Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part III/Q10

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IIIª q. 10 pr. Deinde considerandum est de qualibet praedictarum scientiarum. Sed quia de scientia divina dictum est in prima parte, restat nunc videre de aliis, primo, de scientia beata; secundo, de scientia indita; tertio, de scientia acquisita. Sed quia de scientia beata, quae in Dei visione consistit, plura dicta sunt in prima parte, ideo hic sola illa videntur dicenda quae pertinent ad animam Christi. Circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum anima Christi comprehenderit verbum, sive divinam essentiam. Secundo, utrum cognoverit omnia in verbo. Tertio, utrum anima Christi in verbo cognoverit infinita. Quarto, utrum videat verbum, vel divinam essentiam, clarius qualibet alia creatura. Question 10. The beatific knowledge of Christ's soul 1. Did the soul of Christ comprehend the Word or the Divine Essence? 2. Did it know all things in the Word? 3. Did the soul of Christ know the infinite in the Word? 4. Did it see the Word or the Divine Essence clearer than did any other creature?
IIIª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi comprehenderit et comprehendat verbum, sive divinam essentiam. Dicit enim Isidorus quod Trinitas sibi soli nota est, et homini assumpto. Igitur homo assumptus communicat cum sancta Trinitate in illa notitia sui quae est sanctae Trinitatis propria. Huiusmodi autem est notitia comprehensionis. Ergo anima Christi comprehendit divinam essentiam. Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended and comprehends the Word or Divine Essence. For Isidore says (De Summo Bono i, 3) that "the Trinity is known only to Itself and to the Man assumed." Therefore the Man assumed communicates with the Holy Trinity in that knowledge of Itself which is proper to the Trinity. Now this is the knowledge of comprehension. Therefore the soul of Christ comprehends the Divine Essence.
IIIª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, magis est uniri Deo secundum esse personale quam secundum visionem. Sed, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, tota divinitas, in una personarum, est unita humanae naturae in Christo. Multo igitur magis tota natura divina videtur ab anima Christi. Et ita videtur quod anima Christi comprehendat divinam essentiam. Objection 2. Further, to be united to God in personal being is greater than to be united by vision. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), "the whole Godhead in one Person is united to the human nature in Christ." Therefore much more is the whole Divine Nature seen by the soul of Christ; and hence it would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence.
IIIª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud quod convenit filio Dei per naturam, convenit filio hominis per gratiam, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Trinitate. Sed comprehendere divinam essentiam competit filio Dei per naturam. Ergo filio hominis competit per gratiam. Et ita videtur quod anima Christi per gratiam verbum comprehendat. Objection 3. Further, what belongs by nature to the Son of God belongs by grace to the Son of Man, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13). But to comprehend the Divine Essence belongs by nature to the Son of God. Therefore it belongs by grace to the Son of Man; and thus it seems that the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence by grace.
IIIª q. 10 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaest., quod se comprehendit, finitum est sibi. Sed essentia divina non est finita in comparatione ad animam Christi, cum in infinitum eam excedat. Ergo anima Christi non comprehendit verbum. On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 14): "Whatsoever comprehends itself is finite to itself." But the Divine Essence is not finite with respect to the soul of Christ, since It infinitely exceeds it. Therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend the Word.
IIIª q. 10 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, sic facta est unio naturarum in persona Christi quod tamen proprietas utriusque naturae inconfusa permansit, ita scilicet quod increatum mansit increatum, et creatum mansit infra limites creaturae, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Est autem impossibile quod aliqua creatura comprehendat divinam essentiam, sicut in prima parte dictum est, eo quod infinitum non comprehenditur a finito. Et ideo dicendum quod anima Christi nullo modo comprehendit divinam essentiam. I answer that, As is plain from 2, 1,6, the union of the two natures in the Person of Christ took place in such a way that the properties of both natures remained unconfused, i.e. "the uncreated remained uncreated, and the created remained within the limits of the creature," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4). Now it is impossible for any creature to comprehend the Divine Essence, as was shown in I, 12, 1,4,7, seeing that the infinite is not comprehended by the finite. And hence it must be said that the soul of Christ nowise comprehends the Divine Essence.
IIIª q. 10 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo assumptus connumeratur divinae Trinitati in sui cognitione, non ratione comprehensionis, sed ratione cuiusdam excellentissimae cognitionis prae ceteris creaturis. Reply to Objection 1. The Man assumed is reckoned with the Divine Trinity in the knowledge of Itself, not indeed as regards comprehension, but by reason of a certain most excellent knowledge above the rest of creatures.
