sequi divisionem continui. Par autem est numerus aptus divisioni. Impar enim sub se numerum parem concludit addita unitate, quae indivisionem causat. Probat etiam hoc, quia numeri impares per ordinem sibi additi semper retinent figuram quadrati, pares autem figuram variant. Ternarius enim unitati quae est principium numerorum additus facit quaternarium, qui primus est quadratus. Nam bis duo quatuor sunt. Rursus quaternario quinarius additus, qui est impar, secundum novenarium constituit, qui est etiam quadratus: et sic de aliis. Si vero binarius qui est primus par, unitati addatur, triangularem numerum constituit, scilicet ternarium. Cui si addatur quaternarius, qui est secundus par, constituit heptangulum numerum, qui est septenarius. Et sic deinceps numeri pares sibiinvicem additi, figuram non eamdem servant. Et hac ratione infinitum attribuebant pari, finitum vero impari. Et quia finitum est ex parte formae, cui competit vis activa, ideo pares numeros dicebant esse feminas, impares vero masculos. 125. in fact, they said that the even and odd, which are the first differences of numbers, are the principles of num hers. And they said that even number is the principle of unlimitedness and odd number the principle of limitation, as is shown in the Physics, Book III, because in reality the unlimited seems to result chiefly from the division of the continuous. But an even number is capable of division; for an odd number includes within itself an even number plus a unit, and this makes it indivisible. He also proves this as followswhen odd numbers are added to each other successively, they always retain the figure of a square, whereas even numbers change their figure. For when the number three is added to the unit, which is the principle of numbers, the number four results, which is the first square [number], because 2 x 2 = 4. Again, when the number five, which is an odd number, is added to the number four, the number nine results, which is also a square number; and so on with the others. But if the number two, which is the first even number, is added to the number one, a triangular number results, i.e., the number three. And if the number four, which is the second even number, is added to the number three, there results a septangular number, i.e., the number seven. And when even numbers are added to each other successively in this way, they do not retain the same figure. This is why they attributed the unlimited to the even and the limited to the odd. And since limitedness pertains to form, to which active power belongs, they therefore said that even numbers are feminine, and odd numbers, masculine.
lib. 1 l. 8 n. 3 Ex his vero duobus, scilicet pari et impari, finito et infinito, non solum numerum constituebant, sed etiam ipsum unum, idest unitatem. Unitas enim et par est virtute et impar. Omnes enim differentiae numeri unitati conveniunt in virtute, quia quaecumque differentiae numeri in unitate resolvuntur. Unde in ordine imparium primum invenitur unitas. Et similiter in ordine parium et quadratorum et perfectorum numerorum, et sic de aliis numeri differentiis: quia unitas licet non sit actu aliquis numerus, est tamen omnis numerus virtute. Et sicut unum dicebat componi ex pari et impari, ita numerum ex unitatibus: caelum vero et omnia sensibilia ex numeris. Et hic erat ordo principiorum quem ponebant. 126. From these two, namely, the even and odd, the limited and unlimited, they produced not only number but also the unit itself, i.e., unity. For unity is virtually both even and odd; because all differences of number are virtually contained in the unit; for all differences of number are reduced to the unit. Hence, in the list of odd numbers the unit is found to be the first. And the same is true in the list of even numbers, square numbers, and perfect numbers. This is also the case with the other differences of number, because even though the unit is not actually a number, it is still virtually all numbers. And just as the unit is said to be composed of the even and odd, in a similar way number is composed of units. In fact, [according to them], the heavens and all sensible things are composed of numbers. This was the sequence of principles which they gave.
lib. 1 l. 8 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit eorumdem autem hic ponit aliam opinionem Pythagoricorum de principiis; dicens, quod de numero eorumdem Pythagoricorum fuerunt aliqui, qui non posuerunt unam tantum contrarietatem in principiis, sicut praedicti; sed posuerunt decem principia secundum coelementationem dicta, idest accipiendo unumquodque illorum cum suo coelemento, idest cum suo contrario. Et huius positionis ratio fuit, quia non solum accipiebant prima principia, sed etiam proxima principia singulis rerum generibus attributa. Ponebant ergo primo finitum et infinitum, sicut et illi qui praedicti sunt; et consequenter par et impar, quibus finitum et infinitum attribuitur. Et quia par et impar sunt prima rerum principia, et primo ex eis causantur numeri, ponebant tertio differentiam numerorum, scilicet unum et plura, quae duo ex pari et impari causabantur. Et quia ex numero constituebantur magnitudines, secundum quod in numeris positionem accipiebant (nam secundum eos punctus nihil aliud erat quam unitas positionem habens, et linea dualitas positionem habens), ideo consequenter ponebant principia positionum dextrum et sinistrum. Dextrum enim invenitur perfectum, sinistrum autem imperfectum. Et ideo dextrum erat ex parte imparis, sinistrum ex parte paris. Quia vero naturalia super magnitudines mathematicas addunt virtutem activam et passivam, ideo ulterius ponebant principia masculum et feminam. Masculum enim ad virtutem activam pertinet, femineum ad passivam: quorum masculum pertinet ad imparem, femineum vero ad parem numerum, ut dictum est. 127. But other members (60). Here he gives another opinion which the Pythagoreans held about the principles of things. He says that among these same Pythagoreans there were some who claimed that there is not just one contrariety in principles, as the foregoing did, but ten principles, which are presented as co-elements, that is, by taking each of these principles with its co-principle, or contrary. The reason for this position was that they took not only the first principles but also the proximate principles attributed to each class of things. Hence, they posited first the limited and the unlimited, as did those who have just been mentioned; and subsequently the even and the odd, to which the limited and unlimited are attributed. And because the even and odd are the first principles of things, and numbers are first produced from them, they posited, third, a difference of numbers, namely, the one and the many, both of which are produced from the even and the odd. Again, because continuous quantities are composed of numbers, inasmuch as they understood numbers to have position (for according to them the point was merely the unit having position, and the line the number two having position), they therefore claimed next that the principles of positions are the right and left; for the right is found to be perfect and the left imperfect. Therefore the right is determined from the aspect of oddness, and the left from the aspect of evenness. But because natural bodies have both active and passive powers in addition to mathematical extensions, they therefore next maintained that masculine and feminine are principles. For masculine pertains to active power, and feminine to passive power; and of these masculine pertains to odd number and feminine to even number, as has been stated (125).
lib. 1 l. 8 n. 5 Ex virtute autem activa et passiva sequitur in rebus motus et quies: quorum motus quia deformitatem habet et alteritatem, in ordine infiniti et paris ponitur, quies vero in ordine finiti et imparis. Differentiae autem motuum primae sunt circulare et rectum. Et ideo consequenter rectum ad parem numerum pertinet; unde et lineam rectam dualitatem esse dicebant. Curvum vero sive circulare ratione uniformitatis pertinet ad imparem, qui indivisionem ex forma unitatis retinet. 128. Now it is from active and passive power that motion and rest originate in the world; and of these motion is placed in the class of the unlimited and even, because it partakes of irregularity and otherness, and rest in the class of the unlimited and odd. Furthermore, the first differences of motions are the circular and straight, so that as a consequence of this the straight pertains to even number. Hence they said that the straight line is the number two; but that the curved or circular line, by reason of its uniformity, pertains to odd number, which retains its undividedness because of the form of unity.
lib. 1 l. 8 n. 6 Nec solum ponebant principia rerum quantum ad actiones naturales et motus, sed etiam quantum ad actiones animales. Et quantum quidem ad cognitionem ponebant lucem et tenebras: quantum vero ad appetitum, bonum et malum. Nam lux est cognitionis principium, tenebra vero ignorantiae ascribitur. Bonum etiam est in quod appetitus tendit, malum vero a quo recedit. 129. And they not only posited principles to account for the natural operations and motions of things, but also to account for the operations of living things. In fact, they held that light and darkness are principles of knowing, but that good and evil are principles of appetite. For light is a principle of knowing, whereas darkness is ascribed to ignorance; and good is that to which appetite tends, whereas evil is that from which it turns away.
lib. 1 l. 8 n. 7 Diversitas autem perfectionis et imperfectionis non solum in naturalibus et voluntariis virtutibus et motibus invenitur, sed etiam in magnitudine et figuris. Quae quidem figurae intelliguntur ut supervenientes substantiis magnitudinum, sicut virtutes motus et actiones substantiis rerum naturalium. Et ideo quantum ad hoc ponebant principium quadrangulare, idest quadratum, et altera parte longius. Dicitur autem quadratum figura constans ex quatuor lateribus aequalibus, cuius quatuor anguli sunt recti; et provenit talis figura ex ductu alicuius lineae in seipsam. Unde cum ex ipsa unitate causetur, ad numerum imparem pertinet. Figura vero altera parte longior dicitur, cuius omnes anguli sunt recti, et latera vicissim sibi opposita sunt aequalia, non tamen omnia latera sunt aequalia omnibus. Unde patet quod sicut quadratum consurgit ex ductu unius lineae in seipsam, ita figura altera parte longior, ex ductu duarum linearum in unam. Et sic pertinet ad numerum parem, qui primus est dualitas. 130. Again, [according to them] the difference of perfection and imperfection is found not only in natural things and in voluntary powers and motions, but also in continuous quantities and figures. These figures are understood to be something over and above the substances of continuous quantities, just as the powers responsible for motions and operations are something over and above the substances of natural bodies. Therefore with reference to this they held that what is quadrangular, i.e., the square and oblong, is a principle. Now a square is said to be a figure of four equal sides, whose four angles are right angles; and such a figure is produced by multiplying a line by itself. Therefore, since it is produced from the unit itself, it belongs to the class of odd number. But an oblong is defined as a figure whose angles are all right angles and whose opposite sides alone, not all sides, are equal to each other. Hence it is clear that, just as a square is produced by multiplying one line by itself, in a similar way an oblong is produced by multiplying one line by another. Hence it pertains to the class of even number, of which the first is the number two.
lib. 1 l. 8 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit quemadmodum hic ponit tertiam opinionem Pythagoricorum, dicens, quod Alcmaeon Crotoniates, sic dictus a civitate unde oriundus fuit, videtur suscipere quantum ad aliquid idem quod praedicti Pythagorici dixerunt, scilicet quod plura contraria sint principia. Aut enim accepit a Pythagoricis, aut illi ab isto. Et quod utrumque esse potuerit, patet per hoc quod fuit contemporaneus Pythagoricorum: ita tamen quod incoepit philosophari Pythagora sene existente. Sed qualitercumque fuerit, multum similiter enunciavit Pythagoricis. Dixit enim multa quae sunt humanorum idest multa rerum sensibilium esse in quadam dualitate constituta, intelligens per dualitatem opposita contrarie. Sed tamen in hoc differt a praedictis, quia Pythagorici dicebant determinatas contrarietates esse rerum principia. Sed ille proiecit quasi inordinate ponens quascumque contrarietates, quae a fortuna ad mentem suam deveniebant, esse rerum principia: sicut album nigrum, dulce amarum, et sic de aliis. 131. Akmaeon of Croton (61). Here he gives the third opinion of the Pythagoreans, saying that Alcmaeon of Croton, so named from the city in which he was raised, seems to maintain somewhat the same view as that expressed by these Pythagoreans, namely, that many contraries are the principles of things. For either he derives the theory from the Pythagoreans, or they from him. That either of these might be true is clear from the fact that he was a contemporary of the Pythagoreans, granted that he began to philosophize when Pythagoras was an old man. But whichever happens to be true, he expressed views similar to those of the Pythagoreans. For he said that many of the things “in the realm of human affairs,” i.e., many of the attributes of sensible things are arranged in pairs, understanding by pairs opposites which are contrary. Yet in this matter he differs from the foregoing philosophers, because the Pythagoreans said that determinate contraries are the principles of things. But he throws them in, as it were, without any order, holding that any of the contraries which he happened to think of are the principles of things, such as white and black, sweet and bitter, and so on.
lib. 1 l. 8 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit ab his igitur hic colligit ex praedictis quid Pythagorici de principiis senserunt, et quomodo principia ab eis posita ad aliquod genus causae reducantur. Dicit ergo quod ex ambobus praedictis, scilicet Alcmaeone et Pythagoricis una communis opinio accipi potest, scilicet quod principia entium sunt contraria; quod non est ab aliis dictum. Quod intelligendum est circa causam materialem. Nam circa causam efficientem posuit Empedocles contrarietatem. Antiqui vero naturales, contraria posuerunt principia, ut rarum et densum; contrarietatem tamen ex parte formae assignantes. Empedocles vero etsi principia materialia posuerit quatuor elementa, non tamen posuit ea principia prima materialia ratione contrarietatis, sed propter eorum naturas et substantiam: isti vero contrarietatem ex parte materiae posuerunt. 132. From both of these (62). Here he gathers together from the above remarks what the Pythagoreans thought about the principles of things, and how the principles which they posited are reduced to some class of cause. He says, then, that from both of those mentioned above, namely, Alcmaeon and the Pythagoreans, it is possible to draw one common opinion, namely, that the principles of existing things are contraries; which was not expressed by the other thinkers. This must be understood with reference to the material cause. For Empedocles posited contrariety in the case of the efficient cause; and the ancient philosophers of nature posited contrary principles, such as rarity and density, although they attributed contrariety to form. But even though Empedocles held that the four elements are material principles, he still did not claim that they are the first material principles by reason of contrariety but because of their natures and substance. These men, however, attributed contrariety to matter.
lib. 1 l. 8 n. 10 Quae etiam sint ista contraria quae isti posuerunt, patet ex dictis. Sed quomodo praedicta principia contraria ab eis posita possunt conduci idest reduci ad praedictas species causarum, non est manifeste articulatum, idest distincte expressum ab eis. Tamen videtur quod huiusmodi principia ordinentur secundum speciem causae materialis. Dicunt enim quod substantia rerum constituitur et plasmatur ab istis principiis, sicut ex his quae insunt: quod est ratio causae materialis. Materia enim est ex qua fit aliquid cum insit. Quod quidem dicitur ad differentiam privationis, ex qua etiam dicitur aliquid fieri, non tamen inest, sicut dicitur musicum fieri ex non musico. 133. The nature of the contraries posited by these men is evident from the foregoing discussion. But how the aforesaid contrary principles posited by them can be “brought together under,” i.e., reduced to, the types of causes described, is not clearly “expressed,” i.e., distinctly stated, by them. Yet it seems that such principles are allotted to the class of material cause; for they say that the substance of things is composed and moulded out of these principles as something inherent, and this is the notion of a material cause. For matter is that from which a thing comes to be as something inherent. This is added to distinguish it from privation, from which something also comes to be but which is not inherent, as the musical is said to come from the non-musical.

Lecture 9

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 1 Hic ponit opiniones philosophorum de toto universo, sicut de uno ente; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit eorum opiniones in communi. Secundo ostendit quomodo consideratio huius opinionis ad praesentem tractatum pertineat, et quomodo non, ibi, igitur ad praesentem et cetera. Dicit ergo quod aliqui alii philosophi a praedictis fuerunt, qui enuntiaverunt, de omni, idest de universo quasi de una natura, idest quasi totum universum esset unum ens vel una natura. Quod tamen non eodem modo omnes posuerunt, sicut infra patebit. Ipso tamen modo, quo diversificati sunt, nec bene dixerunt, nec naturaliter. Nullus enim eorum naturaliter locutus est, quia motum rebus subtrahunt. Nullus etiam bene locutus est, quia positionem impossibilem posuerunt, et per rationes sophisticas: sicut patet primo physicorum. 134. Here he gives the opinions of those philosophers who spoke of the whole universe as one being; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the opinion which they held in common; and second (135), he shows how a consideration of this opinion is relevant to the present treatise, and how it is not (“Therefore a consideration”). He says, then, that there were certain philosophers, other than those just mentioned, who spoke “of the whole,” i.e,, of the universe, as if it were of one nature, i.e., as if the whole universe were a single being or a single nature. However, not all maintained this position in the same way, as he will make clear below (138-49). Yet in the way in which they differ their statements are neither acceptable nor in conformity with nature. None of their statements are in conformity with nature, because they did away with motion in things. And none of them are acceptable, because they held an impossible position and used sophistical arguments, as is clear in Book I of the Physics.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit igitur ad hic ostendit quomodo consideratio huius positionis ad praesentem tractatum pertinet, et quomodo non. Et primo ostendit quod non pertinet, si consideretur eorum positio. Secundo ostendit quod pertinet, si consideretur positionis ratio, vel positionis modus, ibi, sed quidem secundum causam et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod quia isti philosophi posuerunt tantum unum ens, et unum non potest suiipsius esse causa, patet, quod ipsi non potuerunt invenire causas. Nam positio, idest pluralitas, causarum diversitatem in rebus exigit. Unde, quantum ad praesentem perscrutationem quae est de causis, non congruit ut sermo de eis habeatur. Secus autem est de antiquis naturalibus, qui tantum ens posuerunt esse unum, de quibus debet hic sermo haberi. Illi enim ex illo uno generant multa, sicut ex materia, et sic ponunt causam et causatum. Sed isti de quibus nunc agitur, alio modo dicunt. Non enim dicunt quod sint omnia unum secundum materiam, ita quod ex uno omnia generentur; sed dicunt quod simpliciter sunt unum. 135. Therefore a consideration (64). Here he shows how a consideration of this position pertains to the present investigation and how it does not. He shows, first, that it has no bearing on this investigation if we consider their position itself; and, second (137), that it does have a bearing on this investigation if the reasoning or method behind their position is considered (“Yet their opinion”). He says, then, that since these philosophers held that there is only one being, and a single thing cannot be its own cause, it is clear that they could not discover the causes. For the position that there is a plurality of things demands a diversity of causes in the world. Hence, a consideration of their statements is of no value for the purposes of the present study, which deals with causes. But the situation is different in the case of the ancient philosophers of nature, who held that there is only one being, and whose statements must be considered here. For they generated many things from that one principle as matter, and thus posited both cause and effect. But these men with whom we are now dealing speak of this in a different way. For they do not say that all things are one materially, so that all things are generated from one matter, but that all things are one in an absolute sense.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 3 Et ratio huius diversitatis est, quod antiqui naturales apponebant motum illis, qui ponebant unum principium et unum ens, dicentes ipsum esse mobile. Et ideo per aliquem modum motus, sicut per rarefactionem et condensationem poterant ex illo uno diversa generari. Et per hunc modum dicebant generari totum universum secundum diversitatem, quae in partibus eius invenitur. Et tamen quia non ponebant variationem secundum substantiam, nisi secundum accidentia, ut supra dictum est, ideo relinquebatur quod totum universum esset unum secundum substantiam, diversificatum tamen secundum accidentia. Sed isti dicebant illud quod ponebant esse unum penitus immobile. Et ideo ex illo uno non poterat aliqua diversitas rerum causari. Et propter hoc nec secundum substantiam nec secundum accidentia pluralitatem in rebus ponere poterant. 136. The reason for this difference is that the ancient philosophers of nature added motion to the view of those who posited one being and one principle, and said that this one being is mobile; and therefore different things could be generated from that one principle by a certain kind of motion, i.e., by rarefaction and condensation. And they said that the whole universe with respect to the diversity found in its parts is generated in this way. Yet since they held that the only change affecting substance is accidental, as was stated above (75), the conclusion then followed that the whole universe is one thing substantially but many things accidentally. But these thinkers [i.e., the Eleatics], said that the one being which they posited is immobile in an absolute sense; and therefore a diversity of things could not be produced from that one being. For since this being is immobile they could not posit any plurality in the world, either substantial or accidental.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit sed quidem hic ostendit quomodo eorum opinio pertineat ad praesentem perscrutationem. Et primo generaliter de omnibus. Secundo specialiter de Parmenide, ibi, igitur hi. Dicit ergo primo, quod licet diversitatem rebus auferrent, et per consequens causalitatem, tamen eorum opinio est propria praesenti inquisitioni, secundum tantum quantum dicetur: quantum scilicet ad modum ponendi, et quantum ad rationem positionis. 137. Yet their opinion (65). Here he shows how their opinion is relevant to the present inquiry. First, he deals with all of these thinkers in general; and second (142), with Parmenides in particular. He says, first, that although they did away with diversity in the world, and consequently with causality, nevertheless their opinion is relevant to the present study to this extent, let us say: as regards the method by which they establish their position and the reason for their position.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 5 Parmenides enim qui fuit unus ex eis, videtur tangere unitatem secundum rationem, idest ex parte formae. Argumentatur enim sic. Quicquid est praeter ens, est non ens: et quicquid est non ens, est nihil: ergo quicquid est praeter ens est nihil. Sed ens est unum. Ergo quicquid est praeter unum, est nihil. In quo patet quod considerabat ipsam rationem essendi quae videtur esse una, quia non potest intelligi quod ad rationem entis aliquid superveniat per quod diversificetur: quia illud quod supervenit enti, oportet esse extraneum ab ente. Quod autem est huiusmodi, est nihil. Unde non videtur quod possit diversificare ens. Sicut etiam videmus quod differentiae advenientes generi diversificant ipsum, quae tamen sunt praeter substantiam eius. Non enim participant differentiae genus, ut dicitur quarto topicorum. Aliter genus esset de substantia differentiae, et in definitionibus esset nugatio, si posito genere, adderetur differentia, si de eius substantia esset genus, sicut esset nugatio si species adderetur. In nullo etiam differentia a specie differret. Ea vero quae sunt praeter substantiam entis, oportet esse non ens, et ita non possunt diversificare ens. 138. Parmenides, who was a member of this group, seems to touch on unity according to intelligible structure) i.e., according to form; for he argued as follows: besides being there is only non-being, and non-being is nothing. Therefore besides being there is nothing. But being is one. Therefore, besides the one there is nothing. In this argument he clearly considered the intelligible structure itself of being, which seems to be one, because nothing can be understood to be added to the concept of being by which it might be diversified. For whatever is added to being must be other than being. But anything such as this is nothing. Hence it does not seem that this can diversify being; just as we also see that differences added to a genus diversify it, even though these differences are outside the substance of that genus. For differences do not participate in a genus, as is stated in the Topics, Book IV, otherwise a genus would have the substance of a difference. And definitions would be nonsense if when a genus is given the difference were added, granted that the genus were the substance of the difference, just as it would be nonsense if the species were added. Moreover a difference would not differ in any way from a species. But those things which are outside the substance of being must be non-being, and thus cannot diversify being.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 6 Sed in hoc decipiebantur, quia utebantur ente quasi una ratione et una natura sicut est natura alicuius generis; hoc enim est impossibile. Ens enim non est genus, sed multipliciter dicitur de diversis. Et ideo in primo physicorum dicitur quod haec est falsa, ens est unum: non enim habet unam naturam sicut unum genus vel una species. 139. But they were mistaken in this matter, because they used being as if it were one in intelligible structure and in nature, like the nature of any genus. But this is impossible. For being is not a genus but is predicated of different things in many ways. Therefore in Book I of the Physics it is said that the statement “Being is one” is false. For being does not have one nature like one genus or one species.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 7 Sed Melissus considerabat ens ex parte materiae. Argumentabatur enim unitatem entis, ex eo quod ens non generatur ex aliquo priori, quod proprie pertinet ad materiam quae est ingenita. Arguebat enim sic: quod est generatum, habet principium; ens non est generatum, ergo non habet principium. Quod autem caret principio, et fine caret; ergo est infinitum. Et si est infinitum, est immobile: quia infinitum non habet extra se quo moveatur. Quod autem ens non generetur, probat sic. Quia si generatur, aut generatur ex ente, aut ex non ente; atqui nec ex non ente, quia non ens est nihil, et ex nihilo nihil fit. Nec ex ente; quia sic aliquid esset antequam fieret; ergo nullo modo generatur. In qua quidem ratione patet quod tetigit ens ex parte materiae; quia non generari ex aliquo prius existente materiae est. Et quia finitum pertinet ad formam, infinitum vero ad materiam, Melissus qui considerabat ens ex parte materiae, dixit esse unum ens infinitum. Parmenides vero, qui considerabat ens ex parte formae, dixit ens esse finitum. Sic igitur inquantum consideratur ens ratione materiae et formae, tractare de his pertinet ad praesentem considerationem, quia materia et forma in numero causarum ponuntur. 140. But Melissus considered being in terms of matter. For he argued that being is one by reason of the fact that being is not generated from something prior, and this characteristic pertains properly to matter, which is ungenerated. For he argued in this way: whatever is generated has a starting-point. But being is not generated and therefore does not have a starting-point. But whatever lacks a starting-point lacks an end and therefore is unlimited. And if it is unlimited, it is immobile, because what is unlimited has nothing outside itself by which it is moved. That being is not generated he proves thus. If being were generated, it would be generated either from being or from non-being. But it is not generated from non-being, because non-being is nothing and from nothing nothing comes. Nor is it generated from being, because then a thing would be before it came to be. Therefore it is not generated in any way. In this argument he obviously treats being as matter, because it is of the very nature of matter not to be generated from something prior. And since limitation pertains to form, and unlimitedness to matter, Melissus, who considered being under the aspect of matter, said that there is one unlimited being. But Parmenides, who considered being under the aspect of form, said that being is limited. Hence, insofar as being is considered under the aspect of form and matter, a study of these men is relevant to the present investigation; because matter and form are included among the causes.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 8 Xenophanes vero qui fuit primus inter dicentes omnia esse unum, unde etiam Parmenides fuit eius discipulus, non explanavit qua ratione diceret omnia esse unum, nec sumendo rationem aliquam ex parte materiae, nec ex parte formae. Et sic de neutra natura scilicet neque de materia neque de forma visus est tangere hos id est pertingere et adaequare eos irrationalitate dicendi; sed respiciens ad totum caelum dixit esse ipsum unum Deum. Antiqui enim dicebant ipsum mundum esse Deum. Unde videns omnes partes mundi in hoc esse similes, quia corporeae sunt, iudicavit de eis quasi omnia essent unum. Et sicut praedicti posuerunt unitatem entium per considerationem eorum quae pertinent ad formam vel ad materiam, ita iste respiciens ad ipsum compositum. 141. But Xenophanes, who was the first of those to say that everything is one (and therefore Parmenides was his disciple), did not explain by what reasoning he maintained that all things are one, either by arguing from the viewpoint of matter, or from that of form. Hence, with respect to neither nature, i.e., neither matter nor form, does he seem “to come up to these men,” that is, to reach and equal them in their irrational manner of arguing. But concerning the whole heaven he says that the one is God. For the ancients said that the world itself is God. Hence, seeing that all parts of the universe are alike insofar as they are bodies, he came to think of them as if they were all one. And just as the foregoing philosophers held that beings are one by considering those things which pertain either to matter or to form, in a similar way these philosophers maintained this position regarding the composite itself.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit igitur ii his specialiter intendit dicere quomodo opinio Parmenidis ad perscrutationem praesentem pertineat; concludens ex praedictis, quod quia diversitatem ab entibus auferebant, et per consequens causalitatem, quantum ad praesentem quaestionem pertinet, omnes praetermittendi sunt. Sed duo eorum, scilicet Xenophanes et Melissus, sunt penitus praetermittendi, quia aliquantulum fuerunt, agrestiores, idest minus subtiliter procedentes. Sed Parmenides visus est dicere suam opinionem, magis videns, idest quasi plus intelligens. Utitur enim tali ratione. Quicquid est praeter ens, est non ens: quicquid est non ens, dignatur esse nihil idest dignum reputat esse nihil. Unde ex necessitate putat sequi quod ens sit unum, et quicquid est aliud ab ente, sit nihil. De qua quidem ratione manifestius dictum est primo physicorum. 142. As we have stated (66). His aim here is to explain in a special way how the opinion of Parmenides pertains to the present investigation. He concludes from the foregoing that, since these men did away with (~) diversity in the world and therefore with (~) causality, all of them must be disregarded so far as the present study is concerned. Two of them—Xenophanes and Melissus—must be disregarded altogether, because they are a little too “rustic,” i.e., they proceeded with less accuracy. But Parmenides seems to have expressed his views “with more insight,” i.e., with greater understanding. For he employs the following argument: besides being there is only non-being, and whatever is non-being “is thought to be nothing”; i.e., he considers it worthy to be nothing. Hence he thought that it necessarily followed that being is one, and that whatever is other than being is nothing. This argument has been treated more clearly in the Physics, Book I.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 10 Licet autem Parmenides ista ratione cogatur ad ponendum omnia esse unum; tamen quia sensui apparebat multitudinem esse in rebus, coactus sequi ea quae apparent, voluit in sua positione utrique satisfacere, et apparentiae sensus et rationi. Unde dixit quod omnia sunt unum secundum rationem, sed sunt plura secundum sensum. Et inquantum ponebat pluralitatem secundum sensum, potuit in rebus ponere causam et causatum. Unde posuit duas causas, scilicet calidum et frigidum: quorum unum attribuebat igni, aliud terrae. Et unum videbatur pertinere ad causam efficientem, scilicet calidum et ignis; aliud ad causam materialem, scilicet frigidum et terra. Et ne eius positio suae rationi videretur esse opposita, qua concludebat quod quicquid est praeter unum, est nihil: dicebat quod unum praedictorum, scilicet calidum, erat ens: alterum vero quod est praeter illud unum ens, scilicet frigidum, dicebat esse non ens secundum rationem et rei veritatem, sed esse ens solum secundum apparentiam sensus. 143. But even though Parmenides was compelled by this argument to hold that all things are one, yet, because there appeared to the senses to be many things in reality, and because he was compelled to accept what appeared to the senses, it was his aim to make his position conform to both of these, i.e., to what is apprehended both by the senses and by reason. Hence he said that all things are one according to reason but many according to the senses. And inasmuch as he held that there is a plurality of things according to the senses, he was able to hold that there is in the world both cause and effect. Hence he posited two causes, namely, the hot and the cold, one of which he ascribed to fire, and the other to earth. And one of these—the hot or fire—seemed to pertain to the efficient cause, and the other—cold or earth—to the material cause. And lest his position should seem to contradict the conclusion of his own argument that whatever is besides being is nothing, he said that one of these causes—the hot—is being, and that the other cause—the one besides being, or the cold—is non-being, according to. both reason and the truth of the thing itself, and is a being only according to sensory perception.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 11 In hoc autem aliquo modo ad veritatem appropinquat. Nam principium materiale non est ens in actu cui attribuebat terram; similiter etiam alterum contrariorum est ut privatio, ut dicitur primo physicorum. Privatio autem ad rationem non entis pertinet. Unde et frigidum quodammodo est privatio calidi, et sic est non ens. 144. Now in this matter he comes very close to the truth; for the material principle, which he held to be earth, is not an actual being. And in a similar way, too, one of two contraries is a privation, as is said in Book I of the Physics. But privation does not belong to the intelligible constitution of being. Hence in a sense cold is the privation of heat, and thus is non-being.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit igitur ex hic recolligit ea, quae dicta sunt de opinionibus antiquorum; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo recolligit ea quae dicta sunt de opinionibus antiquorum naturalium. Secundo quae dicta sunt de opinionibus Pythagoricorum qui mathematicam introduxerunt, ibi, Pythagorici et cetera. Concludit ergo primo ex dictis, quod ex his praedictis, qui idem considerabant, scilicet esse causam materialem rerum substantiam, et qui iam incipiebant per rationem sapere causas rerum inquirendo ipsas, accepimus eas quae dictae sunt. A primis namque philosophis acceptum est quod principium omnium rerum est corporeum. Quod patet per hoc, quod aqua et huiusmodi quae principia rerum ponebant, quaedam corpora sunt. In hoc autem differebant, quod quidam ponebant illud principium corporeum esse unum tantum, sicut Thales, Diogenes, et similes. Quidam vero ponebant esse plura, sicut Anaxagoras, Democritus et Empedocles. Utrique tamen, tam isti qui ponebant unum, quam illi qui ponebant plura esse, huiusmodi corporea principia ponebat in specie causae materialis. Quidam vero eorum non solum causam materialem posuerunt, sed cum ea addiderunt causam unde principium motus: quidam eam unam ponentes, sicut Anaxagoras intellectum, et Parmenides amorem: quidam vero duas, sicut Empedocles amorem et odium. 145. From what has been said (67). Here he summarizes the remarks which have been made about the doctrines of the ancient philosophers; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he summarizes the remarks made about the doctrines of the ancient philosophers of nature; and second (147), those made about the doctrines of the Pythagoreans, who introduced mathematics. Therefore from the above remarks he concludes, first, that from the foregoing philosophers, who adopted the same opinion, namely, that the material cause is the substance of things, and who were already beginning by the use of reason to know the causes of things by investigating them, we learn the causes which have been mentioned. For from the first philosophers it was learned that the principle of all things is corporeal. This is evident from the fact that water and the like, which are given as the principles of things, are bodies. However, they differed in this respect, that some, such as Thales, Diogenes and similar thinkers, claimed that there is only one corporeal principle, whereas others, such as Anaxagoras, Democritus and Leucippus, held that there are several corporeal principles. Yet both groups, i.e., both those who posited one principle and those who posited many, placed such corporeal principles in the class of material cause. And some of them not only posited a material cause but added to this the cause from which motion begins: some holding it to be one, as Anaxagoras did in positing intellect, and Parmenides, love, and others to be two, as Empedocles did in positing love and hate.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 13 Unde patet quod praedicti philosophi qui fuerunt usque ad Italicos, scilicet Pythagoram, et absque illis idest separatam opinionem habentes de rebus non communicando opinionibus Pythagoricorum, obscurius dixerunt de principiis, quia non assignabant ad quod genus causae huiusmodi principia reducerentur: et tamen utebantur duabus causis, scilicet principio motus et materia; et alteram istarum, scilicet ipsam unde principium motus, quidam fecerunt unam, ut dictum est, quidam duas. 146. Hence, it is clear that these philosophers who lived down to the time of the Italians, or Pythagoreans, “and [were] independent of them,” i.e., who had their own opinions about reality and were unaware of those of the Pythagoreans, spoke obscurely about the principles of things; for they did not designate to what class of cause such principles might be reduced. Yet they made use of two causes, i.e., the source from which motion begins and matter: some saying that the former—the source from which motion begins—is one, and others two; as has been pointed out (145).
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit Pythagorici vero hic recolligit quae dicta sunt a Pythagoricis, et quantum ad id quod erat commune cum praedictis, et quantum ad id quod erat eis proprium. Commune tamen fuit aliquibus praedictorum et Pythagoricorum, quod ponerent duo principia aliqualiter eodem modo cum praedictis. Sicut enim Empedocles ponebat duo principia contraria, quorum unum erat principium bonorum, et aliud principium malorum, ita et Pythagorici: ut patet ex coordinatione principiorum contrariorum supposita a Pythagoricis. 147. Now the Pythagoreans (68). Here he summarizes the opinions expressed by the Pythagoreans, both what they held in common with the foregoing philosophers, and what was peculiar to themselves. Now the opinion common to some of the foregoing philosophers and to the Pythagoreans was this that they posited, in a sense, two principles in the same way as the foregoing philosophers did. For Empedocles held that there are two contrary principles, one being the principle of good things, and the other the principle of evil things, and the Pythagoreans did the same thing, as is clear from the co-ordination of contrary principles which they posited.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 15 In hoc tamen non eodem modo, quia Empedocles illa principia contraria ponebat in specie causae materialis, ut supra dictum est. Pythagorici autem addiderunt quod erat eis proprium supra opinionem aliorum; primo quidem quia dicebant quod hoc quod dico unum finitum et infinitum non erant accidentia aliquibus aliis naturis, sicut igni aut terrae, aut alicui huiusmodi. Sed hoc quod dico unum finitum et infinitum, erant substantiae eorumdem, de quibus praedicabantur. Et ex hoc concludebant quod numerus, qui ex unitatibus constituitur, sit substantia rerum omnium. Alii vero naturales, licet ponerent unum et finitum, seu infinitum, tamen attribuebant ista alicui alteri naturae, sicut accidentia attribuuntur subiecto, ut igni, vel aquae, vel alicui huiusmodi. 148. However, they did not do this in the same way; because Empedocles placed these contrary principles in the class of material cause, as was stated above (111), whereas the Pythagoreans added their own opinion to that of the other thinkers. The first thing that they added is this: they said that what I call the one, the limited and the unlimited are not (~) accidents of any other natures, such as fire or earth or the like, but claimed that what I call the one, the limited and the unlimited constitute the (+) substance of the same things of which they are predicated. From this they concluded that number, which is constituted of units, is the substance of all things. But while the other philosophers of nature posited the one, the limited and the unlimited, they nevertheless attributed these to another nature, as accidents are attributed to a subject, for example, to fire or water or something of this kind.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 16 Secundo addiderunt super alios philosophos, quia inceperunt dicere et definire de ipso quid est, scilicet substantia et rerum quidditate. Sed tamen valde simpliciter de hoc tractaverunt, superficialiter definientes. Non enim attendebant in assignandis definitionibus nisi unum tantum. Dicebant enim quod si aliquis terminus dictus inesset alicui primo, quod erat substantia illius rei; sicut si aliquis aestimet quod proportio dupla sit substantia dualitatis: quia talis proportio primo in numero binario invenitur. Et quia ens primo inveniebatur in uno quam in multis, nam multa ex uno constituuntur, ideo dicebant quod ens est ipsa substantia unius. Sed haec eorum determinatio non erat conveniens: quia licet dualitas sit dupla, non tamen idem est esse dualitatis et dupli, ita quod sint idem secundum rationem, sicut definitio et definitum. Si autem etiam esset verum quod illi dicebant, sequeretur quod multa essent unum. Contingit enim aliqua multa primo inesse alicui uni, sicut dualitati primo inest paritas et proportio dupla. Et sic sequitur quod par et duplum sint idem: similiter quod cuicumque inest duplum sit idem dualitati, ex quo duplum est dualitatis substantia. Quod quidem etiam et Pythagoricis contingebat. Nam multa et diversa assignabant quasi unum essent, sicut proprietates numerales dicebant idem esse cum proprietatibus naturalium rerum. 149. The second addition which they made to the views of the other philosophers is this: they began to discuss and to define “the whatness itself,” i.e., the substance and quiddity of things, although they treated this far too simply by defining things superficially. For in giving definitions they paid attention only to one thing; because they said that, if any given definition were to apply primarily to some thing, this would be the substance of that thing; just as if one were to suppose that the ratio “double” is the substance of the number two, because such a ratio is found first in the number two. And since being was found first in the one rather than in the many (for the many is composed of ones), they therefore said that being is the substance itself of the one. But this conclusion of theirs is not acceptable; for although the number two is double, the essence of twoness is not the same as that of the double in such a way that they are the same conceptually, as the definition and the thing defined. But even if their statements were true, it would follow that the many would be one. For some plurality can belong primarily to something one; for example, evenness and the ratio double belong first to the number two. Hence [according to them] it would follow that the even and the double are the same. And it would likewise follow that that to which the double belongs is the same as the number two, so long as the double is the substance of the number two. This, indeed, is also the conclusion which the Pythagoreans drew; for they attributed plurality and diversity to things as if they were one, just as they said that the properties of numbers are the same as the properties of natural beings.
lib. 1 l. 9 n. 17 Sic igitur concludit quod tot est accipere a prioribus philosophis, qui posuerunt tantum unum principium materiale, et ab aliis posterioribus qui posuerunt plura principia. 150. Hence, Aristotle concludes that it is possible to learn this much from the early philosophers, who posited only one material principle, and from the later philosophers, who posited many principles. LESSON 10 The Platonic Theory of Ideas ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 987a 29-988a 17

