Authors/Porphyry/isagoge/parallel

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Translated by Octavius Freire Owen, M. A. of Christ Church, Oxford. Rector of Burstow, Surrey; and Domestic Chaplain to the Duke of Portland. This translation appears in volume 2 of The Organon, or logical treatises of Aristotle, with the introduction of Porphyry, published by Henry G. Bohn in London in 1853. The notes are by Owen.

The Greek was scanned and some corrections made, but is included for reference purposes only, and should not be considered reliable.



Greek Latin English
PORPHYRII ISAGOGE INTRODUCTIO INTRODUCTION OF PORPHYRY [1]
Ὄντος ἀναγκαίου, Χρυσαόριε, καὶ εἰς τὴν τῶν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει κατηγοριῶν διδασκαλίαν τοῦ γνῶναι τί γένος καὶ τί διαφορὰ τί τε εἶδος καὶ τί ἴδιον καὶ τί συμβεβηκός, εἴς τε τὴν τῶν ὁρισμῶν ἀπόδοσιν καὶ ὅλως εἰς τὰ περὶ διαιρέσεως καὶ ἀποδείξεως χρησίμης οὔσης τῆς τούτων θεωρίας, σύντομόν σοι παράδοσιν ποιούμενος πειράσομαι διὰ βραχέων ὥσπερ ἐν εἰσαγωγῆς τρόπῳ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἐπελθεῖν, τῶν μὲν βαθυτέρων ἀπεχόμενος ζητημάτων, τῶν δ' ἁπλουστέρων συμμέτρως στοχαζόμενος. Cum sit necessarium, Chrisaorie, et ad eam quae est apud Aristotelem praedicamentorum doctrinam nosse quid genus sit et quid differentia quidque species et quid proprium et quid accidens, et ad definitionum assignationem, et omnino ad ea quae in divisione vel demonstratione sunt utilia, hac istarum rerum speculatione compendiosam tibi traditionem faciens temptabo breviter velut introductionis modo ea quae ab antiquis dicta sunt aggredi; altioribus quidem quaestionibus abstinens, simpliciores vero mediocriter coniectans. Since it is necessary, Chrysaorius, both to the doctrine of Aristotle's Categories, to know what genus, difference, species, property, and accident are, and also to the assignments of definitions, in short, since the investigation of these is useful for those things which belong to division and demonstration[2], I will endeavour by a summary briefly to discuss to you, as in the form of introduction, what on this subject has been delivered by the ancients, abstaining, indeed, from more profound questions, yet directing attention in a fitting manner, to such as are more simple.


αὐτίκα περὶ τῶν γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν τὸ μὲν εἴτε ὑφέστηκεν εἴτε καὶ ἐν μόναις ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κεῖται εἴτε καὶ ὑφεστηκότα σώματά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματα καὶ πότερον χωριστὰ ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ὑφεστῶτα, παραιτήσομαι λέγειν βαθυτάτης οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης πραγματείας καὶ ἄλλης μείζονος δεομένης ἐξετάσεως: Mox de generibus et speciebus illud quidem sive subsistunt sive in solis nudis purisque intellectibus posita sunt sive subsistentia corporalia sunt an incorporalia, et utrum separata an in sensibilibus et circa ea constantia, dicere recusabo. Altissimum enim est huiusmodi negotium et maioris egens inquisitionis. For instance, I shall omit to speak about genera and species, as to whether they subsist (in the nature of things) or in mere conceptions only; whether also if subsistent, they are bodies or incorporeal, and whether they are separate from, or in, sensibles[3], and subsist about these[4], for such a treatise is most profound, and requires another more extensive investigation[5].
τὸ δ' ὅπως περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν προκειμένων λογικώτερον οἱ παλαιοὶ διέλαβον καὶ τούτων μάλιστα οἱ ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου, νῦν σοι πειράσομαι δεικνύναι. Illud vero quemadmodum de his ac de propositis probabiliter antiqui tractaverint, et horum maxime Peripatetici, tibi nunc temptabo monstrare. Nevertheless, how the ancients, and especially the Peripatetics, discussed these and the other proposed subjects, in a more logical manner, I will now endeavour to point out to you.
Περὶ γένους [01] DE GENERE On genus[6]
Ἔοικεν δὲ μήτε τὸ γένος μήτε τὸ εἶδος ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι. γένος γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ἡ τινῶν ἐχόντων πως πρὸς ἕν τι καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἄθροισις, καθ' ὃ σημαινόμενον τὸ Ἡρακλειδῶν λέγεται γένος ἐκ τῆς ἀφ' ἑνὸς σχέσεως, λέγω δὴ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, καὶ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἐχόντων πως πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνου οἰκειότητα, κατὰ ἀποτομὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν κεκλημένου. Videtur autem neque genus neque species simpliciter dici. Genus enim dicitur et aliquorum quodammodo se habentium ad unum aliquid et ad se invicem collectio, secundum quam significationem Romanorum dicitur genus, ab unius scilicet habitudine -- dico autem Romuli -- et multitudinis habentium aliquo modo ad invicem eam quae ab illo est cognationem secundum divisionem ab aliis generibus dictam. Neither genus nor species appear to be simply denominated, for that is called genus which is a collection of certain things, subsisting in a certain respect relatively to one thing, and to each other, according to which signification the genus of the Heraclidae is denominated from the habitude from one, I mean Hercules, and from the multitude of those who have alliance to each other from him, denominated according to separation from other genera.


λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πάλιν γένος ἡ ἑκάστου τῆς γενέσεως ἀρχὴ εἴτε ἀπὸ τοῦ τεκόντος εἴτε ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου ἐν ᾧ τις γέγονεν. οὕτως γὰρ Ὀρέστην μὲν ἀπὸ Ταντάλου φαμὲν ἔχειν τὸ γένος, Ὕλλον δὲ ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους, καὶ πάλιν Πίνδαρον μὲν Θηβαῖον εἶναι τὸ γένος, Πλάτωνα δὲ Ἀθηναῖον· καὶ γὰρ ἡ πατρὶς ἀρχή τίς ἐστι τῆς ἑκάστου γενέσεως, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ πατήρ. Dicitur autem et aliter rursus genus quod est uniuscuiusque generationis principium vel ab eo qui genuit vel a loco in quo quis genitus est. Sic enim Oresten quidem dicimus a Tantalo habere genus, Illum autem ab Hercule, et rursus Pindarum quidem Thebanum esse genere, Platonem vero Atheniensem; et enim patria principium est uniuscuiusque generationis quemadmodum pater. Again, after another manner also, the principle of the generation of every one is called genus, whether from the generator or from the place in which a person is generated, for thus we say that Orestes had his genus from Tantalus, Hyllus from Hercules, and again, that Pindar was by genus a Theban, but Plato an Athenian, for country is a certain principle of each man's generation, in the same manner as a father.
τοῦτο δὲ ἔοικε πρόχειρον εἶναι τὸ σημαινόμενον· Ἡρακλεῖδαι γὰρ λέγονται οἱ ἐκ γένους κατάγοντες Ἡρακλέους καὶ Κεκροπίδαι οἱ ἀπὸ Κέκροπος καὶ οἱ τούτων ἀγχιστεῖς. καὶ πρότερόν γε ὠνομάσθη γένος ἡ ἑκάστου τῆς γενέσεως ἀρχή, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς οἶον Ἡρακλέους, ὃ ἀφορίζοντες καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίζοντες ἔφαμεν τὸ ὅλον ἄθροισμα Ἡρακλειδῶν γένος. Haec autem videtur promptissima esse significatio; Romani enim qui ex genere descendunt Romuli, et Cecropidae qui ex genere descendunt Cecropis et horum proximi. Et prius quidem appellatum est genus uniuscuiusque generationis principium, dehinc etiam multitudo eorum qui sunt ab uno principio; ut a Romulo, dividentes et ab aliis separantes, dicebamus omnem illam collectionem esse Romanorum genus. Still, this signification appears to be most ready,[7] for they are called Heraclidae who derive their origin from the genus of Hercules, and Cecropidae who are from Cecrops; also their next of kin. The first genus, moreover, is so called, which is the principle of each man's generation, but afterwards the number of those who are from one principle, e. g. from Hercules, which defining and separating from others, we call the whole collected multitude the genus of the Heraclidae.
ἄλλως δὲ πάλιν γένος λέγεται, ᾧ ὑποτάσσεται τὸ εἶδος, καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἴσως τούτων εἰρημένον· καὶ γὰρ ἀρχή τίς ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτο γένος τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτὸ καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος περιέχειν πᾶν τὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτό. Aliter autem rursus dicitur genus, cui supponitur species ad horum fortasse similitudinem dictum. Etenim principium quoddam est huiusmodi genus earum quae sub ipso sunt specierum, videturque et omnem eam multitudinem continere quae sub ipso sunt specierum. Again, in another way that is denominated genus to which the species is subject, called perhaps from the similitude of these; for such a genus is a certain principle of things under it, and seems also to comprehend all the multitude under itself.
Τριχῶς οὖν τοῦ γένους λεγομένου περὶ τοῦ τρίτου παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁ λόγος· ὃ καὶ ὑπογράφοντες ἀποδεδώκασι γένος εἶναι λέγοντες τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον οἷον τὸ ζῷον. Tripliciter igitur cum genus dicatur, de tertio apud philosophos sermo, quod etiam describentes assignaverunt, dicentes, genus esse quod de pluribus et differentibus specie, in eo quod quid sit praedicatur, ut animal. As then, genus is predicated triply, the consideration by philosophers is concerning the third, which also they explain by description, when they say that genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species, in answer to what a thing is, e. g. animal.
τῶν γὰρ κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν καθ' ἑνὸς λέγεται μόνου, ὡς τὰ ἄτομα οἷον Σωκράτης καὶ τὸ οὗτος καὶ τὸ τοῦτο, τὰ δὲ κατὰ πλειόνων, ὡς τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ τὰ ἴδια καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα κοινῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ ἰδίως τινί. ἔστι δὲ γένος μὲν οἷον τὸ ζῷον, εἶδος δὲ οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος, διαφορὰ δὲ οἷον τὸ λογικόν, ἴδιον δὲ οἷον τὸ γελαστικόν, συμβεβηκὸς δὲ οἷον τὸ λευκόν, τὸ μέλαν, τὸ καθέζεσθαι. Eorum enim quae praedicantur alia quidem de uno dicuntur solo, sicut individua sicut Socrates et hic et hoc, alia vero de pluribus, quemadmodum genera et species et differentiae et propria, et accidentia communiter sed non proprie alicui. Est autem genus quidem ut animal, species vero ut homo, differentia autem ut rationale, proprium ut risibile, accidens ut album, nigrum, sedere. For of predicates some are predicated of one thing alone, as individuals, for instance, "Socrates," and "this man," and "this thing;" but others are predicated of many, as genera, species, differences, properties, and accidents, predicated in common, but not peculiarly to any one. Now genus is such as "animal," species as "man," difference as " rational," property as " risible," accident as "white," "black," "to sit."
τῶν μὲν οὖν καθ' ἑνὸς μόνου κατηγορουμένων διαφέρει τὰ γένη τῷ ταῦτα κατὰ πλειόνων ἀποδοθέντα κατηγορεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ αὖ κατὰ πλειόνων τῶν μὲν εἰδῶν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν εἴδη εἰ καὶ κατὰ πλειόνων κατηγορεῖται ἀλλ' οὐ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀριθμῷ· ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εἶδος ὢν Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος κατηγορεῖται, οἳ οὐ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀριθμῷ, τὸ δὲ ζῷον γένος ὂν ἀνθρώπου καὶ βοὸς καὶ ἵππου κατηγορεῖται, οἳ διαφέρουσι καὶ τῷ εἴδει ἀλλήλων ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ μόνον. Ab his ergo quae de uno solo praedicantur differunt genera, eo quod haec de pluribus dicuntur. Ab his autem rursus quae de pluribus, a speciebus quidem, quoniam species etsi de pluribus praedicentur, non tamen de differentibus specie, sed numero: homo enim cum sit species, de Socrate et Platone praedicatur, qui non specie a se invicem differunt, sed numero. Animal vero cum sit genus, de homine, equo, et boue praedicatur, qui differunt a se invicem specie, non numero solum. From such things then, as are predicated of one thing only, genera differ in that they are predicated of many, but on the other hand, from those which are predicated of many and from species, (they differ) because those species are predicated of many things, yet not of those which differ in species, but in number only, for man being a species, is predicated of Socrates and Plato, who do not differ from each other in species, but in number, while animal being a genus is predicated of man, and ox, and horse, which differ also in species from each other, and not in number only.
τοῦ δ' αὖ ἰδίου διαφέρει τὸ γένος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἴδιον καθ' ἑνὸς μόνου εἴδους, οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον, κατηγορεῖται καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀτόμων, ὡς τὸ γελαστικὸν ἀνθρώπου μόνου καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων, τὸ δὲ γένος οὐχ ἑνὸς εἴδους κατηγορεῖται ἀλλὰ πλειόνων τε καὶ διαφερόντων. τῆς δ' αὖ διαφορᾶς καὶ τῶν κοινῇ συμβεβηκότων διαφέρει τὸ γένος, ὅτι εἰ καὶ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει κατηγοροῦνται αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ τὰ κοινῶς συμβεβηκότα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγοροῦνται ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ ὁποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἢ πῶς ἔχον ἐστιν. ἐρωτησάντων γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνο καθ' οὗ κατηγορεῖται ταῦτα τὸ γένος ἀποκρινόμεθα, τὰς δὲ διαφορὰς καὶ τὰ κοινῶς συμβεβηκότα οὐκ ἀποκρινόμεθα, οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, φαμέν, κατηγορεῖται, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐρωτᾶν ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπός φαμεν ὅτι λογικόν, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τι ὁ κόραξ φαμὲν ὅτι μέλαν· ἔστιν δὲ τὸ μὲν λογικόν διαφορά, τὸ δὲ μέλαν συμβεβηκός· ὅταν δὲ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἐρωτηθῶμεν, ζῷον ἀποκρινόμεθα· ἦν δὲ ἀνθρώπου γένος τὸ ζῷον. A proprio quoque differt genus, quoniam proprium de una sola specie, cuius est proprium, praedicatur, et de iis quae sub una specie sunt individuis, quemadmodum risibile de homine solo, et de particularibus hominibus: genus autem non de una solum specie praedicatur, sed de pluribus et differentibus. A differentia vero et ab iis quae communiter sunt accidentia differt genus, quoniam etsi de pluribus et differentibus specie praedicentur differentiae, et communiter accidentia, non tamen in eo quod quid sit praedicantur, sed potius in eo quod quale est, et quomodo se habet. Interrogantibus enim aliquibus quid est illud de quo praedicantur haec? genus respondebimus: differentias autem et communiter et accidentia non respondebimus. Non enim in eo quod quid est praedicantur de subiecto, sed magis in eo quod quale sit. Interrogantibus enim qualis est homo? dicimus rationalis, et qualis est corvus, dicimus niger. Est autem rationale, differentia: nigrum vero, accidens. Quando autem quid est homo interrogamur, animal respondemus: est autem genus hominis animal. From property, moreover, genus differs because property is predicated of one species alone of which it is the property, and of the individuals under the species, as "risible" of man alone, and of men particularly, for genus is not predicated of one species, but of many things, which are also different in species. Besides, genus differs from difference and from accidents in common, because though differences and accidents in common are predicated of many things, different also in species, yet they are not so in reply to what a thing is, but (what kind of a thing) it is. For when some persons ask what that is of which these are predicated, we reply, that it is genus; but we do not assign in answer differences and accidents, since they are not predicated of a subject, as to what a thing is, but rather as to what kind of a thing it is. For in reply to the question, what kind of a thing man is, we say, that he is rational, and in answer to what kind of a thing a crow is, we say that it is black, yet rational is difference, but black is accident. When however we are asked what man is, we answer, an animal, but animal is the genus of man,
ὥστε τὸ μὲν κατὰ πλειόνων λέγεσθαι τὸ γένος διαστέλλει αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἑνὸς μόνου τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγορουμένων, τὸ δὲ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει διαστέλλει ἀπὸ τῶν ὡς εἰδῶν κατηγορουμένων ἤ ὡς ἰδίων, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖσθαι χωρίζει ἀπὸ τῶν διαφορῶν καὶ τῶν κοινῇ συμβεβηκότων, ἃ οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἤ πῶς ἔχον ἐστὶν κατηγορεῖται ἕκαστον ὦν κατηγορεῖται. οὐδὲν ἄρα περιττὸν οὐδὲ ἐλλεῖπον περιέχει ἡ τοῦ γένους ῥηθεῖσα ὑπογραφὴ τῆς ἐννοίας. Quare genus de pluribus praedicari dividit ipsum ab iis quae de uno solo dicuntur, sicut individua; de differentibus vero specie, separat eumdem ab iis quae sicut species praedicantur, vel sicut propria: in eo autem quod quid sit praedicari, dividit ipsum a differentiis et communiter accidentibus, quae singula non in eo quod quid sit praedicatur, sed in eo quod quale est, vel quomodo se habet. Nihil igitur neque superfluum, neque minus continet generis dicta descriptio. Wherefore, from genus being predicated of many, it is diverse from individuals which are predicated of one thing only, but from being predicated of things different in species, it is distinguished from such as are predicated as species or as properties. Moreover, because it is predicated in reply to what a thing is, it is distinguished from differences and from accidents commonly, which are severally predicated of what they are predicated, not in reply to what a thing is, but what kind of a thing it is, or in what manner it subsists: the description therefore of the conception of genus, which has been enunciated, contains nothing superfluous, nothing deficient.[8]
Περὶ εἴδους [02] DE SPECIE
Τὸ δὲ εἶδος λέγεται μὲν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἑκάστου μορφῆς, καθὸ εἴρηται πρῶτον μὲν εἶδος ἄξιον τυραννίδος. Species autem dicitur quidem, et de uniuscuiusque forma, secundum quam dictum est: primum quidem species digna est imperio: Species indeed is predicated of every form, according to which it is said, "form is first worthy of imperial sway;"[9]
λέγεται δὲ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος, καθὸ εἰώθαμεν λέγειν τὸν μὲν ἄνθρωπον εἶδος τοῦ ζῴου γένους ὄντος τοῦ ζῴου, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν τοῦ χρώματος εἶδος, τὸ δὲ τρίγωνον τοῦ σχήματος εἶδος. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ γένος ἀποδιδόντες τοῦ εἴδους ἐμεμνήμεθα εἰπόντες τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον, καὶ τὸ εἶδός φαμεν τὸ υπὸ τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος, εἰδέναι χρὴ ὅτι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ γένος τινός ἐστιν γένος καὶ τὸ εἶδος τινός ἐστιν εἶδος ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀμφοτέρων λόγοις κεχρῆσθαι ἀμφοτέροις. ἀποδιδόασιν οὖν τὸ εἶδος καὶ οὕτως· εἶδός ἐστι τὸ ταττόμενον ὑπὸ τὸ γένος καὶ οὗ τὸ γένος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται. Dicitur autem species, et ea quae est sub assignato genere, secundum quam solemus dicere, hominem quidem speciem animalis, cum sit genus animal; album autem coloris speciem, triangulum vero figurae speciem. Quod si etiam genus assignantes speciei meminimus, dicentes quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quid praedicatur, et speciem dicimus id quod sub assignato genere ponitur. Nosse oportet quod quoniam genus alicuius est genus, et species alicuius est species, idcirco necesse est et in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti. Assignant ergo et sic speciem: Species est quae sub assignato genere ponitur, et de qua genus in eo quod quid sit praedicatur. still that is called species also, which is under the genus stated, according to which we are accustomed to call man a species of animal, animal being genus, but white a species of colour, and triangle of figure. Nevertheless, if when we assign the genus, we make mention of species, saying that which is predicated of many things differing in species, in reply to what a thing is, and call species that which is under the assigned genus, we ought to know that, since genus is the genus of something, and species the species of something, each of each, we must necessarily use both in the definitions of both. They assign, therefore, species thus: species is what is arranged under genus, and of which genus is predicated in reply to what a thing is:
ἔτι δὲ καὶ οὕτως· εἶδός ἐστι τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον. ἀλλ' αὕτη μὲν ἡ ἀπόδοσις τοῦ εἰδικοτάτου ἂν εἴη καὶ ὅ ἐστι μόνον εἶδος οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ γένοϛ, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι εἶεν ἂν καὶ τῶν μὴ εἰδικοτάτων. Amplius autem sic quoque: Species est quae de pluribus et differentibus numero, in eo quod quid sit praedicatur; sed haec quidem assignatio specialissimae est, et eius quae solum species est, non etiam genus: aliae vero et non specialissimarum esse possunt. moreover, thus species is what is predicated of many things differing in number, in reply to what a thing is. This explanation, however, belongs to the most special, and which is species only, but no longer genus also,[10] but the other (descriptions) will pertain to such as are not the most special.
σαφὲς δ' ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. καθ' ἑκάστην κατηγορίαν ἐστίν τινα γενικώτατα καὶ πάλιν ἄλλα εἰδικώτατα καὶ μεταξὺ τῶν γενικωτάτων καὶ τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἄλλα ἃ καὶ γένη καὶ εἴδη λέγεται τὰ αὐτὰ. ἔστιν δὲ γενικώτατον μέν, ὑπὲρ ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἐπαναβεβηκὸς γένος, εἰδικώτατον δέ, μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ὑποβεβηκὸς εἶδος, μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ γενικώτατου καὶ τοῦ εἰδικωτάτου ἄλλα, ἃ καὶ γένη καὶ εἴδη ἐστὶ τὰ αὐτά, πρὸς ἄλλο μέντοι καὶ ἄλλο λαμβανόμενα. Planum autem erit quod dicitur hoc modo: In unoquoque praedicamento sunt quaedam generalissima, et rursus alia specialissima, et inter generalissima et specialissima sunt alia quae et genera et species eadem dicuntur. Est autem generalissimum quidem supra quod non est aliud aliquod superveniens genus. Specialissimum autem post quod non est alia aliqua inferior species. Inter generalissimum autem et specialissimum, alia sunt quae et genera et species sunt eadem, ad aliud tamen et aliud sumpta. Now, what we have stated will be evident in this way: in each category there are certain things most generic, and again, others most special, and between the most generic and the most special, others which are alike called both genera and species, but the most generic is that above which there cannot be another superior genus, and the most special that below which there cannot be another inferior species. Between the most generic and the most special, there are others which are alike both genera and species, referred, nevertheless, to different things,
Γινέσθω δὲ ἐπὶ μιᾶς κατηγορίας σαφὲς τὸ λεγόμενον. ἡ οὐσία ἔστι μὲν καὶ αὐτὴ γένος, ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτην ἐστὶν σῶμα, καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔμψυχον σῶμα, ὑφ' ὃ τὸ ζῷον, ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ ζῷον λογικὸν ζῷον, ὑφ' ὃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι. Sit autem manifestum in uno praedicamento quod dicitur substantia: est quidem et ipsa genus, sub hac autem est corpus, et sub corpore animatum corpus, sub quo animal: sub animali vero, rationale animal, sub quo homo: sub homine vero, Socrates et Plato, et qui sunt particulares homines. but what is stated may become clear in one category. Substance indeed, is itself genus, under this is body, under body animated body, under which is animal, under animal rational animal, under which is man, under man Socrates, Plato, and men particularly.
ἀλλὰ τούτων ἡ μὲν οὐσία τὸ γενικώτατον καὶ ὃ μόνον γένος, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος τὸ εἰδικώτατον καὶ ὃ μόνον εἶδος, τὸ δὲ σῶμα εἶδος μὲν τῆς οὐσίας, γένος δὲ τοῦ ἐμψύχου σώματος. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον σῶμα εἶδος μὲν τοῦ σώματος, γένος δὲ τοῦ ζῴου, πάλιν δὲ τὸ ζῷον εἶδος μὲν τοῦ ἐμψύχου σώματος, γένος δὲ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου. τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ζῷον εἶδος μὲν τοῦ ζῴου, γένος δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος εἶδος μὲν τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ γένος τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ μόνον εἶδος· καὶ πᾶν τὸ πρὸ τῶν ἀτόμων προσεχῶς κατηγορούμενον εἶδος ἂν εἴη μόνον, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ γένος. Sed horum substantia quidem, generalissimum est, et genus solum: homo vero specialissimum, et solum species; corpus vero, species quidem est substantiae, genus vero corporis animati, sed et animatum corpus, species quidem est corporis, genus vero animalis. Rursus animal species quidem est corporis animati, genus vero animalis rationalis, sed rationale animal, species quidem est animalis, genus autem hominis: homo vero species est rationalis animalis, non autem etiam genus particularium hominum, sed solum species. Ac omne quod est ante individua proximeque de ipsis praedicatur, species erit solum, non etiam genus. Still, of these, substance is the most generic, and that which alone is genus; but man is most specific, and that which alone is species; yet body is a species of substance, but a genus of animated body, also animated body is a species of body, but a genus of animal; again, animal is a species of animated body, but a genus of rational animal, and rational animal is a species of animal, but a genus of man, and man is a species of rational animal, but is no longer the genus of particular men, but is species only, and every thing prior to individuals being proximately predicated of them, will be species only, and no longer genus also.
ὥσπερ οὖν ἡ οὐσία ἀνωτάτω οὖσα τῷ μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸ αὐτῆς γένος ἦν τὸ γενικώτατον, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἶδος ὧν, μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδος οὐδέ τι τῶν τέμνεσθαι δυναμένων εἰς εἴδη, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀτόμων (ἄτομον γὰρ Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων καὶ τουτὶ τὸ λευκόν) μόνον ἂν εἴη εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον εἶδος καὶ ὡς ἔφαμεν τὸ εἰδικώτατον· τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν μὲν πρὸ αὐτῶν εἴη ἂν εἴδη, τῶν δὲ μετ' αὐτὰ γένη. Quemadmodum igitur substantia cum suprema sit, eo quod nihil supra eam sit, genus est generalissimum, sic et homo, cum sit species, postquam non est alia species, neque aliquid eorum quae possunt dividi in species, sed solum individua (individuum enim est Socrates et Plato, et hoc album), species erit solum, et ultima species (et ut dictum est) specialissima: quae vero in medio sunt, eorum quidem quae supra se sunt species erunt, eorum vero quae post genera sunt, As then, substance being in the highest place, is most generic, from there being no genus prior to it, so also man being a species, after which there is no other species, nor any thing capable of division into species, but individuals, (for Socrates, Plato, Alcibiades, and this white thing, I call individual,) will be species alone, and the last species, and as we say the most specific. Yet the media will be the species of such as are before them, but the genera of things after them,
ὥστε ταῦτα μὲν ἔχει δύο σχέσεις, τήν τε πρὸς τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν, καθ' ἣν εἴδη αὐτῶν εἶναι λέγεται, τήν τε πρὸς τὰ μετ' αὐτά, καθ' ἣν γένη αὐτῶν εἶναι λέγεται· τὰ δὲ ἄκρα μίαν ἔχει σχέσιν· τό τε γὰρ γενικώτατον τὴν μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτὸ ἔχει σχέσιν, γένος ὂν πάντων τὸ ἀνωτάτω, τὴν δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ οὐκέτι ἔχει, ἀνωτάτω ὂν καὶ ὡς πρώτη ἀρχὴ καί, ὡς ἔφαμεν, ὑπὲρ ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἐπαναβεβηκὸς γένος· καὶ τὸ εἰδικώτατον δὲ μίαν ἔχει σχέσιν τὴν μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ὧν ἐστιν εἶδος, τὴν δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ οὐκ ἀλλοίαν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων εἶδος λέγεται ἀλλ' εἶδος μὲν λέγεται τῶν ἀτόμων ὡς περιέχον αὐτά, εἶδος δὲ πάλιν τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὡς περιεχόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν. quare haec quidem duas habent habitudines, illam quae est ad superiora, secundum quam species dicuntur esse ipsorum, et eam quae est ad posteriora, secundum quam genera ipsorum esse dicuntur. Extrema vero habent unam habitudinem, nam et generalissimum ad ea quae posteriora sunt, habet habitudinem, cum genus sit omnium supremum: eam vero quae est ad superiora non habet, cum sit supremum, et primum principium, et (ut diximus) supra quod non est aliud superveniens genus: et specialissimum etiam unam habet habitudinem, ea quae est ad superiora, quorum est species: eam vero quae est ad posteriora non diversam habet sed eandem, nam et individuorum species dicitur. Sed species quidem individuorum, velut ea continens, species vero superiorum, ut quae ab illis contineatur. So that these have two conditions, one as to things prior to them, according to which they are said to be their species, the other to things after them, according to which they are said to be their genera. The extremes on the other hand, have one condition, for the most generic has indeed a condition as to the things under it, since it is the highest genus of all, but has no longer one as to those before it, being supreme, and the first principle, and, as we have said, that above which there cannot be another higher genus.

Also, the most specific has one condition, as to the things prior to it, of which it is the species, yet it has not a different one, as to things posterior to it, but is called the species of individuals, so termed as comprehending them, and again, the species of things prior to it, as comprehended by them,