IIIª q. 10 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod nec etiam in unione quae est secundum esse personale, natura humana comprehendit verbum Dei, sive naturam divinam, quae quamvis tota unita fuerit humanae naturae in una persona filii, non tamen fuit tota virtus divinitatis ab humana natura quasi circumscripta. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Volusianum, scire te volo non hoc Christianam habere doctrinam, quod ita Deus infusus sit carni ut curam gubernandae universitatis vel deseruerit vel amiserit, vel ad illud corpusculum quasi contractam collectamque transtulerit. Et similiter anima Christi totam essentiam Dei videt, non tamen eam comprehendit, quia non totaliter eam videt, idest, non ita perfecte sicut visibilis est, ut in prima parte expositum est. Reply to Objection 2. Not even in the union by personal being does the human nature comprehend the Word of God or the Divine Nature, for although it was wholly united to the human nature in the one Person of the Son, yet the whole power of the Godhead was not circumscribed by the human nature. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "I would have you know that it is not the Christian doctrine that God was united to flesh in such a manner as to quit or lose the care of the world's government, neither did He narrow or reduce it when He transferred it to that little body." So likewise the soul of Christ sees the whole Essence of God, yet does not comprehend It; since it does not see It totally, i.e. not as perfectly as It is knowable, as was said in I, 12, 7.
IIIª q. 10 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum illud Augustini est intelligendum de gratia unionis, secundum quam omnia quae dicuntur de filio Dei secundum naturam divinam, dicuntur de filio hominis, propter identitatem suppositi. Et secundum hoc, vere potest dici quod filius hominis est comprehensor divinae essentiae, non quidem secundum animam, sed secundum divinam naturam. Per quem etiam modum potest dici quod filius hominis est creator. Reply to Objection 3. This saying of Augustine is to be understood of the grace of union, by reason of which all that is said of the Son of God in His Divine Nature is also said of the Son of Man on account of the identity of suppositum. And in this way it may be said that the Son of Man is a comprehensor of the Divine Essence, not indeed by His soul, but in His Divine Nature; even as we may also say that the Son of Man is the Creator.
IIIª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi in verbo non cognoscat omnia. Dicitur enim Marci XIII, de die autem illa nemo scit, neque Angeli in caelo neque filius, nisi pater. Non igitur omnia scit in verbo. Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ does not know all things in the Word. For it is written (Mark 13:32): "But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father." Therefore He does not know all things in the Word.
IIIª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, quanto aliquis perfectius cognoscit aliquod principium, tanto plura in illo principio cognoscit. Sed Deus perfectius videt essentiam suam quam anima Christi. Ergo plura cognoscit in verbo quam anima Christi. Non ergo anima Christi in verbo cognoscit omnia. Objection 2. Further, the more perfectly anyone knows a principle the more he knows in the principle. But God sees His Essence more perfectly than the soul of Christ does. Therefore He knows more than the soul of Christ knows in the Word. Therefore the soul of Christ does not know all things in the Word.
IIIª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, quantitas scientiae attenditur secundum quantitatem scibilium. Si ergo anima Christi sciret in verbo omnia quae scit verbum, sequeretur quod scientia animae Christi aequaretur scientiae divinae, creatum videlicet increato. Quod est impossibile. Objection 3. Further, the extent depends on the number of things known. If, therefore, the soul of Christ knew in the Word all that the Word knows, it would follow that the knowledge of the soul of Christ would equal the Divine knowledge, i.e. the created would equal the uncreated, which is impossible.
IIIª q. 10 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod, super illud Apoc. V, dignus est agnus qui occisus est accipere divinitatem et scientiam, Glossa dicit, idest, omnium cognitionem. On the contrary, on Apocalypse 5:12, "The Lamb that was slain is worthy to receive . . . divinity and wisdom," a gloss says, i.e. "the knowledge of all things."
