Authors/Buridan/Quaestiones in analytica priora/Liber 1/Q25

Latin	English
Quaestio 25a UTRUM HAEC SIT NECESSARIA 'HOMO EST ANIMAL'	Question 25: whether 'a man is an animal' is necessary.
Vicesima quinta quaestio est utrum haec sit necessaria 'homo est animal'.	The twenty-fifth question is whether 'a man is an animal' is necessary.
1. Arguitur primo quod sic, per Aristotelem, qui communiter reputat illam esse necessariam, et etiam per determinationem Cardinalis Albi.	It is argued first that it is, by Aristotle, who commonly reckons it to be necessary, and also by the determination of the white Cardinal.
2. Item, omnis propositio quae est per se est necessaria, ut debet videri primo Posteriorum; modo haec est per se 'homo est animal'; ergo ipsa est necessaria.	Likewise, every proposition which is per se is necessary, as ought to be seen in the first book of the Posterior Analytics. Now the proposition 'a man is an animal' is per se, therefore this proposition is necessary.
3. Item, si poneretur quod non esset necessaria, hoc esset pro tanto quia deus posset annihilare omnem hominem; ideo nullus homo esset, et sic nullus homo esset animal. Sed probo quod hoc non debet obstare quin ipsa sit necessaria: quia si hoc obstaret, nulla propositio geometrica esset necessaria, cum deus ita possit annihilare omnes magnitudines, sicut omnes homines. Et tunc ultra sequeretur quod geometria non esset scientia, quod reputatur ab omnibus falsum et inconveniens; et patet haec consequentia per hoc quod scientia non est nisi de necessariis.	Likewise, if it were supposed that it were not necessary, this would be the case forasmuch as God could annihilate every man. For that reason no man would exist, and thus no man would be an animal. But I prove that this ought not stand in the way, but that it be necessary, because if this were to stand in the way, no geometrical proposition would be necessary, since God could thus annihilate all magnitude, just as all men. And then it would further follow that geometry would not be a science, which is reckoned by everyone to be false and absurd. And this consequence is clear from the fact that the science is nothing but necessary.
4. Oppositum arguitur: quia idem est iudicium de ista 'homo est animal' sicut de ista 'equus est animal', et tamen secunda non est necessaria; ergo nec prima. Probo minorem: quia illa non est necessaria quae potest esse falsa; modo ista propositio 'equus est animal' potest esse falsa per casum possibilem, scilicet quod deus corrumpat vel annihilet omnes equos; tunc enim nullus equus esset; ideo nullus equus esset animal, quia quod non est non est animal.	On the opposite side it is argued [that] because the the judgement 'a man is an animal' is the same as 'a horse is an animal', and yet the second is not necessary, therefore neither the first. I prove the minor [premiss], because what can be false is not necessary, but the proposition 'a horse is an animal' can be false through a possible case, namely that God destroys or annihilates all horses, for then no horse would exist. For that reason no horse would be an animal, because what is not, is not an animal.
Et quia aliquis posset ponere quod omnibus equis annihilatis adhuc ista esset necessaria 'equus est animal', ideo probo oppositum: quia nullum mortuum, sive corruptum, est animal, et omnis equus est corruptus; ergo nullus equus est animal.	And because someone could suppose that with every horse annihilated still 'a horse is an animal' is necessary, for that reason I prove the opposite. For nothing dead, or destroyed, is an animal, and every horse is destroyed, therefore no horse is an animal.
Item omne animal est sanum vel aegrum, et tamen casu possibili posito, nullus equus est sanus vel aeger, ex eo quod corruptum nec est sanum nec est aegrum; ergo nullus equus est animal.	Likewise, every animal is healthy or sick, and yet in the possible case we supposed, no horse would be healthy or sick, given that what is destroyed is neither healthy nor sick, therefore no horse is an animal.
Ad saluandum AristotiIem et determinationem Cardinalis Albi, ego distinguo triplicem necessitatem attributam propositionibus, scilicet necessitatem condicionalem, necessitatem de quando et necessitatem simpliciter.	In order to save Aristotle and the determination of the white Cardinal, I distinguish a threefold necessity attributable to propositions, namely conditional necessity, necessity of time, and absolute necessity.