Ἀφορίζονται τοίνυν τὸ μὲν γενικώτατον οὕτως, ὃ γένος ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδος, καὶ πάλιν, ὑπὲρ ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἐπαναβεβηκὸς γένος· τὸ δὲ εἰδικώτατον, ὃ εἶδος ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν γένος καὶ ὃ εἶδος ὂν οὐκ ἂν διελοίμεθα ἔτι εἰς εἴδη καὶ ὃ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται. τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν ἄκρων ὑπάλληλά τε καλοῦσι γένη καὶ εἴδη, καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἶδος εἶναι καὶ γένος τίθενται, πρὸς ἄλλο μέντοι καὶ ἄλλο λαμβανόμενον. τὰ δὴ πρὸ τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἄχρι τοῦ γενικωτάτου ἀνιόντα γένη τε λέγεται καὶ εἴδη καὶ ὑπάλληλα γένη ὡς ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων Ἀτρείδης καὶ Πελοπίδης καὶ Τανταλίδης καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον Διός. Determinant ergo generalissimum ita, quod cum genus sit non est species: et rursus, supra quod non est aliud superveniens genus: specialissimum vero, quod cum sit species, non est genus, et quod cum sit species, non amplius in species dividere possumus, et hoc modo quod de pluribus et differentibus numero, in eo quod quid sit, praedicatur. Ea vero quae sunt in medio extremorum, subalterna vocantur genera et species, et unumquodque eorum species esse potest et genus, ad aliud quidem, et ad aliud sumpta. Ea vero quae sunt supra specialissima usque ad generalissimum ascendentia, vicissim genera dicuntur et species, ut Agamemnon, Atrides, Pelopides, Tantalides, et ultimo Iovis. Wherefore the most generic genus is thus defined to be that which being genus is not species, and again, above which there cannot be another higher genus; but the most specific species, that, which being species is not genus, and which being species we can no longer divide into species; moreover, which is predicated of many things differing in number, in reply to what a thing is.[11]Now, the media of the extremes they call subaltern species and genera, and admit each of them to be species and genus, when referred indeed to different things, for those which are prior to the most specific, ascending up to the most generic, are called subaltern genera and species. Thus, Agamemnon is Atrides, Pelopides, Tantalides, and lastly, (the son) of Jupiter,
ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γενεαλογιῶν εἰς ἕνα ἀνάγουσι, φέρε εἰπεῖν τὸν Δία, τὴν ἀρχὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· οὐ γάρ ἐστι κοινὸν ἓν γένος πάντων τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ πάντα ὁμογενῆ καθ' ἓν τὸ ἀνωτάτω γένος, ὥς φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης. ἀλλὰ κείσθω, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις, τὰ πρῶτα δέκα γένη οἷον ἀρχαὶ δέκα πρῶται· Sed in familiis quidem plerumque reducuntur ad unum principium, verbi gratia ad Iovem. In generibus autem et speciebus non sic se habet; neque enim unum commune genus omnium est ens, nec omnia eiusdem generis sunt secundum unum supremum genus, quemadmodum dicit Aristoteles, sed sint posita, quemadmodum dictum est in praedicamentis, prima decem genera, quasi decem prima principia. Yet in genealogies they refer generally to one origin, for instance, to Jupiter; but this is not the case in genera and species, since being is not the common genus of all things, nor, as Aristotle says, are all things of the same genus with respect to one summum genus. Still, let the first ten genera be arranged, as in the Categories, as ten first principles.
κἂν δὴ πάντα τις ὄντα καλῇ, ὁμωνύμως, φησί , καλέσει, ἀλλ' οὐ συνωνύμως. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἦν κοινὸν πάντων γένος τὸ ὄν, συνωνύμως ἂν πάντα ὄντα ἐλέγετο· δέκα δὲ ὄντων τῶν πρώτων ἡ κοινωνία κατὰ τοὔνομα μόνον, οὐκέτι μὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν κατὰ τοὔνομα. Et si omnia quis entia vocet, aequivoce inquit nuncupabit, non univoce: si enim ens unum esset commune omnium genus, univoce omnia entia dicerentur: cum vero sint decem prima, commune est ens secundum nomen solum, non etiam secundum rationem, quae secundum entis nomen est. And even if a person should call all things beings, yet he will call them, so he says, equivocally, but not synonymously, for if being were the one common genus of all things, all things would be synonymously styled beings, but the first principles being ten, the community is in name only, yet not in the definition also belonging to the name:
δέκα μὲν οὖν τὰ γενικώτατα, τὰ δὲ εἰδικώτατα ἐν ἀριθμῷ μέν τινι, οὐ μὴν ἀπείρῳ· τὰ δὲ ἄτομα, ἅπερ ἐστὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰ εἰδικώτατα, ἄπειρα. διὸ ἄχρι τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἀπὸ τῶν γενικωτάτων κατιόντας παρεκελεύετο ὁ Πλάτων παύεσθαι, κατιέναι δὲ διὰ τῶν διὰ μέσου διαιροῦντας ταῖς εἰδοποιοῖς διαφοραῖς· τὰ δὲ ἄπειρά φησιν ἐᾶν, μὴ γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι τούτων ἐπιστήμην. Decem quidem igitur generalissima sunt, specialissima vero in numero quidem quodam sunt, non tamen infinito. Individua autem quae sunt post specialissima, infinita sunt quapropter usque ad specialissima a generalissimis descendentes iubebat Plato quiescere. Descendere autem per media dividendo specificis differentiis, infinita vero relinquenda suadet, neque enim eorum posse fieri disciplinam. There are then ten most generic genera. On the other hand, the most specific they place in a certain number, yet not in an infinite one, but individuals which are after the most specific are infinite; wherefore, when we have come down to the most specific from the most generic, Plato exhorts us to rest,[12] but to descend through those things which are in the middle, dividing by specific differences; he tells us however to leave infinites alone, as there cannot be science of these.
κατιόντων μὲν οὖν εἰς τὰ εἰδικώτατα ἀνάγκη διαιροῦντας διὰ πλήθους ἰέναι, ἀνιόντων δὲ εἰς τὰ γενικώτατα ἀνάγκη συναιρεῖν τὸ πλῆθος εἰς ἕν· συναγωγὸν γὰρ τῶν πολλῶν εἰς μίαν φύσιν τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ γένος, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μέρος καὶ καθ' ἕκαστα τοὐναντίον εἰς πλῆθος ἀεὶ διαιρεὶ τὸ ἕν· τῇ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εἴδους μετουσίᾳ οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι εἷς, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ μέρος ὁ εἴς καὶ κοινὸς πλείους· διαιρετικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, συλληπτικὸν δὲ καὶ ἑνοποιὸν τὸ κοινόν. Descendentibus igitur ad specialissima necesse est, dividendo per multitudinem ire, ascendentibus vero ad generalissima necesse est colligere multitudinem in unum: collectivum enim multorum in unam naturam species est, et magis etiam genus. Particularia vero et singularia e contrario, in multitudinem semper dividunt id quod unum est, participatione enim speciei, plures homines, sunt unus homo, in particularibus autem et singularibus, unus et communis, plures, divisivum enim est semper quod singulare est, collectivum autem et adunativum quod commune est. In descending then, to the most specific, it is necessary to proceed by division through multitude, but in ascending to the most generic, we must collect multitude into one, for species is collective of the many into one nature, and genus yet more so; but particulars and singulars, on the contrary, always divide the one into multitude, for by the participation of species, many men become one man; but in particulars and singulars, the one, and what is common, becomes many; for the singular is always divisive, but what is common is collective and reductive to one.[13]
Ἀποδεδομένου δὲ τοῦ γένους καὶ τοῦ εἴδους τί ἐστιν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν γένους ἑνὸς ὄντος τῶν δὲ εἰδῶν πλειόνων (ἀεὶ γὰρ εἰς πλείω εἴδη ἡ τομὴ τοῦ γένους) τὸ μὲν γένος ἀεὶ τοῦ εἴδους κατηγορεῖται καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐπάνω τῶν ὑποκάτω, τὸ δὲ εἶδος οὔτε τοῦ προσεχοῦς αὐτοῦ γένους οὔτε τῶν ἐπάνω· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀντιστρέφει. δεῖ γὰρ ἢ τὰ ἴσα τῶν ἴσων κατηγορεῖσθαι ὡς τὸ χρεμετιστικὸν τοῦ ἵππου ἢ τὰ μείζω τῶν ἐλαττόνων ὡς τὸ ζῷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν μειζόνων οὐκέτι· οὐκέτι γὰρ τὸ ζῷον εἴποις ἂν εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, ὥσπερ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἴποις ἂν εἶναι ζῷον. Assignato autem genere, specie quid sit utrumque, et genere quidem uno existente, speciebus vero pluribus: semper enim divisio generis in species plures est, genus quidem semper de speciebus praedicatur, et omnia superiora de inferioribus, species autem neque de proximo sibi genere, neque de superioribus, neque enim convertitur. Oportet enim aut aequa de aequis praedicari, ut hinnibile de equo, aut maiora de minoribus, ut animal de homine, minora vero de maioribus minime: nec enim animal dicis esse hominem, quemadmodum dicis hominem animal, Genus then, and species, being each of them explained as to what it is, since also genus is one, but species many, (for there is always a division of genus into many species,) genus indeed is always predicated of species, and all superior of inferior, but species is neither predicated of its proximate genus, nor of those superior, since it does not reciprocate. For it is necessary that either equals should be predicated of equals, as neighing of a horse, or that the greater should be predicated of the less, as animal of man, but the less no longer of the greater, for you can no longer say that animal is man, as you can say that man is animal.
καθ' ὧν δ' ἂν τὸ εἶδος κατηγορῆται, κατ' ἐκείνων ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ τοῦ εἴδους γένος κατηγορηθήσεται καὶ τὸ τοῦ γένους γένος ἄχρι τοῦ γενικότατου· εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὲς τὸ τὸν Σωκράτην εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ζῷον, τὸ δὲ ζῷον οὐσίαν· ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸν Σωκράτην ζῷον εἰπεῖν καὶ οὐσίαν. ἀεὶ οὖν τῶν ἐπάνω κατηγορουμένων τῶν ὑποκάτω τὸ μὲν εἶδος τοῦ ἀτόμου κατηγορηθήσεται, τὸ δὲ γένος καὶ κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου, τὸ δὲ γενικώτατον καὶ κατὰ τοῦ γένους ἢ τῶν γενῶν, εἰ πλείω εἴη τὰ μέσα καὶ ὑπάλληλα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου. De quibus autem species praedicatur, de his necessario et speciei genus praedicatur et generis genus, usque ad generalissimum. Si enim verum est dicere: Socratem hominem, hominem autem animal, animal vero substantiam, verum est Socratem animal dicere atque substantiam: semper igitur cum superiora de inferioribus praedicentur, species quidem de individuo praedicabitur, genus autem et de specie et de individuo; generalissimum autem et de genere, et de generibus, si plura sunt media et subalterna, et de specie, et de individuo: Of those things however whereof species is predicated, that genus of the species will also be necessarily predicated, also that genus of the genus up to the most generic; for if it is true to say that Socrates is a man, but man an animal, and animal substance, it is also true to say that Socrates is animal and substance. At least, since the superior are always predicated of the inferior, species indeed will always be predicated of the individual, but the genus both of the species and of the individual, but the most generic both of the genus or the genera, (if the media and subaltern be many,) and of the species, and of the individual.
λέγεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν γενικώτατον κατὰ πάντων τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτὸ γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν καὶ ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ γένος τὸ πρὸ τοῦ εἰδικωτάτου κατὰ πάντων τῶν εἰδικωτάτων καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ μόνον εἶδος κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ ἄτομον ἐφ' ἑνός μόνου τῶν κατὰ μέρος. ἄτομον δὲ λέγεται ὁ Σωκράτης καὶ τουτὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ οὑτοσὶ ὁ προσιὼν Σωφρονίσκου ὑιός, εἰ μόνος αὐτῷ είη Σωκράτης ὑιός. Dicitur enim generalissimum quidem de omnibus sub se positis generibus et speciebus et individuis; genus autem quod ante specialissimum est, de omnibus specialissimis et de individuis, solum autem species de omnibus individuis, individuum autem praedicatur de uno solo particulari. Individuum autem dicitur Socrates, et hoc album, et hic veniens Sophronisci filius, si solus sit ei Socrates filius). For the most generic is predicated of all the genera, species, and individuals under it, but the genus which is prior to the most specific (species), is predicated of all the most specific species and individuals; but what is species alone of all the individuals (of it), but the individual of one particular alone.[14] Now, an individual is called Socrates, this white thing, this man who approaches the son of Sophroniscus, if Socrates alone is his son,
ἄτομα οὖν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι ἐξ ἰδιοτήτων συνέστηκεν ἕκαστον, ὧν τὸ ἄθροισμα οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλου ποτὲ τὸ αυτὸ γένοιτο· αἱ γὰρ Σωκράτους ἰδιότητες οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν κατὰ μέρος γένοιντο ἂν αἱ αὐταί, αἱ μέντοι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, λέγω δὴ τοῦ κοινοῦ, ἰδιότητες γένοιντ' ἂν αἱ αὐταὶ ἐπὶ πλειόνων, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων, καθὸ ἄνθρωποι. Individua autem dicuntur huiusmodi, quoniam ex proprietatibus consistit unumquodque eorum, quarum collectio numquam in alio quolibet eadem erit. Socratis enim proprietates nunquam in alioquo quolibet erunt particularium eaedem. Hae vero quae sunt hominis proprietates: dico autem eius qui est communis, erunt eaedem pluribus, magis autem in omnibus particularibus hominibus in eo quod homines sunt. And such things are called individuals, because each consists of properties of which the combination can never be the same in any other, for the properties of Socrates can never be the same in any other particular person;[15] the properties of man indeed, (I mean of him as common,) may be the same in many, or rather in all particular men, so far as they are men.
περιέχεται οὖν τὸ μὲν ἄτομον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ὑπὸ τοῦ γένους· ὅλον γάρ τι τὸ γένος, τὸ δὲ ἄτομον μέρος, τὸ δὲ εἶδος καὶ ὅλον καὶ μέρος, ἀλλὰ μέρος μὲν ἄλλου, ὅλον δὲ οὐκ ἄλλου ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον. Continetur igitur individuum quidem sub specie, species autem sub genere. Totum enim quidem est genus, individuum autem pars, species vero totum et pars: sed pars quidem alterius, totum vero non alterius, sed in aliis. In partibus enim totum est. Wherefore the individual is comprehended in the species, but the species by the genus, for genus is a certain whole, but the individual is a part, and species both a whole and a part; part indeed of something else, but a whole not of another, but in other things, for the whole is in its parts.
Περὶ μὲν οὖν γένους καὶ εἴδους καὶ τί τὸ γενικώτατον καὶ τί τὸ εἰδικώτατον καὶ τίνα καὶ γένη τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ εἴδη τίνα τε τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ποσαχῶς τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ εἶδος, εἴρηται. De genere quidem et specie, et quid sit generalissimum, et quid specialissimum, et quae genera, et species eadem sunt, et quae individua, et quot modis genus et species dicatur, sufficienter dictum est. Concerning genus then, and species, we have shown what is the most generic, and the most specific, also what the same things are genera and species, what also are individuals, and in how many ways genus and species are taken.
Περὶ διαφορᾶς [03] DE DIFFERENTIA Of difference
Διαφορὰ δὲ κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίως καὶ ἰδιαίτατα λεγέσθω. κοινῶς μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται τὸ ἑτερότητι διαλλάττον ὁπωσοῦν ἢ πρὸς αὑτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο· διαφέρει γὰρ Σωκράτης Πλάτωνος τῇ ἑτερότητι καὶ αὐτός γε ἑαυτοῦ παιδός τε ὄντος καὶ ἀνδρωθέντος καὶ ἐνεργοῦντός τι ἢ παυσαμένου καὶ ἀεί γε ἐν ταῖς τοῦ πῶς ἔχειν ἑτερότησιν. Differentia vero communiter, proprie, et magis proprie dicitur. Communiter quidem differre alterum ab altero dicitur, quoniam alteritate quadam differt quocunque modo, vel a seipso vel ab alio; differt enim Socrates a Platone alteritate quadam, et ipse a se puero iam vir factus, et a se faciente aliquid cum quiescit, et semper in aliquo modo habendi se alteritatibus spectatur. Difference may be predicated commonly, properly, and most properly: for one thing is said to differ from another in common from its differing in some respect in diversity of nature, either from itself, or from something else; for Socrates differs from Plato in diversity of nature, and himself from himself when a boy, and when become a man, also when he does any thing, or ceases to do it, and it is always perceived in the different ways in which a thing is somehow effected.
ἰδίως δὲ διαφέρειν λέγεται ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ὅταν ἀχωρίστῳ συμβεβηκότι τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου διαφέρη· ἀχώριστον δὲ συμβεβηκὸς οἷον γλαυκότης ἢ γρυπότης ἢ καὶ οὐλὴ ἐκ τραύματος ἐνσκιρωθεῖσα. Ἰδιαίτατα δὲ διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται, ὅταν εἰδοποιῷ διαφορᾷ διαλλάττη, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ἵππου εἰδοποιῷ διαφορᾷ διενήνοχε τῇ τοῦ λογικοῦ ποιότητι. Proprie autem differre alterum ab altero dicitur, quando inseparabili accidente alterum ab altero differt. Inseparabile vero accidens est, ut nasi curvitas, caesitas oculorum, et cicatrix cum ex vulnere occalluerit. Magis autem proprie alterum differre ab altero dicitur, quando specifica differentia differt, quemadmodum homo ab equo specifica differentia differt rationali qualitate. Again, one thing is said to differ properly from another, when one differs from another by an inseparable accident; but an inseparable accident is such as blueness, or crookedness, or a scar become scirrhous from a wound. Moreover, one is most properly said to differ from another, when it varies by specific difference, as man differs from horse by specific difference, i. e. by the quality of rational.
καθόλου μὲν οὖν πᾶσα διαφορὰ ἑτεροῖον ποιεῖ προσγινομένη τινί· ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν κοινῶς καὶ ἰδίως ἀλλοῖον ποιοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰδιαίτατα ἄλλο. τῶν γὰρ διαφορῶν αἱ μὲν ἀλλοῖον ποιοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ ἄλλο. αἱ μὲν οὖν ποιοῦσαι ἄλλο εἰδοποιοὶ κέκληνται, αἱ δὲ ἀλλοῖον ἁπλῶς διαφοραί. τῷ γὰρ ζῴῳ διαφορὰ προσελθοῦσα ἡ τοῦ λογικοῦ ἄλλο ἐποίησεν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλοῖον μόνον παρὰ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν ἐποίησεν, ὥστε ἡ μὲν ἄλλο, ἡ δὲ ἀλλοῖον μόνον ἐποίησεν. Universaliter ergo omnis differentia alteratum facit cuilibet adveniens, sed ea quae est communiter et proprie, alteratum facit: illa autem quae est magis proprie, aliud. Differentiarum enim, aliae quidem alteratum faciunt, aliae vero aliud. Illae igitur quae faciunt aliud, specificae uocantur; illae vero quae alteratum, simpliciter differentiae: animali enim rationalis differentia adveniens aliud facit, et speciem animalis facit. Illa vero quae est movendi, alteratum facit a quiescente. Quare haec quidem aliud, illa vero alteratum solum facit. Universally then every difference acceding to a thing renders it different, but differences common and proper render it different in quality, and the most proper render it another thing. Hence, those which render it another thing are called specific, but those, which make it different in quality, are simply (called) differences, for the difference of rational being added to animal, makes it another thing, (and makes a species of animal,) but difference of being moved makes it different in quality only from what is at rest, so that the one renders it another thing, but the other only of another quality.[16]
κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὰς ἄλλο ποιούσας διαφορὰς αἵ τε διαιρέσεις γίνονται τῶν γενῶν εἰς τὰ εἴδη, οἵ τε ὅροι ἀποδίδονται ἐκ γένους ὄντες καὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαφορῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὰς μόνον ἀλλοῖον ποιούσας αἱ ἑτερότητες μόνον συνίστανται καὶ αἱ τοῦ πῶς ἔχοντος μεταβολαί. Secundum igitur aliud facientes differentias et divisiones fiunt a generibus in species, et diffinitiones assignantur, quae sunt ex genere, et huiusmodi differentiis: secundum autem eas quae solum alteratum faciunt, alterationes solum consistunt, et aliquo modo se habentis permutationes. According then, to the differences which produce another thing do the divisions of genera into species arise, and the definitions arising from genus and such differences are assigned. On the other hand, as to those which only make a thing different in quality, diversities alone consist, and the changes of subsistence of a thing.
Ἄνωθεν οὖν πάλιν ἀρχομένῳ ῥητέον τῶν διαφορῶν τὰς μὲν χωριστὰς εἶναι, τὰς δὲ ἀχωρίστους· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἠρεμεῖν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν καὶ ὅσα τούτοις παραπλήσια χωριστά ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ γρυπὸν εἶναι ἢ σιμὸν ἢ λογικὸν ἢ ἄλογον ἀχώριστα. A superioribus rursus inchoanti dicendum est, differentiarum alias quidem esse separabiles, alias vero inseparabiles. Moveri enim et quiescere, et sanum esse, et aegrum, et quaecunque his proxima sunt, separabilia sunt. At vero aquilum esse, vel simum, vel rationale, vel irrationale, inseparabilia sunt.


