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Translated by Octavius Freire Owen, M. A. of Christ Church, Oxford. Rector of Burstow, Surrey; and Domestic Chaplain to the Duke of Portland. This translation appears in volume 2 of The Organon, or logical treatises of Aristotle, with the introduction of Porphyry, published by Henry G. Bohn in London in 1853. The notes are by Owen.

The Greek was scanned and some corrections made, but is included for reference purposes only, and should not be considered reliable.

Greek Latin English
Όντος άναγκαί ου, Χρυσαόριε, και εις την των παρα Άριστοτέλει κατηγοριών διδασκαλί αν του γνωναι τί γένος και τί διαφορά τί τε είδος και τί ίδιον και τί συμβεβηκός, είς τε την των ορισμών άπόδοσιν και ολως εις τα περι διαιρέσεως και άποδεί ξεως χρησί μης ούσης της τούτων θεωρί ας, συντομόν σοι παραδοσιν ποιούμενος πειρασομαι δια βραχέων ωσπερ εν ε'ισαγωγης τρόπω τα παρα τοις πρεσβυτέροις επελθειν, των μεν βαθυτέρων άπεχόμενος ζητημάτων, των δ' απλούστερων συμμέτρως στοχαζόμενος. Cum sit necessarium, Chrisaorie, et ad eam quae est apud Aristotelem praedicamentorum doctrinam nosse quid genus sit et quid differentia quidque species et quid proprium et quid accidens, et ad definitionum assignationem, et omnino ad ea quae in divisione vel demonstratione sunt utilia, hac istarum rerum speculatione compendiosam tibi traditionem faciens temptabo breviter velut introductionis modo ea quae ab antiquis dicta sunt aggredi; altioribus quidem quaestionibus abstinens, simpliciores vero mediocriter coniectans. Since it is necessary, Chrysaorius, both to the doctrine of Aristotle's Categories, to know what genus, difference, species, property, and accident are, and also to the assignments of definitions, in short, since the investigation of these is useful for those things which belong to division and demonstration[2], I will endeavour by a summary briefly to discuss to you, as in the form of introduction, what on this subject has been delivered by the ancients, abstaining, indeed, from more profound questions, yet directing attention in a fitting manner, to such as are more simple.

αυτί κα περι των γενων τε και ειδων τό μεν είτε υφέστηκεν είτε και εν μόναις ψιλαις επινοί αις κειται είτε και υφεστηκότα σώματα εστιν ? ασώματα και πότερον χωριστα ? εν τοις αισθητοις και περι ταυτα υφεστωτα, παραιτήσομαι λέγειν βαθυτατης ουσης της τοιαύτης πραγματεί ας και ἄλλως μεί ζονος δεομένης εξετασεως: Mox de generibus et speciebus illud quidem sive subsistunt sive in solis nudis purisque intellectibus posita sunt sive subsistentia corporalia sunt an incorporalia, et utrum separata an in sensibilibus et circa ea constantia, dicere recusabo. Altissimum enim est huiusmodi negotium et maioris egens inquisitionis. For instance, I shall omit to speak about genera and species, as to whether they subsist (in the nature of things) or in mere conceptions only; whether also if subsistent, they are bodies or incorporeal, and whether they are separate from, or in, sensibles[3], and subsist about these[4], for such a treatise is most profound, and requires another more extensive investigation[5].
τό δ' οπως περι αυτων και των προκειμένων λογικώτερον ο'ι παλαιοί διέλαβον και τουτων μαλιστα ο'ι εκ του περιπατου, νυν σοι πειρασομαι δεικνυναι. Illud vero quemadmodum de his ac de propositis probabiliter antiqui tractaverint, et horum maxime Peripatetici, tibi nunc temptabo monstrare. Nevertheless, how the ancients, and especially the Peripatetics, discussed these and the other proposed subjects, in a more logical manner, I will now endeavour to point out to you.
Περι γένους [01] DE GENERE On genus[6]
Εοικεν δε μήτε τό γένος μήτε τό είδος άπλως λέγεσθαι. γένος γαρ λέγεται και ή τινων εχόντων πως πρός εν τι και πρός αλλήλους Αθροισις, καθ' ο σημαινόμενον τό Ήρακλειδων λέγεται γένος ε κ της άφ' ενός σχέσεως, λέγω δη του Ηρακλέους, και του πλήθους των εχόντων πως πρός αλλήλους την άπ' εκεί νου οικειότητα. κατα άποτομην την άπό των ἄλλων γενων κεκλημένου. Videtur autem neque genus neque species simpliciter dici. Genus enim dicitur et aliquorum quodammodo se habentium ad unum aliquid et ad se invicem collectio, secundum quam significationem Romanorum dicitur genus, ab unius scilicet habitudine -- dico autem Romuli -- et multitudinis habentium aliquo modo ad invicem eam quae ab illo est cognationem secundum divisionem ab aliis generibus dictam. Neither genus nor species appear to be simply denominated, for that is called genus which is a collection of certain things, subsisting in a certain respect relatively to one thing, and to each other, according to which signification the genus of the Heraclidae is denominated from the habitude from one, I mean Hercules, and from the multitude of those who have alliance to each other from him, denominated according to separation from other genera.

