Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part III/Q63

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Q62 Q64



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IIIª q. 63 pr. Deinde considerandum est de alio effectu sacramentorum, qui est character. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum ex sacramentis causetur character aliquis in anima. Secundo, quid sit ille character. Tertio, cuius sit character. Quarto, in quo sit sicut in subiecto. Quinto, utrum insit indelebiliter. Sexto, utrum omnia sacramenta imprimant characterem. Question 63. The other effect of the sacraments, which is a character 1. Is a character produced in the soul by the sacraments? 2. What is this character? 3. Of whom is this character? 4. What is its subject? 5. Is it indelible? 6. Does every sacrament imprint a character?
IIIª q. 63 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacramentum non imprimat aliquem characterem in anima. Character enim significare videtur quoddam signum distinctivum. Sed distinctio membrorum Christi ab aliis fit per aeternam praedestinationem, quae non ponit aliquid in praedestinato, sed solum in Deo praedestinante, ut in prima parte habitum est, dicitur enim II ad Tim. II, firmum fundamentum Dei stat, habens signaculum hoc, novit dominus qui sunt eius. Ergo sacramenta non imprimunt characterem in anima. Objection 1. It seems that a sacrament does not imprint a character on the soul. For the word "character" seems to signify some kind of distinctive sign. But Christ's members are distinguished from others by eternal predestination, which does not imply anything in the predestined, but only in God predestinating, as we have stated in I, 23, 2. For it is written (2 Timothy 2:19): "The sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal: The Lord knoweth who are His." Therefore the sacraments do not imprint a character on the soul.
IIIª q. 63 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, character signum est distinctivum. Signum autem, ut Augustinus dicit, in II de Doct. Christ., est quod, praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus, facit aliquid aliud in cognitionem venire. Nihil autem est in anima quod aliquam speciem sensibus ingerat. Ergo videtur quod in anima non imprimatur aliquis character per sacramenta. Objection 2. Further, a character is a distinctive sign. Now a sign, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) "is that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the species which it impresses on the senses." But nothing in the soul can impress a species on the senses. Therefore it seems that no character is imprinted on the soul by the sacraments.
IIIª q. 63 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut per sacramenta novae legis distinguitur fidelis ab infideli, ita etiam per sacramenta veteris legis. Sed sacramenta veteris legis non imprimebant aliquem characterem, unde et dicuntur iustitiae carnis, secundum apostolum, ad Heb. IX. Ergo videtur quod nec sacramenta novae legis. Objection 3. Further, just as the believer is distinguished from the unbeliever by the sacraments of the New Law, so was it under the Old Law. But the sacraments of the Old Law did not imprint a character; whence they are called "justices of the flesh" (Hebrews 9:10) by the Apostle. Therefore neither seemingly do the sacraments of the New Law.
IIIª q. 63 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, II Cor. I, qui unxit nos, Deus est, et qui signavit nos, et dedit pignus spiritus in cordibus nostris. Sed nihil aliud importat character quam quandam signationem. Ergo videtur quod Deus per sacramenta nobis suum characterem imprimat. On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Corinthians 1:21-22): "He . . . that hath anointed us is God; Who also hath sealed us, and given the pledge of the spirit in our hearts." But a character means nothing else than a kind of sealing. Therefore it seems that by the sacraments God imprints His character on us.
IIIª q. 63 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, sacramenta novae legis ad duo ordinantur, videlicet ad remedium contra peccata; et ad perficiendum animam in his quae pertinent ad cultum Dei secundum ritum Christianae vitae. Quicumque autem ad aliquid certum deputatur, consuevit ad illud consignari, sicut milites qui adscribebantur ad militiam antiquitus solebant aliquibus characteribus corporalibus insigniri, eo quod deputabantur ad aliquid corporale. Et ideo, cum homines per sacramenta deputentur ad aliquid spirituale pertinens ad cultum Dei, consequens est quod per ea fideles aliquo spirituali charactere insigniantur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in II contra Parmenianum, si militiae characterem in corpore suo non militans pavidus exhorruerit, et ad clementiam imperatoris confugerit, ac, prece fusa et venia impetrata, militare iam coeperit, nunquid, homine liberato atque correcto, character ille repetitur, ac non potius agnitus approbatur? An forte minus haerent sacramenta Christiana quam corporalis haec nota? I answer that, As is clear from what has been already stated (62, 5) the sacraments of the New Law are ordained for a twofold purpose; namely, for a remedy against sins; and for the perfecting of the soul in things pertaining to the Divine worship according to the rite of the Christian life. Now whenever anyone is deputed to some definite purpose he is wont to receive some outward sign thereof; thus in olden times soldiers who enlisted in the ranks used to be marked with certain characters on the body, through being deputed to a bodily service. Since, therefore, by the sacraments men are deputed to a spiritual service pertaining to the worship of God, it follows that by their means the faithful receive a certain spiritual character. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii): "If a deserter from the battle, through dread of the mark of enlistment on his body, throws himself on the emperor's clemency, and having besought and received mercy, return to the fight; is that character renewed, when the man has been set free and reprimanded? is it not rather acknowledged and approved? Are the Christian sacraments, by any chance, of a nature less lasting than this bodily mark?"
IIIª q. 63 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fideles Christi ad praemium quidem futurae gloriae deputantur signaculo praedestinationis divinae. Sed ad actus convenientes praesenti Ecclesiae deputantur quodam spirituali signaculo eis insignito, quod character nuncupatur. Reply to Objection 1. The faithful of Christ are destined to the reward of the glory that is to come, by the seal of Divine Predestination. But they are deputed to acts becoming the Church that is now, by a certain spiritual seal that is set on them, and is called a character.