IIIª q. 10 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum quaeritur an Christus cognoscat omnia in verbo, dicendum est quod ly omnia potest dupliciter accipi. Uno modo, proprie, ut distribuat pro omnibus quae quocumque modo sunt vel erunt vel fuerunt, vel facta vel dicta vel cogitata a quocumque, secundum quodcumque tempus. Et sic dicendum est quod anima Christi in verbo cognoscit omnia. Unusquisque enim intellectus creatus in verbo cognoscit, non quidem omnia simpliciter, sed tanto plura quanto perfectius videt verbum, nulli tamen intellectui beato deest quin cognoscat in verbo omnia quae ad ipsum spectant. Ad Christum autem, et ad eius dignitatem, spectant quodammodo omnia, inquantum ei subiecta sunt omnia. Ipse est etiam omnium iudex constitutus a Deo, quia filius hominis est, ut dicitur Ioan. V. Et ideo anima Christi in verbo cognoscit omnia existentia secundum quodcumque tempus, et etiam hominum cogitatus, quorum est iudex, ita quod de eo dicitur, Ioan. II, ipse enim sciebat quid esset in homine; quod potest intelligi non solum quantum ad scientiam divinam, sed etiam quantum ad scientiam animae eius quam habet in verbo. Alio modo ly omnia potest accipi magis large, ut extendatur non solum ad omnia quae sunt actu secundum quodcumque tempus, sed etiam ad omnia quaecumque sunt in potentia nunquam reducta ad actum. Horum autem quaedam sunt solum in potentia divina. Et huiusmodi non omnia cognoscit in verbo anima Christi. Hoc enim esset comprehendere omnia quae Deus potest facere, quod esset comprehendere divinam virtutem, et per consequens divinam essentiam; virtus enim quaelibet cognoscitur per cognitionem eorum in quae potest. Quaedam vero sunt non solum in potentia divina, sed etiam in potentia creaturae. Et huiusmodi omnia cognoscit anima Christi in verbo. Comprehendit enim in verbo omnis creaturae essentiam, et per consequens potentiam et virtutem, et omnia quae sunt in potentia creaturae. I answer that, When it is inquired whether Christ knows all things in the Word, "all things" may be taken in two ways: First, properly, to stand for all that in any way whatsoever is, will be, or was done, said, or thought, by whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it must be said that the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word. For every created intellect knows in the Word, not all simply, but so many more things the more perfectly it sees the Word. Yet no beatified intellect fails to know in the Word whatever pertains to itself. Now to Christ and to His dignity all things to some extent belong, inasmuch as all things are subject to Him. Moreover, He has been appointed Judge of all by God, "because He is the Son of Man," as is said John 5:27; and therefore the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things existing in whatever time, and the thoughts of men, of which He is the Judge, so that what is said of Him (John 2:25), "For He knew what was in man," can be understood not merely of the Divine knowledge, but also of His soul's knowledge, which it had in the Word. Secondly, "all things" may be taken widely, as extending not merely to such things as are in act at some time, but even to such things as are in potentiality, and never have been nor ever will be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the Divine power alone, and not all of these does the soul of Christ know in the Word. For this would be to comprehend all that God could do, which would be to comprehend the Divine power, and, consequently, the Divine Essence. For every power is known from the knowledge of all it can do. Some, however, are not only in the power of God, but also in the power of the creature; and all of these the soul of Christ knows in the Word; for it comprehends in the Word the essence of every creature, and, consequently, its power and virtue, and all things that are in the power of the creature.
IIIª q. 10 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud verbum intellexerunt Arius et Eunomius, non quantum ad scientiam animae, quam in Christo non ponebant, ut supra dictum est, sed quantum ad divinam cognitionem filii, quem ponebant esse minorem patre quantum ad scientiam. Sed istud stare non potest. Quia per verbum Dei facta sunt omnia, ut dicitur Ioan. I, et, inter alia, facta sunt etiam per ipsum omnia tempora. Nihil autem per ipsum factum est quod ab eo ignoretur. Dicitur ergo nescire diem et horam iudicii, quia non facit scire, interrogatus enim ab apostolis super hoc, Act. I, hoc eis noluit revelare. Sicut e contrario legitur Gen. XXII, nunc cognovi quod timeas Deum, idest, nunc cognoscere feci. Dicitur autem pater scire, eo quod huiusmodi cognitionem tradidit filio. Unde in hoc ipso quod dicitur, nisi pater, datur intelligi quod filius cognoscat, non solum quantum ad divinam naturam, sed etiam quantum ad humanam. Quia, ut Chrysostomus argumentatur, si Christo homini datum est ut sciat qualiter oporteat iudicare, quod est maius; multo magis datum est ei scire quod est minus, scilicet tempus iudicii. Origenes tamen hoc exponit de Christo secundum corpus eius, quod est Ecclesia, quae hoc ipsum tempus ignorat. Quidam autem dicunt hoc esse intelligendum de filio Dei adoptivo, non de naturali. Reply to Objection 1. Arius and Eunomius understood this saying, not of the knowledge of the soul, which they did not