Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part III/Q4

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Q3 Q5



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IIIª q. 4 pr. Deinde considerandum est de unione ex parte assumpti. Circa quod primo considerandum occurrit de his quae sunt a verbo Dei assumpta; secundo, de coassumptis, quae sunt perfectiones et defectus. Assumpsit autem filius Dei humanam naturam, et partes eius. Unde circa primum triplex consideratio occurrit, prima est, quantum ad ipsam naturam humanam; secunda est, quantum ad partes ipsius; tertia, quantum ad ordinem assumptionis. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum humana natura fuerit magis assumptibilis a filio Dei quam aliqua alia natura. Secundo, utrum assumpserit personam. Tertio, utrum assumpserit hominem. Quarto, utrum fuisset conveniens quod assumpsisset humanam naturam a singularibus separatam. Quinto, utrum fuerit conveniens quod assumpsisset humanam naturam in omnibus singularibus. Sexto, utrum fuerit conveniens quod assumeret humanam naturam in aliquo homine ex stirpe Adae progenito. Question 4. The mode of union of the part of the human nature 1. Was human nature more capable of being assumed than any other nature? 2. Did he assume a person? 3. Did he assume a man? 4. Was it becoming that He should assume human nature abstracted from all individuals? 5. Was it becoming that He should assume human nature in all its individuals? 6. Was it becoming that He should assume human nature in any man begotten of the stock of Adam?
IIIª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod humana natura non fuerit magis assumptibilis a filio Dei quam quaelibet alia natura. Dicit enim Augustinus, in epistola ad Volusianum, in rebus mirabiliter factis tota ratio facti est potentia facientis. Sed potentia Dei facientis incarnationem, quae est opus maxime mirabile, non limitatur ad unam naturam, cum potentia Dei sit infinita. Ergo natura humana non est magis assumptibilis a Deo quam aliqua alia creatura. Objection 1. It would seem that human nature is not more capable of being assumed by the Son of God than any other nature. For Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii): "In deeds wrought miraculously the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer." Now the power of God Who wrought Incarnation, which is a most miraculous work, is not limited to one nature, since the power of God is infinite. Therefore human nature is not more capable of being assumed than any other creature.
IIIª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, similitudo est ratio faciens ad congruitatem incarnationis divinae personae, ut supra dictum est. Sed sicut in natura rationali invenitur similitudo imaginis, ita in natura irrationali invenitur similitudo vestigii. Ergo creatura irrationalis assumptibilis fuit, sicut humana natura. Objection 2. Further, likeness is the foundation of the fittingness of the Incarnation of the Divine Person, as above stated (3, 8). But as in rational creatures we find the likeness of image, so in irrational creatures we find the image of trace. Therefore the irrational creature was as capable of assumption as human nature.
IIIª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, in natura angelica invenitur expressior Dei similitudo quam in natura humana, sicut Gregorius dicit, in homilia de centum ovibus, introducens illud Ezech. XXVIII, tu signaculum similitudinis. Invenitur etiam in Angelo peccatum, sicut in homine, secundum illud Iob IV, in Angelis suis reperit pravitatem. Ergo natura angelica fuit ita assumptibilis sicut natura hominis. Objection 3. Further, in the angelic nature we find a more perfect likeness than in human nature, as Gregory says: (Hom. de Cent. Ovib.; xxxiv in Ev.), where he introduces Ezekiel 28:12: "Thou wast the seal of resemblance." And sin is found in angels, even as in man, according to Job 4:18: "And in His angels He found wickedness." Therefore the angelic nature was as capable of assumption as the nature of man.
IIIª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, cum Deo competat summa perfectio, tanto magis est Deo aliquid simile, quanto est magis perfectum. Sed totum universum est magis perfectum quam partes eius, inter quas est humana natura. Ergo totum universum est magis assumptibile quam humana natura. Objection 4. Further, since the highest perfection belongs to God, the more like to God a thing is, the more perfect it is. But the whole universe is more perfect than its parts, amongst which is human nature. Therefore the whole universe is more capable of being assumed than human nature.
IIIª q. 4 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. VIII, ex ore sapientiae genitae, deliciae meae esse cum filiis hominum. Et ita videtur esse quaedam congruentia unionis filii Dei ad humanam naturam. On the contrary, It is said (Proverbs 8:31) by the mouth of Begotten Wisdom: "My delights were to be with the children of men"; and hence there would seem some fitness in the union of the Son of God with human nature.