IIIª q. 63 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod character animae impressus habet rationem signi inquantum per sensibile sacramentum imprimitur, per hoc enim scitur aliquis baptismali charactere insignitus, quod est ablutus aqua sensibili. Nihilominus tamen character, vel signaculum, dici potest per quandam similitudinem omne quod figurat alicui, vel distinguit ab alio, etiam si non sit sensibile, sicut Christus dicitur figura vel character paternae substantiae, secundum apostolum, Heb. I. Reply to Objection 2. The character imprinted on the soul is a kind of sign in so far as it is imprinted by a sensible sacrament: since we know that a certain one has received the baptismal character, through his being cleansed by the sensible water. Nevertheless from a kind of likeness, anything that assimilates one thing to another, or discriminates one thing from another, even though it be not sensible, can be called a character or a seal; thus the Apostle calls Christ "the figure" or charakter "of the substance of the Father" (Hebrews 1:3).
IIIª q. 63 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sacramenta veteris legis non habebant in se spiritualem virtutem ad aliquem spiritualem effectum operantem. Et ideo in illis sacramentis non requirebatur aliquis spiritualis character, sed sufficiebat ibi corporalis circumcisio, quam apostolus signaculum nominat, Rom. IV. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (Question 62, Article 6) the sacraments of the Old Law had not in themselves any spiritual power of producing a spiritual effect. Consequently in those sacraments there was no need of a spiritual character, and bodily circumcision sufficed, which the Apostle calls "a seal" (Romans 4:11).
IIIª q. 63 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod character non sit spiritualis potestas. Character enim idem videtur esse quod figura, unde ad Heb. I, ubi dicitur, figura substantiae eius, in Graeco habetur loco figurae character. Sed figura est in quarta specie qualitatis, et ita differt a potestate, quae est in secunda specie qualitatis. Character ergo non est spiritualis potestas. Objection 1. It seems that a character is not a spiritual power. For "character" seems to be the same thing as "figure"; hence (Hebrews 1:3), where we read "figure of His substance, "for "figure" the Greek has charakter. Now "figure" is in the fourth species of quality, and thus differs from power which is in the second species. Therefore character is not a spiritual power.
IIIª q. 63 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, II cap. Eccles. Hier., quod divina beatitudo accedentem ad beatitudinem in sui participationem recipit, et proprio lumine, quasi quodam signo, ipsi tradit suam participationem. Et sic videtur quod character sit quoddam lumen. Sed lumen pertinet magis ad tertiam speciem qualitatis. Non ergo character est potestas, quae videtur ad secundam speciem qualitatis pertinere. Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. ii): "The Divine Beatitude admits him that seeks happiness to a share in Itself, and grants this share to him by conferring on him Its light as a kind of seal." Consequently, it seems that a character is a kind of light. Now light belongs rather to the third species of quality. Therefore a character is not a power, since this seems to belong to the second species.
IIIª q. 63 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, a quibusdam character sic definitur, character est signum sanctum communionis fidei et sanctae ordinationis, datum a hierarcha. Signum autem est in genere relationis, non autem in genere potestatis. Non ergo character est spiritualis potestas. Objection 3. Further, character is defined by some thus: "A character is a holy sign of the communion of faith and of the holy ordination conferred by a hierarch." Now a sign is in the genus of "relation," not of "power." Therefore a character is not a spiritual power.
IIIª q. 63 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, potestas habet rationem causae et principii, ut patet in V Metaphys. Sed signum, quod ponitur in definitione characteris, magis pertinet ad rationem effectus. Character ergo non est spiritualis potestas. Objection 4. Further, a power is in the nature of a cause and principle (Metaph. v). But a "sign" which is set down in the definition of a character is rather in the nature of an effect. Therefore a character is not a spiritual power.
IIIª q. 63 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., tria sunt in anima, potentia, habitus et passio. Sed character non est passio, quia passio cito transit, character autem indelebilis est, ut infra dicetur. Similiter etiam non est habitus. Quia nullus habitus est qui se possit ad bene et male habere. Character autem ad utrumque se habet, utuntur enim eo quidam bene, alii vero male. Quod in habitibus non contingit, nam habitu virtutis nullus utitur male, habitu malitiae nullus bene. Ergo relinquitur quod character sit potentia. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii): "There are three things in the soul, power, habit, and passion." Now a character is not a passion: since a passion passes quickly, whereas a character is indelible, as will be made clear further on (5). In like manner it is not a habit: because no habit is indifferent to acting well or ill: whereas a character is indifferent to either, since some use it well, some ill. Now this cannot occur with a habit: because no one abuses a habit of virtue, or uses well an evil habit. It remains, therefore, that a character is a power.
