Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part III/Q6

From The Logic Museum

Jump to: navigation, search
Q5 Q7



Latin English
IIIª q. 6 pr. Deinde considerandum est de ordine assumptionis praedictae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum filius Dei assumpserit carnem mediante anima. Secundo, utrum assumpserit animam mediante spiritu, sive mente. Tertio, utrum anima Christi fuerit prius assumpta a verbo quam caro. Quarto, utrum caro fuerit prius a verbo assumpta quam animae unita. Quinto, utrum tota humana natura sit assumpta mediantibus partibus. Sexto, utrum sit assumpta mediante gratia. Question 6. The order of assumption 1. Did the Son of God assume flesh through the medium of the soul? 2. Did he assume the soul through the medium of the spirit or mind? 3. Was the soul assumed previous to the flesh? 4. Was the flesh of Christ assumed by the Word previous to being united to the soul? 5. Was the whole human nature assumed through the medium of the parts? 6. Was it assumed through the medium of grace?
IIIª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei non assumpserit carnem mediante anima. Perfectior enim est modus quo filius Dei unitur humanae naturae et partibus eius, quam quo est in omnibus creaturis. Sed in creaturis est immediate per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam. Ergo multo magis filius Dei unitur carni, et non mediante anima. Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the soul. For the mode in which the Son of God is united to human nature and its parts, is more perfect than the mode whereby He is in all creatures. But He is in all creatures immediately by essence, power and presence. Much more, therefore, is the Son of God united to flesh without the medium of the soul.
IIIª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, anima et caro unita sunt Dei verbo in unitate hypostasis seu personae. Sed corpus immediate pertinet ad personam sive hypostasim hominis, sicut et anima. Quinimmo magis videtur se de propinquo habere ad hypostasim hominis corpus, quod est materia quam anima, quae est forma, quia principium individuationis, quae importatur in nomine hypostasis, videtur esse materia. Ergo filius Dei non assumpsit carnem mediante anima. Objection 2. Further, the soul and flesh are united to the Word of God in unity of hypostasis or person. But the body pertains immediately to the human hypostasis or person, even as the soul. Indeed, the human body, since it is matter, would rather seem to be nearer the hypostasis than the soul, which is a form, since the principle of individuation, which is implied in the word "hypostasis," would seem to be matter. Hence the Son of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the soul.
IIIª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, remoto medio, separantur ea quae per medium coniunguntur, sicut, remota superficie, cessaret color a corpore, qui inest corpori per superficiem. Sed, separata per mortem anima, adhuc remanet unio verbi ad carnem, quod infra patebit. Ergo verbum non coniungitur carni mediante anima. Objection 3. Further, take away the medium and you separate what were joined by the medium; for example, if the superficies be removed color would leave the body, since it adheres to the body through the medium of the superficies. But though the soul was separated from the body by death, yet there still remained the union of the Word to the flesh, as will be shown (50, 2,3). Hence the Word was not joined to flesh through the medium of the soul.
IIIª q. 6 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Volusianum, ipsa magnitudo divinae virtutis animam sibi rationalem, et per eandem corpus humanum, totumque omnino hominem, in melius mutandum, coaptavit. On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvi): "The greatness of the Divine power fitted to itself a rational soul, and through it a human body, so as to raise the whole man to something higher."
IIIª q. 6 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod medium dicitur respectu principii et finis. Unde, sicut principium et finis important ordinem, ita et medium. Est autem duplex ordo, unus quidem temporis; alius autem naturae. Secundum autem ordinem temporis, non dicitur in mysterio incarnationis aliquid medium, quia totam naturam humanam simul sibi Dei verbum univit, ut infra patebit. Ordo autem naturae inter aliqua potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, secundum dignitatis gradum, sicut dicimus Angelos esse medios inter homines et Deum; alio modo, secundum rationem causalitatis, sicut dicimus mediam causam existere inter primam causam et ultimum effectum. Et hic secundus ordo aliquo modo consequitur primum, sicut enim dicit Dionysius, XIII cap. Cael. Hier., Deus per substantias magis propinquas agit in ea quae sunt magis remota. Si ergo attendamus gradum dignitatis, anima media invenitur inter Deum et carnem. Et secundum hoc, potest dici quod filius Dei univit sibi carnem mediante anima. Sed secundum ordinem causalitatis, ipsa anima est aliqualiter causa carnis uniendae filio Dei. Non enim esset assumptibilis nisi per ordinem quem habet ad animam rationalem, secundum quam habet quod sit caro humana, dictum est enim supra quod natura humana prae ceteris est assumptibilis. I answer that, A medium is in reference to a beginning and an end. Hence as beginning and end imply order, so also does a medium. Now there is a twofold order: one, of time; the other, of nature. But in the mystery of Incarnation nothing is said to be a medium in the order of time, for the Word of God united the whole human nature to Himself at the same time, as will appear (30, 3). An order of nature between things may be taken in two ways: first, as regards rank of dignity, as we say the angels are midway between man and God; secondly, as regards the idea of causality, as we say a cause is midway between the first cause and the last effect. And this second order follows the first to some extent; for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiii), God acts upon the more remote substances through the less remote. Hence if we consider the rank of dignity, the soul is found to be midway between God and flesh; and in this way it may be said that the Son of God united flesh to Himself, through the medium of the soul. But even as regards the second order of causality the soul is to some extent the cause of flesh being united to the Son of God. For the flesh would not have been assumable, except by its relation to the rational soul, through which it becomes human flesh. For it was said above (Question 4, Article 1) that human nature was assumable before all others.
