Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part III/Q89

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Q88 Q90



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IIIª q. 89 pr. Deinde considerandum est de recuperatione virtutum per poenitentiam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum per poenitentiam restituantur virtutes. Secundo, utrum restituantur in aequali quantitate. Tertio, utrum restituatur poenitenti aequalis dignitas. Quarto, utrum opera virtutum per peccatum mortificentur. Quinto, utrum opera mortificata per peccatum per poenitentiam reviviscant. Sexto, utrum opera mortua, idest absque caritate facta, per poenitentiam vivificentur. Question 89. The recovery of virtue by means of Penance 1. Are virtues restored through Penance? 2. Are they restored in equal measure? 3. Is equal dignity restored to the penitent? 4. Are works of virtue deadened by subsequent sin? 5. Do works deadened by sin revive through Penance? 6. Are dead works, i.e. works that are done without charity, quickened by Penance?
IIIª q. 89 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod per poenitentiam virtutes non restituantur. Non enim possent virtutes amissae per poenitentiam restitui nisi poenitentia virtutes causaret. Sed poenitentia, cum sit virtus, non potest esse causa omnium virtutum, praesertim cum quaedam virtutes sint naturaliter priores poenitentia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo per poenitentiam non restituuntur. Objection 1. It would seem that the virtues are not restored through penance. Because lost virtue cannot be restored by penance, unless penance be the cause of virtue. But, since penance is itself a virtue, it cannot be the cause of all the virtues, and all the more, since some virtues naturally precede penance, viz., faith, hope, and charity, as stated above (Question 85, Article 6). Therefore the virtues are not restored through penance.
IIIª q. 89 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, poenitentia in quibusdam actibus poenitentis consistit. Sed virtutes gratuitae non causantur ex actibus nostris, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Lib. Arbit., quod virtutes Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Ergo videtur quod per poenitentiam non restituantur virtutes. Objection 2. Further, Penance consists in certain acts of the penitent. But the gratuitous virtues are not caused through any act of ours: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18: In Ps. 118) that "God forms the virtues in us without us." Therefore it seems that the virtues are not restored through Penance.
IIIª q. 89 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, habens virtutem sine difficultate et delectabiliter actus virtutum operatur, unde philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod non est iustus qui non gaudet iusta operatione. Sed multi poenitentes adhuc difficultatem patiuntur in operando actus virtutum. Non ergo per poenitentiam restituuntur virtutes. Objection 3. Further, he that has virtue performs works of virtue with ease and pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that "a man is not just if he does not rejoice in just deeds." Now many penitents find difficulty in performing deeds of virtue. Therefore the virtues are not restored through Penance.
IIIª q. 89 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod, Luc. XV, pater mandavit quod filius poenitens indueretur stola prima, quae, secundum Ambrosium, est amictus sapientiae, quam simul consequuntur omnes virtutes, secundum illud Sap. VIII, sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, prudentiam et virtutem, quibus in vita nihil est utilius hominibus. Ergo per poenitentiam omnes virtutes restituuntur. On the contrary, We read (Luke 15:22) that the father commanded his penitent son to be clothed in "the first robe," which, according to Ambrose (Expos. in Luc. vii), is the "mantle of wisdom," from which all the virtues flow together, according to Wisdom 8:7: "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore all the virtues are restored through Penance.
IIIª q. 89 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod per poenitentiam, sicut dictum est supra, remittuntur peccata. Remissio autem peccatorum non potest esse nisi per infusionem gratiae. Unde relinquitur quod per poenitentiam gratia homini infundatur. Ex gratia autem consequuntur omnes virtutes gratuitae, sicut ex essentia animae fluunt omnes potentiae, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Unde relinquitur quod per poenitentiam omnes virtutes restituantur. I answer that, Sins are pardoned through Penance, as stated above (86, 1). But there can be no remission of sins except through the infusion of grace. Wherefore it follows that grace is infused into man through Penance. Now all the gratuitous virtues flow from grace, even as all the powers result from the essence of the soul; as stated in I-II, 110, 4, ad 1. Therefore all the virtues are restored through Penance.
IIIª q. 89 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod eodem modo poenitentia restituit virtutes per quem modum est causa gratiae, ut iam dictum est. Est autem causa gratiae inquantum est sacramentum, nam inquantum est virtus, est magis gratiae effectus. Et ideo non oportet quod poenitentia, secundum quod est virtus, sit causa omnium aliarum virtutum, sed quod habitus poenitentiae simul cum habitibus aliarum virtutum per sacramentum causetur. Reply to Objection 1. Penance restores the virtues in the same way as it causes grace, as stated above (Question 86, Article 1). Now it is a cause of grace, in so far as it is a sacrament, because, in so far as it is a virtue, it is rather an effect of grace. Consequently it does not follow that penance, as a virtue, needs to be the cause of all the other virtues, but that the habit of penance together with the habits of the other virtues is caused through the sacrament of Penance.
IIIª q. 89 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in sacramento poenitentiae actus humani se habent materialiter, sed formalis vis huius sacramenti dependet ex virtute clavium. Et ideo virtus clavium effective causat gratiam et virtutes, instrumentaliter tamen. Sed actus primus poenitentis se habet ut ultima dispositio ad gratiam consequendam, scilicet contritio, alii vero sequentes actus poenitentiae procedunt iam ex gratia et virtutibus. Reply to Objection 2. In the sacrament of Penance human acts stand as matter, while the formal power of this sacrament is derived from the power of the keys. Consequently the power of the keys causes grace and virtue effectively indeed, but instrumentally; and the first act of the penitent, viz., contrition, stands as ultimate disposition to the reception of grace, while the subsequent acts of Penance proceed from the grace and virtues which are already there.