IIIª q. 63 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, sacramenta novae legis characterem imprimunt inquantum per ea deputamur ad cultum Dei secundum ritum Christianae religionis. Unde Dionysius, in II cap. Eccles. Hier., cum dixisset quod Deus quodam signo tradit sui participationem accedenti, subiungit, perficiens eum divinum et communicatorem divinorum. Divinus autem cultus consistit vel in recipiendo aliqua divina, vel in tradendo aliis. Ad utrumque autem horum requiritur quaedam potentia, nam ad tradendum aliquid aliis, requiritur potentia activa; ad recipiendum autem requiritur potentia passiva. Et ideo character importat quandam potentiam spiritualem ordinatam ad ea quae sunt divini cultus. Sciendum tamen quod haec spiritualis potentia est instrumentalis, sicut supra dictum est de virtute quae est in sacramentis. Habere enim sacramenti characterem competit ministris Dei, minister autem habet se per modum instrumenti, ut philosophus dicit, in I Polit. Et ideo, sicut virtus quae est in sacramentis, non est in genere per se, sed per reductionem, eo quod est quiddam fluens et incompletum; ita etiam character non proprie est in genere vel specie, sed reducitur ad secundam speciem qualitatis. I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the sacraments of the New Law produce a character, in so far as by them we are deputed to the worship of God according to the rite of the Christian religion. Wherefore Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii), after saying that God "by a kind of sign grants a share of Himself to those that approach Him," adds "by making them Godlike and communicators of Divine gifts." Now the worship of God consists either in receiving Divine gifts, or in bestowing them on others. And for both these purposes some power is needed; for to bestow something on others, active power is necessary; and in order to receive, we need a passive power. Consequently, a character signifies a certain spiritual power ordained unto things pertaining to the Divine worship. But it must be observed that this spiritual power is instrumental: as we have stated above (Question 62, Article 4) of the virtue which is in the sacraments. For to have a sacramental character belongs to God's ministers: and a minister is a kind of instrument, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). Consequently, just as the virtue which is in the sacraments is not of itself in a genus, but is reducible to a genus, for the reason that it is of a transitory and incomplete nature: so also a character is not properly in a genus or species, but is reducible to the second species of quality.
IIIª q. 63 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod figuratio est quaedam terminatio quantitatis. Unde, proprie loquendo, non est nisi in rebus corporeis, in spiritualibus autem dicitur metaphorice. Non autem ponitur aliquid in genere vel specie nisi per id quod de eo proprie praedicatur. Et ideo character non potest esse in quarta specie qualitatis, licet hoc quidam posuerint. Reply to Objection 1. Configuration is a certain boundary of quantity. Wherefore, properly speaking, it is only in corporeal things; and of spiritual things is said metaphorically. Now that which decides the genus or species of a thing must needs be predicated of it properly. Consequently, a character cannot be in the fourth species of quality, although some have held this to be the case.
IIIª q. 63 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in tertia specie qualitatis non sunt nisi sensibiles passiones, vel sensibiles qualitates. Character autem non est lumen sensibile. Et ita non est in tertia specie qualitatis, ut quidam dixerunt. Reply to Objection 2. The third species of quality contains only sensible passions or sensible qualities. Now a character is not a sensible light. Consequently, it is not in the third species of quality as some have maintained.
IIIª q. 63 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod relatio quae importatur in nomine signi, oportet quod super aliquid fundetur. Non autem relatio huius signi quod est character, potest fundari immediate super essentiam animae, quia sic conveniret omni animae naturaliter. Et ideo oportet aliquid poni in anima super quod fundetur talis relatio. Et hoc est essentia characteris. Unde non oportebit quod sit in genere relationis, sicut quidam posuerunt. Reply to Objection 3. The relation signified by the word "sign" must needs have some foundation. Now the relation signified by this sign which is a character, cannot be founded immediately on the essence of the soul: because then it would belong to every soul naturally. Consequently, there must be something in the soul on which such a relation is founded. And it is in this that a character essentially consists. Therefore it need not be in the genus "relation" as some have held.
IIIª q. 63 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod character habet rationem signi per comparationem ad sacramentum sensibile a quo imprimitur. Sed secundum se consideratus, habet rationem principii, per modum iam dictum. Reply to Objection 4. A character is in the nature of a sign in comparison to the sensible sacrament by which it is imprinted. But considered in itself, it is in the nature of a principle, in the way already explained.
IIIª q. 63 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod character sacramentalis non sit character Christi. Dicitur enim Ephes. IV, nolite contristare spiritum sanctum Dei, in quo signati estis. Sed consignatio importatur in ratione characteris. Ergo character sacramentalis magis debet attribui spiritui sancto quam Christo. Objection 1. It seems that the sacramental character is not the character of Christ. For it is written (Ephesians 4:30): "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby you are sealed." But a character consists essentially in some. thing that seals. Therefore the sacramental character should be attributed to the Holy Ghost rather than to Christ.
IIIª q. 63 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, character habet rationem signi. Est autem signum gratiae quae per sacramentum confertur. Gratia autem infunditur animae a tota Trinitate, unde dicitur in Psalmo, gratiam et gloriam dabit dominus. Ergo videtur quod character sacramentalis non debeat specialiter attribui Christo. Objection 2. Further, a character has the nature of a sign. And it is a sign of the grace that is conferred by the sacrament. Now grace is poured forth into the soul by the whole Trinity; wherefore it is written (Psalm 83:12): "The Lord will give grace and glory." Therefore it seems that the sacramental character should not be attributed specially to Christ.
