Authors/Augustine/De libero arbitrio/L2

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LIBER SECUNDUS > BOOK TWO WHY HAS MAN BEEN GIVEN FREE CHOICE?
2.1.1.1
EVODIUS. Iam, si fieri potest, explica mihi, quare dederit deus homini liberum arbitrium voluntatis, quod utique si non accepisset, peccare non posset. E. Now explain to me, if you can, why God has given man free choice of will. For if man had not received this gift, he would not be capable of sin.
AUGUSTINUS. Iam enim certum tibi atque cognitum est deum dedisse homini hoc, quod dari debuisse non putas? A. Do you know for certain that God has given man this gift, which you think ought not to have been given?
EVODIUS. Quantum in superiori libro intellegere mihi visus sum, et habemus liberum voluntatis arbitrium et non nisi eo peccamus. E. As far as I thought I understood in the first book, we have free choice of will, and we only sin as a result.
AUGUSTINUS. Ego quoque memini iam nobis id factum esse perspictlum. Sed nunc interrogavi, utrum hoc quod nos habere et quo nos peccare manifestum est, deum nobis dedisse scias. A. I remember too that this became clear to us. But my present question is whether you know that God gave us the gift which plainly we have, and as a result of which plainly we can sin.
2.1.1.2
EVODIUS. Nullum alium puto. Ab ipso enim sumus et sive peccantes sive recte facientes ab illo poenam meremur aut praemium. E. No one else gave it, I think. We are created by God, and from Him we deserve punishment if we sin, or reward if we act rightly.
AUGUSTINUS. Hoc quoque utrum liquido noveris an auctoritate commotus libenter etiam incognitum credas, cupio scire. A.I should like to be told whether you know this also because it is evident or whether you believe it freely on authority without knowing it.
EVODIUS. Auctoritati quidem me primum de hac re credidisse confirmo. Sed quid verius quam omne bonum ex deo esse et omne iustum bonum esse et peccantibus poenam recteque facientibus praemium iustum esse? Ex quo conficitur a deo affici et peccantes miseria et recte facientes beatitate. E. I agree that at first I accepted authority on this question. Yet it is surely true that whatever is good comes from God, and that whatever is just is good, and that sinners are justly punished, and those who do right justly rewarded. The conclusion from this is that God makes sinners unhappy and those who do right happy. 74 >
2.1.2.3
AUGUSTINUS. Nihil resisto. Sed quaero illud alterum, quomodo noveris nos ab ipso esse. Neque enim hoc nunc, sed ab ipso nos vel poenam vel praemium mereri explicasti. A. I do not deny this, but I ask the second question, how you know we are created by God. You have not explained this, but only that from Him we deserve punishment or reward.
EVODIUS. Hoc quoque non aliunde video esse manifestum, nisi quod iam constat deum vindicare peccata, siquidem ab illo est omnis iustitia. Non enim ut alicuius est bonitatis alienis praestare beneficia, ita iustitiae vindicare in alienos. 2.1.2.4 Unde manifestllm est ad eum nos pertinere, quia non solum in nos benignissimus in praestando, sed etiam iustissimus in vindicando est. Deinde ex eo, quod ego posui tuque concessisti, omne bonum ex deo esse etiam hominem ex deo esse intellegi potest. Homo enim ipse in quantum homo est, aliquod bonum est, quia recte vivere cum vult potest. E. I see that this other point also is clear, only because we have already established that God punishes sins. For indeed all justice comes from Him. It is not the work of justice to punish strangers, in the same way that it is the work of goodness to help strangers. Hence it is clear that we belong to Him, because not only is He supremely kind in giving us help, but also supremely just in punishing us. So, from what I asserted and you agreed, namely, that all good comes from God, we can also conclude that man is created by God. Man himself is something good in so far as he is man, for he can live rightly when he so wills. 1
2.1.3.5
AUGUSTINUS. Plane si haec ita sunt, soluta quaestio est quam proposuisti. Si enim homo aliquod bonum est et non posset, nisi cum vellet, recte facere, debuit habere liberam voluntatem, sine qua recte facere non posset. Non enim quia per illam etiam peccatur, ad hoc eam deum dedisse credendum est. Satis ergo causae est cur dari debuerit, quoniam sine illa homo recte non potest vivere. Ad hoc autem datam vel hinc intellegi potest, quia si quis ea usus fuerit ad peccandum, divinitus in eum vindicatur. 2.1.3.6 Quod iniuste fieret, si non solum ut recte viveretur, sed etiam ut peccaretur, libera esset voluntas data. Quomodo enim iuste vindicaretur in eum, qui ad hanc rem usus esset voluntate, ad quam rem data est? Nunc vero deus cum peccantem punit, quid aliud tibi videtur dicere nisi: "Cur non ad eam rem usus es libera voluntate, ad quam tibi eam dedi?" hoc est ad recte faciendum? 2.1.3.7 Deinde illud bonum, quo commendatur ipsa iustitia in damnandis peccatis recteque factis honorandis, quomodo esset, si homo careret libero voluntatis arbitrio? Non enim aut peccatum esset aut recte factum quod non fieret voluntate. Ac per hoc et poena iniusta esset et praemium, si homo voluntatem liberam non haberet. Debuit autem et in supplicio et in praemio esse iustitia, quoniam hoc unum est bonorum quae sunt ex deo. Debuit igitur deus dare homini liberam voluntatem. A. Obviously, if this is true, the question you proposed is solved. If man is something good and cannot do right except when he so wishes, he ought to have free will, without which he could not do right. Because sin occurs through free will, we must not suppose God gave man free will for the purpose of sinning. It is a sufficient reason why it ought to be given, that man cannot live rightly without it. We can understand that it was given for this purpose, because, if anyone uses it to sin, God punishes him. This would be unjust if free will had been given not only that man might live rightly, but also that he might sin. How could a man be punished justly, if he used his will for the very > purpose for which it was given? Since, however, God punishes the sinner, what else do you think He says but: Why did you not use your free will for the purpose for which I gave it you, that is, to do right? Then, if man lacked free choice of will, how could that good be brought about, which consists in the due maintenance of justice by the condemnation of sins and the honouring of good deeds? It would not be a sin or a good deed, unless it was done wilfully. Hence punishment and reward would be unjust, if man did not have free will. There must be justice both in punishment and in reward: it is one of the good things which come from God. Therefore it was right that God should give free will to man.
2.2.4.8
EVODIUS. Iam concedo eam deum dedisse. Sed nonne tibi videtur, quaeso te, si ad recte faciendum data est, quod non debuerit ad peccandum posse converti, sic ut ipsa iustitia quae data est homini ad bene vivendum? Numquid enim potest quispiam per iustitiam suam male vivere? Sic nemo posset per voluntatem peccare, si voluntas data est ad recte faciendum. E. I agree now that God gave it. But I ask you: do you not think that, if it was given for the purpose of good conduct, it ought not to have been possible to misuse it for sin? It is not possible to misuse justice itself which has been given to man that he may live rightly. Can anyone live wrongly through justice? And in the same way no one would be able to sin through his will, if his will had been given for the purpose of good conduct.
2.2.4.9
AUGUSTINUS. Donabit quidem deus, ut spero, ut tibi valeam respondere, vel potius ut ipse tibi, eadem quae summa omnium magistra est veritate intus docente, respondeas. Sed paulisper volo mihi dicas, si id quod abs te quaesiveram certum et cognitum tenes, deum nobis dedisse liberam voluntatem utrum oporteat dicere dari non deb i d d di , mur deum. 2.2.4.10 Si enim incertum est utrum dederit, recte quaerimus utrum bene sit data, ut cum invenerimus bene datam esse, inveniatur etiam illum dedisse a quo animae data sunt omnia bona; si autem invenerimus non bene datam esse, non eum dedisse intellegamus, quem culpare nefas est. Si vero certum est quod ipse illam dederit, oportet fateamur, quoquo modo data est, neque non dari neque aliter eam dari debuisse quam data est. Ille enim dedit cuius factum recte reprehendi nullo pacto potest. A. I hope God will grant that I may be able to answer you, or rather that you may answer yourself, instructed by that truth within you, which is the source of all instruction. 2 I want you to tell me shortly if you know for certain that God gave us free will, the matter about which I asked you whether we should say that the gift ought not to have been given us, which we agree has been given > by God. For, if It is doubtful whether He has given it, we are justified in asking whether it is a good gift. Then, if we find it is a good gift, we shall find also that it is the gift of Him who is the giver of all good things to man. 3 If, however, we find it is not a good gift, we shall realise that He did not give it, since it is wicked to blame Him. On the other hand, if it is certain that He gave it, we must agree that, in whatever form it has been given, it ought not to have been withheld or given in any other way than that in which it has been given. For He gave it, whose act we cannot by any means be justified in blaming.
2.2.5.11
EVODIUS. Quamquam haec inconcussa fide teneam, tamen quia cognitione nondum teneo, ita quaeramus quasi omnia incerta sint. Video enim ex hoc quod incertum est, utrum ad recte faciendum voluntas libera data sit, cum per illam etiam peccare possimus, fieri etiam illud incertum, utrum dari debuerit. 2.2.5.12 Si enim incertum est ad recte faciendum datam esse, incertum est etiam dari debuisse; ac per hoc etiam utrum eam deus dederit incertum erit, quia si incertum est dari debuisse, incertum est ab eo datam esse, quem nefas est credere dedisse aliquid quod dari non debuit. E. I hold this firmly by faith, but, as I do not hold it as a matter of knowledge, let us examine it as though it were altogether doubtful. In view of the fact that it is doubtful whether free will has been given for the purpose of good conduct, since by means of free will we can sin, I see it becomes doubtful whether it ought to have been given us. For, if it is doubtful whether free will was given for the purpose of good conduct, it is also doubtful whether it ought to have been given. Hence it will be doubtful too whether God gave us free will. For, if it is doubtful whether it ought to have been given, it is doubtful whether it has been given by Him whom it is wrong to suppose gave anything which ought not to have been given.
AUGUSTINUS. Illud saltim tibi certum est deum esse. A. At least you are certain that God exists.
EVODIUS. Etiam hoc non contemplando, sed credendo inconcussum teneo. E.Even this I hold for certain not through direct perception, but through belief.
2.2.5.13
AUGUSTINUS. Si quis ergo illorum insipientium de quibus scriptum est: Dixit insipiens in corde suo: Non est deus -- hoc tibi diceret nec vellet tecum credere quod credis, sed cognoscere utrum vera credideris, relinqueresne hominem an aliquo modo quod inconcussum tenes persuadendum esse arbitrareris, praesertim si ille non obluctari peruicaciter, sed studiose id vellet agnoscere? A. Then, if one of those fools of whom Scripture > records, the fool said in his heart: there is no Godf should say this to you, and should refuse to believe with you what you believe, but should want to know whether your belief is true, would you have nothing to do with this man, or would you think you ought to convince him in some way of what you hold firmly especially if he should seriously wish to know, and not obstinately to dispute it?
2.2.5.14
EVODIUS. Hoc quod ultimum posuisti satis me admonet quid ei respondere deberem. Certe enim quamvis esset absurdissimus, concederet mihi cum doloso et peruicaci de nulla omnino et maxime de re tanta non esse disserendum. Quo concesso prior mecum ageret, ut sibi crederem bono animo eum istuc quaerere neque aliquid in se, quod ad rem hanc adtinet, doli ac peruicaciae latere. 2.2.5.15 Tum ego demonstrarem, quod cuivis facillimum puto, quanto esset acquius, cum sibi de occultis animi sui quae ipse nosset vellet alterum credere qui non nosset, ut etiam ipse tantorum virorum libris, qui se cum filio dei vixisse testatum litteris reliquerunt, esse deum crederet, quia et ea se vidisse scripserunt quae nullo modo fieri possent si non esset deus et nimium stultus esset si me reprehenderet quod illis crediderim qui sibi vellet ut crederem. lam vero quod recte reprehendere non valeret, nullo modo reperiret cur etiam nollet imitari. E. Your last remark tells me clearly enough what answer I ought to make to him. Though quite unreasonable, he would certainly admit that I ought not to argue with a crafty and obstinate man about so great a matter, or indeed about anything at all. Granting this, he would first beg me to believe that he was an honest inquirer, and in the present affair concealed no trickery or obstinacy. Then I should show, what I think is easy for anyone, that he wishes another person, who does not know it, to believe what he himself knows concerning the secrets of his own soul, and therefore that he in his turn would be much more reasonable if he believed in God's existence on the authority of all those writers who have testified that they lived with the Son of God. They have recorded that they saw things which could not possibly have happened, if there were no God. He would be very foolish if he blamed me for believing these writers, seeing that he wished me to believe him. He would find no reason for refusing to imitate what he could not rightly blame.
2.2.5.16
AUGUSTINUS. Si ergo utrum sit deus satis esse existimas, quod non temere tantis viris credendum esse iudicavimus, cur non, quaeso te, de his quoque rebus, quas tamquam incertas et plane incognitas quaerere instituimus, similiter putas eorundem virorum auctoritati sic esse credendum ut de investigatione earum nihil amplius laboremus? A. So, on the question of God's existence, you think it is sufficient that our decision to believe > these witnesses is a prudent one. Why, then, I want to know, do you not think that we ought similarly to accept the authority of these same men with regard to those other matters, which we resolved to examine as being uncertain and quite unknown, without troubling about further investigation?
EVODIUS. Sed nos id quod credimus nosse et intellegere cupimus. The reason is that we want to know and understand what we believe.
2.2.6.17
AUGUSTINUS. Recte meministi, quod etiam in exordio superioris disputationis a nobis positum esse negare non possumus. Nisi enim et aliud esset credere, aliud intellegere et primo credendum esset quod magnum et divimlm intellegere cuperemus, frustra propheta dixisset: "Nisi credideritis, non intellegetis". 2.2.6.18 Ipse quoque dominus noster et dictis et factis ad credendum primo hortatus est quos ad salutem vocavit, sed postea cum de ipso dono loqueretur quod erat daturus credentibus non ait: 'Haec est autem vita aeterna ut credant' sed: "Haec est" inquit "uita aeterna ut cognoscant te verum deum et quem misisti Iesum Christum". Deinde iam credentibus dicit: "Quaerite et invenietis" nam neque inventum dici potest quod incognitum creditur neque quisquam inveniendo deo fit idoneus, nisi ante crediderit quod est postea cogniturus. 2.2.6.19 Quapropter domini praeceptis obtemperantes quaeramus instanter; quod enim hortante ipso quaerimus, eodem ipso demonstrante inveniemus, quantum in hac vit a et a nob is talibus inveniri queunt. Nam et a melioribus, etiam dum has terras incolunt, et certe a bonis et piis omnibus post hanc vitam evidentius atque perfectius ista cerni obtinerique credendum est et nobis ita fore sperandum et ista contemptis terrenis et humanis omni modo desideranda et diligenda sunt. A. You remember rightly what we cannot deny we asserted at the beginning of our former discussion. 5 Unless belief and understanding were distinct, and unless we ought to start by believing any important question of theology which we wish to understand, the Prophet would have been wrong in saying, unless you believe, you will not understand. Our Lord Himself also by word and deed urged those whom He called to salvation, first to believe. Afterwards, when He spoke of the gift itself which He would give to believers, He did not say, 'This is eternal life, that they may believe/ but, This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent. 7 Then He says to those who already believe, Seek and you shall find, 8 for what is believed without being known cannot be said to have been found, nor can anyone become capable of finding God, unless he has first believed what afterwards he is to know. Therefore in obedience to the Lord's commands let us seek earnestly. What we seek at His exhortation we shall find also from His teaching, so far > as these matters can be found in this life and by persons such as ourselves. We must believe that these things are seen and grasped more clearly and perfectly by better men even while they dwell in this world, and certainly by all good and devout men after this life. We must hope that so it will happen to us, and we must desire and love these things, despising what is earthly and human.
THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE
2.3.7.20 Quaeramus autem hoc ordine, si placet: primum quomodo manifestum est deum esse. deinde, utrum ab illo sint quaecumque in quantumcumque sunt bona; postremo, utrum in bonis numeranda sit voluntas libera. Quibus compertis satis apparebit, ut opinor, utrum recte homini data sit. Quare prius abs te quaero, ut de manifestissimis capiamus exordium, utrum tu ipse sis. An fortasse tu metuis ne in hac interrogatione fallaris? cum utique si non esses falli omnino non posses. Let us then, I suggest, examine the question in the following order: first, how it is clear that God exists; 9 secondly, whether whatever is good, in whatever degree it is good, is created by Him; thirdly, whether free will is to be counted among good things. When we have decided these questions, it will be plain enough, I think, whether it has been given rightly to man. So, in order to start from what is clearest, I ask you first: Do you yourself exist? Are you perhaps afraid that you may be mistaken, when asked this question? If you did not exist, you could not possibly be mistaken. 10
EVODIUS. Perge potius ad caetera. E. Go on rather to the next point.
2.3.7.21
AUGUSTINUS. Ergo quoniam manifestum est esse te nec tibi aliter manifestum esset nisi viveres, id quoque manifestum est, vivere te. Intellegisne duo ista esse verissima? A. Then, since it is clear that you exist, and since this would not be clear to you unless you were alive, it is clear also that you are alive. Do you understand that these two statements are quite true?
EVODIUS. Prorsus intellego. E. Yes, I understand that at once. >
AUGUSTINUS. Ergo etiam hoc tertium manifestum est, hoc est intellegere te. A. Then this third point too is clear, namely, that you understand.
EVODIUS. Manifestum. E. It is clear.
AUGUSTINUS. Quid in his tribus tibi videtur excellere? A. Which of these three do you think is the most important?
EVODIUS. Intellegentia. E. Understanding.