Beginning then, again, from the first, we must say that of differences some are separable, others inseparable, thus to be moved, and to be at rest, to be ill, and to be well, and such as resemble these, are separable, but to have a crooked, or a flat nose, to be rational, or irrational, are inseparable differences.
τῶν δὲ ἀχωρίστων αἱ μὲν ὑπάρχουσι καθ' αὑτάς, αἱ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ λογικὸν καθ' αὑτὸ ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ θνητόν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δεκτικόν, τὸ δὲ γρυπὸν ἢ σιμὸν εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ οὐ καθ' αὑτό. Inseparabilium autem, aliae quidem sunt per se, aliae vero per accidens; nam rationale per se inest homini, et mortale, et disciplinae esse susceptibile. At vero aquilum esse vel simum, per accidens et non per se. Again, of the inseparable, some exist per se, others by accident, for rational, mortal, to be susceptible of science, are inherent in man per se, but to have a crooked or flat nose, accidentally, and not per se.
αἱ μὲν οὖν καθ' αὑτὰς προσοῦσαι ἐν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας λαμβάνονται λόγῳ καὶ ποιοῦσιν ἄλλο, αἱ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὔτε ἐν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ λαμβάνονται οὔτε ποιοῦσιν ἄλλο ἀλλὰ ἀλλοῖον. καὶ αἱ μὲν καθ' αὑτὰς οὐκ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, αἱ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κἂν ἀχώριστοι ὦσιν, ἐπίτασιν λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἄνεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ γένος μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον κατηγορεῖται οὖ ἂν ᾖ γένος οὔτε αἱ τοῦ γένους διαφοραί, καθ' ἃς διαιρεῖται· αὖται μὲν γάρ εἰσιν αἱ τὸν ἑκάστου λόγον συμπληροῦσαι, τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὔτε ἄνεσιν οὔτε ἐπίτασιν ἐπιδεχόμενόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ γρυπὸν ἢ σιμὸν εἶναι ἢ κεχρῶσθαί πως καὶ ἐπιτείνεται καὶ ἀνίεται. Illae igitur quae per se sunt, in ratione substantiae accipiuntur, et faciunt aliud: illae vero quae secundum accidens, nec in substantiae ratione accipiuntur, nec faciunt aliud, sed alteratum. Et illae quidem quae per se sunt, non suscipiunt magis et minus: illae vero quae per accidens, et si inseparabiles sint, intentionem accipiunt et remissionem: nam neque genus magis et minus praedicatur de eo cuius est genus, neque generis differentiae, secundum quas dividitur: ipsae enim sunt quae uniuscuiusque rationem complent: esse autem unicuique unum et idem, nec intentionem nec remissionem suscipiens est, aquilum autem vel simum esse, vel coloratum aliquo modo, et intenditur et remittitur. Wherefore, such as are present per se, are assumed in the definition of substance, and effect a different thing, but what are accidental are neither taken in the definition of substance, nor render a thing another, but of another quality. Those too, which are per se, do not admit of the more and less, but the accidental, even if they be inseparable, admit of intention and remission, for neither is genus more and less predicated of that of which it is the genus, nor the differences of genus according to which it is divided. For these are such as complete the definition of each thing, but the essence of each is one and the same, and neither admits of intention, nor remission; to have however a crooked or a flat nose, or to be in some way coloured, admits both of intension and remission.
Τριῶν οὖν εἰδῶν τῆς διαφορᾶς θεωρουμένων καὶ τῶν μὲν οὐσῶν χωριστῶν τῶν δὲ ἀχωρίστων καὶ πάλιν τῶν ἀχωρίστων τῶν μὲν οὐσῶν καθ' αὑτὰς τῶν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, πάλιν τῶν καθ' αὑτὰς διαφορῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι καθ' ἃς διαιρούμεθα τὰ γένη εἰς τὰ εἴδη, αἱ δὲ καθ' ἃς τὰ διαιρεθέντα εἰδοποιεῖται. οἷον τῶν καθ' αὑτὰς διαφορῶν πασῶν τῶν τοιούτων τοῦ ζῴου οὐσῶν ἐμψύχου καὶ αἰσθητικοῦ, λογικοῦ καὶ ἀλόγου, θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἐμψύχου καὶ αἰσθητικοῦ διαφορὰ συστατική ἐστι τῆς τοῦ ζῴου οὐσίας, ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ζῷον οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική, ἡ δὲ τοῦ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου διαφορὰ καὶ ἡ τοῦ λογικοῦ τε καὶ ἀλόγου διαιρετικαί εἰσι τοῦ ζῴου διαφοραί· διʹ αὐτῶν γὰρ τὰ γένη εἰς τὰ εἴδη διαιρούμεθα. Cum igitur tres species differentiae considerentur, et cum hae quidem sint separabiles, illae vero inseparabiles, et rursus inseparabilium, hae quidem sint per se, illae vero per accidens, et rursus earum quae per se sint differentiarum, aliae quidem sunt, secundum quas dividimus genera in species aliae vero secundum quas haec quae divisa sunt specificantur; ut, cum per se differentiae omnes huiusmodi sint animalis, animati et sensibilis, rationalis et irrationalis, mortalis et immortalis, ea quidem quae est animati et sensibilis differentia, constitutiva est animalis substantiae: est enim animal substantia animata sensibilis, ea vero quae est mortalis et immortalis differentia, itemque rationalis et irrationalis, divisivae sunt animalis differentiae, per eas enim genera in species dividimus. Since then, there are three species of difference considered, some indeed separable, but others inseparable, again, of the inseparable, some are per se, but others accidental, moreover of differences per se, some are those according to which we divide genera into species, but others according to which the things divided become specific: thus of all such differences per se of animal as these, animated and sensitive, rational and irrational, mortal and immortal, the difference of animated and sensitive is constitutive of the essence of animal, for animal is an animated substance, endued with sense, but the difference of mortal and immortal, and that of rational and irrational, are the divisive differences of animal, for through these we divide genera into species.
ἀλλ' αὖταί γε αἱ διαιρετικαὶ διαφοραὶ τῶν γενῶν συμπληρωτικαὶ γίνονται καὶ συστατικαὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· Sed hae quidem quae divisivae sunt differentiae generum, completivae fiunt et constitutivae specierum: Yet these very differences which divide the genera are constitutive and completive of species.
τέμνεται γὰρ τό ζῷον τῇ τε τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀλόγου διαφορᾷ καὶ πάλιν τῇ τε τοῦ θνητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου διαφορᾷ. ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν τοῦ θνητοῦ καὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ διαφοραὶ συστατικαὶ γίνονται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, αἱ δὲ τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου τοῦ θεοῦ, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω οὐσίας διαιρετικῶν οὐσῶν τῆς τε ἐμψύχου καὶ ἀψύχου διαφορᾶς καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ ἀναισθήτου ἡ μὲν ἔμψυχος καὶ αἰσθητικὴ συλληφθεῖσαι τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀπετέλεσαν τό ζῷον, ἡ δὲ ἔμψυχος καὶ ἀναίσθητος ἀπετέλεσαν τὸ φυτόν. dividitur enim animal rationali et irrationali differentia, et rursus mortali et immortali differentia, sed ea quae sunt rationalis differentiae et mortalis, constitutivae sunt hominis, rationalis vero et immortalis, Dei: illae vero quae sunt irrationalis et mortalis, irrationabilium animalium. Sic et suprema substantia, cum divisiva sit animati et inanimati differentia, sensibili et insensibili, animata et sensibilis congregatae ad substantiam, animal perfecerunt, animata vero et insensibilis perfecerunt plantam. For animal is divided by the difference of rational and irrational, and again, by the difference of mortal and immortal; but the differences of rational and mortal are constitutive of man, but those of rational and immortal of God, those again, of mortal and irrational, of irrational animals.[17] Thus also, since the differences of animate and inanimate, sensitive and void of sense, divide the highest substance, animate and sensitive added to substance, complete animal, but animate and deprived of sense, form plant.
ἐπεì οὖν αἱ αὐταì πὼς μὲν ληφθεῖσαι γίνονται συστατικαí, πὼς δὲ διαιρετικαί, εἰδοποιοὶ πᾶσαι κέκληνται. καὶ τούτων γε μάλιστα χρεία εἴς τε τὰς διαιρέσεις τῶν γενῶν καὶ εἴς τοὺς ὁρισμούς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀχωρíστων οὐδ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον τῶν χωριστῶν. Quoniam ergo eaedem aliquo modo acceptae fiunt constitutivae, aliquo modo autem divisivae, omnes specificae dicuntur: et his maxime opus est ad divisiones generum et diffinitiones specierum, sed non his quae secundum accidens inseparabiles, nec magis his, quae sunt separabiles. Since then, the same differences taken in one way become constitutive, but in another divisive, they are all called specific. These indeed are especially useful for divisions of genera, and for definitions, yet not with regard to those which are inseparable accidentally, nor still more with such as are separable.[18]
Ἃς δὴ καὶ ὁριζόμενοί φασιν· διαφορά ἐστιν ᾗ περισσεύει τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ζῴου πλέον ἔχει τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ θνητόν· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον οὔτε οὐδὲν τούτων ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ πόθεν ἂν τὰ εἴδη σχοῖεν διαφοράς· οὔτε δὲ πάσας τὰς ἀντικειμένας ἔχει, ἐπεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ἕξει τὰ ἀντικείμενα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀξιοῦσι, δυνάμει μὲν πάσας ἔχει τὰς τῶν ὑφ' αὑτὸ διαφοράς, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐδεμίαν. καὶ οὕτως οὔτε ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τι γίνεται οὔτε τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἅμα περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται.


Quas etiam determinantes dicunt: Differentia est qua abundat species a genere. Homo enim ab animali plus habet rationale et mortale: animal enim ipsum nihil horum est, nam unde haberent species differentias? nec enim omnes oppositas habet, namque idem simul habebit oppositas, sed quemadmodum probant, potestate quidem habet omnes differentias sub se, actu vero nullam. Et sic nec ex his quae non sunt, aliquid fit, nec in eodem simul opposita erunt. And indeed defining these, they say that difference is that by which species exceeds genus, e. g. man exceeds animal in being rational and mortal, for animal is neither any one of these, (since whence would species have differences?) nor has it all the opposite differences, (since otherwise the same thing would at the same time have opposites,) but (as they allege) it contains all the differences which are under it in capacity, but not one of them in energy, and so neither is any thing produced from non-entities, nor will opposites at the same time subsist about the same thing.
Ὁρίζονται δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ οὕτως· διαφορά ἐστι τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον· τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορούμενον ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν. τί μὲν γὰρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐρωτωμένων ἡμῶν οἰκεῖον εἰπεῖν ζῷον, ποῖον δὲ ζῷον πυνθανομένων λογικὸν καὶ θνητὸν οἰκείως ἀποδώσομεν. Definiunt autem eam et hoc modo: Differentia est quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quale sit praedicatur rationale enim et mortale, de homine praedicatum in eo quod quale quiddam est homo dicitur sed non in eo quod quid est; "Quid est" enim "homo?" interrogatis nobis conveniens est dicere "Animal"; quale autem animal inquisiti, quoniam rationale et mortale est convenienter assignabimus. Again, they define it (difference) also thus: difference is that which is predicated of many things differing in species in answer to the question, of what kind a thing is,[19] for rational and mortal being predicated of man, are spoken in reply to what kind of thing man is, and not as to the question what is he. For when we are asked what is man, we properly answer, an animal, but when men inquire what kind of animal, we say properly, that he is rational and mortal.
τῶν γὰρ πραγμάτων ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους συνεστώτων ἢ ἀνάλογόν γε ὕλῃ καὶ εἴδει τὴν σύστασιν ἐχόντων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνδριὰς ἐξ ὕλης μὲν τοῦ χαλκοῦ, εἴδους δὲ τοῦ σχήματος, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ κοινός τε καὶ εἰδικός ἐξ ὕλης μὲν ἀναλόγου συνέστηκεν τοῦ γένους, ἐκ μορφῆς δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς, τὸ δὲ ὅλον τοῦτο, ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν, ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ἐκεῖ ὁ ἀνδριάς. Rebus enim ex materia et forma constantibus vel ad similitudinem materiae specieique constitutionem habentibus (quemadmodum statua ex materia est aeris, forma autem figura), sic et homo communis et specialis ex materia quidem similiter consistit genere, ex forma autem differentia, totum autem hoc animal rationale mortale homo est quemadmodum illic statua. For since things consist of matter and form, or have a constitution analogous to matter and form, as a statue is composed of brass, matter, but of figure, form, so also man, both common and specific, consists of matter analogous to genus, and of form analogous to difference, but the whole of this, animal, rational, mortal, is man, in the same manner as the statue there.
Ὑπογράφουσι δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας διαφορὰς καὶ οὕτως· διαφορά ἐστιν τὸ χωρίζειν πεφυκὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος· τὸ λογικὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν ἵππον ὄντα ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τὸ ζῷον χωρίζει. Describunt autem huiusmodi differentiam et hoc modo: Differentia est quod aptum natum est dividere quae sub eodem sunt genere rationale enim et irrationale hominem et equum, quae sub eodem sunt genere quod est animal, dividunt. They also describe it thus, difference is what is naturally adapted to separate things which are under the same genus, as rational and irrational separate man and horse, which are under the same genus, animal.