IIIª q. 63 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad hoc aliquis characterem accipit ut eo a ceteris distinguatur. Sed distinctio sanctorum ab aliis fit per caritatem, quae sola distinguit inter filios regni et filios perditionis, ut Augustinus dicit, XV de Trin., unde et ipsi perditionis filii characterem bestiae habere dicuntur, ut patet Apoc. XIII. Caritas autem non attribuitur Christo, sed magis spiritui sancto, secundum illud Rom. V, caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis; vel etiam patri, secundum illud II Cor. ult., gratia domini nostri Iesu Christi et caritas Dei. Ergo videtur quod character sacramentalis non sit attribuendus Christo. Objection 3. Further, a man is marked with a character that he may be distinguishable from others. But the saints are distinguishable from others by charity, which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "alone separates the children of the Kingdom from the children of perdition": wherefore also the children of perdition are said to have "the character of the beast" (Apocalypse 13:16-17). But charity is not attributed to Christ, but rather to the Holy Ghost according to Romans 5:5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us"; or even to the Father, according to 2 Corinthians 13:13: "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the charity of God." Therefore it seems that the sacramental character should not be attributed to Christ.
IIIª q. 63 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod quidam sic definiunt characterem, character est distinctio a charactere aeterno impressa animae rationali, secundum imaginem consignans Trinitatem creatam Trinitati creanti et recreanti, et distinguens a non configuratis, secundum statum fidei. Sed character aeternus est ipse Christus, secundum illud Heb. I, qui cum sit splendor gloriae et figura, vel character, substantiae eius. Ergo videtur quod character proprie sit attribuendus Christo. On the contrary, Some define character thus: "A character is a distinctive mark printed in a man's rational soul by the eternal Character, whereby the created trinity is sealed with the likeness of the creating and re-creating Trinity, and distinguishing him from those who are not so enlikened, according to the state of faith." But the eternal Character is Christ Himself, according to Hebrews 1:3: "Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure," or character, "of His substance." It seems, therefore, that the character should properly be attributed to Christ.
IIIª q. 63 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, character proprie est signaculum quoddam quo aliquid insignitur ut ordinandum in aliquem finem, sicut charactere insignitur denarius ad usum commutationum, et milites charactere insigniuntur quasi ad militiam deputati. Homo autem fidelis ad duo deputatur. Primo quidem, et principaliter, ad fruitionem gloriae. Et ad hoc insigniuntur signaculo gratiae, secundum illud Ezech. IX, signa thau super frontes virorum gementium et dolentium; et Apoc. VII, nolite nocere terrae et mari neque arboribus, quoadusque signemus servos Dei nostri in frontibus eorum. Secundo autem deputatur quisque fidelis ad recipiendum vel tradendum aliis ea quae pertinent ad cultum Dei. Et ad hoc proprie deputatur character sacramentalis. Totus autem ritus Christianae religionis derivatur a sacerdotio Christi. Et ideo manifestum est quod character sacramentalis specialiter est character Christi, cuius sacerdotio configurantur fideles secundum sacramentales characteres, qui nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam participationes sacerdotii Christi, ab ipso Christo derivatae. I answer that, As has been made clear above (Article 1), a character is properly a kind of seal, whereby something is marked, as being ordained to some particular end: thus a coin is marked for use in exchange of goods, and soldiers are marked with a character as being deputed to military service. Now the faithful are deputed to a twofold end. First and principally to the enjoyment of glory. And for this purpose they are marked with the seal of grace according to Ezekiel 9:4: "Mark Thou upon the foreheads of the men that sigh and mourn"; and Apocalypse 7:3: "Hurt not the earth, nor the sea, nor the trees, till we sign the servants of our God in their foreheads." Secondly, each of the faithful is deputed to receive, or to bestow on others, things pertaining to the worship of God. And this, properly speaking, is the purpose of the sacramental character. Now the whole rite of the Christian religion is derived from Christ's priesthood. Consequently, it is clear that the sacramental character is specially the character of Christ, to Whose character the faithful are likened by reason of the sacramental characters, which are nothing else than certain participations of Christ's Priesthood, flowing from Christ Himself.
IIIª q. 63 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de configuratione secundum quam aliquis deputatur ad futuram gloriam, quae fit per gratiam. Quae spiritui sancto attribuitur, inquantum ex amore procedit quod Deus nobis aliquid gratis largiatur, quod ad rationem gratiae pertinet, spiritus autem sanctus amor est. Unde et I ad Cor. XII dicitur, divisiones gratiarum sunt, idem autem spiritus. Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle speaks there of that sealing by which a man is assigned to future glory, and which is effected by grace. Now grace is attributed to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as it is through love that God gives us something gratis, which is the very nature of grace: while the Holy Ghost is love. Wherefore it is written (1 Corinthians 12:4): "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit."
IIIª q. 63 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod character sacramentalis est res respectu sacramenti exterioris, et est sacramentum respectu ultimi effectus. Et ideo dupliciter potest aliquid characteri attribui. Uno modo, secundum rationem sacramenti. Et hoc modo est signum invisibilis gratiae, quae in sacramento confertur. Alio modo, secundum characteris rationem. Et hoc modo signum est configurativum alicui principali, apud quem residet auctoritas eius ad quod aliquis deputatur, sicut milites, qui deputantur ad pugnam, insigniuntur signo ducis, quo quodammodo ei configurantur. Et hoc modo illi qui deputantur ad cultum Christianum, cuius auctor est Christus, characterem accipiunt quo Christo configurantur. Unde proprie est character Christi. Reply to Objection 2. The sacramental character is a thing as regards the exterior sacrament, and a sacrament in regard to the ultimate effect. Consequently, something can be attributed to a character in two ways. First, if the character be considered as a sacrament: and thus it is a sign of the invisible grace which is conferred in the sacrament. Secondly, if it be considered as a character. And thus it is a sign conferring on a man a likeness to some principal person in whom is vested the authority over that to which he is assigned: thus soldiers who are assigned to military service, are marked with their leader's sign, by which they are, in a fashion, likened to him. And in this way those who are deputed to the Christian worship, of which Christ is the author, receive a character by which they are likened to Christ. Consequently, properly speaking, this is Christ's character.