IIIª q. 4 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid assumptibile dicitur quasi aptum assumi a divina persona. Quae quidem aptitudo non potest intelligi secundum potentiam passivam naturalem, quae non se extendit ad id quod transcendit ordinem naturalem, quem transcendit unio personalis creaturae ad Deum. Unde relinquitur quod assumptibile aliquid dicatur secundum congruentiam ad unionem praedictam. Quae quidem congruentia attenditur secundum duo in humana natura, scilicet secundum eius dignitatem; et necessitatem. Secundum dignitatem quidem, quia humana natura, inquantum est rationalis et intellectualis, nata est contingere aliqualiter ipsum verbum per suam operationem, cognoscendo scilicet et amando ipsum. Secundum necessitatem autem, quia indigebat reparatione, cum subiaceret originali peccato. Haec autem duo soli humanae naturae conveniunt, nam creaturae irrationali deest congruitas dignitatis; naturae autem angelicae deest congruitas praedictae necessitatis. Unde relinquitur quod sola natura humana sit assumptibilis. I answer that, A thing is said to be assumable as being capable of being assumed by a Divine Person, and this capability cannot be taken with reference to the natural passive power, which does not extend to what transcends the natural order, as the personal union of a creature with God transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is said to be assumable according to some fitness for such a union. Now this fitness in human nature may be taken from two things, viz. according to its dignity, and according to its need. According to its dignity, because human nature, as being rational and intellectual, was made for attaining to the Word to some extent by its operation, viz. by knowing and loving Him. According to its need--because it stood in need of restoration, having fallen under original sin. Now these two things belong to human nature alone. For in the irrational creature the fitness of dignity is wanting, and in the angelic nature the aforesaid fitness of need is wanting. Hence it follows that only human nature was assumable.
IIIª q. 4 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creaturae denominantur aliquales ex eo quod competit eis secundum proprias causas, non autem ex eo quod convenit eis secundum primas causas et universales, sicut dicimus aliquem morbum esse incurabilem, non quia non potest curari a Deo, sed quia per propria principia subiecti curari non potest. Sic ergo dicitur aliqua creatura non esse assumptibilis, non ad subtrahendum aliquid divinae potentiae, sed ad ostendendum conditionem creaturae quae ad hoc aptitudinem non habet. Reply to Objection 1. Creatures are said to be "such" with reference to their proper causes, not with reference to what belongs to them from their first and universal causes; thus we call a disease incurable, not that it cannot be cured by God, but that it cannot be cured by the proper principles of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be not assumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power of God, but in order to show the condition of the creature, which has no capability for this.
IIIª q. 4 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo imaginis attenditur in natura humana secundum quod est capax Dei, scilicet ipsum attingendo propria operatione cognitionis et amoris. Similitudo autem vestigii attenditur solum secundum repraesentationem aliquam ex impressione divina in creatura existentem, non autem ex eo quod creatura irrationalis, in qua est sola talis similitudo possit ad Deum attingere per solam suam operationem. Quod autem deficit a minori, non habet congruitatem ad id quod est maius, sicut corpus quod non est aptum perfici anima sensitiva, multo minus est aptum perfici anima intellectiva. Multo autem est maior et perfectior unio ad Deum secundum esse personale quam quae est secundum operationem. Et ideo creatura irrationalis, quae deficit ab unione ad Deum per operationem, non habet congruitatem ut uniatur ei secundum esse personale. Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of image is found in human nature, forasmuch as it is capable of God, viz. by attaining to Him through its own operation of knowledge and love. But the likeness of trace regards only a representation by Divine impression, existing in the creature, and does not imply that the irrational creature, in which such a likeness is, can attain to God by its own operation alone. For what does not come up to the less, has no fitness for the greater; as a body which is not fitted to be perfected by a sensitive soul is much less fitted for an intellectual soul. Now much greater and more perfect is the union with God in personal being than the union by operation. And hence the irrational creature which falls short of the union with God by operation has no fitness to be united with Him in personal being.
IIIª q. 4 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam dicunt Angelum non esse assumptibilem, quia a principio suae creationis est in sua personalitate perfectus, cum non subiaceat generationi et corruptioni. Unde non potuisset in unitatem divinae personae assumi nisi eius personalitas destrueretur, quod neque convenit incorruptibilitati naturae eius; neque bonitati assumentis, ad quam non pertinet quod aliquid perfectionis in creatura assumpta corrumpat. Sed hoc non videtur totaliter excludere congruitatem assumptionis angelicae naturae. Potest enim Deus producendo novam angelicam naturam, copulare eam sibi in unitate personae, et sic nihil praeexistens ibi corrumperetur. Sed, sicut dictum est, deest congruitas ex parte necessitatis, quia, etsi natura angelica in aliquibus peccato subiaceat, est tamen eius peccatum irremediabile ut in prima parte habitum est. Reply to Objection 3. Some say that angels are not assumable, since they are perfect in their personality from the beginning of their creation, inasmuch as they are not subject to generation and corruption; hence they cannot be assumed to the unity of a Divine Person, unless their personality be destroyed, and this does not befit the incorruptibility of their nature nor the goodness of the one assuming, to Whom it does not belong to corrupt any perfection in the creature assumed. But this would not seem totally to disprove the fitness of the angelic nature for being assumed. For God by producing a new angelic nature could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and in this way nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it. But as was said above, there is wanting the fitness of need, because, although the angelic nature in some is the subject of sin, their sin is irremediable, as stated above (I, 64, 2).
