Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part III/Q75

• Question 75.1 The change of bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ
• Question 75.2
• Question 75.3
• Question 75.4
• Question 75.5
• Question 75.6
• Question 75.7
• Question 75.8

Latin	English
IIIª q. 75 pr. Deinde considerandum est de conversione panis et vini in corpus et sanguinem Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum substantia panis et vini remaneat in hoc sacramento post consecrationem. Secundo, utrum annihiletur. Tertio, utrum convertatur in corpus et sanguinem Christi. Quarto, utrum remaneant ibi accidentia post conversionem. Quinto, utrum remaneat ibi forma substantialis. Sexto, utrum conversio ista fiat subito. Septimo, utrum sit miraculosior omni alia mutatione. Octavo, quibus verbis convenienter exprimi possit.	Question 75. The change of bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ 1. Is the Body of Christ in this sacrament truly, or figuratively? 2. Do the substance of bread and wine remain in this sacrament after the consecration? 3. Is it annihilated? 4. Is it changed into the body and blood of Christ? 5. Do the accidents remain after the change? 6. Does the substantial form remain there? 7. Is this change instantaneous? 8. By what words it may be suitably expressed? Editor's note: The order of questions given here may vary from one edition of the Summa to the next. Originally, St. Thomas presented the questions in the following order, taken directly from his Commentary on the Sentences (iv. Dist. xc): "We have now to consider the change of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ; under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the substance of bread and wine remain in this sacrament after the consecration? (2) Whether it is annihilated? (3) Whether it is changed into the body and blood of Christ? (4) Whether the accidents remain after the change? (5) Whether the substantial form remains there? (6) Whether this change is instantaneous? (7) Whether it is more miraculous than any other change? (8) By what words it may be suitably expressed?" However, in writing the articles themselves, he introduced a new arrangement, eliminating Article 7 ("Whether it is more miraculous than any other change?"), adding a new article to the beginning ("Whether the Body of Christ be in this sacrament in very truth, or merely as in a figure or sign?"), and renumbering the other articles accordingly. Most editions -- including this one -- have ignored St. Thomas's original division, and give the one to which he subsequently adhered.
IIIª q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in hoc sacramento non sit corpus Christi secundum veritatem, sed solum secundum figuram, vel sicut in signo. Dicitur enim Ioan. VI quod, cum dominus dixisset, nisi manducaveritis carnem filii hominis et biberitis eius sanguinem, etc., multi ex discipulis eius audientes dixerunt, durus est hic sermo, quibus ipse, spiritus est qui vivificat, caro non prodest quidquam. Quasi dicat, secundum expositionem Augustini, super quartum Psalmum, spiritualiter intellige quae locutus sum. Non hoc corpus quod videtis manducaturi estis, et bibituri illum sanguinem quem fusuri sunt qui me crucifigent. Sacramentum aliquod vobis commendavi. Spiritualiter intellectum vivificabit vos, caro autem non prodest quidquam.	Objection 1. It seems that the body of Christ is not in this sacrament in very truth, but only as in a figure, or sign. For it is written (John 6:54) that when our Lord had uttered these words: "Except you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood," etc., "Many of His disciples on hearing it said: 'this is a hard saying'": to whom He rejoined: "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing": as if He were to say, according to Augustine's exposition on Ps. 4 [On Psalm 98:9]: "Give a spiritual meaning to what I have said. You are not to eat this body which you see, nor to drink the blood which they who crucify Me are to spill. It is a mystery that I put before you: in its spiritual sense it will quicken you; but the flesh profiteth nothing."
IIIª q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, dominus dicit, Matth. ult., ecce, ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem saeculi, quod exponens Augustinus dicit, donec saeculum finiatur, sursum est dominus, sed tamen et hic nobiscum est veritas dominus. Corpus enim in quo resurrexit, uno in loco esse oportet, veritas autem eius ubique diffusa est. Non ergo secundum veritatem est corpus Christi in hoc sacramento, sed solum sicut in signo.	Objection 2. Further, our Lord said (Matthew 28:20): "Behold I am with you all days even to the consummation of the world." Now in explaining this, Augustine makes this observation (Tract. xxx in Joan.): "The Lord is on high until the world be ended; nevertheless the truth of the Lord is here with us; for the body, in which He rose again, must be in one place; but His truth is spread abroad everywhere." Therefore, the body of Christ is not in this sacrament in very truth, but only as in a sign.
IIIª q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, nullum corpus potest esse simul in pluribus locis, cum nec Angelo hoc conveniat, eadem enim ratione posset esse ubique. Sed corpus Christi est verum corpus, et est in caelo. Ergo videtur quod non sit secundum veritatem in sacramento altaris, sed solum sicut in signo.	Objection 3. Further, no body can be in several places at the one time. For this does not even belong to an angel; since for the same reason it could be everywhere. But Christ's is a true body, and it is in heaven. Consequently, it seems that it is not in very truth in the sacrament of the altar, but only as in a sign.
IIIª q. 75 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, sacramenta Ecclesiae ad utilitatem fidelium ordinantur. Sed secundum Gregorium, in quadam homilia, regulus reprehenditur quia quaerebat corporalem Christi praesentiam. Apostoli etiam impediebantur recipere spiritum sanctum propter hoc quod affecti erant ad eius praesentiam corporalem, ut Augustinus dicit, super illud Ioan. XVI, si non abiero, Paraclitus non veniet ad vos. Non ergo Christus secundum praesentiam corporalem est in sacramento altaris.	Objection 4. Further, the Church's sacraments are ordained for the profit of the faithful. But according to Gregory in a certain Homily (xxviii in Evang.), the ruler is rebuked "for demanding Christ's bodily presence." Moreover the apostles were prevented from receiving the Holy Ghost because they were attached to His bodily presence, as Augustine says on John 16:7: "Except I go, the Paraclete will not come to you" (Tract. xciv in Joan.). Therefore Christ is not in the sacrament of the altar according to His bodily presence.
IIIª q. 75 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Hilarius dicit, in VIII de Trin., de veritate carnis et sanguinis Christi non est relictus ambigendi locus. Nunc et ipsius domini professione, et fide nostra, caro eius vere est cibus et sanguis eius vere est potus. Et Ambrosius dicit, VI de sacramentis, sicut verus est Dei filius dominus Iesus Christus, ita vera Christi caro est quam accipimus, et verus sanguis eius est potus.	On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii): "There is no room for doubt regarding the truth of Christ's body and blood; for now by our Lord's own declaring and by our faith His flesh is truly food, and His blood is truly drink." And Ambrose says (De Sacram. vi): "As the Lord Jesus Christ is God's true Son so is it Christ's true flesh which we take, and His true blood which we drink."
IIIª q. 75 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod verum corpus Christi et sanguinem esse in hoc sacramento, non sensu deprehendi potest, sed sola fide, quae auctoritati divinae innititur. Unde super illud Luc. XXII, hoc est corpus meum quod pro vobis tradetur, dicit Cyrillus, non dubites an hoc verum sit, sed potius suscipe verba salvatoris in fide, cum enim sit veritas, non mentitur. Hoc autem conveniens est, primo quidem, perfectioni novae legis. Sacrificia enim veteris legis illud verum sacrificium passionis Christi continebant solum in figura, secundum illud Heb. X, umbram habens lex futurorum bonorum, non ipsam rerum imaginem. Et ideo oportuit ut aliquid plus haberet sacrificium novae legis a Christo institutum, ut scilicet contineret ipsum passum, non solum in significatione vel figura, sed etiam in rei veritate. Et ideo hoc sacramentum, quod ipsum Christum realiter continet, ut Dionysius dicit, III cap. Eccles. Hierar., est perfectivum omnium sacramentorum aliorum, in quibus virtus Christi participatur. Secundo, hoc competit caritati Christi, ex qua pro salute nostra corpus verum nostrae naturae assumpsit. Et quia maxime proprium amicitiae est, convivere amicis, ut philosophus dicit, IX Ethic., sui praesentiam corporalem nobis repromittit in praemium, Matth. XXIV, ubi fuerit corpus, illuc congregabuntur et aquilae. Interim tamen nec sua praesentia corporali in hac peregrinatione destituit, sed per veritatem corporis et sanguinis sui nos sibi coniungit in hoc sacramento. Unde ipse dicit, Ioan. VI, qui manducat meam carnem et bibit meum sanguinem, in me manet et ego in eo. Unde hoc sacramentum est maximae caritatis signum, et nostrae spei sublevamentum, ex tam familiari coniunctione Christi ad nos. Tertio, hoc competit perfectioni fidei, quae, sicut est de divinitate Christi, ita est de eius humanitate, secundum illud Ioan. XIV, creditis in Deum, et in me credite. Et quia fides est invisibilium, sicut divinitatem suam nobis exhibet Christus invisibiliter, ita et in hoc sacramento carnem suam nobis exhibet invisibili modo. Quae quidam non attendentes, posuerunt corpus et sanguinem Christi non esse in hoc sacramento nisi sicut in signo. Quod est tanquam haereticum abiiciendum, utpote verbis Christi contrarium. Unde et Berengarius, qui primus inventor huius erroris fuerat, postea coactus est suum errorem revocare, et veritatem fidei confiteri.	I answer that, The presence of Christ's true body and blood in this sacrament cannot be detected by sense, nor understanding, but by faith alone, which rests upon Divine authority. Hence, on Luke 22:19: "This is My body which shall be delivered up for you," Cyril says: "Doubt not whether this be true; but take rather the Saviour's words with faith; for since He is the Truth, He lieth not." Now this is suitable, first for the perfection of the New Law. For, the sacrifices of the Old Law contained only in figure that true sacrifice of Christ's Passion, according to Hebrews 10:1: "For the law having a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things." And therefore it was necessary that the sacrifice of the New Law instituted by Christ should have something more, namely, that it should contain Christ Himself crucified, not merely in signification or figure, but also in very truth. And therefore this sacrament which contains Christ Himself, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), is perfective of all the other sacraments, in which Christ's virtue is participated. Secondly, this belongs to Christ's love, out of which for our salvation He assumed a true body of our nature. And because it is the special feature of friendship to live together with friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix), He promises us His bodily presence as a reward, saying (Matthew 24:28): "Where the body is, there shall the eagles be gathered together." Yet meanwhile in our pilgrimage He does not deprive us of His bodily presence; but unites us with Himself in this sacrament through the truth of His body and blood. Hence (John 6:57) he says: "He that eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood, abideth in Me, and I in him." Hence this sacrament is the sign of supreme charity, and the uplifter of our hope, from such familiar union of Christ with us. Thirdly, it belongs to the perfection of faith, which concerns His humanity just as it does His Godhead, according to John 14:1: "You believe in God, believe also in Me." And since faith is of things unseen, as Christ shows us His Godhead invisibly, so also in this sacrament He shows us His flesh in an invisible manner. Some men accordingly, not paying heed to these things, have contended that Christ's body and blood are not in this sacrament except as in a sign, a thing to be rejected as heretical, since it is contrary to Christ's words. Hence Berengarius, who had been the first deviser of this heresy, was afterwards forced to withdraw his error, and to acknowledge the truth of the faith.