AUGUSTINUS. Cur tibi hoc videtur? A. Why do you think so?
2.3.7.22
EVODIUS. Quia cum tria sint haec, esse vivere intellegere, et lapis est et pecus vivit, nec tamen lapidem puto vivere aut pecus intellegere; qui autem intellegit, eum et esse et vivere certissimum est. Quare non dubito id excellentius iudicare cui omnia tria insunt quam id cui vel unum desit. 2.3.7.23 Nam quod vivit, utique et est, sed non sequitur ut etiam intellegat, qualem vitam esse pecoris arbitror. Quod autem est, non utique consequens est ut et vivat et intellegat, l nam esse cadavera possum fateri, vivere autem nullus dixerit. Iam vero quod non vivit, multo minus intellegit. E. There are these three, existence, life, understanding: a stone exists, and an animal lives. I do not think a stone lives or an animal understands, but it is quite certain that a person who understands, also exists and lives. Therefore I do not hesitate to judge that in which all three are present as more important than that which lacks one or two of them. For what lives, certainly exists, but does not necessarily understand: such, I think, is the life of an animal. It certainly does not follow that what exists also lives and understands, for I can agree that corpses exist, but no one would say that they lived. Far less does what is not alive understand.
2.3.7.24
AUGUSTINUS. Tenemus igitur horum trium duo deesse cadaveri, umlm pecori, nihil homini. A. We hold, therefore, that of these three two are lacking in a corpse, one in an animal, and none in a man.
EVODIUS. Verum est. E. True.
AUGUSTINUS. Tenemus etiam id, esse in his tribus praestantius quod homo cum duobus caeteris habet, id est intellegere, quod habentem sequitur et esse et vivere. A. We hold also that in these three that is most important which man has in addition to the two others, namely, understanding. Since he has this, it follows that he exists and lives.
EVODIUS. Tenemus sane. E. Yes, we hold this.
2.3.8.25
AUGUSTINUS. Dic mihi iam utrum illos uulgatissimos corporis sensus habere te noveris, videndi et audiendi et olfaciendi et gustandi et tangendi. A. Now tell me whether you know you have the > ordinary bodily senses, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.
EVODIUS. Novi. E.- I do.
AUGUSTINUS. Quid putas pertinere ad videndi sensum? id est, quid putas nos videndo sentire? A. What do you think is the proper object of the sense of sight? That is, what do you think we perceive when we see?
E Quaecumque corporalia E. Any bodily thing.
A Num etiam dura et mollia videndo sentimus? A. Surely we do not perceive the hard and the soft when we see?
EVODIUS. Non. E.-No.
AUGUSTINUS. Quid ergo proprie ad oculos pertinet, quod per eos sentimus? A. What then is the proper object of the eyes, which we perceive through them?
EVODIUS. Color. E. Colour.
AUGUSTINUS. Quid ad aures? A. What is it of the ears?
EVODIUS. Sonus. E. Sound.
AUGUSTINUS. Quid ad olfactum? A. -What of smell?
EVODIUS. Odor. E. Odour.
AUGUSTINUS. Quid ad gustatum? A. What of taste?
EVODIUS. Sapor. E. Flavour.
AUGUSTINUS. Quid ad tactum? A. -What of touch?
EVODIUS. Molle vel durum, lene vel asperum et multa talia. E. Soft or hard, smooth or rough, and many other such things.
AUGUSTINUS. Quid? corporum formas, magnas breues quadras rotundas et si quid huiusmodi est, nonne et tangendo et videndo sentimus et ideo nec visui proprie nec tactui tribui possunt, sed utrique? A. Do we not perceive by touch and sight the shapes of bodily things, that they are large or small, square or round, and so on? Does it not follow that these cannot be assigned specially to sight or touch, but must be assigned to both?
EVODIUS. Intellego. E.l understand.
2.3.8.26
AUGUSTINUS. Intellegis ergo et quaedam singulos sensus habere propria de quibus renuntient, et quaedam quosdam habere communia? A. Then do you understand also that the different senses have their proper objects which they report, and that some have objects in common?
EVODIUS. Et hoc intellego. E. I understand this too. >
AUGUSTINUS. Quid igitur ad quemque sensum pertineat et quid inter se vel omnes vel quidam eorum communiter habeant, num possumus ullo eorum sensu diiudicare? A. Surely, therefore, we cannot distinguish by any of these senses what is the proper object of any sense, and what all or some of them have in common?
EVODIUS. Nullo modo, sed quodam interiore ista diiudicantur. E. Certainly not; they are distinguished by an inner perception.
AUGUSTINUS. Num forte ipsa est ratio, qua bestiae carent? Nam, ut opinor, ratione ista conprehendimus et ita se habere cognoscimus. A. Can this be reason, which beasts lack? It seems to me that by the reason we grant this, and know that it is so.
2.3.8.27
EVODIUS. Magis arbitror nos ratione conprehendere esse interiorem quendam sensum ad quem ab istis quinque notissimis cuncta referantur. Namque aliud est quo videt bestia et aliud quo ea quae videndo sentit vel vitat vel appetit. Ille enim sensus in oculis est, ille autem in ipsa intus anima, quo non solum ea quae videntur, sed etiam ea quae audiuntur quaeque caeteris capiuntur corporis sensibus, vel appetunt animalia delectata et adsumunt vel offensa devitant et respuunt. 2.3.8.28 Hic autem nec visus nec auditus nec olfactus nec gustatus nec tactus dici potest, sed nescio quid aliud quod omnibus communiter praesidet. Quod cum ratione conprehendamus, ut dixi, hoc ipsum tamen rationem vocare non possum, quoniam est bestiis inesse manifestum est. E.I think rather we grasp with our reason that there is an inner sense, to which everything is referred by the five ordinary senses. The faculty by which the beast sees is different from that by which it shuns or seeks what it perceives by sight. The one sense resides in the eyes, but the other is within, in the soul itself. By the latter animals are either enticed to seek and seize, or are warned to shun and reject, not only what they see but also what they hear, and what they perceive with the other bodily senses. This, however, can be called neither sight, nor hearing, nor smell, nor taste, nor touch, but is something else which presides over all the rest together. While, as I have said, we grasp this with our reason, I cannot precisely call it reason, for plainly the beasts possess it.
2.3.9.29
AUGUSTINUS. Agnosco istuc quidquid est, et eum interiorem sensum appellare non dubito. Sed nisi et istum transeat, quod ad nos refertur a sensibus corporis, pervenire ad scientiam non potest. Quicquid enim scimus, id ratione conprehensum tenemus. Scimus autem, ut de caeteris taceam, nec colores auditu nec voces visu posse sentiri. 2.3.9.30 Et cum hoc scimus, nec oculis nec auribus scimus neque illo sensu interiore quo nec bestiae carent. Non enim credendum est eas nosse nec auribus sentiri lucem nec oculis vocem, quoniam ista non nisi rationali animadversione et cogitatione discernimus. A. I recognise this, whatever it may be, and do not hesitate to call it an inner sense. But unless that which is conveyed to us by the bodily senses, passes beyond the inner sense, it cannot become knowledge. Whatever we know we grasp with our reason. We know, for example to say nothing of other facts that colours cannot be perceived > by hearing nor sounds by sight. This knowledge does not come to us from the eyes or ears, nor from that inner sense which even the beasts do not lack. We must not suppose that they know that light is not perceived with the ears or sound with the eyes: we distinguish these only by rational reflection and thought.
2.3.9.31
EVODIUS. Non possum dicere hoc me habere perceptum. Quid si enim sensu illo interiore, Quo eas non carere concedis, hoc quoque diiudicant, nec colores auditu nec visu voces posse sentire? E.I cannot say I am convinced about this. Might not they recognise that colours cannot be perceived by hearing or sound by sight, through that inner sense which you admit they possess?
AUGUSTINUS. Num etiam putas eas posse discernere ab invicem colorem qzli sentitur et sensum qui in oculo est et illum interiorem sensum apud animam et rationem qua ista singillatim definiuntur et dinumerantur? A. You do not think, do you, that they can distinguish between the colour they perceive, and the power of sense in their eye, and the inner sense in their soul, and the reason which marks out exactly the limits of each?
EVODIUS. Nullo modo. E. No, certainly not.
2.3.9.32
AUGUSTINUS. Quid? ista ratio posset haec quattuor discernere ab invicem et definitionibus terminare, nisi ad eam referretur et color per oculorum sensum et ipse rursus per illum interiorem qui ei praesidet et idem interior per se ipsum, si tamen iam nihil aliud interpositum est? A.Well, could reason distinguish and define these four unless colour was presented to it by the sense of sight, and again that sense by that inner sense which presides over it, and again that inner sense by its own act, if there were no other intermediary?
EVODIUS. Non video quomodo aliter posset. E. I do not see how else it could be.
2.3.9.33
AUGUSTINUS. Quid? hoc videsne, sensu oculorum colorem sentiri, eundem autem sensum eodem sensu non sentiri? Non enim quo sensu colorem vides, hoc eodem vides etiam ipsum videre. A. Do you observe that colour is perceived by the sense of sight, and that the sense of sight is not perceived by itself? You do not see that you see by the same sense by which you see colour.
EVODIUS. Non omnino. E. Certainly not.
AUGUSTINUS. Enitere etiam ista diiudicare. Nam credo te non negare aliud colorem esse et aliud colorem videre et item aliud, etiam cum color non subest, habere sensum quo videri posset si subesset. A. Try also to distinguish these. I think you do not deny that colour is different from seeing colour, and again from possession of a sense by > which, when colour is not present, we could see it, if it were present.
EVODIUS. Discerno et ista et inter se differre concedo. E. I distinguish between these, and agree they are distinct.
2.3.9.34
AUGUSTINUS. Num horum trium quicquam vides oculis nisi colorem? A. You do not see with your eyes, do you, any of these three except colour?
EVODIUS. Nihil aliud. E.-No.
AUGUSTINUS. Dic ergo unde videas alia duo. Non enim ea posses non visa discernere. A. Tell me then how you see the other two; you could not distinguish them if you did not see them.
EVODIUS. Nescio quid aliud; esse scio, nihil amplius. E. I only know that a means exists; I know nothing more.
AUGUSTINUS. Nescis igitur, utrum iam ipsa ratio an illa vita sit, quam sensum interiorem vocamus praecellentem sensibus corporis, an aliquid aliud? A. So you do not know whether it is reason or the vital principle, which we call the inner sense and which presides over the bodily senses, or something else?
EVODIUS. Nescio. E. I do not know.
2.3.9.35
AUGUSTINUS. Illud tamen scis, ea definire nisi ratione non posse neque rationem id facere nisi de his quae sibi examinanda offeruntur. A. Yet you know that these elements cannot be defined except by the reason, and the reason can only define what is presented for its examination.
EVODIUS. Certum est. E. That is certain.
AUGUSTINUS. Quicquid est igitur aliud quo sentiri potest omne quod scimus, ministerium rationis est, cui offert et renuntiat quidquid attingit, ut ea quae sentiuntur discerni suis finibus possint et non sentiendo tantum, sed etiam sciendo conprehendi. A. Therefore whatever else the faculty may be by which we perceive everything that we know, it is the servant of reason. It presents and reports to the reason whatever it comes upon, so that what is perceived may be able to be distinguished in its proper sphere, and grasped not only by sense perception but also by knowledge.
EVODIUS. Ita est. E. That is so.
2.3.9.36
AUGUSTINUS. Quid? ipsa ratio quae ministros suos et ea quae suggerunt discernit invicem et item quid inter haec et se ipsam distet agnoscit seque illis praepotentiorem esse confirmat, num alia re se ipsam nisi se ipsa, id est ratione, conprehendit? an aliter scires te habere rationem nisi id ratione perciperes? A. The reason itself distinguishes between its servants and what they present to it, and also recognises what comes between these and itself, and it asserts itself to be their governor. Surely it does > not grasp itself except by means of itself, that is, by the reason? Would you know that you possessed reason unless you perceived it by reason?
EVODIUS. Verissimum est. E. Perfectly true.
2.3.9.37
AUGUSTINUS. Quoniam ergo, cum colorem sentimus, non itidem sensu ipso nos sentire etiam sentimus, neque cum audimus sonum nostrum etiam audimus auditum, neque cum olfacimus rosam olet nobis aliquid et noster olfactus, neque quicquam gustantibus sapit in ore ipse gustus nec tangentes aliquid ipsum etiam tangendi sensum possumus tangere, manifestum est quinque istos sensus nullo eorum sensu posse sentiri, quamvis eis corporalia quaeque sentiantur. A. Then, since, when we perceive colour we do not likewise by the same sense perceive the fact that we perceive it, nor when we hear a sound do we also hear our hearing, nor when we smell a rose do we smell our smelling, nor when we taste something do we taste in the mouth our tasting, nor when we touch something can we touch the actual sense of touching: it is clear that the five senses cannot be perceived by any of the five senses, though they perceive all bodily things.
EVODIUS. Manifestum est. E. That is clear.
2.4.10.38
AUGUSTINUS. Arbitror etiam illud esse manifestum, sensum illum interiorem non ea tantum sentire quae accepit a quinque sensibus corporis, sed etiam ipsos ab eo sentiri. Non enim aliter bestia moveret se vel appetendo aliquid vel fugiendo, nisi se sentire sentiret, non ad sciendum, nam hoc rationis est, sed tantum ad movendum, quod non utique aliquo illorum quinque sentit. 2.4.10.39 Quod si adhuc obscurum est, elucescet, si animadvertas quod exempli gratia sat est in uno aliquo sensu, velut in visu. Namque aperire oculum et movere aspiciendo ad id quod videre appetit nullo modo posset, nisi oculo clauso vel non ita moto se id non videre sentiret. Si autem sentit se non videre dum non videt, necesse est etiam sentiat se videre dum videt, quia, cum eo appetitu non movet oculum videns, quo movet non videns, et indicat se utrumque sentire. A. I think it is clear also that the inner sense not only perceives what is presented by the five bodily senses, but also perceives the bodily senses themselves. A beast would not move itself by seeking or shunning something, unless it perceived that it perceived; and this it does not do in such a way as to know, for this is the work of reason, but only in such a way as to move, and it does not have this perception by any of the five senses. If this is still obscure, it will become clear if you notice, for example, what takes place in any one sense, say, in the sense of sight. A beast could not possibly open its eye, and move it to look at what it wants to see, unless it perceived that it did not see with the eye closed or turned in the wrong direction. But if it perceives that it does not see when it does not see, it must necessarily perceive > that it sees when it sees. It shows that it is aware of both situations, because, when it sees, it does not turn the eye as a result of that desire through which it turns the eye when it does not see.
2.4.10.40
Sed utrum et se ipsam haec vita sentiat, quae se corporalia sentire sentit, non ita clarum est, nisi quod se quisque intus interrogans invenit omnem rem viventem fugere mortem; quae cum sit vitae contraria, necesse est ut vita etiam se ipsam sentiat, quae contrarium suum fugit. 2.4.10.41 Quod si adhuc non liquet, omittatur, ut non nitamur ad id quod volumus nisi certis manifestisque documentis. Manifesta enim sunt: sensu corporis sentiri corporalia; eundem autem sensum hoc eodem sensu non posse sentiri; sensu autem interiore et corporalia per sensum corporis sentiri et ipsum corporis sensum; ratione vero et illa omnia et eandem ipsam notam fieri et scientia contineri. An tibi non videtur? Whether this vital principle, which perceives that it perceives bodily things, also perceives itself, is not so clear, except in so far as everyone who asks himself the question realises that all living things shun death. Since death is the contrary of life, the vital principle must necessarily perceive itself, seeing that it shuns its contrary. If this is still not plain, leave it alone; we must not try to reach our goal except by clear and certain proofs. These facts are clear: bodily things are perceived by a bodily sense; this sense cannot be perceived by itself; but an inner sense perceives both that bodily things are perceived by a bodily sense and also the bodily sense itself; and, finally, all this and reason itself is made known by reason, and grasped by knowledge. Do you not agree?
EVODIUS. Videtur sane. E. Yes indeed.
AUGUSTINUS. Age, nunc responde unde sit quaestio, ad cuius solutionem pervenire cupientes iam diu ista molimur via. A. Well then, tell me how the problem comes in, which we wish to solve and have been working at for all this time.
2.5.11.42
EVODIUS. Quantum memini, trium illarum quaestionum quas paulo ante ad contexendum ordinem huius disputationis posuimus, nunc prima versatur, id est quomodo manifestum fieri possit, quamvis tenacissime firmissimeque credendum sit, deum esse. E. As far as I remember, of those three questions which we proposed just now so as to put this discussion into order, the first is now under consideration, namely, how it can become evident to us that God exists, even though we must believe it with all possible firmness.
AUGUSTINUS. Recte hoc tenes. Sed etiam illud diligenter tenere te volo, cum de te ipso quaererem utrum esse te noveris, non solum hoc, sed alia etiam duo nobis apparuisse quod noveris. A. You are quite right. But I want you also to notice carefully that, when I asked you whether > you knew that you yourself existed, it became clear that you knew not only this but also two other things.
EVODIUS. Id quoque teneo. E. I notice that too.
2.5.11.43
AUGUSTINUS. Nunc ergo vide ad quam rem istarum trium intellegas pertinere omne quod corporis sensus attingit; id est, in quo rerum genere tibi ponendum videatur, quicquid vel oculorum vel alio quolibet corporis instrumento noster sensus attingit, utrum in eo, quod tantum est, an in eo, quod etiam vivit, an in eo, quod etiam intellegit. A. Now observe to which of these three you recognise that every object of the bodily senses belongs: I mean, in what class of things you think should be placed whatever is the object of our senses through the agency of the eyes or any other bodily organ. Should it be placed in the class which merely exists, or in that which also lives, or in that which also understands?