Lecture 10

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 1 Positis opinionibus antiquorum de causa materiali et efficiente, hic tertio ponit opinionem Platonis, qui primo manifeste induxit causam formalem. Et dividitur in partes duas. Primo enim ponit opinionem Platonis. Secundo colligit ex omnibus praedictis quid de quatuor generibus causarum ab aliis philosophis sit positum, ibi, breviter et recapitulariter et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opinionem Platonis de rerum substantiis. Secundo de rerum principiis, ibi, quoniam autem species et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opinionem Platonis quantum ad hoc quod posuit ideas. Secundo quantum ad hoc quod posuit substantias medias, scilicet mathematica separata, ibi, amplius autem praeter sensibilia. Dicit ergo primo, quod post omnes praedictos philosophos supervenit negocium Platonis, qui immediate Aristotelem praecessit. Nam Aristoteles eius discipulus fuisse perhibetur. Plato siquidem in multis secutus est praedictos philosophos naturales, scilicet Empedoclem, Anaxagoram et alios huiusmodi, sed alia quaedam habuit propria praeter illos praedictos philosophos, propter philosophiam Italicorum Pythagoricorum. Nam ipse ut studiosus erat ad veritatis inquisitionem, ubique terrarum philosophos quaesivit, ut eorum dogmata sciret. Unde in Italiam Tarentum venit, et ab Archita Tarentino Pythagorae discipulo de opinionibus Pythagoricis est instructus. 151. Having given the opinion of the ancient philosophers about the material and efficient cause, he gives a third opinion, that of Plato, who was the first to clearly introduce the formal cause. This is divided into two parts. First, he gives Plato’s opinion. Second (171), from all of the foregoing remarks he makes a summary of the opinions which the other philosophers expressed about the four classes of causes (“We have examined”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives Plato’s opinion about the substances of things; and second (159), his opinion about the principles of things (“And since the Forms”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives Plato’s opinion insofar as he posited Ideas; and second (157), insofar as he posited intermediate substances, namely, the separate mathematical entities (“Further, he says”). He says, first, that after all the foregoing philosophers came the system of Plato, who immediately preceded Aristotle; for Aristotle is considered to have been his disciple. And even if Plato followed in many respects the natural philosophers who preceded him, such as Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the like, he nevertheless had certain other doctrines of his own in addition to those of the preceding philosophers, because of the philosophy of the Italians, or Pythagoreans. For insofar as he was devoted to the study of truth he sought out the philosophers of all lands in order to learn their teachings. Hence he came to Tarenturn in Italy, and was instructed in the teachings of the Pythagoreans by Archytas of Tarenturn, a disciple of Pythagoras.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 2 Cum enim naturales philosophos, qui in Graecia fuerunt, sequi videret, et intra eos aliqui posteriores ponerent omnia sensibilia semper esse in fluxu, et quod scientia de eis esse non potest, quod posuerunt Heraclitus et Cratylus, huiusmodi positionibus tamquam novis Plato consuetus, et cum eis conveniens in hac positione ipse posterius ita esse suscepit, unde dixit particularium scibilium scientiam esse relinquendam. Socrates etiam, qui fuit magister Platonis, et discipulus Archelai, qui fuit auditor Anaxagorae, propter hanc opinionem, quae suo tempore surrexerat, quod non potest esse de sensibilibus scientia, noluit aliquid de rerum naturis perscrutari, sed solum circa moralia negociatus est. Et ipse prius incepit in moralibus quaerere quid esset universale, et insistere ad definiendum. 152. Now Plato would seem to follow the natural philosophers who lived in Greece; and of this group some of the later members held that all sensible things are always in a state of flux, and that there can be no scientific knowledge of them (which was the position of Heraclitus and Cratylus). And since Plato became accustomed to positions of this kind from the very beginning, and agreed with these men in this position, which he acknowledged to be true in later years, he therefore said that scientific knowledge of particular sensible things must be abandoned. And Socrates (who was Plato’s master and the disciple of Archelaus, a pupil of Anaxagoras), because of this position, which arose in his time, that there can be no science of sensible things, was unwilling to make any investigation into the nature of physical things, but only busied himself with moral matters. And in this field he first began to investigate what the universal is, and to insist upon the need for definition.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 3 Unde et Plato tamquam eius auditor, recipiens Socratem, idest sequens suscepit hoc ad inquirendum in rebus naturalibus, quasi in eis hoc posset evenire, ut universale in eis acciperetur de quo definitio traderetur, ita quod definitio non daretur de aliquo sensibilium, quia cum sensibilia sint semper transmutantium, idest transmutata, non potest alicuius eorum communis ratio assignari. Nam omnis ratio oportet quod et omni et semper conveniat, et ita aliquam immutabilitatem requirit. Et ideo huiusmodi entia universalia, quae sunt a rebus sensibilibus separata, de quibus definitiones assignantur, nominavit ideas et species existentium sensibilium: ideas quidem, idest formas, inquantum ad earum similitudinem sensibilia constituebantur: species vero inquantum per earum participationem esse substantiale habebant. Vel ideas inquantum erant principium essendi, species vero inquantum erant principium cognoscendi. Unde et sensibilia omnia habent esse propter praedictas et secundum eas. Propter eas quidem inquantum ideae sunt sensibilibus causae essendi. Secundum eas vero inquantum sunt eorum exemplaria. 153. Hence, Plato, being Socrates’ pupil, “accepted Socrates,” i.e., followed him, and adopted this method for the purpose of investigating natural beings. He did so believing that in their case the universal in them could successfully be grasped and a definition be assigned to it, with no definition being given for any sensible thing; because, since sensible things are always “changing,” i.e., being changed, no common intelligible structure can be assigned to any of them. For every definition must conform to each thing defined and must always do so, and thus requires some kind of immutability. Hence universal entities of this kind, which are separate from sensible things and that to which definitions are assigned, he called the Ideas or Forms of sensible things. He called them Ideas, or exemplars, inasmuch as sensible things are made in likeness to them; and he called them Forms inasmuch as [sensible things] have substantial being by participating in them. Or he called them Ideas inasmuch as they are principles of being, and Forms inasmuch as they are principles of knowledge. Hence all sensible things have being because of them and in conformity with them. They have being because of the Ideas insofar as the Ideas are the causes of the being of sensible things, and “in conformity with them” insofar as they are the exemplars of sensible things.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 4 Et quod hoc sit verum, patet ex eo, quod singulis speciebus attribuuntur multa individua univocorum, idest multa individua univocae speciei praedicationem suscipientia et hoc secundum participationem; nam species, vel idea est ipsa natura speciei, qua est existens homo per essentiam. Individuum autem est homo per participationem, inquantum natura speciei in hac materia designata participatur. Quod enim totaliter est aliquid, non participat illud, sed est per essentiam idem illi. Quod vero non totaliter est aliquid habens aliquid aliud adiunctum, proprie participare dicitur. Sicut si calor esset calor per se existens, non diceretur participare calorem, quia nihil esset in eo nisi calor. Ignis vero quia est aliquid aliud quam calor, dicitur participare calorem. 154. The truth of this is clear from the fact that “many individuals of the same name” are attributed to one Form alone, i.e., there are many individuals which have the same Form predicated of them, and predicated by participation. For the Form or Idea [of man] is the specific nature itself by which there exists man essentially. But an individual is man by participation inasmuch as the specific nature [man] is participated in by this designated matter. For that which is something in its entirety does not participate in it but is essentially identical with it, whereas that which is not something in its entirety but has this other thing joined to it, is said properly to participate in that thing. Thus, if heat were a self-subsistent heat, it would not be said to participate in heat, because it would contain nothing but heat. But since fire is something other than heat, it is said to participate in heat.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 5 Similiter autem cum idea hominis separata nihil aliud habeat nisi ipsam naturam speciei, est essentialiter homo. Et propterea ab eo vocabatur per se homo. Socrates vero vel Plato, quia habet praeter naturam speciei principium individuans quod est materia signata, ideo dicitur secundum Platonem participare speciem. 155. In a similar way , since the separate Idea of man contains nothing but the specific nature itself, it is man essentially; and for this reason it was called by him man-in-itself. But since Socrates and Plato have in addition to their specific nature an individuating principle, which is designated matter, they are therefore said to participate in a Form, according to Plato.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 6 Hoc autem nomen participationis Plato accepit a Pythagora. Sed tamen transmutavit ipsum. Pythagorici enim dicebant numeros esse causas rerum sicut Platonici ideas, et dicebant quod huiusmodi existentia sensibilia erant quasi quaedam imitationes numerorum. Inquantum enim numeri qui de se positionem non habent, accipiebant positionem, corpora causabant. Sed quia Plato ideas posuit immutabiles ad hoc quod de eis possent esse scientiae et definitiones, non conveniebat et in ideis uti nomine imitationis. Sed loco eius usus est nomine participationis. Sed tamen est sciendum, quod Pythagorici, licet ponerent participationem, aut imitationem, non tamen perscrutati sunt qualiter species communis participetur ab individuis sensibilibus, sive ab eis imitetur, quod Platonici tradiderunt. 156. Now Plato took this term participation from Pythagoras, although [in doing so] he made a change in the term. For the Pythagoreans said that numbers are the causes of things, just as the Platonists said that the Ideas are, and claimed that sensible things of this kind exist as certain imitations of numbers. For inasmuch as numbers, which have no position of themselves, received positions, they caused bodies. But because Plato held that the Ideas are unchangeable in order that there might be scientific knowledge of them, he did not agree that the term imitation could be used of the Ideas, but in place of it he used the term participation. However, it must be noted that, even though the Pythagoreans posited participation or imitation, they still did not investigate the way in which a common Form is participated in by individual sensible things or imitated by them. But the Platonists have treated this.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit opinionem Platonis de mathematicis substantiis: et dicit quod Plato posuit alias substantias praeter species et praeter sensibilia, idest mathematica; et dixit quod huiusmodi entia erant media trium substantiarum, ita quod erant supra sensibilia et infra species, et ab utrisque differebant. A sensibilibus quidem, quia sensibilia sunt corruptibilia et mobilia, mathematica vero sempiterna et immobilia. Et hoc accipiebant ex ipsa ratione scientiae mathematicae, nam mathematica scientia a motu abstrahit. Differunt vero mathematica a speciebus, quia in mathematicis inveniuntur differentia secundum numerum, similia secundum speciem: alias non salvarentur demonstrationes mathematicae scientiae. Nisi enim essent duo trianguli eiusdem speciei, frustra demonstraret geometra aliquos triangulos esse similes; et similiter in aliis figuris. Hoc autem in speciebus non accidit. Nam cum in specie separata nihil aliud sit nisi natura speciei, non potest esse singularis species nisi una. Licet enim alia sit species hominis, alia asini, tamen species hominis non est nisi una, nec species asini, et similiter de aliis. 157. Further, he says (70). Here he gives Plato’s opinion about the mathematical substances. He says that Plato posited other substances—the objects of mathematics—in addition to the Forms and sensible things. Moreover, he said that beings of this kind were an intermediate class among the three kinds of substances; or that they were above sensible substances and below the Forms, and differed from both. The mathematical substances differed from sensible substances, because sensible substances are corruptible and changeable, whereas the mathematical substances are eternal and immobile. The PIatonists got this idea from the way in which mathematical science conceives its objects; for mathematical science abstracts from motion. The mathematical substances also differed from the Forms, because the objects of mathematics are found to be numerically different and specifically the same, otherwise the demonstrations of mathematics would prove nothing. For unless two triangles belonged to the same class, geometry would attempt in vain to demonstrate that some triangles are alike; and the same thing is true of other figures. But this does not happen in the case of the Forms. For, since a Form is just the specific nature itself of a thing, each Form can only be unique. For even though the Form of man is one thing, and the Form of ass another thing, nevertheless the Form of man is unique, and so is the Form of ass; and the same thing is true of other things.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 8 Patet autem diligenter intuenti rationes Platonis, quod ex hoc in sua positione erravit, quia credidit, quod modus rei intellectae in suo esse sit sicut modus intelligendi rem ipsam. Et ideo quia invenit intellectum nostrum dupliciter abstracta intelligere, uno modo sicut universalia intelligimus abstracta a singularibus, alio modo sicut mathematica abstracta a sensibilibus, utrique abstractioni intellectus posuit respondere abstractionem in essentiis rerum: unde posuit et mathematica esse separata et species. Hoc autem non est necessarium. Nam intellectus etsi intelligat res per hoc, quod similis est eis quantum ad speciem intelligibilem, per quam fit in actu; non tamen oportet quod modo illo sit species illa in intellectu quo in re intellecta: nam omne quod est in aliquo, est per modum eius in quo est. Et ideo ex natura intellectus, quae est alia a natura rei intellectae, necessarium est quod alius sit modus intelligendi quo intellectus intelligit, et alius sit modus essendi quo res existit. Licet enim id in re esse oporteat quod intellectus intelligit, non tamen eodem modo. Unde quamvis intellectus intelligat mathematica non cointelligendo sensibilia, et universalia praeter particularia, non tamen oportet quod mathematica sint praeter sensibilia, et universalia praeter particularia. Nam videmus quod etiam visus percipit colorem sine sapore, cum tamen in sensibilibus sapor et color simul inveniantur. 158. Now to one who carefully examines Plato’s arguments it is evident that Plato’s opinion was false, because he believed that the mode of being which the thing known has in reality is the same as the one which it has in the act of being known. Therefore, since he found that our intellect understands abstractions in two ways: in one way as we understand universals abstracted from singulars, and in another way as we understand the objects of mathematics abstracted from sensible things, he claimed that for each abstraction of the intellect there is a corresponding abstraction in the essences of things. Hence he held that both the objects of mathematics and the Forms are separate. But this is not necessary. For even though the intellect understands things insofar as it becomes assimilated to them through the intelligible form by which it is put into act, it still is not necessary that a form should have the same mode of being in the intellect that it has in the thing known; for everything that exists in something else exists there according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore, considering the nature of the intellect, which is other than the nature of the thing known, the mode of understanding, by which the intellect understands, must be one kind of mode, and the mode of being, by which things exist, must be another. For although the object which the intellect understands must exist in reality, it does not exist there according to the same mode [which it has in the intellect]. Hence, even though the intellect understands mathematical entities without simultaneously understanding sensible substances, and understands universals without understanding particulars, it is not therefore necessary that the objects of mathematics should exist apart from sensible things, or that universals should exist apart from particulars. For we also see that sight perceives color apart from flavor, even though flavor and color are found together in sensible substances.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem hic ponit opinionem Platonis de rerum principiis: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit quae principia rebus Plato assignavit. Secundo ad quod genus causae reducuntur, ibi, palam autem ex dictis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit cuiusmodi principia Plato assignaverit. Secundo ostendit quomodo Plato cum Pythagoricis communicet, et in quo differat ab eis, ibi, unum tamen substantiam. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia secundum Platonem species separatae sunt causae omnibus aliis entibus, ideo elementa specierum putaverunt esse elementa omnium entium. Et ideo assignabant rebus pro materia magnum et parvum, et quasi substantiam rerum, idest formam dicebant esse unum. Et hoc ideo, quia ista ponebant esse principia specierum. Dicebant enim quod sicut species sunt sensibilibus formae, ita unum est forma specierum. Et ideo sicut sensibilia constituuntur ex principiis universalibus per participationem specierum, ita species, quas dicebat esse numeros, constituuntur secundum eum, ex illis, scilicet magno et parvo. Unitas enim diversas numerorum species constituit per additionem et subtractionem, in quibus consistit ratio magni et parvi. Unde cum unum opinaretur esse substantiam entis, quia non distinguebat inter unum quod est principium numeri, et unum quod convertitur cum ente, videbatur sibi quod hoc modo multiplicarentur diversae species separatae ex una quae est communis substantia, sicut ex unitate diversae species numerorum multiplicantur. 159. And since the Forms (159). Here he gives Plato’s opinion concerning the principles of things; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he states the principles which Plato assigned to things; and second (169), the class of cause to which they are reduced (“From the foregoing”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he tells us what kind of principles Plato had assigned to things. Second (160), he shows in what respect Plato agreed with the Pythagoreans, and in what respect he differed from them (“Yet Plato”). He says, first, that, since the Forms are the causes of all other beings according to Plato, the Platonists therefore thought that the elements of the Forms are the elements of all beings. Hence, they assigned as the material principle of things the great and small, and said that “the substance of things,” i.e., their form, is the one. They did this because they held these to be the principles of the Forms. For they said that just as the Forms are the formal principles of sensible things, in a similar way the one is the formal principle of the Forms. Therefore, just as sensible things are constituted of universal principles by participation in the Forms, in a similar way the Forms, which he said are numbers, are constituted “of these,” i.e., of the great and small. For the unit constitutes different species of numbers by addition and subtraction, in which the notion of the great and small consists. Hence, since the one was thought to be the substance of being (because he did not distinguish between the one which is the principle of number, and the one which is convertible with being), it seemed to him that a plurality of different Forms might be produced from the one, which is their common substance, in the same way that a plurality of different species of numbers is produced from the unit.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit unum tamen hic comparat opinionem Platonis Pythagorae. Et primo ostendit in quo conveniebant. Secundo in quo differebant, ibi, pro infinito. Conveniebant autem in duabus positionibus. Quarum prima est quod unum sit substantia rerum. Dicebant enim Platonici, sicut etiam Pythagorici, quod hoc quod dico unum non probatur de aliquo alio ente, sicut accidens de subiecto, sed hoc signat substantiam rei. Et hoc ideo, quia, ut dictum est, non distinguebant inter unum quod convertitur cum ente, et unum quod est principium numeri. 160. Yet Plato (72). Here he compares the position of Plato with that of Pythagoras. First, he shows in what respect they agreed; and second (160), in what respect they differed (“But to posit”). Now they agreed in two positions; (1) and the first is that the one is the substance of things. For the Platonists, like the Pythagoreans, said that what I call the one is not predicated’ of some other being as an accident is of a subject, but signifies a thing’s substance. They said this, as we have pointed out (159), because they did not distinguish between the one which is convertible with being and the one which is the principle of number.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 11 Secunda positio sequitur ex prima. Dicebant enim Platonici (similiter ut Pythagorici) numeros esse causas substantiae omnibus entibus. Et hoc ideo quia numerus nihil aliud est quam unitates collectae. Unde si unitas est substantia, oportet quod etiam numerus. 161. (2) The second position follows from the first; for the Platonists, like the Pythagoreans, said that numbers are the causes of the substance of all beings; and they held this because [in their opinion] number is just a collection of units. Hence if the one is substance, number must also be such.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit pro infinito hic ostendit in quo differebant. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim ponit differentiam inter eos. Secundo differentiae causam, ibi, unum igitur et numeros et cetera. Est autem ista differentia in duobus. Primo quantum ad hoc Pythagorici ponebant (ut dictum est) duo principia, ex quibus constituebantur, scilicet finitum et infinitum: quorum unum, scilicet infinitum, se habet ex parte materiae. Plato vero loco huius unius quod Pythagoras posuit, scilicet infiniti, fecit dualitatem, ponens ex parte materiae magnum et parvum. Et sic infinitum quod Pythagoras posuit unum principium, Plato posuit consistere ex magno et parvo. Et hoc est proprium opinionis suae in comparatione ad Pythagoram. 162. But to posit (73). Here he shows in what respect they differed; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he states how they differed. Second (164), he gives the reason for this difference (“Therefore, his making”). Now this difference involves two things. First, the Pythagoreans, as has already been stated, posited two principles of which things are constituted, namely, the limited and the unlimited, of which one, i.e., the unlimited, has the character of matter. But in place of this one principle—the unlimited— which the Pythagoreans posited, Plato created a dyad, holding that the great and small have the character of matter. Hence the unlimited, which Pythagoras claimed to be one principle, Plato claimed to consist of the great and small. This is his own opinion in contrast with that of Pythagoras.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 13 Secunda differentia est, quia Plato posuit numeros praeter sensibilia, et hoc dupliciter. Ipsas enim species, numeros esse dicebat, sicut supra habitum est. Et iterum inter species et sensibilia posuit mathematica (ut supra dictum est) quae secundum suam substantiam numeros esse dicebat. Sed Pythagorici dicunt ipsas res sensibiles esse numeros, et non ponunt mathematica media inter species et sensibilia, nec iterum ponunt species separatas. 163. The second difference is that Plato held that numbers are separate from sensible things, and this in two ways. For he said that the Forms themselves are numbers, as was pointed out above (159); and he also held, as was stated above (157), that the objects of mathematics are an intermediate class between the Forms and sensible things, and that they are numbers by their very essence. But the Pythagoreans said that sensible things themselves are numbers, and did not make the objects of mathematics an intermediate class between the Forms and sensible things; nor again did they hold that the Forms are separate from things.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit unum igitur hic ostendit causam differentiae. Et primo secundae. Secundo causas differentiae primae, ibi, dualitatem autem fere et cetera. Dicit ergo quod ponere unum et numeros praeter res sensibiles, et non in ipsis sensibilibus, sicut Pythagorici fecerunt, et iterum introducere species separatas, evenit Platonicis propter scrutationem, quae est in rationibus, idest propter hoc quod perscrutati sunt de definitionibus rerum, quas credebant non posse attribui rebus sensibilibus, ut dictum est. Et hac necessitate fuerunt coacti ponere quasdam res quibus definitiones attribuuntur. Sed Pythagorici qui fuerunt priores Platone, non participaverunt dialecticam, ad quam pertinet considerare definitiones et universalia huiusmodi, quarum consideratio induxit ad introductionem idearum. 164. Therefore, his making (74). Here he gives the reason for the difference. First, he gives the reason for the second difference; and then (165), the reason for the first difference. He says, then, that the Platonists adopted the position that both the one and numbers exist apart from sensible things and not in sensible things, as the Pythagoreans claimed; and they also introduced separate Forms because of the investigation “which was made into the intelligible structures of things,” i.e., because of their investigation of the definitions of things, which they thought could not be attributed to sensible substances, as has been stated (150). This is the reason they were compelled to hold that there are certain things to which definitions are assigned. But the Pythagoreans, who came before Plato, were ignorant of dialectic, whose office it is to investigate definitions and universals of this kind, the study of which led to the introduction of the Ideas.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 15 Deinde cum dicit dualitatem autem hic ostendit causam alterius differentiae, quae scilicet ex parte materiae est. Et primo ponit causam huiusmodi differentiae. Secundo ostendit Platonem non rationabiliter motum esse, ibi, attamen e contrario. Dicit ergo quod ideo Platonici fecerunt dualitatem esse numerum, qui est alia natura a speciebus, quia omnes numeri naturaliter generantur ex dualitate praeter numeros primos. Dicuntur autem numeri primi, quos nullus numerat, sicut ternarius, quinarius, septenarius, undenarius, et sic de aliis. Hi enim a sola unitate constituuntur immediate. Numeri vero, quos aliquis alius numerus numerat, non dicuntur primi, sed compositi, sicut quaternarius, quem numerat dualitas; et universaliter omnis numerus par a dualitate numeratur. Unde numeri pares materiae attribuuntur, cum eis attribuatur infinitum, quod est materia, ut supra dictum est. Hac ratione posuit dualitatem, ex qua sicut aliquo echimagio, idest ex aliquo exemplari omnes alii numeri pares generantur. 165. But his making (75). Here he gives the reason for the other difference, that is, the one concerning matter. First, he gives the reason for such a difference. Second (166), he shows that Plato was not reasonably motivated. He accordingly says that the Platonists made the dyad [or duality] to be a number of a different nature than the Forms, because all numbers with the exception of prime numbers are produced from it. They called prime numbers those which are not measured by any other number, such as three, five, seven, eleven, and so on; for these are produced immediately from unity alone. But numbers which are measured by some other number are not called prime numbers but composite ones, for example, the number four, which is measured by the number two; and in general every even number is measured by the number two. Hence even numbers are attributed to matter, since unlimitedness, which belongs to matter, is attributed to them, as has been stated above (125). This is why he posited the dyad, from which as “a matrix,” or exemplar, all other even numbers are produced.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 16 Deinde cum dicit attamen e contrario hic ostendit Platonem irrationabiliter posuisse. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim ex ratione naturali ostendit hoc. Secundo etiam ponit rationem naturalem, quae Platonem movebat ad suam opinionem, ibi, videtur autem ex una materia. Dicit ergo quod quamvis Plato poneret dualitatem ex parte materiae, tamen e converso contingit, sicut attestantur opiniones omnium aliorum philosophorum naturalium, qui posuerunt contrarietatem ex parte formae, et unitatem ex parte materiae, sicut patet primo physicorum. Ponebant enim rerum materiam aerem, vel aquam, aliquid huiusmodi, ex quo diversitatem rerum constituebant per rarum et densum, quae ponebant quasi principia formalia. Non enim est rationabile ponere sicut Plato posuit. Et hoc ideo quia ex materia viderunt philosophi multa fieri per successionem formarum in ipsa. Illa enim materia, quae modo substat uni formae, post modum substare poterit pluribus, uno corrupto et alio generato. Sed una species sive una forma solum semel generat, idest constituit aliquid generatum. Cum enim aliquid generatur accipit formam quidem, quae forma eadem numero non potest alteri generato advenire, sed esse desinit generato corrupto. In quo manifeste apparet quod una materia ad multas formas se habet, et non e converso una forma ad multas materias se habet. Et sic videtur rationabilius ponere ex parte materiae unitatem, sed dualitatem sive contrarietatem ex parte formae, sicut posuerunt naturales, quam e converso, sicut posuit Plato. 166. Yet what happens (76). Here he proves that Plato made unreasonable assumptions; and in regard to this he does two things. For, first, he proves this by an argument from nature. Second (167), he gives the argument based on the nature of things, which led Plato to adopt this position (“And from one matter”). He says that, although Plato posited a dyad on the part of matter, still what happens is the contrary of this, as the opinions of all the other natural philosophers testify; for they claimed that contrariety pertains to form and unity to matter, as is clear in Book I of the Physics. For they held that the material principle of things is air or water or something of this kind, from which the diversity of things is produced by rarefaction and condensation, which they regarded as formal principles; for Plato’s position is not a reasonable one. Now the natural philosophers adopted this position because they saw that many things are generated from matter as a result of a succession of forms in matter. For that matter which now supports one form may afterwards support rnany forms as a result of one form being corrupted and another being generated. But one specifying principle or form “generates only once,” i.e., constitutes the thing which is generated. For when something is generated it receives a form, and the same form numerically cannot become the form of another thing that is generated, but ceases to be when that which was generated undergoes corruption. In this argument it is clearly apparent that one matter is related to many forms, and not the reverse, i.e., one form to many matters. Thus it seems more reasonable to hold that unity pertains to matter but duality or contrariety to form, as the philosophers of nature claimed. This is the opposite of what Plato held.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 17 Deinde cum dicit videtur autem hic ponit rationem e converso ex his sensibilibus acceptam secundum opinionem Platonis. Videbat enim Plato quod unumquodque recipitur in aliquo secundum mensuram recipientis. Unde diversae receptiones videntur provenire ex diversis mensuris recipientium. Una autem materia est una mensura recipiendi. Vidit etiam quod agens, qui inducit speciem, facit multas res speciem habentes, cum sit unus, et hoc propter diversitatem quae est in materiis. Et huius exemplum apparet in masculo et femina. Nam masculus se habet ad feminam sicut agens et imprimens speciem ad materiam. Femina autem impraegnatur ab una actione viri. Sed masculus unus potest impraegnare multas feminas. Et inde est quod posuit unitatem ex parte speciei, et dualitatem ex parte materiae. 167. And from one matter (77). Here he gives an opposite argument taken from sensible things according to the opinion of Plato. For Plato saw that each thing is received in something else according to the measure of the recipient. Hence receptions seem to differ according as the capacities of recipients differ. But one matter is one capacity for reception. And Plato also saw that the agent who induces the form, although he is one, causes many things to have this form; and this comes about because of diversity on the part of matter. An example of this is evident in the case of male and female; for a male is related to a female as an agent and one who impresses a form on matter. But a female is impregnated by one act of a male, whereas one male can impregnate many females. This is why he held that unity pertains to form and duality to matter.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 18 Est autem attendendum quod haec diversitas inter Platonem et naturales accidit propter diversam de rebus considerationem. Naturales enim considerant tantum quae sunt sensibilia, prout sunt subiecta transmutationi, in qua unum subiectum successive accipit contraria. Et ideo posuerunt unitatem ex parte materiae, et contrarietatem ex parte formae. Sed Plato ex consideratione universalium deveniebat ad ponendum principia sensibilium rerum. Unde, cum diversitatis multorum singularium sub uno universali causa sit divisio materiae, posuit diversitatem ex parte materiae, et unitatem ex parte formae. Et tales sunt mutationes illorum principiorum, quae posuit Plato, idest participationes, vel ut ita dicam influentias in causata: sic enim nomen immutationis Pythagoras accipit. Vel immutationes dicit inquantum Plato mutavit opinionem de principiis, quam primi naturales habuerunt, ut ex praedictis patet. Et sic patet ex praedictis, quod Plato de causis quaesitis a nobis ita definivit. 168. Now we must note that this difference between Plato and the philosophers of nature is a result of the fact that they considered things from different points of view. For the philosophers of nature considered sensible things only insofar as they are subject to change, in which one subject successively acquires contrary qualities. Hence they attributed unity to matter and contrariety to form. But Plato, because of his investigation of universals, went on to give the principles of sensible things. Therefore, since the cause of the diversity of the many singular things which come under one universal is the division of matter, he held that diversity pertains to matter and unity to form. “And such are the changes of those principles” which Plato posited, i.e., participations, or, as I may say, influences in the things generated. For Pythagoras understands the word change in this way. Or Aristotle says “changes” inasmuch as Plato changed the opinion which the first philosophers of nature had about principles, as is evident from the foregoing. Hence it is evident from the foregoing that Plato dealt thus with the causes which we are investigating.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 19 Deinde cum dicit palam autem hic ostendit ad quod genus causae principia a Platone posita reducantur. Dicit ergo, ex dictis palam esse quod Plato usus est solum duobus generibus causarum. Causa enim ipsa, idest causa, quae est causa ei, quod quid est, idest quidditatis rei, scilicet causa formalis, per quam rei quidditas constituitur: et etiam usus est ipsa materia. Quod ex hoc patet, quia species quas posuit sunt aliis, idest sensibilibus causae eius quod quid est, idest causae formales: ipsis vero speciebus causa formalis est hoc quod dico unum, et illa videtur substantia de qua sunt species: sicut ens unum ponit causam formalem specierum: ita magnum et parvum ponit earum causam quasi materialem, ut supra dictum est. Et hae quidem causae, scilicet formalis et materialis, non solum sunt respectu specierum, sed etiam respectu sensibilium, quia unum dicitur in speciebus: idest id quod hoc modo se habet ad sensibilia, sicut unum ad speciem, est ipsa species, quia ea dualitas quae respondet sensibilibus pro materia est magnum et parvum. 169. From the foregoing (78). Here he shows to what class of cause the principles given by Plato are referred. He says that it is evident from the foregoing that Plato used only two kinds of causes. For he used as “one” cause of a thing the cause of its “whatness,” i.e., its quiddity, or its formal cause, which determines its quiddity; and he also used matter itself. This is also evident from the fact that the Forms which he posited “are the causes of other things,” i.e., the causes of the whatness of sensible things, namely, their formal causes, whereas the formal cause of the Forms themselves is what I call the one, which seems to be the substance of which the Forms are composed. And just as he holds that the one is the formal cause of the Forms, in a similar fashion he holds that the great and small are their material cause, as was stated above (159). And these causes—the formal and the material cause—are referred not only to the Forms but also to sensible substances, because [there is some subject of which] the one is predicated in the case of the Forms. That is to say, that which is related to sensible substances in the same way as the one is to the Forms is itself a Form, because that duality which relates to sensible things as their matter is the great and small.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 20 Ulterius Plato assignavit causam eius quod est bonum et malum in rebus, et singulis elementis ab eo positis. Nam causam boni ascribebat speciei, causam vero mali materiae. Sed tamen causam boni et mali conati sunt investigare quidam primorum philosophorum, scilicet Anaxagoras et Empedocles, qui ad hoc specialiter aliquas causas in rebus constituerunt, ut ab eis possent assignare principia boni et mali. In hoc autem quod boni causas et mali tetigerunt, aliquo modo accedebant ad ponendum causam finalem, licet non per se, sed per accidens eam ponerent, ut infra dicetur. 170. Furthermore, Plato indicated the cause of good and evil in the world, and he did this with reference to each of the elements which he posited. For he made Form the cause of good and matter the cause of evil. However, some of the first philosophers attempted to investigate the cause of good and evil, namely, Anaxagoras and Empedocles, who established certain causes in the world with this special end in view that by means of these causes they might be able to give the principles of good and evil. And in touching upon these causes of good and evil they came very close to positing the final cause, although they did not posit this cause directly but only indirectly, as is stated below (177).