IIIª q. 4 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod perfectio universi non est perfectio unius personae vel suppositi, sed eius quod est unum sub positione vel ordine. Cuius plurimae partes non sunt assumptibiles, ut dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod solum natura humana sit assumptibilis. Reply to Objection 4. The perfection of the universe is not the perfection of one person or suppositum, but of something which is one by position or order, whereof very many parts are not capable of assumption, as was said above. Hence it follows that only human nature is capable of being assumed.
IIIª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei assumpserit personam. Dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam in atomo, idest, in individuo. Sed individuum rationalis naturae est persona, ut patet per Boetium, in libro de duabus naturis. Ergo filius Dei personam assumpsit. Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God assumed a person. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of God "assumed human nature 'in atomo,'" i.e. in an individual. But an individual in rational nature is a person, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.
IIIª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod filius Dei assumpsit ea quae in natura nostra plantavit. Plantavit autem ibi personalitatem. Ergo filius Dei assumpsit personam. Objection 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that the Son of God "assumed what He had sown in our nature." But He sowed our personality there. Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.
IIIª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, nihil consumitur nisi quod est. Sed Innocentius III dicit, in quadam decretali, quod persona Dei consumpsit personam hominis. Ergo videtur quod persona hominis fuit prius assumpta. Objection 3. Further, nothing is absorbed unless it exist. But Innocent III [Paschas. Diac., De Spiritu Sanct. ii] says in a Decretal that "the Person of God absorbed the person of man." Therefore it would seem that the person of man existed previous to its being assumed.
IIIª q. 4 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, quod Deus naturam hominis assumpsit, non personam. On the contrary, Augustine [Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii) that "God assumed the nature, not the person, of man."
IIIª q. 4 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur assumi ex eo quod ad aliquid sumitur. Unde illud quod assumitur oportet praeintelligi assumptioni, sicut id quod movetur localiter praeintelligitur ipsi motui. Persona autem non praeintelligitur in humana natura assumptioni, sed magis se habet ut terminus assumptionis, ut supra dictum est. Si enim praeintelligeretur, vel oporteret quod corrumperetur, et sic frustra esset assumpta. Vel quod remaneret post unionem, et sic essent duae personae, una assumens et alia assumpta; quod est erroneum, ut supra ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod nullo modo filius Dei assumpsit humanam personam. I answer that, A thing is said to be assumed inasmuch as it is taken into another. Hence, what is assumed must be presupposed to the assumption, as what is moved locally is presupposed to the motion. Now a person in human nature is not presupposed to assumption; rather, it is the term of the assumption, as was said (3, 1,2). For if it were presupposed, it must either have been corrupted--in which case it was useless; or it remains after the union--and thus there would be two persons, one assuming and the other assumed, which is false, as was shown above (Question 2, Article 6). Hence it follows that the Son of God nowise assumed a human person.
IIIª q. 4 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod naturam humanam assumpsit filius Dei in atomo, idest, in individuo quod non est aliud a supposito increato quod est persona filii Dei. Unde non sequitur quod persona sit assumpta. Reply to Objection 1. The Son of God assumed human nature "in atomo," i.e. in an individual, which is no other than the uncreated suppositum, the Person of the Son of God. Hence it does not follow that a person was assumed.
IIIª q. 4 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod naturae assumptae non deest propria personalitas propter defectum alicuius quod ad perfectionem humanae naturae pertineat, sed propter additionem alicuius quod est supra humanam naturam, quod est unio ad divinam personam. Reply to Objection 2. Its proper personality is not wanting to the nature assumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the perfection of the human nature but through the addition of something which is above human nature, viz. the union with a Divine Person.
IIIª q. 4 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod consumptio ibi non importat destructionem alicuius quod prius fuerat, sed impeditionem eius quod aliter esse posset. Si enim humana natura non esset assumpta a divina persona, natura humana propriam personalitatem haberet. Et pro tanto dicitur persona consumpsisse personam, licet improprie, quia persona divina sua unione impedivit ne humana natura propriam personalitatem haberet. Reply to Objection 3. Absorption does not here imply the destruction of anything pre-existing, but the hindering what might otherwise have been. For if the human nature had not been assumed by a Divine Person, the human nature would have had its own personality; and in this way is it said, although improperly, that the Person "absorbed the person," inasmuch as the Divine Person by His union hindered the human nature from having its personality.