EVODIUS. In eo quod tantum est. E. In that which merely exists.
AUGUSTINUS. Quid? ipsum sensum in quo genere trium horum esse censes? A. In which of these three classes do you think the sense itself should be placed?
EVODIUS. In eo quod vivit. E. In that which lives.
AUGUSTINUS. Quid igitur horum duorum melius esse iudicas? sensum ipsum an quod sensus attingit? A. Then, which of these two do you think is better, the sense itself or its object?
EVODIUS. Sensum scilicet. E. Undoubtedly the sense itself.
AUGUSTINUS. Quare? A. Why?
EVODIUS. Quia melius est id quod etiam vivit quam id quod tantum est. E. Because that which also lives is better than that which merely exists. 12
2.5.12.44
AUGUSTINUS. Quid? illum sensum interiorem, quem quidem infra rationem et adhuc nobis communem cum bestiis superius indagavimus, dubitabisne huic sensui praeponere, quo corpus attingimus et quem iam ipsi corpori praeponendem esse dixisti? A. Well, do you hesitate to rank that inner sense, which we have already discovered to be below reason, and yet common to us and the beasts, as higher than the sense by which we perceive bodily things? You have already said the latter sense should be ranked above bodily things themselves.
EVODIUS. Nullo modo dubitaverim. E.I should not hesitate for a moment.
2.5.12.45
AUGUSTINUS. Etiam hoc cur non dubites volo abs te audire. Non enim poteris dicere hunc sensum interiorem iam in eo genere trium illorum esse ponendum quod etiam intellegit, sed adhuc in eo quod et est et vivit, etiamsi intellectu caret; iste enim sensus inest et bestiis, quibus intellectus non inest. 0uae cum ita sint, quaero cur praeponas sensum interiorem sensui quo corporalia sentiuntur, cum sit uterque in eo genere qold vivit. 2.5.12.46 Sensum autem istum qui corpora adtingit ideo praeposuisti corporibus, quia illa sunt in eo genere quod tantum est, iste vero in eo quod etiam vivit; in quo cum et ille interior reperiatur, cur eum meliorem putes dic mihi. Si enim dixeris quia ille istum sentit, non te credo inventurum regulam qua fidere possimus, omne sentiens melius esse quam id quod ab eo sentitur, ne fortassis ex hoc etiam cogamur dicere omne intellegens melius esse quam id quod ab eo intellegitur. 2.5.12.47 Hoc enim falsum est, quia homo intellegit sapientiam et non est melior quam ipsa sapientia. Quamobrem vide qua causa tibi visum sit sensum interiorem huic sensui quo sentimus corpora esse praeferendum. A. Again, I should like to hear why you do not hesitate. You could not say that the inner sense should be placed in that class of the three which > includes understanding, but you must place it in that class which exists and Hves, without understanding. Even the beasts which lack understanding have that sense. This being so, I ask why you rank the inner sense above the sense which perceives bodily things, though both are in that class which lives. You have ranked the sense whose object is bodily things, above such things just because they are in that class which only exists, while the sense which perceives bodily things is in the class which also lives. Since the inner sense is also found to be in this class, tell me why you think it is better. If you say it is because the inner sense perceives the other sense, you will not, I think, find any principle which we can follow, 11 that every percipient is better than the object it perceives. We might have to conclude in that case that everything which has understanding is better than the object it understands. This, however, is false, since man understands wisdom, but is not better than wisdom itself. So consider why you think the inner sense should be regarded as superior to the sense by which we perceive bodily things.
2.5.12.48
EVODIUS. Quia moderatorem et iudicem quendam huius illum esse cognosco. Nam et si quid huic in officio suo abfuerit, ille tamquam debitum a ministro flagitat, sicut paulo ante disputatum est. Non enim se videre aut non videre sensus oculi videt, et quia non videt, non potest quid sibi desit aut quid satis sit iudicare, sed ille interior, quo admonetur et anima bestiae aperire oculum clausum et quod desse sentit implere. Nulli autem dubium est eum qui iudicat eo de quo iudicat esse meliorem. E. Because I know it somehow controls and judges the other sense. If the latter fails in its duty, the inner sense exacts a kind of debt from its servant, as we discussed a little time ago. The sense of sight does not see that it sees or does not see, and, because it does not see this, it cannot judge what is lacking to it or what satisfies it. The inner sense can make this judgment, for it warns > the soul of the beast to open its eye when shut, and to do what it perceives needs to be done. Undoubtedly that which judges is better than that which is judged.
2.5.12.49
AUGUSTINUS. Cernis ergo etiam istum corporis sensum de corporibus quodam modo iudicare? Ad illum enim pertinet voluptas et dolor cum vel leniter vel aspere corpore attingitur. Nam sicut ilie interior quid desit vel satis sit oculorum sensui iudicat, sic ipse sensus oculorum quid desit vel satis sit coloribus iudicat. Item sicut ille interior de auditu nostro iudicat, utrum minus an sufficienter intentus sit, sic iudicat auditus ipse de vocibus, quid earum leniter influat aut aspere perstrepat. 2.5.12.50 Non necesse est caeteros sensus corporis persequi. Iam enim, ut opinor, animadvertis quid velim dicere, ita scilicet sensum illum interiorem de istis corporis sensibus iudicare, cum eorum et integritatem probat et debitum flagitat, quem ad modum et ipsi corporis sensus de corporibus iudicant, adsumentes in eis lenem tactum reicientesque contrarium. A. Then do you notice that the bodily sense in some way also judges bodily things? It is aff ected by pleasure or pain when it comes in contact with a bodily thing gently or harshly. Just as the inner sense judges what is lacking to, or what satisfies, the sense of sight, so too the sense of sight judges what is lacking to, or what satisfies, colour. 12 Moreover, as the inner sense judges the hearing, whether it is sufficiently attentive or not, so the hearing in its turn judges sound, whether it is gentle or loud. We need not go through the other bodily senses, for I think you realise now what I mean. The inner sense judges the bodily senses; it approves them when they respond normally, and exacts what they owe it. In the same way the bodily senses judge bodily things, welcoming a gentle touch and resisting the opposite.
EVODIUS. Cerno sane et verissima esse consentio. E. Yes, I see this and agree it is quite true.
2.6.13.51
AUGUSTINUS. Adtende iam, utrum etiam ratio de hoc interiore sensu iudicet. Iam enim non quaero utrum eam mellorem illo esse dubites, quia non dubito id te iudicare; quamquam ne id quidem iam quaerendum putem, utrum de isto sensu iudicet ratio. Namque in his ipsis quae infra eam sunt, id est in corporibus et in sensibus corporis et isto interiore sensu, quo modo sit aliud alio melius et quam sit illis ipsa praestantior, quae tandem nisi ipsa renuntiat? Quod profecto nullo modo posset, nisi de his ipsa iudicaret. A. Now consider whether reason in its turn judges the inner sense. I am not asking now whether you hesitate to call it better than the inner sense, because I am sure you do call it better. Yet I think now we should not even ask whether reason judges this inner sense. For in regard to those things which are below reason, that is, bodily things and the bodily senses and the inner sense, what else but the reason tells us how one is better > than another, and how reason is nobler than any of them? This could not possibly happen, unless it judged them.
EVODIUS. Manifestum est. E. That is obvious.
2.6.13.52
AUGUSTINUS. Cum ergo eam naturam quae tantum est neque vivit neque intellegit, sicut est corpus exanime, praecedat ea nattlra quae non tantum est, sed etiam vivit neque intellegit, sicuti est anima bestiarum, et rursus hanc praecedat ea quae simul et est et vivit et intellegit, sicut in homine mens rationalis: num arbitraris in nobis, id est in his quibus natura nostra completur ut homines simus, aliquid invenire posse praestantius quam hoc quod in his tribus tertio loco posuimus? 2.6.13.53 Nam et corpus nos habere manifestum est et vitam quandam qua ipsum corpus animatur atque uegetatur, quae duo etiam in bestiis agnoscimus, et tertium quiddam quasi animae nostrae caput aut oculum aut si quid congruentius de ratione atque intellegentia dici potest, quam non habet natura bestiarum. Quare vide, obsecro, utrum aliquid invenire possis, quod sit in natura hominis ratione sublimius. A. So that kind of thing which not only exists, but also lives, yet does not understand, such as the soul of a beast, is nobler than that kind of thing which only exists without living or understanding. Again, that which includes existence, life, and understanding, such as the rational mind of man, is nobler still. I am sure you do not think that anything nobler can be found in us, among those faculties which make up our nature, than that which we have placed third among the three? It is clear we have a body and a vital principle which stirs and quickens the body, both of which we recognise to be present in beasts. It is also clear that we have something else, the head or eye, so to speak, of our soul, or whatever more suitable expression can be used to describe the reason and understanding. The beast does not have this in its nature. So I beg you to consider whether you can find anything which is higher than reason in man's nature.
EVODIUS. Nihil omnino melius video. E. I see nothing at all which is better. 14
2.6.14.54
AUGUSTINUS. Quid si aliquid invenire potuerimus quod non solum esse non dubites, sed etiam ipsa nostra ratione praestantius? dubitabisne illud quidquid est deum dicere? A. Well, if we can find something which you are certain not only exists but also is nobler than our reason, will you hesitate to call this, whatever it is, God?
EVODIUS. Non continuo, si quid melius quam id quod in mea natura optimum est invenire potuero, deum esse dixerim. Non enim mihi placet deum appellare quo mea ratio est inferior, sed quo est nullus superior. E. If I could find something better than the best in my nature, I should not necessarily call it God. I should not like to call that which is above my > reason, God, but rather that which is above everything else.
2.6.14.55
AUGUSTINUS. Ita plane, nam ipse huic tuae rationi dedit tam de se pie vereque sentire. Sed, quaeso te, si non inveneris esse aliquid supra nostram rationem nisi quod aeternum atque incommutabile est, dubitabisne hunc deum dicere? Nam et corpora mutabilia esse cognoscis et ipsam vitam qua corpus animatur per affectus varios mutabilitate non carere manifestum est et ipsa ratio, cum modo ad verum pervenire nititur modo non nititur et aliquando pervenit aliquando non pervenit, mutabilis profecto esse convincitur. 2.6.14.56 Quae si nullo adhibito corporis instrumento neque per tactum neque per gustatum neque per olfactum neque per aures neque per oculos neque per ullum sensum se inferiorem, sed per se ipsam cernit aeternum aliquid et incommutabile, simul et se ipsam inferiorem et illum oportet deum suum esse fateatur. A.That is plainly right. God granted to your reason this reverent and true opinion of Himself. But I ask you: if you find there is nothing above our reason except the eternal and unchangeable, will you hesitate to call this God? You know that bodily things change, and clearly the life which animates the body has various moods and is subject to change. Reason itself at one time strives after the truth, and at another does not strive, sometimes reaches it and sometimes does not; it is manifestly proved to be changeable. If without using any bodily means, if neither by touch, nor taste, nor smell, neither by the ears, nor the eyes, nor any sense lower than itself, but by its own self, the reason sees something eternal and unchangeable, and itself as lower than this, then it must confess that this is its God.
EVODIUS. Hunc plane fatebor deum quo nihil superius esse constiterit. E. I will confess clearly that to be God, which all agree to be higher than anything else.
2.6.14.57
AUGUSTINUS. Bene habet. Nam mihi satis erit ostendere esse aliquid huius modi quod aut fateberis deum esse, aut si aliquid supra est, eum ipsum deum esse concedes. Quare sive supra sit aliquid sive non sit, manifestum erit deum esse, cum ego, quod promisi, esse supra rationem eodem ipso adivuante monstravero. A. Very well. All I need do is to show that there is a being of such a kind, and either you will admit this being to be God, or, if there is anything higher, you will grant that the higher being is God. 14 So, whether there is something higher or whether there is not, it will be clear that God exists, when, with His help, I shall show, as I promised, that there exists something higher than reason.
EVODIUS. Demonstra ergo quod polliceris. E. Show, then, what you promise.
2.7.15.58
AUGUSTINUS. Faciam. Sed prius quaero utrum sensus corporis meus idem sit qui tuus an vero meus non sit nisi meus et tuus non sit nisi tuus. Quod si non ita esset, non possem per oculos meos videre aliquid quod tu non videres. A. I shall do so. But I first ask whether my bodily sense is the same as yours, or whether mine > is only my own, and yours only your own. If this were not so, I could not see anything with my eyes which you would not see.
2.7.15.59
EVODIUS. Concedo prorsus, quamvis eiusdem generis, tamen singulos nos habere sensus, videndi vel audiendi vel quoslibet alios caeterorum. Non enim solum videre sed etiam atldire potest aliquis hominum quod alius non audiat, et aliud aliquid quolibet alio sensu quisquam sentire quod alius non sentiat. Unde manifestum est et tuum non nisi tuum et meum sensum non esse nisi meum. E. I entirely agree that each of us have our own senses, of sight or hearing and so on, though they are in a common class. One man can both see and hear what another does not hear, and with all the other senses each man's perceptions can be different. So it is clear that your sense is only yours, and my sense only mine.
2.7.15.60
AUGUSTINUS. Hoc idem respondebis de illo etiam sensu interiore? an aliquid aliud? A. Will you make the same reply about the inner sense, or will you not?
EVODIUS. Nihil sane aliud. Nam et ille utique sensum meum sentit meus et tuum sentit tuus; nam ideo plerumque interrogor ab eo qui aliquid videt, utrum hoc etiam ego videam, quia ego me videre aut non videre sentio, non ille qui interrogat. E. Yes indeed, the same reply. My inner sense perceives my bodily sense, and yours perceives yours. I am often asked by a man who sees something whether I see it also. The reason is simply that I am conscious of my seeing or not seeing, while my questioner is not.
2.7.15.61
AUGUSTINUS. Quid? ipsam rationem nonne unus quisque nostrum habet suam? quandoquidem fieri potest ut ego aliquid intellegam cum tu id non intellegis, nec utrum intellegam tu scire possis, ego autem sciam. A. Then I suppose each of us has his own reason? It may be that I understand something which you do not understand, and you may be unable to know whether I understand, though I myself know.
EVODIUS. Manifestum est etiam rationales mentes singulos quosque nostrum singulas habere. E. It is clear that each of us has his own distinct rational mind.
2.7.16.62
AUGUSTINUS. Num etiam poteris dicere singulos soles nos habere quos videmus aut lunas aut luciferos aut caetera huius modi, quamvis suo quisque ac proprio sensu ista videat? A. You surely could not say that we each have our own suns or moons or morning stars or such like, though each of us sees them with his own sense?
EVODIUS. Nullo modo istuc dixerim. E. I certainly should not say so.
2.7.16.63
AUGUSTINUS. Possumus ergo videre unum aliquid multi simul, cum sint sensus nostri nobis singulis singuli, quibus omnibus illud unum sentimus quod simul videmus, ut quamvis alius sensus meus sit et alius tuus, possit tamen fieri ut id quod videmus non sit aliud meum aliud tuum, sed unum illud praesto sit utrique nostrum et simul ab utroque videatur. A. Many of us can at the same time see the same thing, though the senses of each of us are our own > distinct senses: with these distinct senses we see the one object, and we all see it at the same time. It may happen, therefore, although your sense and mine are distinct, that we may not each see distinct objects; one and the same thing may be presented to each of us, and may be seen at the same time by each of us.
EVODIUS. Manifestissimum est. E. That is perfectly clear.
2.7.16.64
AUGUSTINUS. Possumus etiam unam aliquam vocem simul audire, ut quamvis alius sit auditus meus alius tuus, non sit tamen alia mea et alia tua vox quam simul audimus, vel alia pars eius auditu meo capiatur et alia tuo, sed quicquid sonuerit, et unum et totum audiendum simul adsit ambobus. A. We can also hear the same sound at the same time, so that, although my hearing is distinct from yours, yet the sound which we hear at the same time is not distinct to each of us, nor is one part of it received by my hearing and another by yours. When a sound is made, the same sound and the whole of it is present to the hearing of both of us.
EVODIUS. Et hoc manifestum est. E. That also is clear. 17
2.7.17.65
AUGUSTINUS. Iam etiam de caeteris sensibus corporis licet animadvertas quod dicimus, neque omnino illos, quod ad hanc rem adtinet, ita se habere, ut illos duos oculorum et aurium, neque omnino non ita. 2.7.17.66 Nam quia ex uno aere et ego et tu possumus implere spiramentum et eius acris affectionem odore sentire, et item quia ex uno melle vel quolibet alio cibo seu potu ambo gustare possumus et eius affectionem sapore sentire, quamvis ille unus sit, nostri autem sint sensus singuli, tibi tuus et mihi meus, ut unum odorem vel unum saporem cum ambo sentiamus, nec tu tamen eum meo sensu sentias nec ego tuo nec aliquo uno qui utriusque nostrum possit esse communiter, sed prorsus mihi meus sensus sit et tuus tibi, etiam si unus aut odor aut sapor ab utroque sentiatur: hinc ergo isti sensus inveniuntur habere aliquid tale quale illi duo in visu et auditu; 2.7.17.67 sed in eo dispares sunt quantum ad id quod nunc agimus pertinet, quod, etsi unum aerem naribus ambo trahimus aut unum cibum gustando capimus, non tamen eam partem acris duco quam tu nec eandem partem cibi sumo quam tu, sed aliam ego aliam tu. Et ideo de toto aere cum spiro, duco partem quanta mihi satis est, et tu item de toto aliam quanta tibi satis est ducis. 2.7.17.68 Et cibus quamvis unus et totus ab utroque absumatur, non tamen et a me totus et a te totus absumi potest, quomodo verbum et ego totum audio et tu totum simul et speciem quamlibet quantam ego video tantaln et tu simul; sed cibi vel potionis alia pars in me alia in te transeat necesse est. An parum ista intellegis? A. You may now notice what we say about the other bodily senses too: as far as our present subject is concerned, they are not quite in the same position as the two senses of sight and hearing, nor are they quite different. You and I can breathe the same air, and perceive what it is like from the smell. We can both taste the same honey or any other food or drink, and can perceive what it is like from the taste, though this is one and the same, while the senses of each of us, yours and mine, are distinct to each of us. Though we both perceive the same smell or the same taste, yet you do not perceive it with my sense nor I with yours, nor by any faculty which can be common to us both: my sense is entirely mine, and yours is entirely yours, even though we both perceive the same smell or > taste. It follows that those other senses are found to have a characteristic similar to that of the senses of sight and hearing. They are unlike them, so far as our present subject is concerned, in that, though we both breathe the same air with our nostrils, or take the same food when we taste it, yet I do not draw in the same part of the air as you, nor do I take the same part of the food as you, but we take different parts. Therefore, when I breathe, I draw from the whole air as much as is sufficient for me, and you draw another part, as much as is sufficient for you. The same food is wholly taken by each of us, 15 yet the whole cannot be taken both by you and me in the same way that you and I both hear the whole of a word simultaneously, and both see exactly the same sight: different parts of food and drink must pass into each of us. Is this not quite clear?