Lecture 11

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 1 Hic recolligit omnia quae ab antiquis de causis sunt dicta: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit, quod priores philosophi nullam causam de quatuor generibus causarum ab eis suprapositis addere potuerunt. Secundo ostendit qualiter praedictas causas tetigerunt, ibi, sed omnes obscure et cetera. Tertio concludit conclusionem principaliter intentam, ibi, quod quidem igitur recte et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod breviter et sub quodam capitulo sive compendio pertranseundo dictum est, quid philosophi, et quomodo locuti sunt de principiis rerum et de veritate, quantum ad ipsam rerum substantiam. Sed ex eorum dictis tantum haberi potest, quod nullus eorum, qui de causis et principiis rerum dixerunt, potuit dicere aliquas causas praeter illas, quae distinctae sunt secundo physicorum. 171. Here he makes a summary of everything that the early philosophers have said about causes* and in regard to this he does three' things. First (79:C 171), he shows that the early philosophers were unable to add artother kind of cause to the four classes of causes given above (34:C 70). Second (80:C 172), he indicates the way in which they touched upon these causes ("Yet all"). Third (85:C 180) he draws the conclusion at which he chiefly aims ("Therefore all these"). He says, first (79), that in giving this brief and summary account he has stated who the philosophers are, and how they have spoken of the principles of things and of what is true of the substance itself of things. And from their statements this much can be learned: that none of those who have spoken about causes and principles were able to mention any causes other than those distinguished in Book II of the Physics.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit sed omnes hic ponit qualiter illas causas posuerunt. Et primo in generali. Secundo in speciali, ibi, illi namque et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod non solum nihil addiderunt, sed quo modo appropinquaverunt, et hoc non manifeste, sed obscure. Non enim assignaverunt secundum quod genus causae principia ab eis posita rerum causae essent; sed solum posuerunt illa, quae ad aliquod genus causae adaptari possunt. 172. Yet all (80). Here he gives the way in which they dealt with each of the causes. He does this, first (80), in a general way: and, second (81:C 172), in a special Way ("For some speak"). Accordingly be says, first, that they not only have not added anything, but in the way in which they approached these causes they proceeded obscurely and not clearly. For they have not stated to what class of cause the principles posited by them would belong; but they gave as principles things that can be adapted to some class of cause.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit illi namque hic ostendit in speciali quomodo singulas causas tetigerunt. Et primo quomodo tetigerunt causam materialem. Secundo quomodo causam efficientem, ibi, alii vero. Tertio quomodo causam formalem, ibi. Quod quid erat esse vero et cetera. Quarto quomodo causam finalem, ibi, cuius vero causa et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod illi, scilicet priores philosophi, omnes in hoc conveniunt, quod dant rebus aliquod principium quasi materiam. Differunt tamen in duobus. Primo, quia quidam posuerunt unam materiam, sicut Thales et Diogenes et similes: quidam plures, sicut Empedocles. Secundo, quia quidam posuerunt rerum materiam esse aliquod corpus, sicut praedicti philosophi. Quidam incorporeum, sicut Plato qui posuit dualitatem. Posuit enim Plato magnum et parvum, quae non dicunt aliquod corpus. Italici vero, idest Pythagorici posuerunt infinitum, quod iterum non est corpus. Empedocles vero quatuor elementa quae sunt corpora. Similiter Anaxagoras posuit infinitatem similium partium idest infinitas partes consimiles principia esse. Et hi omnes tetigerunt talem causam, scilicet materialem. Et etiam illi qui dixerunt aerem aut aquam aut ignem esse principium, vel aliquod medium inter haec elementa, scilicet igne spissius, aere subtilius; omnes enim tales praedicti tale corpus posuerunt esse primum elementum. Et sic patet quod dicit, quod philosophi quantum ad haec, quae praedicta sunt, posuerunt solam causam materialem. 173. For some speak (81). Here he shows in a special way how they touched on each of these causes. He shows, first (81), how they touched on the material cause; second (82:C 174), On the efficient cause ("But others"); third (83:C 175), on the formal cause ("But the quiddity"); and fourth (84:C 177), on the final cause ("That for the sake of which"). He says, first (81), then, that those philosophers, i.e., the early ones, all agree insofar as they assign some material cause to things. Yet they differ in two respects. First, they differ in that some, such as Thales, Diogenes and the like, held that the material principle is one, whereas others, such as Empedocles, claimed that it is many; and second, they differ in that some, such as the first group above, held that the material principle of things is a body, whereas others, such as Plato, who posited a dyad, claimed that it is something incorporeal. For Plato posited the great and small, which the Platonists do not speak of as a body. The Italians, or Pythagoreans, posited the unlimited ; but neither is this a body. Empedocles, on the other hand, posited the four elements, which are bodies; and Anaxagoras also posited "an infinite number of like parts," i.e.) [he claimed] that the principles of things are an infinite number of like parts. All of these thinkers have touched on "this kind of cause," i.e., the material cause, and so also have those who said that the principle of things is air or water or fire or something midway between these elements, i.e., what is denser than fire and rarer than air. For all philosophers such as those just mentioned have claimed that some kind of body is the first element of things. Thus Aristotle's statement is evident, namely, that in the light of the foregoing remarks these philosophers have posited only the material cause.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit alii quidem hic ponit opiniones de causa efficiente, dicens, quod alii praedictorum philosophorum posuerunt cum causa materiali causam unde principium motus: sicut quicumque posuerunt causam rerum amorem, odium, et intellectum; aut qui faciunt aliqua principia agentia praeter haec, sicut Parmenides qui posuit ignem quasi causam agentem. 174. But others (82). Here he gives their opinions about the efficient cause. He says that some of the foregoing philosophers have posited, in addition to the material cause, a cause from which motion begins, for example, those who made love or hate or intellect a cause of things, or those who introduced some other active principle distinct from these, as Parmenides, who made fire an efficient cause.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit quod quid hic ponit opiniones de causa formali; et dicit quod causa, per quam scitur quid est rei substantia, idest causam formalem, nullus manifeste rebus attribuit, et si aliquid tangerent antiqui philosophi quod pertineret ad causam formalem, sicut Empedocles qui posuit os et carnem habere aliquam rationem per quam sunt huiusmodi; non tamen hoc quod pertinet ad causam formalem ponebant per modum causae. 175. But the quiddity (83) Here he gives their opinions about the formal cause. He says that the cause through which a thing's substance is known, i.e., the formal cause, no one attributed to things with any clarity. And if the ancient philosophers touched on something that might pertain to the formal cause, as Empedocles did when he claimed that bone and flesh contain some proportion [of the elements], by which they are things of this kind, nevertheless they did not treat what belongs to the formal cause after the manner of a cause.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 6 Sed inter alios maxime appropinquaverunt ad ponendum causam formalem qui posuerunt species, et eas rationes qui ad species pertinent, sicut unitatem et numerum et alia huiusmodi. Species enim et ea quae sunt modo praedicto in speciebus, ut unitas et numerus, non suscipiuntur vel ponuntur ab eis ut materia rerum sensibilium, cum potius ex parte rerum sensibilium materiam ponant. Nec ponunt eas ut causas unde motus proveniat rebus, immo magis sunt rebus causa immobilitatis. Quicquid enim necessarium in sensibilibus invenitur, hoc ex speciebus causari dicebant, et ipsas, scilicet species, dicebant esse absque motu. Ad hoc enim ab eis ponebantur, ut dictum est, quod immobiles existentes uniformiter se haberent, ita quod de eis possent dari definitiones et fieri demonstrationes. Sed secundum eorum opinionem species rebus singulis praestant quidditatem per modum causae formalis, et unitas hoc ipsum praestat speciebus. 176. But among the other philosophers, those who posited the Forms and those intelligible aspects which belong to the Forms, such as unity, number and the like, came closest to positing the formal cause. For the Forms and everything that belongs to the Forms in the aforesaid way, such as unity and number, are not acknowledged or assumed by them to be the matter of sensible things, since they place matter rather on the side of sensible things; nor do they claim that the Forms are the causes from which motion originates in the world, but rather that they are the cause of immobility in things. For they said that whatever is found to be necessary in sensible things is caused by the Forms, and that these, i.e., the Forms, are immobile. For they claimed that the Forms, because immobile, are uniform in being, as has been said (69:C 156), so that definitions can be given of them and demonstrations made about them. But according to the opinion of these men the Forms are responsible for the quiddity of pparticular things after the manner of a formal cause, and the one is responsible for the quiddity of the Forms.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit cuius vero hic ponit opiniones quorumdam de causa finali, dicens quod philosophi quodammodo finem cuius causa motus et transmutationes et actiones fiunt, dicunt esse causam, et quodammodo non dicunt, nec dicunt eodem modo, quo vera causa est. Illi enim qui dicunt causam esse intellectum vel amorem, ponunt eas causas quasi bonum. Dicebant enim huiusmodi esse causas ut res bene se habeant. Boni enim causa esse non potest nisi bonum. Unde sequitur quod ponerent intellectum et amorem esse causam, sicut bonum est causa. Bonum autem potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo sicut causa finalis, inquantum aliquid fit gratia alicuius boni. Alio modo per modum causae efficientis, sicut dicimus quod bonus homo facit bonum. Isti ergo philosophi non dixerunt praedictas causas esse bonas, quasi horum causa aliquod entium sit aut fiat, quod pertinet ad rationem causae finalis; sed quia a praedictis, scilicet intellectu et amore, procedebat motus quidam ad esse et fieri rerum, quod pertinet ad rationem causae efficientis. 177. That for the sake of which (84). Here he gives the opinions of certain thinkers about the final cause. He says that in one sense the philosophers say that the goal for the sake of which motions, changes and activities occur is a cause, and in another sense they do not. And they neither speak of it in the same way, nor in the way in which it is a true cause. For those who affirm that intellect or love is a cause, posit these causes as good. For they said that things of this kind are the causes of things being well disposed, since the cause of good can only be good. Hence it follows that they could make intellect and love to be causes, just as the good is a cause. But good can be understood in two ways: (1) in one way as a final cause, in the sense that something comes to be for the sake of some good; and (2) in another way as an efficient cause, as we say that the good man does good. Now these philosophers did not say that the foregoing causes are good in the sense that they are the reason for the existence or coming to be of some beings, which pertains to the intelligibility of the final cause, but in the sense that there proceeds from these causes—intellect and will—a kind of motion toward the being and coming-to-be of things; and this pertains to the intelligibility of the efficient cause.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 8 Similiter autem Pythagorici et Platonici qui dixerunt rerum substantiam esse ipsum unum et ens, uni etiam et enti attribuebant bonitatem. Et sic dicebant talem naturam, scilicet bonum, esse rebus sensibilibus causam substantiae, vel per modum causae formalis, sicut Plato posuit, vel per modum materiae sicut Pythagorici. Non tamen dicebant quod esse rerum aut fieri esset huius causa, scilicet unius et entis, quod pertinet ad rationem causae finalis. Et sic sicut naturales posuerunt bonum esse causam, non per modum causae formalis, sed per modum causae efficientis: ita Platonici posuerunt bonum esse causam per modum causae formalis et non per modum causae finalis: Pythagorici vero per modum causae materialis. 178. In a similar way the Pythagoreans and Platonists, who said that the substance of things is the one itself or being, also attributed goodness to the one or being. Thus they said that such a reality, i.e., the good, is the cause of the substance of sensible things, either in the manner of a formal cause, as the Platonists maintained, or in the manner of a material cause, as the Pythagoreans claimed. However, they did not say that the being and coming-to-be of things exists for the sake of this, i.e., the one or being; and this is something that pertains to the intelligibility of the final cause. Hence, just as the philosophers of nature claimed that the good is a cause in the manner of an (+) efficient cause and not in that of a (~) formal cause, in a similar way the Platonists claimed that the good is a cause in the manner of a (+) formal cause, and not in that of a (~) final cause. The Pythagoreans, on the other hand, considered it to be a cause in the manner of a (+) material cause.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 9 Unde patet quod accidebat eis quodammodo dicere bonum esse causam, et quodammodo non dicere. Non enim simpliciter dicebant bonum esse causam, sed per accidens. Bonum enim secundum propriam rationem est causa per modum causae finalis. Quod ex hoc patet, quod bonum est, quod omnia appetunt. Id autem, in quod tendit appetitus, est finis: bonum igitur secundum propriam rationem est causa per modum finis. Illi igitur ponunt bonum simpliciter esse causam, qui ponunt ipsum esse causam finalem. Qui autem attribuunt bono alium modum causalitatis, ponunt ipsum esse causam, et hoc per accidens, quia non ex ratione boni, sed ratione eius cui accidit esse bonum, ut ex hoc quod est esse activum vel perfectivum. Unde patet quod isti philosophi causam finalem non ponebant nisi per accidens, quia scilicet ponebant pro causa, id cui convenit esse finem, scilicet bonum; non tamen posuerunt ipsum esse causam per modum finalis causae, ut dictum est. 179. It is evident, then, that in one sense they happened to speak of the good as a cause and in another not. For they did not speak of it as a cause in its principal aspect but in a secondary one; because according to its proper intelligible structure the good is a cause in the manner of a final cause. This is clear from the fact that the good is what all desire. Now that to which an appetite tends is a goal. Therefore according to its proper intelligible structure the good is a cause in the manner of a goal. Hence those who make the good a cause in its principal aspect claim that it is a final cause. But those who attribute a different mode of causality to the good claim that the good is a cause but only in a secondary way; because they do not hold that it is such by reason of being good, but by reason of that to which good happens to belong by reason of its being active or perfective. Hence it is clear that those philosophers posited a final cause only incidentally, because they posited as a cause something that is fitting to be an end, namely, the good. However, they did not claim that it is a cause in the manner of a final cause, as has been stated.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit quod quidem hic concludit conclusionem principaliter intentam, scilicet quod determinatio facta superius de causis quae et quot sint, recta fuit. Huius enim testimonium videntur praebere praedicti philosophi, nullum genus causae valentes addere supra praedicta. Et haec utilitas provenit ex praedictarum opinionum recitatione. Alia autem utilitas est, quia inde palam est, quod principia rerum sunt quaerenda in ista scientia, ut omnia quae antiqui posuerunt, et quae superius sunt determinata, aut aliquod horum. Maxime enim haec scientia considerat causam formalem et finalem et aliquo modo etiam moventem. Nec solum oportet praedictas opiniones recitasse; sed post haec transeundo dicendum est quomodo quilibet horum dixerit, et in quo bene, et in quo male; et quomodo ea quae dicuntur de principiis habent aliquam dubitationem. 180. Therefore all these (85). Here he draws the conclusion at which he chiefly aims: that the things established about the causes, both as to their number and their kinds, are correct. For the foregoing philosophers seem to bear witness to this in being unable to add another class of cause to those discussed above. This is one of the useful pieces of information resulting from the account of the foregoing views. Another is that evidently the principles of things must be investigated in this science, either all those which the ancient philosophers posited, and which have been established above, or some of them. For this science considers chiefly the formal and final cause, and also in a sense the efficient cause. Now it is not only necessary that the above views be discussed, but after this examination it is also necessary to describe the way in which each of these men has spoken (both in what sense their statements are acceptable and in what sense not), and how the statements which have been made about the principles of things contain a problem.