IIIª q. 63 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod charactere distinguitur aliquis ab alio per comparationem ad aliquem finem in quem ordinatur qui characterem accipit, sicut dictum est de charactere militari, quo in ordine ad pugnam distinguitur miles regis a milite hostis. Et similiter character fidelium est quo distinguuntur fideles Christi a servis Diaboli, vel in ordine ad vitam aeternam, vel in ordine ad cultum praesentis Ecclesiae. Quorum primum fit per caritatem et gratiam, ut obiectio procedit, secundum autem fit per characterem sacramentalem. Unde et character bestiae intelligi potest, per oppositum, vel obstinata malitia, qua aliqui deputantur ad poenam aeternam; vel professio illiciti cultus. Reply to Objection 3. A character distinguishes one from another, in relation to some particular end, to which he, who receives the character is ordained: as has been stated concerning the military character (1) by which a soldier of the king is distinguished from the enemy's soldier in relation to the battle. In like manner the character of the faithful is that by which the faithful of Christ are distinguished from the servants of the devil, either in relation to eternal life, or in relation to the worship of the Church that now is. Of these the former is the result of charity and grace, as the objection runs; while the latter results from the sacramental character. Wherefore the "character of the beast" may be understood by opposition, to mean either the obstinate malice for which some are assigned to eternal punishment, or the profession of an unlawful form of worship.
IIIª q. 63 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod character non sit in potentiis animae sicut in subiecto. Character enim dicitur esse dispositio ad gratiam. Sed gratia est in essentia animae sicut in subiecto, ut in secunda parte dictum est. Ergo videtur quod character sit in essentia animae, non autem in potentiis. Objection 1. It seems that the character is not subjected in the powers of the soul. For a character is said to be a disposition to grace. But grace is subjected in the essence of the soul as we have stated [in I-II, 110, 4]. Therefore it seems that the character is in the essence of the soul and not in the powers.
IIIª q. 63 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, potentia animae non videtur esse subiectum alicuius nisi habitus vel dispositionis. Sed character, ut supra dictum est, non est habitus vel dispositio, sed magis potentia, cuius subiectum non est nisi essentia animae. Ergo videtur quod character non sit sicut in subiecto in potentia animae, sed magis in essentia ipsius. Objection 2. Further, a power of the soul does not seem to be the subject of anything save habit and disposition. But a character, as stated above (Article 2), is neither habit nor disposition, but rather a power: the subject of which is nothing else than the essence of the soul. Therefore it seems that the character is not subjected in a power of the soul, but rather in its essence.
IIIª q. 63 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, potentiae animae rationalis distinguuntur per cognitivas et appetitivas. Sed non potest dici quod character sit tantum in potentia cognoscitiva, nec etiam tantum in potentia appetitiva, quia non ordinatur neque ad cognoscendum tantum, neque ad appetendum. Similiter etiam non potest dici quod sit in utraque, quia idem accidens non potest esse in diversis subiectis. Ergo videtur quod character non sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto, sed magis in essentia. Objection 3. Further, the powers of the soul are divided into those of knowledge and those of appetite. But it cannot be said that a character is only in a cognitive power, nor, again, only in an appetitive power: since it is neither ordained to knowledge only, nor to desire only. Likewise, neither can it be said to be in both, because the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore it seems that a character is not subjected in a power of the soul, but rather in the essence.
IIIª q. 63 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod, sicut in praemissa definitione characteris continetur, character imprimitur animae rationali secundum imaginem. Sed imago Trinitatis in anima attenditur secundum potentias. Ergo character in potentiis animae existit. On the contrary, A character, according to its definition given above (Article 3), is imprinted in the rational soul "by way of an image." But the image of the Trinity in the soul is seen in the powers. Therefore a character is in the powers of the soul.
IIIª q. 63 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, character est quoddam signaculum quo anima insignitur ad suscipiendum vel aliis tradendum ea quae sunt divini cultus. Divinus autem cultus in quibusdam actibus consistit. Ad actus autem proprie ordinantur potentiae animae, sicut essentia ordinatur ad esse. Et ideo character non est sicut in subiecto in essentia animae, sed in eius potentia. I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), a character is a kind of seal by which the soul is marked, so that it may receive, or bestow on others, things pertaining to Divine worship. Now the Divine worship consists in certain actions: and the powers of the soul are properly ordained to actions, just as the essence is ordained to existence. Therefore a character is subjected not in the essence of the soul, but in its power.
IIIª q. 63 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod subiectum alicui accidenti attribuitur secundum rationem eius ad quod propinque disponit, non autem secundum rationem eius ad quod disponit remote vel indirecte. Character autem directe quidem et propinque disponit animam ad ea quae sunt divini cultus exequenda, et quia haec idonee non fiunt sine auxilio gratiae, quia, ut dicitur Ioan. IV, eos qui adorant Deum, in spiritu et veritate adorare oportet, ex consequenti divina largitas recipientibus characterem gratiam largitur, per quam digne impleant ea ad quae deputantur. Et ideo characteri magis est attribuendum subiectum secundum rationem actuum ad divinum cultum pertinentium, quam secundum rationem gratiae. Reply to Objection 1. The subject is ascribed to an. accident in respect of that to which the accident disposes it proximately, but not in respect of that to which it disposes it remotely or indirectly. Now a character disposes the soul directly and proximately to the fulfilling of things pertaining to Divine worship: and because such cannot be accomplished suitably without the help of grace, since, according to John 4:24, "they that adore" God "must adore Him in spirit and in truth," consequently, the Divine bounty bestows grace on those who receive the character, so that they may accomplish worthily the service to which they are deputed. Therefore the subject should be ascribed to a character in respect of those actions that pertain to the Divine worship, rather than in respect of grace.