EVODIUS. Immo vero apertissima et certissima esse consentio. E. I agree it is perfectly clear and certain. 18
2.7.18.69
AUGUSTINUS. Num censes tangendi sensum conparandum esse oculorum et aurium sensibus in ea re de qua nunc agitur? qua non solum corpus unum ambo possumus sentire tangendo, sed etiam eandem partem tu quoque poteris tangere quam ego tetigero, ut non solum idem corpus, sed eandem quoque corporis partem possimus ambo sentire tangendo. 2.7.18.70 Non enim sicuti cibum aliquem appositum non possumus et ego totum et tu totum capere cum ambo illo uescimur, sic etiam in tangendo accidit. sed et unum et totum quod ego tetigero etiam tu potes, ut id ambo tangamus, non singulis partibus, sed totum singuli. A. -You do not think, do you, that the sense of touch is comparable with the senses of sight and hearing in that respect we are now considering? Not only can we both perceive by touch the same bodily thing, but we can also both touch the same part; we can both perceive by touch not only the same bodily thing but the same part of it. It is not the same with touch as with food, for you and I cannot both take the whole of the food put before us, when we are both eating it. You and I can touch the same thing and the whole of it, not merely different parts we can each touch the whole. >
2.7.18.71
EVODIUS. Fateor hoc modo duobus illis superioribus sensibus hunc tangendi sensum esse simillimum. Sed in hoc video esse dissimilem, quod simul, id est uno tempore, et videre aliquid unum totum ambo possumus et audire, tangere autem possumus quidem totum aliquid ambo uno tempore, sed partibus singulis, eandem autem partem non nisi temporibus singulis; nam nulli parti quam tactu capis possum meum tactum admovere nisi tu removeris tuum. E. I agree that in this respect the sense of touch is very much like the two senses mentioned before. But I see that they are unlike in this, that both of us can see and hear the whole of the same thing at exactly the same time, while, though we can touch the whole of a thing at the same time, we can only touch different parts the same part only at different times. I cannot touch the part which you are touching, unless you move your hand. 19
2.7.19.72
AUGUSTINUS. Vigilantissime respondisti. Sed oportet te etiam illud videre: cum horum omnium quae sentimus alia sint quae ambo alia quae singuli sentiamus, ipsos vero sensus nostros suos quisque singuli sentiamus, ut neque ego sentiam sensum tuum neque tu meum, quid de his rebus quae sentiuntur a nobis per corporis sensus, id est quid de corporalibus rebus non possumus sentire ambo, sed singuli, nisi quod ita fit nostrum ut hoc in nos vertere et commutare possimus? [2.7.19.73. Sicuti est cibus et potus, cuius nullam partem quam ego percepero et tu percipere poteris, quia et si nutrices alimenta mansa infantibus reddunt, illud tamen, quod inde gustatus rapuerit atque in mandentis viscera commutaverit, nullo modo reuocari poterit ut in escam refundatur infantis. 2.7.19.74 Gula enim cum aliquid iucunde sapit, etiamsi exiguam, tamen inreuocabilem partem sibi vindicat et hoc cogit fieri quod naturae corporis convenit. Quod nisi ita esset, nullus remaneret sapor in ore, posteaquam fuerint mansa illa reddita atque desputata. A. Your answer is very acute, but you must see this. Of all the things we perceive there are some we both perceive together, and others we each perceive separately. We each perceive separately our own senses: I do not perceive your sense, nor you mine. We each separately, and not both together, perceive objects of the bodily senses, that is, bodily things, only when they become our own in such a way that we can make them change completely into ourselves. Food and drink are examples, for you cannot have a perception of the same part as I have. Nurses may chew food and give it to children, but, when they do so, if the food is tasted and consumed and changed into the nurse's body, it cannot possibly be brought back and offered as food for the child. When the palate tastes something it enjoys, it claims for itself irrevocably a part, however small, and makes this conform to the nature of its body. Otherwise there would remain no taste in the mouth, after the food had been chewed and spat out again.
2.7.19.75
Quod etiam de aeris partibus recte dici potest quas naribus ducimus. Nam etiamsi aliquid aeris quod reddidero possis etiam tu ducere, non tamen poteris etiam illud quod inde in alimentum meum cesserit, quia nec reddi potest. Nam etiam naribus alimentum nos capere medici docent, quod alimentum et spirando solus sentire possum et reflando restituere non possum, ut abs te etiam ductum naribus sentiatur. The same can be said of the parts of the air which we breathe. For, though you may be able > to draw in some part of the air which I breathe out, yet you cannot draw in that which has actually nourished me; this cannot be given up. Doctors tell us that we take nourishment even with our nostrils. When I breathe, I alone can perceive this nourishment, nor can I breathe it out and give it up, so that you may draw it in with your nostrils and perceive it.
2.7.19.76
Nam caetera sensibilia, quae quamvis sentiamus, non tamen ea sentiendo in nostrum corpus corrupta mutamus, possumus ea sive uno tempore sive singulis vicissim temporibus ambo sentire, sic ut vel totum vel pars ipsa quam sentio abs te etiam sentiatur. Qualia sunt sive lux sive sonus sive corpora quae attingimus, non tamen laedimus. When we perceive other sensible objects we do not, by perceiving them, break them up and change them into our own body. Both of us can perceive them either at the same time or at different times, in such a way that the whole, or the part which I perceive, is also perceived by you. Examples of this are light or sound or bodily things with which we come in contact, but which we do not alter.
EVODIUS. Intellego. E.l understand.
2.7.19.77
AUGUSTINUS. Manifestum est ergo ea quae non commutamus et tamen sentimus corporis sensibus, et non pertinere ad naturam sensuum nostrorum et propterea magis nobis esse communia, quia in nostrum proprium et quasi privatum non vertuntur atque mutantur. A. It is clear, therefore, that those things which we perceive with our bodily senses but do not change, do not share the nature of these senses, and consequently are common to us, for the very reason that they do not suffer change and become our personal and, so to speak, private possession.
EVODIUS. Prorsus adsentior. E.I quite agree.
2.7.19.78
AUGUSTINUS. Proprium ergo et quasi privatum intellegendum est quod unus quisque nostrum sibi est et quod in se solus sentit quod ad suam naturam proprie pertinet; commune autem et quasi publicum, quod ab omnibus sentientibus nulla sui corruptione atque commutatione sentitur. A. By our personal and, so to speak, private possession, I mean that which belongs to each individual and to no one else, 16 that which he alone perceives in himself, that which belongs to his own peculiar nature. But that which is common and, so to speak, public, is what is perceived by all who > have perception, with no alteration or change in itself.
EVODIUS. Ita est. E. That is true.
2.8.20.79
AUGUSTINUS. Age, nunc attende, et dic mihi utrum inveniatur aliquid quod omnes ratiocinantes sua quisque ratione atque mente communiter videant, cum illud quod videtur praesto sit omnibus nec in usum eorum quibus praesto est commutetur quasi cibus aut potio, sed incorruptum integrumque permaneat, sive illi videant sive non videant. An forte nihil huiusmodi esse arbitraris? A. Well, listen now, and tell me whether anything can be found which all who reason see in common, each with his own reason and mind. An object which is seen is present to all and is not changed for the use of those to whom it is present, as in the case of food or drink, but remains incorrupt and entire, whether seen or not seen. Do you perhaps disagree with this?
2.8.20.80
EVODIUS. Immo multa esse video, e quibus unum commemorari satis est: quod ratio et veritas numeri omnibus ratiocinantibus praesto est, ut omnis eam computator sua quisque ratione et intellegentia conetur apprehendere et alius id facilius alius difficilius possit, cum tamen ipsa aequaliter se omnibus praebat valentibus eam capere, nec cum eam quisque percipit in sui perceptoris quasi alimentum vertatur atque commutetur, nec cum in ea quisque fallitur ipsa deficiat, sed ea vera et integra permanente ille in errore sit tanto amplius quanto minus eam videt. E. No, I see there are many examples, though it is enough to mention one. The law and truth of number is present to all who reason. All calculators try to grasp their truth by reason and understanding; one man can do so more easily, one less easily, one not at all. However, their truth presents itself equally to all who can grasp it. When a man perceives it, he does not change it and make it into his food of perception, as it were; and when he makes a mistake about it, the truth does not fail but remains entirely true, while he is in error in proportion to his failure to see it. 21
2.8.21.81
AUGUSTINUS. Recte sane. Sed video te tamquam non rudem harum rerum cito invenisse quod diceres. Tamen, si tibi aliquis diceret numeros istos non ex aliqua sua natura, sed ex his rebus quas corporis sensu attingimus inpressos esse animo nostro quasi quasdam imagines quorumque visibilium, quid responderes? An tu quoque id putas? A. Quite right. You are not unpractised in these things, and I see you have quickly found your answer. Yet, if someone were to tell you that these numbers were impressed on our minds, not as a result of their own nature but as a result of those things we experience with the bodily sense, and were, so to speak, images of visible things, what would you answer? Do you agree with this?
2.8.21.82
EVODIUS. Nullo modo id putaverim. Non enim si sensu corporis percepi numeros, idcirco etiam rationem partitionis numerorum vel copulationis sensu corporis percipere potui. Hac enim luce mentis refello eum quisquis vel in addendo vel in retrahendo dum conputat falsam summam renuntiaverit. Et quicquid sensu corporis tango, veluti est hoc caelum et haec terra et quaecumque in eis alia corpora sentio, quamdiu futura sint nescio. 2.8.21.83 Septem autem et tria decem sunt et non solum nunc sed etiam semper neque ullo modo aliquando septem et tria non fuerunt decem aut aliquando septem et tria non erunt decem. Hanc ergo incorruptibilem numeri veritatem dixi mihi et cuilibet ratiocinanti esse communem. E. No, I could not agree. 17 Even if I perceived > numbers with my bodily sense, I should not as a result be able to perceive with my bodily sense the meaning of division or addition of numbers. By the light of my mind I check the man who reaches a wrong result in addition or subtraction. Whatever I become aware of with my bodily sense, whether heaven or earth or any bodily thing they contain, how long they will last I do not know. But seven and three are ten, not only now, but always. There has never been a time when seven and three were not ten, nor will there ever be. Therefore I have said that this incorruptible truth of number 1S is common to myself and to everyone who reasons. 22
2.8.22.84
AUGUSTINUS. Non resisto tibi verissima et certissima respondenti. Sed ipsos quoque numeros non per corporis sensus adtractos esse facile videbis, si cogitaveris quemlibet numerum tot vocari quotiens unum habuerit; verbi gratia, si bis habuerit unum duo vocantur, si ter tria, et si decics unum habent tunc vocantur decem, et quilibet omnino numerus quotiens habet unum hinc illi nomen est et tot appellatur. 2.8.22.85 Unum vero quisquis verissime cogitat profecto invenit corporis sensibus non posse sentiri. Quidquid enim tali sensu attingitur, iam non unum sed multa esse convincitur; corpus est enim et ideo habet innumerabiles partes. Sed ut minutas quasque minusque articulatas non persequar, quantulumcumque illud corpusculum sit, habet certe aliam partem dexteram aliam sinistram, aliam superiorem aliam inferiorem aut aliam ulteriorem aliam citeriorem aut alias finales aliam mediam. 2.8.22.86 Haec enim necesse est quamlibet exiguo corporis modulo inesse fateamur, et propterea nullum corpus vere pureque unum esse concedimus, in quo tamen non possent tam multa numerari nisi illius unius cognitione discreta. Cum enim quaero unum in corpore et me non invenire non dubito, novi utique quid ibi quaeram et quid ibi non inveniam et non posse inveniri vel potius omnino ibi non esse. 2.8.22.87 Ubi ergo novi quod non est corpus unum? Vnum enim si non nossem, multa in corpore numerare non possem. Ubicumque autem unum noverim, non utique per corporis sensum novi, quia per corporis sensum non novi nisi corpus, quod vere pureque unum non esse convincimus. Porro si unum non percepimus corporis sensu, nullum numerum eo sensu percepimus, eorum dumtaxat numerorum quos intellegentia cernimus. 2.8.22.88 Nullus est enim ex his qui non tot vocetur quotiens habet unum, cuius perceptio sensu corporis non fit. Cuiuslibet enim corpusculi pars dimidia, quamvis duabus totum constat, habet et ipsa dimidiam suam; sic ergo sunt illae duae partes in orpore ut nec ipsae simpliciter duae sint; numerus autem ille qui vocatur duo, quoniam bis habet ivud quod simpliciter unum est, non potest pars eius dimidia, id est illud ipsum quod simpliciter unum est, non potest rursus habere partem dimidi am vel tertiam vel quotamlibet, quoniam simplex et vere unum est. A. I do not dispute your answer; it is perfectly true and certain. But you will easily see that the numbers themselves are not perceived through the bodily senses, if you reflect that every number connotes a given amount of units. For example, if one is doubled it is two, if trebled three, if it has ten units it is ten. Any possible number is named according to the units it possesses, and is called this number. But if you have a true notion of 'one/ you certainly find that it cannot be perceived by the bodily senses. Whatever is the object of a bodily sense is proved to be many, and not one, because it is a bodily thing and so has countless parts. I need not dwell on each small and indistinct part; however small such a bodily part may be, it certainly has one part on the right, another on the left, one above and another below, one on the far side and > another on the near side, parts at the ends and a part in the middle. We are bound to admit this is so, on however small a scale. Consequently we grant that no bodily thing is perfectly one, yet all these many parts could not be counted, unless they were distinguished through knowledge of 'one.' I look for 'one' in a bodily thing, and undoubtedly do not find it. I know indeed what I am looking for, and what I do not find there; and I know that it cannot be found, or rather, that it is not there at all. While I know that a bodily thing is not one, I know what 'one' is. If I did not know 'one,' I could not count 'many' in a bodily thing. From whatever source I get my knowledge of 'one,' I do not get it through a bodily sense, for through a bodily sense I only know a bodily thing, which we can prove is not perfectly one. Moreover, if we do not perceive 'one' by a bodily sense, we perceive no number by that sense, none at least of those numbers we distinguish with the understanding. All of these are made up of a given quantity of units, and the bodily sense cannot perceive a unit. Half of any small bodily thing, whatever size the half may be, itself has a half. Thus there are two halves in a bodily thing, yet they themselves are not perfectly two. But, since the number we call two is twice what is perfectly one, its half, namely that which is perfectly one, cannot in its turn have a half, or a third, or any fraction, because it is perfectly one.
2.8.23.89
Deinde quoniam tenentes ordines numerorum post unum duo videmus, qui numerus ad unum collatus duplus invenitur, duplus duorum non consequenter adiungitur, sed interposito ternario quaternarius sequitur qui duplus est duorum. 2.8.23.90 Et haec ratio per omnes caeteros numeros certissima et incommutabili lege pertenditur, ut post unum, id est post prlmum omnium numerorum, ipso excepto primus sit qui duplum eius habet, duo enim sequuntur. post secundum autem, id est post duo, ipso excepto secundus sit qui duplum eius habet; post duo enim primus est ternarius, secundus quaternarius duplus secundi; post tertium, id est post ternarium, ipso excepto tertius sit qui duplus est eius; post tertium enim, id est post ternarium, primus est quaternarius, secundus quinarius, tertius senarius qui duplus est tertii. 2.8.23.91 Atque ita post quartum ipso excepto quartus habet duplum eius; post quartum enim, id est quaternarium, primus est quinarius, secundus senarius, tertius septenarius, quartus octonarius, qui duplex est quarti. Atque ita per omnes caeteros hoc reperies quod in prima copula numerorum id est uno et duobus inventum est, ut quotus quisque numerus est ab ipso principio, totus post illum sit duplus eius. 23 Then, if we keep the order of the numbers, after one we see two, and this number, compared > with one, is found to be double. Twice two does not come next, but three comes next, and then four, which is twice two. This pattern runs through all the other numbers by a sure and unchangeable law, so that after one, that is, after the first of all numbers (not counting the number itself) the next is that which doubles it, for the next is two. After the second number, that is, after two (not counting this number itself), the second is that which doubles it, for after two the first is three, while the second is four, which doubles two. After the third number, that is, after three (not counting this number itself), the third is its double, for after the third, that is, after three, the first is four, the second is five, and the third is six, which is double three. Similarly, after four (not counting this number itself) , the fourth is its double, for after the fourth, that is, after four, the first is five, the second is six, the third is seven, and the fourth is eight, which is double four. Through all the other numbers you will find what you found in the first two numbers, that is, in one and two: whatever the number may be, counting from the beginning, this same number being added to it the number you reach is its double.