IIIª q. 75 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex hac auctoritate praedicti haeretici occasionem errandi sumpserunt, male verba Augustini intelligentes. Cum enim Augustinus dicit, non hoc corpus quod videtis manducaturi estis, non intendit excludere veritatem corporis Christi, sed quod non erat manducandum in hac specie in qua ab eis videbatur. Per hoc autem quod subdit, sacramentum vobis aliquod commendavi, spiritualiter intellectum vivificabit vos, non intendit quod corpus Christi sit in hoc sacramento solum secundum mysticam significationem, sed spiritualiter dici, idest, invisibiliter et per virtutem spiritus. Unde, super Ioan., exponens illud quod dicitur, caro non prodest quidquam, dicit, sed, quo modo illi intellexerunt. Carnem quippe sic intellexerunt manducandam, quo modo in cadavere dilaniatur aut in macello venditur, non quo modo spiritu vegetatur. Accedat spiritus ad carnem, et prodest plurimum, nam, si caro nihil prodesset, verbum caro non fieret, ut habitaret in nobis.	Reply to Objection 1. From this authority the aforesaid heretics have taken occasion to err from evilly understanding Augustine's words. For when Augustine says: "You are not to eat this body which you see," he means not to exclude the truth of Christ's body, but that it was not to be eaten in this species in which it was seen by them. And by the words: "It is a mystery that I put before you; in its spiritual sense it will quicken you," he intends not that the body of Christ is in this sacrament merely according to mystical signification, but "spiritually," that is, invisibly, and by the power of the spirit. Hence (Tract. xxvii), expounding John 6:64: "the flesh profiteth nothing," he says: "Yea, but as they understood it, for they understood that the flesh was to be eaten as it is divided piecemeal in a dead body, or as sold in the shambles, not as it is quickened by the spirit . . . Let the spirit draw nigh to the flesh . . . then the flesh profiteth very much: for if the flesh profiteth nothing, the Word had not been made flesh, that It might dwell among us."
IIIª q. 75 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum illud Augustini, et omnia similia, sunt intelligenda de corpore Christi secundum quod videtur in propria specie, secundum quod etiam ipse dominus dixit, Matth. XXVI, me autem non semper habebitis. Invisibiliter tamen sub speciebus huius sacramenti est ubicumque hoc sacramentum perficitur.	Reply to Objection 2. That saying of Augustine and all others like it are to be understood of Christ's body as it is beheld in its proper species; according as our Lord Himself says (Matthew 26:11): "But Me you have not always." Nevertheless He is invisibly under the species of this sacrament, wherever this sacrament is performed.
IIIª q. 75 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus Christi non est eo modo in sacramento sicut corpus in loco, quod suis dimensionibus loco commensuratur, sed quodam speciali modo, qui est proprius huic sacramento. Unde dicimus quod corpus Christi est in diversis altaribus, non sicut in diversis locis, sed sicut in sacramento. Per quod non intelligimus quod Christus sit ibi solum sicut in signo, licet sacramentum sit in genere signi, sed intelligimus corpus Christi esse ibi, sicut dictum est, secundum modum proprium huic sacramento.	Reply to Objection 3. Christ's body is not in this sacrament in the same way as a body is in a place, which by its dimensions is commensurate with the place; but in a special manner which is proper to this sacrament. Hence we say that Christ's body is upon many altars, not as in different places, but "sacramentally": and thereby we do not understand that Christ is there only as in a sign, although a sacrament is a kind of sign; but that Christ's body is here after a fashion proper to this sacrament, as stated above.
IIIª q. 75 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de praesentia corporis Christi prout est praesens per modum corporis, idest prout est in sua specie visibili, non autem prout spiritualiter, idest invisibiliter, modo et virtute spiritus. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., si intellexisti spiritualiter verba Christi de carne sua, spiritus et vita tibi sunt, si intellexisti carnaliter, etiam spiritus et vita sunt, sed tibi non sunt.	Reply to Objection 4. This argument holds good of Christ's bodily presence, as He is present after the manner of a body, that is, as it is in its visible appearance, but not as it is spiritually, that is, invisibly, after the manner and by the virtue of the spirit. Hence Augustine (Tract. xxvii in Joan.) says: "If thou hast understood" Christ's words spiritually concerning His flesh, "they are spirit and life to thee; if thou hast understood them carnally, they are also spirit and life, but not to thee."
IIIª q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in hoc sacramento remaneat substantia panis et vini post consecrationem. Dicit enim Damascenus, in libro IV, quia consuetudo est hominibus comedere panem et vinum, coniugavit eis deitatem, et fecit ea corpus et sanguinem suum. Et infra, panis communicationis non panis simplex est, sed unitus deitati. Sed coniugatio est rerum actu existentium. Ergo panis et vinum simul sunt in hoc sacramento cum corpore et sanguine Christi.	Objection 1. It seems that the substance of the bread and wine does remain in this sacrament after the consecration: because Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): "Since it is customary for men to eat bread and drink wine, God has wedded his Godhead to them, and made them His body and blood": and further on: "The bread of communication is not simple bread, but is united to the Godhead." But wedding together belongs to things actually existing. Therefore the bread and wine are at the same time, in this sacrament, with the body and the blood of Christ.
IIIª q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, inter Ecclesiae sacramenta debet esse conformitas. Sed in aliis sacramentis substantia materiae manet, sicut in Baptismo substantia aquae, et in confirmatione substantia chrismatis. Ergo et in hoc sacramento substantia panis et vini manet.	Objection 2. Further, there ought to be conformity between the sacraments. But in the other sacraments the substance of the matter remains, like the substance of water in Baptism, and the substance of chrism in Confirmation. Therefore the substance of the bread and wine remains also in this sacrament.
IIIª q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, panis et vinum assumitur in hoc sacramento inquantum significat ecclesiasticam unitatem, prout unus panis fit ex multis granis, et unum vinum ex multis racemis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de symbolo. Sed hoc pertinet ad ipsam substantiam panis et vini. Ergo substantia panis et vini remanet in hoc sacramento.	Objection 3. Further, bread and wine are made use of in this sacrament, inasmuch as they denote ecclesiastical unity, as "one bread is made from many grains and wine from many grapes," as Augustine says in his book on the Creed (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But this belongs to the substance of bread and wine. Therefore, the substance of the bread and wine remains in this sacrament.
IIIª q. 75 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de sacramentis, licet figura panis et vini videatur, nihil tamen aliud quam caro Christi et sanguis post consecrationem credenda sunt.	On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): "Although the figure of the bread and wine be seen, still, after the Consecration, they are to be believed to be nothing else than the body end blood of Christ."