λέγεται δε και ἄλλως πΑλιν γένος ή εκΑστου της γενέσεως άρχη είτε άπό του τεκόντος είτε άπό του τόπου εν ω τις γέγονεν. ούτως γαρ Όρέστην μεν άπό Τανταλου φαμεν ἔχειν τό γένος, "Υλλον δε άφ' Ηρακλέους, και παλιν Πίνδαρον μεν Θηβαιον είναι τό γένος, Πλατωνα δε Άθηναιον: και γαρ ή πατρις άρχή τί ς εστι της έκαστου γενέσεως, ωσπερ και ο πατήρ. Dicitur autem et aliter rursus genus quod est uniuscuiusque generationis principium vel ab eo qui genuit vel a loco in quo quis genitus est. Sic enim Oresten quidem dicimus a Tantalo habere genus, Illum autem ab Hercule, et rursus Pindarum quidem Thebanum esse genere, Platonem vero Atheniensem; et enim patria principium est uniuscuiusque generationis quemadmodum pater. Again, after another manner also, the principle of the generation of every one is called genus, whether from the generator or from the place in which a person is generated, for thus we say that Orestes had his genus from Tantalus, Hyllus from Hercules, and again, that Pindar was by genus a Theban, but Plato an Athenian, for country is a certain principle of each man's generation, in the same manner as a father.
τουτο δε ἔοικε πρόχειρον είναι τό σημαινόμενον: Ήρακλειδαι γαρ λέγονται ο'ι εκ γένους καταγοντες Ηρακλέους και Κεκροπίδαι ο'ι άπό Κέκροπος και ο'ι τουτων άγχιστεις. και πρότερόν γε ώνομασθη γένος ή έκαστου της γενέσεως άρχή, μετα δε ταυτα και τό πληθος των άπό μιας άρχης οίον Ηρακλέους, ο άφορί ζοντες και άπό των ἄλλων χωρί ζοντες ἔφαμεν τό ολον Αθροισμα Ήρακλειδων γένος. Haec autem videtur promptissima esse significatio; Romani enim qui ex genere descendunt Romuli, et Cecropidae qui ex genere descendunt Cecropis et horum proximi. Et prius quidem appellatum est genus uniuscuiusque generationis principium, dehinc etiam multitudo eorum qui sunt ab uno principio; ut a Romulo, dividentes et ab aliis separantes, dicebamus omnem illam collectionem esse Romanorum genus. Still, this signification appears to be most ready,[7] for they are called Heraclidae who derive their origin from the genus of Hercules, and Cecropidae who are from Cecrops; also their next of kin. The first genus, moreover, is so called, which is the principle of each man's generation, but afterwards the number of those who are from one principle, e. g. from Hercules, which defining and separating from others, we call the whole collected multitude the genus of the Heraclidse.
ἄλλως δε παλιν γένος λέγεται, ω υποτασσεται τό είδος, καθ' ομοιότητα ίσως τουτων ειρημένον: και γαρ άρχή τί ς εστι τό τοιουτο γένος των υφ' εαυτό και δοκει και τό πληθος περιέχειν παν τό υφ' εαυτό. Aliter autem rursus genus dicitur cui supponitur species, ad horum fortasse similitudinem dictum: et enim principium quoddam est huiusmodi genus earum quae sub se sunt specierum; videtur etiam multitudinem continere omnem quae sub eo est. Again, in another way that is denominated genus to which the species is subject, called perhaps from the similitude of these; for such a genus is a certain principle of things under it, and seems also to comprehend all the multitude under itself.
Τριχως ουν του γένους λεγομένου περι του τρί του παρα τοις φιλοσόφοις ο λόγος: ο και υπογραφοντες άποδεδώκασι γένος είναι λέγοντες τό κατα πλειόνων και διαφερόντων τω είδει εν τω τί εστι κατηγορουμενον οίον τό ζωον. Tripliciter igitur cum genus dicatur, de tertio apud philosophos sermo est, quod etiam describentes assignaverunt genus esse dicentes quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quid sit praedicatur, ut animal. As then, genus is predicated triply, the consideration by philosophers is concerning the third, which also they explain by description, when they say that genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species, in answer to what a thing is, e. g. animal.
των γαρ κατηγορουμένων τα μεν καθ' ενός λέγεται μόνου, ώς τα ἄτομα οίον Σωκρατης και τό ούτος και τό τουτο, τα δε κατα πλειόνων, ώς τα γένη και τα είδη και Αι διαφοραι και τα ίδια και τα συμβεβηκότα κοινως άλλα μη \δί ως τινί. ἔστι δε γένος μεν οίον τό ζωον, ε\δος δε οίον ο ἄνθρωπος, διαφορα δε οίον τό λογικόν, ίδιον δε οίον τό γελαστικόν, συμβεβηκός δε οίον τό λευκόν, τό μέλαν, τό καθέζεσθαι. Eorum enim quae praedicantur alia quidem de uno dicuntur solo, sicut individua sicut Socrates et hic et hoc, alia vero de pluribus, quemadmodum genera et species et differentiae et propria, et accidentia communiter sed non proprie alicui. Est autem genus quidem ut animal, species vero ut homo, differentia autem ut rationale, proprium ut risibile, accidens ut album, nigrum, sedere. For of predicates some are predicated of one thing alone, as individuals, for instance, "Socrates," and "this man," and "this thing;" but others are predicated of many, as genera, species, differences, properties, and accidents, predicated in common, but not peculiarly to any one. Now genus is such as "animal," species as "man," difference as " rational," property as " risible," accident as "white," "black," "to sit."
των μεν ουν καθ' ενός μόνου κατηγορουμένων διαφέρει τα γένη τω ταυτα κατα πλειόνων άποδοθέντα κατηγορεισθαι, των δε αυ κατα πλειόνων των μεν ειδων, οτι τα μεν είδη ει και κατα πλειόνων κατηγορειται άλλ' ου διαφερόντων τω είδει άλλα τω άριθμω: ο γαρ ἄνθρωπος είδος ών Σωκρατους και Πλατωνος κατηγορειται, οι ου τω είδει διαφέρουσιν άλλήλων άλλα τω άριθμω, τό δε ζωον γένος ον άνθρώπου και βοός και ίππου κατηγορειται, οι διαφέρουσι και τω είδει άλλήλων άλλ' ουχι τω άριθμω μόνον. Ab his ergo quae de uno solo praedicantur differunt genera eo quod de pluribus assignata praedicentur, ab his autem quae de pluribus: ab speciebus quidem quoniam species etsi de pluribus praedicantur sed non de differentibus specie sed numero (homo enim cum sit species de Socrate et Platone praedicatur qui non specie differunt a se invicem sed numero, animal vero cum genus sit de homine et boue et equo praedicatur qui differunt a se invicem et specie quoque, non numero solo); From such things then, as are predicated of one thing only, genera differ in that they are predicated of many, but on the other hand, from those which are predicated of many and from species, (they differ) because those species are predicated of many things, yet not of those which differ in species, but in number only, for man being a species, is predicated of Socrates and Plato, who do not differ from each other in species, but in number, while animal being a genus is predicated of man, and ox, and horse, which differ also in species from each other, and not in number only.
του δ' αυ Ίδίου διαφέρει τό γένος, οτι τό μεν ίδιον καθ' ενός μόνου είδους, ου εστιν ίδιον. κατηγορειται και των υπό τό είδος άτόμων, ώς τό γελαστικόν άνθρώπου μόνου και των κατα μέρος άνθρώπων, τό δε γένος ουχ ενός είδους κατηγορειται άλλα πλειόνων τε και διαφερόντων. της δ' αυ διαφοράς και των κοινή συμβεβηκότων διαφέρει τό γένος, οτι ει και κατα πλειόνων και διαφερόντων τω είδει κατηγορουνται αι διαφοραι και τα κοινως συμβεβηκότα, άλλ' ουκ εν τω τί ε στι κατηγορουνται. ερωτησαντων γαρ ήμων εκεινο καθ' ου κατηγορειται ταυτα, ουκ εν τω τί ε στιν, φαμέν, κατηγορειται, άλλα μαλλον εν τω ποιόν τί εστιν. εν γαρ τω ερωταν ποιόν τί εστιν ο ἄνθρωπός φαμεν οτι λογικόν, και εν τω ποιόν τι ο κόραξ φαμεν οτι μέλαν: ἔστιν δε τό μεν λογικόν διαφορα, τό δε μέλαν συμβεβηκός: οταν δε τί εστιν ἄνθρωπος ερωτηθωμεν, ζωον άποκρινόμεθα: ήν δε άν-θρώπου γένος τό ζωον. a proprio vero differt genus quoniam proprium quidem de una sola specie cuius est proprium praedicatur et de his quae sub una specie sunt individuis (quemadmodum risibile de homine solum et de particularibus hominibus), genus autem non de una specie praedicatur sed de pluribus et differentibus; a differentia vero et ab his quae communiter sunt accidentibus differt genus quoniam etsi de pluribus et differentibus specie praedicantur differentiae et communiter accidentia sed non in eo quod quid sit praedicantur sed in eo quod quale quid sit (interrogantibus nobis enim illud de quo praedicantur haec, non in eo quod quid sit dicimus praedicari sed magis in eo quod quale sit; interrogati enim "Qualis est homo?" dicimus "Rationalis", et in eo quod "Qualis est corvus?" dicitur quoniam niger; est autem rationale quidem differentia, nigrum vero accidens; quando autem "Quid est homo?" interrogamur, "Animal" respondemus; erat autem hominis genus animal). From property, moreover, genus differs because property is predicated of one species alone of which it is the property, and of the individuals under the species, as "risible" of man alone, and of men particularly, for genus is not predicated of one species, but of many things, which are also different in species. Besides, genus differs from difference and from accidents in common, because though differences and accidents in common are predicated of many things, different also in species, yet they are not so in reply to what a thing is, but (what kind of a thing) it is. For when some persons ask what that is of which these are predicated, we reply, that it is genus; but we do not assign in answer differences and accidents, since they are not predicated of a subject, as to what a thing is, but rather as to what kind of a thing it is. For in reply to the question, what kind of a thing man is, we say, that he is rational, and in answer to what kind of a thing a crow is, we say that it is black, yet rational is difference, but black is accident. When however we are asked what man is, we answer, an animal, but animal is the genus of man,
ωστε τό μεν κατα πλειόνων λέγεσθαι τό γένος διαστέλλει αυτό άπό των καθ' ενός μόνου των άτόμων κατηγορουμένων, τό δε διαφερόντων τω είδει διαστέλλει άπό των ώς ειδων κατηγορουμένων ? ώς \δί ων, τό δε εν τω τί εστι κατηγορεισθαι χωρί ζει άπό των διαφορων και των κοινή συμβεβηκότων, α ουκ εν τω τί εστιν άλλ' εν τω ποιόν τί εστιν ? πως ἔχον εστιν κατηγορειται εκαστον ων κατηγορειται. ουδεν Αρα περιττόν ουδε ελλειπον περιέχει ή του γένους ρηθεισα υπογραφή της εννοί ας. Quare "de pluribus praedicari" dividit genus ab his quae de uno solo eorum quae sunt individua praedicantur; "differentibus" vero "specie" separat ab his quae sicut species praedicantur vel sicut propria; "in eo" autem "quod quid sit praedicari" dividit a differentiis et communiter accidentibus quae non in eo quod quid sit sed in eo quod quale est vel quodammodo se habens praedicantur de his de quibus praedicantur. Nihil igitur superfluum neque minus continet generis dicta descriptio. Wherefore, from genus being predicated of many, it is diverse from individuals which are predicated of one thing only, but from being predicated of things different in species, it is distinguished from such as are predicated as species or as properties. Moreover, because it is predicated in reply to what a thing is, it is distinguished from differences and from accidents commonly, which are severally predicated of what they are predicated, not in reply to what a thing is, but what kind of a thing it is, or in what manner it subsists: the description therefore of the conception of genus, which has been enunciated, contains nothing superfluous, nothing deficient.[8]
Περι είδους [02] DE SPECIE
Τό δε είδος λέγεται μεν και επι της εκαστου μορφης, καθό είρηται πρωτον μεν είδος Αξιον τυραννί δος. Species autem dicitur quidem et de uniuscuiusque forma, secundum quam dictum est: Primum quidem species digna imperio. Species indeed is predicated of every form, according to which it is said, "form is first worthy of imperial sway;"[9]
λέγεται δε είδος και τό υπό τό άποδοθεν γένος, καθό ειώθαμεν λέγειν τόν μεν ἄνθρωπον είδος του ζώου γένους οντος του ζώου, τό δε λευκόν του χρώματος είδος, τό δε τρί γωνον του σχήματος είδος. ει δε και τό γένος άποδιδόντες του είδους εμεμνήμεθα ειπόντες τό κατα πλειόνων και διαφερόντων τω είδει εν τω τί εστι κατηγορουμενον, και τό είδός φαμεν τό υπό τό άποδοθεν γένος, ειδέναι χρη οτι, επει και τό γένος τινός εστιν γένος και τό είδος τινός εστιν είδος εκατερον εκατέρου, άναγκη και εν τοις άμφο-τέρων λόγοις κεχρησθαι άμφοτέροις. άποδιδόασιν ουν τό είδος και ούτως: είδός εστι τό ταττόμενον υπό τό γένος και ου τό γένος εν τω τί εστι κατηγορειται. Dicitur autem species et ea quae est sub assignato genere, secundum quam solemus dicere hominem quidem speciem animalis cum sit genus animal, album autem coloris speciem, triangulum vero figurae speciem. Quod si etiam genus assignantes speciei meminimus dicentes quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quid sit praedicatur, et speciem dicimus id quod sub genere est. Nosse autem oportet quoniam et genus alicuius est genus et species alicuius est species, idcirco necesse est et in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti. Assignant ergo et sic speciem: Species est quod ponitur sub genere et de qua genus in eo quod quid sit praedicatur. still that is called species also, which is under the genus stated, according to which we are accustomed to call man a species of animal, animal being genus, but white a species of colour, and triangle of figure. Nevertheless, if when we assign the genus, we make mention of species, saying that which is predicated of many things differing in species, in reply to what a thing is, and call species that which is under the assigned genus, we ought to know that, since genus is the genus of something, and species the species of something, each of each, we must necessarily use both in the definitions of both. They assign, therefore, species thus: species is what is arranged under genus, and of which genus is predicated in reply to what a thing is:
ἔτι δε και ούτως: είδός εστι τό κατα πλειόνων και διαφερόν-των τω άριθμω εν τω τί εστι κατηγορουμενον. άλλ' αυτη μεν ή άπόδοσις του ειδικότατου αν είη και ο εστι μόνον είδος, α'ι δε ἄλλαι είεν αν και των μη ειδικότατων. Amplius autem sic quoque: Species est quod de pluribus et differentibus numero in eo quod quid sit praedicatur sed haec quidem assignatio specialissimae est et quae solum species est, aliae vero erunt etiam non specialissimarum. moreover, thus species is what is predicated of many things differing in number, in reply to what a thing is. This explanation, however, belongs to the most special, and which is species only, but no longer genus also,[10] but the other (descriptions) will pertain to such as are not the most special.
σαφες δ' αν είη τό λεγόμενον τουτον τόν τρόπον. καθ' εκαστην κατηγορί αν εστί ν τινα γενικώτατα και παλιν ἄλλα ειδικώτατα και μεταξύ των γενικωτατων και των ειδικωτατων ἄλλα. ἔστιν δε γενικώ-τατον μέν, υπερ ο ουκ αν είη ἄλλο επαναβεβηκός γένος, ειδικώτατον δέ, μεθ' ο ουκ αν είη ἄλλο υποβεβηκός είδος, μεταξύ δε του γενικωτατου και του ειδικωτατου ἄλλα, α και γένη και είδη εστι τα αυτα, πρός ἄλλο μέντοι και ἄλλο λαμβανόμενα. Planum autem erit quod dicitur hoc modo. In unoquoque praedicamento sunt quaedam generalissima, et rursus alia specialissima, et inter generalissima et specialissima alia. Est autem generalissimum quidem super quod nullum ultra aliud sit superueniens genus, specialissimum autem post quod non erit alia inferior species; inter generalissimum autem et specialissimum et genera et species sunt eadem, ad aliud quidem et aliud sumpta. Now, what we have stated will be evident in this way: in each category there are certain things most generic, and again, others most special, and between the most generic and the most special, others which are alike called both genera and species, but the most generic is that above which there cannot be another superior genus, and the most special that below which there cannot be another inferior species. Between the most generic and the most special, there are others which are alike both genera and species, referred, nevertheless, to different things,
Γινέσθω δε επι μιας κατηγορί ας σαφες τό λεγόμενον. ή ουσία ἔστι μεν και αυτη γένος, υπό δε ταυτην εστιν σωμα, και υπό τό σωμα Ομψυχον σωμα, υφ' ο τό ζωον, υπό δε τό ζωον λογικόν ζωον, υφ' ο ο ἄνθρωπος, υπό δε τόν ἄνθρωπον Σωκρατης και Πλατων και ο'ι κατα μέρος ἄνθρωποι. Sit autem in uno praedicamento manifestum quod dicitur. Substantia est quidem et ipsa genus, sub hac autem est corpus, sub corpore vero animatum corpus sub quo animal, sub animali vero rationale animal sub quo homo, sub homine vero Socrates et Plato et qui sunt particulares homines. but what is stated may become clear in one category. Substance indeed, is itself genus, under this is body, under body animated body, under which is animal, under animal rational animal, under which is man, under man Socrates, Plato, and men particularly.
άλλα τουτων ή μεν ουσία τό γενικώτατον και ο μόνον γένος, ο δε ἄνθρωπος τό ειδικώτατον και ο μόνον είδος, τό δε σωμα είδος μεν της ουσίας, γένος δε του εμψυχου σώματος. άλλα και τό Ομψυχον σωμα είδος μεν του σώματος, γένος δε του ζώου, παλιν δε τό ζωον είδος μεν του εμψυχου σώματος, γένος δε του λογικου ζώου, τό δε λογικόν ζωον είδος μεν του ζωου, γένος δε του άνθρώπου, ο δε ἄνθρωπος είδος μεν του λογικου ζώου, ουκέτι δε και γένος των κατα μέρος άνθρώπων, άλλα μόνον είδος: και παν τό πρό των άτόμων προσεχως κατηγορουμενον είδος αν είη μόνον, ουκέτι δε και γένος. Sed horum, substantia quidem generalissimum est et quod genus sit solum, homo vero specialissimum et quod species solum sit; corpus vero species quidem est substantiae, genus vero corporis animati; et animatum corpus species quidem est corporis, genus vero animalis; animal autem species quidem est corporis animati, genus vero rationalis; sed rationale animal species quidem est animalis, genus autem hominis; homo vero species quidem est rationalis animalis, non autem etiam genus particularium hominum sed solum species; et omne quod ante individua proximum est, species erit solum, non etiam genus. Still, of these, substance is the most generic, and that which alone is genus; but man is most specific, and that which alone is species; yet body is a species of substance, but a genus of animated body, also animated body is a species of body, but a genus of animal; again, animal is a species of animated body, but a genus of rational animal, and rational animal is a species of animal, but a genus of man, and man is a species of rational animal, but is no longer the genus of particular men, but is species only, and every thing prior to individuals being proximately predicated of them, will be species only, and no longer genus also.
ωσπερ ουν ή ουσία άνωτατω ουσα τω μηδεν είναι πρό αυτης γένος ήν τό γενικώτατον, ουτως και ο ἄνθρωπος είδος ών, μεθ' ο ουκ ἔστιν είδος ουδέ τι των τέμνεσθαι δυναμένων εις είδη, άλλα των άτόμων [ἄτομον γαρ Σωκρατης και Πλατων και τουτι τό λευκόν] μόνον αν είη είδος και τό ἔ σχατον είδος και ώς ἔφαμεν τό ειδικώτατον: τα δε μέσα των μεν πρό αυτων είη αν είδη, των δε μετ' αυτα γένη. Quemadmodum igitur substantia quae cum suprema sit eo quod nihil sit supra eam, genus est generalissimum, sic et homo cum sit species post quam non sit alia inferior species neque aliquid eorum quae possunt dividi sed solum individuorum (individuum enim est Socrates et Plato), species erit sola et ultima species et, ut dictum est, specialissima. Quae vero sunt in medio, eorum quidem quae supra ipsa sunt, erunt species, eorum vero quae post ipsa sunt, genera. As then, substance being in the highest place, is most generic, from there being no genus prior to it, so also man being a species, after which there is no other species, nor any thing capable of division into species, but individuals, (for Socrates, Plato, Alcibiades, and this white thing, I call individual,) will be species alone, and the last species, and as we say the most specific. Yet the media will be the species of such as are before them, but the genera of things after them,
ωστε ταυτα μεν ἔχει δυο σχέσεις, τήν τε πρός τα πρό αυτων, καθ' ην είδη αυτων είναι λέγεται, τήν τε πρός τα μετ' αυτα, καθ' ην γένη αυτων είναι λέγεται: τα δε Ακρα μί αν ἔχει σχέσιν: τό τε γαρ γενικώτατον την μεν ώς πρός τα υφ' εαυτό ἔχει σχέσιν, γένος ον παντων τό άνωτατω, την δε ώς πρός τα πρό εαυτου ουκέτι ἔχει, άνωτατω ον και ώς πρώτη άρχη καί , ώς ἔφαμεν, υπερ ο ουκ αν είη ἄλλο επαναβεβηκός γένος: και τό ειδικώτατον δε μί αν ἔχει σχέσιν την μεν ώς πρός τα πρό αυτου, ων εστιν είδος, την δε ώς πρός τα μετ' αυτό ουκ άλλοί αν ἔχει, άλλα και των άτόμων είδος λέγεται άλλ' είδος μεν λέγεται των άτόμων ώς περιέχον αυτα, είδος δε παλιν των πρό αυτου ώς περιεχόμενον υπ' αυτων. Quare haec quidem duas habent habitudines: eam quae est ad superiora secundum quam species ipsorum esse dicuntur, et eam quae est ad posteriora secundum quam genera ipsorum esse dicuntur. Extrema vero unam habent habitudinem; nam et generalissimum ad ea quidem quae posteriora sunt habet habitudinem, cum genus sit omnium id quod est supremum, eam vero quae est ad superiora non habet, cum sit supremum et primum principium; specialissimum autem unam habet habitudinem, eam quae est ad superiora quorum est species, eam vero quae est ad posteriora non diversam habet sed etiam individuorum species dicitur (sed species quidem individuorum velut ea continens, species autem superiorum velut quae ab eis continetur). So that these have two conditions, one as to things prior to them, according to which they are said to be their species, the other to things after them, according to which they are said to be their genera. The extremes on the other hand, have one condition, for the most generic has indeed a condition as to the things under it, since it is the highest genus of all, but has no longer one as to those before it, being supreme, and the first principle, and, as we have said, that above which there cannot be another higher genus.

Also, the most specific has one condition, as to the things prior to it, of which it is the species, yet it has not a different one, as to things posterior to it, but is called the species of individuals, so termed as comprehending them, and again, the species of things prior to it, as comprehended by them,