2.8.23.92
Hoc ergo quod per omnes numeros esse immobile firmum incorruptumque conspicimus, unde conspicimus? Non enim ullus ullo sensu corporis omnes numeros attingit, innumerabiles enim sunt. Unde ergo novimus per omnes hoc esse, aut qua fantasia vel fantasmate tam certa veritas numeri per innumerabilia tam fidenter nisi in luce interiore conspicitur, quam corporalis sensus ignorat? How, then, do we recognise that this fact, which we recognise throughout all numbers, is unchangeable, sure, and certain? No one is aware of all numbers with any bodily sense, for they are innumerable. How, then, do we know that this holds good throughout them all? By what idea or image do we see so sure a truth so confidently > throughout innumerable instances, unless we do it by an inner light, unknown to the bodily sense? 24
2.8.24.93
His et talibus multis documentis coguntur fateri quibus disputantibus deus donavit ingenium et pertinacia caliginem non obducit, rationem veritatemque numerorum et ad sensus corporis non pertinere et invertibilem sinceramque consistere et omnibus ratiocinantibus ad videndum esse communem. 94. Quapropter, cum multa alia possint occurrere quae communiter et tamquam publice praesto sunt ratiocinantibus et ab eis videantur mente atque ratione singulorum quorumque cernentium eaque inuiolata et incommutabilia maneant, non tamen inuitus acceperim quod ista ratio et veritas numeri tibi potissimum occurrit, cum ad id quod interrogaveram respondere voluisses. 2.8.24.95 Non enim frustra in sanctis libris sapientiae coniunctus est numerus, ubi dictum est: "Circui ego et cor meum ut scirem et considerarem et quaererem sapientiam et numerum." By these and many other such proofs those to whom God has given the gift of reasoning and who are not darkened by obstinacy, must admit that the law and truth of number do not concern the bodily sense, that they are unalterably sure, and are perceived in common by all who reason. Many other things may suggest themselves which are presented in common and, as it were, publicly, to those who reason, and which are distinguished by each man's mind and reason individually, and yet remain entire and unchangeable. Nevertheless I was glad to hear that the law and truth of number were the first to suggest themselves to you, when you wished to answer my question. It is not without significance that in the Sacred Books number is joined to wisdom, where it is said: / and my heart went round about to know and consider and seek wisdom and number
2.9.25.96 Verumtamen, quaeso te, quid de ipsa sapientia putas exlstimandum? Singulas quasque suas arbitraris singulos quosque homines habere sapientias? an vero una praesto est communiter omnibus, cuius quanto magis quisque fit particeps tanto est sapientior? However, I ask you: what, in your opinion, should we think of wisdom itself? Do you suppose that each individual has his own individual wisdom, or that one wisdom is present to all in common, so that each man is wiser the more fully he shares in it?
2.9.25.97
EVODIUS. Quam dicas sapientiam nondum scio, video quippe varie videri hominibus quid fiat dicaturue sapienter. Nam et qui militant sapienter sibi facere videntur, et qui contempta militia colendo agro curam atque operam inpendunt, hoc potius laudant tribuuntque sapientiae, et qui astuti sunt ad excogitandos modos conquirendae pecuniae videntur sibi esse sapientes, et qui haec omnia neglegunt vel abiciunt et quaeque sunt huius modi temporalia et totum studium suum ad investigationem conferunt veritatis ut semet ipsos deumque cognoscant, magnum hoc esse sapientiae munus iudicant; 2.9.25.98 et qui huic otio quaerendi et contemplandi veri nolunt se dare, sed potius laboriosissimis curis et officiis agunt ut hominibus consulant, et in rerum humanarum iuste moderandarum et gubernandarum actione versantur, sapientes se esse arbitrant tur, et qui utrumque horum agunt et partim vivunt in contemplatione veritatis, partim in laboribus officiosis quos humanae societati deberi putant, sibi palmam sapientiae videntur tenere. 2.9.25.99 Omitto innumerabiles sectas, quarum nulla est quae non sectatores suos praeponens caeteris eos solos velit esse sapientes. Quam ob rem cum id nunc agatur inter nos ut non quid credamus respondendum sit, sed quid dilucida intellegentia teneamus, nullo modo tibi ad id quod interrogasti respondere potero, nisi quod credendo teneo, contemplando etiam et ratione cernendo noverim, quae sit ipsa sapientia. E. I do not yet know what you mean by wisdom. I see that men have different views as to what constitutes wise action or speech. Soldiers think they are acting wisely. Those who despise war and devote their energies to farming, regard this as preferable and believe they are wise. Those who > are clever at money-making think they are wise. Those who pay no attention to, or set aside, all this and all such temporal interests, and devote themselves entirely to the search for truth that they may know themselves and God, judge this the great work of wisdom. Those who refuse to surrender themselves peacefully to seek and contemplate the truth, but rather endure the laborious cares of public office in order to help their fellowmen, and take their part in the just management and direction of human affairs, think they are wise. Those who do both of these things, and engage themselves partly in the contemplation of truth, and partly in active works which they regard as a debt to society, think they are supremely wise. I leave aside countless groups, each of which prefers its members to others, and would like them alone to be wise. So, since our purpose is not to say what we believe, but what we hold with clear understanding, I could not possibly make any reply to your question unless besides holding by belief what wisdom itself is, I know this by contemplation and by the light of reason. 26
2.9.26.100
AUGUSTINUS. Num aliam putas esse sapientiam nisi veritatem in qua cernitur et tenetur summum bonum? Nam illi omnes, quos commemorasti diversa sectantes, bonum appetunt et malum fugiunt; sed propterea ditlersa sectantur quod aliud alii videtur bonum. Quisquis ergo appetit quod appetendum non erat, tametsiid non appeteret nisi ei videretur bonum, errat tamen. Errare autem neque ille potest qui nihil appetit neque ille qui hoc appetit quod debet appetere. 2.9.26.101 In quantum igitur omnes homines appetunt vitam beatam, non errant; in quantum autem quisque non eam tenet vitae viam quae ducit ad beatitudinem, cum se fateatur et profiteatur nolle nisi ad beatitudinem pervenire, in tantum crrat. Error est enim cum sequitur aliquid quod non ad id ducit quo volumus pervenire. 2.9.26.102 Et quanto magis in via vitae quis errat, tanto minus sapit. Tanto enim magis longe est a veritate, in qua cernitur et tenetur summum bonum. Summo autem bono adsecuto et adepto beatus quisque fit, quod omnes sine controversia volumus. Ut ergo constat nos beatos esse velle, ita nos constat esse velle sapientes, quia nemo sine sapientia beatus est. Nemo enim beatus est nisi summo bono, quod in ea veritate quam sapientiam vocamus cernitur et tenetur. 2.9.26.103 Sicut ergo antequam beati simus mentibus tamen nostris inpressa est notio beatitatis -- per hanc enim scimus fidenterque et sine ulla dubitatione dicimus beatos nos esse velle -- ita etiam priusquam sapientes simus, sapientiae notionem in mente habemus inpressam, per quam unus quisque nostrum, si interrogetur velitne esse sapiens, sine ulla caligine dubitationis se velle respondet. A. You do not think, do you, that there is any other wisdom but the truth, in which we distinguish and grasp the supreme good? All those, whom you have mentioned as following different aims, seek the good and shun evil, but they follow different aims because they have different opinions about the good. If a man seeks what ought not to be sought, he errs, even though he would not seek > it unless he thought it was good. But the man who seeks nothing cannot err, nor can he who seeks what he ought to seek. Therefore, in so far as all men seek a happy life, they are not in error. In so far, however, as anyone does not keep to the way of life which leads to happiness, even though he confesses and professes that he wishes only for happiness, to that extent he is in error. For error comes about when we follow an aim which does not lead us where we wish to go. The more a man errs in his way of life, the less wise he is, for to this extent he departs from the truth, in which the supreme good is distinguished and grasped. When the supreme good is sought and gained, a man is happy, and this we all undoubtedly desire. Therefore, just as we agree that we wish to be happy, so we agree that we wish to be wise, for no one is happy without wisdom. No one is happy without the supreme good, which is distinguished and grasped in that truth which we call wisdom. So, as, before we are happy, the idea of happiness is nevertheless impressed on our minds for through this idea we know and say confidently and without any doubt that we wish to be happy so too, before we are wise, we have the idea of wisdom impressed on the mind. It is through this idea that each of us, if asked whether he wishes to be wise, replies without any shadow of doubt that he does so wish.
2.9.27.104
Quare si iam constat inter nos quae sit sapientia, quam fortasse verbis explicare non poterasÑnam si eam nullo modo animo cerneres, nullo modo scires et velle te esse sapientem et velle debere, quod te negaturum esse non arbitror -- volo iam dicas mihi utrum etiam sapientiam sicut numeri rationem et veritatem omnibus ratiocinantibus communem se praebere arbitreris, an, quoniam tot sunt mentes hominum quot homines sunt, unde nec ego de tua mente aliquid cerno nec tu de mea, tot etiam putes esse sapientias quot potuerunt esse sapientes. 27 So, if we agree what wisdom is, I want you to tell me whether you think wisdom is presented in common to all who reason, as is the law and truth > of number, or whether you think there are as many different wisdoms as there could be different wise men. For each man has a different mind, so that I can see nothing of your mind, nor you of mine. It may be that you cannot explain the nature of wisdom in words, yet, if you did not see it with your mind in any way, you would not know at all that you wished to be wise, and that you had a duty so to wish a fact I think you will not deny.
2.9.27.105
EVODIUS. Si summum bonum omnibus unum est, oportet etiam veritatem in qua cernitur et tenetur, id est sapientiam, omnibus unam esse communem. E. If the supreme good is the same for all, the truth in which it is distinguished and grasped, that is to say, wisdom, must be the same, shared in common by all.
AUGUSTINUS. Dubitas autem summum bonum, quicquid illud est, omnibus hominibus unum esse? A. Do you doubt that the supreme good, whatever it is, is the same for all men?
EVODIUS. Dubito sane, quod diversos diversis rcbus gaudere video tamquam summis bonis suis. E. Yes, I am doubtful about this, because I see men taking pleasure in different things as their supreme goods.
2.9.27.106
AUGUSTINUS. Vellem quidem, ut de summo bono ita nemo dubitaret, ut nemo dubitat quicquid illud est non nisi eo adepto posse fieri hominem beatum. Sed quoniam magna quaestio est et longum sermonem forte desiderat, putemus omnino, tot summa bona esse quot sunt ipsae res diversae quae a diversis tamquam summa bona appetuntur. Num ideo sequitur ut etiam ipsa sapientia non sit una communis omnibus, quia ea bona quac in illa cernunt et eligunt homines multa et diversa sunt? 2.9.27.107 Si enim hoc putas, potes et de luce solis dubitare quod una sit, quia multa et diversa sunt quae in ea cernimus. De quibus multis eligit quisque pro voluntate quo fruatur per oculorum sensum; et alius altitudinem montis alicuius libenter intuetur et eo gaudet aspectu, alius campi planitiem, alius convexa vallium, alius nemorum viriditatem, alius mobilem aequalitatem maris, alius haec omnia vel quaedam horum simul plura confert ad laetitiam videndi. 2.9.27.108 Sicut ergo ista multa et diversa sunt quae in luce solis homines vident et eligunt ad fruendum, lux tamen ipsa una, in qua videt et tenet quo fruatur unius cuiusque intuentis aspcctus, ita, etiam si multa sunt bona eaque diversa, e quibus eligat quisque quod volet idque videndo et tenendo ad fruendum summum sibi bonum recte vereque constituat, fieri tamen potest ut lux ipsa sapientiae, in qua haec videri et teneri possunt, omnibus sapientibus sit una communis. A. I should like no one to doubt about the supreme good, just as no one doubts that, whatever it is, no man can become happy unless he gains it. Since, however, this is a large question, and may demand a long discussion, let us by all means suppose that there are as many supreme goods as there are different objects sought as supreme goods by different men. Surely it does not follow that wisdom itself is not the same, shared in common by all men, because those goods which they distinguish through it and choose, are many different goods? If this is your opinion, you may doubt that the light of the sun is one, because we see in it many different things. Of these many things each > chooses what to enjoy with his sense of sight. One man likes to look at a high mountain and enjoy its view, another a fiat plain, another a curving valley, another green woods, another the level, restless sea. Another takes together all or several of these beautiful 21 things for the joy of looking at them. 22 The objects are many and varied which men see in the light of the sun and which they choose for their enjoyment, yet the light of the sun is itself one in which the gaze of each beholder sees and grasps an object to enjoy. So too the goods are many and varied from which each man chooses what he wants, and, seeing and grasping his choice, constitutes it rightly and truly the supreme good for his enjoyment. Yet the very light of wisdom, in which these things can be seen and grasped, may be one light shared in common by all wise men.
2.9.27.109
EVODIUS. Fateor fieri posse nec inpedire aliquid ut non sit omnibus communis una sapientia, etiam si multa et diversa sint summa bona. Sed vellem scire an ita sit. Quod enim concedimus fieri posse ut ita sit, non continuo ita esse concedimus. E. I agree that this is possible, and nothing prevents the same wisdom being common to all, even though the supreme goods are many and varied; but I would like to know whether it is so. Because we grant it is possible, we do not necessarily grant it is so.
AUGUSTINUS. Tenemus interim esse sapientiam, sed utrum sit communis una omnibus an singuli sapientes suas habeant sicut animas vel mentes Sllas, hoc nondum tenemus. A. Meanwhile we know that wisdom exists. Whether there is one wisdom shared in common by all, or whether each man has his own wisdom, just as he has his own soul or mind, we do not yet know.
EVODIUS. Ita est. E. That is true.
2.10.28.110 > IN TRUTH WE FIND GOD
AUGUSTINUS. Quid? hoc quod tenemus vel esse sapientiam vel sapientes et beatos esse omnes homines velle, ubi videmus? Nam hoc te videre et verum esse nullo modo utique dubitaverim. Hoc ergo verum sic vides ut cogitationem tuam, quam si mihi non enunties, ego prorsus ignoro? an ita, ut intellegas et a me videri posse hoc verum, tametsi mihi abs te non dicatur? A. Well then, where do we see this fact which we knowthat wisdom or wise men exist, and that all men wish to be happy? I certainly should not doubt that you do see this and that it is true. Do you, therefore, see this is true in the same way that you see your thoughts, which I am entirely ignorant of unless you inform me? Or do you see it to be true in such a way that you understand it can be seen to be true by me also, though you do not tell me?
2.10.28.111
EVODIUS. Immo ut abs te quoque, etiam me inuito, videri posse non dubitem. E. Certainly in such a way that I do not doubt you also can see it, even against my will.
AUGUSTINUS. Quod ergo unum verum videmus ambo singulis menti bus, nonne utrique nostrum commune est? A. Hence, is not the one truth common to both of us, which we both see with our individual minds?
EVODIUS. Manifestissime. E Quite clearly so.
AUGUSTINUS. Item credo te non negare studendum esse sapientiae atque hoc verum esse concedere. A. I think you do not deny that we should devote ourselves to wisdom. I think you grant this is true.
EVODIUS. Prorsus non dubito. E. I certainly do not doubt it.
2.10.28.112
AUGUSTINUS. Hoc item verum et unum esse et omnibus qui hoc sciunt ad videndum esse commune, quamvis unus quisque id nec mea nec tua nec cuiusquam alterius, sed sua mente conspiciat, cum id quod conspicitur omnibus conspicientibus communiter praesto sit, numquid negare poterimus? A. Can we deny that this is true, and one, and common to the sight of all who know it, although each sees it with his own mind, and not with yours or mine or anyone else's? For that which is seen is present in common to all who see it.
EVODIUS. Nullo modo. E. This is undeniable.
2.10.28.113
AUGUSTINUS. Item iuste esse videndum, deteriora melioribus esse subdenda et paria paribus conparanda et propria suis quibusque tribuenda nonne fateberis esse verissimum et tam mihi quam tibi atque omnibus id videntibus praesto esse communiter? A. Will you not also agree that the following propositions are absolutely true, and are present in common to you and me and all who see them: we ought to live justly; the better should be preferred > to the worse; like should be compared with like; every man should be given his due?
EVODIUS. Adsentior. E. I agree.
2.10.28.114
AUGUSTINUS. Quid? incorruptum melius esse corrupto, aeternum temporali, inuiolabile violabili poteris negare? A.Could you deny that the incorrupt is better than the corrupt, the eternal than the temporal, that which cannot be injured than that which can be injured?
EVODIUS. Quis potest? E. No one could deny it.
AUGUSTINUS. Hoc ergo verum potest quisque suum proprium dicere, cum incommutabiliter contemplandum adsit omnibus qui hoc contemplari valent? A. So everyone can call this truth his own, though it is present without change to the sight of all who are able to behold it?
EVODIUS. Nullus hoc vere dixerit suum esse proprium, cum tam sit unum atque omnibus commune quam verum est. E. No one could truthfully say it was his own property, since it is one and common to all, just as much as it is true.
2.10.28.115
AUGUSTINUS. Item a corruptione avertendum animum atque ad incorruptionem convertendum esse, id est non corruptionem sed incorruptionem diligendam esse quis negat? Aut quis, cum verum esse fateatur, non etiam incommutabile intellegat atque omnibus mentibus id llalentibus intueri communiter praesto esse videat? A. Again, who denies that we should turn the heart away from what is corrupt and towards what is incorrupt, that is, that we should love not what is corrupt but what is healthy? When a man admits a truth, does he not also understand that it is unchangeable and present in common to all minds which are able to see it?