IIIª q. 89 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quandoque post primum actum poenitentiae, qui est contritio, remanent quaedam reliquiae peccatorum, scilicet dispositiones ex prioribus actibus peccatorum causatae, ex quibus praestatur difficultas quaedam poenitenti ad operandum opera virtutum, sed quantum est ex ipsa inclinatione caritatis et aliarum virtutum, poenitens opera virtutum delectabiliter et sine difficultate operatur; sicut si virtuosus per accidens difficultatem pateretur in executione actus virtutis propter somnum aut aliquam corporis dispositionem. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (Question 86, Article 5), sometimes after the first act of Penance, which is contrition, certain remnants of sin remain, viz. dispositions caused by previous acts, the result being that the penitent finds difficulty in doing deeds of virtue. Nevertheless, so far as the inclination itself of charity and of the other virtues is concerned, the penitent performs works of virtue with pleasure and ease. even as a virtuous man may accidentally find it hard to do an act of virtue, on account of sleepiness or some indisposition of the body.
IIIª q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod post poenitentiam resurgat homo in aequali virtute. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VIII, diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum, ubi dicit Glossa Augustini quod hoc adeo verum est ut, si qui horum devient et exorbitent, hoc ipsum Deus faciat eis in bonum proficere. Sed hoc non esset si homo resurgeret in minori virtute. Objection 1. It would seem that, after Penance, man rises again to equal virtue. For the Apostle says (Romans 8:28): "To them that love God all things work together unto good," whereupon a gloss of Augustine says that "this is so true that, if any such man goes astray and wanders from the path, God makes even this conduce to his good." But this would not be true if he rose again to lesser virtue. Therefore it seems that a penitent never rises again to lesser virtue.
IIIª q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit quod poenitentia optima res est, quae omnes defectus revocat ad perfectum. Sed hoc non esset nisi virtutes in aequali quantitate recuperarentur. Ergo per poenitentiam semper recuperatur aequalis virtus. Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says [Cf. Hypognosticon iii, an anonymous work falsely ascribed to St. Augustine] that "Penance is a very good thing, for it restores every defect to a state of perfection." But this would not be true unless virtues were recovered in equal measure. Therefore equal virtue is always recovered through Penance.
IIIª q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, super illud Genes. I, factum est vespere et mane dies unus, dicit Glossa, vespertina lux est a qua quis cecidit, matutina in qua resurgit. Sed lux matutina est maior quam vespertina. Ergo aliquis resurgit in maiori gratia vel caritate quam prius habuerat. Quod etiam videtur per id quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, ubi abundavit delictum, superabundavit et gratia. Objection 3. Further, on Genesis 1:5: "There was evening and morning, one day," a gloss says: "The evening light is that from which we fall the morning light is that to which we rise again." Now the morning light is greater than the evening light. Therefore a man rises to greater grace or charity than that which he had before; which is confirmed by the Apostle's words (Romans 5:20): "Where sin abounded, grace did more abound."
IIIª q. 89 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, caritas proficiens vel perfecta maior est quam caritas incipiens. Sed quandoque aliquis cadit a caritate proficiente, resurgit autem in caritate incipiente. Ergo semper resurgit homo in minori etiam virtute. On the contrary, Charity whether proficient or perfect is greater than incipient charity. But sometimes a man falls from proficient charity, and rises again to incipient charity. Therefore man always rises again to less virtue.
IIIª q. 89 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, motus liberi arbitrii qui est in iustificatione impii, est ultima dispositio ad gratiam, unde in eodem instanti est gratiae infusio cum praedicto motu liberi arbitrii, ut in secunda parte habitum est. In quo quidem motu comprehenditur actus poenitentiae, ut supra dictum est. Manifestum est autem quod formae quae possunt recipere magis et minus, intenduntur et remittuntur secundum diversam dispositionem subiecti, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Et inde est quod, secundum quod motus liberi arbitrii in poenitentia est intensior vel remissior, secundum hoc poenitens consequitur maiorem vel minorem gratiam. Contingit autem intensionem motus poenitentis quandoque proportionatam esse maiori gratiae quam illa a qua cecidit per peccatum; quandoque vero aequali; quandoque vero minori. Et ideo poenitens quandoque resurgit in maiori gratia quam prius habuerat; quandoque autem in aequali; quandoque etiam in minori. Et eadem ratio est de virtutibus, quae ex gratia consequuntur. I answer that, As stated above (86, 6, ad 3; 89, 1, ad 2), the movement of the free-will, in the justification of the ungodly, is the ultimate disposition to grace; so that in the same instant there is infusion of grace together with the aforesaid movement of the free-will, as stated in I-II, 113, 5,7, which movement includes an act of penance, as stated above (Question 86, Article 2). But it is evident that forms which admit of being more or less, become intense or remiss, according to the different dispositions of the subject, as stated in I-II, 52, 1,2; I-II, 66, 1]. Hence it is that, in Penance, according to the degree of intensity or remissness in the movement of the free-will, the penitent receives greater or lesser grace. Now the intensity of the penitent's movement may be proportionate sometimes to a greater grace than that from which man fell by sinning, sometimes to an equal grace, sometimes to a lesser. Wherefore the penitent sometimes arises to a greater grace than that which he had before, sometimes to an equal, sometimes to a lesser grace: and the same applies to the virtues, which flow from grace.