IIIª q. 63 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod essentia animae est subiectum potentiae naturalis, quae ex principiis essentiae procedit. Talis autem potentia non est character, sed est quaedam spiritualis potentia ab extrinseco adveniens. Unde, sicut essentia animae, per quam est naturalis vita hominis, perficitur per gratiam, qua anima spiritualiter vivit; ita potentia naturalis animae perficitur per spiritualem potentiam, quae est character. Habitus enim et dispositio pertinent ad potentiam animae, eo quod ordinantur ad actus, quorum potentiae sunt principia. Et eadem ratione omne quod ad actum ordinatur, est potentiae tribuendum. Reply to Objection 2. The subject of the natural power, which flows from the principles of the essence. Now a character is not a power of this kind. but a spiritual power coming from without. Wherefore, just as the essence of the soul, from which man has his natural life, is perfected by grace from which the soul derives spiritual life; so the natural power of the soul is perfected by a spiritual power, which is a character. For habit and disposition belong to a power of the soul, since they are ordained to actions of which the powers are the principles. And in like manner whatever is ordained to action, should be attributed to a power.
IIIª q. 63 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, character ordinatur ad ea quae sunt divini cultus. Qui quidem est quaedam fidei protestatio per exteriora signa. Et ideo oportet quod character sit in cognitiva potentia animae, in qua est fides. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, a character is ordained unto things pertaining to the Divine worship; which is a protestation of faith expressed by exterior signs. Consequently, a character needs to be in the soul's cognitive power, where also is faith.
IIIª q. 63 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod character non insit animae indelebiliter. Quanto enim aliquod accidens est perfectius, tanto firmius inhaeret. Sed gratia est perfectior quam character, quia character ordinatur ad gratiam sicut ad ulteriorem finem. Gratia autem amittitur per peccatum. Ergo multo magis character. Objection 1. It seems that a character can be blotted out from the soul. Because the more perfect an accident is, the more firmly does it adhere to its subject. But grace is more perfect than a character; because a character is ordained unto grace as to a further end. Now grace is lost through sin. Much more, therefore, is a character so lost.
IIIª q. 63 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, per characterem aliquis deputatur divino cultui, sicut dictum est. Sed aliqui a cultu divino transeunt ad contrarium cultum per apostasiam a fide. Ergo videtur quod tales amittant characterem sacramentalem. Objection 2. Further, by a character a man is deputed to the Divine worship, as stated above (3,4). But some pass from the worship of God to a contrary worship by apostasy from the faith. It seems, therefore, that such lose the sacramental character.
IIIª q. 63 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, cessante fine, cessare debet et id quod est ad finem, alioquin frustra remaneret, sicut post resurrectionem non erit matrimonium, quia cessabit generatio, ad quam matrimonium ordinatur cultus autem exterior, ad quem character ordinatur, non remanebit in patria, in qua nihil agetur in figura, sed totum in nuda veritate. Ergo character sacramentalis non remanet in perpetuum in anima. Et ita non inest indelebiliter. Objection 3. Further, when the end ceases, the means to the end should cease also: thus after the resurrection there will be no marriage, because begetting will cease, which is the purpose of marriage. Now the exterior worship to which a character is ordained, will not endure in heaven, where there will be no shadows, but all will be truth without a veil. Therefore the sacramental character does not last in the soul for ever: and consequently it can be blotted out.
IIIª q. 63 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in II contra Parmenianum, non minus haerent sacramenta Christiana quam corporalis nota militiae. Sed character militaris non repetitur, sed agnitus approbatur, in eo qui veniam meretur ab imperatore post culpam. Ergo nec character sacramentalis deleri potest. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii): "The Christian sacraments are not less lasting than the bodily mark" of military service. But the character of military service is not repeated, but is "recognized and approved" in the man who obtains the emperor's forgiveness after offending him. Therefore neither can the sacramental character be blotted out.
IIIª q. 63 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, character sacramentalis est quaedam participatio sacerdotii Christi in fidelibus eius, ut scilicet, sicut Christus habet plenam spiritualis sacerdotii potestatem, ita fideles eius ei configurentur in hoc quod participant aliquam spiritualem potestatem respectu sacramentorum et eorum quae pertinent ad divinum cultum. Et propter hoc etiam Christo non competit habere characterem, sed potestas sacerdotii eius comparatur ad characterem sicut id quod est plenum et perfectum ad aliquam sui participationem. Sacerdotium autem Christi est aeternum, secundum illud Psalmi, tu es sacerdos in aeternum secundum ordinem Melchisedech. Et inde est quod omnis sanctificatio quae fit per sacerdotium eius, est perpetua, re consecrata manente. Quod patet etiam in rebus inanimatis, nam Ecclesiae vel altaris manet consecratio semper, nisi destruatur. Cum igitur anima sit subiectum characteris secundum intellectivam partem, in qua est fides, ut dictum est; manifestum est quod, sicut intellectus perpetuus est et incorruptibilis, ita character indelebiliter manet in anima. I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), in a sacramental character Christ's faithful have a share in His Priesthood; in the sense that as Christ has the full power of a spiritual priesthood, so His faithful are likened to Him by sharing a certain spiritual power with regard to the sacraments and to things pertaining to the Divine worship. For this reason it is unbecoming that Christ should have a character: but His Priesthood is compared to a character, as that which is complete and perfect is compared to some participation of itself. Now Christ's Priesthood is eternal, according to Psalm 109:4: "Thou art a priest for ever, according to the order of Melchisedech." Consequently, every sanctification wrought by His Priesthood, is perpetual, enduring as long as the thing sanctified endures. This is clear even in inanimate things; for the consecration of a church or an altar lasts for ever unless they be destroyed. Since, therefore, the subject of a character is the soul as to its intellective part, where faith resides, as stated above (4, ad 3); it is clear that, the intellect being perpetual and incorruptible, a character cannot be blotted out from the soul.