Lecture 12

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 1 Postquam recitavit opiniones philosophorum de principiis, hic incipit eas improbare. Et dividitur in duas partes. Primo improbat singulas opiniones. Secundo recolligit ea quae dicta sunt, et continuat se ad sequentia, ibi, quoniam ergo dictas causas et cetera. Prima dividitur in duas partes. Primo reprobat opiniones eorum qui naturaliter locuti sunt. Secundo reprobat opiniones illorum qui non naturaliter sunt locuti, scilicet Pythagorae et Platonis, eo quod altiora principia posuerunt quam naturales, ibi, quicumque vero et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo improbat opiniones eorum qui posuerunt unam causam materialem. Secundo eorum qui posuerunt plures, ibi, idem quoque et si quis. Circa primum duo facit. Primo improbat opiniones praedictas in generali. Secundo in speciali, ibi, et ad hoc et cetera. Improbat autem in generali triplici ratione. Prima ratio talis est. Quia in rebus non solum sunt corporea, sed etiam quaedam incorporea, ut patet ex libro de anima. Sed ipsi non posuerunt principia nisi corporea: quod ex hoc patet, quia ipsi ponebant, unum omne idest universum esse unum secundum substantiam, et esse unam naturam quasi materiam, et eam esse corpoream, et habentem mensuram idest dimensionem: corpus autem non potest esse causa rei incorporeae; ergo patet quod in hoc deliquerunt insufficienter rerum principia tradentes. Et non solum in hoc, sed in multis, ut ex sequentibus rationibus apparet. 181. Having stated the opinions which the philosophers held about the principles of things, Aristotle begins here to criticize them; and this is divided into two parts. First, he criticizes each opinion. Second (272), he summarizes his discussion and links it up with what follows (“From the foregoing”). The first is divided into two parts. First, he criticizes the opinions of those who have treated things according to the method of natural philosophy. Second (201), he criticizes the opinions of those who have not treated things according to the method of natural philosophy, i.e., Pythagoras and Plato, because they posited higher principles than the natural philosophers did (“But all those”). In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he criticizes the opinions of those who posited one material cause; and second (190), the opinions of those who posited many (“The same consequence”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he criticizes the foregoing opinions in a general way; and second (183), in a special way (“And they were wrong”). He criticizes these opinions in a general way by means of three arguments. The first (86) is this: in the world there are not only bodies but also certain incorporeal things, as is clear from The Soul. But these men posited only corporeal principles, which is clear from the fact that they maintained that “the whole is one,” i.e., that the universe is one thing substantially, and that there is a single nature as matter, and that this is corporeal and has “measure,” i.e., dimension. But a body cannot be the cause of an incorporeal thing. Therefore it is evident that they were at fault in this respect that they treated the principles of things inadequately. And they were at fault not only in this respect but in many others, as is clear from the following arguments.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit de generatione hic ponit secundam rationem quae talis est. Quicumque habet necesse determinare de motu, oportet quod ponat causam motus: sed praedicti philosophi habebant necesse tractare de motu: quod ex duobus patet: tum quia ipsi conabantur dicere causas generationis et corruptionis rerum, quae sine motu non sunt: tum etiam quia de rebus omnibus naturaliter tractare volebant: naturalis autem consideratio requirit motum, eo quod natura est principium motus et quietis, ut patet secundo physicorum: ergo debebant tractare de causa, quae est principium motus. Et ita cum illam auferrent causam, nihil de ea dicendo, patet etiam quod in hoc deliquerunt. 182. And in attempting (87). Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus: whoever feels obliged to establish the truth about motion must posit a cause of motion. But these philosophers felt obliged to treat motion, which is clear for two reasons: first, because they tried to state the causes of generation and corruption in the world, which do not occur without motion; and second, because they wanted to treat things according to the method of natural philosophy. But since a treatment of things according to this method involves motion (because nature is a principle of motion and rest, as is clear in Book II of the Physics), they should therefore have dealt with that cause which is the source of motion. And since they did away with the cause of motion by saying nothing about it, obviously they were also at fault in this respect.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit tertiam rationem. Quaelibet enim res naturalis habet substantiam, idest formam partis, et quod quid est, idest quidditatem quae est forma totius. Formam dicit, inquantum est principium subsistendi: et quod quid est, inquantum est principium cognoscendi, quia per eam scitur quid est res: sed praedicti philosophi formam non ponebant esse alicuius causam: ergo insufficienter de rebus tractabant, in hoc etiam delinquentes, quod causam formalem praetermittebant. 183. Furthermore, they did not (88). Here he gives the third argument: every natural being has “a substance,” i.e., a form of the part, “and whatness,” i.e., quiddity, which is the form of the whole.3 He says form inasmuch as it is a principle of subsistence, and whatness inasmuch as it is a principle of knowing, because what a thing is is known by means of this. But the foregoing philosophers did not claim that form is a cause of anything. They treated things inadequately, then, and were also at fault in neglecting the formal cause.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit nullus enim hic reprobat opiniones eorum in speciali: et hoc dupliciter. Primo quantum ad hoc quod ponebant elementa praeter ignem esse principia. Secundo quantum ad hoc quod praetermittebant terram, ibi, si vero est, quod est generatione et cetera. Primo ergo resumit eorum positionem, qui videlicet ponebant esse elementum quodlibet simplicium corporum praeter terram. Et rationem opinionis ostendit, quia ipsi videbant simplicia corpora ex invicem generari, ita quod quaedam fiunt ex illis per concretionem sive per inspissationem, sicut grossiora ex subtilioribus. 184. For none of the later (92). Here he criticizes their opinions in a special way; and he does this with respect to two things. First, he criticizes them for maintaining that all the elements with the exception of fire are the principles of things. Second (187), he criticizes them for omitting earth (“However, if”). First (92), he takes up once more the position of those who claimed that each of the simple bodies except earth is the [primary] element of things. The reason which he gives for this position is that these men saw that the simple bodies are generated from each other in such a way that some come from others by combination or compacting, as grosser things come from more refined ones.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 5 Ostendit etiam modum procedendi contra eorum opiniones ex eorum rationibus. Ponebant enim hac ratione aliquod istorum esse principium, quia ex eo generabantur alia concretione vel discretione. Qui duo modi multum differunt quantum ad prioritatem vel posterioritatem eius ex quo aliquid generatur. Nam secundum unum modum videtur esse prius id ex quo generatur aliquid per concretionem. Et hanc rationem primo ponit. Secundum vero alium modum videtur esse prius illud, ex quo generatur aliquid per rarefactionem; et ex hoc sumit secundam rationem. 185. He also explains how to proceed against their opinions from their own arguments. For they claimed that one of these elements is the principle of things by arguing that other things are generated from it either by combination or by separation. Now it makes the greatest difference as to which of these two ways is prior and which subsequent, for on this depends the priority or posteriority of that from which something is generated. For, on the one hand, that seems to be prior from which something is produced by combination; and he gives this argument first. Yet, on the other hand, that seems to be prior from which something is produced by rarefaction; and he bases his second argument on this.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 6 Quod enim illud ex quo generatur aliquid per concretionem sit primum, hoc attestatur opinioni, quae nunc habetur, quod illud sit elementum maxime omnium, ex quo alia fiunt per concretionem. Quod quidem patet per rationem, et eorum positiones. Per rationem quidem: quia id ex quo fiunt alia per concretionem est hoc quod est subtilissimum inter corpora, minutissimas partes habens. Et hoc esse videtur simplicius. Unde si simplex est prius composito, videtur quod hoc sit primum. Per eorum vero positiones: quia quicumque posuerunt ignem esse principium, posuerunt ipsum primum esse principium, quia est subtilissimum corporum. Similiter autem alii visi sunt hanc rationem sequi, existimantes tale esse elementum corporum, quod est subtiles partes habens. Quod ex hoc patet, quod nullus posteriorum prosecutus est poetas theologos, qui dixerunt terram esse elementum. Et manifestum est quod hoc renuerunt ponere, propter magnitudinem partialitatis idest propter grossitiem partium. Constat autem quod quodlibet aliorum trium elementorum accepit aliquem philosophorum, qui iudicavit ipsum esse principium. Sed quia non dixerunt terram principium esse, ideo non potest dici quod hoc non dixerunt, quia esset contra communem opinionem. Nam multitudo hominum hoc existimabat, quod terra esset substantia omnium. Et Hesiodus etiam, qui fuit unus de theologicis poetis, dixit quod inter alia corpora primum facta est terra. Et sic patet quod opinio quod terra esset principium, fuit antiqua, quia ab ipsis poetis theologicis posita, qui fuerunt ante naturales philosophos: et publica, quia in eam consenserunt plures. Unde restat quod hac sola ratione posteriores naturales evitaverunt ponere terram esse principium, propter grossitiem partium. Sed constat quod terra habet grossiores partes quam aqua, et aqua quam aer, et aer quam ignis, et si quid est medium inter ea grossius est quam ignis. Unde patet, sequendo hanc rationem, quod nullus eorum recte dixit, nisi qui posuit ignem esse principium. Nam ex quo ratione subtilitatis aliquid ponitur principium, necessarium est illud poni primum principium quod est omnium subtilissimum. 186. For the fact that the primary element is that from which something is produced by combination supports the opinion which is now held that the most basic element is that from which other things are produced by combination. This in fact is evident both from reason and from the things that they held. It is evident from reason, because that from which other things are produced by combination is the most refined type of body, and the one having the smallest parts; and this seems to be the simpler body. Hence, if the simple is prior to the composite, this body seems to be first. It is also evident from the things that they held, because all those who posited fire as the principle of things asserted that it is the first principle. Similarly, others have been seen to follow this argument, for they thought that the primary element of bodies is the one having the finest parts. This is evident from the fact that none of the later philosophers followed the theological poets, who said that earth is the primary element of things. Evidently they refused to do this “because of the size of its parts,” i.e., because of the coarseness of its parts. However, it is a fact that each of the other three elements finds some philosopher who judges it to be the principle of things. But their refusal to make earth a principle is not to be explained by a refusal to reject a common opinion; for many men thought that earth is the substance of things. Hesiod, who was one of the theological poets, also said that earth is the first of all bodies to come into being. Thus the opinion that earth is the principle of things is evidently an ancient one, because it was maintained by the theological poets, who preceded the philosophers of nature. It was also the common opinion, because many men accepted it. It follows, then, that the later philosophers avoided the position that earth is a principle only because of the coarseness of its parts. But it is certain that earth has coarser parts than water, and water than air, and air than fire; and if there is any intermediate element, it is evident that it is grosser than fire. Hence by following this argument it is clear that none of them spoke correctly, except him who held that fire is the first principle. For as soon as some element is held to be a principle by reason of its minuteness, the most minute element must be held to be the first principle of things.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit si vero hic ponit aliam rationem, per quam e converso videtur quod terra sit maxime elementum. Constat enim quod illud quod est in generatione posterius, est prius secundum naturam; eo quod natura in finem generationis tendit, sicut in id quod est primum in eius intentione. Sed quanto aliquid est magis densum et compositum, tanto est etiam posterius generatione: quia in via generationis ex simplicibus proceditur ad composita, sicut ex elementis fiunt mixta, et ex mixtis humores et membra: ergo illud quod est magis compositum et spissum illud est prius secundum naturam. Et sic sequitur contrarium eius quod prima ratio concludebat, scilicet quod aqua sit prior aere, et terra prior aqua quasi primum principium. 187. However, if that which (93). Here he gives another argument, and according to it the opposite seems to be true, namely, that earth is the most basic element of things. For it is evident that whatever is subsequent in generation is prior in nature, because nature tends to the goal of generation as the first thing in its intention. But the denser and more composite something is, the later it appears in the process of generation; for the process of generation proceeds from simple things to composite ones, Just as mixed bodies come from the elements, and the humors and members [of a living body] from mixed bodies. Hence, whatever is more composite and condensed is prior in nature. In this way a conclusion is reached which is the opposite of that following from the first argument; i.e., water is now prior to air and earth to water as the first principle of things.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 8 Est autem attendendum quod differt quaerere illud quod est prius in uno et eodem, et illud quod est prius simpliciter. Si enim quaeratur quid est prius simpliciter, oportet perfectum esse prius imperfecto, sicut et actum potentia. Nihil enim reducitur de imperfecto ad perfectum, vel de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod perfectum ens actu. Et ideo, si loquamur de primo universi, oportet ipsum esse perfectissimum. Sed respectu unius particularis, quod procedit de potentia in actum perfectum, potentia est prius tempore actu, licet posterius natura. Constat etiam quod primum omnium oportet esse simplicissimum, eo quod composita dependent a simplici et non e converso. Necessarium ergo erat antiquis naturalibus quod utrumque attribuerent primo principio totius universi, scilicet cum summa simplicitate maximam perfectionem. Haec autem duo non possunt simul attribui alicui principio corporali. Nam in corporibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus sunt simplicissima imperfecta; ideo cogebantur quasi rationibus contrariis diversa principia ponere. Praeeligebant autem rationem simplicitatis, quia non considerabant res nisi secundum modum, secundum quem aliquid exit de potentia in actum; in cuius ordine non oportet id quod est principium esse perfectius. Huiusmodi autem contrarietatis dissolutio haberi non potest, nisi ponendo primum entium principium incorporeum: quia hoc erit simplicissimum, ut de eo inferius Aristoteles probabit. 188. It should be noted, however, that it is a different thing to look for what is prior in one and the same entity and for what is prior without qualification. For if one seeks what is prior without qualification, the perfect must be prior to the imperfect, just as actuality is prior to potentiality; because a thing is brought from a state of imperfection to one of perfection, or from potentiality to actuality, only by something completely actual. Therefore, if we speak of what is first in the whole universe, it must be the most perfect thing. But in the case of one particular thing which goes from potentiality to. complete actuality, potentiality is prior to actuality in time, although it is subsequent in nature. It is also clear that the first of all things must be one that is simplest; for the composite depends on the simple, and not the reverse. It was necessary, then, that the ancient philosophers should attribute both of these properties (the greatest perfection along with the greatest simplicity) to the first principle of the whole universe. However, these two properties cannot be attributed simultaneously to any corporeal principle, for in bodies subject to generation and corruption the simplest entities are imperfect. They were Compelled, then, as by contrary arguments, to posit different principles. Yet they preferred the argument of simplicity, because they considered things only insofar as something passes from potentiality to actuality, and in this order it is not necessary that anything which is a principle should be more perfect. But this kind of opposition can be resolved only by maintaining that the first principle of things is incorporeal, because this principle will be the simplest one, as Aristotle will prove below (2548).
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 9 Concludit autem in fine quod de positionibus eorum, qui dixerunt unam causam materialem, ea sufficiant quae ad praesens dicta. 189. Last of all he concludes that for the purpose of the present discussion enough has been said about the positions of those who affirm one material cause.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit idem quoque hic ponit rationes contra ponentes plures causas materiales. Et primo contra Empedoclem. Secundo contra Anaxagoram, ibi, Anaxagoram et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod idem accidit Empedocli qui posuit quatuor corpora esse materiam, quia patiebatur eamdem difficultatem ex praedicta contrarietate. Nam ex ratione simplicitatis, ignis videbatur esse maxime principium, alia vero ratione terra, ut dictum est. Quaedam etiam inconvenientia accidunt Empedocli eadem cum praedictis. Sicut de hoc quod non posuit causam formalem, et de praedicta contrarietate simplicitatis et perfectionis in corporalibus, licet contra eum non sit ratio de ablatione causae moventis. Sed quaedam alia inconvenientia accidunt ei, propria praeter ea quae accidunt ponentibus unam causam materialem. 190. The same consequence (94). Here he gives the arguments against those who posited many material causes. First, he argues against Empedocles; and second (194), against Anaxagoras (“But if anyone”). First (94), he says that the same consequence faces Empedocles, who held that the four [elemental] bodies are the matter of things, because he experienced the same difficulty with regard to the above contrariety. For according to the argument of simplicity fire would seem to be the most basic principle of bodies; and according to the other argument earth would seem to be such, as has been stated (187). And while Empedocles faced some of the same absurd conclusions as the preceding philosophers (i.e., he did not posit either a formal cause or the aforesaid contrariety of simplicity and perfection in corporeal things), there is no argument against him for doing away with the cause of motion. But he did face certain other absurd conclusions besides those that confronted the philosophers who posited one material cause.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 11 Et hoc patet tribus rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Quia prima principia non generantur ex invicem, eo quod principia semper oportet manere, ut dictum est primo physicorum. Sed ad sensum videmus quod quatuor elementa ex invicem generantur, unde et de eorum generatione in scientia naturali determinatur. Ergo inconvenienter posuit quatuor elementa prima rerum principia. 191. This is shown by three arguments, of which the first is as follows. First principles are not generated from each other, because a principle must always remain in existence, as is pointed out in Book I of the Physics. But we perceive that the four elements are generated from each other, and for this reason their generation is dealt with in natural philosophy. Hence his position that the four elements are the first principles of things is untenable.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit et de moventium hic ostendit secundum inconveniens quod pertinet ad causam moventem. Ponere enim plures causas moventes et contrarias non omnino dictum est recte, nec omnino rationabiliter. Si enim causae moventes accipiantur proxime, oportet eas esse contrarias, cum earum effectus contrarii appareant. Si autem accipiatur prima causa, tunc oportet esse unum, sicut apparet in duodecimo huius scientiae, et in octavo physicorum. Cum igitur ipse intendat ponere primas causas moventes, inconvenienter posuit eas contrarias. 192. And concerning the cause (95). Here he gives the second absurdity, which has to do with the cause of motion. For to posit many and contrary causes of motion is not at all correct or reasonable; because if the causes of motion are understood to be proximate ones, they must be contraries, since their effects seem to be contraries. But if the first cause is understood, then it must be unique, as is apparent in Book XII (2492) of this work, and in Book VIII of the Physics. Therefore, since he intends to posit the first causes of motion, his position that they are contraries is untenable.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit et ex toto hic ponit tertiam rationem quae ducit ad inconveniens, et est talis. In omni alteratione oportet esse idem subiectum quod patitur contraria. Et hoc ideo, quia ex uno contrario non fit alterum, ita quod unum contrarium in alterum convertatur, sicut ex calido non fit frigidum, ita quod ipse calor fiat frigus vel e converso, licet ex calido fiat frigidum suppositum uno subiecto tantum, inquantum unum subiectum quod suberat calori, postea subest frigori. Empedocles vero non posuit unum subiectum contrariis, immo contraria in diversis subiectis posuit, sicut calidum in igne, et frigidum in aqua. Nec iterum posuit istis duobus unam naturam subiectam; ergo nullo modo potuit alterationem ponere. Et hoc est inconveniens quod alteratio totaliter auferatur. 193. And in general (96). Here he gives the third argument which leads to an absurdity: in every process of alteration it must be the same subject which undergoes contraries. This is true because one contrary does not come from another in such a way that one is converted into the other; for example, the cold does not come from the hot in such a way that heat itself becomes cold or the reverse, although the cold does come from the hot when the underlying subject is one only inasmuch as the single subject which is now the subject of heat is afterwards the subject of cold. But Empedocles did not hold that contraries have one subject. In fact he held that they are found in different subjects, as heat in fire and cold in water. Nor again did he hold that there is one nature underlying these two. Therefore he could not posit alteration in any way. Yet it is absurd that alteration should be done away with altogether.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit Anaxagoram vero hic prosequitur de opinione Anaxagorae: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter opinio Anaxagorae est suscipienda quasi vera, et quomodo quasi falsa in generali. Secundo explicat utrumque in speciali, ibi, nam absurdo existente et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod si quis vult suscipere opinionem Anaxagorae veram de eo quod posuit duo principia, scilicet materiam et causam agentem, accipiat eam secundum rationem quam videtur ipse secutus, quasi quadam necessitate veritatis coactus, ut sequeretur eos, qui hanc rationem exprimunt. Ipse vero non articulavit eam, idest non expresse distinxit. Eius ergo opinio est vera quantum ad hoc quod non expressit, falsa quantum ad hoc quod expressit. 194. But if anyone (97). Here he deals with Anaxagoras’ opinion; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows in general in what respect Anaxagoras’ opinion should be accepted as true, and in what respect not. Second (97), he explains each of these in particular (“For to say”). He says, first, that if anyone wishes to maintain that Anaxagoras’ opinion is true insofar as he posited two principles, i.e., matter and efficient cause, let him understand this according to the reasoning which Anaxagoras himself seems to have followed, as if compelled by some need for truth, inasmuch as he would have followed those who expressed this theory. But “he himself has not stated it articulately”; i.e., he has not expressed it distinctly. Therefore, with reference to what he has not expressly stated his opinion is true; but with reference to what he has expressly stated his opinion is false.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 15 Et hoc in speciali patet sic. Quia si totaliter accipiatur eius opinio secundum quod in superficie apparebat ex eius dictis, apparebit maior absurditas propter quatuor rationes. Primo, quia hoc ipsum quod est, omnia in principio mundi fuisse permixta, est absurdum, cum distinctio partium mundi aestimetur secundum sententiam Aristotelis sempiterna. Secunda ratio est, quia impermixtum se habet ad permixtum sicut simplex ad compositum: sed simplicia praeexistunt compositis, et non e converso: ergo impermixta oportet praeexistere mixtis, cuius contrarium Anaxagoras dicebat. Tertia ratio est, quia non quodlibet natum est misceri cuilibet in corporibus; sed illa sola nata sunt adinvicem misceri, quae nata sunt adinvicem transire per aliquam alterationem, eo quod mixtio est miscibilium alteratorum unio. Anaxagoras vero ponebat quodlibet esse mixtum cuilibet. Quarta ratio est, quia eorumdem est permixtio et separatio: non enim dicuntur misceri nisi illa quae apta nata sunt separata existere: sed passiones et accidentia sunt permixta substantiis, ut Anaxagoras dicebat: ergo sequeretur quod passiones et accidentia possent a substantiis separari, quod est manifeste falsum. Istae igitur absurditates apparent, si consideretur opinio Anaxagorae superficialiter. 195. This is made clear in particular as follows. If his opinion is taken in its entirety according to a superficial understanding of his statements, a greater absurdity will appear for four reasons. First, his opinion that all things were mixed together at the beginning of the world is absurd; for in Aristotle’s opinion the distinction between the parts of the world is thought to be eternal. The second reason is this: what is unmixed is related to what is mixed as the simple to the composite. But simple bodies are prior to composite ones, and not the reverse. Therefore what is unmixed must be prior to what is mixed. This is the opposite of what Anaxagoras said. The third reason is this: in the case of bodies not anything at all is naturally disposed to be mixed with anything else, but only those things are naturally disposed to be mixed which are naturally inclined to pass over into each other by some kind of alteration; for a mixture is a union of the altered things which are capable of being mixed. But Anaxagoras held that anything is mixed with just anything. The fourth reason is this: there is both mixture and separation of the same things; for only those things are said to be mixed which are naturally disposed to exist apart. But properties and accidents are mixed with substances, as Anaxagoras said. Therefore it follows that properties and accidents can exist apart from substances. This is evidently false. These absurdities appear then, if Anaxagoras’ opinion is considered in a superficial way.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 16 Tamen si quis exequatur articulariter, idest distincte et manifeste perquirat quod Anaxagoras vult dicere, idest ad quod eius intellectus tendebat, licet exprimere nesciret, apparebit eius dictum mirabilius et subtilius praecedentium philosophorum dictis. Et hoc propter duo. Primo, quia magis accessit ad veram materiae cognitionem. Quod ex hoc patet, quia in illa permixtione rerum quando nihil erat ab alio discretum, sed omnia erant permixta, de illa substantia sic permixta, quam ponebat rerum materiam, nihil vere poterat de ea praedicari, ut patet de coloribus; non enim poterat de ea praedicari aliquis specialis color, ut diceretur esse alba, vel nigra, vel secundum aliquem alium colorem colorata; quia secundum hoc oporteret illum colorem non esse aliis permixtum. Et similiter color in genere non poterat de ea praedicari, ut diceretur esse colorata; quia de quocumque praedicatur genus, necesse est aliquam eius speciem praedicari, sive sit praedicatio univoca sive denominativa. Unde si illa substantia esset colorata, de necessitate haberet aliquem determinatum colorem, quod est contra praedicta. Et similis ratio est de humoribus idest saporibus, et de omnibus aliis huiusmodi. Unde nec ipsa genera prima poterant de ipso praedicari, ut scilicet esse qualis vel quanta vel aliquid huiusmodi. Si enim genera praedicarentur, oportet quod aliqua specierum particularium inesset ei; quod est impossibile, si ponantur omnia esse permixta; quia iam ista species, quae de illa substantia diceretur, esset ab aliis distincta. Et haec est vera natura materiae, ut scilicet non habeat actu aliquam formam, sed sit in potentia ad omnes; quia et ipsum mixtum non habet actu aliquid eorum quae in eius mixtionem conveniunt, sed potentia tantum. Et propter hanc similitudinem materiae primae ad mixtum, videtur posuisse mixtionem praedictam, licet aliqua differentia sit inter potentiam materiae et potentiam mixti. Nam miscibilia, etsi sint in potentia in mixto, tamen non sunt in eo in potentia pure passiva. Manent enim virtute in mixto. Quod ex hoc potest patere, quia mixtum habet motum et operationes ex virtute corporum miscibilium; quod non potest dici de his, quae sunt in potentia in materia prima. Est et alia differentia: quia mixtum etsi non sit actu aliquod miscibilium, est tamen aliquid actu: quod de materia prima dici non potest. Sed hanc differentiam videtur removere Anaxagoras ex hoc, quod non posuit particularem aliquam mixtionem, sed universalem omnium. 196. Yet if anyone were to follow him up “and articulate,” i.e., investigate clearly and distinctly, the things which Anaxagoras “means,” i.e., what he intended, although he did not know how to express this, his statement would appear to be more astonishing and subtler than those of the preceding philosophers. This will be so for two reasons. First, he came closer to a true understanding of matter. This is clear from the fact that in that mixture of things, when nothing was distinguished from anything else but all things were mixed together, nothing could be truly predicated of that substance which is so mixed, which he held to be the matter of things. This is clear in the case of colors; for no special color could be predicated of it so that it might be said to be white or black or have some other color; because, according to this, that color would necessarily be unmixed with other things. Nor, similarly, could color in general be predicated of it so that it might be said to be colored; because everything of which a generic term is predicated must also have a specific term predicated of it, whether the predication be univocal or denominative. Hence, if that substance were colored, it would necessarily have some special color. But this is opposed to the foregoing statement. And the argument is similar with respect to “humors,” i.e., savors, and to all other things of this kind. Hence the primary genera themselves could not be predicated of it in such a way that it would have quality or quantity or some attribute of this kind. For if these genera were predicated of it, some particular species would necessarily belong to it. But this is impossible, if all things are held to be mixed together. For this species which would be predicated of that substance would already be distinguished from the others. And this is the true nature of matter, namely, that it does not have any form actually but is in potentiality to all forms. For the mixed body itself does not have actually any of the things which combine in its mixture, but has them only potentially. And it is because of this likeness between prime matter and what is mixed that he seems to have posited the above mixture; although there is some difference between the potentiality of matter and that of a mixture. For even though the elements which constitute a mixture are present in the mixture potentially, they are still not present in a state of pure passive potency; for they remain virtually in the mixture. This can be shown from the fact that a mixture has motion and operations as a result of the bodies of which the Mixture is composed. But this cannot be said of the things which are present potentially in prime matter. And there is also another difference, namely, that even though a mixture is not actually any of the mixed bodies which it contains, yet it is something actual. This cannot be said of prime matter. But Anaxagoras seems to do away with this difference, because he has not posited any particular mixture but the universal mixture of all things.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 17 Secundo, subtilius caeteris dixit, quia magis accessit ad verum cognitionem primi principii agentis. Dixit enim omnia esse permixta praeter intellectum; et hunc dixit solum esse impermixtum et purum. 197. The second reason is this: he spoke more subtly than the others, because he came closer to a true understanding of the first active principle. For he said that all things are mixed together except intellect, and that this alone is unmixed and pure.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 18 Ex quibus patet, quod ipse posuit duo esse principia, et ipsum intellectum posuit esse unum, secundum quod ipse est simplex et impermixtus; et alterum principium posuit materiam primam, quam ponimus sicut indeterminatam, antequam determinetur, et antequam aliquam speciem participet. Materia enim, cum sit infinitarum formarum, determinatur per formam, et per eam consequitur aliquam speciem. 198. From these things it is clear that he posited two principles: one of these he claimed to be the intellect itself, insofar as it is simple and unmixed with other things; and the other is prime matter, which we claim is like the indeterminate before it is limited and participates in a form. For since [prime] matter is [the subject] of an infinite number of forms, it is limited by a form and acquires some species by means of it.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 19 Patet igitur quod Anaxagoras secundum illa quae exprimit, nec dixit recte, nec plene. Tamen videbatur directe dicere aliquid propinquius opinionibus posteriorum, quae sunt veriores, scilicet opinioni Platonis et Aristotelis qui recte de materia prima senserunt, quae quidem opiniones tunc erant magis apparentes. 199. It is clear, then, that, in regard to the things which he stated expressly, Anaxagoras neither spoke correctly nor clearly. Yet he would seem to say something directly which comes closer to the opinions of the later philosophers, which are truer (namely, to those of Plato and Aristotle, whose judgments about prime matter were correct) and which were then more apparent.
lib. 1 l. 12 n. 20 Ultimo excusat se Aristoteles a perscrutatione diligentiori harum opinionum, quia sermones dictorum philosophorum sunt proprii sermonibus naturalibus, ad quos pertinet tractare de generatione et corruptione. Ipsi enim fere posuerunt principia et causas talis substantiae, scilicet materialis et corruptibilis. Dicit autem fere, quia de aliis substantiis non tractabant, quamvis quaedam principia ab eis posita possent ad alia etiam extendere, ut patet de intellectu maxime. Quia igitur non posuerunt principia communia omnibus substantiis, quod pertinet ad istam scientiam, sed principia solum substantiarum corruptibilium, quod pertinet ad scientiam naturalem; ideo diligens inquisitio de praedictis opinionibus magis pertinet ad scientiam naturalem quam ad istam. 200. In concluding Aristotle excuses himself from a more diligent investigation of these opinions, because the statements of these philosophers belong to the realm of physical discussions, which treat of generation and corruption. For these men usually posited principles and causes of this kind of substance, i.e., of material and corruptible substance. He says “usually,” because, while they did not treat other substances, certain of the principles laid down by them can also be extended to other substances. This is most evident in the case of intellect. Therefore, since they have not posited principles common to all substances, which pertains to this science, but only principles of corruptible substances, which pertains to the philosophy of nature, a diligent study of the foregoing opinions belongs rather to the philosophy of nature than to this science.