IIIª q. 89 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnibus diligentibus Deum cooperatur in bonum hoc ipsum quod per peccatum a Dei amore cadunt, quod patet in his qui cadunt et nunquam resurgunt, vel qui resurgunt iterum casuri, sed in his qui secundum propositum vocati sunt sancti, scilicet praedestinatis, qui, quotiescumque cadunt, finaliter tamen resurgunt. Cedit igitur eis in bonum hoc quod cadunt, non quia semper in maiori gratia resurgant, sed quia resurgunt in permanentiori gratia, non quidem ex parte ipsius gratiae, quia, quanto gratia est maior, tanto de se est permanentior; sed ex parte hominis, qui tanto stabilius in gratia permanet quanto est cautior et humilior. Unde et Glossa ibidem subdit quod ideo proficit eis in bonum quod cadunt, quia humiliores redeunt, et quia doctiores fiunt. Reply to Objection 1. The very fact of falling away from the love of God by sin, does not work unto the good of all those who love God, which is evident in the case of those who fall and never rise again, or who rise and fall yet again; but only to the good of "such as according to His purpose are called to be saints," viz. the predestined, who, however often they may fall, yet rise again finally. Consequently good comes of their falling, not that they always rise again to greater grace, but that they rise to more abiding grace, not indeed on the part of grace itself, because the greater the grace, the more abiding it is, but on the part of man, who, the more careful and humble he is, abides the more steadfastly in grace. Hence the same gloss adds that "their fall conduces to their good, because they rise more humble and more enlightened."
IIIª q. 89 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod poenitentia, quantum est de se, habet virtutem reparandi omnes defectus ad perfectum, et etiam promovendi in ulteriorem statum, sed hoc quandoque impeditur ex parte hominis, qui remissius movetur in Deum et in detestationem peccati. Sicut etiam in Baptismo aliqui adulti consequuntur maiorem vel minorem gratiam, secundum quod diversimode se disponunt. Reply to Objection 2. Penance, considered in itself, has the power to bring all defects back to perfection, and even to advance man to a higher state; but this is sometimes hindered on the part of man, whose movement towards God and in detestation of sin is too remiss, just as in Baptism adults receive a greater or a lesser grace, according to the various ways in which they prepare themselves.
IIIª q. 89 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illa assimilatio utriusque gratiae ad lucem vespertinam et matutinam fit propter similitudinem ordinis, quia post lucem vespertinam sequuntur tenebrae noctis, post lucem autem matutinam sequitur lux diei, non autem propter maiorem vel minorem similitudinem quantitatis. Illud etiam verbum apostoli intelligitur de gratia, quae exsuperat omnem abundantiam humanorum peccatorum. Non autem hoc est verum in omnibus, quod quanto abundantius peccavit, tanto abundantiorem gratiam consequatur, pensata quantitate habitualis gratiae. Est tamen superabundans gratia quantum ad ipsam gratiae rationem, quia magis gratis beneficium remissionis magis peccatori confertur. Quamvis quandoque abundanter peccantes abundanter dolent, et sic abundantiorem habitum gratiae et virtutum consequuntur, sicut patet in Magdalena. Reply to Objection 3. This comparison of the two graces to the evening and morning light is made on account of a likeness of order, since the darkness of night follows after the evening light, and the light of day after the light of morning, but not on account of a likeness of greater or lesser quantity. Again, this saying of the Apostle refers to the grace of Christ, which abounds more than any number of man's sins. Nor is it true of all, that the more their sins abound, the more abundant grace they receive, if we measure habitual grace by the quantity. Grace is, however, more abundant, as regards the very notion of grace, because to him who sins more a more "gratuitous" favor is vouchsafed by his pardon; although sometimes those whose sins abound, abound also in sorrow, so that they receive a more abundant habit of grace and virtue, as was the case with Magdalen.
IIIª q. 89 a. 2 ad 4 Ad id vero quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum quod una et eadem gratia maior est proficiens quam incipiens, sed in diversis hoc non est necesse. Unus enim incipit a maiori gratia quam alius habeat in statu profectus, sicut Gregorius dicit, in II Dialog., praesentes et secuturi omnes cognoscant, Benedictus puer a quanta perfectione conversionis gratiam incoepisset. To the argument advanced in the contrary sense it must be replied that in one and the same man proficient grace is greater than incipient grace, but this is not necessarily the case in different men, for one begins with a greater grace than another has in the state of proficiency: thus Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): "Let all, both now and hereafter, acknowledge how perfectly the boy Benedict turned to the life of grace from the very beginning."
IIIª q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod per poenitentiam non restituatur homo in pristinam dignitatem. Quia super illud Amos V, virgo Israel cecidit, dicit Glossa, non negat ut resurgat, sed ut resurgere virgo possit, quia semel oberrans ovis, etsi reportetur in humeris pastoris, non habet tantam gloriam quantam quae nunquam erravit. Ergo per poenitentiam non recuperat homo pristinam dignitatem. Objection 1. It would seem that man is not restored by Penance to his former dignity: because a gloss on Amos 5:2, "The virgin of Israel is cast down," observes: "It is not said that she cannot rise up, but that the virgin of Israel shall not rise; because the sheep that has once strayed, although the shepherd bring it back on his shoulder, has not the same glory as if it had never strayed." Therefore man does not, through Penance, recover his former dignity.
IIIª q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit, quicumque dignitatem divini gradus non custodiunt, contenti fiant animam salvare, reverti enim in pristinum gradum difficile est. Et Innocentius Papa dicit quod apud Nicaeam constituti canones poenitentes etiam ab infimis clericorum officiis excludunt. Non ergo per poenitentiam homo recuperat pristinam dignitatem. Objection 2. Further, Jerome says: "Whoever fail to preserve the dignity of the sacred order, must be content with saving their souls; for it is a difficult thing to return to their former degree." Again, Pope Innocent I says (Ep. vi ad Agapit.) that "the canons framed at the council of Nicaea exclude penitents from even the lowest orders of clerics." Therefore man does not, through Penance, recover his former dignity.