IIIª q. 63 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliter est in anima gratia, et aliter character. Nam gratia est in anima sicut quaedam forma habens esse completum in ea, character autem est in anima sicut quaedam virtus instrumentalis, ut supra dictum est. Forma autem completa est in subiecto secundum conditionem subiecti. Et quia anima est mutabilis secundum liberum arbitrium quandiu est in statu viae, consequens est quod insit animae mutabiliter. Sed virtus instrumentalis magis attenditur secundum conditionem principalis agentis. Et ideo character indelebiliter inest animae, non propter sui perfectionem, sed propter perfectionem sacerdotii Christi, a quo derivatur character sicut quaedam instrumentalis virtus. Reply to Objection 1. Both grace and character are in the soul, but in different ways. For grace is in the soul, as a form having complete existence therein: whereas a character is in the soul, as an instrumental power, as stated above (Article 2). Now a complete form is in its subject according to the condition of the subject. And since the soul as long as it is a wayfarer is changeable in respect of the free-will, it results that grace is in the soul in a changeable manner. But an instrumental power follows rather the condition of the principal agent: and consequently a character exists in the soul in an indelible manner, not from any perfection of its own, but from the perfection of Christ's Priesthood, from which the character flows like an instrumental power.
IIIª q. 63 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut ibidem Augustinus dicit, nec ipsos apostatas videmus carere Baptismate, quibus per poenitentiam redeuntibus non restituitur, et ideo amitti non potuisse iudicatur. Et huius ratio est quia character est virtus instrumentalis, ut dictum est, ratio autem instrumenti consistit in hoc quod ab alio moveatur, non autem in hoc quod ipsum se moveat, quod pertinet ad voluntatem. Et ideo, quantumcumque voluntas moveatur in contrarium, character non removetur, propter immobilitatem principalis moventis. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii), "even apostates are not deprived of their baptism, for when they repent and return to the fold they do not receive it again; whence we conclude that it cannot be lost." The reason of this is that a character is an instrumental power, as stated above (ad 1), and the nature of an instrument as such is to be moved by another, but not to move itself; this belongs to the will. Consequently, however much the will be moved in the contrary direction, the character is not removed, by reason of the immobility of the principal mover.
IIIª q. 63 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis post hanc vitam non remaneat exterior cultus, remanet tamen finis illius cultus. Et ideo post hanc vitam remanet character, et in bonis ad eorum gloriam, et in malis ad eorum ignominiam, sicut etiam militaris character remanet in militibus post adeptam victoriam, et in his qui vicerunt ad gloriam, et in his qui sunt victi ad poenam. Reply to Objection 3. Although external worship does not last after this life, yet its end remains. Consequently, after this life the character remains, both in the good as adding to their glory, and in the wicked as increasing their shame: just as the character of the military service remains in the soldiers after the victory, as the boast of the conquerors, and the disgrace of the conquered.
IIIª q. 63 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod per omnia sacramenta novae legis imprimatur character. Per omnia enim sacramenta novae legis fit aliquis particeps sacerdotii Christi. Sed character sacramentalis nihil est aliud quam participatio sacerdotii Christi, ut dictum est. Ergo videtur quod per omnia sacramenta novae legis imprimatur character. Objection 1. It seems that a character is imprinted by all the sacraments of the New Law: because each sacrament of the New Law makes man a participator in Christ's Priesthood. But the sacramental character is nothing but a participation in Christ's Priesthood, as already stated (3,5). Therefore it seems that a character is imprinted by each sacrament of the New Law.
IIIª q. 63 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, character se habet ad animam in qua est, sicut consecratio ad res consecratas. Sed per quodlibet sacramentum novae legis homo recipit gratiam sanctificantem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod per quodlibet sacramentum novae legis imprimatur character. Objection 2. Further, a character may be compared to the soul in which it is, as a consecration to that which is consecrated. But by each sacrament of the New Law man becomes the recipient of sanctifying grace, as stated above (Question 62, Article 1). Therefore it seems that a character is imprinted by each sacrament of the New Law.
IIIª q. 63 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, character est res et sacramentum. Sed in quolibet sacramento novae legis est aliquid quod est res tantum, et aliquid quod est sacramentum tantum, et aliquid quod est res et sacramentum. Ergo per quodlibet sacramentum novae legis imprimitur character. Objection 3. Further, a character is both a reality and a sacrament. But in each sacrament of the New Law, there is something which is only a reality, and something which is only a sacrament, and something which is both reality and sacrament. Therefore a character is imprinted by each sacrament of the New Law.