Lecture 13

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 1 Hic disputat contra opiniones Pythagorae et Platonis, qui altera principia posuerunt quam naturalia. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod consideratio harum opinionum magis pertinet ad scientiam praesentem, quam praedictarum. Secundo incipit contra eas disputare, ibi, ergo qui Pythagorici sunt vocati. Dicit ergo primo, quod illi qui faciunt theoricam, idest considerationem de omnibus entibus, et ponunt, quod entium quaedam sunt sensibilia, quaedam insensibilia, perscrutantur de utroque genere entium. Unde investigare de opinionibus eorum, qui bene et qui non bene dixerunt, magis pertinet ad perscrutationem quam proponimus tradere in hac scientia. Nam haec scientia est de omnibus entibus, non de aliquo particulari genere entis. Et sic illa quae pertinent ad omnia entis genera, magis sunt hic consideranda quam illa quae pertinent ad aliquod particulare genus entis et cetera. 201. Here he argues dialectically against the opinions of Pythagoras and Plato, who posited different principles than those which pertain to the philosophy of nature. In regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that a study of these opinions rather than those mentioned above belongs to the present science. Second (202), he begins to argue dialectically against these opinions (“Therefore those who”). He says, first (98), then, that those who “make a study,” i.e., an investigation, of all existing things, and hold that some are sensible and others non-sensible, make a study of both classes of beings. Hence an investigation of the opinions of those who spoke either correctly or incorrectly, belongs rather to the study which we now propose to make in this science. For this science deals with all beings and not with some particular class of being. Hence, the things which pertain to every class of being are to be considered here rather than those which pertain to some particular class of being.
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit ergo qui hic disputat contra opiniones praedictorum philosophorum. Et primo contra Pythagoram. Secundo contra Platonem, ibi, qui vero ideas. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit in quo Pythagoras conveniebat cum naturalibus, et in quo ab eis differebat. Secundo disputat contra eius opinionem, ibi, ex quo tamen modo motus et cetera. Sciendum est ergo, quod Pythagorici in uno conveniebant cum naturalibus, in alio ab eis differebant. Differebant quidem in positione principiorum; usi sunt enim principiis rerum extraneo modo a naturalibus. Cuius causa est, quia principia rerum non acceperunt ex sensibilibus sicut naturales, sed ex mathematicis, quae sunt sine motu, unde non sunt naturalia. Quod autem mathematica dicuntur esse sine motu, referendum est ad illas scientias, quae sunt pure mathematicae, sicut arithmetica et geometria. Astrologia enim considerat motum, quia astrologia est media scientia inter mathematicam et naturalem. Principia enim sua astrologia et aliae mediae applicant ad res naturales, ut patet secundo physicorum. 202. Therefore those who (99). Here he argues against the opinions of the foregoing philosophers. First (99), he argues against Pythagoras; and second (208), against Plato (“But those who posited Ideas”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows in what way Pythagoras agreed with the philosophers of nature, and in what way he differed from them. Second (204), he argues against Pythagoras’ position (“Yet how”). We must understand (99), then, that in one respect the Pythagoreans agreed with the philosophers of nature, and in another respect they differed from them. They differed from them in their position regarding principles, because they employed principles of things in a way foreign to the philosophers of nature. The reason is that they did not take the principles of things from sensible beings, as the natural philosophers did, but from the objects of mathematics, which are devoid of motion, and are therefore not physical. And the statement that the objects of mathematics are devoid of motion must be referred to those sciences which are purely mathematical, such as arithmetic and geometry. Astronomy considers motion’ because astronomy is a science midway between mathematics and natural philosophy. For astronomy and the other intermediate sciences apply their principles to natural things, as is clear in Book II of the Physics.
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 3 Conveniebat autem Pythagoras cum naturalibus quantum ad ea quorum principia quaerebat. Disputabat enim et tractabat de omnibus naturalibus. Tractabat enim de generatione caeli, et observabat omnia quae accidunt circa partes caeli, quae dicuntur diversae sphaerae, vel etiam diversae stellae: et quae accidunt circa passiones vel circa eclipses luminarium, et quae accidunt circa operationes et circa motus corporum caelestium, et circa eorum effectus in rebus inferioribus; et singulis huiusmodi dispensabat causas, adaptando scilicet unicuique propriam causam. Et videbatur etiam in hoc consentire aliis naturalibus, quod solum sit illud ens, quod est sensibile, quod comprehenditur a caelo quod videmus. Non enim ponebat aliquod corpus sensibile infinitum, sicut alii naturales posuerunt. Nec iterum ponebat plures mundos, sicut posuit Democritus. Ideo autem videbatur aestimare quod nulla entia essent nisi sensibilia, quia non assignabat principia et causas nisi talibus substantiis. Nihilominus tamen causae et principia, quae assignabat, non erant propria et determinata sensibilibus, sed erant sufficientia ascendere ad superiora entia, idest ad entia intellectualia. Et erant adhuc magis convenientia quam rationes naturalium, quae non poterant extendi ultra sensibilia, quia ponebant principia corporea. Pythagoras vero, quia ponebat principia incorporea, scilicet numeros, quamvis non poneret principia nisi corporum sensibilium, ponebat tamen entium intelligibilium, quae non sunt corpora, principia pene, sicut et Plato posterius fecit. 203. Now Pythagoras agreed with the philosophers of nature concerning the things whose principles he sought; for he discussed and treated all natural beings. He dealt with the generation of the heavens, and observed everything that happens to the parts of the heavens, by which are meant the different spheres, or also the different stars. He also considered what happens to its affections, or to the eclipses of the luminous bodies; and what happens to the operations and motions of the heavenly bodies, and their effects on lower bodies. And he used up causes on particular things of this kind by applying to each one its proper cause. He also seemed to agree with’ the other philosophers of nature in thinking that that alone has being which is sensible and is contained by the heavens which we see. For he did not posit an infinite sensible body as the other philosophers of nature did. Nor again did he hold that there are many worlds, as Democritus did. He therefore seemed to think that there are no beings except sensible ones, because he assigned principles and causes only for such substances. However, the causes and principles which he laid down are not proper or limited to sensible things, but are sufficient for ascending to higher beings, i.e., intellectual ones. And they were better fitted to these than the theories of the natural philosophers which could not be extended beyond sensible things, because these philosophers claimed that principles are corporeal. But since Pythagoras posited incorporeal principles, i.e., numbers, although he only posited principles of sensible bodies, he came very close to positing principles of intelligible beings, which are not bodies, as Plato did later on.
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit ex quo tamen hic ponit tres rationes contra opinionem Pythagorae: quarum prima talis est. Pythagoras non poterat assignare, quomodo motus adveniat rebus, quia non ponebat principia nisi finitum et infinitum, par et impar, quae ponebat principia sicut substantia, sive materialia principia. Sed oportebat eum concedere motum rebus inesse. Quomodo enim esset possibile sine motu et transmutatione esse generationem et corruptionem in corporibus, et operationes eorum, quae geruntur circa caelum, quae per motus quosdam fiunt? Patet quod nullo modo. Unde cum Pythagoras consideravit de generatione et corruptione, et eis quae geruntur circa caelum, patet quod insufficienter posuit non assignans aliqua principia motus. 204. Yet how (100). Here he gives three arguments against the opinion of Pythagoras. The first is this: Pythagoras could not explain how motion originates in the world, because he posited as principles only the limited and unlimited and the even and odd, which he held to be principles as substance, or material principles. But he had to admit that there is motion in the world. For how could there be generation and corruption in bodies, and how could there be any activities of the heavenly bodies, which occur as a result of certain kinds of motion, unless motion and change existed? Evidently they could not exist in any way. Hence, since Pythagoras considered generation and corruption and the operations of the heavenly bodies without assigning any principle of motion, his position is clearly unsatisfactory.
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit secundam rationem. Pythagoras enim ponebat ex numeris componi magnitudines. Sed sive hoc probet, sive concedatur, non poterat ex numeris assignare causam, quare quaedam sunt gravia, quaedam levia. Quod ex hoc patet, quia rationes numerorum non magis adaptantur corporibus sensibilibus quam mathematicis quae sunt non gravia et levia. Unde patet, quod ipsi nihil dixerunt plus de corporibus sensibilibus, quam de mathematicis. Et sic patet, quod cum corpora sensibilia, ut ignis et terra et huiusmodi, inquantum talia, addant aliquid supra mathematica, nihil proprium de istis sensibilibus dixerunt secundum veram aestimationem. Et sic iterum patet, quod insufficienter posuerunt, praetermittentes assignare causas eorum, quae sunt propria sensibilibus. 205. And further (101). Here he gives the second argument. For Pythagoras claimed that continuous quantities are composed of numbers. But whether he proves this or takes it for granted, he could not give any reason on the part of numbers as to why some things are heavy and others light. This is clear from the fact that his theories about numbers are no more adapted to sensible bodies than they are to the objects of mathematics, which are neither heavy nor light. Hence they obviously said nothing more about sensible bodies than they did about the objects of mathematics. Therefore, since sensible bodies, such as earth and fire and the like, considered in themselves, add something over and above the objects of mathematics, it is evident that they said nothing proper in any true sense about these sensible bodies. Thus it is also evident that the principles which they laid down are not sufficient, since they neglected to give the causes of those [attributes] which are proper to sensible bodies.
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ostendit tertiam rationem, quae procedit ex hoc, quod Pythagoras videbatur ponere duo contraria. Ponebat enim ex una parte, quod numerus et numeri passiones sunt causa eorum quae sunt in caelo, et omnium generabilium et corruptibilium a principio mundi: ex alia vero ponebat, quod non erat aliquis alius numerus praeter istum numerum ex quo constituitur mundi substantia, numerum enim substantiam rerum posuit. Hoc autem quomodo est accipere, cum idem non sit causa suiipsius? Nam Pythagoras ex hoc dicit demonstrari, quod unumquodque horum sensibilium est numerus secundum substantiam suam, quia in hac parte universi sunt entia contingentia, de quibus est opinio, et quae subsunt tempori inquantum aliquando sunt et aliquando non sunt. Si autem generabilia et corruptibilia essent partim supra aut subtus, in ordine universi esset inordinatio, vel per modum iniustitiae, dum, scilicet, aliqua res sortiretur nobiliorem locum vel minus nobilem quam sibi debeatur: aut per modum discretionis, inquantum corpus si poneretur extra locum suum, divideretur a corporibus similis naturae: vel per modum mixtionis et confusionis, dum corpus extra suum locum positum oportet permisceri alteri corpori, sicut si aliqua pars aquae esset in aliquo loco aeris, vel in loco terrae. Et videtur in hoc tangere duplicem convenientiam corporis naturalis ad suum locum. Unam ex ordine situs, secundum quod nobiliora corpora sortiuntur altiorem locum, in quo videtur quaedam iustitia. Aliam autem ex similitudine vel dissimilitudine corporum locatorum adinvicem, cui contrariatur discretio et permixtio. Quia igitur res secundum quod determinatum situm habent, in universo convenienter se habent, quia situs in modico mutaretur sequeretur inconveniens, ut dictum et manifestum est, quod omnes partes universi sunt ordinatae secundum determinatam proportionem; omnis enim determinata proportio est secundum numeros. Unde ostendebat Pythagoras, quod omnia entia essent numerus. Sed ex alia parte videmus quod magnitudines constitutae in diversis locis sunt plures et diversae, quia singula loca universi consequuntur propriae passiones, quibus corpora diversificantur. Nam aliae sunt passiones corporis existentis sursum et deorsum. Cum igitur Pythagoras ratione praedicta dicat omnia sensibilia numerum, et videamus accidere diversitatem in sensibilibus secundum diversa loca, utrum sit idem et unus numerus tantum, qui est, in caelo, idest in toto corpore sensibili quod in caelo includatur, de quo oportet accipere quod est substantia uniuscuiusque sensibilis? Aut praeter hunc numerum qui est substantia rerum sensibilium, est alius numerus qui est eorum causa? Plato autem dixit alium numerum, qui est substantia sensibilium, et qui est causa. Et quia ipse Plato existimavit sicut Pythagoras, numeros esse ipsa corpora sensibilia et causas eorum, sed numeros intellectuales aestimavit causas insensibilium, numeros vero sensibiles causas esse et formas sensibilium. Quid quia Pythagoras non fecit, insufficienter posuit. 206. Further, how are we (102). Here he gives the third argument, which is based on the fact that Pythagoras seemed to hold two contrary [positions]. For, on the one hand, he held that number and the attributes of number arc the cause both of those events which occur in the heavens and of all generable and corruptible things from the beginning of the world. Yet, on the other hand, he held that there is no other number besides that of which the substance of things is composed; for he held that number is the substance of things. But how is this to be understood, since one and the same thing is not the cause of itself? For Pythagoras says that the former position may be demonstrated from the fact that each one of these sensible things is numerical in substance; because in this part of the universe there are contingent beings, about which there is opinion, and which are subject to time inasmuch as they sometimes are and sometimes are not. But if generable and corruptible things were partly above or partly below, there would be disorder in the order of the universe: either after the manner of injustice, i.e., insofar as some being would receive a nobler or less noble place than it ought to have; or after the manner of separation, i.e., in the sense that, if a body were located outside its own place, it would be separated from bodies of a like nature; or after the manner of mixture and mingling, provided that a body located outside its proper place must be mixed with some other body, for example, if some part of water occupied a place belonging to air or to earth. In this discussion he seems to touch on two ways in which a natural body conforms to its proper place: one pertains to the order of position, according to which nobler bodies receive a higher place, in which there seems to be a kind of justice; and the other pertains to the similarity or dissimilarity between bodies in place, to which separation and mingling may be opposed. Therefore, insofar as things have a definite position, they are fittingly situated in the universe. For if their position were fitting would result, inasmuch as it has been stated and shown that all parts of the universe are arranged in a definite proportion; for every definite proportion is numerical. And it was from this that Pythagoras showed that all things would be numbers. But, on the other hand, we see that the continuous quantities established in different places are many and different, because the particular places in the universe correspond to the proper attributes by which bodies are differentiated. For the attributes of bodies which are above differ from those which are below. Hence, since Pythagoras by means of the above argument affirms that all sensible things are numbers, and we see that the difference in sensible bodies is attributable to difference in place, the question arises whether the number which exists “in the heavens” i.e., in the whole visible body which comprises the heavens, is merely the same as that which must be understood to be the substance of each sensible thing, or whether besides this number which constitutes the substance of sensible things there is another number which is their cause. Now Plato said that there is one kind of number which is the substance of sensible things, and another which is their cause. And while both Plato himself and Pythagoras thought that numbers are both sensible bodies themselves and their causes, Plato alone considered intellectual numbers to be the causes of things that are not sensible, and sensible numbers to be the causes and forms of sensible things. And since Pythagoras did not do this, his position is unsatisfactory.
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 7 Concludit autem in fine quod ista sufficient de Pythagoricis opinionibus, nam eas tetigisse sufficit. 207. In concluding Aristotle says that these remarks about the Pythagoreans’ opinions will suffice; for it is enough to have touched upon them to this extent.