IIIª q. 89 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, ante peccatum potest aliquis ad maiorem gradum ascendere. Non autem hoc post peccatum conceditur poenitenti, dicitur enim Ezech. XLIV, Levitae qui recesserunt a me, nunquam appropinquabunt mihi, ut sacerdotio fungantur. Et, sicut habetur in decretis, dist. l, in Hilerdensi Concilio legitur, hi qui sancto altario deserviunt, si subito flenda debilitate carnis corruerint, et, domino respiciente, poenituerint, officiorum suorum loca recipiant, nec possint ad altiora officia ulterius promoveri. Non ergo poenitentia restituit hominem in pristinam dignitatem. Objection 3. Further, before sinning a man can advance to a higher sacred order. But this is not permitted to a penitent after his sin, for it is written (Ezekiel 44:10-13): "The Levites that went away . . . from Me . . . shall never [Vulgate: 'not'] come near to Me, to do the office of priest": and as laid down in the Decretals (Dist. 1, ch. 52), and taken from the council of Lerida: "If those who serve at the Holy Altar fall suddenly into some deplorable weakness of the flesh, and by God's mercy do proper penance, let them return to their duties, yet so as not to receive further promotion." Therefore Penance does not restore man to his former dignity.
IIIª q. 89 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod, sicut in eadem distinctione legitur, Gregorius, scribens Secundino, dixit, post dignam satisfactionem, credimus hominem posse redire ad suum honorem. Et in Concilio Agathensi legitur, contumaces clerici, prout dignitatis ordo permiserit, ab episcopis corrigantur, ita ut, cum eos poenitentia correxerit, gradum suum dignitatemque recipiant. On the contrary, As we read in the same Distinction, Gregory writing to Secundinus (Regist. vii) says: "We consider that when a man has made proper satisfaction, he may return to his honorable position": and moreover we read in the acts of the council of Agde: "Contumacious clerics, so far as their position allows, should be corrected by their bishops. so that when Penance has reformed them, they may recover their degree and dignity."
IIIª q. 89 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod homo per peccatum duplicem dignitatem amittit, unam quantum ad Deum, aliam vero quantum ad Ecclesiam. Quantum autem ad Deum, amittit duplicem dignitatem. Unam principalem, qua scilicet computatus erat inter filios Dei per gratiam. Et hanc dignitatem recuperat per poenitentiam. Quod significatur Luc. XV de filio prodigo, cui pater poenitenti iussit restitui stolam primam et anulum et calceamenta. Aliam vero dignitatem amittit secundariam, scilicet innocentiam, de qua, sicut ibidem legitur, gloriabatur filius senior, dicens, ecce, tot annis servio tibi, et nunquam mandatum tuum praeterivi. Et hanc dignitatem poenitens recuperare non potest. Recuperat tamen quandoque aliquid maius. Quia, ut Gregorius dicit, in homilia de centum ovibus, qui errasse a Deo se considerant, damna praecedentia lucris sequentibus recompensant. Maius ergo gaudium de eis fit in caelo, quia et dux in praelio plus eum militem diligit qui post fugam reversus hostem fortiter premit, quam illum qui nunquam terga praebuit et nunquam aliquid fortiter fecit. Dignitatem autem ecclesiasticam homo per peccatum perdit, qui indignum se reddit ad ea quae competunt dignitati ecclesiasticae exercenda. Quam quidem recuperare prohibentur, uno modo, quia non poenitent. Unde Isidorus ad Misianum episcopum scribit, sicut in eadem distinctione legitur, cap. domino, illos ad pristinos gradus canones redire praecipiunt quos poenitentiae praecessit satisfactio, vel condigna peccatorum confessio. At contra hi qui a vitio corruptionis non emendantur, nec gradum honoris, nec gratiam recipiunt communionis. Secundo, quia poenitentiam negligenter agunt. Unde in eadem distinctione, cap. si quis diaconus, dicitur, cum in aliquibus nec compunctio humilitatis, nec instantia orandi appareat, nec ieiuniis vel lectionibus eos vacare videamus, possumus agnoscere, si ad pristinos honores redirent, cum quanta negligentia permanerent. Tertio, si commisit aliquod peccatum habens irregularitatem aliquam admixtam. Unde in eadem distinctione, ex Concilio Martini Papae, dicitur, si quis viduam, vel ab alio relictam duxerit, non admittatur ad clerum. Quod si irrepserit, deiiciatur. Similiter si homicidii aut facto aut praecepto aut consilio aut defensione, post Baptismum, conscius fuerit. Sed hoc non est ratione peccati, sed ratione irregularitatis. Quarto, propter scandalum. Unde in eadem distinctione legitur, cap. de his vero, Rabanus dicit, hi qui deprehensi vel capti fuerint publice in periurio, furto aut fornicatione, et ceteris criminibus, secundum canonum sacrorum instituta a proprio gradu decidant, quia scandalum est populo Dei tales personas superpositas habere. Qui autem de praedictis peccatis absconse a se commissis sacerdoti confitentur, si se per ieiunia et eleemosynas vigiliasque et sacras orationes purgaverint, his etiam, gradu proprio servato, spes veniae de misericordia Dei promittenda est. Et hoc etiam dicitur extra, de qualitate Ordinand., cap. quaesitum, si crimina ordine iudiciario comprobata, vel alias notoria non fuerint, praeter reos homicidii, post poenitentiam in susceptis vel iam suscipiendis ordinibus impedire non possunt. I answer that, By sin, man loses a twofold dignity, one in respect of God, the other in respect of the Church. In respect of God he again loses a twofold dignity. one is his principal dignity, whereby he was counted among the children of God, and this he recovers by Penance, which is signified (Luke 15) in the prodigal son, for when he repented, his father commanded that the first garment should be restored to him, together with a ring and shoes. The other is his secondary dignity, viz. innocence, of which, as we read in the same chapter, the elder son boasted saying (Luke 15:29): "Behold, for so many years do I serve thee, and I have never transgressed thy commandments": and this dignity the penitent cannot recover. Nevertheless he recovers something greater sometimes; because as Gregory says (Hom. de centum Ovibus, 34 in Evang.), "those who acknowledge themselves to have strayed away from God, make up for their past losses, by subsequent gains: so that there is more joy in heaven on their account, even as in battle, the commanding officer thinks more of the soldier who, after running away, returns and bravely attacks the foe, than of one who has never turned his back, but has done nothing brave." By sin man loses his