Άφορί ζονται τοί νυν τό μεν γενικώτατον ουτως, ο γένος ον ουκ ἔστιν είδος, και παλιν, υπερ ο ουκ αν είη ἄλλο επαναβεβηκός γένος: τό δε ει-δικώτατον, ο είδος ον ουκ ἔστιν γένος και ο είδος ον ουκ αν διελοί μεθα ἔτι εις είδη και ο κατα πλειόνων και διαφερόντων τω άριθμω εν τω τί εστι κατηγορειται. τα δε μέσα των Ακρων υπαλληλα τε καλουσι γένη και είδη, και εκαστον αυτων είδος είναι και γένος τίθενται, πρός ἄλλο μέντοι και ἄλλο λαμβανόμενον. τα δη πρό των ειδικωτατων ἄχρι του γενικωτατου άνιόντα γένη τε λέγεται και είδη και υπαλληλα γένη ώς ο Αγαμέμνων Άτρεί δης και Πελοπί δης και Τανταλί δης και τό τελευταιον Διός. Determinant ergo generalissimum ita: Quod, cum genus sit, non est species et rursus: Supra quod non est aliud superueniens genus specialissimum vero: Quod, cum sit species, non est genus et: Quod, cum sit species, numquam dividitur in species et: Quod de pluribus et differentibus numero in eo quod quid sit praedicatur ea vero quae in medio sunt extremorum subalterna uocant genera et species, et unumquodque ipsorum species esse et genus ponunt ad aliud quidem et ad aliud sumpta; ea vero quae sunt ante specialissima usque ad generalissimum ascendentia et genera dicuntur et species et subalterna genera, ut Agamemnon Atrides et Pelopides et Tantalides et, ultimum, Iovis. Wherefore the most generic genus is thus defined to be that which being genus is not species, and again, above which there cannot be another higher genus; but the most specific species, that, which being species is not genus, and which being species we can no longer divide into species; moreover, which is predicated of many things differing in number, in reply to what a thing is.[11]Now, the media of the extremes they call subaltern species and genera, and admit each of them to be species and genus, when referred indeed to different things, for those which are prior to the most specific, ascending up to the most generic, are called subaltern genera and species. Thus, Agamemnon is Atrides, Pelopides, Tantalides, and lastly, (the son) of Jupiter,
άλλ' επι μεν των γενεαλογιων εις ενα άναγουσι, φέρε ειπειν τόν Δία, την άρχην ώς επι τό πλειστον, επι δε των γενων και των ειδων ουχ ουτως ἔχει: ου γαρ εστι κοινόν εν γένος παντων τό ον ουδε παντα ομο¬γενη καθ' εν τό άνωτατω γένος, ως φησιν ο Αριστοτέλης. άλλα κεί σθω, ωσπερ εν ταις Κατηγορί αις, τα πρωτα δέκα γένη οίον άρχαι δέκα πρωται: Sed in familiis quidem plerumque ad unum reducuntur principium, verbi gratia Iouem, in generibus autem et speciebus non se sic habet; neque enim est commune unum genus omnium ens, nec omnia eiusdem generis sunt secundum unum supremum genus, quemadmodum dicit Aristoteles sed sint posita (quemadmodum in Praedicamentis) prima decem genera quasi prima decem principia. Yet in genealogies they refer generally to one origin, for instance, to Jupiter; but this is not the case in genera and species, since being is not the common genus of all things, nor, as Aristotle says, are all things of the same genus with respect to one summum genus. Still, let the first ten genera be arranged, as in the Categories, as ten first principles.
καν δη παντα τις οντα καλρ, ομωνυμως, φησί , καλέσει, άλλ' ου συνωνυμως. ει μεν γαρ εν ήν κοινόν παντων γένος τό ον, συνωνυμως αν παντα οντα ελέγετο: δέκα δε οντων των πρώτων ή κοινωνί α κατα τουνομα μόνον, ουκέτι μην και κατα τόν λόγον τόν κατα τουνομα. Vel, si omnia quis entia vocet, aequiuoce (inquit) nuncupabit, non univoce; si enim unum esset commune omnium genus ens, univoce entia dicerentur, cum autem decem sint prima, communio secundum nomen est solum, non etiam secundum definitionis rationem quae secundum nomen est. And even if a person should call all things beings, yet he will call them, so he says, equivocally, but not synonymously, for if being were the one common genus of all things, all things would be synonymously styled beings,
δέκα μεν ουν τα γενικώτατα, τα δε ειδικώτατα εν άριθμω μέν τινι, ου μην άπεί ρω: τα δε ἄτομα, απερ εστι τα μετα τα ειδικώτατα, Απειρα. διό ἄχρι των ειδι-κωτατων άπό των γενικωτατων κατιόντας παρεκελευετο ο Πλατων παυεσθαι, κατιέναι δε δια των δια μέσου διαιρουντας ταις ειδοποιοις διαφοραις: τα δε Απειρα φησιν εαν, μη γαρ αν γενέσθαι τουτων επιστήμην. Decem quidem generalissima sunt, specialissima vero in numero quidem quodam sunt non tamen infinito, individua autem quae sunt post specialissima infinita sunt. Quapropter usque ad specialissima a generalissimis descendentem iubet Plato quiescere, descendere autem per media dividentem specificis differentiis; infinita, inquit, relinquenda sunt, neque enim horum posse fieri disciplinam. but the first principles being ten, the community is in name only, yet not in the definition also belonging to the name: there are then ten most generic genera. On the other hand, the most specific they place in a certain number, yet not in an infinite one, but individuals which are after the most specific are infinite; wherefore, when we have come down to the most specific from the most generic, Plato exhorts us to rest,[12] but to descend through those things which are in the middle, dividing by specific differences; he tells us however to leave infinites alone, as there cannot be science of these.
κατιόν-των μεν ουν εις τα ειδικώτατα άναγκη διαιρουντας δια πλήθους ιέναι, άνιόντων δε εις τα γενικώτατα άναγκη συναιρειν τό πληθος εις εν: συνα-γωγόν γαρ των πολλων εις μί αν φυσιν τό είδος και ἔτι μαλλον τό γένος, τα δε κατα μέρος και καθ' εκαστα τουναντί ον εις πληθος άει διαιρει τό εν: τρ μεν γαρ του είδους μετουσία οι πολλοι ἄνθρωποι είς, τοις δε κατα μέρος ο είς και κοινός πλεί ους: διαιρετικόν μεν γαρ άει τό καθ' εκαστον, συλληπτικόν δε και ενοποιόν τό κοινόν. Descendentibus igitur ad specialissima necesse est dividentem per multitudinem ire, ascendentibus vero ad generalissima necesse est colligere multitudinem (collectiuum enim multorum in unam naturam species est, et magis id quod genus est, particularia vero et singularia semper in multitudinem e contrario dividunt quod unum est; participatione enim speciei plures homines unus, particularibus autem unus et communis plures; divisiuum enim est semper quod singulare est, collectiuum autem et adunativum quod commune est). In descending then, to the most specific, it is necessary to proceed by division through multitude, but in ascending to the most generic, we must collect multitude into one, for species is collective of the many into one nature, and genus yet more so; but particulars and singulars, on the contrary, always divide the one into multitude, for by the participation of species, many men become one man; but in particulars and singulars, the one, and what is common, becomes many; for the singular is always divisive, but what is common is collective and reductive to one.[13]
Άποδεδομένου δε του γένους και του είδους τί εστιν εκατερον αυτων, και του μεν γένους ενός οντος των δε ειδων πλειόνων [άει γαρ εις πλεί ω είδη ή τομη του γένους] τό μεν γένος άει του είδους κατηγορειται και παντα τα επανω των υποκατω, τό δε είδος ουτε του προσεχους αυτου γένους ουτε των επανω: ουδε γαρ άντιστρέφει. δει γαρ ? τα ίσα των ίσων κατηγορεισθαι ώς τό χρεμετιστικόν του ίππου ? τα μεί ζω των ελαττόνων ώς τό ζωον του άνθρώπου, τα δε ελαττω των μειζόνων ουκέτι: ουκέτι γαρ τό ζωον είποις αν είναι ἄνθρωπον, ωσπερ τόν ἄνθρωπον είποις αν είναι ζωον. Assignato autem genere et specie quid est utrumque, cumque sit genus unum, species vero plurimae (semper enim in plures species divisio generis est), genus quidem semper de specie praedicatur et omnia superiora de inferioribus, species autem neque de proximo sibi genere neque de superioribus (neque enim convertitur); oportet autem aequa de aequis praedicari ut hinnibile de equuo, aut maiora de minoribus ut animal de homine; minora vero de maioribus minime (neque enim animal dicis esse hominem quemadmodum hominem dicis esse animal). Genus then, and species, being each of them explained as to what it is, since also genus is one, but species many, (for there is always a division of genus into many species,) genus indeed is always predicated of species, and all superior of inferior, but species is neither predicated of its proximate genus, nor of those superior, since it does not reciprocate. For it is necessary that either equals should be predicated of equals, as neighing of a horse, or that the greater should be predicated of the less, as animal of man, but the less no longer of the greater, for you can no longer say that animal is man, as you can say that man is animal.
καθ' ων δ' αν τό είδος κατηγορηται, κατ' ε κεί νων εξ άναγκης και τό του είδους γένος κατηγορηθήσεται και τό του γένους γένος ἄχρι του γενικότατου: ει γαρ άληθες τό τόν Σωκρατην ειπειν ἄνθρωπον, τόν δε ἄνθρωπον ζωον, τό δε ζωον ουσίαν: άληθες και τόν Σωκρατην ζωον ειπειν και ουσίαν. άει ουν των επανω κατηγορουμένων των υποκατω τό μεν είδος του άτόμου κατηγορηθήσεται, τό δε γένος και κατα του είδους και κατα του άτόμου, τό δε γενικώτατον και κατα του γένους ? των γενων, ει πλεί ω είη τα μέσα και υπαλληλα, και κατα του είδους και κατα του άτόμου. De quibus autem species praedicatur, de his necessario et speciei genus praedicabitur et generis genus usque ad generalissimum; si enim verum est Socratem hominem dicere, hominem autem animal, animal vero substantiam, verum est hominem animal dicere atque substantiam. Semper enim superioribus de inferioribus praedicatis species quidem de individuis praedicabitur, genus autem et de specie et de individuo, generalissimum autem et de genere (et de generibus si plura sint media et subalterna) et de specie et de individuo. Of those things however whereof species is predicated, that genus of the species will also be necessarily predicated, also that genus of the genus up to the most generic; for if it is true to say that Socrates is a man, but man an animal, and animal substance, it is also true to say that Socrates is animal and substance. At least, since the superior are always predicated of the inferior, species indeed will always be predicated of the individual, but the genus both of the species and of the individual, but the most generic both of the genus or the genera, (if the media and subaltern be many,) and of the species, and of the individual.
λέγεται γαρ τό μεν γενικώτατον κατα παντων των υφ' εαυτό γενων τε και ειδων και άτόμων, τό δε γένος τό πρό του ειδικωτατου κατα παντων των ειδικωτατων και των άτόμων, τό δε μόνον είδος κατα παντων των άτόμων, τό δε ἄτομον εφ' ενός μόνου των κατα μέρος. ἄτομον δε λέγε-ται ο Σωκρατης και τουτι τό λευκόν και ουτοσι ο προσιών Σωφρονί σκου υ'ιός, ει μόνος αυτω είη Σωκρατης υ'ιός. Dicitur enim generalissimum quidem de omnibus sub se generibus speciebusque et de individuis, genus autem quod ante specialissimum est de omnibus specialissimis et de individuis, solum autem species de omnibus individuis, individuum autem de uno solo particulari (individuum autem dicitur Socrates et hoc-album et hic-ueniens, ut Sophronisci filius, si solus ei sit Socrates filius). For the most generic is predicated of all the genera, species, and individuals under it, but the genus which is prior to the most specific (species), is predicated of all the most specific species and individuals; but what is species alone of all the individuals (of it), but the individual of one particular alone.[14] Now, an individual is called Socrates, this white thing, this man who approaches the son of Sophroniscus, if Socrates alone is his son,
ἄτομα ουν λέγεται τα τοιαυτα, οτι εξ ιδιοτήτων συνέστηκεν εκαστον, ων τό Αθροισμα ουκ αν επ' ἄλλου ποτε τό αυτό γένοιτο: αι γαρ Σωκρατους ιδιότητες ουκ αν επ' ἄλλου τινός των κατα μέρος γένοιντο αν αι αυταί, α'ι μέντοι του άν-θρώπου, λέγω δη του κοινου, Ιδιότητες γένοιντ' αν α'ι αυται επι πλειόνων, μαλλον δε επι παντων των κατα μέρος άνθρώπων, καθό ἄνθρωποι. Individua ergo dicuntur huiusmodi quoniam ex proprietatibus consistit unumquodque eorum quorum collectio numquam in alio eadem erit; Socratis enim proprietates numquam in alio quolibet erunt particularium; hae vero quae sunt hominis (dico autem eius qui est communis) proprietates erunt eaedem in pluribus, magis autem et in omnibus particularibus hominibus in eo quod homines sunt. And such things are called individuals, because each consists of properties of which the combination can never be the same in any other, for the properties of Socrates can never be the same in any other particular person;[15] the properties of man indeed, (I mean of him as common,) may be the same in many, or rather in all particular men, so far as they are men.
περιέχεται ουν τό μεν ἄτομον υπό του είδους, τό δε είδος υπό του γένους: ολον γαρ τι τό γένος, τό δε ἄτομον μέρος, τό δε είδος και ολον και μέρος, άλλα μέρος μεν ἄλλου, ολον δε ουκ ἄλλου άλλ' εν ἄλλοις: εν γαρ τοις μέρεσι τό ολον. Continetur igitur individuum quidem sub specie, species autem sub genere; totum enim quiddam est genus, individuum autem pars, species vero et totum et pars (sed pars quidem alterius, totum autem non alterius sed aliis; partibus enim totum est). Wherefore the individual is comprehended in the species, but the species by the genus, for genus is a certain whole, but the individual is a part, and species both a whole and a part; part indeed of something else, but a whole not of another, but in other things, for the whole is in its parts.
Περι μεν ουν γένους και είδους και τί τό γενικώτατον και τί τό ειδικώτατον και τί να και γένη τα αυτα και είδη τί να τε τα ἄτομα και ποσαχως τό γένος και τό είδος, είρηται. De genere quidem et specie, et quid generalissimum et quid specialissimum et quae genera eadem et species sunt, quae etiam individua, et quot modis genus et species dicatur, sufficienter dictum est. Concerning genus then, and species, we have shown what is the most generic, and the most specific, also what the same things are genera and species, what also are individuals, and in how many ways genus and species are taken.
Περι διαφοράς [03] DE DIFFERENTIA Of difference
Διαφορα δε κοινως τε και ιδί ως και ιδιαί τατα λεγέσθω. κοινως μεν γαρ διαφέρειν ετερον ετέρου λέγεται τό ετερότητι διαλλαττον οπωσουν ? πρός αυτό ? πρός ἄλλο: διαφέρει γαρ Σωκρατης Πλατωνος ετερότητι και αυτός γε εαυτου παιδός τε οντος και άνδρωθέντος και ενεργουντός τι ? παυσαμένου και άεί γε εν ταις του πως ἔχειν ετερότησιν. Differentia vero communiter et proprie et magis proprie dicatur. Communiter quidem differre alterum altero dicitur quod alteritate quadam differt quocumque modo vel a se ipso vel ab alio; differt enim Socrates Platone alteritate et ipse a se vel puero vel iam uiro vel faciente aliquid vel quiescente, et semper in aliquo modo habendi alteritatibus. Difference may be predicated commonly, properly, and most properly: for one thing is said to differ from another in common from its differing in some respect in diversity of nature, either from itself, or from something else; for Socrates differs from Plato in diversity of nature, and himself from himself when a boy, and when become a man, also when he does any thing, or ceases to do it, and it is always perceived in the different ways in which a thing is somehow effected.
\δί ως δε διαφέρειν λέγεται ετερον ε τέρου, οταν άχωρί στω συμβεβηκότι τό ετερον του ετέρου διαφέρη: άχώριστον δε συμβεβηκός οίον γλαυκότης ? γρυπότης ? και ουλη εκ τραυματος ενσκιρωθεισα. Ίδιαί τατα δε διαφέρειν ετερον ε τέρου λέγεται, οταν ειδοποιω διαφορά διαλλαττη, ωσπερ ἄνθρωπος ίππου ειδοποιω διαφορά διενήνοχε τρ του λογικου ποιότητι. Proprie autem differre alterum altero dicitur quando inseparabili accidenti altero differt. (Inseparabile vero accidens est ut nasi curuitas, caecitas oculorum, cicatrix cum ex uulnere obcalluerit.) Magis proprie differre alterum altero dicitur quando specifica differentia distiterit, quemadmodum homo ab equo specifica differentia differt rationali qualitate. Again, one thing is said to differ properly from another, when one differs from another by an inseparable accident; but an inseparable accident is such as blueness, or crookedness, or a scar become scirrhous from a wound. Moreover, one is most properly said to differ from another, when it varies by specific difference, as man differs from horse by specific difference, i. e. by the quality of rational.
καθόλου μεν ουν πασα διαφορα ετεροιον ποιει προσγινομένη τινί : άλλ' αι μεν κοινως και ιδί ως άλλοιον ποιουσιν, αι δε ιδιαί τατα ἄλλο. των γαρ διαφορων αι μεν άλλοιον ποιουσιν, αι δε ἄλλο. αι μεν ουν ποιουσαι ἄλλο ειδοποιοι κέκληνται, αι δε άλλοιον άπλως διαφοραί. τω γαρ ζωω διαφορα προσελθουσα ή του λο γικου ἄλλο εποίησεν, ή δε του κινεισθαι άλλοιον μόνον παρα τό ήρεμουν εποί ησεν, ωστε ή μεν ἄλλο, ή δε άλλοιον μόνον ε ποί ησεν. Universaliter ergo omnis differentia alteratum facit cuilibet adveniens; sed ea quae est communiter et proprie alteratum facit, illa autem quae est magis proprie aliud. Differentiarum enim aliae quidem alteratum faciunt, aliae vero aliud; illae quidem quae faciunt aliud, specificae uocantur; illae vero quae alteratum, simpliciter differentiae (animali enim differentia adueniens rationalis, aliud fecit et speciem animalis fecit; illa vero quae est mouendi, alteratum solum a quiescente fecit; quare haec quidem aliud, illa vero alteratum solum fecit). Universally then every difference acceding to a thing renders it different, but differences common and proper render it different in quality, and the most proper render it another thing. Hence, those which render it another thing are called specific, but those, which make it different in quality, are simply (called) differences, for the difference of rational being added to animal, makes it another thing, (and makes a species of animal,) but difference of being moved makes it different in quality only from what is at rest, so that the one renders it another thing, but the other only of another quality.[16]
κατα μεν ουν τας ἄλλο ποιουσας διαφορας αϊ τε διαιρέσεις γί νονται των γενων εις τα είδη, οΐ τε οροι άποδί δονται εκ γένους οντες και των τοιουτων διαφορων, κατα δε τας μόνον άλλοιον ποιουσας α'ι ετερότητες μόνον συνί στανται και α'ι του πως ἔχοντος μεταβολαί . Secundum igitur aliud facientes, divisiones fiunt a generibus in species et definitiones assignantur quae sunt ex genere et huiusmodi differentiis; secundum autem eas quae solum alteratum faciunt, alteratio sola consistit et aliquo modo se habendi permutationes. According then, to the differences which produce another thing do the divisions of genera into species arise, and the definitions arising from genus and such differences are assigned. On the other hand, as to those which only make a thing different in quality, diversities alone consist, and the changes of subsistence of a thing.
Ανωθεν ουν παλιν άρχομένω ρητέον των διαφορων τας μεν χωριστας είναι, τας δε άχωρί στους: τό μεν γαρ κινεισθαι και τό ήρεμειν και τόυγιαίνειν και τό νοσειν και οσα τουτοις παραπλήσια χωριστά εστιν, τό δε γρυπόν είναι ? σιμόν ? λογικόν ? ἄλογον άχώριστα. A superioribus ergo rursus inchoanti dicendum est differentiarum alias quidem esse separabiles alias vero inseparabiles; moueri enim et quiescere et sanum esse et aegrum et quaecumque his proxima sunt separabilia sunt, at vero aquilum esse vel simum vel rationale vel irrationale inseparabilia.