IIIª q. 6 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex ordo considerari potest inter creaturam et Deum. Unus quidem, secundum quod creaturae causantur a Deo et dependent ab ipso sicut a principio sui esse. Et sic, propter infinitatem suae virtutis, Deus immediate attingit quamlibet rem, causando et conservando. Et ad hoc pertinet quod Deus immediate est in omnibus per essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam. Alius autem ordo est secundum quod res reducuntur in Deum sicut in finem. Et quantum ad hoc, invenitur medium inter creaturam et Deum, quia inferiores creaturae reducuntur in Deum per superiores, ut dicit Dionysius, in libro Caelest. Hier. Et ad hunc ordinem pertinet assumptio humanae naturae a verbo Dei quod est terminus assumptionis. Et ideo per animam unitur carni. Reply to Objection 1. We may consider a twofold order between creatures and God: the first is by reason of creatures being caused by God and depending on Him as on the principle of their being; and thus on account of the infinitude of His power God touches each thing immediately, by causing and preserving it, and so it is that God is in all things by essence, presence and power. But the second order is by reason of things being directed to God as to their end; and it is here that there is a medium between the creature and God, since lower creatures are directed to God by higher, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); and to this order pertains the assumption of human nature by the Word of God, Who is the term of the assumption; and hence it is united to flesh through the soul.
IIIª q. 6 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, si hypostasis verbi Dei constitueretur simpliciter per naturam humanam, sequeretur quod corpus esset ei vicinius, cum sit materia, quae est individuationis principium, sicut et anima, quae est forma specifica, propinquius se habet ad naturam humanam. Sed quia hypostasis est prior et altior quam humana natura, tanto id quod est in humana natura propinquius se habet, quanto est altius. Et ideo propinquior est verbo Dei anima quam corpus. Reply to Objection 2. If the hypostasis of the Word of God were constituted simply by human nature, it would follow that the body was nearest to it, since it is matter which is the principle of individuation; even as the soul, being the specific form, would be nearer the human nature. But because the hypostasis of the Word is prior to and more exalted than the human nature, the more exalted any part of the human nature is, the nearer it is to the hypostasis of the Word. And hence the soul is nearer the Word of God than the body is.
IIIª q. 6 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse causam alicuius quantum ad aptitudinem et congruitatem, quo tamen remoto, id non tollitur, quia, etsi fieri alicuius dependeat ex aliquo, postquam tamen est in facto esse, ab eo non dependet. Sicut, si inter aliquos amicitia causaretur aliquo mediante, eo recedente adhuc amicitia remanet, et si aliqua in matrimonium ducitur propter pulchritudinem, quae facit congruitatem in muliere ad copulam coniugalem, tamen, cessante pulchritudine, adhuc durat copula coniugalis. Et similiter, separata anima, remanet unio verbi Dei ad carnem. Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents one thing being the cause of the aptitude and congruity of another, and yet if it be taken away the other remains; because although a thing's becoming may depend on another, yet when it is in being it no longer depends on it, just as a friendship brought about by some other may endure when the latter has gone; or as a woman is taken in marriage on account of her beauty, which makes a woman's fittingness for the marriage tie, yet when her beauty passes away, the marriage tie still remains. So likewise, when the soul was separated, the union of the Word with flesh still endured.
IIIª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei non assumpsit animam mediante spiritu. Idem enim non cadit medium inter ipsum et aliquid aliud. Sed spiritus, sive mens, non est aliud in essentia ab ipsa anima, ut in prima parte dictum est. Ergo filius Dei non assumpsit animam mediante spiritu, sive mente. Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind. For nothing is a medium between itself and another. But the spirit is nothing else in essence but the soul itself, as was said above (I, 77, 1, ad 1). Therefore the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind.