ἀποδιδόασι δὲ καὶ οὕτως· διαφορά ἐστιν ὅτῳ διαφέρει ἕκαστα. ἄνθρωπος γὰρ καὶ ἵππος κατὰ μὲν τὸ γένος οὐ διενήνοχεν· θνητὰ γὰρ ζῷα καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογικὸν προστεθὲν διέστησεν ἡμᾶς ἀπ' ἐκείνων· καὶ λογικά ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ οἱ θεοί , ἀλλὰ τὸ θνητὸν προστεθὲν διέστησεν ἡμᾶς ἀπ' ἐκείνων. Assignant autem etiam hoc modo: Differentia est qua differunt a se singula nam secundum genus non differunt; sumus enim mortalia animalia et nos et irrationabilia sed additum rationabile separavit nos ab illis; rationabiles sumus et nos et dii sed mortale appositum disiunxit nos ab illis. Again, they give it in this way: difference is that by which each singular thing differs, for man and horse do not differ as to genus, for both we and horses are animals, but the addition of rational separates us from them; again, both we and the gods [20] are rational, but the addition of mortal separates us from them.
προσεξεργαζόμενοι δὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς μὴ τὸ τυχόν φασι τῶν χωριζόντων τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος εἶναι τὴν διαφοράν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ εἰς τὸ εἶναι συμβάλλεται καὶ ὃ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι τοῦ πράγματός ἐστι μέρος. οὐ γὰρ τὸ πεφυκέναι πλεῖν διαφορὰ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ καὶ ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου· εἴποιμεν γὰρ ἂν τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν πλεῖν πεφυκέναι τὰ δὲ μή χωρίζοντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι πλεῖν οὐκ ἦν συμπληρωτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας οὐδὲ μέρος αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπιτηδειότης μόνον αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι οἷαι αἱ ἰδίως εἰδοποιοὶ λεγόμεναι διαφοραί. εἶεν ἂν οὖν εἰδοποιοὶ διαφοραί, ὅσαι ἕτερον εἶδος ποιοῦσιν, καὶ ὅσαι ἐν τῷ τί ἦν εἶναι παραλαμβάνονται. Interius autem perscrutantes et speculantes differentiam, dicunt non quodlibet eorum quae sub eodem sunt genere dividentium esse differentiam sed quod ad esse conducit et quod eius quod est esse rei pars est; neque enim quod aptum natum est nauigare erit hominis differentia, etsi proprium sit hominis. Dicimus enim: animalium haec quidem apta nata sunt ad nauigandum, illa vero minime dividentes ab aliis, sed aptum natum esse ad nauigandum non erat completiuum substantiae nec eius pars sed aptitudo quaedam eius est (idcirco quoniam non est talis quales sunt quae specificae dicuntur differentiae). Erunt igitur specificae differentiae quaecumque alteram faciunt speciem et quaecumque in eo quod quale est accipiuntur. They however who more nicely discuss what pertains to difference, say that it is not any casual thing dividing those under the same genus, but such as contributes to the essence, and to the definition of the essence of a thing, and which is part of the thing. For to be naturally adapted to sail is not the difference, though it is the property of man, since we may say that of animals, some are naturally adapted to sail, but others not, separating man from other animals; yet a natural ability to sail does not complete the essence, neither is a part of it, but only an aptitude of it, because it is not such a difference as those which are called specific differences. Wherefore specific differences will be such as produce another species, and which are assumed in explaining the very nature of a thing:
Καὶ περὶ μὲν διαφορᾶς ἀρκεῖ τοσαῦτα. Et de differentiis quidem ista sufficiunt. And concerning difference this is sufficient.
Περὶ ἰδίου. [04] DE PROPRIO Of property
Τὸ δὲ ἴδιον διαιροῦσι τετραχῶς· καὶ γὰρ ὃ μόνῳ τινὶ εἴδει συμβέβηκεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ παντί, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἰατρεύειν ἢ τὸ γεωμετρεῖν· καὶ ὃ παντὶ συμβέβηκεν τῷ εἴδει, εἰ καὶ μὴ μόνῳ, ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι δίποδι· καὶ ὃ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ καὶ ποτέ, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ παντὶ τὸ ἐν γήρᾳ πολιοῦσθαι. τέταρτον δέ, ἐφ' οὗ συνδεδράμηκεν τὸ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ καὶ ἀεί, ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ γελαστικόν· κἂν γὰρ μὴ γελᾷ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ γελαστικὸν λέγεται οὐ τῷ ἀεὶ γελᾶν ἀλλὰ τῷ πεφυκέναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἀεὶ αὐτῷ σύμφυτον ὑπάρχει, ὡς καὶ τῷ ἵππῳ τὸ χρεμετιστικόν. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ κυρίως ἴδιά φασιν, ὅτι καὶ ἀντιστρέφει· εἰ γὰρ ἵππος, χρεμετιστικόν, καὶ εἰ χρεμετιστικόν, ἵππος. Proprium vero quadrifariam dividunt. Nam et id quod soli alicui speciei accidit, etsi non omni (ut homini medicum esse vel geometrem), et quod omni accidit, etsi non soli (quemadmodum homini esse bipedem), et quod soli et omni et aliquando (ut homini in senectute canescere), quartum vero in quo concurrit et soli et omni et semper (quemadmodum homini esse risibile; nam, etsi non ridet, tamen risibile dicitur, non quod iam rideat sed quod aptus natus sit; hoc autem ei semper est naturale; et equo hinnibile). Haec autem proprie propria perhibent, quoniam etiam convertuntur; quicquid enim equus, et hinnibile, et quicquid hinnibile, equus. Property they divide in four ways: for it is that which happens to some one species alone, though not to every (individual of that species), as to a man to heal, or to geometrize: that also which happens to a whole species, though not to that alone, as to man to be a biped: that again, which happens to a species alone, and to every (individual of it), and at a certain time, as to every man to become grey in old age: in the fourth place, it is that in which it concurs (to happen) to one species alone, and to every (individual of it), and always, as risibility to a man; for though he does not always laugh, yet he is said to be risible, not from his always laughing, but from being naturally adapted to laugh, and this is always inherent in him, in the same way as neighing in a horse. They say also that these are validly properties, because they reciprocate, since if any thing be a horse it is capable of neighing, and if any thing be capable of neighing it is a horse.
Περὶ συμβεβηκότος. [05] DE ACCIDENTI Of accident
Συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν ὃ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς. διαιρεῖται δὲ εἰς δύο· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χωριστόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἀχώριστον. τὸ μὲν οὖν καθεύδειν χωριστὸν συμβεβηκός, τὸ δὲ μέλαν εἶναι ἀχωρίστως τῷ κόρακι καὶ τῷ Αἰθίοπι συμβέβηκεν, δύναται δὲ ἐπινοηθῆναι καὶ κόραξ λευκὸς καὶ Αἰθίοψ ἀποβαλὼν τὴν χροιὰν χωρὶς φθορᾶς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. Accidens vero est quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem. Dividitur autem in duo, in separabile et in inseparabile; namque dormire est separabile accidens, nigrum vero esse inseparabiliter coruo et Aethiopi accidit (potest autem subintellegi et corvus albus et Aethiops amittens colorem praeter subiecti corruptionem). Accident is that which is present and absent without the destruction of its subject. It receives a two-fold division, for one kind of it is separable, but the other inseparable, e. g. to sleep is a separable accident, but to be black happens inseparably to a crow and an Ethiopian; we may possibly indeed conceive a white crow, and an Ethiopian casting his colour, without destruction of the subject.
ὁρίζονται δὲ καὶ οὕτως· συμβεβηκός ἐστιν ὃ ἐνδέχεται τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἢ ὃ οὔτε γένος ἐστιν οὔτε διαφορὰ οὔτε εἶδος οὔτε ἴδιον, ἀεὶ δέ ἐστιν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὑφιστάμενον. Ἀφορισθέντων δὲ πάντων τῶν προτεθέντων, λέγω δὴ γένους, εἴδους, διαφορᾶς, ἰδίου, συμβεβηκότος, ῥητέον τίνα τε κοινὰ πρόσεστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ τίνα ἴδια. Definitur autem sic quoque: Accidens est quod contingit eidem esse et non esse uel: Quod neque genus neque differentia neque species neque proprium, semper autem est in subiecto subsistens. Omnibus igitur determinatis quae proposita sunt, dico autem genere, specie, differentia, proprio, accidenti, dicendum est quae eis communia adsunt et quae propria. They also define it thus; accident is that which may be present and not present to the same thing; also that which is neither genus, nor difference, nor species, nor property, yet is always inherent in a subject. Having discussed all that were proposed, I mean, genus, species, difference, property, accident, we must declare what things are common, and what peculiar to them.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῶν πέντε φωνῶν. [06] DE COMMUNITATIBUS ET PROPRIETATIBUS Of things common and peculiar to the five predicates
Κοινὸν μὲν δὴ πάντων τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων κατηγορεῖσθαι. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν εἰδῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων, καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ εἶδος τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸ ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον τοῦ τε εἴδους, οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον, καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ εἰδῶν καὶ ἀτόμων. Commune quidem omnibus est de pluribus praedicari; sed genus quidem de speciebus et de individuis, et differentia similiter, species autem de his quae sub ipsa sunt individuis, at vero proprium et de specie et cuius est proprium et de his quae sub specie sunt individuis, accidens autem et de speciebus et de individuis. Now it is common to them all to be predicated, as we have said, of many things, but genus (is predicated) of the species and individuals under it, and difference in like manner; but species, of the individuals under it; and property, both of the species, of which it is the property, and of the individuals under that species; again, accident (is predicated) both of species, and individuals.
τό τε γὰρ ζῷον ἵππων τε καὶ βοῶν κατηγορεῖται εἰδῶν ὄντων καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ ἵππου καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ βοὸς ἀτόμων ὄντων, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον ἵππων καὶ βοῶν κατηγορεῖται καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, τὸ μέντοι εἶδος οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν κατὰ μέρος μόνον, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον οἷον τὸ γελαστικὸν καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, τὸ δὲ μέλαν τοῦ τε εἴδους τῶν κοράκων καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος συμβεβηκὸς ὂν ἀχώριστον, καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ ἵππου χωριστὸν ὂν συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως μὲν τῶν ἀτόμων, κατὰ δεύτερον δὲ λόγον καὶ τῶν περιεχόντων τὰ ἄτομα. Namque animal de equis et bubus et canibus praedicatur quae sunt species, et de hoc equo et de hoc boue quae sunt individua; irrationale vero et de equis et de bubus praedicatur et de his qui sunt particulares; species autem, ut homo, solum de his qui sunt particulares praedicatur; proprium autem, quod est risibile, de homine et de his qui sunt particulares; nigrum autem et de specie coruorum et de his qui sunt particulares, quod est accidens inseparabile; et moueri de homine et de equo, quod est accidens separabile sed principaliter quidem de individuis, secundum posteriorem vero rationem de his quae continent individua. For animal is predicated of horse and ox, being species, also of this particular horse and ox, which are individuals, but irrational is predicated of horse and ox, and of particulars. Species however, as man, is predicated of particulars alone, but property both of the species, of which it is the property, and of the individuals under that species; as risibility both of man, and of particular men, but blackness of the species of crows, and of particulars, being an inseparable accident; and to be moved, of man and horse, being a separable accident. Notwithstanding, it is pre-eminently (predicated) of individuals, but secondarily of those things which comprehend individuals.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας γένους καὶ διαφορᾶς. [07] De communibus generis et differentiae Chap. VII. Of the Community and Distinction of Genus and Difference.
Κοινὸν δὲ γένους καὶ διαφορᾶς τὸ περιεκτικὸν εἰδῶν· περιέχει γὰρ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ εἴδη, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντα ὅσα τὰ γένη. τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν εἰ καὶ μὴ περιέχει τὰ ἄλογα ὥσπερ τὸ ζῷον, ἀλλὰ περιέχει ἄνθρωπον καὶ θεόν, ἅπερ ἐστὶν εἴδη. Commune est autem generi et differentiae continentia specierum; continet enim et differentia species, etsi non omnes quot genera; rationale enim, etiam si non continet ea quae sunt irrationabilia ut genus quemadmodum animal sed continet hominem et deum quae sunt species. It is common to genus and difference to be comprehensive of species, for difference also comprehends species, though not all such as the genera; for rational, though, it does not comprehend irrational, as animal does, yet it comprehends man and divinity, which are species.


ὅσα τε κατηγορεῖται τοῦ γένους ὡς γένους, καὶ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸ εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, ὅσα τε τῆς διαφορᾶς ὡς διαφορᾶς, καὶ τοῦ ἐξ αὐτῆς εἴδους κατηγορηθήσεται. γένους τε γὰρ τοῦ ζῴου ὄντος ὡς γένους κατηγορεῖται ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ ζῷον εἰδῶν πάντων κατηγορεῖται ταῦτα ἄχρι καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων· διαφορᾶς τε οὔσης τῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ κατηγορεῖται ὡς διαφορᾶς τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι, οὐ μόνον δὲ τοῦ λογικοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ λογικὸν εἰδῶν κατηγορηθήσεται τὸ χρῆσθαι λόγῳ. Et quaecumque praedicantur de genere ut genus, et de his quae sub ipso sunt speciebus praedicantur; quaeque de differentia praedicantur ut differentiae, et de ea quae ex ipsa est specie praedicabuntur. Nam, cum sit genus animal, non solum de eo praedicantur ut genus substantia et animatum sed etiam de his quae sunt sub animali speciebus omnibus praedicantur haec usque ad individua; cumque sit differentia rationalis, praedicatur de ea ut differentia id quod est ratione uti, non solum de eo quod est rationale sed etiam de his quae sunt sub rationali speciebus praedicabitur ratione uti. Whatever things also are predicated of genus as genus, are predicated of the species under it, and whatever are predicated of difference as difference, will be also of the species formed from it. For animal being a genus, substance is predicated of it as of a genus, also animated, and sensible, but these are predicated of all the species under animal, as far as to individuals. As moreover, rational is difference, the use of reason is predicated of it, as of difference, yet the use of reason will not be predicated of rational only, but also of the species under rational.
κοινὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀναιρεθέντος ἢ τοῦ γένους ἢ τῆς διαφορᾶς ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπ' αὐτά· ὡς γὰρ μὴ ὄντος ζῴου οὐκ ἔστιν ἵππος οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος, οὕτως μὴ ὄντος λογικοῦ οὐδὲν ἔσται ζῷον τὸ χρώμενον λόγῳ. Commune autem est et perempto genere vel differentia simul perimi quae sub ipsis sunt; quemadmodum, si non sit animal, non est equus neque homo, sic, si non sit rationale, nullum erit animal quod utatur ratione. This too is common, that when genus or difference is subverted, the things under them are also subverted, for as when animal is not, horse is not, nor man, thus also, when rational is not, there will be no animal which uses reason.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ γένους καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς De propriis generis et differentiae
Ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ γένους τὸ ἐπὶ πλειόνων κατηγορεῖσθαι, ἤπερ ἡ διαφορὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῷον ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππου καὶ ὀρνέου καὶ ὄφεως, τὸ δὲ τετράπουν ἐπὶ μόνων τῶν τέσσαρας πόδας ἐχόντων, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ μόνων τῶν ἀτόμων, καὶ τὸ χρεμετιστικὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἵππου μόνον καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὁμοίως ἐπ' ἐλαττόνων. δεῖ δὲ διαφορὰς λαμβάνειν, αἷς τέμνεται τὸ γένος, οὐ τὰς συμπληρωτικὰς τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ γένους. Proprium autem generis est de pluribus praedicari quam differentia et species et proprium et accidens; animal enim de homine et equo et aue et serpente, quadrupes vero de solis quattuor pedes habentibus, homo vero videtur de solis individuis, et hinnibile de equo et de his qui sunt particulares; et accidens similiter de paucioribus. Oportet autem differentias accipere quibus dividitur genus, non eas quae complent substantiam generis. Now, it is the property of genus to be predicated of more things than difference, species, property, and accident are, for animal (is predicated) of man and horse, bird and snake, but quadruped of animals alone, which have four feet; again, man of individuals alone, and capacity of neighing of horse alone, and of particulars. Likewise, accident of fewer things: yet we must assume the differences by which the genus is divided, not those which complete, but which divide the essence of genus.
ἔτι τὸ γένος περιέχει τὴν διαφορὰν δυνάμει· τοῦ γὰρ ζῴου τὸ μὲν λογικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄλογον. Amplius genus continet differentiam potestate; animalis enim hoc quidem rationale est, illud vero irrationale. Moreover, genus comprehends difference in capacity, for of animal one kind is rational, but another irrational, but differences do not comprehend genera.
ἔτι τὰ μὲν γένη πρότερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ διαφορῶν, διὸ συναναιρεῖ μὲν αὐτάς, οὐ συναναιρεῖται δέ· ἀναιρεθέντος γὰρ τοῦ ζῴου συναναιρεῖται τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον. αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ οὐκέτι συναναιροῦσι τὸ γένος· κἂν γὰρ πᾶσαι ἀναιρεθῶσιν, οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητικὴ ἐπινοεῖται, ἥτις ἦν τὸ ζῷον. Amplius genera quidem priora sunt his quae sunt sub se positis differentiis propter quod simul quidem eas aufert, non autem simul aufertur (sublato enim animali aufertur rationale et irrationale), differentiae vero non auferunt genus (nam, si omnes interimantur, tamen substantia animata sensibilis subintellegi potest quae est animal). Besides, genera are prior to the differences under them, wherefore they subvert them, but are not co-subverted with them. For animal being subverted, rational and irrational are co-subverted, but differences no longer co-subvert genus, for even if all of them should be subverted, yet we may form a conception of animated, sensible substance, which is animal.