Beginning then, again, from the first, we must say that of differences some are separable, others inseparable, thus to be moved, and to be at rest, to be ill, and to be well, and such as resemble these, are separable, but to have a crooked, or a flat nose, to be rational, or irrational, are inseparable differences.
των δε άχωρί στων α'ι μεν υπαρχουσι καθ' αυτας, αι δε κατα συμβεβηκός: τό μεν γαρ λογικόν καθ' αυτό υπαρχει τω άνθρώπω και τό θνητόν και τό επιστήμης είναι δεκτικόν, τό δε γρυπόν ? σιμόν είναι κατα συμβεβηκός και ου καθ' αυτό. Inseparabilium autem aliae quidem sunt per se aliae vero per accidens; nam rationale per se inest homini, et mortale et disciplinae esse perceptibile, at vero aquilum esse vel simum secundum accidens et non per se. Again, of the inseparable, some exist per se, others by accident, for rational, mortal, to be susceptible of science, are inherent in man per se, but to have a crooked or flat nose, accidentally, and not per se.
αι μεν ουν καθ' αυτας προσουσαι εν τω της ουσίας λαμβανονται λόγω και ποιουσιν ἄλλο, α'ι δε κατα συμβεβηκός ουτε εν τω της ουσίας λόγω λαμβάνονται ουτε ποιουσιν ἄλλο άλλα άλλοιον. και α'ι μεν καθ' αυτας ουκ επιδέχονται τό μαλλον και τό ήττον, α'ι δε κατα συμβεβηκός, καν άχώριστοι ώσιν, επί τασιν λαμβανουσι και Ανεσιν: ουτε γαρ τό γένος μαλλον και ήττον κατηγορειται ου αν Ζ γένος ουτε α'ι του γένους διαφοραί, καθ' ας διαιρειται: αυται μεν γαρ εισιν αι τόν εκαστου λόγον συμπληρουσαι, τό δε είναι εκαστω εν και τό αυτό ουτε Ανεσιν ουτε επί τασιν επιδεχόμενόν εστιν, τό δε γρυπόν ? σιμόν ε\ναι ? κεχρωσθαί πως και ε πιτεί νεται και άνί εται. Illae igitur quae per se sunt, in substantiae ratione accipiuntur et faciunt aliud; illae vero quae secundum accidens, nec in substantiae ratione dicuntur nec faciunt aliud sed alteratum. Et illae quidem quae per se sunt non suscipiunt magis et minus, illae vero quae per accidens (uel si inseparabiles sint) intentionem recipiunt et remissionem; nam neque genus magis et minus praedicatur cuius fuerit genus, neque generis differentiae secundum quas dividitur; ipsae enim sunt quae uniuscuiusque rationem complent, esse autem unicuique unum et idem neque intentionem neque remissionem suscipiens est, aquilum autem esse vel simum vel coloratum aliquo modo et intenditur et remittitur. Wherefore, such as are present per se, are assumed in the definition of substance, and effect a different thing, but what are accidental arc neither taken in the definition of substance, nor render a thing another, but of another quality. Those too, which are per se, do not admit of the more and less, but the accidental, even if they be inseparable, admit of intention and remission, for neither is genus more and less predicated of that of which it is the genus, nor the differences of genus according to which it is divided. For these are such as complete the definition of each thing, but the essence of each is one and the same, and neither admits of intention, nor remission; to have however a crooked or a flat nose, or to be in some way coloured, admits both of intension and remission.
Τριων ουν ειδων της διαφορας θεωρουμένων και των μεν ουσων χωριστων των δε άχωρί στων και παλιν των άχωρί στων των μεν ουσων καθ' αυτας των δε κατα συμβεβηκός, παλιν των καθ' αυτας διαφορων αι μέν εισι καθ' ας διαιρουμεθα τα γένη εις τα είδη, αι δε καθ' ας τα διαιρεθέντα ειδοποιειται. οίον των καθ' αυτας διαφορων πασων των τοιουτων του ζωου ουσων εμψυχου και αισθητικου, λογικου και άλόγου, θνητου και άθανατου, ή μεν του εμψυχου και αισθητικου διαφορα συστατική εστι της του ζωου ουσίας, ἔστι γαρ τό ζωον ουσία ἔμψυχος αισθητική, ή δε του θνητου και άθανατου διαφορα και ή του λογικου τε και άλόγου διαιρετικαί εισι του ζωου διαφοραί: δι' αυτων γαρ τα γένη εις τα είδη διαιρουμεθα. Cum igitur tres species differentiae considerentur, et cum hae quidem sint separabiles illae vero inseparabiles, et rursus inseparabilium cum hae quidem sint per se illae vero per accidens, rursus earum quae sunt per se differentiarum aliae quidem sunt secundum quas dividimus genera in species, aliae vero secundum quas haec quae divisa sunt specificantur; ut, cum per se differentiae omnes huiusmodi sint animalis, animati et sensibilis, rationalis et irrationalis, mortalis et immortalis, ea quidem quae est animati et sensibilis differentia, constitutiua est substantiae animalis (est enim animal substantia animata sensibilis), ea vero quae est mortalis et immortalis differentia et rationalis et irrationalis, divisiuae sunt animalis differentiae (per eas enim genera in species dividimus). Since then, there are three species of difference considered, some indeed separable, but others inseparable, again, of the inseparable, some are per se, but others accidental, moreover of differences per se, some are those according to which we divide genera into species, but others according to which the things divided become specific:--thus of all such differences per se of animal as these, animated and sensitive, rational and irrational, mortal and. immortal, the difference of animated and sensitive is constitutive of the essence of animal, for animal is an animated substance, endued with sense, but the difference of mortal and immortal, and that of rational and irrational, are the divisive differences of animal, for through these we divide genera into species.
άλλ' αυταί γε αι διαιρετικαι διαφοραι των γενων συμπληρωτικαι γί νονται και συστατικαι των ειδων: Sed hae quidem quae divisivae sunt differentiae generum, completivae fiunt et constitutiuae specierum. Yet these very differences which divide the genera are constitutive and completive of species.
τέμνεται γαρ τό ζωον τρ τε του λογικου και τρ του άλόγου διαφορα και παλιν τρ τε του θνητου και του άθανατου διαφορα. άλλ' α'ι μεν του θνητου και του λογικου διαφοραι συστατικαι γί νονται του άνθρώπου, αι δε του λογικου και του άθανατου του θεου, αι δε του άλόγου και του θνητου των άλόγων ζωων. ουτω δε και της άνωτατω ουσίας διαιρετικων ουσων της τε εμψυχου και άψυχου διαφορας και της αισθητικης και άναισθήτου ή μεν ἔμψυχος και αισθητικη συλληφθεισαι τρ ουσία άπετέλεσαν τό ζωον, ή δε ἔμψυχος και άναί σθητος άπετέλεσαν τό φυτόν. Dividitur enim animal rationali et irrationali differentia, et rursus mortali et immortali differentia; sed ea quae est rationalis differentia et mortalis, constitutiuae fiunt hominis, rationalis vero et immortalis dei, illae vero quae sunt irrationalis et mortalis, irrationabilium animalium. Sic etiam et supremae substantiae cum divisiva sit animati et inanimati differentia, et sensibilis et insensibilis, animata et sensibilis congregatae ad substantiam animal perfecerunt. For animal is divided by the difference of rational and irrational, and again, by the difference of mortal and immortal; but the differences of rational and mortal are constitutive of man, but those of rational and immortal of God, those again, of mortal and irrational, of irrational animals.[17] Thus also, since the differences of animate and inanimate, sensitive and void of sense, divide the highest substance, animate and sensitive added to substance, complete animal, but animate and deprived of sense, form plant.
επει ουν α'ι αυται πώς μεν ληφθεισαι γί νονται συστατικαί , πώς δε διαιρετικαί, ειδοποιοι πασαι κέκληνται. και τουτων γε μαλιστα χρεί α είς τε τας διαιρέσεις των γενων και εις τούς ορισμους, άλλ' ου των κατα συμβεβηκός άχωρί στων ουδ' ἔτι μαλλον των χωριστων. Quoniam ergo eaedem aliquo modo quidem acceptae fiunt constitutiuae, aliquo modo autem divisiuae, specificae omnes uocantur; et his maxime opus est ad divisiones generum et definitiones sed non his quae secundum accidens inseparabiles sunt nec magis his quae sunt separabiles. Since then, the same differences taken in one way become constitutive, but in another divisive, they are all called specific. These indeed are especially useful for divisions of genera, and for definitions, yet not with regard to those which are inseparable accidentally, nor still more with such as are separable.[18]
Ας δη και οριζόμενοί φασιν: διαφορα εστιν περισσευει τό είδος του γένους. ο γαρ ἄνθρωπος του ζωου πλέον ἔχει τό λογικόν και τό θνητόν: τό γαρ ζωον ουτε ουδεν τουτων εστί ν, επει πόθεν αν τα είδη σχοιεν διαφορας; ουτε δε πασας τας άντικειμένας ἔχει, επει τό αυτό αμα εξει τα άντικεί μενα, άλλ' ώς άξιουσι, δυναμει μεν πασας ἔχει τας των υφ' αυτό διαφορας, ενεργεί α δε ουδεμί αν. και ουτως ουτε εξ ουκ οντων τι γί νεται ουτε τα άντικεί μενα αμα περι τό αυτό ἔσται.

Quas etiam determinantes dicunt: Differentia est qua abundat species a genere homo enim ab animali plus habet rationale et mortale. Animal enim neque ipsum nihil horum est (nam unde habebunt species differentias?); neque autem omnes oppositas habent (nam in eodem simul habebunt opposita); sed, quemadmodum probant, potestate quidem omnes habent sub se differentias, actu vero nullam, ac sic neque ex his quae non sunt aliquid fit, neque opposita circa idem sunt. And indeed defining these, they say that difference is that by which species exceeds genus, e. g. man exceeds animal in being rational and mortal, for animal is neither any one of these, (since whence would species have differences?) nor has it all the opposite differences, (since otherwise the same thing would at the same time have opposites,) but (as they allege) it contains all the differences which are under it in capacity, but not one of them in energy, and so neither is any thing produced from non-entities, nor will opposites at the same time subsist about the same thing.
Όρί ζονται δε αυτην και ουτως: διαφορα εστι τό κατα πλειόνων και διαφερόντων τω είδει εν τω ποιόν τί εστι κατηγορουμενον: τό γαρ λογικόν και τό θνητόν του άνθρώπου κατηγορουμενον εν τω ποιόν τί εστιν ο ἄνθρωπος λέγεται άλλ' ουκ εν τω τί εστιν. τί μεν γαρ εστιν ο ἄνθρωπος ερωτωμένων ήμων οικειον ειπειν ζωον, ποιον δε ζωον πυνθανομένων λογικόν και θνητόν οικεί ως άποδώσομεν. Definiunt autem eam et hoc modo: Differentia est quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quale sit praedicatur rationale enim et mortale, de homine praedicatum in eo quod quale quiddam est homo dicitur sed non in eo quod quid est; "Quid est" enim "homo?" interrogatis nobis conveniens est dicere "Animal"; quale autem animal inquisiti, quoniam rationale et mortale est convenienter assignabimus. Again, they define it (difference) also thus: difference is that which is predicated of many things differing in species in answer to the question, of what kind a thing is,[19] for rational and mortal being predicated of man, are spoken in reply to what kind of thing man is, and not as to the question what is he. For when we are asked what is man, we properly answer, an animal, but when men inquire what kind of animal, we say properly, that he is rational and mortal.
των γαρ πραγματων εξ ϊυλης και είδους συνεστώτων? άναλογόν γε υλη και είδει την συστασιν εχόντων, ωσπερ ο άνδριας εξ υλης μεν του χαλκου, είδους δε του σχήματος, ουτως και ο ἄνθρωπος ο κοινός τε και ειδικός εξ υλης μεν άναλόγου συνέστηκεν του γένους, εκ μορφης δε της διαφορας, τό δε ολον τουτο, ζωον λογικόν θνητόν, ο ἄνθρωπος, ώς εκει ο άνδριας. Rebus enim ex materia et forma constantibus vel ad similitudinem materiae specieique constitutionem habentibus (quemadmodum statua ex materia est aeris, forma autem figura), sic et homo communis et specialis ex materia quidem similiter consistit genere, ex forma autem differentia, totum autem hoc animal rationale mortale homo est quemadmodum illic statua. For since things consist of matter and form, or have a constitution analogous to matter and form, as a statue is composed of brass, matter, but of figure, form, so also man, both common and specific, consists of matter analogous to genus, and of form analogous to difference, but the whole of this, animal, rational, mortal, is man, in the same manner as the statue there.
Ύπογραφουσι δε τας τοιαυτας διαφορας και οϊυτως: διαφορα εστιν τό χωρί ζειν πεφυκός τα υπό τό αυτό γένος: τό λογικόν γαρ και τό ἄλογον τόν ἄνθρωπον και τόν ΐππον οντα υπό τό αυτό γένος τό ζωον χωρίζει. Describunt autem huiusmodi differentiam et hoc modo: Differentia est quod aptum natum est dividere quae sub eodem sunt genere rationale enim et irrationale hominem et equum, quae sub eodem sunt genere quod est animal, dividunt. They also describe it thus, difference is what is naturally adapted to separate things which are under the same genus, as rational and irrational separate man and horse, which are under the same genus, animal.