ecclesiastical dignity, because thereby he becomes unworthy of those things which appertain to the exercise of the ecclesiastical dignity. This he is debarred from recovering: first, because he fails to repent; wherefore Isidore wrote to the bishop Masso, and as we read in the Distinction quoted above (Objection 3): "The canons order those to be restored to their former degree, who by repentance have made satisfaction for their sins, or have made worthy confession of them. On the other hand, those who do not mend their corrupt and wicked ways are neither allowed to exercise their order, nor received to the grace of communion." Secondly, because he does penance negligently, wherefore it is written in the same Distinction (Objection 3): "We can be sure that those who show no signs of humble compunction, or of earnest prayer, who avoid fasting or study, would exercise their former duties with great negligence if they were restored to them." Thirdly, if he has committed a sin to which an irregularity is attached; wherefore it is said in the same Distinction (Objection 3), quoting the council of Pope Martin [Martin, bishop of Braga]: "If a man marry a widow or the relict of another, he must not be admitted to the ranks of the clergy: and if he has succeeded in creeping in, he must be turned out. In like manner, if anyone after Baptism be guilty of homicide, whether by deed, or by command, or by counsel, or in self-defense." But this is in consequence not of sin, but of irregularity. Fourthly, on account of scandal, wherefore it is said in the same Distinction (Objection 3): "Those who have been publicly convicted or caught in the act of perjury, robbery, fornication, and of such like crimes, according to the prescription of the sacred canons must be deprived of the exercise of their respective orders, because it is a scandal to God's people that such persons should be placed over them. But those who commit such sins occultly and confess them secretly to a priest, may be retained in the exercise of their respective orders, with the assurance of God's merciful forgiveness, provided they be careful to expiate their sins by fasts and alms, vigils and holy deeds." The same is expressed (Extra, De Qual. Ordinand.): "If the aforesaid crimes are not proved by a judicial process, or in some other way made notorious, those who are guilty of them must not be hindered, after they have done penance, from exercising the orders they have received, or from receiving further orders, except in cases of homicide."
IIIª q. 89 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod eadem ratio est de recuperatione virginitatis et de recuperatione innocentiae, quae pertinet ad secundariam dignitatem quoad Deum. Reply to Objection 1. The same is to be said of the recovery of virginity as of the recovery of innocence which belongs to man's secondary dignity in the sight of God.
IIIª q. 89 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Hieronymus in verbis illis non dicit esse impossibile, sed dicit esse difficile hominem recuperare post peccatum pristinum gradum, quia hoc non conceditur nisi perfecte poenitenti, ut dictum est. Ad statuta autem canonum qui hoc prohibere videntur, respondet Augustinus, Bonifacio scribens, ut constitueretur in Ecclesia ne quisquam post alicuius criminis poenitentiam clericatum accipiat, vel ad clericatum redeat, vel in clericatu maneat, non desperatione indulgentiae, sed rigore factum est disciplinae. Alioquin contra claves datas Ecclesiae disputabitur, de quibus dictum est, quaecumque solveritis super terram, erunt soluta et in caelo. Et postea subdit, nam et sanctus David de criminibus egit poenitentiam, et tamen in honore suo perstitit. Et beatum Petrum, quando amarissimas lacrimas fudit, utique dominum negasse poenituit, et tamen apostolus permansit. Sed non ideo putanda est supervacua posteriorum diligentia, qui, ubi saluti nihil detrahebatur, humilitati aliquid addiderunt, experti, ut credo, aliquorum fictas poenitentias per affectatas honorum potentias. Reply to Objection 2. In these words Jerome does not say that it is impossible, but that it is difficult, for man to recover his former dignity after having sinned, because this is allowed to none but those who repent perfectly, as stated above. To those canonical statutes, which seem to forbid this, Augustine replies in his letter to Boniface (Ep. clxxxv): "If the law of the Church forbids anyone, after doing penance for a crime, to become a cleric, or to return to his clerical duties, or to retain them the intention was not to deprive him of the hope of pardon, but to preserve the rigor of discipline; else we should have to deny the keys given to the Church, of which it was said: 'Whatsoever you shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.'" And further on he adds: "For holy David did penance for his deadly crimes, and yet he retained his dignity; and Blessed Peter by shedding most bitter tears did indeed repent him of having denied his Lord, and yet he remained an apostle. Nevertheless we must not deem the care of later teachers excessive, who without endangering a man's salvation, exacted more from his humility, having, in my opinion, found by experience, that some assumed a pretended repentance through hankering after honors and power."
IIIª q. 89 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illud statutum intelligitur de illis qui publicam poenitentiam agunt, qui postmodum non possunt ad maiorem provehi gradum. Nam et Petrus post negationem pastor ovium Christi constitutus est, ut patet Ioan. ult. Ubi dicit Chrysostomus quod Petrus post negationem et poenitentiam ostendit se habere maiorem fiduciam ad Christum. Qui enim in cena non audebat interrogare, sed Ioanni interrogationem commisit, huic postea et praepositura fratrum credita est, et non solum non committit alteri interrogare quae ad ipsum pertinent, sed de reliquo ipse pro Ioanne magistrum interrogat. Reply to Objection 3. This statute is to be understood as applying to those who do public penance, for these cannot be promoted to a higher order. For Peter, after his denial, was made shepherd of Christ's sheep, as appears from John 21:21, where Chrysostom comments as follows: "After his denial and repentance Peter gives proof of greater confidence in Christ: for whereas, at the supper, he durst not ask Him, but deputed John to ask in his stead, afterwards he was placed at the head of his brethren, and not only did not depute another to ask for him, what concerned him, but henceforth asks the Master instead of John."