ἔτι τὸ μὲν γένος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν, ὡς εἴρηται, κατηγορεῖται. ἔτι γένος μὲν ἓν καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος οἷον ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον, διαφοραὶ δὲ πλείους οἷον λογικόν, θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν, αἷς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων διαφέρει. καὶ τὸ μὲν γένος ἔοικεν ὕλῃ, μορφῇ δὲ ἡ διαφορά. Amplius genus quidem in eo quod quid est, differentia vero in eo quod quale quiddam est, quemadmodum dictum est, praedicatur. Amplius genus quidem unum est secundum unamquamque speciem (ut hominis id quod est animal), differentiae vero plurimae (ut rationale, mortale, mentis et disciplinae perceptibile) quibus ab aliis differt. Et genus quidem consimile est materiae, formae vero differentia. Yet more, genus is predicated in reference to what a thing is, but difference in reference to what kind of a thing it is, as was observed before; besides there is one genus according to every species; e. g. of man, animal (is the genus), but there are many differences, as rational, mortal, capable of intellect and science, by which he differs from other animals. Genus also is similar to matter, but difference to form.
προσόντων δὲ καὶ ἄλλων κοινῶν τε καὶ ἰδίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ διαφορᾷ ἀρκείτω ταῦτα. Cum autem sint et alia communia et propria generis et differentiae, nunc ista sufficiant. However since there are other things common and peculiar to genus and difference, these will suffice.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ γένους καὶ τοῦ εἴδους [08] De communibus generis et speciei Chap. VIII. --Of Community and Difference of Genus and Species.
Γένος δὲ καὶ εἶδος κοινὸν μὲν ἔχουσι τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων, ὡς εἴρηται, κατηγορεῖσθαι· εἰλήφθω δὲ τὸ εἶδος ὡς εἶδος, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ καὶ ὡς γένος, ἄνπερ ᾗ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ εἶδος καὶ γένος. Genus autem et species commune quidem habent de pluribus (quemadmodum dictum est) praedicari; sumatur autem species ut species et non etiam ut genus, si fuerit idem species et genus. Genus and species possess in common, (as we have said,) the being predicated of many things, but species must be taken as species only, and not as genus, if the same thing be both species and genus.
κοινὸν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ προτέροις εἶναι ὧν κατηγορεῖται καὶ τὸ ὅλον τι εἶναι ἑκάτερον. Commune autem his est et priora esse eorum de quibus praedicantur et totum quiddam esse utrumque. Moreover, it is common to them both to be prior to what they are predicated of, and to be each a certain whole.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ γένους καὶ τοῦ εἴδους De propriis generis et speciei
Διαφέρει ᾗ δὲ τὸ μὲν γένος περιέχει τὰ εἴδη, τὰ δὲ εἴδη περιέχεται καὶ οὐ περιέχει τὰ γένη· ἐπὶ πλεῖον γὰρ τὸ γένος τοῦ εἴδους. ἔτι τὰ γένη προυποκεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ διαμορφωθέντα ταῖς εἰδοποιοῖς διαφοραῖς ἀποτελεῖν τὰ εἴδη, ὅθεν καὶ πρότερα τῇ φύσει τὰ γένη. καὶ συναναιροῦντα, ἀλλ' οὐ συναναιρούμενα, καὶ εἴδους μὲν ὄντος πάντως ἔστι καὶ γένος, γένους δὲ ὄντος οὐ πάντως ἔστι καὶ τὸ εἶδος. Differt autem eo quod genus quidem continet species sub se, species vero continentur et non continent genera; in pluribus enim genus quam species est (genera enim praeiacere oportet et formata specificis differentiis perficere species, unde et priora sunt naturaliter genera et simul interimentia sed quae non simul interimantur). Et species quidem cum sit, est et genus, genus vero cum sit non omnino erit et species. But they differ, because genus indeed comprehends species, but species are comprehended by, and do not comprehend genera, for genus is predicated of more than species. Besides, it is necessary that genera should be presupposed, and when formed by specific differences, that they should consummate species, whence also genera are by nature prior. They also co-subvert, but are not co-subverted, for species existing, genus also entirely exists, but genus existing there is not altogether species.
καὶ τὰ μὲν γένη συνωνύμως κατηγορεῖται τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτὰ εἰδῶν, τὰ δὲ εἴδη τῶν γενῶν οὐκέτι. Et genera quidem univoce de speciebus praedicantur, species vero de generibus minime. Genera too, are indeed univocally predicated of species under them, but not species of genera.
ἔτι τὰ μὲν γένη πλεονάζει τῇ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ εἰδῶν περιοχῇ, τὰ δὲ εἴδη τῶν γενῶν πλεονάζει ταῖς οἰκείαις διαφοραῖς. Amplius quidem genera abundant earum quae sub ipsis sunt specierum continentia, species vero generibus abundant propriis differentiis. Moreover, genera exceed, from comprehending the species which are under them, but species exceed genera by their proper differences.
ἔτι οὔτε τὸ εἶδος γένοιτ' ἂν γενικώτατον οὔτε τὸ γένος εἰδικώτατον. Amplius neque species fiet umquam generalissimum neque genus specialissimum. Besides, neither can species become most generic, nor genus most specific.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ γένους καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου [09] De communibus generis et proprii Chap. IX. --Of Community and Difference of Genus and Property.
Γένους δὲ καὶ ἰδίου κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς εἴδεσιν· εἰ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, ζῷον, καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπος, γελαστικόν. καὶ τὸ ἐπίσης κατηγορεῖσθαι τὸ γένος τῶν εἰδων καὶ τὸ ἴδιον τῶν αὐτοῦ μετεχόντων ἀτόμων· ἐπίσης γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς ζῷον καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλητος γελαστικόν. κοινὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ συνωνύμως κατηγορεῖσθαι τὸ γένος τῶν οἰκείων εἰδῶν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον ὧν ἂν ᾖ ἴδιον. Generis autem et proprii commune quidem est sequi species (nam, si homo est, animal est, et, si homo est, risibile est), et aequaliter praedicari genus de speciebus et proprium de his quae illo participant (aequaliter enim et homo et bos animal, et Cato et Cicero risibile). Commune autem et univoce praedicari genus de propriis speciebus et proprium quorum est proprium. Both to genus and to property it is common to follow species, for if any thing be man, it is animal, and if any thing be man, it is risible. Likewise to genus, to be equally predicated of species, and to property, (to be equally predicated) of the individuals which participate it; thus man and ox are equally animal, and Anytus and Melitus risible. [21] It is also common that genus should be univocally predicated of its proper species, and property of the things of which it is the property.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς γένους καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου. De propriis generis et proprii
Διαφέρει δὲ ὅτι τὸ μὲν γένος πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ ἴδιον· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι ζῷον, εἶτα διαιρεῖσθαι διαφοραῖς καὶ ἰδίοις. Differt autem quoniam genus quidem prius est, posterius vero proprium (oportet enim esse animal, dehinc dividi differentiis et propriis). Still they differ, because genus is prior, but property posterior, for animal must first necessarily exist, afterwards be divided by differences and properties.
καὶ τὸ μὲν γένος κατὰ πλειόνων εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἑνὸς εἴδους, οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον. Et genus quidem de pluribus speciebus praedicari, proprium vero de una sola specie cuius est proprium. Also genus indeed is predicated of many species, but property of one certain species of which it is the property.
καὶ τὸ μὲν ἴδιον ἀντικατηγορεῖται οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον, τὸ δὲ γένος οὐδενὸς ἀντικατηγορεῖται· οὔτε γὰρ εἰ ζῷον, ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε εἰ ζῷον, γελαστικόν· εἰ δὲ ἄνθρωπος, γελαστικόν, καὶ ἔμπαλιν. Et proprium quidem conversim praedicatur cuius est proprium, genus vero de nullo conversim praedicatur (nam neque si animal est, homo est, neque si animal est, risibile est; sin vero homo, et risibile est, et e converso). Besides property is reciprocally predicated of that of which it is the property, but genus is not reciprocally predicated of any thing, for neither if any thing is an animal, is it a man, nor if a thing be animal is it risible, but if any thing is a man it is risible, and vice versa.
ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἴδιον παντὶ τῷ εἴδει ὑπάρχει, οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον, καὶ μόνῳ καὶ ἀεί , τὸ δὲ γένος παντὶ μὲν τῷ εἴδει, οὗ ἂν ᾖ γένος, καὶ ἀεί, οὐ μέντοι καὶ μόνῳ. Amplius proprium omni speciei inest cuius est proprium et uni et semper, genus vero omni quidem speciei cuius fuerit genus et semper, non autem soli. Moreover, property is inherent in the whole species, of which it is the property, in it alone, and always, but genus in the whole species indeed of which it is the genus, and always, yet not in it alone;
ἔτι τὰ μὲν ἴδια ἀναιρούμενα οὐ συναναιρεῖ τὰ γένη, τὰ δὲ γένη ἀναιρούμενα συναναιρεῖ τὰ εἴδη, ὧν ἐστιν ἴδια, ὥστε καὶ ὧν ἐστιν ἴδια ἀναιρουμένων καὶ αὐτὰ συναναιρεῖται. Amplius species quidem interemptae non simul interimunt genera, propria vero interempta simul interimunt quorum sunt propria, et his quorum sunt propria interemptis et ipsa simul interimuntur. once more, properties being subverted do not co-subvert genera, but genera being subverted, co-subvert species, to which properties belong; wherefore, also those things of which there are properties, being subverted, the properties themselves also, are co-subverted.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ γένους καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος [10] De communibus generis et accidentis Chap. X. -- Of Community and Difference of Genus and Accident.
Γένους δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότος κοινὸν τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων, ὡς εἴρηται, κατηγορεῖσθαι, ἄν τε τῶν χωριστῶν ᾖ ἄν τε τῶν ἀχωρίστων· καὶ γὰρ τὸ κινεῖσθαι κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ τὸ μέλαν κατὰ κοράκων καὶ Αἰθιόπων καί τινων ἀψύχων. Generis vero et accidentis commune est de pluribus (quemadmodum dictum est) praedicari sive separabilium sit sive inseparabilium; et enim moueri de pluribus, et nigrum de coruis et hominibus et Aethiopibus et aliquibus inanimatis. It is common to genus and accident to be predicated, as we have said, of many things, whether they (the accidents) be separable or inseparable, for to be moved is predicated of many things, and blackness of crows, and of Ethiopians, and of certain inanimate things.
Περὶ τῆς διαφοράς τοῦ γένους καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος. De propriis generis et accidentis
Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ γένος τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν γένος πρὸ τῶν εἰδῶν, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα τῶν εἰδῶν ὕστερα· κἂν γὰρ ἀχώριστον λαμβάνηται συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ' οὖν πρότερόν ἐστι τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκε τοῦ συμβεβηκότος. Differt autem genus accidente quoniam genus ante species est, accidentia vero speciebus inferiora sunt; nam si etiam inseparabile sumatur accidens sed tamen prius est illud cui accidit quam accidens. Genus however differs from accident, in that genus is prior, but accident posterior to species, for though an inseparable accident be assumed, yet that of which it is the accident is prior to the accident.
καὶ τοῦ μὲν γένους ἐπίσης τὰ μετέχοντα μετέχει, τοῦ δὲ συμβεβηκότος οὐκ ἐπίσης· ἐπίτασιν γὰρ καὶ ἄνεσιν ἐπιδέχεται ἡ τῶν συμβεβηκότων μέθεξις, ἡ δὲ τῶν γενῶν οὐκέτι. Et genere quidem quae participant aequaliter participant, accidente vero non aequaliter; intentionem enim et remissionem suscipit accidentium participatio, generum vero minime. Also the participants of genus participate it equally, but those of accident do not equally; for the participation of accidents accepts intension and remission, but not that of genera.
καὶ τὰ μὲν συμβεβηκότα ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων προηγουμένως ὑφίσταται, τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη φύσει πρότερα τῶν ἀτόμων οὐσιῶν. καὶ τὰ μὲν γένη ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τι ἢ πῶς ἔχον ἕκαστον· ποῖος γὰρ Αἰθίοψ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἐρεῖς μέλας, καὶ πῶς ἔχει Σωκράτης ἐρεῖς ὅτι κάθηται ἢ περιπατεῖ. Et accidentia quidem in individuis principaliter subsistunt, genera vero et species naturaliter priora sunt individuis substantiis. Et genera quidem in eo quod quid est praedicantur de his quae sub ipsis sunt, accidentia vero in eo quod quale aliquid est vel quomodo se habeat unumquodque; "Qualis est" enim "Aethiops?" interrogatus dicis "Niger", et quemadmodum se Socrates habeat, dicis quoniam sedet vel ambulat. Besides, accidents primarily subsist about individuals, but genera and species are by nature prior to individual substances. Moreover, genera are predicated of the things under them, in respect to what a thing is, but accidents in respect to what kind of a thing it is, or how each thing subsists; for being asked, what kind of man an Ethiopian is, you say that he is black; or how Socrates is, you reply that he is sick or well.
[11] Chap. XI. --Of Community and Difference of Species and Difference.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν γένος ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων τεττάρων διαφέρει εἴρηται, συμβέβηκεν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον διαφέρειν τῶν τεττάρων, ὥστε πέντε μὲν ὄντων, ἑνὸς δὲ ἑκάστου τῶν τεττάρων διαφέροντος, τετράκι τὰ πέντε, εἴκοσι γίνεσθαι τὰς πάσας διαφοράς. ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς καταριθμουμένων καὶ τῶν μὲν δύο μιᾷ λειπομένων διαφορᾷ διὰ τὸ· ἤδη εἰλῆφθαι, τῶν δὲ τριῶν δυσίν, τῶν δὲ τεττάρων τρισί, τῶν δὲ πέντε τέτρασι, δέκα αἱ πᾶσαι γίνονται διαφοραί, τέσσαρες, τρεῖς, δύο, μία. Genus vero quo aliis quattuor differat dictum est. Contingit autem etiam unumquodque aliorum differre ab aliis quattuor, ut, cum quinque quidem sint, unum autem ab aliis quattuor differat, quater quinque (uiginti) fiant omnes differentiae; sed, semper posterioribus enumeratis et secundis quidem una differentia superatis (propterea quoniam iam sumpta est), tertiis vero, duabus, quartis vero tribus, quintis vero quattuor, decem omnes fiunt (quattuor, tres, duae, una).


We have shown then, wherein genus differs from the other four, but each of the other four happens also to differ from the rest, so that as there are five, and each one of the four differs from the rest, the five being four times (taken), all the differences would appear to be twenty. Nevertheless, such is not the case, but always those successive being enumerated, and two being deficient by one difference, from having been already assumed, and the three by two differences, the four by three, the five by four; all the differences are ten, namely, four, three, two, one.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ γένος διαφέρει τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος· τέσσαρες οὖν αἱ διαφοραί. Genus enim differt differentia et specie et proprio et accidenti; quattuor igitur sunt omnes differentiae. For in what genus differs from difference, species, property, and accident, we have shown, wherefore, there are four differences.
ἡ διαφορὰ δέ πῇ μὲν διενήνοχεν τοῦ γένους εἴρηται, ὅτε πῇ διαφέρει τὸ γένος αὐτῆς ἐρρέθη· λοιπὸν δὲ πῇ διαφέρει τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου καὶ τοῦ

συμβεβηκότος ῥηθήσεται, καὶ γίνονται τρεῖς. πάλιν τὸ εἶδος πῇ μὲν διαφέρει τῆς διαφορᾶς ἐρρέθη, ὅτε πῇ διαφέρει ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ εἴδους ἐλέγετο· πῇ δὲ διαφέρει τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους ἐρρέθη, ὅτε πῇ διαφέρει τὸ γένος τοῦ εἴδους ἐλέγετο· λοιπὸν οὖν πῇ διαφέρει τοῦ ἰδίου καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ῥηθήσεται· δύο οὖν καὶ αὗται αἱ διαφοραί.