IIIª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, id quo mediante facta est assumptio, videtur magis assumptibile. Sed spiritus, sive mens, non est magis assumptibilis quam anima, quod patet ex hoc quod spiritus angelici non sunt assumptibiles, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod filius Dei non assumpserit animam mediante spiritu. Objection 2. Further, what is the medium of the assumption is itself more assumable. But the spirit or mind is not more assumable than the soul; which is plain from the fact that angelic spirits are not assumable, as was said above (Question 4, Article 1). Hence it seems that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit.
IIIª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, posterius assumitur a primo mediante priori. Sed anima nominat ipsam essentiam, quae est prior naturaliter quam ipsa potentia eius quae est mens. Ergo videtur quod filius Dei non assumpserit animam mediante spiritu vel mente. Objection 3. Further, that which comes later is assumed by the first through the medium of what comes before. But the soul implies the very essence, which naturally comes before its power--the mind. Therefore it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind.
IIIª q. 6 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano, invisibilis et incommutabilis veritas per spiritum animam, et per animam corpus accepit. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xviii): "The invisible and unchangeable Truth took a soul by means of the spirit, and a body by means of the soul."
IIIª q. 6 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, filius Dei dicitur assumpsisse carnem anima mediante, tum propter ordinem dignitatis, tum etiam propter congruitatem assumptionis. Utrumque autem horum invenitur si comparemus intellectum, qui spiritus dicitur, ad ceteras animae partes. Non enim anima est assumptibilis secundum congruitatem nisi per hoc quod est capax Dei, ad imaginem eius existens, quod est secundum mentem, quae spiritus dicitur, secundum illud Ephes. IV, renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae. Similiter etiam intellectus, inter ceteras partes animae, est superior et dignior et Deo similior. Et ideo, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, unitum est carni per medium intellectum verbum Dei, intellectus enim est quod est animae purissimum; sed et Deus est intellectus. I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the Son of God is said to have assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, on account of the order of dignity, and the congruity of the assumption. Now both these may be applied to the intellect, which is called the spirit, if we compare it with the other parts of the soul. For the soul is assumed congruously only inasmuch as it has a capacity for God, being in His likeness: which is in respect of the mind that is called the spirit, according to Ephesians 4:23: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind." So, too, the intellect is the highest and noblest of the parts of the soul, and the most like to God, and hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "the Word of God is united to flesh through the medium of the intellect; for the intellect is the purest part of the soul, God Himself being an intellect."
IIIª q. 6 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si intellectus non sit aliud ab anima secundum essentiam, distinguitur tamen ab aliis partibus animae secundum rationem potentiae. Et secundum hoc competit sibi ratio medii. Reply to Objection 1. Although the intellect is not distinct from the soul in essence, it is distinct from the other parts of the soul as a power; and it is in this way that it has the nature of a medium.
IIIª q. 6 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod spiritui angelico non deest congruitas ad assumptionem propter defectum dignitatis, sed propter irreparabilitatem casus. Quod non potest dici de spiritu humano, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt. Reply to Objection 2. Fitness for assumption is wanting to the angelic spirits, not from any lack of dignity, but because of the irremediableness of their fall, which cannot be said of the human spirit, as is clear from what has been said above (I, 62, 8; I, 64, 2).
IIIª q. 6 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod anima inter quam et Dei verbum ponitur medium intellectus, non accipitur pro essentia animae, quae est omnibus potentiis communis, sed pro potentiis inferioribus, quae sunt omni animae communes. Reply to Objection 3. The soul, between which and the Word of God the intellect is said to be a medium, does not stand for the essence of the soul, which is common to all the powers, but for the lower powers, which are common to every soul.
IIIª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi fuerit prius assumpta a verbo quam caro. Filius enim Dei assumpsit carnem mediante anima, ut dictum est. Sed prius pervenitur ad medium quam ad extremum. Ergo filius Dei prius assumpsit animam quam corpus. Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ was assumed before the flesh by the Word. For the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, as was said above (Article 1). Now the medium is reached before the end. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul before the body.
IIIª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, anima Christi est dignior Angelis, secundum illud Psalmi, adorate eum, omnes Angeli eius. Sed Angeli creati sunt a principio, ut in primo habitum est. Ergo et anima Christi. Quae non fuit ante creata quam assumpta, dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod nunquam neque anima neque corpus Christi propriam habuerunt hypostasim praeter verbi hypostasim. Ergo videtur quod anima fuerit ante assumpta quam caro, quae est concepta in utero virginali. Objection 2. Further, the soul of Christ is nobler than the angels, according to Psalm 96:8: "Adore Him, all you His angels." But the angels were created in the beginning, as was said above (I, 46, 3). Therefore the soul of Christ also (was created in the beginning). But it was not created before it was assumed, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2,3,9), that "neither the soul nor the body of Christ ever had any hypostasis save the hypostasis of the Word." Therefore it would seem that the soul was assumed before the flesh, which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin.