EVODIUS. Verissimum est. E. That is perfectly true.
AUGUSTINUS. Quid? eam vitam quae nullis adversitatibus de certa et honesta sententia demovetur, dubitavit aliquis esse meliorem quam eam quae facile incommodis temporalibus frangitur atque subuertitur? A. Will anyone doubt that a life is better, if no difficulty can move it from a firm, virtuous purpose, than if it is easily shaken and upset by the troubles of this life?
EVODIUS. Quis dubitaverit? E. Undoubtedly. 29
2.10.29.116
AUGUSTINUS. Iam huius modi plura non quaeram. Satis est enim guod istas tamquam regulas et quaedam lumina virtutum et vera et incommutabilia et sive singula sive omnia communiter adesse ad contemplandum eis qui haec valent sua quisque ratione ac mente conspicere, pariter mecum vides certissimumque esse concedis. Sed sane quaero utrum haec tibi videantur ad sapientiam pertinere. Nam credo videri tibi eum qui sapientiam adsecutus est esse sapientem. A. I will not ask any more questions about this. It is enough that you see, as I do, and admit to be quite certain that those principles and illuminations, so to speak, in which the virtues appear, are true and unchangeable and, whether separately or > all together, are present in common to the sight of those who can see them, each with his own reason and mind. But I do ask this question, whether you think these are concerned with wisdom. I believe that in your opinion a man is wise who has gained wisdom.
2.10.29.117
EVODIUS. Videtur omnino. E. That is certainly my opinion.
AUGUSTINUS. Quid? Ille qui iuste vivit, possetne ita vivere nisi videret quae inferiora quibus potioribus subdat et quae paria sibimet copulet et quae propria suis quibusque distribuat? A. Well, could a man, who lives justly, so live unless he saw what were the higher things he should prefer to the lower, what were the like things he should put together, and what were the things he should assign as due to each?
EVODIUS. Non posset. E. No, he could not.
AUGUSTINUS. Qui ergo haec videt, num eum negabis sapienter videre? A. You will not deny, will you, that the man who sees these things sees them wisely?
EVODIUS. Non nego. E.-No.
AUGUSTINUS. Quid? ille qui prudenter vivit, nonne eligit incorruptionem et eam corruptioni praeponendam esse decernet? A. Well, does not the man who lives prudently choose the incorrupt, and judge that it should be preferred to corruption?
EVODIUS. Manifestissime. E.-Clearly.
AUGUSTINUS. Cum ergo id eligit quo convertat animum, quod eligendum esse nemo ambigit, num negari potest sapienter eligere? A. Then I suppose it cannot be denied that he chooses wisely, when he chooses to turn his soul to what no one doubts ought to be chosen?
EVODIUS. Nullo modo negaverim. E. I certainly should not deny it.
AUGUSTINUS. Cum ergo ad id quod sapienter eligit convertit animum, sapienter utique convertit. A. So when he turns his soul to a wise choice, he does so wisely.
EVODIUS. Certissimum est. E. Most certainly.
AUGUSTINUS. Et qui ab eo quod sapienter eligit et quo se sapienter convertit, nullis terroribus poenisque depellitur, sapienter sine dubio facit. A. -And the man who is deterred by no threat or penalty from that which he chooses wisely, and to which he is wise in turning, undoubtedly acts wisely.
EVODIUS. Prorsus sine dubio. E. Beyond any doubt. >
2.10.29.118
AUGUSTINUS. Manifestissimum est igitur omnes has quas regulas diximus et lumina virtutum ad sapientiam pertinere quando quidem quanto magis quisque ad agendam vitam eis utitur et secundum haec agit vitam, tanto magis vivit facitque sapienter; omne autem quod sapienter fit non potest recte dici a sapientia esse separatum. A. So it is quite clear that those principles and illuminations, as we have called them, in which the virtues appear, concern wisdom. The more a man uses them in living his life, and the more he passes his life in conformity with them, the more wisely he lives and acts. But nothing which is done wisely can rightly be called distinct from wisdom.
EVODIUS. Omnino ita est. E. Certainly not.
2.10.29.119
AUGUSTINUS. Quam ergo verae atque incommutabiles sunt regulae numerorum, quorum rationem atque veritatem incommutabiliter atque communiter omnibus eam cernentibus praesto esse dixisti, tam sunt verae atque incommutabiles regulae sapientiae, de quibus paucis nunc singillatim interrogatus respondisti esse veras atque manifestas easque omnibus qui haec intueri valent communes ad contemplandum adesse concedis. A Therefore the principles of number are true and unchangeable; their law and truth are, as you said, present unchangeably and in common to all who see them. In the same way the principles of wisdom are true and unchangeable. When I asked you about a few instances of these, you replied that they were manifestly true, and you grant that they are present to the sight of all in common who are able to behold them. 23
2.11.30.120
EVODIUS. Dubitare non possum. Sed peruellem scire utrum uno aliquo genere contineantur haec duo, sapientia scilicet et numerus, quia coniuncta etiam in scripturis sanctis haec posita esse commemorasti, an alterum existat ab altero aut alterum in altero consistat veluti numerus a sapientia vel in sapientia. 2.11.30.121 Nam sapientiam existere a numero aut consistere in numero non ausim dicere. Nescio quo enim modo, quia multos novi numerarios aut numeratores vel si quo alio nomine vocandi sunt qui summe atque mirabiliter computant, sapientes autem perpaucos aut forsitan neminem, longe venerabilior mihi occurrit sapientia quam numerus. E. I cannot doubt it. But I should very much like to know whether these two, wisdom and number, are contained in any one class, because you mentioned that they are coupled together in Holy Scripture. Does one depend on the other, or is one included in the other; does number, for example, depend on wisdom, or is it included in wisdom? I should not dare to say that wisdom depends on number or is included in number. Because I know many mathematicians, or accountants, or whatever they should be called, who make wonderfully clever calculations, but very few, if any, wise men; somehow or other wisdom appears to me far nobler than number.
2.11.30.122
AUGUSTINUS. Rem dicis quam ego quoque mirari soleo. Nam cum incommutabilem veritatem numerorum mecum ipse considero et eius quasi cubile ac penetrale vel regionem quandam vel si quod aliud nomen aptum inveniri potest quo nominemus quasi habitaculum quoddam sedemque numerorum, longe removeor a corpore. Et inveniens fortasse aliquid quod cogitare possim, non tamen aliquid inveniens quod verbis proferre sufficiam, redeo tamquam lassatus in haec nostra ut loqui possim, et ea quae ante oculos sita sunt dico sicut dici solent. 2.11.30.123 Hoc mihi accidit etiam cum de sapientia, quantum valeo, vigilantissime atque intentissime cogito. Et propterea multum miror, cum haec duo sint in secretissima certissimaque veritate, accedente etiam testimonio scripturarum quo commemoravi coniuncte illa posita, plurimum miror, ut dixi, quare numerus vilis sit multitudini hominum et cara sapientia. Sed nimirum illud est, quod una quaedam eademque res est. 2.11.30.124 Verumtamen, quoniam nihilominus in divinis libris de sapientia dicitur quod "adtingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit omnia suaviter": ea potentia, qua fortiter a fine usquem ad finem adtingit, numerus fortasse dicitur, ea vero, qua disponit omnia suaviter, sapientia proprie iam vocatur cum sit utrumque unius eiusdemque sapientiae. A. You speak of something at which I also often > wonder. When I meditate on the unchangeable truth of number, and, so to speak, its home or sanctuary, or whatever word is suitable to describe the place where number resides, I am carried far away from the body. 24 Finding, it may be, something which I can think of, but not finding anything I can express in words, I return, worn out, to familiar things in order to speak, and I express in ordinary language what lies before my eyes. The same thing happens to me when I concentrate my thoughts with the fullest attention that I can, on wisdom. I wonder much, since both of these are established in the most secret and certain truth, and in view also of the witness of Scripture, which, as I have mentioned, couples them together, I wonder very much indeed, as I say, why number is of little value to most men, while wisdom is precious to them. The fact, however, surely is that somehow they are one and the same thing. Yet, since Sacred Scripture says about wisdom that she reacheth from end to end mightily and ordereth all things sweetly y 23 that power by which she reacheth from end to end mightily perhaps signifies number, and that by which she ordereth all things sweetly refers directly to wisdom, though both belong to one and the same wisdom.
2.11.31.125
Sed quia dedit numeros omnibus rebus etiam infimis et in fine rerum locatis -- et corpora enim omnia, quamvis in rebus extrema sint, habent numeros suos, sapere autem non dedit corporibus neque animis omnibus, sed tantum rationalibus, tamquam in eis sibi sedem locaverit de qua disponat omnia illa etiam infima quibus numeros dedit -- itaque quoniam de corporibus facile iudicamus tamquam de rebus quae infra nos ordinatae sunt, quiblls inpressos numeros cernimus, putamus etiam ipsos numeros infra nos esse et eos propterea vilius habemus. 2.11.31.126 Sed cum coeperimus tamquam sursum versus recurrere, invenimlls eos etiam nostras mentes transcendere atque incommutabiles in ipsa manere veritate. Et quia sapere pauci possunt, numerare autem stultis concessum est, mirantur homines sapientiam numerosque contemnunt. Docti autem et studiosi quantum remotiores sunt a Iabe terrena, tanto magis et numerum et sapientiam in ipsa veritate contuentur et utrumque carum habent; et in eius veritatis conparatione non eis aurum et argentum et caetera de quibus homines dimicant, sed ipsi etiam vilescunt sibi. Wisdom has given numbers to all things, even the lowest and those ranked least of all; all bodily things, though they are below everything else, possess these numbers. But it has not given the power to be wise to bodily things, nor to all souls, but > only to rational souls. It is as if it has made its dwelling among them, so that from there it may set in order all those things, even the lowest, to which it has given numbers. Therefore, since we judge easily about bodily things as things belonging to a lower rank than ours, and see the numbers impressed on them are lower than we are, 26 for this reason we hold numbers of little value. But, when we begin, as it were, to mount upward, we find that numbers pass beyond our minds and abide unchangeably in truth itself. Because few can be wise, while it is granted even to fools to count, men admire wisdom but despise number. Learned students, the further they are removed from the grossness of earth, the more clearly they see number and wisdom in truth itself, and hold both precious. Compared with the truth, not only gold and .silver and the other things for which men strive, but even they themselves appear worthless.
2.11.32.127
Nec mireris numeros ideo viluisse hominibus et caram esse sapientiam quia facilius possunt numerare quam sapere, cum videas carius illos habere aurum quam lumen lucernae, cui conparatum aurum ridetur. Sed honoratur amplius res longe inferior, quia lucernam sibi et mendicus accendit, aurum vero pauci habent; quamquam sapientia absit ut in conparatione numeri inveniatur inferior, cum eadem sit, sed oculum quo id cerni possit inquirat. 2.11.32.128 Sed quem ad modum in uno igne consubstantialis, ut ita dicam, sentitur fulgor et calor nec separari ab invicem possunt, calor tamen ad ea pervenit quae prope admoventur, fulgor vero etiam longius latiusque diffunditur, sic intellegentiae potentia quae inest sapientiae propinquiora feruescunt, sicuti sunt animae rationales, ea vero quae remotiora sunt sicuti corpora non adtingit calore sapiendi, sed perfundit lumine numerorum. 2.11.32.129 Quod tibi fortassis obscurum est, non enim ulla visibilis similitudo inuisibili rei potest ad omnem convenientiam coaptari. Tantum illud adtende, quod et quaestioni quam suscepimus satis est et humilioribus etiam mentibus quales sumus sese manifestat, quia, etsi clarum nobis esse non potest utrum in sapientia vel ex sapientia numerus an ipsa sapientia ex numero an in numero sit an utrumque nomen unius rei possit ostendi, illud certe manifestum est utrumque verum esse et incommutabiliter verum. 32 Number seems of little value to men, and wisdom precious, because they can count numbers more easily than they can acquire wisdom. Do not be surprised at this, for you see that men regard gold as more precious than the light of a lamp, though it is absurd to value gold in comparison. But they honour more highly a thing much lower because even a beggar lights his lamp, and only a few have gold. I do not suggest for a moment that wisdom is found lower when compared to number, since it is the same; but it demands an eye capable of discerning it. 27 > Light and heat are perceived, fused together, so to speak, from one fire, and cannot be separated from each other; yet heat is communicated to what is put near the fire, while light is diffused far and wide. So too the power of understanding which wisdom contains, heats what is closer to it, such as a rational soul, but does not affect what is more distant, such as bodily things, with the warmth of wisdom; it only shines on them with the light of number. Perhaps this is obscure to you, but no analogy from a visible thing can be made applicable in every respect to what is invisible. Only notice this point, which is sufficient for our problem and is apparent even to more lowly minds such as our own. Although we cannot be clear whether number resides in wisdom or is derived from wisdom, or whether wisdom itself is derived from number or resides in number, or whether both terms can be shown to refer to the same thing, yet it is certainly plain that both are true, and true unchangeably.
2.12.33.130
Quapropter nullo modo negaveris esse incommutabilem veritatem, haec omnia quae incommutabiliter vera sunt continentem, quam non possis dicere tuam vel meam vel cuiusquam hominis, sed omnibus incommutabilia vera cerneni tibus tamquam miris modis secretum et publicum lumen praesto esse ac se praebere communiter. 2.12.33.131 Omne autem quod communiter omnibus ratiocinantibus atque intellegentibus praesto est, ad ullius eorum proprie naturam pertinere quis dixerit? Meministi enim, ut opinor, quid de sensibus corporis pallla ante tractatum sit: ea scilicet quae oculorum vel aurium sensu communiter tangimus, sicuti sunt colores et soni, quos ego et tu simul videmus vel simul audimus, non pertinere ad oculorum nostrorum auriumue naturam sed ad sentiendum nobis esse communia. 2.12.33.132 Sic ergo etiam illa quae ego et tu communiter propria quisque mente conspicimus, nequaquam dixeris ad mentis alicuius nostrum pertinere naturam. Duorum enim oculi quod simul vident, nec huius nec illius oculos esse poteris dicere, sed aliquid tertium in quod utriusque conferatur aspectus. Therefore you would by no means deny that there exists unchangeable truth, containing all those things which are unchangeably true. You could not call this yours or mine or any man's, but it is present and off ers itself in common to all who behold unchangeable truths, like a light which in a wonderful fashion is both secret and public. No one could say that anything which is present in common to all who have reason and understanding belongs to the nature of one individual. You remember, I think, our discussion a little > while ago about the bodily senses. 28 We decided that the common objects of the sense of sight or of hearing colours and sounds, for instance, which you and I both see at the same time do not share the nature of our eyes or ears, but are common objects of perception. So you would certainly not say that what you and I perceive in common, each with his own mind, shares the nature of the mind of either of us. You could not say that what the eyes of two people see at the same time is the eyes of either of them; it is something else to which both of them direct their sight.
EVODIUS. Apertissimum atque verissimum est. E. That is manifestly true. 34
2.12.34.133
AUGUSTINUS. Hanc ergo veritatem de qua iam diu loquimur et in qua tam multa conspicimus, excellentiorem putas esse quam mens nostra est an aequalem mentibus nostris an etiam inferiorem? Sed si esset inferior, non secundum illam sed de illa iudicaremus, sicut iudicamus de corporibus quia infra sunt, et dicimus ea plerumque non tantum ita esse vel non ita, sed ita vel non ita esse debere, sic et de animis nostris non solum ita esse animum novimus, sed plerumque etiam ita esse debere. 2.12.34.134 Et de corporibus quidem sic iudicamus cum dicimus 'minus candidum est quam debuit, aut 'minus quadrum et multa similiter; de animis vero 'minus aptus est quam debet, aut 'minus lenis, aut 'minus uehemens', sicut nostrorum morum se ratio tulerit. Et iudicamus haec secundum illas interiores regulas veritatis quas communiter cernimus, de ipsis vero nullo modo quis iudicat. Cum enim quis dixerit aeterna temporalibus esse potiora aut septem et tria decem esse, nemo dicit esse debuisse, sed tantum ita esse cognoscens non examinator corrigit, sed tantum laetatur inventor. A. Do you think that this truth, about which we have been talking for such a long time, and in which, though one, we see so many things, is higher than our minds, or equal to them, or lower? If it were lower, we should make judgments about it, not in accordance with it. We make judgments about bodily things because they are lower; we often say not only that such and such is true of them, but also that it ought to be. Similarly, not only do we know that our souls are in a particular state, but often that they ought to be. And in the same way we judge about bodily things, and say, It is not so bright as it ought to be,' or 'not so square/ and so on; and of souls, c lt is not so ready as it ought to be/ or 'not so gentle/ or 'not so vigorous/ according to the nature of our character. In making these judgments we follow the principles of truth within us, which we see in common. > No one ever makes these the object of a judgment. When a man says that the eternal is superior to the temporal, or that seven and three are ten, no one asserts that it ought to be so, but, knowing it is so, we rejoice to make the discovery without scrutinising and trying to correct it.
2.12.34.135
Si autem esset aequalis mentibus nostris haec veritas, mutabilis etiam ipsa esset. Mentes enim nostrae aliquando eam minus aliquando eam plus vident et ex hoc fatentur se esse mutabiles, cum illa in se manens nec proficiat cum plus a nobis videtur nec deficiat cum minus, sed integra et incorrupta et conversus laetificet lumine et aversos puniat caecitate. 2.12.34.136 Quid, quod etiam de ipsis mentibus nostris secundum illam iudicamus, cum de illa nullo modo iudicare possimus? Dicimus enim 'minus intellegit quam debet, aut 'tantum quantum debet intellegit'. Tantum autem mens debet intellegere quantum propius admoveri atque inherere potuerit incommutabili veritati. Quare si nec inferior nec aequalis est, restat ut sit superior atque excellentior. If this truth were on an equality with our minds, it would itself be subject to change. Sometimes our minds see it more clearly, sometimes less clearly, and as a result they admit themselves to be subject to change. The truth, however, abiding in itself, gains nothing when we see it more clearly, and loses nothing when we see it less clearly, but, whole and sound, it gladdens with its light those who are turned towards it, and punishes with blindness those who are turned away from it. Again, we judge about our own minds according to the truth, though we can by no means judge about the truth itself. We say, 'our mind understands less than it ought,' or, 'it understands as much as it ought.' But the mind ought to understand more in proportion as it approaches, and clings to, the unchangeable truth. Hence if the truth is neither inferior to nor equal to our minds, it can only be higher and more noble.