IIIª q. 75 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt post consecrationem substantiam panis et vini in hoc sacramento remanere. Sed haec positio stare non potest. Primo quidem, quia per hanc positionem tollitur veritas huius sacramenti, ad quam pertinet ut verum corpus Christi in hoc sacramento existat. Quod quidem ibi non est ante consecrationem. Non autem aliquid potest esse alicubi ubi prius non erat, nisi per loci mutationem, vel per alterius conversionem in ipsum, sicut in domo aliqua de novo incipit esse ignis aut quod illuc defertur, aut quod ibi generatur. Manifestum est autem quod corpus Christi non incipit esse in hoc sacramento per motum localem. Primo quidem, quia sequeretur quod desineret esse in caelo, non enim quod localiter movetur, pervenit de novo ad aliquem locum, nisi deserat priorem. Secundo, quia omne corpus localiter motum pertransit omnia media, quod hic dici non potest. Tertio, quia impossibile est quod unus motus eiusdem corporis localiter moti terminetur simul ad diversa loca, cum tamen in pluribus locis corpus Christi sub hoc sacramento simul esse incipiat. Et propter hoc relinquitur quod non possit aliter corpus Christi incipere esse de novo in hoc sacramento nisi per conversionem substantiae panis in ipsum. Quod autem convertitur in aliquid, facta conversione, non manet. Unde relinquitur quod, salva veritate huius sacramenti, substantia panis post consecrationem remanere non possit. Secundo, quia haec positio contrariatur formae huius sacramenti, in qua dicitur, hoc est corpus meum. Quod non esset verum si substantia panis ibi remaneret, nunquam enim substantia panis est corpus Christi. Sed potius esset dicendum, hic est corpus meum. Tertio, quia contrariaretur venerationi huius sacramenti, si aliqua substantia esset ibi quae non posset adorari adoratione latriae. Quarto, quia contrariaretur ritui Ecclesiae, secundum quem post corporalem cibum non licet sumere corpus Christi, cum tamen post unam hostiam consecratam liceat sumere aliam. Unde haec positio vitanda est tanquam haeretica.	I answer that, Some have held that the substance of the bread and wine remains in this sacrament after the consecration. But this opinion cannot stand: first of all, because by such an opinion the truth of this sacrament is destroyed, to which it belongs that Christ's true body exists in this sacrament; which indeed was not there before the consecration. Now a thing cannot be in any place, where it was not previously, except by change of place, or by the conversion of another thing into itself; just as fire begins anew to be in some house, either because it is carried thither, or because it is generated there. Now it is evident that Christ's body does not begin to be present in this sacrament by local motion. First of all, because it would follow that it would cease to be in heaven: for what is moved locally does not come anew to some place unless it quit the former one. Secondly, because every body moved locally passes through all intermediary spaces, which cannot be said here. Thirdly, because it is not possible for one movement of the same body moved locally to be terminated in different places at the one time, whereas the body of Christ under this sacrament begins at the one time to be in several places. And consequently it remains that Christ's body cannot begin to be anew in this sacrament except by change of the substance of bread into itself. But what is changed into another thing, no longer remains after such change. Hence the conclusion is that, saving the truth of this sacrament, the substance of the bread cannot remain after the consecration. Secondly, because this position is contrary to the form of this sacrament, in which it is said: "This is My body," which would not be true if the substance of the bread were to remain there; for the substance of bread never is the body of Christ. Rather should one say in that case: "Here is My body." Thirdly, because it would be opposed to the veneration of this sacrament, if any substance were there, which could not be adored with adoration of latria. Fourthly, because it is contrary to the rite of the Church, according to which it is not lawful to take the body of Christ after bodily food, while it is nevertheless lawful to take one consecrated host after another. Hence this opinion is to be avoided as heretical.
IIIª q. 75 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus coniugavit divinitatem suam, idest divinam virtutem, pani et vino, non ut remaneant in hoc sacramento, sed ut faciat inde corpus et sanguinem suum.	Reply to Objection 1. God "wedded His Godhead," i.e. His Divine power, to the bread and wine, not that these may remain in this sacrament, but in order that He may make from them His body and blood.
IIIª q. 75 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in aliis sacramentis non est ipse Christus realiter, sicut in hoc sacramento. Et ideo in sacramentis aliis manet substantia materiae, non autem in isto.	Reply to Objection 2. Christ is not really present in the other sacraments, as in this; and therefore the substance of the matter remains in the other sacraments, but not in this.
IIIª q. 75 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod species quae remanent in hoc sacramento, ut infra dicetur, sufficiunt ad significationem huius sacramenti, nam per accidentia cognoscitur ratio substantiae.	Reply to Objection 3. The species which remain in this sacrament, as shall be said later (5), suffice for its signification; because the nature of the substance is known by its accidents.
IIIª q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod substantia panis, post consecrationem huius sacramenti, annihiletur, aut in pristinam materiam resolvatur. Quod enim est aliquid corporale, oportet alicubi esse. Sed substantia panis, quae est quiddam corporale, non manet in hoc sacramento, ut dictum est, nec etiam est dare aliquem locum ubi sit. Ergo non est aliquid post consecrationem. Igitur aut est annihilata, aut in praeiacentem materiam resoluta.	Objection 1. It seems that the substance of the bread is annihilated after the consecration of this sacrament, or dissolved into its original matter. For whatever is corporeal must be somewhere. But the substance of bread, which is something corporeal, does not remain, in this sacrament, as stated above (Article 2); nor can we assign any place where it may be. Consequently it is nothing after the consecration. Therefore, it is either annihilated, or dissolved into its original matter.
IIIª q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod est terminus a quo in qualibet mutatione, non remanet, nisi forte in potentia materiae, sicut, quando ex aere fit ignis, forma aeris non manet nisi in potentia materiae; et similiter quando ex albo fit nigrum. Sed in hoc sacramento substantia panis et vini se habet sicut terminus a quo corpus autem vel sanguis Christi sicut terminus ad quem, dicit enim Ambrosius, in libro de officiis, ante benedictionem alia species nominatur, post benedictionem corpus significatur. Ergo, facta consecratione, substantia panis vel vini non manet, nisi forte resoluta in suam materiam.	Objection 2. Further, what is the term "wherefrom" in every change exists no longer, except in the potentiality of matter; e.g. when air is changed into fire, the form of the air remains only in the potentiality of matter; and in like fashion when what is white becomes black. But in this sacrament the substance of the bread or of the wine is the term "wherefrom," while the body or the blood of Christ is the term "whereunto": for Ambrose says in De Officiis (De Myster. ix): "Before the blessing it is called another species, after the blessing the body of Christ is signified." Therefore, when the consecration takes place, the substance of the bread or wine no longer remains, unless perchance dissolved into its (original) matter.
IIIª q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, oportet alterum contradictoriorum esse verum. Sed haec est falsa, facta consecratione, substantia panis vel vini est aliquid. Ergo haec est vera, substantia panis vel vini est nihil.	Objection 3. Further, one of two contradictories must be true. But this proposition is false: "After the consecration the substance of the bread or wine is something." Consequently, this is true: "The substance of the bread or wine is nothing."
IIIª q. 75 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaestionum, Deus non est causa tendendi in non esse. Sed hoc sacramentum divina virtute perficitur. Ergo in hoc sacramento non annihilatur substantia panis aut vini.	On the contrary, Augustine says (83): "God is not the cause of tending to nothing." But this sacrament is wrought by Divine power. Therefore, in this sacrament the substance of the bread or wine is not annihilated.
IIIª q. 75 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, quia substantia panis vel vini non manet in hoc sacramento, quidam, impossibile reputantes quod substantia panis vel vini in corpus vel sanguinem Christi convertatur, posuerunt quod per consecrationem substantia panis vel vini vel resolvitur in praeiacentem materiam, vel quod annihiletur. Praeiacens autem materia in quam corpora mixta resolvi possunt, sunt quatuor elementa, non enim potest fieri resolutio in materiam primam, ita quod sine forma existat, quia materia sine forma esse non potest. Cum autem post consecrationem nihil sub speciebus sacramenti remaneat nisi corpus et sanguis, oportebit dicere quod elementa in quae resoluta est substantia panis et vini, inde discedant per motum localem. Quod sensu perciperetur. Similiter etiam substantia panis vel vini manet usque ad ultimum instans consecrationis. In ultimo autem instanti consecrationis iam est ibi substantia vel corporis vel sanguinis Christi, sicut in ultimo instanti generationis iam inest forma. Unde non erit dare aliquod instans in quo sit ibi praeiacens materia. Non enim potest dici quod paulatim substantia panis vel vini resolvatur in praeiacentem materiam, vel successive egrediatur de loco specierum. Quia, si hoc inciperet fieri in ultimo instanti suae consecrationis, simul sub aliqua parte hostiae esset corpus Christi cum substantia panis, quod est contra praedicta. Si vero incipiat fieri ante consecrationem, erit dare aliquod tempus in quo sub aliqua parte hostiae neque erit substantia panis, neque erit corpus Christi, quod est inconveniens. Et hoc ipsimet perpendisse videntur. Unde posuerunt aliud sub disiunctione, scilicet quod annihiletur. Sed nec hoc potest esse. Quia non erit dare aliquem modum quo corpus Christi verum incipiat esse in hoc sacramento, nisi per conversionem substantiae panis in ipsum, quae quidem conversio tollitur, posita vel annihilatione panis, vel resolutione in praeiacentem materiam. Similiter etiam non est dare unde talis resolutio vel annihilatio in hoc sacramento causetur, cum effectus sacramenti significetur per formam; neutrum autem horum significatur per haec verba formae, hoc est corpus meum. Unde patet praedictam positionem esse falsam.	I answer that, Because the substance of the bread and wine does not remain in this sacrament, some, deeming that it is impossible for the substance of the bread and wine to be changed into Christ's flesh and blood, have maintained that by the consecration, the substance of the bread and wine is either dissolved into the original matter, or that it is annihilated. Now the original matter into which mixed bodies can be dissolved is the four elements. For dissolution cannot be made into primary matter, so that a subject can exist without a form, since matter cannot exist without a form. But since after the consecration nothing remains under the sacramental species except the body and the blood of Christ, it will be necessary to say that the elements into which the substance of the bread and wine is dissolved, depart from thence by local motion, which would be perceived by the senses. In like manner also the substance of the bread or wine remains until the last instant of the consecration; but in the last instant of the consecration there is already present there the substance of the body or blood of Christ, just as the form is already present in the last instant of generation. Hence no instant can be assigned in which the original matter can be there. For it cannot be said that the substance of the bread or wine is dissolved gradually into the original matter, or that it successively quits the species, for if this began to be done in the last instant of its consecration, then at the one time under part of the host there would be the body of Christ together with the substance of bread, which is contrary to what has been said above (Article 2). But if this begin to come to pass before the consecration, there will then be a time in which under one part of the host there will be neither the substance of bread nor the body of Christ, which is not fitting. They seem indeed to have taken this into careful consideration, wherefore they formulated their proposition with an alternative viz. that (the substance) may be annihilated. But even this cannot stand, because no way can be assigned whereby Christ's true body can begin to be in this sacrament, except by the change of the substance of bread into it, which change is excluded the moment we admit either annihilation of the substance of the bread, or dissolution into the original matter. Likewise no cause can be assigned for such dissolution or annihilation, since the effect of the sacrament is signified by the form: "This is My body." Hence it is clear that the aforesaid opinion is false.