Unde necessitas condicionalis ex hoc est quod oportet si subiectum et praedicatum pro aliquo supponant quod supponant pro eodem. Et sic concedo quod haec est necessaria 'homo est animal', et haec etiam 'equus est animal'. Immo etiam haec est necessaria 'uacuum est locus', quamvis sit simpliciter falsa. Et est sensus quod necesse est hominem, si est, esse animal, et similiter necesse est equum, si est, esse animal, et etiam necesse est uacuum, si est, esse locum. Unde dicere quod haec 'uacuum est locus' est necessaria ex condicione non est aliud dicere quam quod haec est necessaria 'uacuum, si est, est locus'.	Wherefore conditional necessity, from this is what must be if subject and predicate supposit for something which supposit for the same thing. And thus I concede that 'a man is an animal' is necessary, and also 'a horse is an animal'. Indeed the proposition 'a vacuum is a place' is necessary, although it is absolutely false. And it is the sense in which a man, if he exists, is an animal, and similarly a horse, if it exists, is an animal, and also necessary that a vacuum, if it exists, is a place. Wherefore to say that the proposition 'a vacuum is a place' is necessary from condition is no other than to say that the proposition 'if there is a vacuum, it is a place' is necessary.
Sed necessitas de quando ex hoc provenit quod oportet subiectum et praedicatum quandocumque supponunt pro aliquo supponere pro eodem; et hoc dico in affirmativis. Et sic dico quod haec est necessaria 'homo est animal', vel etiam 'equus est animal'. Immo etiam haec est necessaria 'rosa est flos', licet modo nulla sit rosa. Et quamvis non sit eclipsis lunae, tamen haec est necessaria 'eclipsis lunae est defectus luminis a sole'. Sed isto modo haec non est necessaria 'uacuum est locus' si ponamus cum Aristotele quod impossibile est uacuum esse.	But necessity 'of time' comes about from the fact that whenever the subject and predicate supposit for something, they have to supposit for the same thing, and I say this in afffirmatives. And thus I say that 'a man is an animal' is necessary, and also 'a horse is an animal'. Indeed 'a rose is a flower' is also necessary, although nothing at the moment is a rose. And although nothing at the moment is an eclipse of the moon, nonetheless 'an eclipse of the moon is the falling away of light from the sun. But in this way 'a vacuum is a place' is not necessary, if we suppose with Aristotle that it is impossible for a vacuum to exist.
Et est sensus talium propositionum quod necesse est equum, quandocumque est, fuit vel erit, esse, fuisse vel fore animal, et necesse est eclipsim lunae quandocumque est, fuit vel erit, tunc esse, fuisse vel fore defectum luminis a sole; ita quod cum dico 'haec est necessaria 'tonitruum est sonus factus in nubibus', non aliud intelligo quam quod haec est necessaria 'tonitruum, quandocumque est, fuit vel erit, tunc est, fuit vel erit sonus factus in nubibus'.	And the sense of such propositions is such that it is necessary for a horse, whenever it is, was or will be, to be, or have been, or be-in-the-future an animal. And it is necessary that an eclipse of the moon, whenever it is, was or will be, to be, or have been, or be-in-the-future a falling away of light from the sun, so that when I say 'the proposition 'thunder is a noise made in the clouds' is necessary, I understand no other than that the following proposition is necessary: 'thunder, whenever it is, was or will be, is was or will be a noise made in the clouds'.