IIIª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, Ioan. I dicitur, vidimus eum plenum gratiae et veritatis, et postea sequitur, de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus, idest, omnes fideles quocumque tempore, ut Chrysostomus exponit. Hoc autem non esset nisi Christus habuisset plenitudinem gratiae et veritatis ante omnes sanctos qui fuerunt ab origine mundi, quia causa non est posterior causato. Cum ergo plenitudo gratiae et veritatis fuerit in anima Christi ex unione ad verbum, secundum illud quod ibidem dicitur, vidimus gloriam eius quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis; consequens videtur quod a principio mundi anima Christi fuisset a verbo Dei assumpta. Objection 3. Further, it is written (John 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulgate: 'His glory'] full of grace and truth," and it is added afterwards that "of His fulness we have all received" (John 1:16), i.e. all the faithful of all time, as Chrysostom expounds it (Hom. xiii in Joan.). Now this could not have been unless the soul of Christ had all fulness of grace and truth before all the saints, who were from the beginning of the world, for the cause is not subsequent to the effect. Hence since the fulness of grace and truth was in the soul of Christ from union with the Word, according to what is written in the same place: "We saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth," it would seem in consequence that from the beginning of the world the soul of Christ was assumed by the Word of God.
IIIª q. 6 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in IV libro, non, ut quidam mentiuntur, ante eam quae est ex virgine incarnationem, intellectus est unitus Deo verbo, et ex tunc vocatus est Christus. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 6): "The intellect was not, as some untruthfully say, united to the true God, and henceforth called Christ, before Incarnation which was of the Virgin."
IIIª q. 6 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes posuit omnes animas a principio fuisse creatas, inter quas etiam posuit animam Christi creatam. Sed hoc quidem est inconveniens, scilicet, si ponatur quod fuerit tunc creata sed non statim verbo unita, quia sequeretur quod anima illa habuisset aliquando propriam subsistentiam sine verbo. Et sic, cum fuisset a verbo assumpta, vel non esset facta unio secundum substinentiam; vel corrupta fuisset subsistentia animae praeexistens. Similiter etiam est inconveniens si ponatur quod anima illa fuerit a principio verbo unita, et postmodum in utero virginis incarnata. Quia sic eius anima non videretur eiusdem esse naturae cum nostris, quae simul creantur dum corporibus infunduntur. Unde Leo Papa dicit, in epistola ad Iulianum, quod non alterius naturae erat caro quam nostra, nec alio illi quam ceteris hominibus est anima inspirata principio. I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8; ii, 8) maintained that all souls, amongst which he placed Christ's soul, were created in the beginning. But this is not fitting, if we suppose that it was first of all created, but not at once joined to the Word, since it would follow that this soul once had its proper subsistence without the Word; and thus, since it was assumed by the Word, either the union did not take place in the subsistence, or the pre-existing subsistence of the soul was corrupted. So likewise it is not fitting to suppose that this soul was united to the Word from the beginning, and that it afterwards became incarnate in the womb of the Virgin; for thus His soul would not seem to be of the same nature as ours, which are created at the same time that they are infused into bodies. Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Julian. xxxv) that "Christ's flesh was not of a different nature to ours, nor was a different soul infused into it in the beginning than into other men."
IIIª q. 6 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, anima Christi dicitur esse medium in unione carnis ad verbum secundum ordinem naturae. Non autem oportet ex hoc quod fuerit medium ex ordine temporis. Reply to Objection 1. As was said above (Article 1), the soul of Christ is said to be the medium in the union of the flesh with the Word, in the order of nature; but it does not follow from this that it was the medium in the order of time.
IIIª q. 6 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Leo Papa in eadem epistola, dicit, anima Christi excellit non diversitate generis, sed sublimitate virtutis. Est enim eiusdem generis cum nostris animabus, sed excellit etiam Angelos secundum plenitudinem gratiae et veritatis. Modus autem incarnationis respondet animae secundum proprietatem sui generis, ex quo habet, cum sit corporis forma, ut creetur simul dum corpori infunditur et unitur. Quod non competit Angelis, quia sunt substantiae omnino a corporibus absolutae. Reply to Objection 2. As Pope Leo says in the same Epistle, Christ's soul excels our soul "not by diversity of genus, but by sublimity of power"; for it is of the same genus as our souls, yet excels even the angels in "fulness of grace and truth." But the mode of creation is in harmony with the generic property of the soul; and since it is the form of the body, it is consequently created at the same time that it is infused into and united with the body; which does not happen to angels, since they are substances entirely free from matter.