2.13.35.137
Promiseram autem, si meministi, me tibi demonstraturum esse aliquid quod sit nostra mente atque ratione sublimius. Ecce tibi est ipsa veritas: amplectere illam si potes et fruere illa et "delectare in domino et dabit tibi petitiones cordis tui". Quid enim petis amplius quam ut beatus sis? Et quid beatius eo qui fruitur inconcussa et incommutabili et excellentissima veritate? 2.13.35.138 An vero clamant, homines beatos se esse, cum pulchra corpora magno desiderio concupita sive coniugum sive etiam meretricum amplexantur, et nos in amplexu veritatis beatos esse dubitabimus? Clamant homines se beatos esse cum aestu aridis faucibus ad fontem abundantem salubremque perveniunt aut esurientes prandium cenamue ornatam copiosamque reperiunt, et nos negabimus beatos esse, cum irrigamur pascimurque veritate? 2.13.35.139 Solemus audire voces clamantium se beatos, si iaceant in rosa et aliis floribus vel etiam unguentis odoratissimis perfruantur: quid fraglantius, quid iocundius inspiratione veritatis? et dubitamus nos cum ab illa inspiramur dicere beatos? Multi beatam vitam in cantu vocum et neruorum et tibiarum sibi constituunt, et cum ea sibi desunt se miseros iudicant, cum autem adsunt efferuntur laetitia: et nos cum mentibus nostris sine ullo strepitu, ut ita dicam, canorum et facundum quoddam silentium veritatis inlabitur, aliam beatam vitam quaerimlls et tam certa et praesente non fruimur? 2.13.35.140 Luce auri et argenti, luce gemmarum et aliorum colorum sive ipsius lucis, quae ad hos oculos pertinet sive in ignibus terrenis sive in stellis vel luna vel sole, claritate et iocunditate delectati homines, cum ab ista laetitia nullis molestiis nulla indigentia reuocantur, beati sibi videntur et propter haec semper volunt vivere: et nos in luce veritatis beatam vitam collocare metuimus? I had promised, you may remember, to show you something higher than our mind and reason. This thing is truth itself. Embrace it if you can, and enjoy it; and delight in the Lord, and He 'will give thee the requests of thy heart What more do you ask than to be happy? What is happier > than the man who enjoys the firm, unchangeable, most excellent truth? Men declare they are happy when they embrace the fair bodies, ardently desired, of wives and even of harlots, and can we doubt of our happiness in the embrace of truth? Men declare they are happy when with parched throats they reach an abundant and healthful spring of water, or when they are hungry and discover a dinner or supper, richly furnished. Shall we deny our happiness when we are given the food and drink of truth? We often hear men declare they are happy if they lie amid roses and other flowers, or enjoy the sweet smell of ointments. What is more fragrant, what more delightful, than the inspiration of truth? Do we hesitate to call ourselves happy, when so inspired? Many place their lives' happiness in song, in the music of lyre and flute: when these are missing, they count themselves wretched; when these are present, they are transported with joy. When the truth, tuneful and eloquent in its silence, falls noiselessly, as it were, upon our minds, shall we seek elsewhere for a happy life, and not enjoy that which is so sure and so near at hand? Men take delight in gleaming gold and silver, in glittering gems and colours, in the light itself which our eyes perceive in fire upon the earth, or in the stars, the moon, or the sun; men take delight in the splendour and graciousness of these things. When neither poverty nor trouble keeps them from such enjoyment, they count themselves happy and for these > things they wish to live forever. Are we afraid to set the happiness of life in the light of truth?
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Immo vero quoniam in veritate cognoscitur et tenetur summum bonum eaque veritas sapientia est, cernamus in ea teneamusque summum bonum eoque perfruamur. Beatus est quippe qui fruitur summo bono. Haec enim veritas ostendit omnia bona quae vera sunt, quae sibi suo captu intellegentes homines vel singula vel plura eligunt quibus fruantur. 2.13.36.142 Sed quem ad modum illi, qui in luce solis eligunt quod libenter aspiciant, et eo aspectu laetificantur -- in quibus si qui forte fuerint uegetioribus sanisque et fortissimis oculis praediti, nihil libentius quam ipsum solem contuentur, qui etiam caetera quibus infirmiores oculi delectantur inlustrat -- sic fortis acies mentis et uegeta, cum multa vera et incommutabilia certa ratione conspexerit, diriget in ipsam veritatem qua cuncta monstrantur, eique inherens tamquam obliviscitur caetera et in illa simul omnibus fruitur. Quidquid enim iocundum est in caeteris veris, ipsa utique veritate iocundum est. Since the supreme good is known and grasped in the truth, and since that truth is wisdom, let us see in wisdom the supreme good, and grasp and enjoy it. The man who enjoys the supreme good is indeed happy. The truth shows men all the things which are truly good, and each man, understanding these according to his capacity, chooses for his enjoyment one or several of them. Among those who choose an object to look at in the light of the sun and who take pleasure in the sight, some may possess strong, healthy, vigorous eyes, and these men are perfectly ready to gaze at the sun itself, which also illuminates other objects in which weaker eyes take pleasure. So too a strong, vigorous, mental gaze, when it sees with certainty many unchangeable truths, turns to the truth itself in which all things are shown; to this it clings as though forgetful of all else, and in it enjoys all things together. For whatever is delightful in other truths, owes its delightfulness to the truth itself. 30
2.13.37.143
Haec est libertas nostra, cum isti subdimur veritati et ipse est deus noster qui nos liberat a morte, id est a condicione peccati. Ipsa enim veritas etiam homo cum hominibus loquens ait credentibus sibi: "Si manseritis in verbo meo, vere discipuli mei estis et cognoscetis veritatem et veritas liberabit vos". Nulla enim re fruitur anima cum Iibertate nisi qua fruitur cum securitate. 37 Our freedom consists in submission to the truth, and it is our God Himself who frees us from death, that is, from the state of sin. For truth itself, speaking as a man with men, says to those who believe in Him: // you continue in my word, you shall be my disciples, indeed, and you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.** The soul enjoys nothing with freedom unless it enjoys it securely.
2.14.36.144
Nemo autem securus est in his bonis quae potest inuitus amittere. Veritatem autem atque sapientiam nemo amittit inuitus. Non enim locis separari ab ea quisquam potest, sed ea, quae dicitur a veritate atque sapientia separatio, peruersa voluntas est, qua inferiora diliguntur. Nemo autem vult aliquid nolens. 2.14.36.145 Habemus igitur qua fruamur omnes aequaliter atque communiter, nullae sunt angustiae, nullus in ea defectus. Omnes amatores suos nullo modo sibi inuidos recipit et omnibus communis est et singulis casta est. Nemo alicui dicit: 'Recede ut etiam ego accedam, remove manus ut etiam ego amplectar'. 2.14.36.146 Omnes inherent, id ipsum omnes tangunt. Cibus eius nulla ex parte discerpitur; nihil de ipsa bibis quod ego non possim. Non enim ab eius communione in privatum tuum mutas aliquid, sed quod tu de illa capis et mihi integrum manet. Quod te inspirat non exspecto, ut reddatur abs te et sic ego inspirer ex eo; non enim aliquid eius aliquando fit cuiusquam unius aut quorundam proprium, sed simul omnibus tota est communis. > No one, however, possesses securely those goods, which he can lose against his will. But no one loses truth and wisdom against his will, for no one can be separated from them physically. That which we call separation from truth and wisdom is a perverted will, which loves lower things. No one wishes for something against his will. We have, therefore, in the truth a possession which we can all enjoy equally and in common; there is nothing wanting or defective in it. It receives all its lovers without stirring their envy; it welcomes all, and is chaste with each. One man does not say to another: go back and let me come; take away your hands and let me embrace it. All cling to it; all touch it at the same time. It is a food which is never divided; you drink nothing from it which I cannot drink. When you share in it, you make nothing your private possession; what you take from it still remains whole for me too. I do not wait until you surrender the inspiration it gives you before I can be inspired; no one ever takes any part of it for his private use, but it is wholly common to all at the same time. 32
2.14.38.147
Minus ergo ea quae tangimus vel quae gustamus vel quae olfacimus huic sunt veritati similia, sed magis ea quae audimus et cernimus, quia et omne verbum a quibus auditur totum auditur ab omnibus et simul a singulis totum et species omnis quae oculis adiacet, quanta videtur ab uno, tanta et ab alio simul. 2.14.38.148 Sed multum longo interuallo sunt ista similia; nec tota enim simul sonat quaelibet vox, quia per tempora tenditur et producitur et aliud eius prius sonat aliud posterius, et species omnis visibilis tamquam intumescit per locos nec ubique tota est. Et certe omnia haec auferuntur inuito, et quominus eis frui possimus quibusdam impedimur angustiis. 2.14.38.149 Nam et si posset esse cuiusquam suavis cantus sempiternus et studiosi eius certatim ad eum audiendum venirent, coartarent sese atque pugnarent de locis, quanto plures essent, ut cantanti esset quisque propinquior; et in audiendo nihil tenerent manere secum, sed omnibus vocibus fugientibus tangerentur. 2.14.38.150 Solem autem istum si vellem intueri atque id pertinaciter possem, et in occasu me desereret et subuelaretur nubilo et multis aliis obstaculis voluptatem videndi eum inuitus amitterem. Postremo etiam si adesset semper suavitas et lucis videnti et vocis audienti, quid magnum ad me perveniret, cum mihi esset commune cum beluis? 38 Therefore what we touch, or taste, or smell, are less like the truth than what we hear and see. Every word is heard wholly by all who hear it, and wholly by each at the same time, and every sight presented to the eyes is seen as much by one man as by another at the same time. But the likeness is a very distant one. No voice sounds wholly at the same time, since its sound is lengthened out and protracted, and some comes earlier, some later. > Every sight off ered swells, as it were, over space, and is not wholly everywhere. Certainly all those things are taken away from us against our will, and there are obstacles which prevent us from being able to enjoy them. For instance, even if the music of a singer could last forever, his admirers would struggle and vie with each other to hear him; they would crowd each other, and the more numerous they were, they would fight for seats, each one anxious to get nearer to the singer. They would retain nothing lastingly which they heard, and sounds would only touch them and die away. If I wished to look at the sun, and could continue to do so, it would leave me when it sets, and so too a cloud would veil it from my sight; and there are many other obstacles through which I should lose the pleasure of this sight against my will. And, granted I could see forever the beauty of light and hear forever the beauty of sound: what great thing would it be to me, since I should share it in common with the beasts?
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At illa veritatis et sapientiae pulchritudo, tantum adsit perseverans voluntas fruendi, nec multitudine audientium constipata secludit venientes nec peragitur tempore nec migrat locis nec nocte intercipitur nec umbra intercluditur nec sensibus corporis subiacet. 2.14.38.152 De toto mundo ad se conversis qui diligunt eam omnibus proxima est, omnibus sempiterna, nullo loco est nusquam deest, foris admonet intus docet, cernentes se commutat Omnes in melius, a nullo in deterius commutatur, nullus de illa iudicat nullus sine illa iudicat bene. Ac per hoc eam manifestum est mentibus nostris, quae ab ipsa una fiunt singulae sapientes et non de ipsa, sed per ipsam de caeteris iudices, sine dubitatione esse potiorem. But no thronging crowd of hearers keeps others from approaching the beauty of truth and wisdom, provided only there is a constant will to enjoy them. Their beauty does not pass with time, nor move from place to place. Night does not interrupt it, nor darkness hide it, and it is not subject to bodily sense. It is close to all its lovers throughout the world who turn towards it, and for all it is everlasting. It is in no place, yet nowhere is it absent; from without it admonishes us, within it > instructs us. It changes all its beholders for the better; it is itself never changed for the worse. No one is its judge; without it no one judges rightly. Clearly, therefore, and undoubtedly it is more excellent than our minds, for it is one, and yet makes each separate mind wise and the judge of other things, never of the truth.
2.15.39.153 Tu autem concesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras esse monstrarem, deum te esse confessurum, si adhuc nihil esset superius. Quam tuam concessionem accipiens dixeram satis esse ut hoc demonstrarem. Si enim est aliquid excellentius, ille potius deus est; si autem non est, iam ipsa veritas deus est. Sive ergo illud sit sive non sit, deum tamen esse negare non poteris; quae nobis erat ad tractandum et disserendum quaestio constituta. 2.15.39.154 Nam si te hoc movet quod apud sacrosanctam disciplinam Christi in fidem recepimus, esse patrem sapientiae, memento nos etiam hoc in fidem accepisse, quod aeterno patri aequalis sit quae ab ipso genita est sapientia. Unde nunc nihil quaerendum est, sed inconcussa fide retinendum. Est enim deus et vere summeque est. 2.15.39.155 Quod iam non solum indubitatum, quantum arbitror, fide retinemus, sed etiam certa, quamvis adhuc tenuissima forma cognitionis adtingimus. Quod quaestioni susceptae sufficit ut caetera quae ad rem pertinent explicare possimus, nisi quid habes adversus ista quae opponas. If I showed there was something above our minds, you admitted you would confess it to be God, provided there was nothing else higher. I accepted your admission, and said it was enough that I should show T this. For if there is anything more excellent, it is this which is God, but, if there is nothing more excellent, then truth itself is God. Whichever is the fact, you cannot deny that God exists, and this was the question we set ourselves to debate. 33 If you are influenced by what we have received on faith through the most holy teaching of Christ, namely, that there is a Father of Wisdom, remember that we have also received this on faith that Wisdom, begotten of the eternal Father, is His equal. We must ask no further questions about this, but hold it firmly by faith. God exists, and He exists truly and supremely. We not only hold this, I think, by our faith as certain, but we also attain to it by a sure, though very feeble, kind of knowledge. This suffices for the question we have undertaken, and enables us to explain the other matters connected with it. Or have you any objections to raise?
2.15.39.156
EVODIUS. Ego vero incredibili omnino et quam tibi verbis explicare non possum laetitia perfusus accipio ista et clamo esse certissima. Clamo autem voce interiore, qua exaudiri cupio ab ipsa veritate et illi inherere, quod non solum bonum, sed etiam summum bonum et beatificum esse concedo. E. I accept this with a joy past belief, which I > cannot express to you in words. I declare it to be most certain. My inner voice declares this, and I desire to be heard by the truth itself, and to cling to it. This I grant to be not only good, but the supreme good, and the source of happiness.
2.15.40.157 EVERY PERFECTION COMES FROM GOD
AUGUSTINUS. Recte sane, etiam ego plurimum gaudeo. Sed, quaeso te, numquid iam sapientes et beati sumus? an adhuc eo tendimus, ut id nobis esse proveniat? A. Quite right. I too rejoice greatly. But, I ask you, are we already wise and happy, or are we still on the way towards this?
EVODIUS. Ego nos potius tendere existimo. E.l think rather we are on our way towards it.
AUGUSTINUS. Unde ergo ista conprehendis, quibus veris certisque gaudere te clamas et haec ad sapientiam pertinere concedis? an quisquam insipiens potest nosse sapientiam? A. How then do you understand those things which you declare that you rejoice in as true and certain? You grant that wisdom consists in understanding them. Can a foolish man know wisdom?
EVODIUS. Quamdiu insipiens est non potest. E. He cannot, so long as he is foolish.
2.15.40.158
AUGUSTINUS. Tu ergo iam sapiens es aut nondum nosti sapientiam. A .Then you must be already wise, or you do not yet know wisdom.
EVODIUS. Non sum quidem adhuc sapiens, sed nec insipientem me dixerim, in quantum novi sapientiam; quoniam et certa sunt ista quae novi et ad sapientiam pertinere negare non possum. E. I am certainly not already wise, yet I should say I was not foolish, so far as I know wisdom. I cannot deny that what I know is certain, and that wisdom consists in this knowledge.
AUGUSTINUS. Dic, quaeso te, nonne fateberis eum qui non est iustus iniustum esse, et qui non est prudens inprudentem esse, et qui non est temperans intemperantem? An dubitari de his aliquid potest? A. Tell me, please: will you not admit that the man who is not just is unjust, and the man who is not prudent is imprudent, and the man who is not temperate is intemperate? Can there be any doubt about this?
EVODIUS. Fateor hominem quando iustus non est iniustum esse hoc etiam de prudente et temperante responderim. E.l admit that when a man is not just, he is unjust, and I should make the same answer about the prudent and the temperate man. >
2.15.40.159
AUGUSTINUS. Cur ergo et quando sapiens non est, non sit insipiens? A. Why, then, is a man not foolish when he is not wise?
EVODIUS. Hoc quoque fateor, quando quisque sapiens non est, eum esse insipientem. E. I admit this too, that when a man is not wise, he is foolish.
AUGUSTINUS. Nunc ergo tu quid horum es? A. Now, which of these are you?
EVODIUS. Quodlibet horum me appelles, nondum audeo me dicere sapientem et ex his quae concessi video esse consequens ut me insipientem non dubitem dicere. E. Whichever you call me, I do not dare to say I am yet wise. From what I have admitted, I see I must draw the conclusion that I should not hesitate to say I am foolish.