Et tales temporales requirunt quod subiecta earum aliquando supponant pro aliquo; ideo sic ista non est necessaria 'vacuum est locus', eo quod haec est falsa 'uacuum quandocumque est, fuit vel erit, tunc est, fuit vel erit locus'. Et videtur mihi quod secundum istum sensum ponitur suppositio naturalis in demonstrativis. Unde ad dictum sensum propositiones praedictae in libro Posteriorum dicerentur esse de omni, prout 'de omni' notat universalitatem et exsistentiam suppositorum et temporum. Unde de hac necessitate sunt scientiae demonstrativae, naturales et mathematicae.	And such temporal [propositions] require that their subject sometimes supposits for something. Thus for that reason 'a vacuum is a place' is not necessary, because 'a vacuum, whenever it is, was or will be, is, was or will be a place'. And it seems to me that according to that second sense is given natural supposition in demonstratives. Wherefore in this sense, propositions previously mentioned in the Posterior Analytics would be said to be 'de omni', according as 'de omni' denotes universality, and the existence of supposita and times. Wherefore, of this necessity is demonstrative knowledge [scientia], natural and mathematical.
Necessitas simpliciter ex eo provenit quod impossibile est quod aliquando subiectum et praedicatum non supponant pro eodem in propositione formata vel quod impossibile est aliter esse quam propositio significat secundum sensum simpliciter categoricum. Et sic diceremus quod ista non est necessaria 'eclipsis lunae est defectus luminis a sole', quia modo est falsa: quia modo non est eclipsis; sequitur ergo quod eclipsis nec est defectus luminis nec aliud. Ideo etiam dicerem quod ista non est necessaria 'asinus est animal', vel 'homo est animal', quia per casum possibilem, ut arguebatur, potest esse falsa. Sed ista est simpliciter necessaria 'deus est'.	Absolute necessity comes about when it is impossible that at any time the subject and the predicate do not supposit for the same thing in the proposition formed, or that it is impossible for it to be in any other way other than the proposition signifies, in a sense that is absolutely categorical . And thus we would say that 'an eclipse of the moon is the falling away of light from the sun', is not necesssary, because it is now false. For now there is no eclipse, therefore it follows that an eclipse is not the falling away of light or anything else. For that reason also I would say that 'a donkey is an animal' is not necessary, or 'a man is an animal', because in a possible state of affairs, as was argued, it can be false. But 'God exists' is absolutely necessary.
Et tamen verum est quod Aristoteles, ponens perpetuitatem mundi et esse necessarium quod perpetuarentur generationes et corruptiones in istis inferioribus, secundum has opiniones opinabatur consequenter has esse simpliciter necessarias 'asinus est animal', 'homo est animal', et ita de consimilibus. Et ipsae possent dici 'naturaliter necessariae', ad istum sensum quod non potest aliter esse quam ipsae significant per potentiam naturalem, sed solum per supernaturalem.	And yet it is true what Aristotle [says], supposing the perpetuity of the world, and that it was necessary that generation and destruction was perpetuated in the inferior [regions]. Consequently, it was thought that according to these opinions the proposition 'a donkey is an animal' and 'a man is an animal' were simply necessary, and so for similar [ones]. And those could called 'naturally necessary', in the sense that it cannot otherwise be that they signify through natural potential, but through supernatural potential alone.
Et debetis scire ultimo quod isti tres modi necessitatum se consequuntur quodam modo et quodam ordine. Quia omnis propositio simpliciter necessaria est etiam necessaria de quando et ex condicione, sed non convertitur; etiam omnis propositio necessaria de quando est necessaria ex condicione, sed non convertitur.	And you ought to know finally that these three modes of necessity follow another in a certain way and in a certain order. For every absolutely necessary proposition is also necessary of time, and from condition, and is not converted, also every proposition that is necessary of time is necessary from condition, but is not converted.
Per haec potest dici ad rationes quod omnes procedunt viis suis. Unde posset concedi quod haec non est per se simpliciter necessaria 'equus est animal', sed est per se de quando, qua perseitate sufficit uti in naturalibus, aut etiam in mathematicis. Et sic omnes aliae rationes secundum supra declarata procedunt viis suis.	Through this it can be replied to the arguments, that all proceed in their ways. Wherefore it could be allowed that 'a horse is an animal' is not per se absolutely necessary, but is per se of time, which perseity it suffices to use in natural objects, or also in mathematical. And thus all other arguments according to what was made clear above, proceed in their ways.