IIIª q. 6 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod de plenitudine Christi omnes homines accipiunt secundum fidem quam habent in ipsum, dicitur enim Rom. III, quod iustitia Dei est per fidem Iesu Christi in omnes et super omnes qui credunt in ipsum. Sicut autem nos in ipsum credimus ut incarnatum, ita antiqui crediderunt in ipsum ut nasciturum, habentes enim eundem spiritum credimus, ut dicitur II Cor. IV. Habet autem fides quae est in Christum virtutem iustificandi ex proposito gratiae Dei, secundum illud Rom. IV, ei qui non operatur, credenti autem in eum qui iustificat impium, fides reputatur ad iustitiam secundum propositum gratiae Dei. Unde, quia hoc propositum est aeternum, nihil prohibet per fidem Iesu Christi aliquos iustificari antequam eius anima esset plena gratia et veritate. Reply to Objection 3. Of the fulness of Christ all men receive according to the faith they have in Him; for it is written (Romans 3:22) that "the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe in Him." Now just as we believe in Him as already born; so the ancients believed in Him as about to be born, since "having the same spirit of faith . . . we also believe," as it is written (2 Corinthians 4:13). But the faith which is in Christ has the power of justifying by reason of the purpose of the grace of God, according to Romans 4:5: "But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to the purpose of the grace of God." Hence because this purpose is eternal, there is nothing to hinder some from being justified by the faith of Jesus Christ, even before His soul was full of grace and truth.
IIIª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caro Christi fuit primo a verbo assumpta quam animae unita. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de fide ad Petrum, firmissime tene, et nullatenus dubites, non carnem Christi sine divinitate conceptam in utero virginis antequam susciperetur a verbo. Sed caro Christi videtur prius fuisse concepta quam animae rationali unita, quia materialis dispositio prius est in via generationis quam forma completiva. Ergo prius fuit caro Christi assumpta quam animae unita. Objection 1. It would seem that the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul. For Augustine [Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum xviii): "Most firmly hold, and nowise doubt that the flesh of Christ was not conceived in the womb of the Virgin without the Godhead before it was assumed by the Word." But the flesh of Christ would seem to have been conceived before being united to the rational soul, because matter or disposition is prior to the completive form in order of generation. Therefore the flesh of Christ was assumed before being united to the soul.
IIIª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut anima est pars naturae humanae, ita et corpus. Sed anima humana non habuit aliud principium sui esse in Christo quam in aliis hominibus, ut patet ex auctoritate Leonis Papae supra inducta. Ergo videtur quod nec corpus Christi aliter habuit principium essendi quam in nobis. Sed in nobis ante concipitur caro quam adveniat anima rationalis. Ergo etiam ita fuit in Christo. Et sic caro prius fuit a verbo assumpta quam animae unita. Objection 2. Further, as the soul is a part of human nature, so is the body. But the human soul in Christ had no other principle of being than in other men, as is clear from the authority of Pope Leo, quoted above (3). Therefore it would seem that the body of Christ had no other principle of being than we have. But in us the body is begotten before the rational soul comes to it. Therefore it was the same in Christ; and thus the flesh was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul.
IIIª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut dicitur in libro de causis, causa prima plus influit in causatum, et prius unitur ei quam causa secunda. Sed anima Christi comparatur ad verbum sicut causa secunda ad primam. Prius ergo verbum est unitum carni quam anima. Objection 3. Further, as is said (De Causis), the first cause excels the second in bringing about the effect, and precedes it in its union with the effect. But the soul of Christ is compared to the Word as a second cause to a first. Hence the Word was united to the flesh before it was to the soul.
IIIª q. 6 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, simul Dei verbi caro, simul caro animata, rationalis et intellectualis. Non ergo unio verbi ad carnem praecessit unionem ad animam. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): "At the same time the Word of God was made flesh, and flesh was united to a rational and intellectual soul." Therefore the union of the Word with the flesh did not precede the union with the soul.
IIIª q. 6 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod caro humana est assumptibilis a verbo secundum ordinem quem habet ad animam rationalem sicut ad propriam formam. Hunc autem ordinem non habet antequam anima rationalis ei adveniat, quia simul dum aliqua materia fit propria alicuius formae, recipit illam formam; unde in eodem instanti terminatur alteratio in quo introducitur forma substantialis. Et inde est quod caro non debuit ante assumi quam esset caro humana, quod factum est anima rationali adveniente. Sicut igitur anima non est prius assumpta quam caro, quia contra naturam animae est ut prius sit quam corpori uniatur; ita caro non debuit prius assumi quam anima, quia non prius est caro humana quam habeat animam rationalem. I answer that, The human flesh is assumable by the Word on account of the order which it has to the rational soul as to its proper form. Now it has not this order before the rational soul comes to it, because when any matter becomes proper to any form, at the same time it receives that form; hence the alteration is terminated at the same instant in which the substantial form is introduced. And hence it is that the flesh ought not to have been assumed before it was human flesh; and this happened when the rational soul came to it. Therefore since the soul was not assumed before the flesh, inasmuch as it is against the nature of the soul to be before it is united to the body, so likewise the flesh ought not to have been assumed before the soul, since it is not human flesh before it has a rational soul.