hold to be in Christ, as was said above (Question 9, Article 1), but of the Divine knowledge of the Son, Whom they held to be less than the Father as regards knowledge. But this will not stand, since all things were made by the Word of God, as is said John 1:3, and, amongst other things, all times were made by Him. Now He is not ignorant of anything that was made by Him.He is said, therefore, not to know the day and the hour of the Judgment, for that He does not make it known, since, on being asked by the apostles (Acts 1:7), He was unwilling to reveal it; and, on the contrary, we read (Genesis 22:12): "Now I know that thou fearest God," i.e. "Now I have made thee know." But the Father is said to know, because He imparted this knowledge to the Son. Hence, by saying but the Father, we are given to understand that the Son knows, not merely in the Divine Nature, but also in the human, because, as Chrysostom argues (Hom. lxxviii in Matth.), if it is given to Christ as man to know how to judge--which is greater--much more is it given to Him to know the less, viz. the time of Judgment. Origen, however (in Matth. Tract. xxx), expounds it of His body, which is the Church, which is ignorant of this time. Lastly, some say this is to be understood of the adoptive, and not of the natural Son of God.
IIIª q. 10 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus perfectius cognoscit suam essentiam quam anima Christi, quia eam comprehendit. Et ideo cognoscit omnia non solum quae sunt in actu secundum quodcumque tempus, quae dicitur cognoscere scientia visionis; sed etiam omnia quaecumque ipse potest facere, quae dicitur cognoscere per simplicem intelligentiam, ut in primo habitum est. Scit ergo anima Christi omnia quae Deus in seipso cognoscit per scientiam visionis, non tamen omnia quae Deus in seipso cognoscit per scientiam simplicis intelligentiae. Et ita plura scit Deus in seipso quam anima Christi. Reply to Objection 2. God knows His Essence so much the more perfectly than the soul of Christ, as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all things, not merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He is said to know by knowledge of vision, but also what ever He Himself can do, which He is said to know by simple intelligence, as was shown in I, 14, 9. Therefore the soul of Christ knows all things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision, but not all that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence; and thus in Himself God knows many more things than the soul of Christ.
IIIª q. 10 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quantitas scientiae non solum attenditur secundum numerum scibilium, sed etiam secundum claritatem cognitionis. Quamvis igitur scientia animae Christi quam habet in verbo, parificetur scientiae visionis quam Deus habet in seipso quantum ad numerum scibilium; scientia tamen Dei excedit in infinitum, quantum ad claritatem cognitionis, scientiam animae Christi. Quia lumen increatum divini intellectus in infinitum excedit lumen creatum quodcumque receptum in anima Christi, non solum quantum ad modum cognoscendi, sed etiam quantum ad numerum scibilium, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. The extent of knowledge depends not merely on the number of knowable things, but also on the clearness of the knowledge. Therefore, although the knowledge of the soul of Christ which He has in the Word is equal to the knowledge of vision as regards the number of things known, nevertheless the knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ in clearness of cognition, since the uncreated light of the Divine intellect infinitely exceeds any created light received by the soul of Christ; although, absolutely speaking, the Divine knowledge exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ, not only as regards the mode of knowing, but also as regards the number of things known, as was stated above.
IIIª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi non possit cognoscere infinita in verbo. Quod enim infinitum cognoscatur, repugnat definitioni infiniti, prout dicitur in III Physic. quod infinitum est cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid extra accipere. Impossibile autem est definitionem a definito separari, quia hoc esset contradictoria esse simul. Ergo impossibile est quod anima Christi sciat infinita. Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ cannot know the infinite in the Word. For that the infinite should be known is repugnant to the definition of the infinite which (Phys. iii, 63) is said to be that "from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken." But it is impossible for the definition to be separated from the thing defined, since this would mean that contradictories exist together. Therefore it is impossible that the soul of Christ knows the infinite.
IIIª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, infinitorum scientia est infinita. Sed scientia animae Christi non potest esse infinita, est enim capacitas eius finita, cum sit creatura. Non ergo anima Christi potest cognoscere infinita. Objection 2. Further, the knowledge of the infinite is infinite. But the knowledge of the soul of Christ cannot be infinite, because its capacity is finite, since it is created. Therefore the soul of Christ cannot know the infinite.