άποδιδόασι δε και οϊυτως: διαφορα εστιν οτω διαφέρει εκαστα. ἄνθρωπος γαρ και ίππος κατα μεν τό γένος ου διενήνοχεν: θνητα γαρ ζωα και ήμεις και τα ἄλογα, άλλα τό λογικόν προστεθεν διέστησεν ήμας άπ' εκεί νων: και λογικα εσμεν και ήμεις και οι θεοί , άλλα τό θνητόν προστεθεν διέστησεν ήμας άπ' εκεί νων. Assignant autem etiam hoc modo: Differentia est qua differunt a se singula nam secundum genus non differunt; sumus enim mortalia animalia et nos et irrationabilia sed additum rationabile separavit nos ab illis; rationabiles sumus et nos et dii sed mortale appositum disiunxit nos ab illis. Again, they give it in this way: difference is that by which each singular thing differs, for man and horse do not differ as to genus, for both we and horses are animals, but the addition of rational separates us from them; again, both we and the gods [20] are rational, but the addition of mortal separates us from them.
προσεξεργαζόμενοι δε τα περι της διαφορας μη τό τυχόν φασι των χωριζόντων τα υπό τό αυτό γένος είναι την διαφοραν, άλλ' οπερ εις τό είναι συμβαλλεται και ο του τί ήν είναι του πραγματός εστι μέρος. ου γαρ τό πεφυκέναι πλειν διαφορα άνθρώπου, ει και ίδιον άνθρώπου: είποιμεν γαρ αν των ζωων τα μεν πλειν πεφυκέναι τα δε μή χωρί ζοντες άπό των ἄλλων, άλλα τό πεφυκέναι πλειν ουκ ήν συμπληρωτικόν της ουσίας ουδε μέρος αυτης, άλλ' επιτηδειότης μόνον αυτης δια τό μη είναι οίαι αι ιδί ως ειδοποιοι λεγόμεναι δια-φοραί . είεν αν ουν ειδοποιοι διαφοραί , οσαι ετερον είδος ποιουσιν, και οσαι εν τω τί ήν είναι παραλαμβανονται. Interius autem perscrutantes et speculantes differentiam, dicunt non quodlibet eorum quae sub eodem sunt genere dividentium esse differentiam sed quod ad esse conducit et quod eius quod est esse rei pars est; neque enim quod aptum natum est nauigare erit hominis differentia, etsi proprium sit hominis. Dicimus enim: animalium haec quidem apta nata sunt ad nauigandum, illa vero minime dividentes ab aliis, sed aptum natum esse ad nauigandum non erat completiuum substantiae nec eius pars sed aptitudo quaedam eius est (idcirco quoniam non est talis quales sunt quae specificae dicuntur differentiae). Erunt igitur specificae differentiae quaecumque alteram faciunt speciem et quaecumque in eo quod quale est accipiuntur. They however who more nicely discuss what pertains to difference, say that it is not any casual thing dividing those under the same genus, but such as contributes to the essence, and to the definition of the essence of a thing, and which is part of the thing. For to be naturally adapted to sail is not the difference, though it is the property of man, since we may say that of animals, some are naturally adapted to sail, but others not, separating man from other animals; yet a natural ability to sail does not complete the essence, neither is a part of it, but only an aptitude of it, because it is not such a difference as those which are called specific differences. Wherefore specific differences will be such as produce another species, and which are assumed in explaining the very nature of a thing:
Και περι μεν διαφορας άρκει τοσαυτα. Et de differentiis quidem ista sufficiunt. And concerning difference this is sufficient.
Περι \δί ου. [04] DE PROPRIO Of property
Τό δε ίδιον διαιρουσι τετραχως: και γαρ ο μόνω τινι είδει συμβέβηκεν, ει και μη παντί, ώς άνθρώπω τό Ίατρευειν ? τό γεωμετρειν: και ο παντι συμβέβηκεν τω είδει, ει και μη μόνω, ώς τω άνθρώπω τό είναι δίποδι: και ο μόνω και παντι και ποτέ, ώς άνθρώπω παντι τό εν γήρα πολιουσθαι. τέταρτον δέ, εφ' ου συνδεδραμηκεν τό μόνω και παντι και άεί , ώς τω άνθρώπω τό γελαστικόν: καν γαρ μη γελα άεί , άλλα γελαστικόν λέγεται ου τω άει γελαν άλλα τω πεφυκέναι: τουτο δε άει αυτω συμφυτον υπαρ χει, ώς και τω ΐππω τό χρεμετιστικόν. ταυτα δε και κυρί ως ίδια φασιν, οτι και άντιστρέφει: ει γαρ ίππος, χρεμετιστικόν, και ει χρεμετιστικόν, ίππος. Proprium vero quadrifariam dividunt. Nam et id quod soli alicui speciei accidit, etsi non omni (ut homini medicum esse vel geometrem), et quod omni accidit, etsi non soli (quemadmodum homini esse bipedem), et quod soli et omni et aliquando (ut homini in senectute canescere), quartum vero in quo concurrit et soli et omni et semper (quemadmodum homini esse risibile; nam, etsi non ridet, tamen risibile dicitur, non quod iam rideat sed quod aptus natus sit; hoc autem ei semper est naturale; et equo hinnibile). Haec autem proprie propria perhibent, quoniam etiam convertuntur; quicquid enim equus, et hinnibile, et quicquid hinnibile, equus. Property they divide in four ways: for it is that which happens to some one species alone, though not to every (individual of that species), as to a man to heal, or to geometrize: that also which happens to a whole species, though not to that alone, as to man to be a biped: that again, which happens to a species alone, and to every (individual of it), and at a certain time, as to every man to become grey in old age: in the fourth place, it is that in which it concurs (to happen) to one species alone, and to every (individual of it), and always, as risibility to a man; for though he does not always laugh, yet he is said to be risible, not from his always laughing, but from being naturally adapted to laugh, and this is always inherent in him, in the same way as neighing in a horse. They say also that these are validly properties, because they reciprocate, since if any thing be a horse it is capable of neighing, and if any thing be capable of neighing it is a horse.
Περι συμβεβηκότος. [05] DE ACCIDENTI Of accident
Συμβεβηκός δέ εστιν ο γί νεται και άπογί νεται χωρις της του υποκει-μένου φθορας. διαιρειται δε εις δυο: τό μεν γαρ αυτου χωριστόν εστιν, τό δε άχώριστον. τό μεν ουν καθευδειν χωριστόν συμβεβηκός, τό δε μέλαν είναι άχωρί στως τω κόρακι και τω Αιθί οπι συμβέβηκεν, δυναται δε ε πινοηθηναι και κόραξ λευκός και Αιθί οψ άποβαλών την χροιαν χωρις φθορας του υποκειμένου. Accidens vero est quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem. Dividitur autem in duo, in separabile et in inseparabile; namque dormire est separabile accidens, nigrum vero esse inseparabiliter coruo et Aethiopi accidit (potest autem subintellegi et corvus albus et Aethiops amittens colorem praeter subiecti corruptionem). Accident is that which is present and absent without the destruction of its subject. It receives a two-fold division, for one kind of it is separable, but the other inseparable, e. g. to sleep is a separable accident, but to be black happens inseparably to a crow and an Ethiopian; we may possibly indeed conceive a white crow, and an Ethiopian casting his colour, without destruction of the subject.
ορί ζονται δε και ουτως: συμβεβηκός εστιν ο ενδέχεται τω αυτω υπαρχειν ? μη υπαρχειν, ? ο ουτε γένος εστιν ουτε διαφορα ουτε είδος ουτε ίδιον, άει δέ εστιν εν υποκειμένω υφισταμενον. Άφορισθέντων δε παντων των προτεθέντων, λέγω δη γένους, είδους, διαφορας, \δί ου, συμβεβηκότος, ρητέον τί να τε κοινα πρόσεστιν αυτοις και τί να ίδια. Definitur autem sic quoque: Accidens est quod contingit eidem esse et non esse uel: Quod neque genus neque differentia neque species neque proprium, semper autem est in subiecto subsistens. They also define it thus; accident is that which may be present and not present to the same thing; also that which is neither genus, nor difference, nor species, nor property, yet is always inherent in a subject.
Περι τη^ κοινωνί ας των πέντε φωνων. [06] DE COMMUNITATIBUS ET PROPRIETATIBUS Of things common and peculiar to the five predicates
Omnibus igitur determinatis quae proposita sunt, dico autem genere, specie, differentia, proprio, accidenti, dicendum est quae eis communia adsunt et quae propria. Having discussed all that were proposed, I mean, genus, species, difference, property, accident, we must declare what things are common, and what peculiar to them.

Κοινόν μεν δη παντων τό κατα πλειόνων κατηγορεισθαι. άλλα τό μεν γένος των ειδων τε και των άτόμων, και ή διαφορα ώσαυτως, τό δε είδος των υπ' αυτό άτόμων, τό δε ίδιον του τε είδους, ου ε στιν ίδιον, και των υπό τό είδος άτόμων, τό δε συμβεβηκός και ειδων και άτόμων. Commune quidem omnibus est de pluribus praedicari; sed genus quidem de speciebus et de individuis, et differentia similiter, species autem de his quae sub ipsa sunt individuis, at vero proprium et de specie et cuius est proprium et de his quae sub specie sunt individuis, accidens autem et de speciebus et de individuis. Now it is common to them all to be predicated, as we have said, of many things, but genus (is predicated) of the species and individuals under it, and difference in like manner; but species, of the individuals under it; and property, both of the species, of which it is the property, and of the individuals under that species; again, accident (is predicated) both of species, and individuals.
τό τε γαρ ζωον ίππων τε και βοων κατηγορειται ειδων οντων και τουδε του ίππου και τουδε του βοός άτόμων οντων, τό δε ἄλογον ίππων και βοων κατηγορειται και των κατα μέρος, τό μέντοι είδος οίον ο ἄνθρωπος των κατα μέρος μόνον, τό δε ίδιον οίον τό γελαστικόν και του άνθρώπου και των κατα μέρος, τό δε μέλαν του τε είδους των κορακων και των κατα μέρος συμβεβηκός ον άχώριστον, και τό κινεισθαι άνθρώπου τε και ίππου χωριστόν ον συμβεβηκός, άλλα προηγουμένως μεν των άτόμων, κατα δευτερον δε λόγον και των περιεχόντων τα ἄτομα. Namque animal de equis et bubus et canibus praedicatur quae sunt species, et de hoc equo et de hoc boue quae sunt individua; irrationale vero et de equis et de bubus praedicatur et de his qui sunt particulares; species autem, ut homo, solum de his qui sunt particulares praedicatur; proprium autem, quod est risibile, de homine et de his qui sunt particulares; nigrum autem et de specie coruorum et de his qui sunt particulares, quod est accidens inseparabile; et moueri de homine et de equo, quod est accidens separabile sed principaliter quidem de individuis, secundum posteriorem vero rationem de his quae continent individua. For animal is predicated of horse and ox, being species, also of this particular horse and ox, which are individuals, but irrational is predicated of horse and ox, and of particulars. Species however, as man, is predicated of particulars alone, but property both of the species, of which it is the property, and of the individuals under that species; as risibility both of man, and of particular men, but blackness of the species of crows, and of particulars, being an inseparable accident; and to be moved, of man and horse, being a separable accident. Notwithstanding, it is pre-eminently (predicated) of individuals, but secondarily of those things which comprehend individuals.
Περι της κοινωνί ας γένους και διαφορας [07] De communibus generis et differentiae Chap. VII. Of the Community and Distinction of Genus and Difference.
Κοινόν δε γένους και διαφορας τό περιεκτικόν ειδων: περιέχει γαρ και ή διαφορα είδη, ει και μη παντα οσα τα γένη. τό γαρ λογικόν ει και μη περιέχει τα Αλογα ωσπερ τό ζωον, άλλα περιέχει ἄνθρωπον και θεόν, απερ εστιν είδη. Commune est autem generi et differentiae continentia specierum; continet enim et differentia species, etsi non omnes quot genera; rationale enim, etiam si non continet ea quae sunt irrationabilia ut genus quemadmodum animal sed continet hominem et deum quae sunt species. It is common to genus and difference to be comprehensive of species, for difference also comprehends species, though not all such as the genera; for rational, though, it does not comprehend irrational, as animal does, yet it comprehends man and divinity, which are species.

οσα τε κατηγορειται του γένους ώς γένους, και των υπ' αυτό ειδων κατηγορειται, οσα τε της διαφορας ώς διαφορας, και του εξ αυτης είδους κατηγορηθήσεται. γένους τε γαρ του ζωου οντος ώς γένους κατηγορειται ή ουσία και τό ἔμψυχον, άλλα και των υπό τό ζωον ειδων παντων κατηγορειται ταυτα ἄχρι και των άτόμων: διαφορας τε ουσης της του λογικου κατηγορειται ώς διαφορας τό λόγω χρησθαι, ου μόνον δε του λογικου άλλα και των υπό τό λογικόν ειδων κατηγορηθήσεται τό χρησθαι λόγω. Et quaecumque praedicantur de genere ut genus, et de his quae sub ipso sunt speciebus praedicantur; quaeque de differentia praedicantur ut differentiae, et de ea quae ex ipsa est specie praedicabuntur. Nam, cum sit genus animal, non solum de eo praedicantur ut genus substantia et animatum sed etiam de his quae sunt sub animali speciebus omnibus praedicantur haec usque ad individua; cumque sit differentia rationalis, praedicatur de ea ut differentia id quod est ratione uti, non solum de eo quod est rationale sed etiam de his quae sunt sub rationali speciebus praedicabitur ratione uti. Whatever things also are predicated of genus as genus, are predicated of the species under it, and whatever are predicated of difference as difference, will be also of the species formed from it. For animal being a genus, substance is predicated of it as of a genus, also animated, and sensible, but these are predicated of all the species under animal, as far as to individuals. As moreover, rational is difference, the use of reason is predicated of it, as of difference, yet the use of reason will not be predicated of rational only, but also of the species under rational.
κοινόν δε και τό άναιρεθέντος ? του γένους ? της διαφορας άναιρεισθαι τα υπ' αυτα: ώς γαρ μη οντος ζωου ουκ ἔστιν ίππος ουδε ἄνθρωπος, ουτως μη οντος λογικου ουδεν ἔσται ζωον τό χρώμενον λόγω. Commune autem est et perempto genere vel differentia simul perimi quae sub ipsis sunt; quemadmodum, si non sit animal, non est equus neque homo, sic, si non sit rationale, nullum erit animal quod utatur ratione. This too is common, that when genus or difference is subverted, the things under them are also subverted, for as when animal is not, horse is not, nor man, thus also, when rational is not, there will be no animal which uses reason.
Περι της διαφορας του γένους και της διαφορας De propriis generis et differentiae
Ίδιον δε του γένους τό επι πλειόνων κατηγορεισθαι, ηπερ ή διαφορα και τό είδος και τό ίδιον και τό συμβεβηκός: τό μεν γαρ ζωον επ' άνθρώπου και ίππου και Όρνέου και οφεως, τό δε τετραπουν ε πι μόνων των τέσσαρας πόδας εχόντων, ο δε ἄνθρωπος επι μόνων των άτόμων, και τό χρεμετιστικόν επι του ίππου μόνον και των κατα μέρος, και τό συμβεβηκός ομοί ως επ' ε λαττόνων. δει δε διαφορας λαμβανειν, αίς τέμνεται τό γένος, ου τας συμπληρωτικας της ουσίας του γένους. Proprium autem generis est de pluribus praedicari quam differentia et species et proprium et accidens; animal enim de homine et equo et aue et serpente, quadrupes vero de solis quattuor pedes habentibus, homo vero videtur de solis individuis, et hinnibile de equo et de his qui sunt particulares; et accidens similiter de paucioribus. Oportet autem differentias accipere quibus dividitur genus, non eas quae complent substantiam generis. Now, it is the property of genus to be predicated of more things than difference, species, property, and accident are, for animal (is predicated) of man and horse, bird and snake, but quadruped of animals alone, which have four feet; again, man of individuals alone, and capacity of neighing of horse alone, and of particulars. Likewise, accident of fewer things: yet we must assume the differences by which the genus is divided, not those which complete, but which divide the essence of genus.
ἔτι τό γένος περιέχει την διαφοραν δυναμει: του γαρ ζωου τό μεν λογικόν τό δε ἄλογον. Amplius genus continet differentiam potestate; animalis enim hoc quidem rationale est, illud vero irrationale. Moreover, genus comprehends difference in capacity, for of animal one kind is rational, but another irrational, but differences do not comprehend genera.
ἔτι τα μεν γένη πρότερα των υπ' αυτα διαφορων, διό συναναιρει μεν αυτας, ου συναναιρειται δέ: άναιρεθέντος γαρ του ζωου συναναιρειται τό λογικόν και τό ἄλογον. α'ι δε διαφοραι ουκέτι συναναιρουσι τό γένος: καν γαρ πασαι άναιρεθωσιν, ουσία ἔμψυχος αισθητικη ε πινοειται, ητις ήν τό ζωον. Amplius genera quidem priora sunt his quae sunt sub se positis differentiis propter quod simul quidem eas aufert, non autem simul aufertur (sublato enim animali aufertur rationale et irrationale), differentiae vero non auferunt genus (nam, si omnes interimantur, tamen substantia animata sensibilis subintellegi potest quae est animal). Besides, genera are prior to the differences under them, wherefore they subvert them, but are not co-subverted with them. For animal being subverted, rational and irrational are co-subverted, but differences no longer co-subvert genus, for even if all of them should be subverted, yet we may form a conception of animated, sensible substance, which is animal.