IIIª q. 6 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caro humana sortitur esse per animam. Et ideo ante adventum animae non est caro humana, sed potest esse dispositio ad carnem humanam. In conceptione tamen Christi spiritus sanctus, qui est agens infinitae virtutis, simul et materiam disposuit et ad perfectum perduxit. Reply to Objection 1. Human flesh depends upon the soul for its being; and hence, before the coming of the soul, there is no human flesh, but there may be a disposition towards human flesh. Yet in the conception of Christ, the Holy Ghost, Who is an agent of infinite might, disposed the matter and brought it to its perfection at the same time.
IIIª q. 6 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod forma actu dat speciem, materia autem, quantum est de se, est in potentia ad speciem. Et ideo contra rationem formae esset quod praeexisteret naturae speciei, quae perficitur per unionem eius ad materiam, non autem est contra naturam materiae quod praeexistat naturae speciei. Et ideo dissimilitudo quae est inter originem nostram et originem Christi secundum hoc quod caro nostra prius concipitur quam animetur, non autem caro Christi, est secundum id quod praecedit naturae complementum, sicut et quod nos concipimur ex semine viri, non autem Christus. Sed differentia quae esset quantum ad originem animae, redundaret in diversitatem naturae. Reply to Objection 2. The form actually gives the species; but the matter in itself is in potentiality to the species. And hence it would be against the nature of a form to exist before the specific nature. And therefore the dissimilarity between our origin and Christ's origin, inasmuch as we are conceived before being animated, and Christ's flesh is not, is by reason of what precedes the perfection of the nature, viz. that we are conceived from the seed of man, and Christ is not. But a difference which would be with reference to the origin of the soul, would bespeak a diversity of nature.
IIIª q. 6 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum Dei per prius intelligitur unitum carni quam anima per modum communem quo est in ceteris creaturis per essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam, prius tamen dico, non tempore, sed natura. Prius enim intelligitur caro ut quoddam ens, quod habet a verbo, quam ut animata, quod habet ab anima. Sed unione personali prius secundum intellectum oportet quod caro uniatur animae quam verbo, quia ex unione ad animam habet quod sit unibilis verbo in persona; praesertim quia persona non invenitur nisi in rationali natura. Reply to Objection 3. The Word of God is understood to be united to the flesh before the soul by the common mode whereby He is in the rest of creatures by essence, power, and presence. Yet I say "before," not in time, but in nature; for the flesh is understood as a being, which it has from the Word, before it is understood as animated, which it has from the soul. But by the personal union we understand the flesh as united to the soul before it is united to the Word, for it is from its union with the soul that it is capable of being united to the Word in Person; especially since a person is found only in the rational nature
IIIª q. 6 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei assumpserit totam naturam humanam mediantibus partibus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de agone Christiano, quod invisibilis et incommutabilis veritas per spiritum animam, per animam corpus, et sic totum hominem assumpsit. Sed spiritus, anima et corpus sunt partes totius hominis. Ergo totum hominem assumpsit mediantibus partibus. Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God assumed the whole human nature through the medium of its parts. For Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xviii) that "the invisible and unchangeable Truth assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit, and the body through the medium of the soul, and in this way the whole man." But the spirit, soul, and body are parts of the whole man. Therefore He assumed all, through the medium of the parts.
IIIª q. 6 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, ideo Dei filius carnem assumpsit mediante anima, quia anima est Deo similior quam corpus. Sed partes humanae naturae, cum sint simpliciores videntur esse similiores ei, qui est simplicissimus, quam totum. Ergo assumpsit totum mediantibus partibus. Objection 2. Further, the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul because the soul is more like to God than the body. But the parts of human nature, since they are simpler than the body, would seem to be more like to God, Who is most simple, than the whole. Therefore He assumed the whole through the medium of the parts.
IIIª q. 6 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, totum resultat ex unione partium. Sed unio intelligitur ut terminus assumptionis, partes autem praeintelliguntur assumptioni. Ergo assumpsit totum per partes. Objection 3. Further, the whole results from the union of parts. But the union is taken to be the term of the assumption, and the parts are presupposed to the assumption. Therefore He assumed the whole by the parts.