IIIª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod persona divina assumpserit hominem. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, beatus quem elegisti et assumpsisti, quod Glossa exponit de Christo. Et Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano, filius Dei hominem assumpsit, et in illo humana perpessus est. Objection 1. It would seem that the Divine Person assumed a man. For it is written (Psalm 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee," which a gloss expounds of Christ; and Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi): "The Son of God assumed a man, and in him bore things human."
IIIª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, hoc nomen homo significat naturam humanam. Sed filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam. Ergo assumpsit hominem. Objection 2. Further, the word "man" signifies a human nature. But the Son of God assumed a human nature. Therefore He assumed a man.
IIIª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, filius Dei est homo. Sed non est homo quem non assumpsit quia sic esset pari ratione Petrus, vel quilibet alius homo. Ergo est homo quem assumpsit. Objection 3. Further, the Son of God is a man. But He is not one of the men He did not assume, for with equal reason He would be Peter or any other man. Therefore He is the man whom He assumed.
IIIª q. 4 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est auctoritas Felicis Papae et martyris, quae introducitur in Ephesina synodo, credimus in dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, de virgine Maria natum quia ipse est Dei sempiternus filius et verbum, et non homo a Deo assumptus, ut alter sit praeter illum. Neque enim hominem assumpsit Dei filius ut alter sit praeter ipsum. On the contrary, Is the authority of Felix, Pope and Martyr, which is quoted by the Council of Ephesus: "We believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, because He is the Eternal Son and Word of God, and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there is another besides Him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that there be another besides Him."
IIIª q. 4 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, id quod assumitur non est terminus assumptionis, sed assumptioni praeintelligitur. Dictum est autem quod individuum in quo assumitur natura humana, non est aliud quam divina persona, quae est terminus assumptionis. Hoc autem nomen homo significat humanam naturam prout est nata in supposito esse, quia, ut dicit Damascenus, sicut hoc nomen Deus significat eum qui habet divinam naturam, ita hoc nomen homo significat eum qui habet humanam naturam. Et ideo non est proprie dictum quod filius Dei assumpsit hominem, supponendo, sicut rei veritas se habet, quod in Christo sit unum suppositum et una hypostasis. Sed secundum illos qui ponunt in Christo duas hypostases vel duo supposita, convenienter et proprie dici posset quod filius Dei hominem assumpsisset. Unde et prima opinio quae ponitur sexta distinctione tertii libri sententiarum concedit hominem esse assumptum. Sed illa opinio erronea est, ut supra ostensum est. I answer that, As has been said above (Article 2), what is assumed is not the term of the assumption, but is presupposed to the assumption. Now it was said (3, 1,2) that the individual to Whom the human nature is assumed is none other than the Divine Person, Who is the term of the assumption. Now this word "man" signifies human nature, as it is in a suppositum, because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4,11), this word God signifies Him Who has human nature. And hence it cannot properly be said that the Son assumed a man, granted (as it must be, in fact) that in Christ there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis. But according to such as hold that there are two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, it may fittingly and properly be said that the Son of God assumed a man. Hence the first opinion quoted in Sent. iii, D. 6, grants that a man was assumed. But this opinion is erroneous, as was said above (Question 2, Article 6).
IIIª q. 4 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi locutiones non sunt extendendae, tanquam propriae, sed pie sunt exponendae, ubicumque a sacris doctoribus ponuntur; ut dicamus hominem assumptum, quia eius natura est assumpta; et quia assumptio terminata est ad hoc quod filius Dei sit homo. Reply to Objection 1. These phrases are not to be taken too literally, but are to be loyally explained, wherever they are used by holy doctors; so as to say that a man was assumed, inasmuch as his nature was assumed; and because the assumption terminated in this--that the Son of God is man.
IIIª q. 4 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc nomen homo significat naturam humanam in concreto, prout scilicet est in aliquo supposito. Et ideo, sicut non possumus dicere quod suppositum sit assumptum, ita non possumus dicere quod homo sit assumptus. Reply to Objection 2. The word "man" signifies human nature in the concrete, inasmuch as it is in a suppositum; and hence, since we cannot say a suppositum was assumed, so we cannot say a man was assumed.
IIIª q. 4 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod filius Dei non est homo quem assumpsit; sed cuius naturam assumpsit. Reply to Objection 3. The Son of God is not the man whom He assumed, but the man whose nature He assumed.