ἔτι τό μεν γένος εν τω τί εστιν, ή δε διαφορα εν τω ποιόν τί εστιν, ώς είρηται, κατηγορειται. ἔτι γένος μεν εν καθ' εκαστον είδος οίον άνθρώπου τό ζωον, διαφοραι δε πλεί ους οίον λογικόν, θνητόν, νου και επιστήμης δεκτικόν, αίς των ἄλλων ζωων διαφέρει. και τό μεν γένος ἔοικεν υλη, μορφρ δε ή διαφορα. Amplius genus quidem in eo quod quid est, differentia vero in eo quod quale quiddam est, quemadmodum dictum est, praedicatur. Amplius genus quidem unum est secundum unamquamque speciem (ut hominis id quod est animal), differentiae vero plurimae (ut rationale, mortale, mentis et disciplinae perceptibile) quibus ab aliis differt. Et genus quidem consimile est materiae, formae vero differentia. Yet more, genus is predicated in reference to what a thing is, but difference in reference to what kind of a thing it is, as was observed before; besides there is one genus according to every species; e. g. of man, animal (is the genus), but there are many differences, as rational, mortal, capable of intellect and science, by which he differs from other animals. Genus also is similar to matter, but difference to form.
προσόντων δε και ἄλλων κοινων τε και \δί ων τω γένει και τρ διαφορα άρκεί τω ταυτα. Cum autem sint et alia communia et propria generis et differentiae, nunc ista sufficiant. However since there are other things common and peculiar to genus and difference, these will suffice.
Περι της κοινωνί ας του γένους και του είδους [08] De communibus generis et speciei Chap. VIII. --Of Community and Difference of Genus and Species.
Γένος δε και είδος κοινόν μεν ἔχουσι τό κατα πλειόνων, ώς είρηται, κατηγορεισθαι: ειλήφθω δε τό είδος ώς είδος, άλλ' ουχι και ώς γένος, Ανπερ Ζ τό αυτό και είδος και γένος. Genus autem et species commune quidem habent de pluribus (quemadmodum dictum est) praedicari; sumatur autem species ut species et non etiam ut genus, si fuerit idem species et genus. Genus and species possess in common, (as we have said,) the being predicated of many things, but species must be taken as species only, and not as genus, if the same thing be both species and genus.
κοινόν δε αυτοις και τό προτέροις είναι ων κατηγορειται και τό ολον τι είναι εκατερον. Commune autem his est et priora esse eorum de quibus praedicantur et totum quiddam esse utrumque. Moreover, it is common to them both to be prior to what they are predicated of, and to be each a certain whole.
Περι της διαφορας του γένους και του είδους De propriis generis et speciei
Διαφέρει δε τό μεν γένος περιέχει τα είδη, τα δε είδη περιέχεται και ου περιέχει τα γένη: επι πλειον γαρ τό γένος του είδους. ἔτι τα γένη προυποκεισθαι δει και διαμορφωθέντα ταις ειδοποιοις διαφοραις άποτελειν τα είδη, οθεν και πρότερα τρ φυσει τα γένη. και συναναιρουντα, άλλ' ου συναναιρουμενα, και είδους μεν οντος παντως ἔστι και γένος, γένους δε οντος ου παντως ἔστι και τό είδος. Differt autem eo quod genus quidem continet species sub se, species vero continentur et non continent genera; in pluribus enim genus quam species est (genera enim praeiacere oportet et formata specificis differentiis perficere species, unde et priora sunt naturaliter genera et simul interimentia sed quae non simul interimantur). Et species quidem cum sit, est et genus, genus vero cum sit non omnino erit et species. But they differ, because genus indeed comprehends species, but species are comprehended by, and do not comprehend genera, for genus is predicated of more than species. Besides, it is necessary that genera should be presupposed, and when formed by specific differences, that they should consummate species, whence also genera are by nature prior. They also co-subvert, but are not co-subverted, for species existing, genus also entirely exists, but genus existing there is not altogether species.
και τα μεν γένη συνωνυμως κατη-γορειται των υφ' εαυτα ειδων, τα δε είδη των γενων ουκέτι. Et genera quidem univoce de speciebus praedicantur, species vero de generibus minime. Genera too, are indeed univocally predicated of species under them, but not species of genera.
ἔτι τα μεν γένη πλεοναζει τρ των υπ' αυτα ειδων περιοχρ, τα δε είδη των γενων πλεοναζει ταις οικεί αις διαφοραις. Amplius quidem genera abundant earum quae sub ipsis sunt specierum continentia, species vero generibus abundant propriis differentiis. Moreover, genera exceed, from comprehending the species which are under them, but species exceed genera by their proper differences.
ἔτι ουτε τό είδος γένοιτ' αν γενικώτατον ουτε τό γένος ειδικώτατον. Amplius neque species fiet umquam generalissimum neque genus specialissimum. Besides, neither can species become most generic, nor genus most specific.
Περι τη^ κοινωνί ας του γένους και του Ίδί ου [09] De communibus generis et proprii Chap. IX. --Of Community and Difference of Genus and Property.
Γένους δε και \δί ου κοινόν μεν τό επεσθαι τοις είδεσιν: ει γαρ ἄνθρωπος, ζωον, και ει ἄνθρωπος, γελαστικόν. και τό επί σης κατηγορει-σθαι τό γένος των ειδων και τό ίδιον των αυτου μετεχόντων άτόμων: επί σης γαρ και ο ἄνθρωπος και ο βους ζωον καΓ Ανυτος και Μέλητος γελαστικόν. κοινόν δε και τό συνωνυμως κατηγορεισθαι τό γένος των οικεί ων ειδων και τό ίδιον ων αν Ζ ίδιον. Generis autem et proprii commune quidem est sequi species (nam, si homo est, animal est, et, si homo est, risibile est), et aequaliter praedicari genus de speciebus et proprium de his quae illo participant (aequaliter enim et homo et bos animal, et Cato et Cicero risibile). Commune autem et univoce praedicari genus de propriis speciebus et proprium quorum est proprium. Both to genus and to property it is common to follow species, for if any thing be man, it is animal, and if any thing be man, it is risible. Likewise to genus, to be equally predicated of species, and to property, (to be equally predicated) of the individuals which participate it; thus man and ox are equally animal, and Anytus and Melitus risible. [21] It is also common that genus should be univocally predicated of its proper species, and property of the things of which it is the property.
Περι τη^ διαφορας του γένους και του Ίδί ου De propriis generis et proprii
Διαφέρει δε οτι τό μεν γένος πρότερον, υστερον δε τό ίδιον: δει γαρ είναι ζωον, είτα διαιρεισθαι διαφοραις και ιδί οις. Differt autem quoniam genus quidem prius est, posterius vero proprium (oportet enim esse animal, dehinc dividi differentiis et propriis). Still they differ, because genus is prior, but property posterior, for animal must first necessarily exist, afterwards be divided by differences and properties.
και τό μεν γένος κατα πλειόνων ειδων κατηγορειται, τό δε ίδιον ενός είδους, ου εστιν ίδιον. Et genus quidem de pluribus speciebus praedicari, proprium vero de una sola specie cuius est proprium. Also genus indeed is predicated of many species, but property of one certain species of which it is the property.
και τό μεν ίδιον άντικατηγορειται ου εστιν ίδιον, τό δε γένος ουδενός άντικατηγορειται: ουτε γαρ ει ζωον, ἄνθρωπος, ουτε ει ζωον, γελαστικόν: ει δε ἄνθρωπος, γελαστικόν, και ἔμπαλιν. Et proprium quidem conversim praedicatur cuius est proprium, genus vero de nullo conversim praedicatur (nam neque si animal est, homo est, neque si animal est, risibile est; sin vero homo, et risibile est, et e converso). Besides property is reciprocally predicated of that of which it is the property, but genus is not reciprocally predicated of any thing, for neither if any thing is an animal, is it a man, nor if a thing be animal is it risible, but if any thing is a man it is risible, and vice versa.
ἔτι τό μεν ίδιον παντι τω είδει υπαρχει, ου εστιν ίδιον, και μόνω και άεί , τό δε γένος παντι μεν τω είδει, ου αν Ζ γένος, και άεί , ου μέντοι και μόνω. Amplius proprium omni speciei inest cuius est proprium et uni et semper, genus vero omni quidem speciei cuius fuerit genus et semper, non autem soli. Moreover, property is inherent in the whole species, of which it is the property, in it alone, and always, but genus in the whole species indeed of which it is the genus, and always, yet not in it alone;
ἔτι τα μεν ίδια άναιρουμενα ου συναναιρει τα γένη, τα δε γένη άναιρουμενα συναναιρει τα είδη, ων εστιν ίδια, ωστε και ων εστιν ίδια άναιρουμένων και αυτα συναναιρειται. Amplius species quidem interemptae non simul interimunt genera, propria vero interempta simul interimunt quorum sunt propria, et his quorum sunt propria interemptis et ipsa simul interimuntur. once more, properties being subverted do not co-subvert genera, but genera being subverted, co-subvert species, to which properties belong; wherefore, also those things of which there are properties, being subverted, the properties themselves also, are co-subverted.
Περι της κοινωνί ας του γένους και του συμβεβηκότος [10] De communibus generis et accidentis Chap. X. -- Of Community and Difference of Genus and Accident.
Γένους δέ και συμβεβηκότος κοινόν τό κατοο πλειόνων, ώς είρηται, κατηγορεισθαι, αν τε των χωριστών η αν τε των άχωρί στων: και γοίρ τό κινεισθαι κατοί πλειόνων και τό μέλαν κατοί κοράκων και Α'ιθιόπων καί τινων άψυχων. Generis vero et accidentis commune est de pluribus (quemadmodum dictum est) praedicari sive separabilium sit sive inseparabilium; et enim moueri de pluribus, et nigrum de coruis et hominibus et Aethiopibus et aliquibus inanimatis. It is common to genus and accident to be predicated, as we have said, of many things, whether they (the accidents) be separable or inseparable, for to be moved is predicated of many things, and blackness of crows, and of Ethiopians, and of certain inanimate things.
Περί της διαφοράς τοῦ γένους και τοῦ συμβεβηκότος. De propriis generis et accidentis
Διαφέρει δέ τό γένος τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, (τι τό μέν γένος πρό των ειδών, τοί δέ συμβεβηκότα των ειδών ύστερα: καν γαρ άχώριστον λαμβανηται συμβεβηκός, άλλ' οῦν πρότερόν εστι τό ω συμβέβηκε τοῦ συμβεβηκότος. Differt autem genus accidente quoniam genus ante species est, accidentia vero speciebus inferiora sunt; nam si etiam inseparabile sumatur accidens sed tamen prius est illud cui accidit quam accidens. Genus however differs from accident, in that genus is prior, but accident posterior to species, for though an inseparable accident be assumed, yet that of which it is the accident is prior to the accident.
και τοῦ μέν γένους επί σης τοο μετέχοντα μετέχει, τοῦ δέ συμβεβηκότος ουκ ε πί σης: επί τασιν γοορ και ανεσιν επιδέχεται ή των συμβεβηκότων μέθεξις, ή δέ των γενών ουκέτι. Et genere quidem quae participant aequaliter participant, accidente vero non aequaliter; intentionem enim et remissionem suscipit accidentium participatio, generum vero minime. Also the participants of genus participate it equally, but those of accident do not equally; for the participation of accidents accepts intension and remission, but not that of genera.
και τοο μέν συμβεβηκότα επι των άτόμων προηγουμένως ϊχρί σταται, το δέ γένη και το είδη φυσει πρότερα των άτόμων ουσιων. και το μέν γένη εν τω τί εστι κατηγορείται των υπ' αυτοί, το δέ συμβεβηκότα εν τω ποιόν τι ? πως ἔχον εκαστον: ποιος γοορ Α'ιθί οψ ερωτηθεις ερεις μέλας, και πως ἔχει Σωκράτης ερεις (τι καθηται ? περιπατει. Et accidentia quidem in individuis principaliter subsistunt, genera vero et species naturaliter priora sunt individuis substantiis. Et genera quidem in eo quod quid est praedicantur de his quae sub ipsis sunt, accidentia vero in eo quod quale aliquid est vel quomodo se habeat unumquodque; "Qualis est" enim "Aethiops?" interrogatus dicis "Niger", et quemadmodum se Socrates habeat, dicis quoniam sedet vel ambulat. Besides, accidents primarily subsist about individuals, but genera and species are by nature prior to individual substances. Moreover, genera are predicated of the things under them, in respect to what a thing is, but accidents in respect to what kind of a thing it is, or how each thing subsists; for being asked, what kind of man an Ethiopian is, you say that he is black; or how Socrates is, you reply that he is sick or well.
[11] Chap. XI. --Of Community and Difference of Species and Difference.
Τό μέν ουν γένος των ἄλλων τετταρων διαφέρει είρηται, συμβέβηκεν δέ και των ἄλλων εκαστον διαφέρειν των τετταρων, ωστε πέντε μέν όντων, ενός δέ έκαστου των τετταρων διαφέροντος, τετρακι τοο πέντε, είκοσι γί νεσθαι τοος πασας διαφορας. άλλ' ουχ ούτως ἔχει, άλλ' άει των εφεξης καταριθμουμένων και των μέν δυο μια λειπομένων διαφορά διοο τό ήδη ειληφθαι, των δέ τριων δυσί ν, των δέ τετταρων τρισί, των δέ πέντε τέτρασι, δέκα α'ι πασαι γί νονται διαφοραί, τέσσαρες, τρεις, δυο, μί α. Genus vero quo aliis quattuor differat dictum est. Contingit autem etiam unumquodque aliorum differre ab aliis quattuor, ut, cum quinque quidem sint, unum autem ab aliis quattuor differat, quater quinque (uiginti) fiant omnes differentiae; sed, semper posterioribus enumeratis et secundis quidem una differentia superatis (propterea quoniam iam sumpta est), tertiis vero, duabus, quartis vero tribus, quintis vero quattuor, decem omnes fiunt (quattuor, tres, duae, una).

We have shown then, wherein genus differs from the other four, but each of the other four happens also to differ from the rest, so that as there are five, and each one of the four differs from the rest, the five being four times (taken), all the differences would appear to be twenty. Nevertheless, such is not the case, but always those successive being enumerated, and two being deficient by one difference, from having been already assumed, and the three by two differences, the four by three, the five by four; all the differences are ten, namely, four, three, two, one.
τό μέν γοορ γένος διαφέρει της διαφορας και τοῦ είδους και τοῦ \δί ου και τοῦ συμβεβηκότος: τέσσαρες ουν α'ι διαφοραί. Genus enim differt differentia et specie et proprio et accidenti; quattuor igitur sunt omnes differentiae. For in what genus differs from difference, species, property, and accident, we have shown, wherefore, there are four differences.
ή διαφοροο δέ πη μέν διενήνοχεν τοῦ γένους είρηται, (τε πη διαφέρει τό γένος αυτης ε ρρέθη: λοιπόν δέ πη διαφέρει τοῦ είδους και τοῦ \δί ου και τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ρηθήσεται, και γί νονται τρεις. παλιν τό είδος πη μέν διαφέρει της διαφορας ερρέθη, (τε πη διαφέρει ή διαφοροο τοῦ είδους ελέγετο: πη δέ διαφέρει τό είδος τοῦ γένους ερρέθη, (τε πη διαφέρει τό γένος τοῦ είδους ελέγετο: λοιπόν ουν πη διαφέρει τοῦ \δί ου και τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ρηθήσεται: δυο οῦν και αῦται α'ι διαφοραί. Differentia vero quo differt genere dictum est quando quo differret genus ab ea dicebatur; relinquitur igitur quo differat specie et proprio et accidente dicere, et fiunt tres. Rursus species quo quidem differat a differentia dictum est quando quo differret specie differentia dicebatur, quo autem differt species genere dictum est quando quo differret genus specie dicebatur; reliquum est igitur ut quo differat proprio et accidente dicatur; duae igitur etiam istae sunt differentiae.