IIIª q. 6 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, in domino Iesu Christo non partes partium intuemur, sed quae proxime componuntur, idest deitatem et humanitatem. Humanitas autem est quoddam totum, quod componitur ex anima et corpore sicut ex partibus. Ergo filius Dei assumpsit partes mediante toto. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 16): "In our Lord Jesus Christ we do not behold parts of parts, but such as are immediately joined, i.e. the Godhead and the manhood." Now the humanity is a whole, which is composed of soul and body, as parts. Therefore the Son of God assumed the parts through the medium of the whole.
IIIª q. 6 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum dicitur aliquid medium in assumptione incarnationis, non designatur ordo temporis, quia simul facta est assumptio totius et omnium partium. Ostensum est enim quod simul anima et corpus sunt ad invicem unita ad constituendam naturam humanam in verbo. Designatur autem ibi ordo naturae. Unde per id quod est prius natura, assumitur id quod est posterius. Est autem aliquid prius in natura dupliciter, uno modo ex parte agentis, alio modo ex parte materiae; hae enim duae causae praeexistunt rei. Ex parte quidem agentis, est simpliciter primum id quod primo cadit in eius intentione, sed secundum quid est primum illud a quo incipit eius operatio, et hoc ideo, quia intentio est prior operatione. Ex parte vero materiae, est prius illud quod prius existit in transmutatione materiae. In incarnatione autem oportet maxime attendere ordinem qui est ex parte agentis, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Volusianum, in talibus rebus tota ratio facti est potentia facientis. Manifestum est autem quod secundum intentionem facientis prius est completum quam incompletum, et per consequens, totum quam partes. Et ideo dicendum est quod verbum Dei assumpsit partes humanae naturae mediante toto. Sicut enim corpus assumpsit propter ordinem quem habet ad animam rationalem, ita assumpsit corpus et animam propter ordinem quem habent ad humanam naturam. I answer that, When anything is said to be a medium in the assumption of Incarnation, we do not signify order of time, because the assumption of the whole and the parts was simultaneous. For it has been shown (3],4) that the soul and body were mutually united at the same time in order to constitute the human nature of the Word. But it is order of nature that is signified. Hence by what is prior in nature, that is assumed which is posterior in nature. Now a thing is prior in nature in two ways: First on the part of the agent, secondly on the part of the matter; for these two causes precede the thing. On the part of the agent--that is simply first, which is first included in his intention; but that is relatively first, with which his operation begins--and this because the intention is prior to the operation. On the part of the matter--that is first which exists first in the transmutation of the matter. Now in the Incarnation the order depending on the agent must be particularly considered, because, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii), "in such things the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer." But it is manifest that, according to the intention of the doer, what is complete is prior to what is incomplete, and, consequently, the whole to the parts. Hence it must be said that the Word of God assumed the parts of human nature, through the medium of the whole; for even as He assumed the body on account of its relation to the rational soul, so likewise He assumed a body and soul on account of their relation to human nature.
IIIª q. 6 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex verbis illis nihil datur intelligi nisi quod verbum, assumendo partes humanae naturae, assumpsit totam humanam naturam. Et sic assumptio partium prior est in via operationis intellectu, non tempore. Assumptio autem naturae est prior in via intentionis, quod est esse prius simpliciter, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. From these words nothing may be gathered, except that the Word, by assuming the parts of human nature, assumed the whole human nature. And thus the assumption of parts is prior in the order of the intellect, if we consider the operation, but not in order of time; whereas the assumption of the nature is prior if we consider the intention: and this is to be simply first, as was said above.
IIIª q. 6 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus ita est simplex quod etiam est perfectissimus. Et ideo totum est magis simile Deo quam partes, inquantum est perfectius. Reply to Objection 2. God is so simple that He is also most perfect; and hence the whole is more like to God than the parts, inasmuch as it is more perfect.
IIIª q. 6 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod unio personalis est ad quam terminatur assumptio, non autem unio naturae, quae resultat ex coniunctione partium. Reply to Objection 3. It is a personal union wherein the assumption is terminated, not a union of nature, which springs from a conjunction of parts.
IIIª q. 6 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei assumpserit humanam naturam mediante gratia. Per gratiam enim unimur Deo. Sed humana natura in Christo maxime fuit unita. Ergo illa unio facta fuit per gratiam. Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God assumed human nature through the medium of grace. For by grace we are united to God. But the human nature in Christ was most closely united to God. Therefore the union took place by grace.
IIIª q. 6 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut corpus vivit per animam, quae est eius perfectio, ita anima per gratiam. Sed humana natura redditur congrua ad assumptionem per animam, ut dictum est. Ergo et anima redditur congrua ad assumptionem per gratiam. Ergo filius Dei assumpsit animam mediante gratia. Objection 2. Further, as the body lives by the soul, which is its perfection, so does the soul by grace. But the human nature was fitted for the assumption by the soul. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul through the medium of grace.