IIIª q. 63 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod sacramenta in quibus imprimitur character, non reiterantur, eo quod character est indelebilis, ut dictum est. Quaedam autem sacramenta iterantur, sicut patet de poenitentia et matrimonio. Ergo non omnia sacramenta imprimunt characterem. On the contrary, Those sacraments in which a character is imprinted, are not reiterated, because a character is indelible, as stated above (Article 5): whereas some sacraments are reiterated, for instance, penance and matrimony. Therefore not all the sacraments imprint a character.
IIIª q. 63 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sacramenta novae legis ad duo ordinantur, scilicet in remedium peccati, et ad cultum divinum. Est autem omnibus sacramentis commune quod per ea exhibetur aliquod remedium contra peccatum, per hoc quod gratiam conferunt. Non autem omnia sacramenta ordinantur directe ad divinum cultum, sicut patet de poenitentia, per quam homo liberatur a peccato, non autem per hoc sacramentum exhibetur homini aliquid de novo pertinens ad divinum cultum, sed restituitur in statum pristinum. Pertinet autem aliquod sacramentum ad divinum cultum tripliciter, uno modo, per modum ipsius actionis; alio modo, per modum agentis; tertio modo, per modum recipientis. Per modum quidem ipsius actionis pertinet ad divinum cultum Eucharistia, in qua principaliter divinus cultus consistit, inquantum est Ecclesiae sacrificium. Et per hoc idem sacramentum non imprimitur homini character, quia per hoc sacramentum non ordinatur homo ad aliquid aliud ulterius agendum vel recipiendum in sacramentis, cum potius sit finis et consummatio omnium sacramentorum, ut Dionysius dicit, III cap. Eccles. Hier. Continet tamen in seipso Christum, in quo non est character, sed tota sacerdotii plenitudo. Sed ad agentes in sacramentis pertinet sacramentum ordinis, quia per hoc sacramentum deputantur homines ad sacramenta aliis tradenda. Sed ad recipientes pertinet sacramentum Baptismi, per quod homo accipit potestatem recipiendi alia Ecclesiae sacramenta, unde Baptismus dicitur esse ianua sacramentorum. Ad idem etiam ordinatur quodammodo confirmatio, ut infra suo loco dicetur. Et ideo per haec tria sacramenta character imprimitur, scilicet Baptismum, confirmationem et ordinem. I answer that, As stated above (62, 1,5), the sacraments of the New Law are ordained for a twofold purpose, namely, as a remedy for sin, and for the Divine worship. Now all the sacraments, from the fact that they confer grace, have this in common, that they afford a remedy against sin: whereas not all the sacraments are directly ordained to the Divine worship. Thus it is clear that penance, whereby man is delivered from sin, does not afford man any advance in the Divine worship, but restores him to his former state. Now a sacrament may belong to the Divine worship in three ways: first in regard to the thing done; secondly, in regard to the agent; thirdly, in regard to the recipient. In regard to the thing done, the Eucharist belongs to the Divine worship, for the Divine worship consists principally therein, so far as it is the sacrifice of the Church. And by this same sacrament a character is not imprinted on man; because it does not ordain man to any further sacramental action or benefit received, since rather is it "the end and consummation of all the sacraments," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii). But it contains within itself Christ, in Whom there is not the character, but the very plenitude of the Priesthood. But it is the sacrament of order that pertains to the sacramental agents: for it is by this sacrament that men are deputed to confer sacraments on others: while the sacrament of Baptism pertains to the recipients, since it confers on man the power to receive the other sacraments of the Church; whence it is called the "door of the sacraments." In a way Confirmation also is ordained for the same purpose, as we shall explain in its proper place (65, 3). Consequently, these three sacraments imprint a character, namely, Baptism, Confirmation, and order.
IIIª q. 63 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per omnia sacramenta fit homo particeps sacerdotii Christi, utpote percipiens aliquem effectum eius, non tamen per omnia sacramenta aliquis deputatur ad agendum aliquid vel recipiendum quod pertineat ad cultum sacerdotii Christi. Quod quidem exigitur ad hoc quod sacramentum characterem imprimat. Reply to Objection 1. Every sacrament makes man of the a participator in Christ's Priesthood, from the fact that it confers on him some effect thereof. But every sacrament does not depute a man to do or receive something pertaining to the worship of the priesthood of Christ: while it is just this that is required for a sacrament to imprint a character.
IIIª q. 63 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod per omnia sacramenta sanctificatur homo, propter hoc quod sanctitas importat munditiam a peccato, quod fit per gratiam. Sed specialiter per quaedam sacramenta, quae characterem imprimunt, homo sanctificatur quadam consecratione, utpote deputatus ad divinum cultum, sicut etiam res inanimatae sanctificari dicuntur inquantum divino cultui deputantur. Reply to Objection 2. Man is sanctified by each of the sacraments, since sanctity means immunity from sin, which is the effect of grace. But in a special way some sacraments, which imprint a character, bestow on man a certain consecration, thus deputing him to the Divine worship: just as inanimate things are said to be consecrated forasmuch as they are deputed to Divine worship.
IIIª q. 63 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet character sit res et sacramentum, non tamen oportet id quod est res et sacramentum, esse characterem. Quid autem sit res et sacramentum in aliis sacramentis, infra dicetur. Reply to Objection 3. Although a character is a reality and a sacrament, it does not follow that whatever is a reality and a sacrament, is also a character. With regard to the other sacraments we shall explain further on what is the reality and what is the sacrament.

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