IIIª q. 75 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantia panis vel vini, facta consecratione, neque sub speciebus sacramenti manet, neque alibi. Non tamen sequitur quod annihiletur, convertitur enim in corpus Christi. Sicut non sequitur, si aer ex quo generatus est ignis, non sit ibi vel alibi, quod sit annihilatus.	Reply to Objection 1. The substance of the bread or wine, after the consecration, remains neither under the sacramental species, nor elsewhere; yet it does not follow that it is annihilated; for it is changed into the body of Christ; just as if the air, from which fire is generated, be not there or elsewhere, it does not follow that it is annihilated.
IIIª q. 75 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod forma quae est terminus a quo, non convertitur in aliam formam, sed una forma succedit alteri in subiecto, et ideo prima forma non remanet nisi in potentia materiae. Sed hic substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi, ut supra dictum est. Unde ratio non sequitur.	Reply to Objection 2. The form, which is the term "wherefrom," is not changed into another form; but one form succeeds another in the subject; and therefore the first form remains only in the potentiality of matter. But here the substance of the bread is changed into the body of Christ, as stated above. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
IIIª q. 75 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet post consecrationem haec sit falsa substantia panis est aliquid; id tamen in quod substantia panis conversa est, est aliquid. Et ideo substantia panis non est annihilata.	Reply to Objection 3. Although after the consecration this proposition is false: "The substance of the breed is something," still that into which the substance of the bread is changed, is something, and consequently the substance of the bread is not annihilated.
IIIª q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod panis non possit converti in corpus Christi. Conversio enim quaedam mutatio est. Sed in omni mutatione oportet esse aliquod subiectum, quod prius est in potentia et postea est in actu, ut enim dicitur in III Physic., motus est actus existentis in potentia. Non est autem dare aliquod subiectum substantiae panis et corporis Christi, quia de ratione substantiae est quod non sit in subiecto, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Non ergo potest esse quod tota substantia panis convertatur in corpus Christi.	Objection 1. It seems that bread cannot be converted into the body of Christ. For conversion is a kind of change. But in every change there must be some subject, which from being previously in potentiality is now in act. because as is said in Phys. iii: "motion is the act of a thing existing in potentiality." But no subject can be assigned for the substance of the bread and of the body of Christ, because it is of the very nature of substance for it "not to be in a subject," as it is said in Praedic. iii. Therefore it is not possible for the whole substance of the bread to be converted into the body of Christ.
IIIª q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, forma illius in quod aliquid convertitur, de novo incipit esse in materia eius quod in ipsum convertitur, sicut, cum aer convertitur in ignem prius non existentem, forma ignis incipit de novo esse in materia aeris; et similiter, cum cibus convertitur in hominem prius non existentem, forma hominis incipit esse de novo in materia cibi. Si ergo panis convertitur in corpus Christi, necesse est quod forma corporis Christi de novo incipiat esse in materia panis, quod est falsum. Non ergo panis convertitur in substantiam corporis Christi.	Objection 2. Further, the form of the thing into which another is converted, begins anew to inhere in the matter of the thing converted into it: as when air is changed into fire not already existing, the form of fire begins anew to be in the matter of the air; and in like manner when food is converted into non-pre-existing man, the form of the man begins to be anew in the matter of the food. Therefore, if bread be changed into the body of Christ, the form of Christ's body must necessarily begin to be in the matter of the bread, which is false. Consequently, the bread is not changed into the substance of Christ's body.
IIIª q. 75 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, quae sunt secundum se divisa, nunquam unum eorum fit alterum, sicut albedo nunquam fit nigredo, sed subiectum albedinis fit subiectum nigredinis, ut dicitur in I Physic. Sed, sicut duae formae contrariae sunt secundum se divisae, utpote principia formalis differentiae existentes; ita duae materiae signatae sunt secundum se divisae, utpote existentes principium materialis divisionis. Ergo non potest esse quod haec materia panis fiat haec materia qua individuatur corpus Christi. Et ita non potest esse quod substantia huius panis convertatur in substantiam corporis Christi.	Objection 3. Further, when two things are diverse, one never becomes the other, as whiteness never becomes blackness, as is stated in Phys. i. But since two contrary forms are of themselves diverse, as being the principles of formal difference, so two signate matters are of themselves diverse, as being the principles of material distinction. Consequently, it is not possible for this matter of bread to become this matter whereby Christ's body is individuated, and so it is not possible for this substance of bread to be changed into the substance of Christ's body.
IIIª q. 75 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Eusebius Emesenus dicit, novum tibi et impossibile esse non debet quod in Christi substantiam terrena et mortalia convertuntur.	On the contrary, Eusebius Emesenus says: "To thee it ought neither to be a novelty nor an impossibility that earthly and mortal things be changed into the substance of Christ."
IIIª q. 75 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum in hoc sacramento sit verum corpus Christi, nec incipiat ibi esse de novo per motum localem; cum etiam nec corpus Christi sit ibi sicut in loco, ut ex dictis patet, necesse est dicere quod ibi incipiat esse per conversionem substantiae panis in ipsum. Haec tamen conversio non est similis conversionibus naturalibus, sed est omnino supernaturalis, sola Dei virtute effecta. Unde Ambrosius dicit, in libro de sacramentis, liquet quod praeter naturae ordinem virgo generavit. Et hoc quod conficimus, corpus ex virgine est. Quid igitur quaeris naturae ordinem in Christi corpore, cum praeter naturam sit ipse dominus Iesus partus ex virgine? Et super illud Ioan. VI, verba quae ego locutus sum vobis, scilicet de hoc sacramento, spiritus et vita sunt, dicit Chrysostomus, idest, spiritualia sunt, nihil habentia carnale neque consequentiam naturalem, sed eruta sunt ab omni tali necessitate quae in terra, et a legibus quae hic positae sunt. Manifestum est enim quod omne agens agit inquantum est actu. Quodlibet autem agens creatum est determinatum in suo actu, cum sit determinati generis et speciei. Et ideo cuiuslibet agentis creati actio fertur super aliquem determinatum actum. Determinatio autem cuiuslibet rei in esse actuali est per eius formam. Unde nullum agens naturale vel creatum potest agere nisi ad immutationem formae. Et propter hoc omnis conversio quae fit secundum leges naturae, est formalis. Sed Deus est infinitus actus, ut in prima parte habitum est. Unde eius actio se extendit ad totam naturam entis. Non igitur solum potest perficere conversionem formalem, ut scilicet diversae formae sibi in eodem subiecto succedant, sed conversionem totius entis, ut scilicet tota substantia huius convertatur in totam substantiam illius. Et hoc agitur divina virtute in hoc sacramento. Nam tota substantia panis convertitur in totam substantiam corporis Christi, et tota substantia vini in totam substantiam sanguinis Christi. Unde haec conversio non est formalis, sed substantialis. Nec continetur inter species motus naturalis, sed proprio nomine potest dici transubstantiatio.	I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), since Christ's true body is in this sacrament, and since it does not begin to be there by local motion, nor is it contained therein as in a place, as is evident from what was stated above (1, ad 2), it must be said then that it begins to be there by conversion of the substance of bread into itself. Yet this change is not like natural changes, but is entirely supernatural, and effected by God's power alone. Hence Ambrose says [(De Sacram. iv): "See how Christ's word changes nature's laws, as He wills: a man is not wont to be born save of man and woman: see therefore that against the established law and order a man is born of a Virgin": and] [The passage in the brackets is not in the Leonine edition] (De Myster. iv): "It is clear that a Virgin begot beyond the order of nature: and what we make is the body from the Virgin. Why, then, do you look for nature's order in Christ's body, since the Lord Jesus was Himself brought forth of a Virgin beyond nature?" Chrysostom likewise (Hom. xlvii), commenting on John 6:64: "The words which I have spoken to you," namely, of this sacrament, "are spirit and life," says: i.e. "spiritual, having nothing carnal, nor natural consequence; but they are rent from all such necessity which exists upon earth, and from the laws here established." For it is evident that every agent acts according as it is in act. But every created agent is limited in its act, as being of a determinate genus and species: and consequently the action of every created agent bears upon some determinate act. Now the determination of every thing in actual existence comes from its form. Consequently, no natural or created agent can act except by changing the form in something; and on this account every change made according to nature's laws is a formal change. But God is infinite act, as stated in I, 7, 1; 26, 2; hence His action extends to the whole nature of being. Therefore He can work not only formal conversion, so that diverse forms succeed each other in the same subject; but also the change of all being, so that, to wit, the whole substance of one thing be changed into the whole substance of another. And this is done by Divine power in this sacrament; for the whole substance of the bread is changed into the whole substance of Christ's body, and the whole substance of the wine into the whole substance of Christ's blood. Hence this is not a formal, but a substantial conversion; nor is it a kind of natural movement: but, with a name of its own, it can be called "transubstantiation."
