Authors/Ps-Aquinas/Summa Totius Logicae/TRACTATUS 1/Caput 2

Latin	English
CAPUT 2
Genus, ut hic sumitur, est quod praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid.	Genus, as understood here, is what is predicated of several things "differing in species in respect of the kind of thing they are".
Ad videndum autem particulas huius descriptionis, sciendum est, quod genus dicitur praedicari de pluribus speciebus, seu dividitur in plures species. Et cum non sit unum re, sed solum secundum rationem, ideo non dividitur secundum rem.	But for considering the component parts of this description, it should be known that genus is said to be predicated of several species or divided into several species. And since it is not one in reality, but only according to reason, therefore it is not divided in reality.
Et quia genus non est unum re; ideo partes subiectivae, seu species in quas dividitur, sunt realiter diversae et distinctae inter se: ideo oportet quod aliquod reale habeant in se, per quod reale una sit diversa ab alia.	And because genus is not one in reality, therefore the subjective parts or species into which it is divided are in reality diverse and distinct from each other. Therefore they must have something real in themselves - a reality through which one may be distinct from anothoer.
Ubi nota, quod una et eadem res per suam essentiam cum essentia alterius rei habet aliquam conformitatem seu convenientiam, et aliquam difformitatem realem: quae conformitas vel difformitas potest esse maior vel minor per comparationem ad diversas res.	Note here that one and the same thing has, through its essence, some conformity or agreement with the essence of another thing, and some other real disconformity. This conformity and disconformity can be greater or lesser through comparison to diverse things.
Verbi gratia, Socrates per essentiam suam quae est ex hac anima et hoc corpore, conformatur Platoni, et huic equo, et huic plantae: Socrates enim per suam essentiam est rationalis, sensibilis et vivus: in omnibus his tribus est conformis Platoni: huic autem equo est conformis in duobus, scilicet in sensibili et in vivo, et in uno est difformis, quia in eo est realiter rationale, quod non est in hoc equo: huic vero plantae conformis est in uno, scilicet, in vivo.	For example, Socrates through his essence, which is from this spirit and this body, conforms to Plato, and to this horse, and to this plant, for Socrates through his essence is rational, sensitive, and alive - in all these three he is similar to Plato: however to this horse he agrees in two, namely in being sensitive and in life, and in one is disconforming, because in him there really is the rationale, which is not in this horse: but to this plant he is similar in one thing, namely in life.
Quia vero intellectus noster ea quae in re sunt coniuncta potest distinguere, quando unum eorum non cadit in ratione alterius; et cum rationale in se consideratum non sit de ratione sensibilis, nec sensibile de ratione vivi, ideo ea in Socrate separatim accipit, ut dictum est, per respectum ad diversa. Quando ergo intellectus considerat in re illud in quo convenit cum aliis rebus, illi rei conceptae attribuit intentionem universalitatis.	But because our understanding can distinguish things which are conjoined in reality, when one of them does not agree in the definition [ratio] of the other; and since rational considered in itself is not in the definition of sensibility, nor sensible in the definition of life, so the understanding takes those things in Socrates separately, as was said, in respect of diversity.  Therefore when an intellect considers in the reality that in which it agrees with other things it attributes the intention of universality to that conceived thing.
Et quia in qualibet re singulari est considerare aliquid quod est proprium illius rei in quantum est haec res, sicut in Socrate est considerare aliquid quod est ita proprium Socratis in quantum est hic homo, quod nulli alii convenit. Rei ergo sic conceptae attribuit intellectus intentionem singularitatis, et vocat illud singulare vel individuum: et hae secundae intentiones sunt, scilicet universalitas et singularitas.	And because in any singular thing one has to consider something which is a property of that thing in so far as it is this thing, just as in Socrates one has to consider something which is thus a property of Socreates insofar as he is this man, because it agrees with no other thing, therefore, to a thing thus conceived the understanding attributes the intention of singularity, and calls it a singular or individual: and these are second intentions, namely universality and singularity.
Unde, licet supra dictum fuerit quod intentiones fiunt ab intellectu, tamen oportet quod aliquod fundamentum habeant in re extra: nam intentioni singularitatis respondet extra illud quod est proprium Socratis in quantum est hic homo; intentioni vero universalitatis respondet extra ut fundamentum illud in quo Socrates est conformis cum aliis rebus. Cum igitur ea quae in uno conformantur et in alio sunt difformia, dummodo talis difformitas sit secundum formam, et non secundum materiam signatam, vel secundum illud quod est proprium huic individuo in quantum huiusmodi; illi uni in quo talia conveniunt, attribuit intellectus intentionem generis, et vocat genus.	Hence, although it was said above that intentions are created by the understanding, nevertheless they must have some basis in external reality, for to the intention of singularity there corresponds that external thing which is a property of Socrates in so far as he is this man,but to the intention of universality there corresponds externally as a basis that thing in which Socrates conforms with other things. Therefore, since things which conform in one way and do not conform in another, provided that such lack of conformity is by form, and not by signified matter, or by that which is proper to this individual in so far as he is this individual - to that single thing in which such things agree,the understanding attributes the intention of genus, and calls it genus.