IIIª q. 4 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei debuit assumere naturam humanam abstractam ab omnibus individuis. Assumptio enim naturae humanae facta est ad communem omnium hominum salutem, unde dicitur I Tim. IV, de Christo, quod est salvator omnium hominum, maxime fidelium. Sed natura prout est in individuis, recedit a sua communitate. Ergo filius Dei debuit humanam naturam assumere prout est ab omnibus individuis abstracta. Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all individuals. For the assumption of human nature took place for the common salvation of all men; hence it is said of Christ (1 Timothy 4:10) that He is "the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful." But nature as it is in individuals withdraws from its universality. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature as it is abstracted from all individuals.
IIIª q. 4 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, in omnibus quod nobilissimum est Deo est attribuendum. Sed in unoquoque genere id quod est per se potissimum est. Ergo filius Dei debuit assumere per se hominem. Quod quidem, secundum Platonicos, est humana natura ab individuis separata. Hanc ergo debuit filius Dei assumere. Objection 2. Further, what is noblest in all things ought to be attributed to God. But in every genus what is of itself is best. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed self-existing [per se] man, which, according to Platonists, is human nature abstracted from its individuals. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed this.
IIIª q. 4 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, natura humana non est assumpta a filio Dei prout significatur in concreto per hoc nomen homo, ut dictum est. Sic autem significatur prout est in singularibus, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam prout est ab individuis separata. Objection 3. Further, human nature was not assumed by the Son of God in the concrete as is signified by the word "man," as was said above (Article 3). Now in this way it signifies human nature as it is in individuals, as is plain from what has been said (3). Therefore the Son of God assumed human nature as it is separated from individuals.
IIIª q. 4 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus, in III libro, Dei verbum incarnatum neque eam quae nuda contemplatione consideratur naturam assumpsit. Non enim incarnatio hoc, sed deceptio, et fictio incarnationis. Sed natura humana prout est a singularibus separata vel abstracta, in nuda contemplatione cogitatur, quia secundum seipsam non subsistit, ut idem Damascenus dicit. Ergo filius Dei non assumpsit humanam naturam secundum quod est a singularibus separata. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "God the Word Incarnate did not assume a nature which exists in pure thought; for this would have been no Incarnation, but a false and fictitious Incarnation." But human nature as it is separated or abstracted from individuals is "taken to be a pure conception, since it does not exist in itself," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the Son of God did not assume human nature, as it is separated from individuals.
IIIª q. 4 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod natura hominis, vel cuiuscumque alterius rei sensibilis, praeter esse quod in singularibus habet, dupliciter potest intelligi, uno modo, quasi per seipsam esse habeat praeter materiam, sicut Platonici posuerunt; alio modo, sicut in intellectu existens, vel humano vel divino. Per se quidem subsistere non potest, ut philosophus probat, in VII Metaphys., quia ad naturam speciei rerum sensibilium pertinet materia sensibilis, quae ponitur in eius definitione; sicut carnes et ossa in definitione hominis. Unde non potest esse quod natura humana sit praeter materiam sensibilem. Si tamen esset hoc modo subsistens natura humana, non fuisset conveniens ut a verbo Dei assumeretur. Primo quidem, quia assumptio ista terminatur ad personam. Hoc autem est contra rationem formae communis, ut sic in persona individuetur. Secundo, quia naturae communi non possunt attribui nisi operationes communes et universales, secundum quas homo nec meretur nec demeretur, cum tamen illa assumptio ad hoc facta sit ut filius Dei in natura assumpta nobis mereretur. Tertio quia natura sic existens non est sensibilis, sed intelligibilis. Filius autem Dei assumpsit humanam naturam ut hominibus in ea visibilis appareret, secundum illud Baruch III, post haec in terris visus est, et cum hominibus conversatus est. Similiter etiam non potuit assumi natura humana a filio Dei secundum quod est in intellectu divino. Quia sic nihil aliud esset quam natura divina, et per hunc modum, ab aeterno esset in filio Dei humana natura. Similiter non convenit dicere quod filius Dei assumpserit humanam naturam prout est in intellectu humano. Quia hoc nihil aliud esset quam si intelligeretur assumere naturam humanam. Et sic, si non assumeret eam in rerum natura, esset intellectus falsus. Nec aliud esset quam fictio quaedam incarnationis, ut Damascenus dicit. I answer that, The nature of man or of any other sensible thing, beyond the being which it has in individuals, may be taken in two ways: first, as if it had being of itself, away from matter, as the Platonists held; secondly, as existing in an intellect either human or Divine. Now it cannot subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, 26,27,29,51), because sensible matter belongs to the specific nature of sensible things, and is placed in its definition, as flesh and bones in the definition of man. Hence human nature cannot be without sensible matter. Nevertheless, if human nature were subsistent in this way, it would not be fitting that it should be assumed by the Word of God. First, because this assumption is terminated in a Person, and it is contrary to the nature of a common form to be thus individualized in a person. Secondly, because to a common nature can only be attributed common and universal operations, according to which man neither merits nor demerits, whereas, on the contrary, the assumption took place in order that the Son of God, having assumed our nature, might merit for us. Thirdly, because a nature so existing would not be sensible, but intelligible. But the Son of God assumed human nature in order to show Himself in men's sight, according to Baruch 3:38: "Afterwards He was seen upon earth, and conversed with men." Likewise, neither could human nature have been assumed by the Son of God, as it is in the Divine intellect, since it would be none other than the Divine Nature; and, according to this, human nature would be in the Son of God from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in a human intellect, for this would mean nothing else but that He is understood to assume a human nature; and thus if He did not assume it in reality, this would be a false understanding; nor would this assumption of the human nature be anything but a fictitious Incarnation, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11).