IIIª q. 75 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de mutatione formali, quia formae proprium est in materia vel subiecto esse. Non autem habet locum in conversione totius substantiae. Unde, cum haec conversio substantialis importet quendam ordinem substantiarum quarum una convertitur in alteram, est sicut in subiecto in utraque substantia, sicut ordo et numerus.	Reply to Objection 1. This objection holds good in respect of formal change, because it belongs to a form to be in matter or in a subject; but it does not hold good in respect of the change of the entire substance. Hence, since this substantial change implies a certain order of substances, one of which is changed into the other, it is in both substances as in a subject, just as order and number.
IIIª q. 75 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam illa obiectio procedit de conversione formali, seu mutatione, quia oportet, sicut dictum est, formam esse in materia vel subiecto. Non autem habet locum in conversione totius substantiae, cuius non est accipere aliquod subiectum.	Reply to Objection 2. This argument also is true of formal conversion or change, because, as stated above (ad 1), a form must be in some matter or subject. But this is not so in a change of the entire substance; for in this case no subject is possible.
IIIª q. 75 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod virtute agentis finiti non potest forma in formam mutari, nec materia in materiam. Sed virtute agentis infiniti, quod habet actionem in totum ens, potest talis conversio fieri, quia utrique formae et utrique materiae est communis natura entis; et id quod entitatis est in una, potest auctor entis convertere ad id quod est entitatis in altera, sublato eo per quod ab illa distinguebatur.	Reply to Objection 3. Form cannot be changed into form, nor matter into matter by the power of any finite agent. Such a change, however, can be made by the power of an infinite agent, which has control over all being, because the nature of being is common to both forms and to both matters; and whatever there is of being in the one, the author of being can change into whatever there is of being in the other, withdrawing that whereby it was distinguished from the other.
IIIª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in hoc sacramento non remaneant accidentia panis et vini. Remoto enim priori, removetur posterius. Sed substantia est naturaliter prior accidente, ut probatur VII Metaphys. Cum ergo, facta consecratione, non remaneat substantia panis in hoc sacramento, videtur quod non possint remanere accidentia eius.	Objection 1. It seems that the accidents of the bread and wine do not remain in this sacrament. For when that which comes first is removed, that which follows is also taken away. But substance is naturally before accident, as is proved in Metaph. vii. Since, then, after consecration, the substance of the bread does not remain in this sacrament, it seems that its accidents cannot remain.
IIIª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, in sacramento veritatis non debet esse aliqua deceptio. Sed per accidentia iudicamus de substantia. Videtur ergo quod decipiatur humanum iudicium, si, remanentibus accidentibus, substantia panis non remaneat. Non ergo hoc est conveniens huic sacramento.	Objection 2. Further, there ought not to be any deception in a sacrament of truth. But we judge of substance by accidents. It seems, then, that human judgment is deceived, if, while the accidents remain, the substance of the bread does not. Consequently this is unbecoming to this sacrament.
IIIª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, quamvis fides non sit subiecta rationi, non tamen est contra rationem, sed supra ipsam, ut in principio huius operis dictum est. Sed ratio nostra habet ortum a sensu. Ergo fides nostra non debet esse contra sensum, dum sensus noster iudicat esse panem, et fides nostra credit esse substantiam corporis Christi. Non ergo hoc est conveniens huic sacramento, quod accidentia panis subiecta sensibus maneant, et substantia panis non maneat.	Objection 3. Further, although our faith is not subject to reason, still it is not contrary to reason, but above it, as was said in the beginning of this work (I, 1, 6, ad 2; 8). But our reason has its origin in the senses. Therefore our faith ought not to be contrary to the senses, as it is when sense judges that to be bread which faith believes to be the substance of Christ's body. Therefore it is not befitting this sacrament for the accidents of bread to remain subject to the senses, and for the substance of bread not to remain.
IIIª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, illud quod manet, conversione facta, videtur esse subiectum mutationis. Si ergo accidentia panis manent conversione facta, videtur quod ipsa accidentia sint conversionis subiectum. Quod est impossibile, nam accidentis non est accidens. Non ergo in hoc sacramento debent remanere accidentia panis et vini.	Objection 4. Further, what remains after the change has taken place seems to be the subject of change. If therefore the accidents of the bread remain after the change has been effected, it seems that the accidents are the subject of the change. But this is impossible; for "an accident cannot have an accident" (Metaph. iii). Therefore the accidents of the bread and wine ought not to remain in this sacrament.
IIIª q. 75 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro sententiarum prosperi, nos in specie panis et vini, quam videmus, res invisibiles, idest carnem et sanguinem, honoramus.	On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Sentences of Prosper (Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xiii): "Under the species which we behold, of bread and wine, we honor invisible things, i.e. flesh and blood."
IIIª q. 75 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod sensu apparet, facta consecratione, omnia accidentia panis et vini remanere. Quod quidem rationabiliter per divinam providentiam fit. Primo quidem, quia non est consuetum hominibus, sed horribile, carnem hominis comedere et sanguinem bibere, proponitur nobis caro et sanguis Christi sumenda sub speciebus illorum quae frequentius in usum hominis veniunt, scilicet panis et vini. Secundo, ne hoc sacramentum ab infidelibus irrideretur, si sub specie propria dominum nostrum manducemus. Tertio ut, dum invisibiliter corpus et sanguinem domini nostri sumimus, hoc proficiat ad meritum fidei.	I answer that, It is evident to sense that all the accidents of the bread and wine remain after the consecration. And this is reasonably done by Divine providence. First of all, because it is not customary, but horrible, for men to eat human flesh, and to drink blood. And therefore Christ's flesh and blood are set before us to be partaken of under the species of those things which are the more commonly used by men, namely, bread and wine. Secondly, lest this sacrament might be derided by unbelievers, if we were to eat our Lord under His own species. Thirdly, that while we receive our Lord's body and blood invisibly, this may redound to the merit of faith.
IIIª q. 75 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in libro de causis, effectus plus dependet a causa prima quam a causa secunda. Et ideo virtute Dei, qui est causa prima omnium, fieri potest ut remaneant posteriora, sublatis prioribus.	Reply to Objection 1. As is said in the book De Causis, an effect depends more on the first cause than on the second. And therefore by God's power, which is the first cause of all things, it is possible for that which follows to remain, while that which is first is taken away.
IIIª q. 75 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in hoc sacramento nulla est deceptio, sunt enim secundum rei veritatem accidentia, quae sensibus diiudicantur. Intellectus autem, cuius est proprium obiectum substantia, ut dicitur in III de anima, per fidem a deceptione praeservatur.	Reply to Objection 2. There is no deception in this sacrament; for the accidents which are discerned by the senses are truly present. But the intellect, whose proper object is substance as is said in De Anima iii, is preserved by faith from deception.
IIIª q. 75 a. 5 ad 3 Et sic patet responsio ad tertium. Nam fides non est contra sensum, sed est de eo ad quod sensus non attingit.	And this serves as answer to the third argument; because faith is not contrary to the senses, but concerns things to which sense does not reach.
IIIª q. 75 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod haec conversio non proprie habet subiectum, ut dictum est. Sed tamen accidentia, quae remanent, habent aliquam similitudinem subiecti.	Reply to Objection 4. This change has not properly a subject, as was stated above (4, ad 1); nevertheless the accidents which remain have some resemblance of a subject.
IIIª q. 75 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod, facta consecratione, remaneat in hoc sacramento forma substantialis panis. Dictum est enim quod, facta consecratione, remaneant accidentia. Sed, cum panis sit quiddam artificiale, etiam forma eius est accidens. Ergo remanet, facta consecratione.	Objection 1. It seems that the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament after the consecration. For it has been said (5) that the accidents remain after the consecration. But since bread is an artificial thing, its form is an accident. Therefore it remains after the consecration.
IIIª q. 75 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, forma corporis Christi est anima, dicitur enim in II de anima, quod anima est actus corporis physici potentia vitam habentis. Sed non potest dici quod forma substantialis panis convertatur in animam. Ergo videtur quod remaneat, facta consecratione.	Objection 2. Further, the form of Christ's body is His soul: for it is said in De Anima ii, that the soul "is the act of a physical body which has life in potentiality". But it cannot be said that the substantial form of the bread is changed into the soul. Therefore it appears that it remains after the consecration.
IIIª q. 75 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, propria operatio rei sequitur formam substantialem eius. Sed illud quod remanet in hoc sacramento, nutrit, et omnem operationem facit quam faceret panis existens. Ergo forma substantialis panis remanet in hoc sacramento, facta consecratione.	Objection 3. Further, the proper operation of a things follows its substantial form. But what remains in this sacrament, nourishes, and performs every operation which bread would do were it present. Therefore the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament after the consecration.