IIIª q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod opera virtutum in caritate facta mortificari non possunt. Quod enim non est, immutari non potest. Sed mortificatio est quaedam mutatio de vita in mortem. Cum ergo opera virtutum, postquam facta sunt, iam non sint, videtur quod ulterius mortificari non possunt. Objection 1. It would seem that virtuous deeds done in charity cannot be deadened. For that which is not cannot be changed. But to be deadened is to be changed from life to death. Since therefore virtuous deeds, after being done, are no more, it seems that they cannot afterwards be deadened.
IIIª q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, per opera virtutis in caritate facta homo meretur vitam aeternam. Sed subtrahere mercedem merenti est iniustitia, quae non cadit in Deum. Ergo non potest esse quod opera virtutum in caritate facta per peccatum sequens mortificentur. Objection 2. Further, by virtuous deeds done in charity, man merits eternal life. But to take away the reward from one who has merited it is an injustice, which cannot be ascribed to God. Therefore it is not possible for virtuous deeds done in charity to be deadened by a subsequent sin.
IIIª q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, fortius non corrumpitur a debiliori. Sed opera caritatis sunt fortiora quibuslibet peccatis, quia, ut dicitur Proverb. X, universa delicta operit caritas. Ergo videtur quod opera in caritate facta per sequens mortale peccatum mortificari non possunt. Objection 3. Further, the strong is not corrupted by the weak. Now works of charity are stronger than any sins, because, as it is written (Proverbs 10:12), "charity covereth all sins." Therefore it seems that deeds done in charity cannot be deadened by a subsequent mortal sin.
IIIª q. 89 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ezech. XVIII, si averterit se iustus a iustitia sua, omnes iustitiae eius quas fecerat, non recordabuntur. On the contrary, It is written (Ezekiel 18:24): "If the just man turn himself away from his justice . . . all his justices which he hath done shall not be remembered."
IIIª q. 89 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod res viva per mortem perdit operationem vitae, unde per quandam similitudinem dicuntur res mortificari quando impediuntur a proprio suo effectu vel operatione. Effectus autem operum virtuosorum quae in caritate fiunt, est perducere ad vitam aeternam. Quod quidem impeditur per peccatum mortale sequens, quod gratiam tollit. Et secundum hoc, opera in caritate facta dicuntur mortificari per sequens peccatum mortale. I answer that, A living thing, by dying, ceases to have vital operations: for which reason, by a kind of metaphor, a thing is said to be deadened when it is hindered from producing its proper effect or operation. Now the effect of virtuous works, which are done in charity, is to bring man to eternal life; and this is hindered by a subsequent mortal sin, inasmuch as it takes away grace. Wherefore deeds done in charity are said to be deadened by a subsequent mortal sin.
IIIª q. 89 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut opera peccatorum transeunt actu et manent reatu, ita opera in caritate facta, postquam transeunt actu, manent merito in Dei acceptatione. Et secundum hoc mortificantur, inquantum impeditur homo ne consequatur suam mercedem. Reply to Objection 1. Just as sinful deeds pass as to the act but remain as to guilt, so deeds done in charity, after passing, as to the act, remain as to merit, in so far as they are acceptable to God. It is in this respect that they are deadened, inasmuch as man is hindered from receiving his reward.
IIIª q. 89 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sine iniustitia potest subtrahi merces merenti quando ipse reddiderit se indignum mercede per culpam sequentem. Nam et ea quae homo iam accepit, quandoque iuste propter culpam perdit. Reply to Objection 2. There is no injustice in withdrawing the reward from him who has deserved it, if he has made himself unworthy by his subsequent fault, since at times a man justly forfeits through his own fault, even that which he has already received.
IIIª q. 89 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non est propter fortitudinem operum peccati quod mortificantur opera prius in caritate facta, sed est propter libertatem voluntatis, quae potest a bono in malum deflecti. Reply to Objection 3. It is not on account of the strength of sinful deeds that deeds, previously done in charity, are deadened, but on account of the freedom of the will which can be turned away from good to evil.
IIIª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod opera mortificata per peccatum per poenitentiam non reviviscant. Sicut enim per poenitentiam subsequentem remittuntur peccata praeterita, ita etiam per peccatum sequens mortificantur opera prius in caritate facta. Sed peccata dimissa per poenitentiam non redeunt, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod etiam opera mortificata per caritatem non reviviscant. Objection 1. It would seem that deeds deadened by sin are not revived by Penance. Because just as past sins are remitted by subsequent Penance, so are deeds previously done in charity, deadened by subsequent sin. But sins remitted by Penance do not return, as stated above (88, 1,2). Therefore it seems that neither are dead deeds revived by charity.
IIIª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, opera dicuntur mortificari ad similitudinem animalium quae moriuntur, ut dictum est. Sed animal mortuum non potest iterum vivificari. Ergo nec opera mortificata possunt iterum per poenitentiam reviviscere. Objection 2. Further, deeds are said to be deadened by comparison with animals who die, as stated above (Article 4). But a dead animal cannot be revived. Therefore neither can dead works be revived by Penance.
IIIª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, opera in caritate facta merentur gloriam secundum quantitatem gratiae vel caritatis. Sed quandoque per poenitentiam homo resurgit in minori gratia vel caritate. Ergo non consequetur gloriam secundum merita priorum operum. Et ita videtur quod opera mortificata per peccatum non reviviscant. Objection 3. Further, deeds done in charity are deserving of glory according to the quantity of grace or charity. But sometimes man arises through Penance to lesser grace or charity. Therefore he does not receive glory according to the merit of his previous works; so that it seems that deeds deadened by sin are not revived.
IIIª q. 89 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod, super illud Ioel II, reddam vobis annos quos comedit locusta, dicit Glossa, non patiar perire ubertatem quam cum perturbatione animi amisistis. Sed illa ubertas est meritum bonorum operum, quod fuit perditum per peccatum. Ergo per poenitentiam reviviscunt opera meritoria prius facta. On the contrary, on Joel 2:25, "I will restore to you the years, which the locust . . . hath eaten," a gloss says: "I will not suffer to perish the fruit which you lost when your soul was disturbed." But this fruit is the merit of good works which was lost through sin. Therefore meritorious deeds done before are revived by Penance.