IIIª q. 4 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod filius Dei incarnatus est communis omnium salvator, non communitate generis vel speciei, quae attribuitur naturae ab individuis separatae, sed communitate causae, prout filius Dei incarnatus est universalis causa salutis humanae. Reply to Objection 1. The incarnate Son of God is the common Saviour of all, not by a generic or specific community, such as is attributed to the nature separated from the individuals, but by a community of cause, whereby the incarnate Son of God is the universal cause of human salvation.
IIIª q. 4 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod per se homo non invenitur in rerum natura ita quod sit praeter singularia, sicut Platonici posuerunt. Quamvis quidam dicant quod Plato non intellexit hominem separatum esse nisi in intellectu divino. Et sic non oportuit quod assumeretur a verbo, cum ab aeterno sibi affuerit. Reply to Objection 2. Self-existing [per se] man is not to be found in nature in such a way as to be outside the singular, as the Platonists held, although some say Plato believed that the separate man was only in the Divine intellect. And hence it was not necessary for it to be assumed by the Word, since it had been with Him from eternity.
IIIª q. 4 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod natura humana, quamvis non sit assumpta in concreto ut suppositum praeintelligatur assumptioni, sic tamen assumpta est in individuo, quia assumpta est ut sit in individuo. Reply to Objection 3. Although human nature was not assumed in the concrete, as if the suppositum were presupposed to the assumption, nevertheless it is assumed in an individual, since it is assumed so as to be in an individual.
IIIª q. 4 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei humanam naturam assumere debuit in omnibus individuis. Id enim quod primo et per se assumptum est, est natura humana. Sed quod convenit per se alicui naturae, convenit omnibus in eadem natura existentibus. Ergo conveniens fuit ut natura humana assumeretur a Dei verbo in omnibus suppositis. Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all individuals. For what is assumed first and by itself is human nature. But what belongs essentially to a nature belongs to all who exist in the nature. Therefore it was fitting that human nature should be assumed by the Word of God in all its supposita.
IIIª q. 4 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, incarnatio divina processit ex divina caritate, ideo dicitur Ioan. III, sic Deus dilexit mundum ut filium suum unigenitum daret. Sed caritas facit ut aliquis se communicet amicis quantum possibile est. Possibile autem fuit filio Dei ut plures naturas hominum assumeret, ut supra dictum est, et, eadem ratione, omnes. Ergo conveniens fuit ut filius Dei assumeret naturam in omnibus suis suppositis. Objection 2. Further, the Divine Incarnation proceeded from Divine Love; hence it is written (John 3:16): "God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son." But love makes us give ourselves to our friends as much as we can, and it was possible for the Son of God to assume several human natures, as was said above (Question 3, Article 7), and with equal reason all. Hence it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature in all its supposita.
IIIª q. 4 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, sapiens operator perficit opus suum breviori via qua potest. Sed brevior via fuisset si omnes homines assumpti fuissent ad naturalem filiationem, quam quod per unum filium naturalem multi in adoptionem filiorum adducantur, ut dicitur Galat. IV. Ergo natura humana debuit a filio Dei assumi in omnibus suppositis. Objection 3. Further, a skilful workman completes his work in the shortest manner possible. But it would have been a shorter way if all men had been assumed to the natural sonship than for one natural Son to lead many to the adoption of sons, as is written Galatians 4:5 (cf. Hebrews 2:10). Therefore human nature ought to have been assumed by God in all its supposita.
IIIª q. 4 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod filius Dei non assumpsit humanam naturam quae in specie consideratur, neque enim omnes hypostases eius assumpsit. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of God "did not assume human nature as a species, nor did He assume all its hypostases."