Lecture 14

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 1 Hic disputat contra opinionem Platonis: et dividitur in duas partes. Primo disputat contra eius opinionem, quantum ad hoc quod ponebat de rerum substantiis. Secundo quantum ad hoc quod de rerum principiis, ibi, omnino autem sapientia. Prima dividitur in duas partes. Primo enim disputat contra hoc quod ponebat substantias species. Secundo quantum ad hoc quod ponebat de mathematicis, ibi, amplius si sunt numeri. Circa primum duo facit. Primo enim disputat contra ipsam positionem Platonis. Secundo contra rationem ipsius, ibi, amplius autem secundum quos et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod Platonici ponentes ideas esse quasdam substantias separatas, in hoc videntur deliquisse, quia cum ipsi quaerentes causas horum sensibilium entium, praetermissis sensibilibus, adinvenerunt quaedam alia nova entia aequalia numeris sensibilibus. Et hoc videtur inconveniens: quia qui quaerit causas aliquarum rerum, debet ipsas certificare, non alias res addere, ex quarum positione accrescat necessitas inquisitionis: hoc enim simile est ac si aliquis vellet numerare res aliquas, quas non putet se posse numerare sicut pauciores, sed vult eas numerare multiplicando eas per additionem aliquarum rerum. Constat enim quod talis stulte movetur, quia in paucioribus est via magis plana, quia melius et facilius certificantur pauca quam multa. Et numerus tanto est certior quanto est minor, sicut propinquior unitati, quae est mensura certissima. Sicut autem numeratio est quaedam rerum certificatio quantum ad numerum, ita inquisitio de causis rerum est quaedam certa mensura ad certificationem naturae rerum. Unde sicut numeratae pauciores res facilius certificantur quantum ad earum numerum, ita pauciores res facilius certificantur quantum ad earum naturam. Unde cum Plato ad notificandum res sensibiles tantum, multiplicaverit rerum genera, adiunxit difficultates, accipiens quod est difficilius ad manifestationem facilioris, quod est inconveniens. 208. Here he argues disputatively against Plato’s opinion. This is divided into two parts. First (208), he argues against Plato’s opinion with reference to his position about the substances of things; and second (259), with reference to his position about the principles of things (“And in general”). The first is divided into two parts. First, he argues against Plato’s position that the Forms are substances; and second (122:C 239), against the things that he posited about the objects of mathematics (“Further, if the Forms”). In regard to the first he does two thinks. First, he argues against this position of Plato; and second (210), against the reasoning behind it (“Furthermore, with regard to”). He says, first (103), that the Platonists, in holding that the Ideas are certain separate substances, seemed to be at fault in that, when they sought for the causes of these sensible beings, they neglected sensible beings and invented certain other new entities equal in number to sensible beings. This seems to be absurd, because one who seeks the causes of certain things ought to make these evident and not add other things, the premising of which only adds to the number of points which have to be investigated. For it would be similar if a man who wished to count certain things which he did not think he was able to count because they are few, believed that he could count them by increasing their number through the addition of certain other things. But it is evident that such a man has a foolish motive, because the path is clearer when there are fewer things; for it is better and easier to make certain of fewer things than of many. And the smaller a number is, the more certain it is to us, inasmuch as it is nearer to the unit, which is the most accurate measure. And just as the process of counting things is the measure we use to make certain of their number, in a similar fashion an investigation of the causes of things is the accurate measure for making certain of their natures. Therefore, just as the number of fewer numerable things is made certain of more easily, n a similar way the nature of fewer things is made certain of more easily. Hence, when Plato increased the classes of beings to the extent that he did with a view to explaining sensible things, he added to the number of difficulties by taking what is more difficult in order to explain what is less difficult. This is absurd.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 2 Et quod ideae sint aequales numero, aut non pauciores sensibilibus, de quibus Platonici inquirunt causas (quibus Aristoteles se connumerat, quia Platonis discipulus fuit) et determinaverunt procedentes de his sensibilibus ad praedictas species, manifestum est si consideretur, qua ratione Platonici ideas induxerunt: hac, scilicet, quia videbant in omnibus univocis unum esse in multis. Unde id unum ponebant esse speciem separatam. Videmus tamen, quod circa omnes substantias rerum aliarum ab ideis invenitur unum in multis per modum univocae praedicationis, inquantum inveniuntur multa unius speciei et hoc non solum in sensibilibus corruptibilibus, sed etiam in mathematicis, quae sunt sempiterna: quia et in eis multa sunt unius speciei, ut supra dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod omnibus speciebus rerum sensibilium respondeat aliqua idea. Quaelibet igitur earum est quoddam aequivocum cum istis sensibilibus, quia communicat in nomine cum eis. Sicut enim Socrates dicitur homo, ita et illa. Tamen differunt ratione. Ratio enim Socratis est cum materia. Ratio vero hominis idealis est sine materia. Vel secundum aliam literam, unaquaeque species dicitur esse aliquid univocum, inquantum scilicet est unum in multis, et convenit cum illis de quibus praedicatur, quantum ad rationem speciei. Ideo autem dicit aequales, aut non pauciores, quia ideae vel ponuntur solum specierum, et sic erunt aequales numero istis sensibilibus, si numerentur hic sensibilia secundum diversas species, et non secundum diversa individua quae sunt infinita. Vel ponuntur ideae non solum specierum, sed etiam generum; et sic sunt plures ideae quam species sensibilium, quia ideae tunc erunt species omnes, et praeter haec omnia et singula genera. Et propter hoc dicit aut non pauciores quidem, sed plures. Vel aliter, ut dicantur esse aequales, inquantum ponebat eas esse sensibilium; non pauciores autem sed plures, inquantum ponebat eas non solum species sensibilium, sed etiam mathematicorum. 209. That the Ideas are equal in number to, or not fewer than, sensible things, whose causes the Platonists seek (and Aristotle includes himself among their number because he was Plato’s disciple), and which they established by going from sensible things to the aforesaid Forms, becomes evident if one considers by what reasoning the Platonists introduced the Ideas. Now they reasoned thus: they saw that there is a one-in-many for all things having the same name. Hence they claimed that this one-in-many is a Form. Yet with respect to all substances of things other than the Ideas we see that there is found to be a one-in-many which is predicated of them univocally inasmuch as there are found to be many things which are specifically one. This occurs not only in the case of sensible things but also in that of the objects of mathematics, which are eternal; because among these there are also many things which are specifically one, as was stated above (157). Hence it follows that some Idea corresponds to each species of sensible things; and therefore each Idea is something having the same name as these sensible things, because the Ideas agree with them in name. For just as Socrates is called man, so also is the Idea of man. Yet they differ conceptually; for the intelligible structure of Socrates contains matter, whereas that of the ideal man is devoid of matter. or, according to another reading, each Form is said to be something having the same name [as these sensible things] inasmuch as it is a one-in-many and agrees with the things of which it is predicated so far as the intelligible structure of the species is concerned. Hence he says that they are equal to, or not fewer than, these things. For either there are held to be Ideas only of species, and then they would. be equal in number to these sensible things (granted that things are counted here insofar as they differ specifically and not individually, for the latter difference is infinite); or there are held to be ideas not only of species but also of genera, and then there would be more ideas than there are species of sensible things, because all species would be Ideas and in addition to these each and every genus [would be an Idea]. This is why he says that they are either not fewer than or more. Or, in another way, they are said to be equal inasmuch as he claimed that they are the Forms of sensible things. And he says not fewer than but more inasmuch as he held that they are the Forms not only of sensible things but also of the objects of mathematics.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic disputat contra Platonem quantum ad rationem suae positionis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo tangit modos in generali, quibus rationes Platonis deficiebant. Secundo exponit illos in speciali, ibi, quia secundum rationes scientiarum. Dicit ergo primo, quod secundum nullum illorum modorum videntur species esse, secundum quos nos Platonici ostendimus species esse. Et hoc ideo quia ex quibusdam illorum modorum non necessarium est fieri syllogismum, idest quasdam rationes Platonis, quia scilicet non de necessitate possunt syllogizare species esse: ex quibusdam vero modis fit syllogismus, sed non ad propositum Platonis: quia per quasdam suas rationes ostenditur, quod species separatae sunt quarumdam rerum, quarum esse species Platonici non putaverunt similiter, sicut et illarum quarum putaverunt, esse species. 210. Furthermore, with regard to (104). Here he argues dialectically against the reasoning behind Plato’s position; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives a general account of the ways in which Plato’s arguments fail. Second (211), he explains them in detail (“For according to those”). He says, first, that with regard to the ways in which we Platonists prove the existence of the Forms, according to none of these are the Forms seen to exist. The reason is that “no syllogism follows” necessarily from some of these ways, i.e., from certain arguments of Plato, because they cannot demonstrate with necessity the existence of the Ideas. However, from other arguments a syllogism does follow, although it does not support Plato’s thesis; for by certain of his arguments there are proved to be Forms of certain things of which the Platonists did not think there are Forms, just as there are proved to be Forms of those things of which they think there are Forms.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit quia secundum hic prosequitur istos modos in speciali. Et primo prosequitur secundum, ostendendo quod sequitur per rationem Platonis species esse aliquorum, quorum species non ponebat. Secundo prosequitur primum, ostendens quod rationes Platonis non sunt sufficientes ad ostendendum esse ideas, ibi, omnium autem dubitabit aliquis et cetera. Circa primum ponit septem rationes: quarum prima talis est. Una rationum inducentium Platonem ad ponendum ideas sumebatur ex parte scientiae: quia videlicet scientia cum sit de necessariis, non potest esse de his sensibilibus, quae sunt corruptibilia, sed oportet quod sit de entibus separatis incorruptibilibus. Secundum igitur hanc rationem ex scientiis sumptam, sequitur quod species sint omnium quorumcumque sunt scientiae. Scientiae autem non solum sunt de hoc quod est esse unum in multis, quod est per affirmationem, sed etiam de negationibus: quia sicut sunt aliquae demonstrationes concludentes affirmativam propositionem, ita sunt etiam demonstrationes concludentes negativam propositionem: ergo oportet etiam negationum ponere ideas. 211. For according to (105). Here he examines in detail the arguments by which the Platonists establish Ideas. First, he examines the second argument; and he does this by showing that from Plato’s argument it follows that there are Forms of some things for which the Platonists did not posit Forms. Second (225), he examines the first argument; and he does this by showing that Plato’s arguments are not sufficient to prove that Ideas exist (“But the most”). In regard to the first member of this division he gives seven arguments. The first is this: one of the arguments that induced Plato to posit Ideas is taken from scientific knowledge; for since science is concerned with necessary things, it cannot be concerned with sensible things, which are corruptible, but must be concerned with separate entities which are incorruptible. According to the argument taken from the sciences, then, it follows that there are Forms of every sort of thing of which there are sciences. Now there are sciences not only of that which is one-in-many, which is affirmative, but also of negations; for just as there are some demonstrations which conclude with an affirmative proposition, in a similar way there are demonstrations which conclude with a negative proposition. Hence it is also necessary to posit Ideas of negations.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit et secundum hic ponit secundam rationem. In scientiis enim non solum intelligitur quod quaedam semper se eodem modo habent, sed etiam quod quaedam corrumpuntur; aliter tolleretur scientia naturalis, quae circa motum versatur. Si igitur oportet esse ideas omnium illorum quae in scientiis intelliguntur, oportet esse ideas corruptibilium inquantum corruptibilia, hoc est inquantum sunt haec sensibilia singularia; sic enim sunt corruptibilia. Non autem potest dici secundum rationem Platonis, quod scientiae illae, quibus intelligimus corruptiones rerum, intelligantur corruptiones horum sensibilium; quia horum sensibilium non est intellectus, sed imaginatio vel phantasia, quae est motus factus a sensu secundum actum, secundum quod dicitur in secundo de anima. 212. Again, according to the argument (106). Here he gives the second argument. For in the sciences it is not only understood that some things always exist in the same way, but also that some things are destroyed; otherwise the philosophy of nature, which deals with motion, would be destroyed. Therefore, if there must be ideas of all the things which are comprehended in the sciences, there must be Ideas of corruptible things as such, i.e., insofar as these are singular sensible things; for thus are things corruptible. But according to Plato’s theory it cannot be said that those sciences by which we understand the processes of corruption in the world attain any understanding of the processes of corruption in sensible things; for there is no comprehension of these sensible things, but only imagination or phantasy, which is a motion produced by the senses in their act of sensing, as is pointed out in The Soul, Book II.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit tertiam rationem, quae continet duas conclusiones, quas certissimis rationibus dicit concludi. Una est, quia si ideae sunt omnium, quorum sunt scientiae, scientiae autem non solum sunt de absolutis, sed etiam sunt de his quae dicuntur ad aliquid, sequitur hac ratione faciente quod ideae sunt etiam eorum quae sunt ad aliquid: quod est contra opinionem Platonis; quia cum ideae separatae sint secundum se existentes, quod est contra rationem eius quod est ad aliquid, non ponebat Plato eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, aliquod esse genus idearum, quia secundum se dicuntur. 213. Again, according to the most (107). Here he gives the third argument, which contains two conclusions that he says are drawn from the most certain arguments of Plato. One conclusion is this: if there are Ideas of all things of which there are sciences, and there are sciences not only of absolutes but also of things predicated relatively, then in giving this argument it follows that there are also Ideas of relations. This is opposed to Plato’s view. For, since the separate Ideas are things which exist of themselves, which is opposed to the intelligibility of a relation, Plato did not hold that there is a class of Ideas of relations, because the Ideas are said to exist of themselves.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 7 Alia conclusio est quae ex aliis rationibus certissimis sequitur, quod scilicet sit tertius homo. Quod quidem tripliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo quod intelligatur, quod homo idealis sit tertius a duobus hominibus sensibilibus, qui communis hominis praedicationem suscipiunt. Sed haec non videtur eius esse intentio, licet non tangatur secundo elenchorum: haec enim est positio contra quam disputat: unde ad hoc non duceret quasi ad inconveniens. 214. The second conclusion is one which follows from other most certain arguments, namely, that there is “a third man.” This phrase can be understood in three ways. First, it can mean that the ideal man is a third man distinct from two men perceived by the senses, who have the common name man predicated of both of them. But this does not seem to be what he has in mind, even though it is not mentioned in the Sophistical Refutations, Book II; for this is the position against which he argues. Hence according to this it would not lead to an absurdity.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 8 Alio modo potest intelligi, ut dicatur tertius homo, scilicet qui sit communis et homini ideali et homini sensibili. Cum enim homo sensibilis et homo idealis conveniant in ratione, sicut duo homines sensibiles, et sicut homo idealis ponitur tertius praeter duos homines sensibiles, ita alius homo debet poni tertius praeter hominem idealem et hominem sensibilem. Et hoc etiam non videtur hic esse eius intentio, quia ad hoc inconveniens statim alia ratione ducet: unde esset superfluum hic ad idem inconveniens ducere. 215. The second way in which this expression can be understood is this: the third man means one that is common to the ideal man and to one perceived by the senses. For since both a man perceived by the senses and the ideal man have a common intelligible structure, like two men perceived by the senses, then just as the ideal man is held to be a third man in addition to two men perceived by the senses, in a similar way there should be held to be another third man in addition to the ideal man and one perceived by the senses. But neither does this seem to be what he has in mind here, because he leads us immediately to this absurdity by means of another argument. Hence it would be pointless to lead us to the same absurdity here.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 9 Tertio modo potest intelligi, quia Plato ponebat in quibusdam generibus tria, quaedam scilicet sensibilia, mathematica et species, sicut in numeris et lineis et omnibus huiusmodi. Non est autem maior ratio quare in quibusdam rebus ponantur media quam in aliis; ergo oportebat etiam in specie hominis ponere hominem medium, qui erit tertius inter hominem sensibilem et idealem: et hanc etiam rationem in posterioribus libris Aristoteles ponit. 216. The third way in which this expression can be understood is this: Plato posited three kinds of entities in certain classes of things, namely, sensible substances, the objects of mathematics and the Forms. He does this, for example, in the case of numbers, lines and the like. But there is no reason why intermediate things should be held to exist in certain classes rather than in others. Hence in the class of man it was also necessary to posit an intermediate man, who will be a third man midway between the man perceived by the senses and the ideal man. Aristotle also gives this argument in the later books of this work (2160).
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit et omnino hic ponit quartam rationem quae talis est. Quicumque per suam rationem removet aliqua, quae sunt apud eum magis nota quam ipsa positio, inconvenienter ponit. Sed istae rationes, quas Plato posuit, de speciebus separatis, auferunt quaedam principia, quae Platonici dicentes esse species magis volunt esse vera quam hoc ipsum quod est, ideas esse: ergo Plato inconvenienter posuit. Minorem autem sic manifestat. Ideae secundum Platonem sunt priores rebus sensibilibus et mathematicis: sed ipsae ideae sunt numeri secundum eum, et magis numeri impares quam pares, quia numerum imparem attribuebat formae, parem autem materiae. Unde et dualitatem dixit esse materiam. Sequitur ergo quod alii numeri sunt priores dualitate, quam ponebat sicut materiam sensibilium, ponens magnum et parvum. Cuius contrarium Platonici maxime asserebant, scilicet dualitatem esse primam in genere numeri. 217. And in general (108). Here he gives the fourth argument, which runs as follows. Whoever by his own reason he does away with certain [principles] which are better known to him than the ones which he posits, adopts an absurd position. But these theories about the Forms which Plato held do away with certain principles whose reality the Platonists (when they said that there are Ideas) were more convinced of than the existence of the Ideas. Therefore Plato’s position is absurd. The minor premise is proved in this way. According to Plato the Ideas are prior both to sensible things and to the objects of mathematics. But according to him the Ideas themselves are numbers; and they are odd numbers rather than even ones, because he attributed odd number to form and even number to matter. Hence he also said that the dyad [or duality] is matter. Therefore it follows that other numbers are prior to the dyad, which he held to be the matter of sensible things, and identified with the great and small. Yet the Platonists asserted the very opposite of this, that is to say, that the dyad is first in the class of number.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 11 Item si, sicut per superiorem rationem probatum est, oportet esse aliquas ideas relationum, quae sint secundum se ad aliquid, et ipsa idea est prior eo quod participat ideam, sequitur quod hoc ipsum quod est ad aliquid est prius absoluto quod secundum se dicitur. Nam huiusmodi substantiae sensibiles, quae participant ideas, absolute dicuntur. Et similiter de omnibus est quaecumque illi qui sequuntur opinionem de ideis dicunt opposita principiis per se notis, quae etiam ipsi maxime concedebant. 218. Again, if, as has been proved by the above argument (213), there must be Ideas of relations, which are self-subsistent relations, and if the Idea itself is prior to whatever participates in the Idea, it follows that the relative is prior to the absolute, which is said to exist of itself. For sensible substances of this kind, which participate in Ideas, are said to be in an unqualified sense. And in like manner whatever those who follow the opinion about the Ideas say of all things is opposed to self-evident principles which even they themselves are most ready to acknowledge.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit quintam rationem, quae talis est. Ideae ponebantur a Platone, ut eis competerent rationes sive definitiones positae in scientiis, ut etiam de eis scientiae esse possent. Sed intelligentia una, idest simplex et indivisibilis, qua scitur de unoquoque quid est, non solum est circa substantias sed etiam de aliis, scilicet accidentibus. Et similiter scientiae non solum sunt substantiae, et de substantia, sed etiam inveniuntur scientiae aliorum, scilicet accidentium: ergo patet quod ad aestimationem, secundum quam vos Platonici esse dicitis ideas, sequitur quod species non solum essent substantiarum, sed etiam multorum aliorum, scilicet accidentium. Et hoc idem sequitur non solum propter definitiones et scientias, sed etiam accidunt multa alia talia, scilicet plurima, ex quibus oportet ponere ideas accidentium secundum rationes Platonis. Sicut quia ponebat ideas principia essendi et fieri rerum, et multorum huiusmodi, quae conveniunt accidentibus. 219. Again, according to the opinion (109). Here he gives the fifth argument, which is as follows: Ideas were posited by Plato in order that the intelligible structures and definitions of things given in the sciences might correspond to them, and in order that there could be sciences of them. But there is “one concept,” i.e., a simple and indivisible concept, by which the quiddity of each thing is known, i.e., not only the quiddity of substances “but also of other things,” namely, of accidents. And in a similar way there are sciences not only of substance and about substance, but there are also found to be sciences “of other things,” i.e., of accidents. Hence according to the opinion by which you Platonists acknowledge the existence of Ideas, it evidently follows that there will be Forms not only of substances but also of other things, i.e., of accidents. This same conclusion follows not only because of definitions and the sciences, but there also happen to be many “other such” [reasons], i.e., very many .reasons why it is necessary to posit Ideas of accidents according to Plato’s arguments. For example, he held that the Ideas are the principles of being and of becoming in the world, and of many such aspects which apply to accidents.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 13 Sed ex alia parte secundum quod Plato opinabatur de ideis, et secundum necessitatem, qua sunt necessariae sensibilibus inquantum scilicet sunt participabiles a sensibilibus, est necessarium ponere quod ideae sint solum substantiarum. Quod sic patet. Ea quae sunt secundum accidens non participantur: sed ideam oportet participari in unoquoque inquantum non dicitur de subiecto. Quod sic patet. Quia si aliquod sensibile participat per se duplo, idest duplo separato (sic enim appellabat Plato omnia separata, scilicet per se entia): oportet quod participet sempiterno; non quidem per se, quia tunc sequeretur quod dupla sensibilia essent sempiterna, sed per accidens: inquantum scilicet ipsum per se duplum quod participatur est sempiternum. Ex quo patet quod participatio non est eorum quae accidentia sunt, sed solummodo substantiarum. Unde secundum opinionem Platonis non erat aliquod accidens species separata, sed solum substantia: et tamen secundum rationem sumptam ex scientiis oportebat quod esset species etiam accidentium, ut dictum est. 220. But, on the other hand, according to Plato’s opinion about the Ideas and according to logical necessity, insofar as the Ideas are indispensable to sensible things, i.e., “insofar” s as they are capable of being participated in by sensible things, it is necessary to posit Ideas only of substances. This is proved thus: things which are accidental are not participated in. But an Idea must be participated in by each thing insofar as it is not predicated of a subject. This becomes clear as follows: if any sensible thing participates in “doubleness itself,” i.e., in a separate doubleness (for Plato spoke of all separated things in this way, namely, as self-subsisting things), it must participate in the eternal. But it does not do this essentially (because then it would follow that any double perceived by the senses would be eternal), but accidentally, i.e., insofar as doubleness itself, which is participated in, is eternal. And from this it is evident that there is no participation in things which are accidental, but only in substances. Hence according to Plato’s position a separate Form was not an accident but only a substance. Yet according to the argument taken from the sciences there must also be Forms of accidents, as was stated above (219).
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit haec vero hic ponit sextam rationem, quae talis est. Istae res sensibiles substantiam significant in rebus quae videntur et similiter illic, ut in rebus intelligibilibus, quae substantiam significant, quia tam intelligibilia quam sensibilia substantiam ponebant: ergo necesse est ponere praeter utrasque substantias, scilicet intelligibiles et sensibiles, aliquid commune eis quod sit unum in multis: ex hac enim ratione Platonici ideas ponebant, quia inveniebant unum in multis, quod credebant esse praeter illa multa. 221. But these things (111). Then he gives the sixth argument, which runs thus: these sensible things signify substance both in the case of things perceived by the senses and in that of those in the ideal world, i.e., in the case of intelligible things, which signify substance; because they held that both intelligible things and sensible ones are substance. Therefore it is necessary to posit in addition to both of these substances—intelligible and sensible ones—some common entity which is a one-in-many. For the Platonists maintained that the Ideas exist on the grounds that they found a one-in-many which they believed to be separate from the many.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 15 Et quod hoc ponere sit necessarium, scilicet aliquod unum praeter substantias sensibiles et praeter species, sic ostendit. Aut enim ideae et sensibilia quae participant ideas sunt unius speciei aut non. Si sunt unius speciei, omnium autem multorum in specie convenientium oportet ponere secundum positionem Platonis unam speciem separatam communem, oportebit igitur aliquid ponere commune sensibilibus et ipsis ideis, quod sit separatum ab utroque. Non potest autem responderi ad hanc rationem quod ideae quae sunt incorporales et immateriales non indigent aliis speciebus superioribus; quia similiter mathematica quae ponuntur a Platone media inter sensibilia et species, sunt incorporea et immaterialia: et tamen, quia plura eorum inveniuntur unius speciei, Plato posuit eorum speciem communem separatam, qua etiam participant non solum mathematica, sed etiam sensibilia. Si igitur est una et eadem dualitas, quae est species vel idea dualitatis, quae quidem est etiam in dualitatibus sensibilibus quae sunt corruptibiles, sicut exemplar est in exemplato et in dualitatibus etiam mathematicis quae sunt multae unius speciei, sed tamen sunt sempiternae, eadem ratione in eadem dualitate, scilicet quae est idea et in alia quae est mathematica, vel sensibilis, erit alia dualitas separata. Non enim potest reddi propter quid illud sit, et hoc non sit. 222. The need for positing a one apart from both sensible substances and the Forms he proves thus: the Ideas and the sensible things which participate in them either belong to one class or not. If they belong to one class, and it is necessary to posit, according to Plato’s position, one common separate Form for all things having a common nature, then it will be necessary to Posit some entity common to both sensible things and the Ideas themselves) which exists apart from both. Now one cannot answer this argument by saying that the Ideas, which are incorporeal and immaterial, do not stand in need of any higher Forms; because the objects of mathematics, which Plato places midway between sensible substances and the Forms, are similarly incorporeal and immaterial. Yet since many of them are found to belong to one species, Plato held that there is a common Form for these things, in which not only the objects of mathematics participate but also sensible substances. Therefore, if the twoness [or duality] which is the Form or Idea of twoness is identical with that found in sensible twos, which are corruptible (just as a pattern is found in the things fashioned after it), and with that found in mathematical twos, which are many in one class (but are nevertheless eternal) ‘ then for the same reason in the case of the same twoness, i.e., the Idea two , and in that of the other twoness, which is either mathematical or sensible, there will be another separate twoness. For no reason can be given why the former should exist and the latter should not.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 16 Si autem detur alia pars, scilicet sensibilia quae participant ideas non sunt eiusdem speciei cum ideis: sequitur quod nomen quod dicitur de ideis et de substantia sensibili dicatur omnino aequivoce. Illa enim dicuntur aequivoce, quorum solum nomen commune est, ratione speciei existente diversa. Nec solum sequitur quod sint quocumque modo aequivoca, sed simpliciter aequivoca, sicut illa quibus imponitur unum nomen sine respectu ad aliquam communicationem, quae dicuntur aequivoca a casu. Sicut si aliquem hominem aliquis vocaret Calliam et aliquod lignum. 223. But if the other alternative is admitted—that sensible things, which participate in the Ideas, do not have the same form as the Ideas—it follows that the name which is predicated of both the Ideas and sensible substances is predicated in a purely equivocal way. For those things are said to be equivocal which have only a common name and differ in their intelligible structure. And it follows that they are not only equivocal in every way but equivocal in an absolute sense, like those things on which one name is imposed without regard for any common attribute, which are said to be equivocal by chance; for example, if one were to call both Callias and a piece of wood man.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 17 Hoc autem ideo addidit Aristoteles quia posset aliquis dicere quod non omnino aequivoce aliquod nomen praedicatur de idea et de substantia sensibili, cum de idea praedicetur essentialiter, de substantia vero sensibili per participationem. Nam idea hominis secundum Platonem dicitur per se homo, hic autem homo sensibilis dicitur per participationem. Sed tamen talis aequivocatio non est pura; sed nomen quod per participationem praedicatur, dicitur per respectum ad illud quod praedicatur per se, quod non est pura aequivocatio, sed multiplicitas analogiae. Si autem essent omnino aequivoca a casu idea et substantia sensibilis, sequeretur quod per unum non posset cognosci aliud, sicut aequivoca non se invicem notificant. 224. Now Aristotle added this because someone might say that a name is not predicated of an Idea and of a sensible substance in a purely equivocal way, since a name is predicated of an Idea essentially and of a sensible substance by participation. For, according to Plato, the Idea of man is called “man in himself,” whereas this man whom we apprehend by the senses is said to be a man by participation. However, such an equivocation is not pure equivocation. But a name which is predicated by participation is predicated with reference to something that is predicated essentially; and this is not pure equivocation but the multiplicity of analogy. However, if an Idea and a sensible substance were altogether equivocal by chance, it would follow that one could not be known through the other, as one equivocal thing cannot be known through another.

Lecture 15

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 15 n. 1 Hic improbat opinionem Platonis quantum ad hoc quod non concludebat quod concludere intendebat. Intendebat enim Plato concludere ideas esse per hoc, quod sunt necesse sensibilibus rebus secundum aliquem modum. Unde Aristoteles ostendens quod ideae ad nihil possunt sensibilibus utiles esse, destruit rationes Platonis de positione idearum: et ideo dicit, quod inter omnia dubitabilia, quae sunt contra Platonem, illud est maximum, quod species a Platone positae non videntur aliquid conferre rebus sensibilibus, nec sempiternis, sicut sunt corpora caelestia: nec his, quae fiunt et corrumpuntur, sicut corpora elementaria. Quod sigillatim de omnibus ostendit propter quae Plato ponebat ideas, cum dicit nec enim. 225. Here Aristotle attacks the opinion of Plato insofar as he did not draw the conclusion which he intended to draw. For Plato intended to conclude that there are Ideas by this argument that they are necessary in some way for sensible things. Hence, Aristotle, by showing that the Ideas cannot contribute anything to sensible things, destroys the arguments by which Plato posits Ideas. Thus he says (112) that of all the objections which may be raised against Plato the foremost is that the Forms which Plato posited do not seem to contribute anything to sensible things, either to those which are eternal, as the celestial bodies, or to those which are generated and corrupted, as the elemental bodies. He shows (113) that this criticism applies to each of the arguments by which Plato posited Ideas (“For they are not”).
lib. 1 l. 15 n. 2 Ibi incipit quinque ostendere. Primo quod non prosunt ad motum. Secundo quod non prosunt ad scientias, ibi, sed nec ad scientiam. Tertio quod non prosunt exemplaria, ibi, dicere vero exemplaria et cetera. Quarto quod non prosunt sicut substantiae, ibi, amplius opinabitur. Quinto quod non prosunt sicut causae fiendi, ibi, in Phaedone vero et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod species non possunt conferre sensibilibus, ita quod sint eis causa motus vel transmutationis alicuius. Cuius rationem hic non dicit, sed superius tetigit, quia videlicet ideae non introducebantur propter motum, sed magis propter immobilitatem. Quia enim Platoni videbatur quod omnia sensibilia semper essent in motu, voluit aliquid ponere extra sensibilia fixum et immobile, de quo posset esse certa scientia. Unde species non poterant ab eo poni sicut principia sensibilia motus, sed potius sicut immobiles, et immobilitatis principia: ut scilicet si aliquid fixum et eodem modo se habens in rebus sensibilibus invenitur, hoc sit secundum participantiam idearum, quae per se sunt immobiles. 226. At this point in the text (113) he begins to present his five objections [against the Platonic arguments for Ideas] . He argues, first (226), that they are useless in explaining motion; second (227), that they are use less in explaining our knowledge of sensible things (“Nor are they”); third (231), that they are of no value as exemplars (“Again, to say”); fourth (236), that they are of no value as the substances of things (“Again, it is thought”); and fifth (237) that they are of no value as causes of generation (“But in the Phaedo”). Accordingly, he says, first (113), that the Forms cannot contribute anything to sensible things in such a way as to be the cause of motion or of any kind of change in them. He does not give the reason for this here but mentioned it above (237), because it is clear that the Ideas were not introduced to explain motion but rather to explain immutability. For since it seemed to Plato that all sensible things are always in motion, he wanted to posit something separate from sensible things that is fixed and immobile, of which there can be certain knowledge. Hence, according to him, the Forms could not be held to be sensible principles of motion, but rather to be immutable things and principles of immutability; so that, undoubtedly, whatever is found to be fixed and constant in sensible things will be due to participation in the Ideas, which are immutable in themselves.
lib. 1 l. 15 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit sed nec ad ostendit secundo, quod species non prosunt sensibilibus ad scientiam, tali ratione. Cognitio uniuscuiusque perficitur per cognitionem suae substantiae, et non per cognitionem aliquarum substantiarum extrinsecarum: sed substantiae separatae quas dicebant species, sunt omnino aliae ab istis substantiis sensibilibus: ergo earum cognitio non auxiliatur ad scientiam illorum sensibilium. 227. Nor are they of any assistance (114). Second, he shows that the Forms do not contribute anything to the knowledge of sensible things, by the following argument: knowledge of each thing is acquired by knowing its own substance, and not by knowing certain substances which are separate from it. But these separate substances, which they call Forms, are altogether othef than sensible substances. Therefore a knowledge of them is of no assistance in knowing other sensible things.
lib. 1 l. 15 n. 4 Nec potest dici quod illae species sunt substantiae istorum sensibilium: nam cuiuslibet rei substantia est in eo cuius est substantia. Si igitur illae species essent substantiae rerum sensibilium, essent in his sensibilibus: quod est contra Platonem. 228. Nor can it be said that the Forms are the substances of these sensible things; for the substance of each thing is present in the thing whom substance it is. Therefore, if then Forms were the substances of sensible things, they would be present in sensible things. This is opposed to Plato’s opinion.
lib. 1 l. 15 n. 5 Nec iterum potest dici quod illae species adsint istis substantiis sensibilibus, sicut participantibus eas. Hoc enim modo Plato opinabatur aliquas species horum sensibilium causas esse. Sicut nos intelligeremus ipsum album per se existens, ac si esset quoddam album separatum, permisceri albo quod est in subiecto, et albedinem participare, ut sic etiam dicamus quod homo iste, qui est separatus, permisceatur huic homini qui componitur ex materia et natura speciei, quam participat. Sed haec ratio est valde mobilis, idest destructibilis: hanc enim rationem primo tetigit Anaxagoras qui posuit etiam formas et accidentia permisceri rebus. Et secundo tetigit Hesiodus et alii quidam. Et ideo dico quod est valde mobilis, scilicet quia facile est colligere multa impossibilia contra talem opinionem. Sequitur enim, sicut supra dixit contra Anaxagoram, quod accidentia et formae possunt esse sine substantiis. Nam ea sola nata sunt misceri quae possunt separatim existere. 229. Nor again can it be said that the Forms are present in these sensible substances as in things which participate in them; for Plato thought that some Forms are the causes of sensible things in this way. For just as we might understand whiteness itself existing of itself as a certain separate whiteness to be mingled with the whiteness in a subject, and to participate in whiteness, in a similar way we . might say that man [in himself], who is separate, is mingled with this man who is composed of matter and the specific nature in which he participates. But this argument is easily “disposed of, ‘ i.e., destroyed; for Anaxagoras, who also held that forms and accidents are mingled with things, was the first to state it. Hesiod and certain other thinkers were the second to mention it. Therefore I say that it is easily disposed of, because it is easy to bring many absurd conclusions against such an opinion. For it would follow as he pointed out above (194) against Anaxagoras, that accidents and forms could exist without substances. For only those things can exist separately which are naturally disposed to be mixed with other things.
lib. 1 l. 15 n. 6 Sic igitur non potest dici quod species sic conferant ad scientiam sensibilium ut eorum substantiae, nec quod sint eis principia existendi per modum participandi. Nec etiam potest dici quod ex speciebus sicut ex principiis sunt alia, scilicet sensibilia secundum ullum eorum modum qui consueverunt dici. Unde si eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi, oportet quod species non conferant ad scientias, cum principia essendi esse non possint. Ideo autem dicit secundum ullum modum consuetorum dici, quia Plato invenerat novos modos aliquid ex alio cognoscendi. 230. It cannot be said, then, that the Forms contribute in any way to our knowledge of sensible things as their substances. Nor can it be said that they are the principles of being in these substances by way of participation. Nor again can it be said that from these Forms as principles other things—sensible ones—come to be in any of the ways in which we are accustomed to speak. Therefore, if principles of being and principles of knowledge are the same, the Forms cannot possibly make any contribution to scientific knowledge, since they cannot be principles of 1wing. Hence he says “in any of the customary ways” of speaking, because Plato invented many new ways of deriving knowledge of one thing from something else.
lib. 1 l. 15 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit dicere vero hic tertio ostendit, quod species non conferant sensibilibus sicut exemplaria. Et primo proponit intentum. Secundo probat, ibi, nam quid opus est et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod dicere species esse exemplaria sensibilium et mathematicorum eo quod huiusmodi causas participent, est dupliciter inconveniens. Uno modo, quia vanum et nulla utilitas est huiusmodi exemplaria ponere, sicut ostendet. Alio modo quia est simile metaphoris quas poetae inducunt, quod ad philosophum non pertinet. Nam philosophus ex propriis docere debet. Ideo autem hoc dicit esse metaphoricum, quia Plato productionem rerum naturalium assimilavit factioni rerum artificialium, in quibus artifex ad aliquid exemplar respiciens, operatur aliquid simile suae arti. 231. Again, to say (115). Here he gives the third objection against the arguments for separate Forms. He says that the Forms are of no value to sensible things as their exemplars. First (115), he states his thesis; and, second (232), he proves it (“For what is the work”). Accordingly he says, first (115), that to say that the Forms are the exemplars both of sensible things and the objects of mathematics (because the latter participate in causes of this kind), is untenable for two reasons. First, because it is vain and useless to posit exemplars of this kind, as he will show; and second, because this manner of speaking is similar to the metaphors which the poets introduce, which do not pertain to the philosopher. For the philosopher ought to teach by using proper causes. Hence he says that this manner of speaking is metaphorical, because Plato likened the generation of natural substances to the making of works of art, in which the artisan, by looking at some exemplar, produces something similar to his artistic idea.
lib. 1 l. 15 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit nam quid est hic probat propositum tribus rationibus. Hoc enim videtur esse opus exemplaris, idest utilitas, quod artifex respiciens ad exemplar inducat similitudinem formae in suo artificio. Videmus autem in operatione naturalium rerum, quod similia ex similibus generantur, sicut ex homine generatur homo. Aut ergo similitudo ista provenit in rebus generatis propter respectum alicuius agentis ad exemplar, aut non. Si non, quid erat opus, idest utilitas quod aliquod agens sic respiciens ad ideas sicut ad exemplaria? Quasi dicat, nullum. Si autem similitudo provenit ex respectu ad exemplar separatum, tunc non poterit dici quod causa huius similitudinis in genito sit forma inferioris generantis. Fiet enim aliquid simile propter respectum ad hoc exemplar separatum, et non per respectum ad agens hoc sensibile. Et hoc est quod dicit et non simile illi, idest agenti sensibili. Ex quo sequitur hoc inconveniens quod aliquis generetur similis Socrati, sive posito, sive remoto Socrate. Quod videmus esse falsum; quia nisi Socrates agat in generatione, nunquam generabitur aliquis similis Socrati. Si igitur hoc est falsum, quod non similitudo generatorum dependeat a proximis generantibus, vanum et superfluum est ponere aliqua exemplaria separata. 232. For what is the work (116). Here he proves his thesis by three arguments. For the work, i.e., the use, of an exemplar, seems to be this, that the artisan by looking at an exemplar induces a likeness of the form in his own artifact. But in the operations of natural beings we see that like things are generated by like, as man is generated by man. Therefore this likeness arises in things which are generated, either because some agent looks toward an exemplar or not. If not, then what is “the work,” or utility, of the agent’s so looking toward the Ideas as exemplars?—as if to say, none. But if the likeness results from looking at a separate exemplar, then it cannot be said that the cause of this likeness in the thing generated is the form of an inferior agent. For something similar would come into being with reference to this separate exemplar and not with reference to this sensible agent. And this is what he means when he says “and not be like it,” i.e., like the sensible agent. From this the following absurdity results: someone similar to Socrates will be generated whether Socrates is held to exist or not. This we see is false; for unless Socrates plays an active part in the process of generation, no one similar to Socrates will ever be generated. Therefore, if it is false that the likeness of things which are generated does not depend on proximate agents, it is pointless and superfluous to posit separate exemplars of any kind.
lib. 1 l. 15 n. 9 Sciendum autem quod illa ratio, etsi destruat exemplaria separata a Platone posita, non tamen removet divinam scientiam esse rerum omnium exemplarem. Cum enim res naturales naturaliter intendant similitudines in res generatas inducere, oportet quod ista intentio ad aliquod principium dirigens reducatur, quod est in finem ordinans unumquodque. Et hoc non potest esse nisi intellectus cuius sit cognoscere finem et proportionem rerum in finem. Et sic ista similitudo effectuum ad causas naturales reducitur, sicut in primum principium, in intellectum aliquem. Non autem oportet quod in aliquas alias formas separatas: quia ad similitudinem praedictam sufficit praedicta directio in finem, qua virtutes naturales diriguntur a primo intellectu. 233. However, it should be noted that, even though this argument does away with the separate exemplars postulated by Plato, it still does not do away with the fact that God’s knowledge is the exemplar of all things. For since things in the physical world are naturally inclined to induce their likeness in things which are generated, this inclination must be traced back to some directing principle which ordains each thing to its end. This can only be the intellect of that being who knows the end and the relationship of things to the end. Therefore this likeness of effects to their natural causes is traced back to an intellect as their first principle. But it is not necessary that this likeness should be traced back to any other separate forms; because in order to have the above-mentioned likeness this direction of things to their end, according to which natural powers are directed by the first intellect, is sufficient.
lib. 1 l. 15 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit similiter autem hic ponit secundam rationem, quae talis est. Sicut Socrates ex eo quod est Socrates addit aliquid supra hominem, ita etiam homo addit aliquid supra animal: et sicut Socrates participat hominem, ita homo participat animal. Sed si praeter istum Socratem sensibilem poneretur alius Socrates sempiternus, quasi exemplaris, sequeretur quod huius Socratis sensibilis essent plura exemplaria, scilicet Socrates sempiternus et idea hominis: ergo et eadem ratione species hominis habet plura exemplaria. Erit enim exemplar eius et animal et bipes et iterum autosanthropos, idest idea hominis. Hoc autem est inconveniens quod unius exemplati sint plura exemplaria: ergo inconveniens est ponere huiusmodi sensibilium exemplaria. 234. Similarly, it is evident (117). Here he gives the second argument, which runs as follows: just as Socrates because he is Socrates adds something to man, in a similar way man adds something to animal. And just as Socrates participates in man, so does man participate in animal. But if besides this Socrates whom we perceive there is held to be another Socrates who is eternal, as his exemplar, it will follow that there are several exemplars of this Socrates whom we perceive, i.e., the eternal Socrates and the Form man. And by the same reasoning the Form man will have several exemplars; for its exemplar will be both animal and two-footed and also “man-in-himself,” i.e., the Idea of man. But that there should be several exemplars of a single thing made in likeness to an exemplar is untenable. Therefore it is absurd to hold that things of this kind are the exemplars of sensible things.
lib. 1 l. 15 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit tertiam rationem, quae talis est. Sicut se habet species ad individuum, ita se habet genus ad speciem. Si igitur species sunt exemplaria sensibilium individuorum, ut Plato ponit, ipsarum etiam specierum erunt aliqua exemplaria, scilicet genus specierum: quod est inconveniens: quia tunc sequeretur quod idem, scilicet species, erit exemplum alterius, scilicet individui sensibilis, et imago ab alio exemplata, scilicet a genere; quod videtur esse inconveniens. 235. Further (118). Here he gives the third argument, which runs thus: just as a Form is related to an individual, so also is a genus related to a species. Therefore, if the Forms are the exemplars of individual sensible things, as Plato held, there will be also certain exemplars of these Forms, that is to say, their genus. But this is absurd, because then it would follow that one and the same thing, i.e., Form, would be an exemplar of one thing, namely, of the individual whom we perceive by the senses, and a copy made in likeness to something else, namely, a genus. This seems to be absurd.
lib. 1 l. 15 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit amplius opinabitur hic quarto ostendit quod species non conferunt rebus sensibilibus sicut earum substantiae vel causae formales, quia hic opinabitur, idest hoc est opinativum (ut impersonaliter ponatur), quod impossibile est separari substantiam ab eo cuius est substantia. Sed hae separantur ab eo cuius sunt ideae, idest a sensibilibus: ergo non sunt substantiae sensibilium. 236. Again, it is thought (119). Here he proves his fourth objection, namely, that the Forms contribute nothing to sensible things as their substances or formal causes; because “It is thought by him,” that is to say, it is a matter of opinion (to put this impersonally), that it is impossible for a thing’s substance to exist apart from the thing whose substance it is. But the Forms exist apart from the things of which they are the Forms, i.e., apart, from sensible things. Therefore they are not the substances of sensible things.
lib. 1 l. 15 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit in Phaedone hic ostendit quod non conferunt species sensibilibus ad eorum fieri, quamvis Plato dixerit in Phaedone, idest in quodam suo libro, quod species sunt causae rebus sensibilibus essendi et fiendi. Sed hoc improbat duabus rationibus: quarum prima talis est. Posita causa ponitur effectus: sed existentibus speciebus non propter hoc fiunt entia particularia sive individua participantia species, nisi sit aliquid motivum quod moveat ad speciem. Quod ex hoc patet, quia species semper eodem modo sunt secundum Platonem. Si igitur eis positis essent vel fierent individua participantia eas, sequeretur quod semper essent huiusmodi individua, quod patet esse falsum: ergo non potest dici quod species sint causae fieri et esse rerum; et praecipue cum non poneret species causas esse motivas, ut supra dictum est. Sic enim a substantiis separatis immobilibus ponit Aristoteles procedere et fieri et esse inferiorum, inquantum illae substantiae sunt motivae caelestium corporum, quibus mediantibus causatur generatio et corruptio in istis inferioribus. 237. But in the “Phaedo” (120). Here he shows that the Forms are of no value in accounting for the coming to be of sensible things, although Plato said “in the Phaedo,” i.e., in one of his works, that the Forms are the causes both of the being and of the coming to be of sensible things. But Aristotle disproves this by two arguments. The first is as follows: to posit the cause is to posit the effect. However, even if the Forms exist, the particular or individual things which participate in the Forms will come into being only if there is some agent which moves them to acquire form. This is evident from Plato’s opinion that the Forms are always in the same state. Therefore, assuming that these Forms exist, if individuals were to exist or come into being by participating in them, it would follow that individual substances of this kind would always be. This is clearly false. Therefore it cannot be said that the Forms are the causes of both the coming to be and the being of sensible things. The chief reason is that Plato did not hold that the Forms are efficient causes, as was stated above (226). For Aristotle holds that the being and coming to be of lower substances proceeds from immobile separate substances, inasmuch as these substances are the movers of the celestial bodies, by means of which generation and corruption are produced in these lower substances.
lib. 1 l. 15 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit et multa hic ponit secundam rationem, quae talis est. Sicut se habent artificialia ad causas artificiales, ita se habent naturalia ad causas naturales. Sed videmus quod multa alia a naturalibus, ut domus et annulus, fiunt in istis inferioribus, quorum Platonici species non ponebant: ergo et alias, scilicet naturalia contingit esse et fieri propter tales causas proximas, quales contingit esse nunc dictas, scilicet artificiales; ut scilicet sicut res artificiales fiunt a proximis agentibus, ita et res naturales. 238. And many other (121). Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus: just as artifacts are related to artificial causes, so are natural bodies to natural causes. But we see that many other things besides natural bodies come into being in the realm of these lower bodies, as a house and a ring, for which the Platonists did not posit any Forms. Therefore “other things,” namely, natural things, can both be and come to be because of such proximate causes as those just mentioned, i.e., artificial ones; so that, just as artificial things come to be as a result of proximate agents, so also do natural things.