IIIª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, infinito non potest esse aliquid maius. Sed plura continentur in scientia divina, absolute loquendo, quam in scientia animae Christi, ut dictum est. Ergo anima Christi non cognoscit infinita. Objection 3. Further, there can be nothing greater than the infinite. But more is contained in the Divine knowledge, absolutely speaking, than in the knowledge of Christ's soul, as stated above (Article 2). Therefore the soul of Christ does not know the infinite.
IIIª q. 10 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, anima Christi cognoscit totam suam potentiam, et omnia in quae potest. Potest autem in emundationem infinitorum peccatorum, secundum illud I Ioan. II, ipse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris, non autem pro nostris tantum, sed etiam totius mundi. Ergo anima Christi cognoscit infinita. On the contrary, The soul of Christ knows all its power and all it can do. Now it can cleanse infinite sins, according to 1 John 2:2: "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world." Therefore the soul of Christ knows the infinite.
IIIª q. 10 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod scientia non est nisi entis, eo quod ens et verum convertuntur. Dupliciter autem dicitur aliquid ens, uno modo, simpliciter, quod scilicet est ens actu; alio modo, secundum quid, quod scilicet est ens in potentia. Et quia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu, non autem secundum quod est in potentia, scientia primo et principaliter respicit ens actu. Secundario autem respicit ens in potentia, quod quidem non secundum seipsum cognoscibile est, sed secundum quod cognoscitur illud in cuius potentia existit. Quantum igitur ad primum modum scientiae, anima Christi non scit infinita. Quia non sunt infinita in actu, etiam si accipiantur omnia quaecumque sunt in actu secundum quodcumque tempus, eo quod status generationis et corruptionis non durat in infinitum; unde est certus numerus non solum eorum quae sunt absque generatione et corruptione, sed etiam generabilium et corruptibilium. Quantum vero ad alium modum sciendi, anima Christi in verbo scit infinita. Scit enim, ut dictum est, omnia quae sunt in potentia creaturae. Unde, cum in potentia creaturae sint infinita, per hunc modum scit infinita, quasi quadam scientia simplicis intelligentiae, non autem scientia visionis. I answer that, Knowledge regards only being, since being and truth are convertible. Now a thing is said to be a being in two ways: First, simply, i.e. whatever is a being in act; secondly, relatively, i.e. whatever is a being in potentiality. And because, as is said Metaph. ix, 20, everything is known as it is in act, and not as it is in potentiality, knowledge primarily and essentially regards being in act, and secondarily regards being in potentiality, which is not knowable of itself, but inasmuch as that in whose power it exists is known. Hence, with regard to the first mode of knowledge, the soul of Christ does not know the infinite. Because there is not an infinite number in act, even though we were to reckon all that are in act at any time whatsoever, since the state of generation and corruption will not last for ever: consequently there is a certain number not only of things lacking generation and corruption, but also of things capable of generation and corruption. But with regard to the other mode of knowing, the soul of Christ knows infinite things in the Word, for it knows, as stated above (Article 2), all that is in the power of the creature. Hence, since in the power of the creature there is an infinite number of things, it knows the infinite, as it were, by a certain knowledge of simple intelligence, and not by a knowledge of vision.