IIIª q. 75 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra, forma substantialis panis est de substantia panis. Sed substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi, sicut dictum est. Ergo forma substantialis panis non manet.	On the contrary, The substantial form of bread is of the substance of bread. But the substance of the bread is changed into the body of Christ, as stated above (2,3,4). Therefore the substantial form of the bread does not remain.
IIIª q. 75 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod, facta consecratione, non solum remanent accidentia panis, sed etiam forma substantialis eius. Sed hoc esse non potest. Primo quidem quia, si forma substantialis remaneret, nihil de pane converteretur in corpus Christi nisi sola materia. Et ita sequeretur quod non converteretur in corpus Christi totum, sed in eius materiam. Quod repugnat formae sacramenti, qua dicitur, hoc est corpus meum. Secundo quia, si forma substantialis panis remaneret, aut remaneret in materia, aut a materia separata. Primum autem esse non potest. Quia, si remaneret in materia panis, tunc tota substantia panis remaneret, quod est contra praedicta. In alia autem materia remanere non posset, quia propria forma non est nisi in propria materia. Si autem remaneret a materia separata, iam esset forma intelligibilis actu, et etiam intellectus, nam omnes formae a materia separatae sunt tales. Tertio, esset inconveniens huic sacramento. Nam accidentia panis in hoc sacramento remanent ut sub eis videatur corpus Christi, non autem sub propria specie, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo dicendum est quod forma substantialis panis non manet.	I answer that, Some have contended that after the consecration not only do the accidents of the bread remain, but also its substantial form. But this cannot be. First of all, because if the substantial form of the bread were to remain, nothing of the bread would be changed into the body of Christ, excepting the matter; and so it would follow that it would be changed, not into the whole body of Christ, but into its matter, which is repugnant to the form of the sacrament, wherein it is said: "This is My body." Secondly, because if the substantial form of the bread were to remain, it would remain either in matter, or separated from matter. The first cannot be, for if it were to remain in the matter of the bread, then the whole substance of the bread would remain, which is against what was said above (Article 2). Nor could it remain in any other matter, because the proper form exists only in its proper matter. But if it were to remain separate from matter, it would then be an actually intelligible form, and also an intelligence; for all forms separated from matter are such. Thirdly, it would be unbefitting this sacrament: because the accidents of the bread remain in this sacrament, in order that the body of Christ may be seen under them, and not under its proper species, as stated above (Article 5). And therefore it must be said that the substantial form of the bread does not remain.
IIIª q. 75 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet arte fieri aliquid cuius forma non est accidens, sed forma substantialis, sicut arte possunt produci ranae et serpentes. Talem enim formam non producit ars virtute propria, sed virtute naturalium principiorum. Et hoc modo producit formam substantialem panis, virtute ignis decoquentis materiam ex farina et aqua confectam.	Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing to prevent art from making a thing whose form is not an accident, but a substantial form; as frogs and serpents can be produced by art: for art produces such forms not by its own power, but by the power of natural energies. And in this way it produces the substantial forms of bread, by the power of fire baking the matter made up of flour and water.
IIIª q. 75 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod anima est forma corporis dans ei totum ordinem esse perfecti, scilicet esse, et esse corporeum, et esse animatum, et sic de aliis. Convertitur igitur forma panis in formam corporis Christi secundum quod dat esse corporeum, non autem secundum quod dat esse animatum tali anima.	Reply to Objection 2. The soul is the form of the body, giving it the whole order of perfect being, i.e. being, corporeal being, and animated being, and so on. Therefore the form of the bread is changed into the form of Christ's body, according as the latter gives corporeal being, but not according as it bestows animated being.
IIIª q. 75 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod operationum panis quaedam consequuntur ipsum ratione accidentium, sicut immutare sensum. Et tales operationes inveniuntur in speciebus panis post consecrationem, propter ipsa accidentia, quae remanent. Quaedam autem operationes consequuntur panem vel ratione materiae, sicut quod convertitur in aliquid; vel ratione formae substantialis, sicut est operatio consequens speciem eius, puta quod confirmat cor hominis. Et tales operationes inveniuntur in hoc sacramento, non propter formam vel materiam quae remaneat, sed quia miraculose conferuntur ipsis accidentibus, ut infra dicetur.	Reply to Objection 3. Some of the operations of bread follow it by reason of the accidents, such as to affect the senses, and such operations are found in the species of the bread after the consecration on account of the accidents which remain. But some other operations follow the bread either by reason of the matter, such as that it is changed into something else, or else by reason of the substantial form, such as an operation consequent upon its species, for instance, that it "strengthens man's heart" (Psalm 103:15); and such operations are found in this sacrament, not on account of the form or matter remaining, but because they are bestowed miraculously upon the accidents themselves, as will be said later (77, 3, ad 2,3; 5,6).
IIIª q. 75 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ista conversio non fiat in instanti, sed fiat successive. In hac enim conversione prius est substantia panis, et postea substantia corporis Christi. Non ergo utrumque est in eodem instanti, sed in duobus instantibus. Sed inter quaelibet duo instantia est tempus medium. Ergo oportet quod haec conversio fiat secundum successionem temporis quod est inter ultimum instans quo est ibi panis, et primum instans quo est ibi corpus Christi.	Objection 1. It seems that this change is not wrought instantaneously, but successively. For in this change there is first the substance of bread, and afterwards the substance of Christ's body. Neither, then, is in the same instant, but in two instants. But there is a mid-time between every two instants. Therefore this change must take place according to the succession of time, which is between the last instant in which the bread is there, and the first instant in which the body of Christ is present.
IIIª q. 75 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, in omni conversione est fieri et factum esse. Sed haec duo non sunt simul, quia quod fit, non est; quod autem factum est, iam est. Ergo in hac conversione est prius et posterius. Et ita oportet quod non sit instantanea, sed successiva.	Objection 2. Further, in every change something is "in becoming" and something is "in being." But these two things do not exist at the one time for, what is "in becoming," is not yet, whereas what is "in being," already is. Consequently, there is a before and an after in such change: and so necessarily the change cannot be instantaneous, but successive.
IIIª q. 75 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, in libro de Sacram., quod istud sacramentum Christi sermone conficitur. Sed sermo Christi successive profertur. Ergo haec conversio fit successive.	Objection 3. Further, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv) that this sacrament "is made by the words of Christ." But Christ's words are pronounced successively. Therefore the change takes place successively.
IIIª q. 75 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod haec conversio perficitur virtute infinita, cuius est subito operari.	On the contrary, This change is effected by a power which is infinite, to which it belongs to operate in an instant.
IIIª q. 75 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliqua mutatio est instantanea triplici ratione. Uno quidem modo, ex parte formae, quae est terminus mutationis. Si enim sit aliqua forma quae recipiat magis aut minus, successive acquiritur subiecto, sicut sanitas. Et ideo, quia forma substantialis non recipit magis et minus, inde est quod subito fit eius introductio in materia. Alio modo, ex parte subiecti, quod quandoque successive praeparatur ad susceptionem formae, et ideo aqua successive calefit. Quando vero ipsum subiectum est in ultima dispositione ad formam, subito recipit ipsam, sicut diaphanum subito illuminatur. Tertio, ex parte agentis, quod est infinitae virtutis, unde statim potest materiam ad formam disponere. Sicut dicitur Marc. VII, quod, cum Christus dixisset, ephphetha, quod est adaperire, statim apertae sunt aures hominis, et solutum est vinculum linguae eius. Et his tribus rationibus haec conversio est instantanea. Primo quidem, quia substantia corporis Christi, ad quam terminatur ista conversio, non suscipit magis neque minus. Secundo, quia in hac conversione non est aliquod subiectum, quod successive praeparetur. Tertio, quia agitur Dei virtute infinita.	I answer that, A change may be instantaneous from a threefold reason. First on the part of the form, which is the terminus of the change. For, if it be a form that receives more and less, it is acquired by its subject successively, such as health; and therefore because a substantial form does not receive more and less, it follows that its introduction into matter is instantaneous. Secondly on the part of the subject, which sometimes is prepared successively for receiving the form; thus water is heated successively. When, however, the subject itself is in the ultimate disposition for receiving the form, it receives it suddenly, as a transparent body is illuminated suddenly. Thirdly on the part of the agent, which possesses infinite power: wherefore it can instantly dispose the matter for the form. Thus it is written (Mark 7:34) that when Christ had said, "'Ephpheta,' which is 'Be thou opened,' immediately his ears were opened, and the string of his tongue was loosed." For these three reasons this conversion is instantaneous. First, because the substance of Christ's body which is the term of this conversion, does not receive more or less. Secondly, because in this conversion there is no subject to be disposed successively. Thirdly, because it is effected by God's infinite power.