IIIª q. 89 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod opera meritoria per peccatum sequens mortificata non reviviscunt per poenitentiam sequentem, considerantes quod opera illa non remanent, ut iterum vivificari possent. Sed hoc impedire non potest quin vivificentur. Non enim habent vim perducendi in vitam aeternam, quod pertinet ad eorum vitam, solum secundum quod actu existunt, sed etiam postquam actu esse desinunt secundum quod remanent in acceptatione divina. Sic autem remanent, quantum est de se, etiam postquam per peccatum mortificantur, quia semper Deus illa opera, prout facta fuerunt, acceptabit, et sancti de eis gaudebunt, secundum illud Apoc. III, tene quod habes, ne alius accipiat coronam tuam. Sed quod isti qui ea fecit non sint efficacia ad ducendum ad vitam aeternam, provenit ex impedimento peccati supervenientis, per quod ipse redditur indignus vita aeterna. Hoc autem impedimentum tollitur per poenitentiam, inquantum per eam remittuntur peccata. Unde restat quod opera prius mortificata per poenitentiam recuperant efficaciam perducendi eum qui fecit ea in vitam aeternam, quod est ea reviviscere. Et ita patet quod opera mortificata per poenitentiam reviviscunt. I answer that, Some have said that meritorious works deadened by subsequent sin are not revived by the ensuing Penance, because they deemed such works to have passed away, so that they could not be revived. But that is no reason why they should not be revived: because they are conducive to eternal life (wherein their life consists) not only as actually existing, but also after they cease to exist actually, and as abiding in the Divine acceptance. Now, they abide thus, so far as they are concerned, even after they have been deadened by sin, because those works, according as they were done, will ever be acceptable to God and give joy to the saints, according to Apocalypse 3:11: "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown." That they fail in their efficacy to bring the man, who did them, to eternal life, is due to the impediment of the supervening sin whereby he is become unworthy of eternal life. But this impediment is removed by Penance, inasmuch as sins are taken away thereby. Hence it follows that deeds previously deadened, recover, through Penance, their efficacy in bringing him, who did them, to eternal life, and, in other words, they are revived. It is therefore evident that deadened works are revived by Penance.
IIIª q. 89 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod opera peccati per poenitentiam abolentur secundum se, ita scilicet quod ex eis ulterius, Deo indulgente, nec macula nec reatus inducitur. Sed opera ex caritate facta non abolentur a Deo, in cuius acceptatione remanent, sed impedimentum accipiunt ex parte hominis operantis. Et ideo, remoto impedimento quod est ex parte hominis, Deus implet ex parte sua illud quod opera merebantur. Reply to Objection 1. The very works themselves of sin are removed by Penance, so that, by God's mercy, no further stain or debt of punishment is incurred on their account: on the other hand, works done in charity are not removed by God, since they abide in His acceptance, but they are hindered on the part of the man who does them; wherefore if this hindrance, on the part of the man who does those works, be removed, God on His side fulfills what those works deserved.
IIIª q. 89 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod opera in caritate facta non mortificantur secundum se, sicut dictum est, sed solum per impedimentum superveniens ex parte operantis. Animalia autem moriuntur secundum se, inquantum privantur principio vitae. Et ideo non est simile. Reply to Objection 2. Deeds done in charity are not in themselves deadened, as explained above, but only with regard to a supervening impediment on the part of the man who does them. On the other hand, an animal dies in itself, through being deprived of the principle of life: so that the comparison fails.
IIIª q. 89 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui per poenitentiam resurgit in minori caritate, consequetur quidem praemium essentiale secundum quantitatem caritatis in qua invenitur, habebit tamen gaudium maius de operibus in prima caritate factis quam de operibus quae in secunda fecit. Quod pertinet ad praemium accidentale. Reply to Objection 3. He who, through Penance, arises to lesser charity, will receive the essential reward according to the degree of charity in which he is found. Yet he will have greater joy for the works he had done in his former charity, than for those which he did in his subsequent charity: and this joy belongs to the accidental reward.
IIIª q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod per poenitentiam subsequentem etiam opera mortua, quae scilicet non sunt in caritate facta, vivificentur. Difficilius enim videtur quod ad vitam perveniat illud quod fuit mortificatum, quod nunquam fit secundum naturam, quam illud quod nunquam fuit vivum, vivificetur, quia ex non vivis secundum naturam viva aliqua generantur. Sed opera mortificata per poenitentiam vivificantur, ut dictum est. Ergo multo magis opera mortua vivificantur. Objection 1. It would seem that the effect of subsequent Penance is to quicken even dead works, those, namely, that were not done in charity. For it seems more difficult to bring to life that which has been deadened, since this is never done naturally, than to quicken that which never had life, since certain living things are engendered naturally from things without life. Now deadened works are revived by Penance, as stated above (Article 5). Much more, therefore, are dead works revived.
IIIª q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, remota causa, removetur effectus. Sed causa quare opera de genere bonorum sine caritate facta non fuerunt viva, fuit defectus caritatis et gratiae. Sed iste defectus tollitur per poenitentiam. Ergo per poenitentiam opera mortua vivificantur. Objection 2. Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. But the cause of the lack of life in works generically good done without charity, was the lack of charity and grace. which lack is removed by Penance. Therefore dead works are quickened by charity.