IIIª q. 10 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod infinitum, sicut in prima parte dictum est, dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, secundum rationem formae. Et sic dicitur infinitum negative, scilicet id quod est forma vel actus non limitatus per materiam vel subiectum in quo recipiatur. Et huiusmodi infinitum, quantum est de se, est maxime cognoscibile, propter perfectionem actus, licet non sit comprehensibile a potentia finita creaturae, sic enim dicitur Deus infinitus. Et tale infinitum anima Christi cognoscit, licet non comprehendat. Alio modo dicitur infinitum secundum potentiam materiae. Quod quidem dicitur privative, ex hoc scilicet quod non habet formam quam natum est habere. Et per hunc modum dicitur infinitum in quantitate. Tale autem infinitum ex sui ratione est ignotum, quia scilicet est quasi materia cum privatione formae, ut dicitur in III Physic.; omnis autem cognitio est per formam vel actum. Sic igitur, si huiusmodi infinitum cognosci debeat secundum modum ipsius cogniti, impossibile est quod cognoscatur, est enim modus ipsius ut accipiatur pars eius post partem, ut dicitur in III Physic. Et hoc modo verum est quod eius quantitatem accipientibus, scilicet parte accepta post partem, semper est aliquid extra accipere. Sed sicut materialia possunt accipi ab intellectu immaterialiter, et multa unite, ita infinita possunt accipi ab intellectu non per modum infiniti, sed quasi finite, ut sic ea quae sunt in seipsis infinita, sint intellectui cognoscentis finita. Et hoc modo anima Christi scit infinita, inquantum scilicet scit ea, non discurrendo per singula, sed in aliquo uno; puta in aliqua creatura in cuius potentia praeexistunt infinita; et principaliter in ipso verbo. Reply to Objection 1. As we said in I, 8, 1, the infinite is taken in two ways. First, on the part of a form, and thus we have the negatively infinite, i.e. a form or act not limited by being received into matter or a subject; and this infinite of itself is most knowable on account of the perfection of the act, although it is not comprehensible by the finite power of the creature; for thus God is said to be infinite. And this infinite the soul of Christ knows, yet does not comprehend. Secondly, there is the infinite as regards matter, which is taken privatively, i.e. inasmuch as it has not the form it ought naturally to have, and in this way we have infinite in quantity. Now such an infinite of itself, is unknown: inasmuch as it is, as it were, matter with privation of form as is said Phys. iii, 65. But all knowledge is by form or act. Therefore if this infinite is to be known according to its mode of being, it cannot be known. For its mode is that part be taken after part, as is said Phys. iii, 62,63. And in this way it is true that, if we take something from it, i.e. taking part after part, there always remains something to be taken. But as material things can be received by the intellect immaterially, and many things unitedly, so can infinite things be received by the intellect, not after the manner of infinite, but finitely; and thus what are in themselves infinite are, in the intellect of the knower, finite. And in this way the soul of Christ knows an infinite number of things, inasmuch as it knows them not by discoursing from one to another, but in a certain unity, i.e. in any creature in whose potentiality infinite things exist, and principally in the Word Himself.
IIIª q. 10 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse infinitum uno modo quod est alio modo finitum, sicut si imaginemur in quantitatibus superficiem quae sit secundum longitudinem infinita secundum latitudinem autem finita. Sic igitur, si essent infiniti homines numero, haberent quidem infinita esse secundum aliquid, scilicet secundum multitudinem, secundum tamen rationem essentiae non haberent infinitatem, eo quod omnis essentia esset limitata sub ratione unius speciei. Sed illud quod est simpliciter infinitum secundum essentiae rationem, est Deus, ut in prima parte dictum est, proprium autem obiectum intellectus est quod quid est, ut dicitur in III de anima, ad quod pertinet ratio speciei. Sic igitur anima Christi, propter hoc quod habet capacitatem finitam, id quod est simpliciter infinitum secundum essentiam, scilicet Deum, attingit quidem, sed non comprehendit, ut dictum est. Id autem infinitum quod in creaturis est in potentia, potest comprehendi ab anima Christi, quia comparatur ad ipsam secundum essentiae rationem, ex qua parte infinitatem non habet. Nam etiam intellectus noster intelligit universale, puta naturam generis vel speciei, quod quodammodo habet infinitatem, inquantum potest de infinitis praedicari. Reply to Objection 2. There is nothing to hinder a thing from being infinite in one way and finite in another, as when in quantities we imagine a surface infinite in length and finite in breadth. Hence, if there were an infinite number of men, they would have a relative infinity, i.e. in multitude; but, as regards the essence, they would be finite, since the essence of all would be limited to one specific nature. But what is simply infinite in its essence is God, as was said in I, 7, 2. Now the proper object of the intellect is "what a thing is," as is said De Anima iii, 26, to which pertains the notion of the species. And thus the soul of Christ, since it has a finite capacity, attains to, but does not comprehend, what is simply infinite in essence, as stated above (1). But the infinite in potentiality which is in creatures can be comprehended by the soul of Christ, since it is compared to that soul according to its essence, in which respect it is not infinite. For even our intellect understands a universal--for example, the nature of a genus or species, which in a manner has infinity, inasmuch as it can be predicated of an infinite number.