Differentia vero quo differt genere dictum est quando quo differret genus ab ea dicebatur; relinquitur igitur quo differat specie et proprio et accidente dicere, et fiunt tres. Rursus species quo quidem differat a differentia dictum est quando quo differret specie differentia dicebatur, quo autem differt species genere dictum est quando quo differret genus specie dicebatur; reliquum est igitur ut quo differat proprio et accidente dicatur; duae igitur etiam istae sunt differentiae.


Also we explained in what respect difference differs from genus, when we declared in what genus differs from it. What remains then, viz. in what respect it differs from species, property, and accident, shall be told, and three (differences) arise. Again, we declared how species differs from difference, when we showed how difference differs from species; also we showed how species differs from genus, when we explained how genus differs from species; what remains then, viz. in what species differs from property and from accident, shall be told: these, then, are two differences.
τὸ δὲ ἴδιον πῇ διαφέρει τοῦ συμβεβηκότος καταλειφθήσεται· πῇ γὰρ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ γένους διαφέρει, προειρημένον ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων πρὸς αὐτὸ διαφορᾷ· τεσσάρων οὖν λαμβανομένων τοῦ γένους πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα διαφορῶν, τριῶν δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς, δύο δὲ τοῦ εἴδους, μιᾶς δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου πρὸς τὸ συμβεβηκός, δέκα ἔσονται αἱ πᾶσαι, ὧν τὰς τέσσαρας, αἳ ἦσαν τοῦ γένους πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, φθάσαντες ἀπεδείξαμεν. Proprium autem quo differat accidente relinquitur, nam quo specie et differentia et genere differt praedictum est in illorum ad ipsum differentia. Quattuor igitur sumptis generis ad alia differentiis, tribus vero differentiae, duabus autem speciei, una autem proprii ad accidens, decem erunt omnes; quarum quattuor quae erant generis ad reliqua superius demonstravimus. But in what respect property differs from accident, shall be discovered, for how it differs from species, difference, and genus, was explained before in the difference of those from these. Wherefore, as four differences of genus with respect to the rest, are assumed, but three of difference, two of species, and one of property with regard to accident, there will be ten (differences altogether), of which, four we have already demonstrated, viz. those of genus, with respect to the rest.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ εἴδους. [12] De communibus differentiae et speciei Chap. XII. --The same subject continued.
Κοινὸν τοίνυν διαφορᾶς καὶ εἴδους τὸ ἐπίσης μετέχεσθαι· ἀνθρώπου τε γὰρ ἐπίσης μετέχουσιν οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι καὶ τῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διαφορᾶς. κοινὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ παρεῖναι τοῖς μετέχουσιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ Σωκράτης λογικός, καὶ ἀεὶ Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος. Commune ergo differentiae et speciei est aequaliter participari; homine enim aequaliter participant particulares homines et rationali differentia. Commune vero est et semper adesse his quae participant; semper enim Socrates rationalis et semper Socrates homo. It is common then to difference and species to be equally participated, for particular men partake equally of man, and of the difference of rational. It is also common always to be present to their participants, for Socrates is always rational, and always man.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς. De propriis differentiae et speciei
Ἴδιον δὲ διαφορᾶς μὲν τὸ ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖσθαι, εἴδους δὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν· κἂν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὡς ποιὸν λαμβάνηται, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἂν εἴη ποιόν, ἀλλὰ καθὸ τῷ γένει προσελθοῦσαι αἱ διαφοραὶ ὑπέστησαν αὐτό. Proprium autem differentiae quidem est in eo quod quale sit praedicari, speciei vero in eo quod quid est; nam, et si homo velut qualitas accipiatur, non simpliciter erit qualitas sed secundum id quod generi aduenientes differentiae eam constituerunt. But it is the property of difference indeed to be predicated in respect to what kind a thing is of, but of species in respect to what a thing is, for though man should be assumed as a certain kind of thing, yet he will not be simply so, but in as far as differences according to genus constitute him.
ἔτι ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ ἐπὶ πλειόνων πολλάκις εἰδῶν θεωρεῖται, ὡς τὸ τετράπουν ἐπὶ πλείστων ζῴων τῷ εἴδει διαφερόντων, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐπὶ μόνων τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀτόμων ἐστίν. Amplius differentia quidem in pluribus saepe speciebus consideratur (quemadmodum quadrupes in pluribus animalibus specie differentibus), species vero in solis his quae sub specie sunt individuis est. Besides, difference is often seen in many species, as quadruped in many animals, different in species, but species is in the individuals alone, which are under the species.
ἔτι ἡ διαφορὰ προτέρα τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν εἴδους· συναναιρεῖ γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν ἀναιρεθὲν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἀναιρεθεὶς οὐκ ἀνῄρηκεν τὸ λογικὸν, ὄντος θεοῦ. Amplius differentia prima est ab ea specie quae est secundum ipsam; simul enim ablatum rationale interimit hominem, homo vero interemptus non aufert rationale, cum sit deus. Moreover, difference is prior to the species which subsists according to it, for rational being subverted, co-subverts man, but man being subverted, does not co-subvert rational, since there is still divinity.
ἔτι διαφορὰ μὲν συντίθεται μετὰ ἄλλης διαφορᾶς· τὸ λογικὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ θνητὸν συνετέθη εἰς ὑπόστασιν ἀνθρώπου· εἶδος δὲ εἴδει οὐ συντίθεται, ὥστε ἀπογεννῆσαι ἄλλο τι εἶδος· τὶς μὲν γὰρ ἵππος τινὶ ὄνῳ σύνεισιν εἰς ἡμιόνου γένεσιν, ἵππος δὲ ἁπλῶς ὄνῳ οὐκ ἂν συντεθεὶς ἀποτελέσειεν ἡμίονον. Amplius differentia quidem componitur cum alia differentia (rationale enim et mortale compositum est in substantia hominis), species vero speciei non componitur ut gignat aliquam aliam speciem (quidam enim equus cuidam asino permiscetur ad muli generationem, equus autem simpliciter asino numquam conveniens perficiet mulum). Further, difference is joined with another difference, (for rational and mortal are joined for the subsistence of man,) but species is not joined with species, so as to produce some other species; for indeed a certain horse is joined with a certain ass, for the production of a mule, but horse simply joined with ass will not produce a mule.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου [13] De communibus differentiae et proprii Chap. XIII. -- Of Community and Difference of Property and Difference.[22]
Διαφορὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδιον κοινὸν μὲν ἔχουσι τὸ ἐπίσης μετέχεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν μετεχόντων· ἐπίσης γὰρ τὰ λογικὰ λογικὰ καὶ τὰ γελαστικὰ γελαστικά. Differentia vero et proprium commune quidem habent aequaliter participari ab his quae eorum participant; aequaliter enim rationalia rationalia sunt et risibilia risibilia sunt. Difference also and property have it in common to be equally shared by their participants, for rational are equally rational, and risible (equally) risible (animals).
καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ παρεῖναι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν· κἂν γὰρ κολοβωθῇ ὁ δίπους, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ πεφυκέναι τὸ ἀεὶ λέγεται, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ γελαστικὸν τῷ πεφυκέναι ἔχει τὸ ἀεί, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τῷ γελᾶν ἀεί. Et semper et omni adesse commune utrisque est; sive enim curtetur qui est bipes, non substantiam perimit sed ad quod natum est semper dicitur; nam et risibile, eo quod natum est habet id quod est semper sed non eo quod semper rideat. Also it is common to both to be always present, and to every one, for though a biped should be mutilated, yet (the term biped) is always predicated with reference to what is naturally adapted, since also risible has the "always" from natural adaptation, but not from always laughing.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ ἰδίου καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς De propriis differentiae et proprii
Ἴδιον δὲ διαφορᾶς ὅτι αὕτη μὲν ἐπὶ πλειόνων εἰδῶν λέγεται πολλάκις, οἷον τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἐπὶ θεοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἐφ' ἑνὸς εἴδους, οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον. Proprium autem differentiae est quoniam haec quidem de pluribus speciebus dicitur saepe (ut rationale de homine et deo), proprium vero in una sola specie cuius est proprium. Now, it is the property of difference, that it is frequently predicated of many species, as rational of divinity and man, but property (is predicated) of one species, of which it is the property.
καὶ ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ ἕπεται ἐκείνοις, ὧν ἦν διαφορά, οὐ μὴν καὶ ἀντιστρέφει· τὰ δὲ ἴδια ἀντικατηγορεῖται ὧν ἂν ᾖ ἴδια διὰ τὸ ἀντιστρέφειν. Et differentia quidem illis est consequens quorum est differentia sed non convertitur, propria vero conversim praedicantur quorum sunt propria idcirco quoniam convertuntur. Difference moreover follows those things of which it is the difference, yet does not also reciprocate, but properties are reciprocally predicated of those of which they are the properties, in consequence of reciprocating.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος [14] De communibus differentiae et accidentis Chap. XIV. --Of Community and Difference of Accident and Difference.
Διαφορᾷ δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότι κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἐπὶ πλειόνων λέγεσθαι, κοινὸν δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἀχώριστα συμβεβηκότα τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ προσεῖναι· τό τε γὰρ δίπουν ἀεὶ πρόσεστι πᾶσι κόραξι τό τε μέλαν ὁμοίως. Differentiae autem et accidenti commune quidem est de pluribus dici, commune vero ad ea quae sunt inseparabilia accidentia semper et omnibus adesse; bipes enim semper adest omnibus coruis, et nigrum esse similiter. To difference and accident it is common to be predicated of many things, but it is common (to the former) with inseparable accidents to be present always and with every one, for biped is always present to man, and likewise blackness to all crows.
Περὶ τῶν ἰδίων διαφορᾶς καὶ συμβεβηκότος De propriis differentiae et accidentis
Διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ περιέχει, οὐ περιέχεται δέ· περιέχει γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον· τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα τρόπον μέν τινα περιέχει τῷ ἐν πλείοσιν εἶναι, τρόπον δέ τινα περιέχεται τῷ μὴ ἑνὸς συμβεβηκότος εἶναι δεκτικὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα, ἀλλὰ πλειόνων. Differunt autem quoniam differentia quidem continet et non continetur (continet enim rationalitas hominem), accidentia vero quodam quidem modo continent eo quod in pluribus sint, quodam vero modo continentur eo quod non unius accidentis susceptibilia sunt subiecta sed plurimorum. Still they differ in that difference indeed comprehends but is not comprehended by species; for rational comprehends divinity and man, but accidents after a certain manner comprehend from their being in many things, yet in a certain manner are comprehended from the subjects not being the recipients of one accident, but of many.
καὶ ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ ἀνεπίτατος καὶ ἀνάνετος, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐπιδέχεται. Et differentia quidem inintendibilis est et inremissibilis, accidentia vero magis et minus recipiunt. Besides, difference indeed docs not admit of intension and remission, but accidents accept the more and less.
καὶ ἀμιγεῖς μὲν αἱ ἐναντίαι διαφοραί, μιγείη δ' ἂν τὰ ἐναντία συμβεβηκότα. Et impermixtae quidem sunt contrariae differentiae, mista vero contraria accidentia. Moreover contrary differences cannot be mingled, but contrary accidents may sometimes be mingled.
Τοιαῦται μὲν οὖν αἱ κοινότητες καὶ αἱ ἰδιότητες τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Huiusmodi quidem communiones et proprietates differentiae et caeterorum sunt. So many then are the points common and peculiar to difference and the others.
τὸ δὲ εἶδος πῇ μὲν διαφέρει γένους καὶ διαφορᾶς, εἴρηται ἐν ᾧ ἐλέγομεν, πῇ τὸ γένος διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων καὶ πῇ ἡ διαφορὰ διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων. Species vero quo quidem differat a genere et differentia dictum est in eo quod dicebamus quo genus differt caeteris et quo differentia differret caeteris. In what respect species differs from genus and difference, was explained in our enunciation of the way in which genus, and also difference, differ from the rest; it now remains that we should point out how it (species) differs from property and accident.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου [15] De communibus speciei et proprii Chap. XV. --Of Community and Difference of Species and Property.
Εἴδους δὲ καὶ ἰδίου κοινὸν τὸ ἀλλήλων ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι· εἰ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, γελαστικόν, καὶ εἰ γελαστικόν, ἄνθρωπος· τὸ γελαστικὸν δὲ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι γελᾶν ληπτέον, πολλάκις εἴρηται· ἐπίσης τε γάρ ἐστι τὰ εἴδη τοῖς μετέχουσι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ὧν ἐστιν ἴδια. Speciei autem et proprii commune est de se invicem praedicari; nam, si homo, risibile est, et si risibile, homo est (risibile vero quoniam secundum id quod natum est dicitur, saepe iam dictum est); aequaliter enim sunt species his quae eorum participant et propria quorum sunt propria. It is common then to species and property, to be reciprocally predicated of each other, since if any thing be man, it is risible, also if it be risible, it is man, still we have frequently declared that risible must be assumed according to natural adaptation to risibility. It is also common (to them) to be equally present, for species are equally present to their participants, and properties to the things of which they are properties.


Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου De propriis speciei et proprii
Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἰδίου, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶδος δύναται ἄλλων γένος εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον εἶναι ἄλλων ἴδιον ἀδύνατον. Differt autem species proprio quoniam species quidem potest et aliis genus esse, proprium vero et aliarum specierum esse impossibile est. But species differs from property, in that species indeed may be the genus of other things, but property cannot possibly be the property of other things.
καὶ τὸ μὲν εἶδος προυφέστηκεν τοῦ ἰδίου, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἐπιγίνεται τῷ εἴδει· δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἵνα καὶ γελαστικὸν ᾖ. Et species quidem ante subsistit quam proprium, proprium vero postea fit in specie; oportet enim hominem esse ut sit risibile. Again, species subsists prior to property, but property accedes to species, for man must exist, in order that risible may:
ἔτι τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἀεὶ ἐνεργείᾳ πάρεστι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, τὸ δὲ ἴδιόν ποτε καὶ δυνάμει· ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, γελᾷ δὲ οὐκ ἀεί, καίπερ ἀεὶ πεφυκὼς εἶναι γελαστικός. Amplius species quidem semper actu adest subiecto, proprium vero aliquando potestate; homo enim semper actu est Socrates, non vero semper ridet quamuis sit natus semper risibilis. Besides, species is always present in energy with its subject, but property sometimes also in capacity, for Socrates is a man always in energy, but he does not always laugh, though he is always naturally adapted to be risible.