IIIª q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit, si quando videris inter multa opera peccatorum facere quemquam aliqua quae iusta sunt, non est tam iniustus Deus ut propter multa mala obliviscatur paucorum bonorum. Sed hoc videtur maxime quando mala praeterita per poenitentiam tolluntur. Ergo videtur quod post poenitentiam Deus remuneret priora bona in statu peccati facta, quod est ea vivificari. Objection 3. Further, Jerome in commenting on Haggai 1:26: "You have sowed much," says: "If at any time you find a sinner, among his many evil deeds, doing that which is right, God is not so unjust as to forget the few good deeds on account of his many evil deeds." Now this seems to be the case chiefly when past evil "deeds" are removed by Penance. Therefore it seems that through Penance, God rewards the former deeds done in the state of sin, which implies that they are quickened.
IIIª q. 89 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I Cor. XIII, si distribuero in cibos pauperum omnes facultates meas, et si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, caritatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest. Hoc autem non esset si saltem per poenitentiam subsequentem vivificarentur. Non ergo poenitentia vivificat opera prius mortua. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Corinthians 13:3): "If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." But this would not be true, if, at least by subsequent Penance, they were quickened. Therefore Penance does not quicken works which before were dead.
IIIª q. 89 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod opus aliquod dicitur mortuum dupliciter. Uno modo, effective, quia scilicet est causa mortis. Et secundum hoc, opera peccati dicuntur opera mortua, secundum illud Heb. IX, sanguis Christi emundabit conscientias nostras ab operibus mortuis. Haec igitur opera mortua non vivificantur per poenitentiam, sed magis abolentur, secundum illud Heb. VI, non rursus iacientes fundamentum poenitentiae ab operibus mortuis. Alio modo dicuntur opera mortua privative, scilicet quia carent vita spirituali, quae est ex caritate, per quam anima Deo coniungitur, ex quo vivit sicut corpus per animam. Et per hunc modum etiam fides quae est sine caritate, dicitur mortua, secundum illud Iac. II, fides sine operibus mortua est. Et per hunc etiam modum omnia opera quae sunt bona ex genere, si sine caritate fiant, dicuntur mortua, inquantum scilicet non procedunt ex principio vitae; sicut si dicamus sonum citharae vocem mortuam dare. Sic igitur differentia mortis et vitae in operibus est secundum comparationem ad principium a quo procedunt. Opera autem non possunt iterum a principio procedere, quia transeunt, et iterum eadem numero assumi non possunt. Unde impossibile est quod opera mortua iterum fiant viva per poenitentiam. I answer that, A work is said to be dead in two ways: first, effectively, because, to wit, it is a cause of death, in which sense sinful works are said to be dead, according to Hebrews 9:14: "The blood of Christ . . . shall cleanse our conscience from dead works." These dead works are not quickened but removed by Penance, according to Hebrews 6:1: "Not laying again the foundation of Penance from dead works." Secondly, works are said to be dead privatively, because, to wit, they lack spiritual life, which is founded on charity, whereby the soul is united to God, the result being that it is quickened as the body by the soul: in which sense too, faith, if it lack charity, is said to be dead, according to James 2:20: "Faith without works is dead." In this way also, all works that are generically good, are said to be dead, if they be done without charity, inasmuch as they fail to proceed from the principle of life; even as we might call the sound of a harp, a dead voice. Accordingly, the difference of life and death in works is in relation to the principle from which they proceed. But works cannot proceed a second time from a principle, because they are transitory, and the same identical deed cannot be resumed. Therefore it is impossible for dead works to be quickened by Penance.
IIIª q. 89 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in rebus naturalibus tam mortua quam mortificata carent principio vitae. Sed opera dicuntur mortificata non ex parte principii a quo processerunt, sed ex parte impedimenti extrinseci. Mortua autem dicuntur ex parte principii. Et ideo non est similis ratio. Reply to Objection 1. In the physical order things whether dead or deadened lack the principle of life. But works are said to be deadened, not in relation to the principle whence they proceeded, but in relation to an extrinsic impediment; while they are said to be dead in relation to a principle. Consequently there is no comparison.
IIIª q. 89 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod opera de genere bonorum sine caritate facta dicuntur mortua propter defectum caritatis et gratiae sicut principii. Hoc autem non praestatur eis per poenitentiam subsequentem, ut ex tali principio procedant. Unde ratio non sequitur. Reply to Objection 2. Works generically good done without charity are said to be dead on account of the lack of grace and charity, as principles. Now the subsequent Penance does not supply that want, so as to make them proceed from such a principle. Hence the argument does not prove.
IIIª q. 89 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus recordatur bonorum quae quis facit in statu peccati, non ut remuneret ea in vita aeterna, quod debetur solis operibus vivis, idest ex caritate factis, sed remunerat temporali remuneratione. Sicut Gregorius dicit, in homilia de divite et Lazaro, quod, nisi dives ille aliquod bonum egisset et in praesenti saeculo remunerationem accepisset, nequaquam ei Abraham diceret, recepisti bona in vita tua. Vel hoc etiam potest referri ad hoc quod patietur tolerabilius iudicium. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro de patientia, non possumus dicere schismatico melius fuisse ei ut, Christum negando, nihil eorum pateretur quae passus est confitendo, ut illud quod ait apostolus, si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, caritatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest, intelligatur ad regnum caelorum obtinendum, non ad extremi iudicii supplicium tolerabilius subeundum. Reply to Objection 3. God remembers the good deeds a man does when in a state of sin, not by rewarding them in eternal life, which is due only to living works, i.e. those done from charity, but by a temporal reward: thus Gregory declares (Hom. de Divite et Lazaro, 41 in Evang.) that "unless that rich man had done some good deed, and had received his reward in this world, Abraham would certainly not have said to him: 'Thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime.'" Or again, this may mean that he will be judged less severely: wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia xxvi): "We cannot say that it would be better for the schismatic that by denying Christ he should suffer none of those things which he suffered by confessing Him; but we must believe that he will be judged with less severity, than if by denying Christ, he had suffered none of those things. Thus the words of the Apostle, 'If I should deliver my body to be burned and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing,' refer to the obtaining of the kingdom of heaven, and do not exclude the possibility of being sentenced with less severity at the last judgment."

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