Also we explained in what respect difference differs from genus, when we declared in what genus differs from it. What remains then, viz. in what respect it differs from species, property, and accident, shall be told, and three (differences) arise. Again, we declared how species differs from difference, when we showed how difference differs from species; also we showed how species differs from genus, when we explained how genus differs from species; what remains then, viz. in what species differs from property and from accident, shall be told: these, then, are two differences.
τό δέ ίδιον πη διαφέρει τοῦ συμβεβηκότος καταλειφθήσεται: πη γοορ τοῦ είδους και της διαφορας και τοῦ γένους διαφέρει, προειρημένον εστιν εν τη εκεί νων πρός αυτό διαφορα: τεσσαρων ουν λαμβανομένων τοῦ γένους πρός το αλλα διαφορων, τριων δέ της διαφορας, δυο δέ τοῦ είδους, μιας δέ τοῦ \δί ου πρός τό συμβεβηκός, δέκα ἔσονται α'ι πασαι, ων τοος τέσσαρας, αϊ ήσαν τοῦ γένους πρός τοο αλλα, φθασαντες άπεδεί ξαμεν. Proprium autem quo differat accidente relinquitur, nam quo specie et differentia et genere differt praedictum est in illorum ad ipsum differentia. Quattuor igitur sumptis generis ad alia differentiis, tribus vero differentiae, duabus autem speciei, una autem proprii ad accidens, decem erunt omnes; quarum quattuor quae erant generis ad reliqua superius demonstravimus. But in what respect property differs from accident, shall be discovered, for how it differs from species, difference, and genus, was explained before in the difference of those from these. Wherefore, as four differences of genus with respect to the rest, are assumed, but three of difference, two of species, and one of property with regard to accident, there will be ten (differences altogether), of which, four we have already demonstrated, viz. those of genus, with respect to the rest.
Περι της κοινωνί ας της διαφορας και τοῦ Είδους [12] De communibus differentiae et speciei Chap. XII. --The same subject continued.
Κοινόν τοί νυν διαφορας και είδους τό επί σης μετέχεσθαι: άνθρώπου τε γοορ επί σης μετέχουσιν ο'ι κατο μέρος ἄνθρωποι και της τοῦ λογικοῦ διαφορας. κοινόν δέ και τό άει παρειναι τοις μετέχουσιν: άει γοορ Σωκρατης λογικός, και άει Σωκρατης ἄνθρωπος. Commune ergo differentiae et speciei est aequaliter participari; homine enim aequaliter participant particulares homines et rationali differentia. Commune vero est et semper adesse his quae participant; semper enim Socrates rationalis et semper Socrates homo. It is common then to difference and species to be equally participated, for particular men partake equally of man, and of the difference of rational. It is also common always to be present to their participants, for Socrates is always rational, and always man.
Περι της διαφορας τοῦ είδους και της διαφορας De propriis differentiae et speciei
Ίδιον δέ διαφορας μέν τό εν τω ποιόν τί εστι κατηγορεισθαι, είδους δέ τό εν τω τί εστιν: καν γοορ ' ἄνθρωπος ώς ποιόν λαμβανηται, ουχ άπλως αν είη ποιόν, άλλο καθό τω γένει προσελθοῦσαι α'ι διαφοραι υπέστησαν αυτό. Proprium autem differentiae quidem est in eo quod quale sit praedicari, speciei vero in eo quod quid est; nam, et si homo velut qualitas accipiatur, non simpliciter erit qualitas sed secundum id quod generi aduenientes differentiae eam constituerunt. But it is the property of difference indeed to be predicated in respect to what kind a thing is of, but of species in respect to what a thing is, for though man should be assumed as a certain kind of thing, yet he will not be simply so, but in as far as differences according to genus constitute him.
ἔτι ή μέν διαφορο επι πλειόνων πολλακις ειδων θεωρειται, ώς τό τετραπουν επι πλεί στων 6^ων τω είδει διαφερόντων, τό δέ είδος επι μόνων των υπό τό είδος άτόμων εστί ν. Amplius differentia quidem in pluribus saepe speciebus consideratur (quemadmodum quadrupes in pluribus animalibus specie differentibus), species vero in solis his quae sub specie sunt individuis est. Besides, difference is often seen in many species, as quadruped in many animals, different in species, but species is in the individuals alone, which are tinder the species.
ἔτι ή διαφοροο προτέρα τοῦ κατ' αυτήν είδους: συναναιρει γοορ τό λογικόν άναιρεθέν τόν ἄνθρωπον, ' δέ ἄνθρωπος άναιρεθεις ουκ άνήρηκεν τό λογικόν, οντος θεοῦ. Amplius differentia prima est ab ea specie quae est secundum ipsam; simul enim ablatum rationale interimit hominem, homo vero interemptus non aufert rationale, cum sit deus. Moreover, difference is prior to the species which subsists according to it, for rational being subverted, co-subverts man, but man being subverted, does not co-subvert rational, since there is still divinity.
ἔτι διαφορο μέν συντί θεται μετο ἄλλως διαφορας: τό λογικόν γοορ και τό θνητόν συνετέθη εις υπόστασιν άνθρώπου: είδος δέ είδει ου συντί θεται, ωστε άπογεννησαι αλλο τι είδος: τις μέν γοορ ίππος τινι ονω συνεισιν εις ήμιόνου γένεσιν, ίππος δέ άπλως ονω ουκ αν συντεθεις άποτελέσειεν ήμί ονον. Amplius differentia quidem componitur cum alia differentia (rationale enim et mortale compositum est in substantia hominis), species vero speciei non componitur ut gignat aliquam aliam speciem (quidam enim equus cuidam asino permiscetur ad muli generationem, equus autem simpliciter asino numquam conveniens perficiet mulum). Further, difference is joined with another difference, (for rational and mortal are joined for the subsistence of man,) but species is not joined with species, so as to produce some other species; for indeed a certain horse is joined with a certain ass, for the production of a mule, but horse simply joined with ass will not produce a mule.
Περι της κοινωνί ας της διαφορας και τοῦ Ίδί ου [13] De communibus differentiae et proprii Chap. XIII. -- Of Community and Difference of Property and Difference.[22]
Διαφορο δέ και ίδιον κοινόν μέν ἔχουσι τό επί σης μετέχεσθαι υπό των μετεχόντων: επί σης γοορ το λογικο λογικο και το γελαστικο γελαστικα. Differentia vero et proprium commune quidem habent aequaliter participari ab his quae eorum participant; aequaliter enim rationalia rationalia sunt et risibilia risibilia sunt. Difference also and property have it in common to be equally shared by their participants, for rational are equally rational, and risible (equally) risible (animals).
και τό άει και παντι παρειναι κοινόν άμφοιν: καν γοορ κολοβωθη ' δί πους, άλλο πρός τό πεφυκέναι τό άει λέγεται, επει και τό γελαστικόν τω πεφυκέναι ἔχει τό άεί , άλλ' ουχι τω γελαν άεί. Et semper et omni adesse commune utrisque est; sive enim curtetur qui est bipes, non substantiam perimit sed ad quod natum est semper dicitur; nam et risibile, eo quod natum est habet id quod est semper sed non eo quod semper rideat. Also it is common to both to be always present, and to every one, for though a biped should be mutilated, yet (the term biped) is always predicated with reference to what is naturally adapted, since also risible has the "always" from natural adaptation, but not from always laughing.
Περι τη^ διαφορας του \δί ου και της διαφορας De propriis differentiae et proprii
Ίδιον δε διαφορας οτι αυτη μεν επι πλειόνων ειδων λέγεται πολλακις, οίον τό λογικόν και επι θεου και επι άνθρώπου, τό δε ίδιον εφ' ενός είδους, ου εστιν ίδιον. Proprium autem differentiae est quoniam haec quidem de pluribus speciebus dicitur saepe (ut rationale de homine et deo), proprium vero in una sola specie cuius est proprium. Now, it is the property of difference, that it is frequently predicated of many species, as rational of divinity and man, but property (is predicated) of one species, of which it is the property.
και ή μεν διαφορα επεται εκεί νοις, ων ήν διαφορα, ου μην και άντιστρέφει: τα δε ίδια άντικατηγορειται ων αν Ζ ίδια δια τό άντιστρέφειν. Et differentia quidem illis est consequens quorum est differentia sed non convertitur, propria vero conversim praedicantur quorum sunt propria idcirco quoniam convertuntur. Difference moreover follows those things of which it is the difference, yet does not also reciprocate, but properties are reciprocally predicated of those of which they are the properties, in consequence of reciprocating.
Περι της κοινωνί ας της διαφορας και του συμβεβηκότος [14] De communibus differentiae et accidentis Chap. XIV. --Of Community and Difference of Accident and Difference.
Διαφορα δε και συμβεβηκότι κοινόν μεν τό επι πλειόνων λέγεσθαι, κοινόν δε πρός τα άχώριστα συμβεβηκότα τό άει και παντι προσειναι: τό τε γαρ δί πουν άει πρόσεστι πασι κόραξι τό τε μέλαν ομοί ως. Differentiae autem et accidenti commune quidem est de pluribus dici, commune vero ad ea quae sunt inseparabilia accidentia semper et omnibus adesse; bipes enim semper adest omnibus coruis, et nigrum esse similiter. To difference and accident it is common to be predicated of many things, but it is common (to the former) with inseparable accidents to be present always and with every one, for biped is always present to man, and likewise blackness to all crows.
Περι των \δί ων διαφορας και συμβεβηκότος De propriis differentiae et accidentis
Διαφέρουσι δε οτι ή μεν διαφορα περιέχει, ου περιέχεται δέ: περιέχει γαρ τό λογικόν τόν ἄνθρωπον: τα δε συμβεβηκότα τρόπον μέν τινα περιέχει τω εν πλεί οσιν είναι, τρόπον δέ τινα περιέχεται τω μη ενός συμβεβηκότος είναι δεκτικα τα υποκεί μενα, άλλα πλειόνων. Differunt autem quoniam differentia quidem continet et non continetur (continet enim rationalitas hominem), accidentia vero quodam quidem modo continent eo quod in pluribus sint, quodam vero modo continentur eo quod non unius accidentis susceptibilia sunt subiecta sed plurimorum. Still they differ in that difference indeed comprehends but is not comprehended by species; for rational comprehends divinity and man, but accidents after a certain manner comprehend from their being in many things, yet in a certain manner are comprehended from the subjects not being the recipients of one accident, but of many.
και ή μεν διαφορα άνεπί τατος και άνανετος, τα δε συμβεβηκότα τό μαλλον και τό ήττον επιδέχεται. Et differentia quidem inintendibilis est et inremissibilis, accidentia vero magis et minus recipiunt. Besides, difference indeed docs not admit of intension and remission, but accidents accept the more and less.
και άμιγεις μεν α'ι εναντί αι διαφοραί, μιγεί η δ' αν τα εναντί α συμβεβηκότα. Et impermixtae quidem sunt contrariae differentiae, mista vero contraria accidentia. Moreover contrary differences cannot be mingled, but contrary accidents may sometimes be mingled.
Τοιαυται μεν ουν α'ι κοινότητες και αι ιδιότητες της διαφορας και των ἄλλων. Huiusmodi quidem communiones et proprietates differentiae et caeterorum sunt. So many then are the points common and peculiar to difference and the others.
[15] Chap. XV. --Of Community and Difference of Species and Property.
τό δε είδος πρ μεν διαφέρει γένους και διαφορας, είρηται εν ω ελέγομεν, πρ τό γένος διαφέρει των ἄλλων και πρ ή διαφορα διαφέρει των ἄλλων. Species vero quo quidem differat a genere et differentia dictum est in eo quod dicebamus quo genus differt caeteris et quo differentia differret caeteris. In what respect species differs from genus and difference, was explained in our enunciation of the way in which genus, and also difference, differ from the rest; it now remains that we should point out how it (species) differs from property and accident.

Περι τη^ κοινωνί ας του είδους και του \δί ου De communibus speciei et proprii
Είδους δε και \δί ου κοινόν τό άλλήλων άντικατηγορεισθαι: ει γαρ ἄνθρωπος, γελαστικόν, και ει γελαστικόν, ἄνθρωπος: τό γελαστικόν δε οτι κατα τό πεφυκέναι γελαν ληπτέον, πολλακις είρηται: επί σης τε γαρ εστι τα είδη τοις μετέχουσι και τα ίδια ων εστιν ίδια. Speciei autem et proprii commune est de se invicem praedicari; nam, si homo, risibile est, et si risibile, homo est (risibile vero quoniam secundum id quod natum est dicitur, saepe iam dictum est); aequaliter enim sunt species his quae eorum participant et propria quorum sunt propria. It is common then to species and property, to be reciprocally predicated of each other, since if any thing be man, it is risible, also if it be risible, it is man, still we have frequently declared that risible must be assumed according to natural adaptation to risibility. It is also common (to them) to be equally present, for species are equally present to their participants, and properties to the things of which they are properties.

Περι τη^ διαφορας του είδους και του \δί ου De propriis speciei et proprii
Διαφέρει δε τό είδος του ιδί ου, οτι τό μεν είδος δυναται ἄλλων γένος είναι, τό δε ίδιον είναι ἄλλων ίδιον άδυνατον. Differt autem species proprio quoniam species quidem potest et aliis genus esse, proprium vero et aliarum specierum esse impossibile est. But species differs from property, in that species indeed may be the genus of other things, but property cannot possibly be the property of other things.
και τό μεν είδος προυφέστηκεν του ιδί ου, τό δε ίδιον επιγί νεται τω είδει: δει γαρ ἄνθρωπον είναι, ίνα και γελαστικόν Ζ. Et species quidem ante subsistit quam proprium, proprium vero postea fit in specie; oportet enim hominem esse ut sit risibile. Again, species subsists prior to property, but property accedes to species, for man must exist, in order that risible may:
ἔτι τό μεν είδος άει ενεργεί α παρεστι τω υποκειμένω, τό δε ΐδιόν ποτε και δυναμει: ἄνθρωπος μεν γαρ άει ενεργεία ο Σωκρατης εστίν, γελα δε ουκ άεί, καί περ άει πεφυκώς είναι γελαστικός. Amplius species quidem semper actu adest subiecto, proprium vero aliquando potestate; homo enim semper actu est Socrates, non vero semper ridet quamuis sit natus semper risibilis. Besides, species is always present in energy with its subject, but property sometimes also in capacity, for Socrates is a man always in energy, but he does not always laugh, though he is always naturally adapted to be risible.