Ubi nota secundum Avicennam quod duplex est forma: quaedam est quae est pars compositi, sicut anima est forma hominis: ex anima enim et corpore componitur homo; quaedam autem sequitur totum compositum, ut humanitas, quae etiam est forma hominis: et isto modo sumpta forma dicitur quidditas, et est illud quod intellectus intelligit de re. Quando ergo intellectus intelligit praedictam formam seu quidditatem ut est determinata ad hanc materiam, puta humanitatem ut est in hac materia signata, scilicet in his carnibus et in his ossibus et huiusmodi; tunc faciendo concretum, puta hunc hominem, intelligit singulare, et huic attribuit intentionem singularitatis.	Note there that, according to Avicenna, form is twofold. One form is part of composition, just as spirit is the form of man, for a man is composed from spirit and body. But another form follows the whole composite, such as humanity, which is also a form of man, and understood in that way the form is called quiddity, and is that which the understanding understands about a thing. Therefore, when the understanding understands the aforesaid form or quiddity as it is determined to this matter, for example humanity as it is in this signified matter, namely in this flesh and in the bones and so on, then being made concrete, for example this man, it understands a singular, and attributes to it an intention of singularity.
Si vero dictam formam intelligit non ut est determinata ad hanc materiam, quia omnis talis forma de se plurificabilis est ad hanc et ad illam materiam; habenti talem formam intellectus attribuit intentionem universalitatis, unde homo est universale.	But if it understands said form not as it is determined to this matter (for every such form is plurifiable of itself according to this and that matter) the understanding attributes an intention of universality to the one having such a form. Hence man is a universal.
Et si ea quae in hac forma conveniunt, non habent inter se difformitatem pertinentem ad dictam formam, sed solum sunt difformia per materiam signatam istius vel illius, in qua dicta forma determinata est in isto vel in illo, secundum modum qui dicetur in tractatu de specie, illa dicuntur solum differre numero; et concretum substantivum huiusmodi formae acceptae ut plurificari potest, puta homo, dicitur species specialissima.	And if those which agree in this form do not have between each other difformity pertaining to the said form, but they fail to conform only through the signified matter of this or that thing, in which the said form is determined in this or that thing, according to a mode which will be discussed in the treatise on species, they are said to differ only by number, and a concrete substantive of this sort of accepted form insofar as it is able to be plurified, for example man, is called the most specific species.
Si vero ea quae conveniunt in aliqua forma plurificabili, ut dictum est, sunt inter se difformia non solum quantum ad materiam signatam, ut dictum est, sed quantum ad difformitatem specificam: puta, quod talis forma est animalitas, in qua conveniunt Socrates et hic equus, qui inter se non solum sunt difformes quantum ad has carnes et haec ossa, sed in hoc quia hic homo habet formam humanitatis, et ille equinitatis; talia dicuntur differre specie: et talis forma in qua conveniunt in concreto sumpta, puta, animal, est genus.	But if those which agree in some plurifiable form, as was said, mutually fail to conform not only with respect to signified matter, as was said, but with respect to specific non-conformity (for example, because such a form is animality - in which Socrates and this horse agree, who not only fail to conform with each other with respect to this flesh and these bones, but because of this man having the form of humanity, and that horse having the form of equinity) such are said to differ in species: and such form in which is convened in a concrete assumption, for example, animal, is a genus.
Et quia, ut dictum est, talis natura sumpta in concreto, de pluribus formaliter differentibus, quae sunt in diversis speciebus, dici potest; hinc est quod tali naturae intentio generis potest attribui: ideo dicitur quod genus praedicatur, idest praedicabile est de pluribus differentibus specie, seu dicitur dividi in plures species. Et hoc quod dictum est in concreto sumptum intelligitur solum in praedicamento substantiae: in aliis vero praedicamentis, et maxime in absolutis, sumitur genus et species in abstracto. Dicitur autem genus praedicari in eo quod quid est, idest, substantive secundum grammaticos; ut animal quod de homine et de equo praedicatur, est substantivum et non adiectivum. Sensibile enim quod de animali praedicatur, quamvis sit de essentia animalis, non tamen dicitur praedicari in quid, sed in quale; et causa est quia est adiectivum.	And because, as was said, such a nature understood in concrete of many things formally differing, which are in diverse species, can be named. Hence it is that the intention of genus can be attributed to such a nature. For this reason it is said that genus is predicated, that is, a predicable is of many things differing in species, or it is said to be divided into many species. And that which is predicated, understood in concrete, is understood only in the category of substance: but in other categories, and chiefly in absolute categories, is understood genus and species in abstract. However, it is said that genus is predicated in respect of the kind of thing some is, that is, substantively, according to grammarians, e.g. animal, which is predicated of man and of horse, is substantive, and not adjective. For the sensitive, which is predicated of animal, although it may be of the essence of animal,still is not said to be predicated in anything but in quale; and the cause is because it is adjectival.
Sciendum est autem quod quia ea quae in quid praedicantur sunt de essentia seu quidditate eorum de quibus praedicantur; ideo praedicari in quid non solum potest dicere modum significandi, ut dictum est; sed etiam dicit quidditatem ipsius de quo praedicatur. Et patet quid sit genus.	But it should be known that because those things which are predicated In quid are of the essence or quiddity of the things of which they are predicated, so to be predicated in quid is not only able to be called a mode of signifying, as was said, but also means the quiddity of that of which it is predicated. And it is clear what genus is.