IIIª q. 10 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod id quod est infinitum omnibus modis, non potest esse nisi unum, unde et philosophus dicit, in I de caelo et mundo, quod quia corpus est ad omnem partem dimensionatum, impossibile est plura esse corpora infinita. Si tamen aliquid esset infinitum uno modo tantum, nihil prohiberet esse plura talia infinita, sicut si intelligeremus plures lineas infinitas secundum longitudinem protractas in aliqua superficie finita secundum latitudinem. Quia igitur infinitum non est substantia quaedam, sed accidit rebus quae dicuntur infinitae, ut dicitur in III Physic.; sicut infinitum multiplicatur secundum diversa subiecta, ita necesse est quod proprietas infiniti multiplicetur, ita quod conveniat unicuique eorum secundum illud subiectum. Est autem quaedam proprietas infiniti quod infinito non sit aliquid maius. Sic igitur, si accipiamus unam lineam infinitam, in illa non est aliquid maius infinito. Et similiter, si accipiamus quamcumque aliarum linearum infinitarum, manifestum est quod uniuscuiusque earum partes sunt infinitae. Oportet igitur quod omnibus illis infinitis non sit aliquid maius in illa linea, tamen in alia linea et in tertia erunt plures partes, etiam infinitae, praeter istas. Et hoc etiam videmus in numeris accidere, nam species numerorum parium sunt infinitae, et similiter species numerorum imparium; et tamen numeri et pares et impares sunt plures quam pares. Sic igitur dicendum quod infinito simpliciter quoad omnia, nihil est maius, infinito autem secundum aliquid determinatum, non est aliquid maius in illo ordine, potest tamen accipi aliquid maius extra illum ordinem. Per hunc igitur modum infinita sunt in potentia creaturae, et tamen plura sunt in potentia Dei quam in potentia creaturae. Et similiter anima Christi scit infinita scientia simplicis intelligentiae, plura tamen scit Deus secundum hunc intelligentiae modum. Reply to Objection 3. That which is infinite in every way can be but one. Hence the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 2,3,) that, since bodies have dimensions in every part, there cannot be several infinite bodies. Yet if anything were infinite in one way only, nothing would hinder the existence of several such infinite things; as if we were to suppose several lines of infinite length drawn on a surface of finite breadth. Hence, because infinitude is not a substance, but is accidental to things that are said to be infinite, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, 37,38); as the infinite is multiplied by different subjects, so, too, a property of the infinite must be multiplied, in such a way that it belongs to each of them according to that particular subject. Now it is a property of the infinite that nothing is greater than it. Hence, if we take one infinite line, there is nothing greater in it than the infinite; so, too, if we take any one of other infinite lines, it is plain that each has infinite parts. Therefore of necessity in this particular line there is nothing greater than all these infinite parts; yet in another or a third line there will be more infinite parts besides these. We observe this in numbers also, for the species of even numbers are infinite, and likewise the species of odd numbers are infinite; yet there are more even and odd numbers than even. And thus it must be said that nothing is greater than the simply and in every way infinite; but than the infinite which is limited in some respect, nothing is greater in that order; yet we may suppose something greater outside that order. In this way, therefore, there are infinite things in the potentiality of the creature, and yet there are more in the power of God than in the potentiality of the creature. So, too, the soul of Christ knows infinite things by the knowledge of simple intelligence; yet God knows more by this manner of knowledge or understanding.
IIIª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi non perfectius videat verbum quam quaelibet alia creatura. Perfectio enim cognitionis est secundum medium cognoscendi, sicut perfectior est cognitio quae habetur per medium syllogismi demonstrativi, quam quae habetur per medium syllogismi dialectici. Sed omnes beati vident verbum immediate per ipsam divinam essentiam, ut in prima parte dictum est. Ergo anima Christi non perfectius videt verbum quam quaelibet alia creatura. Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ does not see the Word more perfectly than does any other creature. For the perfection of knowledge depends upon the medium of knowing; as the knowledge we have by means of a demonstrative syllogism is more perfect than that which we have by means of a probable syllogism. But all the blessed see the Word immediately in the Divine Essence Itself, as was said in I, 12, 2. Therefore the soul of Christ does not see the Word more perfectly than any other creature.
IIIª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, perfectio visionis non excedit potentiam visivam. Sed potentia rationalis animae, qualis est anima Christi, est infra potentiam intellectivam Angeli, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo anima Christi non perfectius videt verbum quam Angeli. Objection 2. Further, the perfection of vision does not exceed the power of seeing. But the rational power of a soul such as is the soul of Christ is below the intellective power of an angel, as is plain from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the soul of Christ did not see the Word more perfectly than the angels.