ἔτι ων ο'ι οροι διαφοροι, και αυτα διαφορα εστιν: ἔστιν δε είδους μεν τό υπό τό γένος είναι και τό κατα πλειόνων και διαφερόντων τω άριθμω εν τω τί εστιν κατηγορουμενον είναι και οσα τοιαυτα, ιδί ου δε τό μόνω και άει και παντι προσειναι. Amplius quorum termini differentes, et ipsa sunt differentia; est autem speciei quidem sub genere esse et de pluribus et differentibus numero in eo quod quid est praedicari et caetera huiusmodi, proprii vero quod est soli et semper et omni adesse. Once more, things of which the definitions are different, are themselves also different, but it is (the definition) of species to be under genus, and to be predicated of many things, also differing in number, in respect to what a thing is, and things of this kind, but of property it is to be present to a thing alone, and to every individual and always.
Περι της κοινωνί ας του είδους και του συμβεβηκότος [16] De communibus speciei et accidentis Chap. XVI. --Of Community and Difference of Species and Accident.
Είδους δε και συμβεβηκότος κοινόν μεν τό επι πολλων κατηγορεισθαι, σπανιοι δε αι ἄλλαι κοινότητες δια τό πλειστον άλλήλων διεσταναι τό τε συμβεβηκός και τό ω συμβέβηκεν. Speciei vero et accidentis commune quidem est de pluribus praedicari; rarae vero aliae sunt communitates propterea quoniam plurimum a se distant accidens et cui accidit. To species and accident it is common to be predicated of many, but other points of community are rare, from the circumstance of accident, and that to which it is accidental, differing very much from each other.
Περι τη^ διαφορας των αυτων
Ίδια δε εκατέρου, του μεν είδους τό εν τω τί εστι κατηγορεισθαι ων εστιν είδος, του δε συμβεβηκότος τό εν τω ποιον ? πως ἔχον. Propria vero utriusque sunt, speciei quidem in eo quod quid est praedicari de his quorum est species, accidentis autem in eo quod quale quiddam est vel aliquo modo se habens. Now, the properties of each are these: of species, to be predicated of those of which it is the species, in respect to what a thing is, but of accident, in reference to what kind a thing is of, or how it subsists.[23]
και τό εκαστην ουσίαν ενός μεν είδους μετέχειν, συμβεβηκότων δε πλειόνων, των τε χωριστων και των άχωρί στων. και τα μεν είδη προεπινοειται των συμβεβηκότων, καν άχώριστα Ζ [δει γαρ είναι τό υποκεί μενον, ίνα εκεί νω τι συμβρ]: τα δε συμβεβηκότα υστερογενη πέφυκεν και επεισοδιώδη την φυσιν ἔχει. Et unamquamque substantiam una quidem specie participare, pluribus autem accidentibus et separabilibus et inseparabilibus. Et species quidem ante subintellegi quam accidentia vel si sint inseparabilia (oportet enim esse subiectum ut illi aliquid accidat), accidentia vero posterioris generis sunt et aduenticiae naturae. Likewise, that each substance partakes of one species, but of many accidents, both separable and inseparable: moreover, species are conceived prior to accidents, even if they be inseparable, (for there must be subject, in order that something should happen to it,) but accidents are naturally adapted to be of posterior origin, and possess a nature adjunctive to substance.
και του μεν είδους ή μετοχη ε πί σης, του δε συμβεβηκότος, καν άχώριστον Ζ, ουκ επί σης: και γαρ Αιθί οψ Αιθί οπος ἔχοι αν την χροιαν ? άνειμένην ? επιτεταμένην κατα μελανί αν. Et speciei quidem participatio aequaliter est, accidentis vero, vel si inseparabile sit, non aequaliter; Aethiops enim alio Aethiope habebit colorem vel intentum amplius vel remissum secundum nigritudinem. Again, of species the participation is equal, but of accident, even if it be inseparable, it is not equal; for an Ethiopian may have a colour intense, or remitted, according to blackness, with reference to an(other) Ethiopian.
[17] Chap. XVII. -- Of Community and Difference of Property and Accident.[24]
Λεί πεται δη περι Ιδίου και συμβεβηκότος ειπειν: πρ γαρ τό ίδιον του τε είδους και της διαφορας και του γένους διενήνοχεν, είρηται. Restat igitur de proprio et accidenti dicere; quo enim proprium specie et differentia et genere differt, dictum est. It remains to speak of property and accident, for how property differs from species, difference, and genus, has been stated.
Περι της κοινωνί ας τοῦ \δί ου και τοῦ άχωρί στου συμβεβηκότος De communibus proprii et accidentis
Κοινόν δή τω ιδί ω και τω άχωρί στω συμβεβηκότι τό ανευ αυτων μή υποστηναι εκεινα, εφ' ων θεωρειται: ώς γοορ ανευ τοῦ γελαστικοῦ ουχ υφί σταται ἄνθρωπος, ουτως ουδέ ανευ τοῦ μέλανος υποσταίη αν Αιθίοψ. Commune autem proprii et inseparabilis accidentis est quod praeter ea numquam consistant illa in quibus considerantur; quemadmodum enim praeter risibile non subsistit homo, ita nec praeter nigredinem subsistit Aethiops. It is common then to property and inseparable accident not to subsist without those things in which they are beheld, for as man does not subsist without risible[25], so neither can Ethiopian subsist without blackness,
και ωσπερ παντι και άει παρεστι τό ίδιον, ουτως και τό άχώριστον συμβεβηκός. Et quemadmodum semper et omni adest proprium, sic et inseparabile accidens. And as property is present to every, and always, so also is inseparable accident.
Περι της διαφορας των αυτων De propriis proprii et accidentis
Διενήνοχεν δέ (τι τό μέν ίδιον μόνω ενι είδει παρεστιν ώς τό γελα-στικόν άνθρώπω, τό δέ άχώριστον συμβεβηκός οίον τό μέλαν ουκ Αιθί οπι μόνον άλλο και κόρακι πρόσεστι και ἄνθρακι και εβένω και αλλοις τισί ν. Differunt autem quoniam proprium uni soli speciei adest (quemadmodum risibile homini), inseparabile vero accidens, ut nigrum, non solum Aethiopi sed etiam coruo adest et carboni et ebeno et quibusdam aliis. Nevertheless, they differ, in that property is present to one species alone, as the being risible to man, but inseparable accident, as black, is present not only to an Ethiopian, but also to a crow, to a coal, to ebony, and to certain other things.
διό τό μέν ίδιον άντικατηγορειται οῦ εστιν ίδιον και ἔστιν επί σης, τό δέ άχώριστον συμβεβηκός ουκ άντικατηγορειται. Quare proprium conversim praedicatur de eo cuius est proprium et est aequaliter, inseparabile vero accidens conversim non praedicatur. Moreover, property is reciprocally predicated of that of which it is the property, and is equally (present), but inseparable accident is not reciprocally predicated.
και των μέν ιδί ων επί σης ή μετοχή, των δέ συμβεβηκότων ή μέν μαλλον ή δέ ήττον. Et propriorum quidem aequalis est participatio, accidentium vero haec quidem magis, illa vero minus.

Besides, the participation of properties is equal, but of accidents one (subject partakes) more, but another less.

Ε'ισιν μέν οῦν και αλλαι κοινότητές τε και Ιδιότητες των ειρημένων, άλλ' εξαρκοῦσι και αῦται εις διακρισί ν τε αυτων και της κοινωνί ας παραστασιν. Sunt quidem etiam aliae communitates vel proprietates eorum quae dicta sunt sed sufficiunt etiam haec ad discretionem eorum communitatisque traditionem. There are indeed other points of community, and peculiarity of the above-mentioned (predicables), but these are sufficient for their distinction, and the setting forth of their agreement.


  1. 1 “At the request of Chrysaorius, his pupil, who had recently met with the Categories of Aristotle, Porphyry wrote this introduction, in order to his comprehension of that treatise: nearly the whole of it is composed from the writings, and often almost in the very words of Plato. As philosophers reduced all things under ten common natures, as grammarians also, with respect to eight words, so Porphyry has comprehended every significant word, except such as are significant of individuals, under five terms. The five heads of predicables therefore, taken from this Isagoge, which was written in the third century, are an addition to the Aristotelian Logic, in part of which, (the Topics,) the doctrine laid down differs from that enunciated here, in several points, as Porphyry's view also differs from that of Aldrich. Upon the subject generally, the reader may compare Albertus Magnus de Praedicab. Aquinas. Occam Logica. Abelard de Gen. et Spec. ed Cousin. Trendelenb. Elem. Crakanthorpe's, Whately's, Hill's, and Wallis' Logics, also Boethius de Divisione”.
  2. "2. Dialectic, according to Plato, consists of four parts, division, definition, demonstration, and analysis; hence a treatise adapted to the formation of these, will be evidently useful to the dialectic of Plato. The difference between the dialectic of Plato and that of Aristotle, is noticed in the subsequent notes upon the Organon, and the reader will find the subject ably discussed in the introduction to Mansel's Logic; here we need only observe that Aristotle in the Topics, looks to opinion (in his treatment of dialectic), while Plato disregards it, and the former delivers many arguments about one problem, but the latter, the same method about many problems. Cf. Proclus. MSS. commentary on the Parmenides, Philip., Schol. p. 143, ch, 4; Waitz, vol. ii. p. 137."
  3. "3. On the metaphysical part of this question, the opinions of philosophers are as vague as (I may add) they are unprofitable, hence the term "universals," is the best to be employed, as least liable to commit the logician to any metaphysical hypothesis; since the realist may interpret it of "substances," the nominalist of "names," the conceptualist of "notions." Cf. Occam, Log. p. 1, Albertus Magnus, Abelard. The agreement between the first and last, proves that there is no real difference between nominalism and conceptualism, since they were both. Vide also Mansel, Appendix A, where the authorities upon each side will be found quoted."
  4. "4. Genus and species, in short all forms, have a triple subsistence, for they are either prior to the many, or in the many, or posterior to the many. Taylor. Philoponus, in his extracts from Ammonius, illustrates this as follows: Let a seal-ring be conceived, having the image of Achilles upon it, from which seal let there be many impressions taken in pieces of wax, afterwards let a man perceiving the pieces of wax to have all the impression of one seal, retain such impression in his mind: then the seal in the ring is said to be prior to the many; the impression in the wax to be in the many, and the image remaining in the conception of the spectator, after the many, and of posterior origin. This he applies to genus and species."
  5. "5. Viz. metaphysics; it is, in fact, psychological. Cf. Leibnitz Meditat. de Cognit. Ver. opera. ed Erdmann. and Mansel's Prolegomena Logica."
  6. "6. With this chapter compare ch. 5, of the Categories, and Top. i. 5 and 8, whence the discrepancies between the account of the predicables given by Arist. and this by Porphyry will appear, upon which see Mansel's comment. Log. App. A, p. 9. Cf. also Albertus Mag. de Predicab. Trac. 11, cap. 1, Metap. iv. 28."
  7. "7. Ammonius remarks that, "It is worth while to doubt why Porphyry says that the first signification of genus appears to be the one easily adopted, and not the second signification, which is the habitude of one thing to one; since this nature first knows, for she first produces one thing from one, and thus many from many." But as Taylor observes, the second signification of genus, which is second with reference to us, is first to nature; for from Hercules, one man is first produced, and thus afterwards the multitude of the Heraclidae. Universally, whatever is first to nature is second to us, and vice versa, e. g. she begins with form and matter, then flesh and bone; we begin from man, so that things prior to nature are posterior to our knowledge, wherefore the first signification is clearer than the second."
  8. "8. Porphyry does not recognise the distinction between "quale quid" and "quale," (cf. Aldrich, Abelard de Gen. et Spe. ed. Cousin,) but makes difference, property, and accident to be all predicated ἐϝ τῷ ὁποῖόν τὶ ἐστιν: Boethius distinguishes quale in substantia, from quale non in substantia. Moreover, Porphyry makes difference to be always predicated de specie differentibus; upon his consideration of property, vide note to ch. 4, Isagog."
  9. "9. Athenaeus attributes this verse to Euripides. Vide Ath. lib. xiii. ch. 7."
  10. "10. An infima species can be maintained by none consistently but a Realist. Vide Mansel, p. 21"
  11. "11. For the exemplification of the above, see the "Arbor Porphyriana," (sometimes called by the Greek logicians, the "ladder," κλίμαξ,) given at page 7, ch. 5, of the Categories, with the note. [Note to the online text: vol. 1 can be found online at]"
  12. "12. See notes to pp. 6 and 8, Categor. An infima species implies a notion so complex as to be incapable of further accessions, the Realist maintains it to be the whole essence of the individuals of which it is predicated. Cf. Boethius; also Wallis, lib. i. 13, et seq.; Whately, b. ii. ch. 5, sect. 3 and 5."
  13. "13. Cf. Mansel, pp. 18 and 21, note; Whately, p. 52, 138; Outline of Laws of Thought, p. 44; Stewart, Philo. of Human Mind, part i. ch. 4."
  14. "14. Properly speaking, there cannot be more than one highest genus, which is a cognate term to every substance and quality supposed to exist; yet a subaltern genus may be relatively considered as a highest genus. Species, when resolved into its component parts, is found to be combined of genus and difference, and in different points of view, may be referred to different genera, also many species have no appropriate name, but are expressed by the combination of their constituent parts, genus and difference, e. g. "rectilinear-figure," " water-fowl;" indeed, some are denoted by the difference alone, as " repeater" (a watch which strikes the hour). Cf. ch. 3, Cat. note; Crakanthorpe, Log. lib. ii. Any singular term (denoting one individual) implies, (vide Whately, b. ii. ch. 5, 5,) not only the whole of what is understood by the species it belongs to, but also more, namely, whatever distinguishes that single object from others of the same species, as London implies all that is denoted by the term " city," and also all that distinguishes that individual city. Cf. Wallis, ch. 2."
  15. "15. Hence, in describing an individual, we do not employ properties (which belong to a whole species), but generally, inseparable accidents, i. e. such as can be predicated of their subject at all times."
  16. "16. According to Porphyry, difference is always predicated "de specie differentibus," and he recognises only a relative difference between two given species; thus "rational" is not the difference of man per se, but of man as distinguished from brutes. ..."
  17. "17. Porphyry's definition of man, "animal rationale mortale," was adopted by Abelard, Albertus Magnus, and Petrus Hispanus, though sometimes with the saving clause, that it must be understood with reference to the Stoical notions of the gods. Aquinas first removed the genus animal rationale from the Arbor Porphy., and limited rationality to man, distinguishing angels as intellectuales. Cf. Summa, p. 1; Qu. lviii. 3; Opusc. xlviii. Tract 1. In the Aristotelian definition of man, ζῷον πέζον δίπουν, the last would be regarded by him as a difference."
  18. "18. Boethius agrees with Porphyry, that accidents, properly so called, are useless in definition, (vide Opera, p. 3,) accidental definition is, in fact, merely a description. Cf. Albert. 1. c. Occam, pt. i. ch. 27. The only proper definition is by genus and differentiae, hence all definable notions will be species. The definition here given of difference, as to its being the excess of species over genus, is clear, from a reference to what was stated in the last note of the preceding chapter."
  19. "19. "Ratione ejus, quale quid est predicatur." Buhle; so Aldrich. There is no warranty, as we have observed, by Porphyry, for distinction between "quale quid" and "quale.""
  20. "20. "Rationales enim sumus et nos et Dii," vetus interpres Latinus. Commonly the word ἄγγελοι was substituted here, probably, as Casaubon conjectures, from the emendation of some Christian: Ammonius and Boethius (Comment, v.) attest that Porphyry wrote θεοὶ."
  21. "21. The property of a subaltern genus is predicated of all the species comprehended in that genus; that of a lowest species is predicated of all the individuals which partake of the nature of that species: thus,"Shape is the generic property of body, Growth is the generic property of living body, Voluntary motion is the generic property of animal, Risibility, the specific property of man." Vide Hill's Logic."
  22. "22. Whately observes, "It is often hard to distinguish certain properties from differentia, but whatever you consider as the most essential to the nature of a species, with respect to the matter you are engaged in, you must call the differentia, as rationality to man, and whatever you consider as rather an accompaniment (or result) of that difference, you must call the property, as the use of speech seems to be a result of rationality. He adds also, that the difference is not always one quality, but is frequently compounded of several together, no one of which would alone suffice." Vide also Huyshe's Log., pp. 33, 34."
  23. "23. Buhle retains the distinction here, between quid and quale quid, upon which, see notes on ch. 2 and 3. The reading is that of Julius Pacius, whom all later editors have followed: the Latin interpretation renders it, "accidentis vero in eo, quod quale quiddam, vel quomodo se habens.""
  24. "24. 4 Accidents may be distinguished from properties by the very definitions given of them. The latter belong necessarily, and therefore universally, to an essence, whereas the former are those qualities which do not of necessity belong to any essence, but are mere contingencies. Huyshe. Vide also note ch. 4, and cf. Albert de Predicab. Tract, vi. cap. I."
  25. "25. Risibility is considered to be so dependent upon rationality, as that the latter could not exist without the former, and if this were not so, the term risible would not be a property of man, but only an inseparable accident. Cf. Whately and Mansel."
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