IIIª q. 6 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus, XV de Trin., dicit quod verbum incarnatum est sicut verbum nostrum in voce. Sed verbum nostrum unitur voci mediante spiritu. Ergo verbum Dei unitur carni mediante spiritu sancto, et ita mediante gratia, quae spiritui sancto attribuitur, secundum illud I ad Cor. XII, divisiones gratiarum sunt, idem autem spiritus. Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 11) that the incarnate Word is like our spoken word. But our word is united to our speech by means of "breathing" [spiritus]. Therefore the Word of God is united to flesh by means of the Holy Spirit, and hence by means of grace, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Corinthians 12:4: "Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit."
IIIª q. 6 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod gratia est quoddam accidens animae, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Unio autem verbi ad humanam naturam est facta secundum subsistentiam, et non secundum accidens ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo natura humana non est assumpta mediante gratia. On the contrary, Grace is an accident in the soul, as was shown above (I-II, 110, 2). Now the union of the Word with human nature took place in the subsistence, and not accidentally, as was shown above (Question 2, Article 6). Therefore the human nature was not assumed by means of grace.
IIIª q. 6 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in Christo ponitur gratia unionis, et gratia habitualis. Gratia ergo non potest intelligi ut medium in assumptione humanae naturae, sive loquamur de gratia unionis, sive de gratia habituali. Gratia enim unionis est ipsum esse personale quod gratis divinitus datur humanae naturae in persona verbi, quod quidem est terminus assumptionis. Gratia autem habitualis pertinens ad specialem sanctitatem illius hominis, est effectus quidam consequens unionem, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus gloriam eius quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis; per quod datur intelligi quod hoc ipso quod ille homo est unigenitus a patre, quod habet per unionem, habet plenitudinem gratiae et veritatis. Si vero intelligatur gratia ipsa voluntas Dei aliquid gratis faciens vel donans, sic unio facta est per gratiam, non sicut per medium, sed sicut per causam efficientem. I answer that, In Christ there was the grace of union and habitual grace. Therefore grace cannot be taken to be the medium of the assumption of the human nature, whether we speak of the grace of union or of habitual grace. For the grace of union is the personal being that is given gratis from above to the human nature in the Person of the Word, and is the term of the assumption. Whereas the habitual grace pertaining to the spiritual holiness of the man is an effect following the union, according to John 1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth"--by which we are given to understand that because this Man (as a result of the union) is the Only-begotten of the Father, He is full of grace and truth. But if by grace we understand the will of God doing or bestowing something gratis, the union took place by grace, not as a means, but as the efficient cause.
IIIª q. 6 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unio nostra ad Deum est per operationem, inquantum scilicet eum cognoscimus et amamus. Et ideo talis unio est per gratiam habitualem, inquantum operatio perfecta procedit ab habitu. Sed unio naturae humanae ad verbum Dei est secundum esse personale, quod non dependet ab aliquo habitu, sed immediate ab ipsa natura. Reply to Objection 1. Our union with God is by operation, inasmuch as we know and love Him; and hence this union is by habitual grace, inasmuch as a perfect operation proceeds from a habit. Now the union of the human nature with the Word of God is in personal being, which depends not on any habit, but on the nature itself.
IIIª q. 6 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod anima est perfectio substantialis corporis, gratia vero est perfectio animae accidentalis. Et ideo gratia non potest ordinare animam ad unionem personalem, quae non est accidentalis, sicut anima corpus. Reply to Objection 2. The soul is the substantial perfection of the body; grace is but an accidental perfection of the soul. Hence grace cannot ordain the soul to personal union, which is not accidental, as the soul ordains the body.
IIIª q. 6 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum nostrum unitur voci mediante spiritu, non quidem sicut medio formali, sed sicut per medium movens, nam ex verbo concepto interius procedit spiritus, ex quo formatur vox. Et similiter ex verbo aeterno procedit spiritus sanctus, qui formavit corpus Christi ut infra patebit. Non autem ex hoc sequitur quod gratia spiritus sancti sit formale medium in unione praedicta. Reply to Objection 3. Our word is united to our speech, by means of breathing [spiritus, not as a formal medium, but as a moving medium. For from the word conceived within, the breathing proceeds, from which the speech is formed. And similarly from the eternal Word proceeds the Holy Spirit, Who formed the body of Christ, as will be shown (32, 1). But it does not follow from this that the grace of the Holy Spirit is the formal medium in the aforesaid union.

Notes


  • [[]]
Personal tools