Lecture 16

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 1 Hic improbat opinionem Platonis de speciebus inquantum ponebat eas esse numeros. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo disputat contra ea quae posita sunt ab ipso de numeris. Secundo contra ea quae posita sunt ab ipso de aliis mathematicis, ibi, volentes autem substantias et cetera. Circa primum ponit sex rationes: quarum prima talis est. Eorum quae sunt idem secundum substantiam, unum non est causa alterius: sed sensibilia secundum substantiam sunt numeri secundum Platonicos et Pythagoricos: si igitur species sunt etiam numeri, non poterunt species esse causae sensibilium. 239. Here he destroys Plato’s opinion about the Forms inasmuch as Plato claimed that they are numbers. In regard to this he does two things. First, he argues dialectically against Plato’s opinion about numbers, and second (254), against his opinion about the other objects of mathematics (“Now when we wish”). In regard to the first part he gives six arguments. The first (122) is this: in the case of things which are substantially the same, one thing is not the cause of another. But sensible things are substantially numbers according to the Platonists and Pythagoreans. Therefore, if the Forms themselves are numbers, they cannot be the cause of sensible things.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 2 Si autem dicatur quod alii numeri sunt species, et alii sunt sensibilia, sicut ad literam Plato ponebat: ut si dicamus quod hic numerus est homo, et ille alius numerus est Socrates et alius numerus est Callias, istud adhuc non videtur sufficere: quia secundum hoc sensibilia et species conveniunt in ratione numeri: et eorum, quae sunt idem secundum rationem, unum non videtur esse causa alterius: ergo species non erunt causae horum sensibilium. 240. But if it is said that some numbers are Forms and others are sensible filings, as Plato literally held (as though We were to say that this number is man and another is Socrates and still another is Callias), even this would not seem to be sufficient; for according to this view the intelligible structure of number will be common both to sensible things and the Forms. But in the case of things which have the same intelligible structure, one does not seem to be the cause of another. Therefore the Forms will not be the causes of sensible things.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 3 Non iterum potest dici quod sunt causae; quia illi numeri, si sunt species, sunt sempiterni. Illa enim differentia non sufficit ad hoc quod quaedam ponantur causae aliorum; quia aliqua differunt per sempiternum et non sempiternum secundum esse suum absolute consideratum; sed per causam et causatum differunt secundum habitudinem unius ad alterum: ergo diversa numero non differunt per causam et causatum per hoc, quod quaedam sunt sempiterna, et quaedam non sempiterna. 241. Nor again can it be said that they are causes for the reason that, if those numbers are Forms, they are eternal. For this difference, namely, that some things differ from others in virtue of being eternal and non-eternal in their own being considered absolutely, is not sufficient to explain why some things are held to be the causes of others. Indeed, things differ from each other as cause and effect rather because of the relationship which one has to the other. Therefore things that differ numerically do not differ from each other as cause and effect because some are eternal and some are not.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 4 Si autem dicatur quod haec sensibilia sunt quaedam rationes, idest proportiones numerorum, et per hunc modum numeri sunt causae horum sensibilium, sicut videmus in symphoniis, idest in musicis consonantiis, quia numeri dicuntur esse causae consonantiarum, inquantum proportiones numerales, quae applicantur sonis, consonantias reddunt: palam est quod oportebat praeter ipsos numeros in sensibilibus ponere aliquod unum secundum genus, cui applicantur proportiones numerales: ut scilicet eorum, quae sunt illius generis proportiones, sensibilia constituant; sicut praeter proportiones numerales in consonantiis inveniuntur soni. Si autem illud, cui applicatur illa proportio numeralis in sensibilibus est materia, manifestum est quod oportebat dicere, quod ipsi numeri separati qui sunt species, sint proportiones alicuius unius, scilicet ad aliquod aliud. Oportet enim dicere quod hic homo, qui est Callias vel Socrates, est similis homini ideali qui dicitur autosanthropos idest per se homo. Si igitur Callias non est numerus tantum, sed magis est ratio quaedam vel proportio in numeris elementorum, scilicet ignis, terrae, aquae et aeris; et ipse homo idealis erit quaedam ratio vel proportio in numeris aliquorum; et non erit homo idealis numerus per suam substantiam. Ex quo sequitur, quod nullus numerus erit praeter ea, id est praeter res numeratas. Si enim numerus specierum est maxime separatus, et ille non est separatus a rebus, sed est quaedam proportio rerum numeratarum, nunc nullus alius numerus erit separatus: quod est contra Platonicos. 242. Again, it is said that sensible things are certain “ratios” or proportions of numbers, and that numbers are the causes of these sensible things, as we also observe to be the case “in harmonies,” i.e., in the combinations of musical notes. For numbers are said to be the causes of harmonies insofar as the numerical proportions applied to sounds yield harmonies. Now if the above is true, then just as in harmonies there are found to be sounds in addition to numerical proportions, in a similar way it was obviously necessary to posit in addition to the numbers in sensible things something generically one to which the numerical proportions are applied, so that the proportions of those things which belong to that one genus would constitute sensible things. However, if that to which the numerical proportion in sensible things is applied is matter, evidently those separate numbers, which are Forms, had to be termed proportions of some one thing to something else. For this particular man, called Callias or Socrates, must be said to be similar to the ideal man, called “man-in-himself,” or humanity. Hence, if Callias is not merely a number, but is rather a kind of ratio or numerical proportion of the elements, i.e., of fire, earth, water and air, and if the ideal man-in-himself is a kind of ratio or numerical proportion of certain things, the ideal man will not be a number by reason of its own substance. From this it follows that there will be no number “apart from these,” i.e., apart from the things numbered. For if the number which constitutes the Forms is separate in the highest degree, and if it is not separate from things but is a kind of proportion of numbered things, no other number will now be separate. This is opposed to Plato’s view.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 5 Sequitur autem, quod homo idealis sit proportio aliquorum numeratorum, sive ponatur esse numerus, sive non: tam enim secundum ponentes substantias esse numeros, quam secundum naturales, qui numeros substantias esse non dicebant, oportet quod in rerum substantiis aliquae proportiones numerales inveniantur: quod patet praecipue ex opinione Empedoclis, qui ponebat unamquamque rerum sensibilium constitui per quamdam harmoniam et proportionem. 243. It also follows that the ideal man is a proportion of certain numbered things, whether it is held to be a number or not. For according to those who held that substances are numbers, and according to the philosophers of nature, who denied that numbers are substances, some numerical proportions must be found in the substances of things. This is most evident in the case of the opinion of Empedocles, who held that each one of these sensible things is composed of a certain harmony or proportion [of the elements].
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit amplius ex hic ponit secundam rationem, quae talis est. Ex multis numeris fit unus numerus. Si igitur species sunt numeri, ex multis speciebus fiet una species, quod est impossibile. Nam si ex multis diversarum specierum aliquid unum in specie constituatur, hoc fit per mixtionem, in qua non salvantur species eorum quae miscentur, sicut ex quatuor elementis fit lapis. Et iterum ex huiusmodi diversis secundum speciem non fit aliquod unum ratione specierum, quia ipsae species non coniunguntur ad aliquod unum constituendum, nisi secundum rationem individuorum, qui alterantur, ut possint permisceri: ipsae autem species numerorum binarii et ternarii simul coniunctae numerum constituunt quinarium, ita quod in quinario uterque numerus remanet et salvatur. 244. Again, one number (123). Here he gives the second argument which runs thus: one number is produced from many numbers. Therefore, if the Forms are numbers, one Form is produced from many Forms. But this is impossible. For if from many things which differ specifically something specifically one is produced, this comes about by mixture, in which the natures of the things mixed are not preserved; just as a stone is produced from the four elements. Again, from things of this kind which differ specifically one thing is not produced by reason of the Forms, because the Forms themselves are combined in such a way as to constitute a single thing only in accordance with the intelligible structure of individual things, which are altered in such a way that they can be mixed together. And when the Forms themselves of the numbers two and three are combined, they give rise to the number five, so that each number remains and is retained in the number five.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 7 Sed quia ad hanc rationem posset responderi ex parte Platonis, quod ex multis numeris non fit unus numerus, sed quilibet numerus immediate constituitur ex unitatibus, ideo consequenter cum dicit sed si nec excludit etiam hanc responsionem. Si enim dicitur quod aliquis numerus maior, ut millenarius, non constituatur ex eis, scilicet ex duobus vel pluribus numeris minoribus, sed constituitur ex unis, idest ex unitatibus, remanebit quaestio quomodo se habent unitates adinvicem, ex quibus numeri constituuntur? Aut enim oportet, quod omnes unitates sint conformes adinvicem, aut quod sint difformes adinvicem. 245. But since someone could answer this argument, in support of Plato, by saying that one number does not come from many numbers, but each number is immediately constituted of units, Aristotle is therefore logical in rejecting this answer (124) (“But if one number”). For if it is said that some greater number, such as ten thousand, is not produced “from them,” namely, from twos or many smaller numbers, but from “units,” i.e., ones, this question will follow: How are the units of which numbers are composed related to each other? For all units must either conform with each other or not.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 8 Sed primo modo sequuntur multa inconvenientia, et praecipue quantum ad ponentes species esse numeros; quia sequitur quod diversae species non differant secundum substantiam, sed solum secundum excessum unius speciei super aliam. Inconveniens etiam videtur, quod unitates nullo modo differant; et tamen sunt multae, cum diversitas multitudinem consequatur. 246. But many absurd conclusions follow from the first alternative, especially for those who claim that the Forms are numbers. For it will follow that different Forms do not differ substantially but only insofar as one Form surpasses another. It also seems absurd that units should differ in no way and yet be many, since difference is a result of multiplicity.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 9 Si vero non sint conformes, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, quia unitates unius numeri sunt differentes ab unitatibus alterius numeri, sicut unitates binarii ab unitatibus ternarii; et tamen unitates unius et eiusdem numeri sibi invicem sunt conformes. Alio modo ut unitates eiusdem numeri non sibi invicem, nec unitatibus alterius numeri conformes existant. Hanc divisionem significat, cum dicit, nec eaedem sibi invicem, idest quae ad eumdem numerum pertinent, nec aliae omnes etc., scilicet quae pertinent ad diversos numeros. Quocumque autem modo ponatur difformitas inter unitates, videtur inconveniens. Nam omnis difformitas est per aliquam formam vel passionem; sicut videmus quod corpora difformia differunt calido et frigido, albo et nigro, et huiusmodi passionibus: unitates autem huiusmodi passionibus carent, cum sint impassibiles secundum Platonicos; ergo non poterit inter ea poni talis difformitas vel differentia, quae causatur ab aliqua passione. Et sic patet quod ea quae Plato ponit de speciebus et numeris, nec sunt rationabilia, sicut illa quae per certam rationem probantur, nec sunt intelligentiae confessa, sicut ea quae sunt per se nota, et solo intellectu certificantur, ut prima demonstrationis principia. 247. But if they do not conform, this can happen in two ways. First, they can lack conformity because the units of one number differ from those of another number, as the units of the number two differ from those of the number three, although the units of one and the same number will conform with each other. Second, they can lack conformity insofar as the units of one and the same number do not conform with each other or with the units of another number. He indicates this distinction when he says, “For neither will they be the same as one another (125),” i.e., the units which comprise the same number, “nor all the others the same as all,” i.e., those which belong to different numbers. Indeed, in whatever way there is held to be lack of conformity between units an absurdity is apparent. For every instance of non-conformity involves some form or attribute, just as we see that bodies which lack conformity differ insofar as they are hot and cold, white and black, or in terms of similar attributes. Now units lack qualities of this kind, because they have no qualities, according to Plato. Hence it will be impossible to hold that there is any non-conformity or difference between them of the kind caused by a quality. Thus it is evident that Plato’s opinions about the Forms and numbers are neither “reasonable” (for example, those proved by an apodictic argument), nor “in accord with our understanding” (for example, those things which are self-evident and verified by [the habit of] intellect alone, as the first principles of demonstration).
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit tertiam rationem contra Platonem, quae talis est. Omnia mathematica, quae a Platone sunt dicta intermedia sensibilium et specierum, sunt ex numeris, aut simpliciter, sicut ex propriis principiis, aut sicut ex primis. Et hoc ideo dicit, quia secundum unam viam videtur quod numeri sint immediata principia aliorum mathematicorum; nam unum dicebant constituere punctum, binarium lineam, ternarium superficiem, quaternarium corpus. Secundum vero aliam viam videntur resolvi mathematica in numeros, sicut in prima principia et non in proxima. Nam corpora dicebant componi ex superficiebus, superficies ex lineis, lineas ex punctis, puncta autem ex unitatibus, quae constituunt numeros. Utroque autem modo sequebatur numeros esse principia aliorum mathematicorum. 248. Further, [if the Forms] (126). Here he gives the third argument against Plato, which runs thus: all objects of mathematics, which Plato affirmed to be midway between the Forms and sensible substances, are derived unqualifiedly from numbers, either as proper principles, or as first principles. He says this because in one sense numbers seem to be the immediate principles of the other objects of mathematics; for the Platonists said that the number one constitutes the point, the number two the line, the number three surface, and the number four the solid. But in another sense the objects of mathematics seem to be reduced to numbers as first principles and not as proximate ones. For the Platonists said that solids are composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, lines of points, and points of units, which constitute numbers. But in either way it followed that numbers are the principles of the other objects of mathematics.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 11 Sicut igitur alia mathematica erant media inter sensibilia et species, ita necessarium est facere aliquod genus numeri, quod sit aliud a numeris qui sunt species, et a numeris qui sunt substantia sensibilium: et quod de huiusmodi numero sit arithmetica, sicut de proprio subiecto, quae est una mathematicarum, sicut geometria de magnitudinibus mathematicis. Hoc autem ponere videtur superfluum esse. Nam nulla ratio poterit assignari quare sunt numeri medii inter praesentia, idest sensibilia et eas scilicet species, cum tam sensibilia quam species sint numeri. 249. Therefore, just as the other objects of mathematics constituted an intermediate class between sensible substances and the Forms, in a similar way it was necessary to devise some class of number which is other than the numbers that constitute the Forms and other than those that constitute the substance of sensible things. And arithmetic, which is one of the mathematical sciences, evidently deals with this kind of number as its proper subject, just as geometry deals with mathematical extensions. However, this position seems to be superfluous; for no reason can be given why number should be midway “between the things at hand,” or sensible things, and “those in the ideal world,” or the Forms, since both sensible things and the Forms are numbers.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit quartam rationem, quae talis est. Ea quae sunt in sensibilibus et in mathematicis sunt causata ex speciebus: si igitur aliqua dualitas in sensibilibus et in mathematicis invenitur, oportet quod utraque unitas huius posterioris dualitatis sit causata ex priori dualitate, quae est species dualitatis. Et hoc est impossibile, scilicet quod unitas ex dualitate causetur. Hoc enim praecipue oportet dicere, si unitates unius numeri sint alterius speciei ab unitatibus alterius, quia tunc a specie ante illius numeri unitates, species sortientur. Et sic oportet quod unitates posterioris dualitatis sint causatae ex priori dualitate. 250. Again, each of the units (127). Here he gives the fourth argument, which runs thus: those things which exist in the sensible world and those which exist in the realm of mathematical entities are caused by the Forms. Therefore, if some number two is found both in the sensible world and in the realm of the objects of mathematics, each unit of this subsequent two must be caused by a prior two, which is the Form of twoness. But it is “impossible” that unity should be caused by duality. For it would be most necessary to say this if the units of one number were of a different species than those of another number, because then these units would acquire their species from a Form which is prior to the units of that number. And thus the units of a subsequent two would have to be produced from a prior two.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit amplius quare hic ponit quintam rationem, quae talis est. Multa non conveniunt ad unum constituendum, nisi propter aliquam causam, quae potest accipi vel extrinseca, sicut aliquod agens quod coniungit, vel intrinseca, sicut aliquod vinculum uniens. Vel si aliqua uniuntur per seipsa, oportet ut unum sit ut potentia, et aliud ut actus. Nullum autem horum potest dici in unitatibus quare numerus idest ex qua causa numerus erit quoddam comprehensum, idest congregatum ex pluribus unitatibus: quasi dicat: non erit hoc assignare. 251. Further, why is (128). Here he gives the fifth argument, which runs thus: many things combine so as to constitute one thing only by reason of some cause, which can be considered to be either extrinsic, as some agent which unites them, or intrinsic, as some unifying bond. Or if some things are united of themselves, one of them must be potential and another actual. However, in the case of units none of these reasons can be said to be the one “why a number,” i.e., the cause by which a number, will be a certain “combination,” ‘ i.e., collection of many units; as if to say, it will be impossible to give any reason for this.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit sextam rationem, quae talis est. Si numeri sunt species et substantiae rerum, oportet, sicut praemissum est, dicere vel quod unitates sint differentes, aut convenientes. Si autem differentes, sequitur quod unitas, inquantum unitas, non sit principium. Quod patet per similitudinem sumptam a naturalium positione. Naturales enim aliqui posuerunt quatuor corpora esse principia. Quamvis autem commune sit ipsis hoc quod est esse corpus, non tamen ponebant corpus commune esse principium, sed magis ignem, terram, aquam et aerem, quae sunt corpora differentia. Unde, si unitates sint differentes, quamvis omnes conveniant in ratione unitatis, non tamen erit dicendum, quod ipsa unitas inquantum huiusmodi sit principium; quod est contra positionem Platonicorum. Nam nunc ab eis dicitur, quod unum sit principium, sicut primo de naturalibus dicitur quod ignis aut aqua aut aliquod corpus similium partium principium sit. Sed si hoc est verum quod conclusum est contra positionem Platonicorum, scilicet quod unum inquantum unum non sit principium et substantia rerum, sequeretur quod numeri non sunt rerum substantia. Numerus enim non ponitur esse rerum substantia, nisi inquantum constituitur ex unitatibus, quae dicuntur esse rerum substantiae. Quod iterum est contra positionem Platonicorum, quam nunc prosequitur, qua scilicet ponitur, quod numeri sint species. 252. And, again, in addition (129). Here he gives the sixth argument, which runs thus: if numbers are the Forms and substances of things, it will be necessary to say, as has been stated before (245), either that units are different, or that they conform. But if they are different, it follows that unity as unity will not be a principle. This is clarified by a similar case drawn from the position of the natural philosophers. For some of these thinkers held that the four [elemental] bodies are principles. But even though being a body is common to these elements, these philosophers did not maintain that a common body is a principle, but rather fire, earth, water and air, which are different bodies. Therefore, if units are different, even though all have in common the intelligible constitution of unity, it will not be said that unity itself as such is a principle. This is contrary to the Platonists’ position; for they now say that the unit is the principle of things, just as the natural philosophers say that fire or water or some body with like parts is the principle of things. But if our conclusion against the Platonists’ theory is true-that unity as such is not the principle and substance of things-it will follow that numbers are not the substances of things. For number is held to be the substance of things only insofar as it is constituted of units, which are said to be the substances of things. This is also contrary to the Platonists’ position which is now being examined, i.e., that numbers are Forms.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 15 Si autem dicas quod omnes unitates sunt indifferentes, sequitur quod omne, idest universum totum sit aliquid unum et idem, ex quo substantia rei cuiuslibet est ipsum unum, quod est commune indifferens. Et ulterius sequitur, quod idem illud sit unum principium omnium: quod est impossibile ratione ipsius rationis, quae de se est inopinabilis, ut scilicet sint omnia unum secundum rationem substantiae; tum quia includit contradictionem ex eo quod ponit unam esse substantiam rerum, et tamen ponit illud unum esse principium. Nam unum et idem non est sui ipsius principium: nisi forte dicatur quod unum multipliciter dicitur, ut distincto uno ponantur omnia esse unum genere, et non specie vel numero. 253. But if you say that all units are undifferentiated, it follows that “the whole,” i.e., the entire universe, is a single entity, since the substance of each thing is the one itself, and this is something common and undifferentiated. Further, it follows that the same entity is the principle of all things. But this is impossible by reason of the notion involved, which is inconceivable in itself, namely, that all things should be one according to the aspect of substance. For this view contains a contradiction, since it claims that the one is the substance of all things, yet maintains that the one is a principle. For one and the same thing is not its own principle, unless, perhaps, it is said that “the one” is used in different senses, so that when the senses of the one are differentiated all things are said to be generically one and not numerically or specifically one.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 16 Volentes autem substantias hic disputat contra positionem Platonis quantum ad hoc quod posuit de magnitudinibus mathematicis. Et primo ponit eius positionem. Secundo obiicit contra ipsam, ibi, attamen quomodo habebit et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod Platonici volentes rerum substantias reducere ad prima principia, cum ipsas magnitudines dicerent esse substantias rerum sensibilium, lineam, superficiem et corpus, istorum principia assignantes, putabant se rerum principia invenisse. Assignando autem magnitudinum principia, dicebant longitudines, idest lineas componi ex producto et brevi, eo quod principia rerum omnium ponebant esse contraria. Et quia linea est prima inter quantitates continuas, ei per prius attribuebant magnum et parvum, ut per hoc quod haec duo sunt principia lineae, sint etiam principia aliarum magnitudinum. Dicit autem ex aliquo parvo et magno, quia parvum et magnum etiam in speciebus ponebantur, ut dictum est, sed secundum quod per situm determinatur et quodammodo particulari ad genus magnitudinum, constituunt primo lineam, et deinde alias magnitudines. Planum autem, idest superficiem eadem ratione dicebant componi ex lato et arcto, et corpus ex profundo et humili. 254. Now when we wish (130). Here he argues against Plato’s position with reference to his views about mathematical extensions. First (130), he gives Plato’s position; and second (255), he advances an argument against it (“Yet how will”). He says, first, that the Platonists, wishing to reduce the substances of things to their first principles, when they say that continuous quantities themselves are the substances of sensible things, thought they had discovered the principles of things when they assigned line, surface and solid as the principles of sensible things. But in giving the principles of continuous quantities they said that “lengths,” i.e., lines, are composed of the long and short, because they held that contraries are the principles of all things. And since the line is the first of continuous quantities, they first attributed to it the great and small; for inasmuch as these two are the principles of the line, they are also the principles of other continuous quantities. He says “from the great and small” because the great and small are also placed among the Forms, as has been stated (217). But insofar as they are limited by position, and are thus particularized in the class of continuous quantities, they constitute first the line and then other continuous quantities. And for the same reason they said that surface is composed of the wide and narrow, and body of the deep and shallow.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 17 Deinde cum dicit attamen quomodo hic obiicit contra praedictam positionem duabus rationibus: quarum prima talis est. Quorum principia sunt diversa, ipsa etiam sunt diversa; sed principia dictarum magnitudinum secundum praedictam positionem sunt diversa. Latum enim et arctum, quae ponuntur principia superficiei, sunt alterius generis quam profundum et humile, quae ponuntur principia corporis. Et similiter potest dici de longo et brevi quod differunt ab utroque; ergo etiam linea et superficies et corpus erunt adinvicem distincta. Quomodo ergo poterat dici quod superficies haberet in se lineam, et quod corpus habeat lineam et superficiem? Et ad huius rationis confirmationem inducit simile de numero. Multum enim et paucum, quae simili ratione ponuntur principia rerum, sunt alterius generis a longo et brevi, lato et stricto, profundo et humili. Et ideo numerus non continetur in his magnitudinibus, sed est separatus per se. Unde et eadem ratione nec superius inter praedicta erit etiam in inferioribus, sicut linea non in superficie, nec superficies in corpore. 255. Yet how will a surface (130). Here he argues against the foregoing position, by means of two arguments. The first is as follows. Things whose principles are different are themselves different. But the principles of continuous quantities mentioned above are different, according to the foregoing position, for the wide and narrow, which are posited as the principles of surface, belong to a different class than the deep and shallow, which are held to be the principles of body. The same thing can be said of the long and short, which differ from each of the above. Therefore, line, surface and body all differ from each other. How then will one be able to say that a surface contains a line, and a body a line and a surface? In confirmation of this argument he introduces a similar case involving number. For the many and few, which are held to be principles of things for a similar reason, belong to a different class than the long and short, the wide and narrow, and the deep and shallow. Therefore number is not contained in these continuous quantities but is essentially separate. Hence, for the same reason, the higher of the above mentioned things will not be contained in the lower; for example, a line will not be contained in a surface or a surface in a body.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 18 Sed quia posset dici, quod quaedam praedictorum contrariorum sunt genera aliorum, sicut quod longum esset lati genus, et latum genus profundi; hoc removet tali ratione. Sicut habent se principia adinvicem, et principiata: si igitur latum est genus profundi, et superficies erit genus corporis. Et ita corpus erit aliquod planum, idest aliqua species superficiei: quod patet esse falsum. 256. But because it could be said that certain of the foregoing contraries are the genera of the others, for example, that the long is the genus of the broad, and the broad the genus of the deep, he destroys this [objection] by the following argument: things composed of principles are related to each other in the same way as their principles are. Therefore, if the broad is the genus of the deep, surface will also be the genus of body. Hence a solid will be a kind of plane, i.e., a species of surface. This is clearly false.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 19 Deinde cum dicit amplius puncta hic ponit secundam rationem, quae sumitur ex punctis; circa quam Plato videtur dupliciter deliquisse. Primo quidem, quia cum punctus sit terminus lineae, sicut linea superficiei, et superficies corporis; sicut posuit aliqua principia, ex quibus componuntur praedicta, ita debuit aliquid ponere ex quo existerent puncta; quod videtur praetermisisse. 257. Further, from what will (132). Here he gives the second argument, which involves points; and in regard to this Plato seems to have made two errors. First, Plato claimed that a point is the limit of a line, just as a line is the limit of a surface and a surface the limit of a body. Therefore, just as he posited certain principles of, which the latter are composed, so too he should have posited some principle from which points derive their being. But he seems to have omitted this.
lib. 1 l. 16 n. 20 Secundo, quia circa puncta videbatur diversimode sentire. Quandoque enim contendebat totam doctrinam geometricam de hoc genere existere, scilicet de punctis, inquantum scilicet puncta ponebat principia et substantiam omnium magnitudinum. Et hoc non solum implicite, sed etiam explicite punctum vocabat principium lineae, sic ipsum definiens. Multoties vero dicebat, quod lineae indivisibiles essent principia linearum, et aliarum magnitudinum; et hoc genus esse, de quo sit geometria, scilicet lineae indivisibiles. Et tamen per hoc quod ponit ex lineis indivisibilibus componi omnes magnitudines, non evadit quin magnitudines componantur ex punctis, et quin puncta sint principia magnitudinum. Linearum enim indivisibilium necessarium esse aliquos terminos, qui non possunt esse nisi puncta. Unde ex qua ratione ponitur linea indivisibilis principium magnitudinum, ex eadem ratione et punctum principium magnitudinis ponitur. 258. The second error is this: Plato seems to have held different opinions about points. For sometimes he maintained that the whole science of geometry treats this class of things, namely, points, inasmuch as he held that points are the principles and substance of all continuous quantities. And he not only implied this but even explicitly stated that a point is the principle of a line, defining it in this way. But many times he said that indivisible lines are the principles of lines and other continuous quantities, and that this is the class of things with which geometry deals, namely, indivisible lines. Yet by reason of the fact that he held that all continuous (quantities are composed of indivisible lines, he did not avoid the consequence that continuous quantities are composed of points, and that points are the principles of continuous quantities. For indivisible lines must have some limits, and these can only be points. Hence, by whatever argument indivisible lines are held to be the principles of continuous quantities, by the same argument too the point is held to be the principle of continuous quantity.