IIIª q. 75 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quidam non simpliciter concedunt quod inter quaelibet duo instantia sit tempus medium. Dicunt enim quod hoc habet locum in duobus instantibus quae referuntur ad eundem motum, non autem in duobus instantibus quae referuntur ad diversa. Unde inter instans quod mensurat finem quietis, et aliud instans quod mensurat principium motus, non est tempus medium. Sed in hoc decipiuntur. Quia unitas temporis et instantis, vel etiam pluralitas eorum, non accipitur secundum quoscumque motus, sed secundum primum motum caeli, qui est mensura omnis motus et quietis. Et ideo alii hoc concedunt in tempore quod mensurat motum dependentem ex motu caeli. Sunt autem quidam motus ex motu caeli non dependentes, nec ab eo mensurati, sicut in prima parte dictum est de motibus Angelorum. Unde inter duo instantia illis motibus respondentia, non est tempus medium. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito. Quia, quamvis ista conversio secundum se non habeat ordinem ad motum caeli, consequitur tamen prolationem verborum, quam necesse est motu caeli mensurari. Et ideo necesse est inter quaelibet duo instantia circa istam conversionem signata esse tempus medium. Quidam ergo dicunt quod instans in quo ultimo est panis, et instans in quo primo est corpus Christi, sunt quidem duo per comparationem ad mensurata, sed sunt unum per comparationem ad tempus mensurans, sicut, cum duae lineae se contingunt, sunt duo puncta ex parte duarum linearum, unum autem punctum ex parte loci continentis. Sed hoc non est simile. Quia instans et tempus particularibus motibus non est mensura intrinseca, sicut linea et punctus corporibus, sed solum extrinseca, sicut corporibus locus. Unde alii dicunt quod est idem instans re, sed aliud ratione. Sed secundum hoc sequeretur quod realiter opposita essent simul. Nam diversitas rationis non variat aliquid ex parte rei. Et ideo dicendum est quod haec conversio, sicut dictum est, perficitur per verba Christi, quae a sacerdote proferuntur, ita quod ultimum instans prolationis verborum est primum instans in quo est in sacramento corpus Christi, in toto autem tempore praecedente est ibi substantia panis. Cuius temporis non est accipere aliquod instans proximo praecedens ultimum, quia tempus non componitur ex instantibus consequenter se habentibus, ut probatur in VI Physic. Et ideo est quidem dare instans in quo est corpus Christi, non est autem dare ultimum instans in quo sit substantia panis, sed est dare ultimum tempus. Et idem est in mutationibus naturalibus, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII physicorum.	Reply to Objection 1. Some [Cf. Albert the Great, Sent. iv, D, 11; St. Bonaventure, Sent., iv, D, 11] do not grant simply that there is a mid-time between every two instants. For they say that this is true of two instants referring to the same movement, but not if they refer to different things. Hence between the instant that marks the close of rest, and another which marks the beginning of movement, there is no mid-time. But in this they are mistaken, because the unity of time and of instant, or even their plurality, is not taken according to movements of any sort, but according to the first movement of the heavens, which is the measure of all movement and rest. Accordingly others grant this of the time which measures movement depending on the movement of the heavens. But there are some movements which are not dependent on the movement of the heavens, nor measured by it, as was said in I, 53, 3 concerning the movements of the angels. Hence between two instants responding to those movements there is no mid-time. But this is not to the point, because although the change in question has no relation of itself to the movement of the heavens, still it follows the pronouncing of the words, which (pronouncing) must necessarily be measured by the movement of the heavens. And therefore there must of necessity be a mid-time between every two signate instants in connection with that change. Some say therefore that the instant in which the bread was last, and the instant in which the body of Christ is first, are indeed two in comparison with the things measured, but are one comparatively to the time measuring; as when two lines touch, there are two points on the part of the two lines, but one point on the part of the place containing them. But here there is no likeness, because instant and time is not the intrinsic measure of particular movements, as a line and point are of a body, but only the extrinsic measure, as place is to bodies. Hence others say that it is the same instant in fact, but another according to reason. But according to this it would follow that things really opposite would exist together; for diversity of reason does not change a thing objectively. And therefore it must be said that this change, as stated above, is wrought by Christ's words which are spoken by the priest, so that the last instant of pronouncing the words is the first instant in which Christ's body is in the sacrament; and that the substance of the bread is there during the whole preceding time. Of this time no instant is to be taken as proximately preceding the last one, because time is not made up of successive instants, as is proved in Phys. vi. And therefore a first instant can be assigned in which Christ's body is present; but a last instant cannot be assigned in which the substance of bread is there, but a last time can be assigned. And the same holds good in natural changes, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. viii).
IIIª q. 75 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in mutationibus instantaneis simul est fieri et factum esse, sicut simul est illuminari et illuminatum esse. Dicitur enim in talibus factum esse secundum quod iam est, fieri autem, secundum quod ante non fuit.	Reply to Objection 2. In instantaneous changes a thing is "in becoming," and is "in being" simultaneously; just as becoming illuminated and to be actually illuminated are simultaneous: for in such, a thing is said to be "in being" according as it now is; but to be "in becoming," according as it was not before.
IIIª q. 75 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ista conversio, sicut dictum est, fit in ultimo instanti prolationis verborum, tunc enim completur verborum significatio, quae est efficax in sacramentorum formis. Et ideo non sequitur quod ista conversio sit successiva.	Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (ad 1), this change comes about in the last instant of the pronouncing of the words. for then the meaning of the words is finished, which meaning is efficacious in the forms of the sacraments. And therefore it does not follow that this change is successive.
IIIª q. 75 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec sit falsa, ex pane fit corpus Christi. Omne enim id ex quo fit aliquid, est id quod fit illud, sed non convertitur, dicimus enim quod ex albo fit nigrum, et quod album fit nigrum; et licet dicamus quod homo fiat niger, non tamen dicimus quod ex homine fiat nigrum ut patet in I Physic. Si ergo verum est quod ex pane fiat corpus Christi, verum erit dicere quod panis fiat corpus Christi. Quod videtur esse falsum, quia panis non est subiectum factionis, sed magis est terminus. Ergo non vere dicitur quod ex pane fiat corpus Christi.	Objection 1. It seems that this proposition is false: "The body of Christ is made out of bread." For everything out of which another is made, is that which is made the other; but not conversely: for we say that a black thing is made out of a white thing, and that a white thing is made black: and although we may say that a man becomes black still we do not say that a black thing is made out of a man, as is shown in Phys. i. If it be true, then, that Christ's body is made out of bread, it will be true to say that bread is made the body of Christ. But this seems to be false, because the bread is not the subject of the making, but rather its term. Therefore, it is not said truly that Christ's body is made out of bread.
IIIª q. 75 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, fieri terminatur ad esse, vel ad factum esse. Sed haec nunquam est vera, panis est corpus Christi, vel, panis est factus corpus Christi, vel etiam, panis erit corpus Christi. Ergo videtur quod nec haec sit vera, ex pane fit corpus Christi.	Objection 2. Further, the term of "becoming" is something that is, or something that is "made." But this proposition is never true: "The bread is the body of Christ"; or "The bread is made the body of Christ"; or again, "The bread will be the body of Christ." Therefore it seems that not even this is true: "The body of Christ is made out of bread."
IIIª q. 75 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, omne id ex quo fit aliquid, convertitur in id quod fit ex eo. Sed haec videtur esse falsa, panis convertitur in corpus Christi, quia haec conversio videtur esse miraculosior quam creatio; in qua tamen non dicitur quod non ens convertatur in ens. Ergo videtur quod etiam haec sit falsa, ex pane fit corpus Christi.	Objection 3. Further, everything out of which another is made is converted into that which is made from it. But this proposition seems to be false: "The bread is converted into the body of Christ," because such conversion seems to be more miraculous than the creation of the world, in which it is not said that non-being is converted into being. Therefore it seems that this proposition likewise is false: "The body of Christ is made out of bread."
IIIª q. 75 a. 8 arg. 4 Praeterea, illud ex quo fit aliquid, potest esse illud. Sed haec est falsa, panis potest esse corpus Christi. Ergo etiam haec est falsa, ex pane fit corpus Christi.	Objection 4. Further, that out of which something is made, can be that thing. But this proposition is false: "Bread can be the body of Christ." Therefore this is likewise false: "The body of Christ is made out of bread."
IIIª q. 75 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de sacramentis, ubi accedit consecratio, de pane fit corpus Christi.	On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): "When the consecration takes place, the body of Christ is made out of the bread."