IIIª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, Deus in infinitum perfectius videt verbum suum quam anima. Sunt ergo infiniti gradus medii inter modum quo Deus videt verbum suum, et inter modum quo anima Christi videt ipsum. Ergo non est asserendum quod anima Christi perfectius videat verbum, vel essentiam divinam, quam quaelibet alia creatura. Objection 3. Further, God sees His Word infinitely more perfectly than does the soul of Christ. Hence there are infinite possible mediate degrees between the manner in which God sees His Word, and the manner in which the soul of Christ sees the Word. Therefore we cannot assert that the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more perfectly than does every other creature.
IIIª q. 10 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Ephes. I, quod Deus constituit Christum in caelestibus super omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem, et omne nomen quod nominatur, non solum in hoc saeculo, sed etiam in futuro. Sed in caelesti gloria tanto aliquis est superior quanto perfectius cognoscit Deum. Ergo anima Christi perfectius videt Deum quam quaevis alia creatura. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Ephesians 1:20-21) that God set Christ "on His right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality and power and virtue and dominion and every name that is named not only in this world, but also in that which is to come." But in that heavenly glory the higher anyone is the more perfectly does he know God. Therefore the soul of Christ sees God more perfectly than does any other creature.
IIIª q. 10 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod divinae essentiae visio convenit omnibus beatis secundum participationem luminis derivati ad eos a fonte verbi Dei, secundum illud Eccli. I, fons sapientiae verbum Dei in excelsis. Huic autem verbo Dei propinquius coniungitur anima Christi, quae est unita verbo in persona, quam quaevis alia creatura. Et ideo plenius recipit influentiam luminis in quo Deus videtur ab ipso verbo, quam quaecumque alia creatura. Et ideo prae ceteris creaturis perfectius videt ipsam primam veritatem, quae est Dei essentia. Et ideo dicitur Ioan. I, vidimus gloriam eius, quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum non solum gratiae, sed etiam veritatis. I answer that, The vision of the Divine Essence is granted to all the blessed by a partaking of the Divine light which is shed upon them from the fountain of the Word of God, according to Sirach 1:5: "The Word of God on high is the fountain of Wisdom." Now the soul of Christ, since it is united to the Word in person, is more closely joined to the Word of God than any other creature. Hence it more fully receives the light in which God is seen by the Word Himself than any other creature. And therefore more perfectly than the rest of creatures it sees the First Truth itself, which is the Essence of God; hence it is written (John 1:14): "And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father," "full" not only of "grace" but also of "truth."
IIIª q. 10 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod perfectio cognitionis, quantum est ex parte cogniti, attenditur secundum medium, sed quantum est ex parte cognoscentis, attenditur secundum potentiam vel habitum. Et inde est quod etiam inter homines per unum medium unus perfectius cognoscit aliquam conclusionem quam alius. Et per hunc modum anima Christi, quae abundantiori impletur lumine, perfectius cognoscit divinam essentiam quam alii beati, licet omnes Dei essentiam videant per seipsam. Reply to Objection 1. Perfection of knowledge, on the part of the thing known, depends on the medium; but as regards the knower, it depends on the power or habit. And hence it is that even amongst men one sees a conclusion in a medium more perfectly than another does. And in this way the soul of Christ, which is filled with a more abundant light, knows the Divine Essence more perfectly than do the other blessed, although all see the Divine Essence in itself.
IIIª q. 10 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod visio divinae essentiae excedit naturalem potentiam cuiuslibet creaturae, ut in prima parte dictum est. Et ideo gradus in ipso attenduntur magis secundum ordinem gratiae, in quo Christus est excellentissimus, quam secundum ordinem naturae, secundum quem natura angelica praefertur humanae. Reply to Objection 2. The vision of the Divine Essence exceeds the natural power of any creature, as was said in I, 12, 4. And hence the degrees thereof depend rather on the order of grace in which Christ is supreme, than on the order of nature, in which the angelic nature is placed before the human.
IIIª q. 10 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est de gratia quod non potest esse maior gratia quam gratia Christi per respectum ad unionem verbi, idem etiam dicendum est de perfectione divinae visionis, licet, absolute considerando, possit aliquis gradus esse sublimior secundum infinitatem divinae potentiae. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (Question 7, Article 12), there cannot be a greater grace than the grace of Christ with respect to the union with the Word; and the same is to be said of the perfection of the Divine vision; although, absolutely speaking, there could be a higher and more sublime degree by the infinity of the Divine power.

Notes

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