Lecture 17

Latin English
lib. 1 l. 17 n. 1 Hic improbat positionem Platonis quantum ad hoc, quod ponebat de rerum principiis. Et primo quantum ad hoc quod ponebat principia essendi. Secundo quantum ad hoc quod ponebat principia cognoscendi, ibi, quomodo autem aliquis et cetera. Circa primum ponit sex rationes; quarum prima sumitur ex hoc, quod genera causarum praetermittebat. Unde dicit quod omnino sapientia, scilicet philosophia habet inquirere causas de manifestis, idest de his, quae sensui apparent. Ex hoc enim homines inceperunt philosophari, quod causas inquisiverunt, ut in prooemio dictum est. Platonici autem, quibus se connumerat, rerum principia praetermiserunt, quia nihil dixerunt de causa efficiente, quae est principium transmutationis. Causam vero formalem putaverunt se assignare ponentes ideas. Sed, dum ipsi putaverunt se dicere substantiam eorum, scilicet sensibilium, dixerunt quasdam esse alias substantias separatas ab istis diversas. Modus autem, quo assignabant illa separata esse substantias horum sensibilium, est supervacuus, idest efficaciam non habens nec veritatem. Dicebant enim quod species sunt substantiae eorum inquantum ab istis participantur. Sed hoc quod de participatione dicebant, nihil est, sicut ex supradictis patet. Item species, quas ipsi ponebant, non tangunt causam finalem, quod tamen videmus in aliquibus scientiis, quae demonstrant per causam finalem, et propter quam causam omne agens per intellectum et agens per naturam operatur, ut secundo physicorum ostensum est. Et sicut ponendo species non tangunt causam quae dicitur finis, ita nec causam quae dicitur principium, scilicet efficientem, quae fini quasi opponitur. Sed Platonicis praetermittentibus huiusmodi causas facta sunt naturalia, ac si essent mathematica sine motu, dum principium et finem motus praetermittebant. Unde et dicebant quod mathematica debent tractari non solum propter seipsa, sed aliorum gratia, idest naturalium, inquantum passiones mathematicorum sensibilibus attribuebant. 259. Here Aristotle destroys Plato’s opinion about the principles of things. First, he destroys Plato’s opinion about principles of being; and second (268), his opinion about principles of knowledge (“But how will one”). In regard to the first part he gives six arguments. The first is based on the fact that Plato neglected to deal with the classes of causes. Thus he says that, “in general, wisdom,” or philosophy, has as its aim to investigate the causes “of apparent things,” i.e., things apparent to the senses. For men began to philosophize because they sought for the causes of things, as was stated in the prologue (53). But the Platonists, among whom he includes himself, neglected the principles of things, because they said nothing about the efficient cause, which is the source of change. And by positing the Ideas they thought they had given the formal cause of things. But while they thought that they were speaking of the substance of these things, i.e., sensible ones, they posited the existence of certain other separate substances which differ from these. However, the way in which they assigned these separate substances as the substances of sensible things “is empty talk,” i.e., it proves nothing and is not true. For they said that the Forms are the substances of sensible things inasmuch as they are participated in by sensible things. But what they said about participation is meaningless, as is clear from what was said above (225). Furthermore, the Forms which they posited have no connection with the final cause, although we see that this is a cause in certain sciences which demonstrate by means of the final cause, and that it is by reason of this cause that every intellectual agent and every natural one operates, as has been shown in the Physics, Book II. And just as they do not touch on that cause which is called an end [or goal], when they postulate the existence of the Forms (169), neither do they treat of that cause which is called the source of motion, namely, the efficient cause, which is the opposite, so to speak, of the final cause. But the Platonists by omitting causes of this kind (since they did omit a starting-point and end of motion), have dealt with natural things as if they were objects of mathematics, which lack motion. Hence they said that the objects of mathematics should be studied not only for themselves but for the sake of other things, i.e., natural bodies; inasmuch as they attributed the properties of the objects of mathematics to sensible bodies.
lib. 1 l. 17 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit secundam rationem, quae talis est. Illud, quod ponitur tamquam rei materia, magis est substantia rei et praedicabile de re, quam illud quod est separatum a re: sed species est separata a rebus sensibilibus: ergo secundum Platonicorum opinionem magis aliquid suscipiet substantiam subiectam, ut materiam, esse substantiam mathematicorum quam speciem separatam. Magis etiam suscipiet eam praedicari de re sensibili quam speciem praedictam. Platonici enim ponebant magnum et parvum esse differentiam substantiae et materiei. Haec enim duo principia ponebant ex parte materiae, sicut naturales ponentes rarum et densum esse primas differentias subiecti idest materiae, per quas scilicet materia transmutabatur, dicentes eas quodammodo scilicet magnum et parvum. Quod ex hoc patet, quia rarum et densum sunt quaedam superabundantia et defectio. Spissum enim est quod habet multum de materia sub eisdem dimensionibus. Rarum quod parum. Et tamen Platonici substantiam rerum sensibilium magis dicebant species quam mathematica, et magis praedicari. 260. Further, one might (134). Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus: that which is posited as the matter of a thing is the substance of a thing, and is predicable of a thing to a greater degree than something which exists apart from it. But a Form exists apart from sensible things. Therefore, according to the opinion of the Platonists, one might suppose that the underlying substance as matter is the substance of the objects of mathematics rather than a separate Form. Furthermore, he admits that it is predicated of a sensible thing rather than the above Form. For the Platonists held that the great and small is a difference of substance or matter; for they referred these two principles to matter, just as the philosophers of nature (115) held that rarity and density are the primary differences of the “underlying subject,” or matter, by which matter is changed, and spoke of them in a sense as the great and small. This is clear from the fact that rarity and density are a kind of excess and defect. For the dense is what contains a great deal of matter under the same dimensions, and the rare is what contains very little matter. Yet the Platonists said that the Forms are the substance of sensible things rather than the objects of mathematics, and that they are predicable of them to a greater degree.
lib. 1 l. 17 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit et de motu hic ponit tertiam rationem, quae talis est. Si ea, quae sunt in sensibilibus, causantur a speciebus separatis, necessarium est dicere quod sit in speciebus idea motus, aut non. Si est ibi aliqua species et idea motus, etiam constat quod non potest esse motus sine eo quod movetur, necesse erit quod species moveantur; quod est contra Platonicorum opinionem, qui ponebant species immobiles. Si autem non sit idea motus, ea autem quae sunt in sensibilibus causantur ab ideis, non erit assignare causam, unde motus veniat ad ista sensibilia. Et sic aufertur tota perscrutatio scientiae naturalis, quae inquirit de rebus mobilibus. 261. And with regard (135). Here he gives the third argument, which runs thus: if those attributes which exist in sensible things are caused by separate Forms, it is necessary to say either that there is an Idea of “motion” among the Forms or there is not. If there is a Form or Idea of motion among the Forms, and there cannot be motion without something that is moved, it also follows that the Forms must be moved. But this is opposed to the Platonists’ opinion, for they claimed that the Forms are immobile. On the other hand, if there is no Idea of motion, and these attributes which exist in sensible things are caused by the Ideas, it will be impossible to assign a cause for the motion which occurs in sensible things; and thus the entire investigation of natural philosophy, which studies mobile things, will be destroyed.
lib. 1 l. 17 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit et quod hic ponit quartam rationem, quae talis est. Si unum esset substantia rerum omnium sicut Platonici posuerunt, oporteret dicere quod omnia sint unum, sicut et naturales, qui ponebant substantiam omnium esse aquam, et sic de elementis aliis. Sed facile est monstrare, quod omnia non sunt unum: ergo positio quae ponit substantiam omnium esse unum, est improbabilis. 262. And what seems easy (136). Then he gives the fourth argument, which runs thus: if unity were the substance of all things, as the Platonists assumed, it would be necessary to say that all things are one, just as the philosophers of nature also did in claiming that the substance of all things is water, and so on for the other elements. But it is easy to show that all things are not one. Hence the position that unity is the substance of all things is not held in high repute.
lib. 1 l. 17 n. 5 Si autem aliquis dicat quod ex positione Platonis non sequitur quod omnia sint unum simpliciter, sed aliquod unum, sicut dicimus aliqua esse unum secundum genus, vel secundum speciem; si quis velit dicere sic omnia esse unum, nec hoc etiam poterit sustineri, nisi hoc quod dico unum, sit genus, vel universale omnium. Per hunc enim modum possemus dicere omnia esse unum specialiter, sicut dicimus hominem et asinum esse animal substantialiter. Hoc autem quibusdam videtur impossibile, scilicet quod sit unum genus omnium; quia oporteret, quod differentia divisiva huius generis non esset una, ut in tertio dicetur, ergo nullo modo potest poni quod substantia rerum omnium sit unum. 263. But let us assume that someone might say that it does not follow, from Plato’s position, that all things are one in an unqualified sense but in a qualified sense, just as we say that some things are one generically or specifically. And if someone wished to say that all things are one in this way, even this could be held only if what I call the one were a genus or universal predicate of all things. For then we could say that all things are one specifically, just as we say that both a man and an ass are animal substantially. But in certain cases it seems impossible that there should be one class of all things, because the difference dividing this class would necessarily not be one, as will be said in Book III (432). Therefore, in no way can it be held that the substance of all things is one.
lib. 1 l. 17 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit nullam namque hic ponit quintam rationem, quae talis est. Plato ponebat post numeros, longitudines et latitudines et soliditates esse substantias rerum sensibilium, ex quibus scilicet corpora componerentur. Hoc autem secundum Platonis positionem nullam rationem habere videtur, quare debeant poni nec in praesenti, nec in futuro. Nec etiam videtur habere aliquam potestatem ad hoc quod sint sensibilium causae. Per praesentia enim hic oportet intelligi immobilia, quia semper eodem modo se habent. Per futura autem corruptibilia et generabilia, quae esse habent post non esse. Quod sic patet. Plato enim ponebat tria genera rerum; scilicet sensibilia, et species, et mathematica quae media sunt. Huiusmodi autem lineae et superficies, ex quibus componuntur corpora sensibilia, non est possibile esse species, quia species sunt numeri essentialiter. Huiusmodi autem sunt post numeros. Nec iterum potest dici quod sunt intermedia inter species et sensibilia. Huiusmodi enim sunt entia mathematica, et a sensibilibus separata: quod non potest dici de illis lineis et superficiebus ex quibus corpora sensibilia componuntur. Nec iterum possunt esse sensibilia. Nam sensibilia sunt corruptibilia; huiusmodi autem incorruptibilia sunt, ut infra probabitur in tertio. Ergo vel ista nihil sunt, vel sunt quartum aliquod genus entium, quod Plato praetermisit. 264. For they do not have (137). Here he gives the fifth argument, which runs thus: Plato placed lengths, widths and solids after numbers as the substances of sensible things, i.e., that of which they are composed. But according to Plato’s position there seems to be no reason why they should be held to exist either now or in the future. Nor does this notion seem to have any efficacy to establish them as the causes of sensible things. For things which exist “now” must mean immobile things (because these always exist in the same way), whereas things which “will exist” must mean those which are capable of generation and corruption, which acquire being after non-being. This becomes clear thus: Plato posited three classes of things—sensible things, the Forms and the objects of mathematics, which are an intermediate class. But such lines and surfaces as those of which sensible bodies are composed cannot be Forms; for the Forms are essentially numbers, whereas such things [i.e., the lines and surfaces composing bodies] come after numbers. Nor can such lines and surfaces be said to be an intermediate class between the Forms and sensible things; for the things in this intermediate class are the objects of mathematics, and exist apart from sensible things; but this cannot be said of the lines and surfaces of which sensible bodies are composed. Nor again can such lines and surfaces be sensible things; for the latter are corruptible, whereas these lines and surfaces are incorruptible, as will be proved below in Book III (466). Therefore these things are either nothing at all or they constitute a fourth class of things, which Plato omitted.
lib. 1 l. 17 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit et omnino hic ponit sextam rationem, quae talis est. Impossibile est invenire principia alicuius multipliciter dicti, nisi multiplicitas dividatur. Ea enim quae solo nomine convenientia sunt et differunt ratione, non possunt habere principia communia, quia sic haberent rationem eamdem, cum rei cuiuscumque ratio ex suis principiis sumatur. Distincta autem principia his, quibus solum nomen commune est, assignari impossibile est, nisi his quorum principia sunt assignanda adinvicem diversis. Cum igitur ens multipliciter dicatur et non univoce de substantia et aliis generibus, inconvenienter assignat Plato principia existentium, non dividendo abinvicem entia. 265. And, in general (138). Here he gives the sixth argument, which runs thus: it is impossible to discover the principles of anything that is spoken of in many senses, unless these many senses are distinguished. Now those things which agree in name only and differ in their intelligible structure cannot have common principles; otherwise they would have the same intelligible structure, since the intelligible structure of a thing is derived from its own principles. But it is impossible to assign distinct principles for those things which have only the name in common, unless it be those whose principles must be indicated to differ from each other. Therefore, since being is predicated both of substance and the other genera in different senses and not in the same sense, Plato assigned inadequate principles for things by failing to distinguish beings from each other.
lib. 1 l. 17 n. 8 Sed quia aliquis posset aliquibus ratione differentibus, quibus nomen commune est, principia assignare, singulis propria principia captando, sine hoc quod nominis communis multiplicitatem distingueret, hoc etiam Platonici non fecerunt. Unde et aliter, idest alia ratione inconvenienter rerum principia assignaverunt quaerentes ex quibus elementis sunt entia, secundum hunc modum, quo quaesierunt, ut scilicet non omnibus entibus sufficientia principia assignarent. Non enim ex eorum dictis est accipere ex quibus principiis est agere aut pati, aut curvum aut rectum, aut alia huiusmodi accidentia. Assignabant enim solum principia substantiarum, accidentia praetermittentes. 266. But since someone could assign principles to things which differ in their intelligible structure and have a common name, by adjusting proper principles to each without distinguishing the many senses of the common name, and since the Platonists have not done this, then “in another way,” i.e., by another argument, they assigned inadequate principles to things when they looked for the elements of which things are made, i.e., in the way in which they sought for them, inasmuch as they did not assign principles which are sufficient for all things. For from their statements it is impossible to understand the principles of which either action and passion, curvature and straightness, or other such accidents, are composed. For they only indicated the principles of substances and neglected accidents.
lib. 1 l. 17 n. 9 Sed si aliquis defendendo Platonem dicere vellet, quod tunc contingit omnium entium elementa esse acquisita aut inventa, quando contingit solarum substantiarum principia habita esse vel inventa, hoc opinari non est verum. Nam licet principia substantiarum etiam quodammodo sint principia accidentium, tamen accidentia propria principia habent. Nec sunt omnibus modis omnium generum eadem principia, ut ostendetur infra, undecimo vel duodecimo huius. 267. But if in defense of Plato someone wished to say that it is possible for the elements of all things to have been acquired or discovered at the moment when the principles of substances alone happen to have been acquired or discovered, this opinion would not be true. For even if the principles of substances are also in a sense the principles of accidents, nevertheless accidents have their own principles. Nor are the principles of all genera the same in all respects, as will be shown below in Book XI (2173) and Book XII (2455) of this work.
lib. 1 l. 17 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit quomodo autem disputat contra Platonem quantum ad hoc, quod ponebat ideas esse principia scientiae in nobis. Et ponit quatuor rationes: quarum prima est. Si ex ipsis ideis scientia in nobis causatur, non continget addiscere rerum principia. Constat autem quod addiscimus. Ergo ex ipsis ideis scientia non causatur in nobis. Quod autem non contingeret aliquid addiscere sic probat. Nullus enim praecognoscit illud quod addiscere debet; sicut geometra, etsi praecognoscat alia quae sunt necessaria ad demonstrandum, tamen ea quae debet addiscere non debet praecognoscere. Et similiter est in aliis scientiis. Sed si ideae sunt causa scientiae in nobis, oportet quod omnium scientiam habeant, quia ideae sunt rationes omnium scibilium: ergo non possumus aliquid addiscere, nisi aliquis dicatur addiscere illud quod prius praecognovit. Unde si ponatur quod aliquis addiscat, oportet quod non praeexistat cognoscens illa quae addiscit, sed quaedam alia cum quibus fiat disciplinatus, idest addiscens praecognita omnia, idest universalia aut quaedam, idest singularia. Universalia quidem, sicut in his quae addiscuntur per demonstrationem et definitionem; nam oportet sicut in demonstrationibus, ita in definitionibus esse praecognita ea, ex quibus definitiones fiunt, quae sunt universalia; singularia vero oportet esse praecognita in his quae discuntur per inductionem. 268. But how will one (139). Here he argues dialectically against Plato’s position that the Ideas are the principles of our scientific knowledge. He gives four arguments, of which the first is this: if our scientific knowledge is caused by the Ideas themselves, it is impossible for us to acquire knowledge of the principles of things. But it is evident that we do acquire knowledge. Therefore our knowledge is not caused by the Ideas themselves. That it would be impossible to acquire knowledge of anything, he proves thus: no one has any prior knowledge of that object of which he ought to acquire knowledge; for example, even though in the case of geometry one has prior knowledge of other things which are necessary for demonstration, nevertheless the objects of which he ought to acquire knowledge he must not know beforehand. The same thing is also true in the case of the other sciences. But if the Ideas are the cause of our knowledge, men must have knowledge of all things, because the Ideas are the intelligible structures of all knowable things. Therefore we cannot acquire knowledge of anything) unless one might be said to acquire knowledge of something, which he already knew. if it is held, then, that someone acquires knowledge, he must not have any prior knowledge of the thing which he comes to know, but only of certain other things through which he becomes instructed; i.e., one acquires knowledge through things previously known, [either] “all,” i.e., universals, “or some of them,” i.e.,:singular things. One learns through universals in the case of those things which are discovered by demonstration and definition, for in the case of demonstrations and definitions the things of which definitions or universals are composed must be known first. And in the case of things which are discovered by induction singular things must be known first.
lib. 1 l. 17 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit sed si est hic ponit secundam rationem, quae talis est. Si ideae sunt causa scientiae, oportet nostram scientiam esse nobis connaturalem. Sensibilia enim per haec naturam propriam adipiscuntur, quia ideas participant secundum Platonicos. Sed potissima disciplina sive cognitio est illa quae est nobis connaturalis, nec eius possumus oblivisci, sicut patet in cognitione primorum principiorum demonstrationis, quae nullus ignorat: ergo nullo modo possumus omnium scientiam ab ideis in nobis causatam oblivisci. Quod est contra Platonicos, qui dicebant quod anima ex unione ad corpus obliviscitur scientiae, quam naturaliter in omnibus habet: et postea per disciplinam addiscit homo illud quod est prius notum, quasi addiscere nihil sit nisi reminisci. 269. But if this, science (140). Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus: if the Ideas are the cause of our knowledge, it must be connatural to us; for men grasp sensible things through this proper nature, because sensible things participate in Ideas according to the Platonists. But the most important knowledge or science is one that is connatural to us and which we cannot forget, as is evident of our knowledge of the first principles of demonstration, of which no one is ignorant. Hence there is no way in which we can forget the knowledge of all things caused in us by the Ideas. But this is contrary to the Platonists’ opinion, who said that the soul as a result of its union with the body forgets the knowledge which it has of all things by nature, and that by teaching a man acquires knowledge of something that he previously knew, as though the process of acquiring knowledge were merely one of remembering.
lib. 1 l. 17 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit tertiam rationem, quae talis est. Ad rerum cognitionem requiritur, quod homo non solum cognoscat formas rerum, sed etiam principia materialia, ex quibus componitur. Quod ex hoc patet, quia de his interdum contingit esse dubitationem, sicut de hac syllaba sma, quidam dubitant utrum sit composita ex tribus literis scilicet s, m, a, aut sit una litera praeter omnes praedictas habens proprium sonum. Sed ex ideis non possunt cognosci nisi principia formalia, quia ideae sunt formae rerum: ergo non sunt sufficientes causae cognitionis rerum principiis materialibus remanentibus ignotis. 270. Again, how is anyone (141). Here he gives the third argument, which runs thus: in order to know things a man must acquire knowledge not only of the forms of things but also of the material principles of which they are composed. This is evident from the fact that occasionally questions arise regarding these; for example, with regard to this syllable sma, some raise the question whether it is composed of the three letters s, m and a, or whether it is one letter which is distinct from these and has its own sound. But only the formal principles of things can be known through the Ideas, because the Ideas are the forms of things. Hence the Ideas are not a sufficient cause of our knowledge of things when material principles remain unknown.
lib. 1 l. 17 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit quartam rationem, quae talis est. Ad cognitionem rerum oportet de sensibilibus notitiam habere, quia sensibilia sunt manifesta elementa materialia omnium rerum, ex quibus componuntur, sicut voces compositae, ut syllabae et dictiones componuntur ex propriis elementis. Si igitur per ideas scientia in nobis causatur, oportet quod per ideas causetur in nobis cognitio sensibilium. Cognitio autem in nobis causata ex ideis sine sensu est accepta, quia per sensum non habemus habitudinem ad ideas. In cognoscendo ergo sequitur quod aliquis non habens sensum possit cognoscere sensibilia, quod patet esse falsum. Nam caecus natus non potest habere scientiam de coloribus. 271. Again, how could (142). Here he gives the fourth argument, which runs thus: in order to know reality we must know sensible things, because sensible things are the apparent material element of which all things are composed, just as complex sounds (such as syllables and words) are composed of their proper elements. If, then, knowledge is caused in us by the Ideas, our knowledge of sensible things must be caused by the Ideas. But the knowledge which is caused in us by the Ideas is grasped without the senses, because we have no connection with the Ideas through the senses. Therefore in the act of perception it follows that anyone who does not have a sense can apprehend the object of that sense. This is clearly false; for a man born blind cannot have any knowledge of colors.
lib. 1 l. 17 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit quoniam ergo hic colligit ea, quae ab antiquis de principiis dicta sunt; dicens quod ex prius dictis est manifestum, quod antiqui philosophi conati sunt quaerere causas a nobis in libro physicorum determinatas, et quod per dicta eorum non habemus aliquam causam extra causas ibi declaratas. Has autem causas obscure dixerunt, et quodammodo omnes ab eis sunt tactae, quodammodo vero nullam earum tetigerunt. Sicut enim pueri de novo loqui incipientes imperfecte et balbutiendo loquuntur, ita philosophia priorum philosophorum nova existens, visa est balbutiendo et imperfecte de omnibus loqui circa principia. Quod in hoc patet quod Empedocles primo dixit quod ossa habent quamdam rationem idest commixtionem proportionis, quae quidem ratio est quod quid est et substantia rei. Sed similiter necessarium est de carne et de singulis aliorum, aut de nullo. Omnia enim ista ex elementis commixta sunt. Et propter hoc patet quod caro et os et omnia huiusmodi non sunt id quod sunt, propter materiam quae ab eo ponitur quatuor elementa, sed propter hoc principium, scilicet formale. Hoc autem Empedocles quasi ex necessitate veritatis coactus posuit aliquo alio expressius ista dicente, sed ipse manifeste non expressit. Et sicut expresse non manifestaverunt naturam formae, ita nec materiae, ut supra de Anaxagora dictum est. Et similiter nec alicuius alterius principii. De talibus ergo quae ab aliis imperfecte dicta sunt, dictum est prius. Iterum autem in tertio libro recapitulabimus de istis quaecumque circa hoc potest aliquis dubitare ad unam partem vel ad aliam. Ex talibus enim dubitationibus forsitan investigabimus aliquid utile ad dubitationes, quas posterius per totam scientiam prosequi et determinare oportet. 272. From the foregoing (143). Here he summarizes the statements made by the ancient philosophers. He says that from what has been said above it is evident that the ancient philosophers attempted to investigate the cause which he [Aristotle] dealt with in the Physics, and that in their statements we find no cause in addition to those established in that work. However, these men discussed these causes obscurely; and while in a sense they have mentioned all of these causes, in another sense they have not mentioned any of them. For just as young children at first speak imperfectly and in a stammering way, in a similar fashion this philosophy, since it was new, seems to speak imperfectly and in a stammering way about the principles of all things. This is borne out by the fact that Empedocles was the first to say that bones have a certain ratio, or proportional mixture [of the elements], and that this is a thing’s quiddity or substance. But the same thing must also be true of flesh and of every other single thing or of none of them, for all of these things are mixtures of the elements. And for this reason it is evident that flesh and bone and all things of this kind are not what they are because of their matter, which he identified with the four elements, but because of this principle-their form. However, Empedocles, compelled as it were by the need for truth, would have maintained this view if it had been expressed more clearly by someone else, but he did not express it clearly. And just as the ancient philosophers have not clearly expressed the nature of form, neither have they clearly expressed the nature of matter, as was said above about Anaxagoras (90). Nor have they clearly expressed the nature of any other principles. Therefore, concerning such thing, as have been stated imperfectly, we have spoken of this before (190). And with regard to these matters we will restate again in Book III (423) whatever difficulties can be raised on both sides of the question. For perhaps from such difficulties we will discover some useful information for dealing with the problems which must be examined and solved later on throughout this whole science. </tbody>


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