ἔτι ὧν οἱ ὅροι διάφοροι, καὶ αὐτὰ διάφορά ἐστιν· ἔστιν δὲ εἴδους μὲν τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ γένος εἶναι καὶ τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν κατηγορούμενον εἶναι καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἰδίου δὲ τὸ μόνῳ καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ προσεῖναι. Amplius quorum termini differentes, et ipsa sunt differentia; est autem speciei quidem sub genere esse et de pluribus et differentibus numero in eo quod quid est praedicari et caetera huiusmodi, proprii vero quod est soli et semper et omni adesse. Once more, things of which the definitions are different, are themselves also different, but it is (the definition) of species to be under genus, and to be predicated of many things, also differing in number, in respect to what a thing is, and things of this kind, but of property it is to be present to a thing alone, and to every individual and always.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος [16] De communibus speciei et accidentis Chap. XVI. --Of Community and Difference of Species and Accident.
Εἴδους δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότος κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἐπὶ πολλῶν κατηγορεῖσθαι, σπάνιοι δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι κοινότητες διὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστάναι τό τε συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν. Speciei vero et accidentis commune quidem est de pluribus praedicari; rarae vero aliae sunt communitates propterea quoniam plurimum a se distant accidens et cui accidit. To species and accident it is common to be predicated of many, but other points of community are rare, from the circumstance of accident, and that to which it is accidental, differing very much from each other.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν αυτῶν
Ἴδια δὲ ἑκατέρου, τοῦ μὲν εἴδους τὸ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖσθαι ὧν ἐστιν εἶδος, τοῦ δὲ συμβεβηκότος τὸ ἐν τῷ ποῖον ἢ πῶς ἔχον. Propria vero utriusque sunt, speciei quidem in eo quod quid est praedicari de his quorum est species, accidentis autem in eo quod quale quiddam est vel aliquo modo se habens. Now, the properties of each are these: of species, to be predicated of those of which it is the species, in respect to what a thing is, but of accident, in reference to what kind a thing is of, or how it subsists.[23]
καὶ τὸ ἑκάστην οὐσίαν ἑνὸς μὲν εἴδους μετέχειν, συμβεβηκότων δὲ πλειόνων, τῶν τε χωριστῶν καὶ τῶν ἀχωρίστων. καὶ τὰ μὲν εἴδη προεπινοεῖται τῶν συμβεβηκότων, κἂν ἀχώριστα ᾖ (δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἵνα ἐκείνῳ τι συμβῇ)· τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα ὑστερογενῆ πέφυκεν καὶ ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν φύσιν ἔχει. Et unamquamque substantiam una quidem specie participare, pluribus autem accidentibus et separabilibus et inseparabilibus. Et species quidem ante subintellegi quam accidentia vel si sint inseparabilia (oportet enim esse subiectum ut illi aliquid accidat), accidentia vero posterioris generis sunt et aduenticiae naturae. Likewise, that each substance partakes of one species, but of many accidents, both separable and inseparable: moreover, species are conceived prior to accidents, even if they be inseparable, (for there must be subject, in order that something should happen to it,) but accidents are naturally adapted to be of posterior origin, and possess a nature adjunctive to substance.
καὶ τοῦ μὲν εἴδους ἡ μετοχὴ ἐπίσης, τοῦ δὲ συμβεβηκότος, κἂν ἀχώριστον ᾖ, οὐκ ἐπίσης· καὶ γὰρ Αἰθίοψ Αἰθίοπος ἔχοι ἂν τὴν χροιὰν ἢ ἀνειμένην ἢ ἐπιτεταμένην κατὰ μελανίαν. Et speciei quidem participatio aequaliter est, accidentis vero, vel si inseparabile sit, non aequaliter; Aethiops enim alio Aethiope habebit colorem vel intentum amplius vel remissum secundum nigritudinem. Again, of species the participation is equal, but of accident, even if it be inseparable, it is not equal; for an Ethiopian may have a colour intense, or remitted, according to blackness, with reference to an(other) Ethiopian.
Λείπεται δὴ περὶ ἰδίου καὶ συμβεβηκότος εἰπεῖν· πῇ γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ τε εἴδους καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ γένους διενήνοχεν, εἴρηται. Restat igitur de proprio et accidenti dicere; quo enim proprium specie et differentia et genere differt, dictum est. It remains to speak of property and accident, for how property differs from species, difference, and genus, has been stated.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ ἰδίου καὶ τοῦ ἀχωρίστου συμβεβηκότος [17] De communibus proprii et accidentis Chap. XVII. -- Of Community and Difference of Property and Accident.[24]
Κοινὸν δὴ τῷ ἰδίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀχωρίστῳ συμβεβηκότι τὸ ἄνευ αὐτῶν μὴ ὑποστῆναι ἐκεῖνα, ἐφ' ὧν θεωρεῖται· ὡς γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ γελαστικοῦ οὐχ ὑφίσταται ἄνθρωπος, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἄνευ τοῦ μέλανος ὑποσταίη ἂν Αἰθίοψ. Commune autem proprii et inseparabilis accidentis est quod praeter ea numquam consistant illa in quibus considerantur; quemadmodum enim praeter risibile non subsistit homo, ita nec praeter nigredinem subsistit Aethiops. It is common then to property and inseparable accident not to subsist without those things in which they are beheld, for as man does not subsist without risible[25], so neither can Ethiopian subsist without blackness,
καὶ ὥσπερ παντὶ καὶ ἀεὶ πάρεστι τὸ ἴδιον, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκός. Et quemadmodum semper et omni adest proprium, sic et inseparabile accidens. And as property is present to every, and always, so also is inseparable accident.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν αὐτῶν De propriis proprii et accidentis
Διενήνοχεν δὲ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἴδιον μόνῳ ἑνὶ εἴδει πάρεστιν ὡς τὸ γελαστικὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ δὲ ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκὸς οἷον τὸ μέλαν οὐκ Αἰθίοπι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κόρακι πρόσεστι καὶ ἄνθρακι καὶ ἐβένῳ καὶ ἄλλοις τισίν. Differunt autem quoniam proprium uni soli speciei adest (quemadmodum risibile homini), inseparabile vero accidens, ut nigrum, non solum Aethiopi sed etiam coruo adest et carboni et ebeno et quibusdam aliis. Nevertheless, they differ, in that property is present to one species alone, as the being risible to man, but inseparable accident, as black, is present not only to an Ethiopian, but also to a crow, to a coal, to ebony, and to certain other things.
διὸ τὸ μὲν ἴδιον ἀντικατηγορεῖται οὗ ἐστὶν ἴδιον καὶ ἔστιν ἐπίσης, τὸ δὲ ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκὸς οὐκ ἀντικατηγορεῖται. Quare proprium conversim praedicatur de eo cuius est proprium et est aequaliter, inseparabile vero accidens conversim non praedicatur. Moreover, property is reciprocally predicated of that of which it is the property, and is equally (present), but inseparable accident is not reciprocally predicated.
καὶ τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ἐπίσης ἡ μετοχή, τῶν δὲ συμβεβηκότων ἡ μὲν μᾶλλον ἡ δὲ ἧττον. Et propriorum quidem aequalis est participatio, accidentium vero haec quidem magis, illa vero minus.

Besides, the participation of properties is equal, but of accidents one (subject partakes) more, but another less.


Εἰσὶν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλαι κοινότητές τε καὶ ἰδιότητες τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκοῦσι καὶ αὗται εἰς διάκρισίν τε αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας παράστασιν. Sunt quidem etiam aliae communitates vel proprietates eorum quae dicta sunt sed sufficiunt etiam haec ad discretionem eorum communitatisque traditionem. There are indeed other points of community, and peculiarity of the above-mentioned (predicables), but these are sufficient for their distinction, and the setting forth of their agreement.

Notes

  1. 1 “At the request of Chrysaorius, his pupil, who had recently met with the Categories of Aristotle, Porphyry wrote this introduction, in order to his comprehension of that treatise: nearly the whole of it is composed from the writings, and often almost in the very words of Plato. As philosophers reduced all things under ten common natures, as grammarians also, with respect to eight words, so Porphyry has comprehended every significant word, except such as are significant of individuals, under five terms. The five heads of predicables therefore, taken from this Isagoge, which was written in the third century, are an addition to the Aristotelian Logic, in part of which, (the Topics,) the doctrine laid down differs from that enunciated here, in several points, as Porphyry's view also differs from that of Aldrich. Upon the subject generally, the reader may compare Albertus Magnus de Praedicab. Aquinas. Occam Logica. Abelard de Gen. et Spec. ed Cousin. Trendelenb. Elem. Crakanthorpe's, Whately's, Hill's, and Wallis' Logics, also Boethius de Divisione”.
  2. "2. Dialectic, according to Plato, consists of four parts, division, definition, demonstration, and analysis; hence a treatise adapted to the formation of these, will be evidently useful to the dialectic of Plato. The difference between the dialectic of Plato and that of Aristotle, is noticed in the subsequent notes upon the Organon, and the reader will find the subject ably discussed in the introduction to Mansel's Logic; here we need only observe that Aristotle in the Topics, looks to opinion (in his treatment of dialectic), while Plato disregards it, and the former delivers many arguments about one problem, but the latter, the same method about many problems. Cf. Proclus. MSS. commentary on the Parmenides, Philip., Schol. p. 143, ch, 4; Waitz, vol. ii. p. 137."
  3. "3. On the metaphysical part of this question, the opinions of philosophers are as vague as (I may add) they are unprofitable, hence the term "universals," is the best to be employed, as least liable to commit the logician to any metaphysical hypothesis; since the realist may interpret it of "substances," the nominalist of "names," the conceptualist of "notions." Cf. Occam, Log. p. 1, Albertus Magnus, Abelard. The agreement between the first and last, proves that there is no real difference between nominalism and conceptualism, since they were both. Vide also Mansel, Appendix A, where the authorities upon each side will be found quoted."
  4. "4. Genus and species, in short all forms, have a triple subsistence, for they are either prior to the many, or in the many, or posterior to the many. Taylor. Philoponus, in his extracts from Ammonius, illustrates this as follows: Let a seal-ring be conceived, having the image of Achilles upon it, from which seal let there be many impressions taken in pieces of wax, afterwards let a man perceiving the pieces of wax to have all the impression of one seal, retain such impression in his mind: then the seal in the ring is said to be prior to the many; the impression in the wax to be in the many, and the image remaining in the conception of the spectator, after the many, and of posterior origin. This he applies to genus and species."
  5. "5. Viz. metaphysics; it is, in fact, psychological. Cf. Leibnitz Meditat. de Cognit. Ver. opera. ed Erdmann. and Mansel's Prolegomena Logica."
  6. "6. With this chapter compare ch. 5, of the Categories, and Top. i. 5 and 8, whence the discrepancies between the account of the predicables given by Arist. and this by Porphyry will appear, upon which see Mansel's comment. Log. App. A, p. 9. Cf. also Albertus Mag. de Predicab. Trac. 11, cap. 1, Metap. iv. 28."
  7. "7. Ammonius remarks that, "It is worth while to doubt why Porphyry says that the first signification of genus appears to be the one easily adopted, and not the second signification, which is the habitude of one thing to one; since this nature first knows, for she first produces one thing from one, and thus many from many." But as Taylor observes, the second signification of genus, which is second with reference to us, is first to nature; for from Hercules, one man is first produced, and thus afterwards the multitude of the Heraclidae. Universally, whatever is first to nature is second to us, and vice versa, e. g. she begins with form and matter, then flesh and bone; we begin from man, so that things prior to nature are posterior to our knowledge, wherefore the first signification is clearer than the second."
  8. "8. Porphyry does not recognise the distinction between "quale quid" and "quale," (cf. Aldrich, Abelard de Gen. et Spe. ed. Cousin,) but makes difference, property, and accident to be all predicated ἐϝ τῷ ὁποῖόν τὶ ἐστιν: Boethius distinguishes quale in substantia, from quale non in substantia. Moreover, Porphyry makes difference to be always predicated de specie differentibus; upon his consideration of property, vide note to ch. 4, Isagog."
  9. "9. Athenaeus attributes this verse to Euripides. Vide Ath. lib. xiii. ch. 7."
  10. "10. An infima species can be maintained by none consistently but a Realist. Vide Mansel, p. 21"
  11. "11. For the exemplification of the above, see the "Arbor Porphyriana," (sometimes called by the Greek logicians, the "ladder," κλίμαξ,) given at page 7, ch. 5, of the Categories, with the note. [Note to the online text: vol. 1 can be found online at books.google.com]"
  12. "12. See notes to pp. 6 and 8, Categor. An infima species implies a notion so complex as to be incapable of further accessions, the Realist maintains it to be the whole essence of the individuals of which it is predicated. Cf. Boethius; also Wallis, lib. i. 13, et seq.; Whately, b. ii. ch. 5, sect. 3 and 5."
  13. "13. Cf. Mansel, pp. 18 and 21, note; Whately, p. 52, 138; Outline of Laws of Thought, p. 44; Stewart, Philo. of Human Mind, part i. ch. 4."
  14. "14. Properly speaking, there cannot be more than one highest genus, which is a cognate term to every substance and quality supposed to exist; yet a subaltern genus may be relatively considered as a highest genus. Species, when resolved into its component parts, is found to be combined of genus and difference, and in different points of view, may be referred to different genera, also many species have no appropriate name, but are expressed by the combination of their constituent parts, genus and difference, e. g. "rectilinear-figure," " water-fowl;" indeed, some are denoted by the difference alone, as " repeater" (a watch which strikes the hour). Cf. ch. 3, Cat. note; Crakanthorpe, Log. lib. ii. Any singular term (denoting one individual) implies, (vide Whately, b. ii. ch. 5, 5,) not only the whole of what is understood by the species it belongs to, but also more, namely, whatever distinguishes that single object from others of the same species, as London implies all that is denoted by the term " city," and also all that distinguishes that individual city. Cf. Wallis, ch. 2."
  15. "15. Hence, in describing an individual, we do not employ properties (which belong to a whole species), but generally, inseparable accidents, i. e. such as can be predicated of their subject at all times."
  16. "16. According to Porphyry, difference is always predicated "de specie differentibus," and he recognises only a relative difference between two given species; thus "rational" is not the difference of man per se, but of man as distinguished from brutes. ..."
  17. "17. Porphyry's definition of man, "animal rationale mortale," was adopted by Abelard, Albertus Magnus, and Petrus Hispanus, though sometimes with the saving clause, that it must be understood with reference to the Stoical notions of the gods. Aquinas first removed the genus animal rationale from the Arbor Porphy., and limited rationality to man, distinguishing angels as intellectuales. Cf. Summa, p. 1; Qu. lviii. 3; Opusc. xlviii. Tract 1. In the Aristotelian definition of man, ζῷον πέζον δίπουν, the last would be regarded by him as a difference."
  18. "18. Boethius agrees with Porphyry, that accidents, properly so called, are useless in definition, (vide Opera, p. 3,) accidental definition is, in fact, merely a description. Cf. Albert. 1. c. Occam, pt. i. ch. 27. The only proper definition is by genus and differentiae, hence all definable notions will be species. The definition here given of difference, as to its being the excess of species over genus, is clear, from a reference to what was stated in the last note of the preceding chapter."
  19. "19. "Ratione ejus, quale quid est predicatur." Buhle; so Aldrich. There is no warranty, as we have observed, by Porphyry, for distinction between "quale quid" and "quale.""
  20. "20. "Rationales enim sumus et nos et Dii," vetus interpres Latinus. Commonly the word ἄγγελοι was substituted here, probably, as Casaubon conjectures, from the emendation of some Christian: Ammonius and Boethius (Comment, v.) attest that Porphyry wrote θεοὶ."
  21. "21. The property of a subaltern genus is predicated of all the species comprehended in that genus; that of a lowest species is predicated of all the individuals which partake of the nature of that species: thus,"Shape is the generic property of body, Growth is the generic property of living body, Voluntary motion is the generic property of animal, Risibility, the specific property of man." Vide Hill's Logic."
  22. "22. Whately observes, "It is often hard to distinguish certain properties from differentia, but whatever you consider as the most essential to the nature of a species, with respect to the matter you are engaged in, you must call the differentia, as rationality to man, and whatever you consider as rather an accompaniment (or result) of that difference, you must call the property, as the use of speech seems to be a result of rationality. He adds also, that the difference is not always one quality, but is frequently compounded of several together, no one of which would alone suffice." Vide also Huyshe's Log., pp. 33, 34."
  23. "23. Buhle retains the distinction here, between quid and quale quid, upon which, see notes on ch. 2 and 3. The reading is that of Julius Pacius, whom all later editors have followed: the Latin interpretation renders it, "accidentis vero in eo, quod quale quiddam, vel quomodo se habens.""
  24. "24. 4 Accidents may be distinguished from properties by the very definitions given of them. The latter belong necessarily, and therefore universally, to an essence, whereas the former are those qualities which do not of necessity belong to any essence, but are mere contingencies. Huyshe. Vide also note ch. 4, and cf. Albert de Predicab. Tract, vi. cap. I."
  25. "25. Risibility is considered to be so dependent upon rationality, as that the latter could not exist without the former, and if this were not so, the term risible would not be a property of man, but only an inseparable accident. Cf. Whately and Mansel."