IIIª q. 4 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod non fuit conveniens quod humana natura in omnibus suis suppositis a verbo assumeretur. Primo quidem, quia tolleretur multitudo suppositorum humanae naturae, quae est ei connaturalis. Cum enim in natura assumpta non sit considerare aliud suppositum praeter personam assumentem, ut supra dictum est; si non esset natura humana nisi assumpta, sequeretur quod non esset nisi unum suppositum humanae naturae, quod est persona assumens. Secundo, quia hoc derogaret dignitati filii Dei incarnati, prout est primogenitus in multis fratribus secundum humanam naturam, sicut est primogenitus omnis creaturae secundum divinam. Essent enim tunc omnes homines aequalis dignitatis. Tertio, quia conveniens fuit quod, sicut unum suppositum divinum est incarnatum, ita unam solam naturam humanam assumeret, ut ex utraque parte unitas inveniatur. I answer that, It was unfitting for human nature to be assumed by the Word in all its supposita. First, because the multitude of supposita of human nature, which are natural to it, would have been taken away. For since we must not see any other suppositum in the assumed nature, except the Person assuming, as was said above (Article 3), if there was no human nature except what was assumed, it would follow that there was but one suppositum of human nature, which is the Person assuming. Secondly, because this would have been derogatory to the dignity of the incarnate Son of God, as He is the First-born of many brethren, according to the human nature, even as He is the First-born of all creatures according to the Divine, for then all men would be of equal dignity. Thirdly, because it is fitting that as one Divine suppositum is incarnate, so He should assume one human nature, so that on both sides unity might be found.
IIIª q. 4 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod assumi convenit secundum se humanae naturae, quia scilicet non convenit ei ratione personae, sicut naturae divinae convenit assumere ratione personae. Non autem quia convenit ei secundum se sicut pertinens ad principia essentialia eius, vel sicut naturalis eius proprietas, per quem modum conveniret omnibus eius suppositis. Reply to Objection 1. To be assumed belongs to the human nature of itself, because it does not belong to it by reason of a person, as it belongs to the Divine Nature to assume by reason of the Person; not, however, that it belongs to it of itself as if belonging to its essential principles, or as its natural property in which manner it would belong to all its supposita.
IIIª q. 4 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod dilectio Dei ad homines manifestatur non solum in ipsa assumptione humanae naturae, sed praecipue per ea quae passus est in natura humana pro aliis hominibus, secundum illud Rom. V, commendat autem Deus suam caritatem in nobis, quia, cum inimici essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Quod locum non haberet si in omnibus hominibus naturam humanam assumpsisset. Reply to Objection 2. The love of God to men is shown not merely in the assumption of human nature, but especially in what He suffered in human nature for other men, according to Romans 5:8: "But God commendeth His charity towards us; because when as yet we were sinners . . . Christ died for us," which would not have taken place had He assumed human nature in all its supposita.
IIIª q. 4 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ad brevitatem viae quam sapiens operator observat, pertinet quod non faciat per multa quod sufficienter potest fieri per unum. Et ideo convenientissimum fuit quod per unum hominem alii omnes salvarentur. Reply to Objection 3. In order to shorten the way, which every skilful workman does, what can be done by one must not be done by many. Hence it was most fitting that by one man all the rest should be saved.
IIIª q. 4 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens ut filius Dei humanam naturam assumeret ex stirpe Adae. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Heb. VII, decebat ut esset nobis pontifex segregatus a peccatoribus. Sed magis esset a peccatoribus segregatus si non assumpsisset humanam naturam ex stirpe Adae peccatoris. Ergo videtur quod non debuit de stirpe Adae naturam humanam assumere. Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the stock of Adam, for the Apostle says (Hebrews 7:26): "For it was fitting that we should have such a high priest . . . separated from sinners." But He would have been still further separated from sinners had He not assumed human nature of the stock of Adam, a sinner. Hence it seems that He ought not to have assumed human nature of the stock of Adam.
IIIª q. 4 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, in quolibet genere nobilius est principium eo quod est ex principio. Si igitur assumere voluit humanam naturam, magis debuit eam assumere in ipso Adam. Objection 2. Further, in every genus the principle is nobler than what is from the principle. Hence, if He wished to assume human nature, He ought to have assumed it in Adam himself.