IIIª q. 75 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod haec conversio panis in corpus Christi, quantum ad aliquid convenit cum creatione et cum transmutatione naturali, et quantum ad aliquid differt ab utroque. Est enim commune his tribus ordo terminorum, scilicet ut post hoc sit hoc, in creatione enim est esse post non esse, in hoc sacramento corpus Christi post substantiam panis, in transmutatione naturali album post nigrum vel ignis post aerem; et quod praedicti termini non sint simul. Convenit autem conversio de qua nunc loquimur cum creatione, quia in neutra earum est aliquod commune subiectum utrique extremorum. Cuius contrarium apparet in omni transmutatione naturali. Convenit vero haec conversio cum transmutatione naturali in duobus, licet non similiter. Primo quidem, quia in utraque unum extremorum transit in aliud, sicut panis in corpus Christi, et aer in ignem, non autem non ens convertitur in ens. Aliter tamen hoc accidit utrobique. Nam in hoc sacramento tota substantia panis transit in totum corpus Christi, sed in transmutatione naturali materia unius suscipit formam alterius, priori forma deposita. Secundo conveniunt in hoc, quod utrobique remanet aliquid idem, quod non accidit in creatione. Differenter tamen, nam in transmutatione naturali remanet eadem materia vel subiectum; in hoc autem sacramento remanent eadem accidentia. Et ex his accipi potest qualiter differenter in talibus loqui debeamus. Quia enim in nullo praedictorum trium extrema sunt simul ideo in nullo eorum potest unum extremum de alio praedicari per verbum substantivum praesentis temporis, non enim dicimus, non ens est ens, vel, panis est corpus Christi, vel, aer est ignis aut album nigrum. Propter ordinem vero extremorum, possumus uti in omnibus hac praepositione ex, quae ordinem designat. Possumus enim vere et proprie dicere quod ex non ente fit ens, et ex pane corpus Christi, et ex aere ignis vel ex albo nigrum. Quia vero in creatione unum extremorum non transit in alterum, non possumus in creatione uti verbo conversionis, ut dicamus quod non ens convertitur in ens. Quo tamen verbo uti possumus in hoc sacramento, sicut et in transmutatione naturali. Sed quia in hoc sacramento tota substantia in totam mutatur, propter hoc haec conversio proprie transubstantiatio vocatur. Rursus, quia huius conversionis non est accipere aliquod subiectum, ea quae verificantur in conversione naturali ratione subiecti, non sunt concedenda in hac conversione. Et primo quidem, manifestum est quod potentia ad oppositum consequitur subiectum, ratione cuius dicimus quod album potest esse nigrum, vel aer potest esse ignis. Licet haec non sit ita propria sicut prima, nam subiectum albi, in quo est potentia ad nigredinem, est tota substantia albi, non enim albedo est pars eius; subiectum autem formae aeris est pars eius; unde, cum dicitur, aer potest esse ignis, verificatur ratione partis per synecdochen. Sed in hac conversione et similiter in creatione, quia nullum est subiectum, non dicitur quod unum extremum possit esse aliud, sicut quod non ens possit esse ens, vel quod panis possit esse corpus Christi. Et eadem ratione non potest proprie dici quod de non ente fiat ens, vel quod de pane fiat corpus Christi, quia haec praepositio de designat causam consubstantialem; quae quidem consubstantialitas extremorum in transmutationibus naturalibus attenditur penes convenientiam in subiecto. Et simili ratione non conceditur quod panis erit corpus Christi, vel quod fiat corpus Christi, sicut neque conceditur in creatione quod non ens erit ens, vel quod non ens fiat ens, quia hic modus loquendi verificatur in transmutationibus naturalibus ratione subiecti, puta cum dicimus quod album fit nigrum, vel album erit nigrum. Quia tamen in hoc sacramento, facta conversione, aliquid idem manet, scilicet accidentia panis, ut supra dictum est, secundum quandam similitudinem aliquae harum locutionum possunt concedi, scilicet quod panis sit corpus Christi, vel, panis erit corpus Christi, vel, de pane fit corpus Christi; ut nomine panis non intelligatur substantia panis, sed in universali hoc quod sub speciebus panis continetur, sub quibus prius continetur substantia panis, et postea corpus Christi.	I answer that, This conversion of bread into the body of Christ has something in common with creation, and with natural transmutation, and in some respect differs from both. For the order of the terms is common to these three; that is, that after one thing there is another (for, in creation there is being after non-being; in this sacrament, Christ's body after the substance of bread; in natural transmutation white after black, or fire after air); and that the aforesaid terms are not coexistent. Now the conversion, of which we are speaking, has this in common with creation, that in neither of them is there any common subject belonging to either of the extremes; the contrary of which appears in every natural transmutation. Again, this conversion has something in common with natural transmutation in two respects, although not in the same fashion. First of all because in both, one of the extremes passes into the other, as bread into Christ's body, and air into fire; whereas non-being is not converted into being. But this comes to pass differently on the one side and on the other; for in this sacrament the whole substance of the bread passes into the whole body of Christ; whereas in natural transmutation the matter of the one receives the form of the other, the previous form being laid aside. Secondly, they have this in common, that on both sides something remains the same; whereas this does not happen in creation: yet differently; for the same matter or subject remains in natural transmutation; whereas in this sacrament the same accidents remain. From these observations we can gather the various ways of speaking in such matters. For, because in no one of the aforesaid three things are the extremes coexistent, therefore in none of them can one extreme be predicated of the other by the substantive verb of the present tense: for we do not say, "Non-being is being" or, "Bread is the body of Christ," or, "Air is fire," or, "White is black." Yet because of the relationship of the extremes in all of them we can use the preposition "ex" [out of, which denotes order; for we can truly and properly say that "being is made out of non-being," and "out of bread, the body of Christ," and "out of air, fire," and "out of white, black." But because in creation one of the extremes does not pass into the other, we cannot use the word "conversion" in creation, so as to say that "non-being is converted into being": we can, however, use the word in this sacrament, just as in natural transmutation. But since in this sacrament the whole substance is converted into the whole substance, on that account this conversion is properly termed transubstantiation. Again, since there is no subject of this conversion, the things which are true in natural conversion by reason of the subject, are not to be granted in this conversion. And in the first place indeed it is evident that potentiality to the opposite follows a subject, by reason whereof we say that "a white thing can be black," or that "air can be fire"; although the latter is not so proper as the former: for the subject of whiteness, in which there is potentiality to blackness, is the whole substance of the white thing; since whiteness is not a part thereof; whereas the subject of the form of air is part thereof: hence when it is said, "Air can be fire," it is verified by synecdoche by reason of the part. But in this conversion, and similarly in creation, because there is no subject, it is not said that one extreme can be the other, as that "non-being can be being," or that "bread can be the body of Christ": and for the same reason it cannot be properly said that "being is made of [de] non-being," or that "the body of Christ is made of bread," because this preposition "of" [de] denotes a consubstantial cause, which consubstantiality of the extremes in natural transmutations is considered according to something common in the subject. And for the same reason it is not granted that "bread will be the body of Christ," or that it "may become the body of Christ," just as it is not granted in creation that "non-being will be being," or that "non-being may become being," because this manner of speaking is verified in natural transmutations by reason of the subject: for instance, when we say that "a white thing becomes black," or "a white thing will be black." Nevertheless, since in this sacrament, after the change, something remains the same, namely, the accidents of the bread, as stated above (Article 5), some of these expressions may be admitted by way of similitude, namely, that "bread is the body of Christ," or, "bread will be the body of Christ," or "the body of Christ is made of bread"; provided that by the word "bread" is not understood the substance of bread, but in general "that which is contained under the species of bread," under which species there is first contained the substance of bread, and afterwards the body of Christ.
IIIª q. 75 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud ex quo aliquid fit, quandoque quidem importat simul subiectum cum uno extremorum transmutationis, sicut cum dicitur, ex albo fit nigrum. Quandoque vero importat solum oppositum, vel extremum, sicut cum dicitur, ex mane fit dies. Et sic non conceditur quod hoc fiat illud, idest quod mane fiat dies. Et ita etiam in proposito, licet proprie dicatur quod ex pane fiat corpus Christi, non tamen proprie dicitur quod panis fiat corpus Christi, nisi secundum quandam similitudinem, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 1. That out of which something else is made, sometimes implies together with the subject, one of the extremes of the transmutation, as when it is said "a black thing is made out of a white one"; but sometimes it implies only the opposite or the extreme, as when it is said--"out of morning comes the day." And so it is not granted that the latter becomes the former, that is, "that morning becomes the day." So likewise in the matter in hand, although it may be said properly that "the body of Christ is made out of bread," yet it is not said properly that "bread becomes the body of Christ," except by similitude, as was said above.
IIIª q. 75 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illud ex quo fit aliquid, quandoque erit illud, propter subiectum quod importatur. Et ideo, cum huius conversionis non sit aliquod subiectum, non est similis ratio.	Reply to Objection 2. That out of which another is made, will sometimes be that other because of the subject which is implied. And therefore, since there is no subject of this change, the comparison does not hold.
IIIª q. 75 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in hac conversione sunt plura difficilia quam in creatione, in qua hoc solum difficile est, quod aliquid fit ex nihilo, quod tamen pertinet ad proprium modum productionis primae causae, quae nihil aliud praesupponit. Sed in hac conversione non solum est difficile quod hoc totum convertitur in illud totum, ita quod nihil prioris remaneat, quod non pertinet ad communem modum productionis alicuius causae, sed etiam habet hoc difficile, quod accidentia remanent corrupta substantia, et multa alia, de quibus in sequentibus agetur. Tamen verbum conversionis recipitur in hoc sacramento, non autem in creatione, sicut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 3. In this change there are many more difficulties than in creation, in which there is but this one difficulty, that something is made out of nothing; yet this belongs to the proper mode of production of the first cause, which presupposes nothing else. But in this conversion not only is it difficult for this whole to be changed into that whole, so that nothing of the former may remain (which does not belong to the common mode of production of a cause), but furthermore it has this difficulty that the accidents remain while the substance is destroyed, and many other difficulties of which we shall treat hereafter (77). Nevertheless the word "conversion" is admitted in this sacrament, but not in creation, as stated above.
IIIª q. 75 a. 8 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, potentia pertinet ad subiectum, quod non est accipere in hac conversione. Et ideo non conceditur quod panis possit esse corpus Christi, non enim haec conversio fit per potentiam passivam creaturae, sed per solam potentiam activam creatoris.	Reply to Objection 4. As was observed above, potentiality belongs to the subject, whereas there is no subject in this conversion. And therefore it is not granted that bread can be the body of Christ: for this conversion does not come about by the passive potentiality of the creature, but solely by the active power of the Creator.