IIIª q. 4 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, gentiles fuerunt magis peccatores quam Iudaei, ut dicit Glossa, Galat. II, super illud, nos natura Iudaei, non ex gentibus peccatores. Si ergo ex peccatoribus naturam humanam assumere voluit, debuit eam magis assumere ex gentilibus quam ex stirpe Abrahae, qui fuit iustus. Objection 3. Further, the Gentiles were greater sinners than the Jews, as a gloss says on Galatians 2:15: "For we by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners." Hence, if He wished to assume human nature from sinners, He ought rather to have assumed it from the Gentiles than from the stock of Abraham, who was just.
IIIª q. 4 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Luc. III generatio domini reducitur usque ad Adam. On the contrary, (Luke 3), the genealogy of our Lord is traced back to Adam.
IIIª q. 4 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., poterat Deus hominem aliunde suscipere, non de genere illius Adae qui suo peccato obligavit genus humanum. Sed melius iudicavit et de ipso quod victum fuerat genere assumere hominem Deus, per quem generis humani vinceret inimicum. Et hoc propter tria. Primo quidem, quia hoc videtur ad iustitiam pertinere, ut ille satisfaciat qui peccavit. Et ideo de natura per ipsum corrupta debuit assumi id per quod satisfactio erat implenda pro tota natura. Secundo, hoc etiam pertinet ad maiorem hominis dignitatem, dum ex illo genere victor Diaboli nascitur quod per Diabolum fuerat victum. Tertio, quia per hoc etiam Dei potentia magis ostenditur, dum de natura corrupta et infirma assumpsit id quod in tantam virtutem et dignitatem est promotum. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 18): "God was able to assume human nature elsewhere than from the stock of Adam, who by his sin had fettered the whole human race; yet God judged it better to assume human nature from the vanquished race, and thus to vanquish the enemy of the human race." And this for three reasons: First, because it would seem to belong to justice that he who sinned should make amends; and hence that from the nature which he had corrupted should be assumed that whereby satisfaction was to be made for the whole nature. Secondly, it pertains to man's greater dignity that the conqueror of the devil should spring from the stock conquered by the devil. Thirdly, because God's power is thereby made more manifest, since, from a corrupt and weakened nature, He assumed that which was raised to such might and glory.
IIIª q. 4 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus debuit esse a peccatoribus segregatus quantum ad culpam, quam venerat destruere, non quantum ad naturam, quam venerat salvare; secundum quam debuit per omnia fratribus assimilari, ut idem apostolus dicit, Heb. II. Et in hoc etiam mirabilior est eius innocentia, quod de massa peccato subiecta natura assumpta tantam habuit puritatem. Reply to Objection 1. Christ ought to be separated from sinners as regards sin, which He came to overthrow, and not as regards nature which He came to save, and in which "it behooved Him in all things to be made like to His brethren," as the Apostle says (Hebrews 2:17). And in this is His innocence the more wonderful, seeing that though assumed from a mass tainted by sin, His nature was endowed with such purity.
IIIª q. 4 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, oportuit eum qui peccata venerat tollere, esse a peccatoribus segregatum quantum ad culpam, cui Adam subiacuit, et quem Christus a suo delicto eduxit, ut dicitur Sap. X. Oportebat autem eum qui mundare omnes venerat, non esse mundandum, sicut et in quolibet genere motus primum movens est immobile secundum illum motum, sicut primum alterans est inalterabile. Et ideo non fuit conveniens ut assumeret humanam naturam in ipso Adam. Reply to Objection 2. As was said above (ad 1) it behooved Him Who came to take away sins to be separated from sinners as regards sin, to which Adam was subject, whom Christ "brought out of his sin," as is written (Wisdom 10:2). For it behooved Him Who came to cleanse all, not to need cleansing Himself; just as in every genus of motion the first mover is immovable as regards that motion, and the first to alter is itself unalterable. Hence it was not fitting that He should assume human nature in Adam himself.
IIIª q. 4 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia Christus debebat esse maxime a peccatoribus segregatus quantum ad culpam, quasi summam innocentiae obtinens, conveniens fuit ut a primo peccatore usque ad Christum perveniretur mediantibus quibusdam iustis, in quibus perfulgerent quaedam insignia futurae sanctitatis. Propter hoc etiam in populo ex quo Christus erat nasciturus instituit Deus quaedam sanctitatis signa, quae incoeperunt in Abraham, qui primus promissionem accepit de Christo, et circumcisionem in signum foederis consummandi, ut dicitur Gen. XVII. Reply to Objection 3. Since Christ ought especially to be separated from sinners as regards sin, and to possess the highest innocence, it was fitting that between the first sinner and Christ some just men should stand midway, in whom certain forecasts of (His) future holiness should shine forth. And hence, even in the people from whom Christ was to be born, God appointed signs of holiness, which began in Abraham, who was the first to receive the promise of Christ, and circumcision, as a sign that the covenant should be kept, as is written (Genesis 17:11).

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