2.15.40.160
AUGUSTINUS. Novit ergo insipiens sapientiam. Non enim sicut iam dictum est, certus esset velle se esse sapientem idque oportere, nisi notio sapientiae menti eius inhereret, sicut earum rerum de quibus singillatim interrogatus respondisti, quae ad ipsam sapientiam pertinent, quorum cognitione laetatus es. A. Therefore a foolish man knows wisdom. As we have said, he would not be sure that he wished to be wise, and that this was his duty, unless the idea of wisdom was established in his mind. It is thus that you have in your mind the ideas of those things about which you answered each of my questions, the things in which wisdom consists, and in the knowledge of which you rejoiced.
EVODIUS. Ita est ut dicis. E. What you say is true.
2.16.41.161
AUGUSTINUS. Quid igitur aliud agimus cum studemus esse sapientes, nisi ut quanta possumus alacritate ad id quod mente contingimus totam animam nostram quodam modo colligamus et ponamus ibi atque stabiliter infigamus, ut non iam privato suo gaudeat quod implicavit rebus transeuntibus, sed exuta omnibus temporum et locorum affectionibus ad prehendat id quod unum atque idem semper est? 2.16.41.162 Sicut enim tota vita corporis anima est, sic beata vita animae deus est. Quod dum agimus, donec peragamus, in via sumus. Et quod istis veris et certis bonis, quamvis adhuc in hoc tenebroso itinere coruscantibus, gaudere concessum est, vide utrum hoc sit quod scriptum est de sapientia, quid agat cum amatoribus suis cum ad eam veniunt et eam quaerunt. Dictum est enim: "In viis ostendet se illis hilariter et omni providentia occurret illis". 2.16.41.163 Quoquo enim te verteris, uestigiis quibusdam quae operibus suis inpressit loquitur tibi et te in exteriora relabentem ipsis exteriorum formis intro reuocat, ut, quidquid te delectat in corpore et per corporeos inlicit sensus, videas esse numerosum et quaeras unde sit et in te ipsum redeas atque intellegas te id quod adtingis sensibus corporis probare aut inprobare non posse, nisi apud te habeas quasdam pulchritudinis Ieges ad quas referas quaeque pulchra sentis exterius. A. What else, then, do we do when we endeavour to be wise, but concentrate, as it were, our whole soul with all the energy we can upon the object we reach with our mind, and set our soul there, and fix it firmly? We do this that the soul may not now rejoice in its own individual self which has entangled it in passing interests, but that, setting aside all inclination to things of time and space, it may grasp that which is always one and the same. Just as the whole life of the body is the soul, so the happy life of the soul is God. While we are engaged in this work, and before we have finished it, we are on the way. We are allowed to rejoice in those true and cer> tain goods, which gleam even in the darkness of our present path. Is not this what Scripture tells us about the conduct of Wisdom towards its lovers, when they come and seek for it: she shall show herself to them cheerfully in the ways and shall meet them with all providence? 34 Wherever you turn she speaks to you by means of the traces she has left on her works, and calls you back within, when you are slipping away into outward things, through the very forms of these outward things. She does this so that you may see that whatever bodily thing delights you and attracts the bodily senses, is subject to number, and that you may ask whence it comes, and may return to yourself, and understand that you could not approve or disapprove what you perceive with the bodily senses, unless you possessed within yourself certain laws of beauty to which you refer all the beautiful things you perceive outside. 35
2.16.42.164
Intuere caelum et terram et mare et quaecumque in eis vel desuper fulgent vel deorsum repunt vel volant vel natant. Formas habent quia numeros habent; adime illis haec, nihil erunt. A quo ergo sunt nisi a quo numerus? quandoquidem in tantum illis est esse in quantum numerosa esse. 2.16.42.165 Et omnium quidem formarum corporearum artifices homines in arte habent numeros quibus coaptant opera sua, et tamdiu manus atque instrumenta in fabricando movent, donec illud quod formatur foris ad eam quae intus est lucem numerorum relatum, quantum potest, impetret ab solutionem placeatque per interpretem sensum interno iudici supernos numeros intuenti. Quaere deinde artificis ipsius membra quis moveat: numerus erit, nam moventur etiam illa numerose. 2.16.42.166 Et si detrahas de manibus opus et de animo intentionem fabricandi motusque ille membrorum ad delectationem referatur, saltatio vocabitur. Quaere ergo quid in saltatione delectet: respondebit tibi numerus: 'Ecce sum'; inspice iam pulchritudinem formati corporis: numeri tenentur in loco; inspice pulchritudinem mobilitatis in corpore: numeri versantur in tempore; intra ad artem unde isti procedunt, quaere in ea tempus et locum: numquam erit, nusquam erit, vivit in ea tamen numerus nec eius regio spatiorum est nec aetas dierum. 2.16.42.167 Et discendae arti tamen cum se accomodant qui se artifices fieri volunt, corpus suum per locos et tempora movent, animum vero per tempora; accessu quippe temporis peritiores fiunt. Transcende ergo et animum artificis, ut numerum sempiternum videas: iam tibi sapientia de ipsa interiore sede fulgebit et de ipso secretario veritatis. Quae si adhuc languidiorem aspectum tuum reuerberat, refer oculum mentis in illam viam ubi ostendebat hilariter. Memento sane distulisse te visionem quam fortior saniorque repetas. Look at the sky and the earth and the sea, and whatever shines brightly above or creeps below or flies or swims. They have forms because they have numbers. Take these away, and nothing will be left. What is their source, but the source of number? For, so far as they have being, they have numbered being. Artists, in whatever bodily forms they work, have in their art numbers to which they adapt their work. They move their hands and tools in their art until that which is formed externally, conforming to the inward light of number, is perfected so far as possible, and, after being expressed by the > senses, pleases the inner judge who gazes upwards upon number. Ask, then, who moves the limbs of the artist himself. It is number, for they too are moved according to number. If you take away the work from his hands and take from his mind the intention of exercising his art, and if you say that pleasure moves his limbs, it will be a dance. Ask what is pleasant in dancing, and number will answer, It is I. Look at the beauty of a graceful body: numbers are held in place. Look at the beauty of bodily movement; numbers alter in time. Go to the art from which they come, search in it for time and place; there is no time, no place. Yet number lives in it. Number has no position in space nor duration in time. When those who wish to become artists set themselves to learn their art, they move their bodies in space and time, and their souls in time; with the passage of time they become more skilful. Then pass beyond the soul of the artist, to see everlasting number. Wisdom will now shine from its inner dwelling, and from the very sanctuary of truth. If your sight is still too weak and is repelled, turn your mind's eye to that path where she showed herself cheerfully. But remember that you have put off the vision, to return to it when your strength is greater.
2.16.43.168 Vae qui derelinquunt te ducem et oberrant in uestigiis tuis, qui nutus tuos pro te amant te obliviscuntur quid innuas, o suavissima lux purgatae mentis sapientia! non enim cessas innuere nobis quae et quanta sis, et nutus tui sunt omne creaturarum decus. Et artifex enim quodam modo innuit spectatori operis sui de ipsa operis pulchritudine, ne ibi totus hereat, sed speciem corporis fabricati sic per currat oculis, ut in eum qui fabricaverit recurrat affectu. 2.16.43.169 Similes autem sunt, qui ea quae facis pro te amant, hominibus, qui, cum audiunt aliquem facundum sapientem, dum nimis suavitatem vocis eius et structuras syllabarum apte locatarum avide audiunt, amittunt sententiarum principatum, cuius illa verba tamquam signa sonuerunt. Vae qui se avertunt a lumine tuo et obscuritati suae dulciter inherent! Tamquam enim dorsum ad te ponentes in carnali opera velut in umbra sua defiguntur et tamen etiam ibi quod eos delectat adhuc habent de circumfulgentia lucis tuae. 2.16.43.170 Sed umbra dum amatur languidiorem facit oculum animi et inualidiorem ad perferendum conspectum tuum. Propterea magis magisque homo tenebratur, dum sectatur libentius quidquid infirmiorem tolerabilius excipit. Ex quo incipit non posse videre quod summe est, et malum putare quicquid fallit inprovidum aut inlicit indiguum aut captum excruciat, cum ea pro merito patiatur aversionis suae et quicquid iustum est malum esse non possit. Alas for those who abandon you as leader and who stray in what are but your footprints, who love the signs which you show but not yourself, who forget your meaning, O wisdom, most gra> cious light of a purified mind! You tell us without ceasing your name and your greatness. Every excellence in a creature reveals you. By the very beauty of his work the artist, as it were, suggests to its admirer not to be wholly absorbed in it, but so to glance at the work produced that he may reserve his attention for the artist who made it. Those who love your works instead of yourself are like those who hear a wise and eloquent speaker, who listens too eagerly to the pleasant voice and the carefully uttered syllables, but lose that which matters most, the meaning of the speaker, whose words are spoken only as signs. Woe to those who turn away from your light, and love to linger in their darkness! It is as if they turned their backs upon you, they are held fast in the shadow cast on them by their works of the flesh, and yet what delights them even there they still receive from the brightness shed by your light. But love of the shadow makes the soul's eye too lazy and weak to endure your sight. Then a man is wrapped more and more in darkness, while he is inclined to seek \vhatever his weakness can endure more easily. Gradually he is unable to see what is supreme, and to think evil whatever deceives his blindness or attracts his poverty, 36 or pains him when held captive. In this he suffers the punishment of his defection, and what is just cannot be evil.
2.16.44.171
Si ergo, quicquid mutabile aspexeris, vel sensu corporis vel animi consideratione capere non potes, nisi aliqua numerorum forma teneatur, qua detracta in nihil recidat, noli dubitare, ut ista mutabilia non intercipiantur, sed dimensis motibus et distincta varietate formarum quasi quosdam versus temporum peragant, esse aliquam formam aeternam et incommutabilem, quae neque contineatur et quasi diffundatur locis neque protendatur atque varietur temporibus, per quam cuncta ista formari valeant et pro suo genere implere atque agere locorum ac temporum numeros. 44 You cannot grasp with bodily sense or attention of the soul any changeable thing you see which is not possessed by some form of number: take this > away, and it falls back to nothing. Therefore have no doubt that there is some eternal and unchangeable form, in order that changeable things may not cease, but, with measured movement and distinct and varied forms, may pass through their temporal course. 37 This eternal form is neither contained, nor, as it were, spread in space, nor prolonged nor altered in time; it enables those other things to receive their forms, and according to their nature to realise and use the numbers proper to place and time.
2.16.45.172
Omnis enim res mutabilis etiam formabilis sit necesse est. Sicut autem mutabile dicimus quod mutari potest, ita formabile quod formari potest appellaverim. Nulla autem res formare se ipsam potest, quia nulla res potest dare quod non habet, et utique ut habeat formam formatur aliquid. Quapropter quaelibet res si quam habet formam, non ei opus est accipere quod habet; si qua vero formam non habet, non potest a se accipere quod non habet. Nulla ergo res ut diximus formare se potest. 2.16.45.173 Quid autem amplius de mutabilitate corporis et animi dicamus? superius enim satis dictum est. Conficitur itaque, ut corpus et animus forma quadam incommutabili et semper manente formentur. Cui formae dictum est: "Mutabis ea et mutabuntur; tu autem idem es et anni tui non deficient". Annos sine defectu pro aeternitate posuit prophetica locutio. De hac item forma dictum est quod "in se ipsa manens innovet omnia". 2.16.45.174 Hinc etiam conprehenditur omnia providentia gubernari. Si enim omnia, quae sunt, forma penitus subtracta nulla erunt, forma ipsa incommutabilis per quam mutabilia cuncta subsistunt, ut formarum suarum numeris impleantur et agantur, ipsa est eorum providentia. Non enim ista essent si illa non esset. Intuitus ergo et considerans universam creaturam quicumque iter agit ad sapientiam, sentit sapientiam in via se sibi ostendere hilariter et in omni providentia occurrere sibi. Et tanto alacrius ardescit viam istam peragere quanto et ipsa via per ivam pulchra est ad quam exaestuat pervenire. Every changeable thing must necessarily be able to realise its form. Just as we call what can change changeable, so I should call what can receive its form 'formable.' Nothing can give its form to itself, since nothing can give itself what it does not possess, and indeed a thing is given its form, that it may possess its form. Hence, if anything possesses a form, there is no need for it to receive what it possesses, but, if it does not possess a form, it cannot receive from itself what it does not possess. Nothing, then, as we have said, can give itself a form. What more can we say about the changeable character of body and soul? We said enough earlier on. So we conclude that body and soul are given their forms by a form which is unchangeable and everlasting. To this form it was said: Thou shah change them, and they shall be changed. But thou an always the selfsame, and thy years shall not fail. 38 By years which shall not fail the inspired writer means eternity. It is also > said of this form that remaining in herself the same, she reneweth all things From this, too, we understand that all things are ruled by providence. If everything which exists would become nothing, were the form wholly withdrawn, the unchangeable form itself is their providence. For it makes all changeable things subsist, and realise themselves and act through the numbers proper to their forms. They would not be, if it were not present. Every man advancing on the way to wisdom, perceives, when he attentively reflects on the whole of creation, that wisdom shows herself to him cheerfully on his way, and comes to meet him in every act of providence. He becomes the more eager to finish his journey, as the journey becomes more delightful through that wisdom, which he ardently longs to reach.
2.16.46.175
Tu autem si praeter id quod est et non vivit, et id quod est et vivit neque intellegit, et id quod est et vivit et intellegit inveneris aliquod aliud creaturarum genus, tunc aude dicere aliquod bonum esse quod non sit ex deo. Tria enim haec duobus etiam nominibus enuntiari possunt, si appellentur corpus et vita, quia et illa quae tantum vivit neque intellegit, qualis est pecorum, et haec quae intellegit, sicuti est hominum, rectissime vita dicitur. 2.16.46.176 Haec autem duo, id est corpus et vita, quae quidem creaturae deputantur -- nam et creatoris ipsius vita dicitur et ea summa vita est -- istae igitur duae creaturae, corpus et vita, quoniam formabilia sunt, sicuti superius dicta docuerunt, amissaque omnino forma in nihilum recidunt, satis ostendunt ex illa forma subsistere quae semper eius modi est. Quam ob rem quantacumque bona quamvis magna quamvis minima nisi ex deo esse non possunt. 2.16.46.177 Quid enim maius in creaturis quam vita intellegens aut quid minus potest esse quam corpus? Quae quantumlibet deficiant et eo tendant ut non sint, tamen aliquid formae illis remanet ut quoquo modo sint. Quicquid autem formae cuipiam rei deficienti remanet, ex illa forma est quae nescit deficere motusque ipsos rerum deficientium vel proficientium excedere numerorum suorum leges non sinit. Quicquid igitur laudabile advertitur in rerum natura, sive exigua sive ampla laude dignum iudicetur, ad excellentissimam et ineffabilem Iaudem referendum est conditoris -- nisi quid habes ad haec. 46 If, besides that which exists and does not live, and that which exists and lives but does not understand, and that which exists and lives and understands, you find some other kind of creature, only then may you say there is something good, which does not come from God. These three kinds of thing can be expressed by two words, by calling them body and life. For that life which is only life and has no understandingof animals, for example and that life which has understandingsuch as that of men are both rightly called life. But these two kinds of thing, that is, body and life, when regarded as creatures (the Creator Himself has life, and this is supreme life) these two created things, body and life, be> cause, as we explained above, they are able to receive forms and because they fall to nothing if the form is altogether lost, show well enough that they derive their existence from that form which is always the same. Therefore all good things, great or small, can only come from God. What is greater among creatures than the life which has understanding, and what can be less than body? However defective they may become, and however near they may approach towards non-existence, some form always remains if they are to exist at all But whatever form remains to a thing which is defective, comes from that form which can have no defect, and which does not allow even the movements of things, whether the things are growing worse or better, to escape the law of their numbers. Hence whatever we observe in the nature of things to be worthy of praise, whether we judge it worthy of little or great praise, should be referred to the most excellent, unutterable praise of its Creator. Have you any objection to this?
2.18.47.178 FREE WILL IS GOOD
EVODIUS. Satis mihi persuasum esse fateor, et quem ad modum manifestum fiat, quantum in hac vita atque inter tales quales nos sumus potest, deum esse, et ex deo esse omnia bona, quandoquidem omnia quae sunt, sive quae intellegunt et viunt et sunt sive quae tantum vivunt et sunt sive quae tantum sunt, ex deo sunt. Nunc iam tertiam quaestionem videamus, utrum expediri possit: inter bona esse numerandam liberam voluntatem. Quo demonstrato sine dubitatione concedam deum dedisse nobis eam darique oportuisse. E. I confess I am sufficiently convinced. There is evidence, so far as is possible in this life and for beings such as ourselves, that God exists and that all good things come from God. Everything which exists comes from God, whether it has understanding and life and existence, or whether > it has only life and existence, or whether it only has existence. Now let us turn to the third question, whether it can be shown that free will is to be counted among good things. If this is proved, I shall not hesitate to grant that God has given it to us and that it ought to have been given. -
2.18.47.179
AUGUSTINUS. Bene meministi proposita et secundam quaestionem iam explicatam vigilanter animadvertisti. Sed videre debuisti etiam istam tertiam iam solutam. Propterea quippe tibi videri dixeras dari non debuisse liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quod eo quisque peccat. Cui sententiae tuae cum ego retulissem recte fieri non posse nisi eodem libero voluntatis arbitrio, atque ad id potius hoc deum dedisse adseuerarem, respondisti liberam voluntatem ita nobis dari debuisse ut iustitia data est, qua nemo uti nisi recte potest. 2.17.47.180 Quae responsio tua in tantos circuitus disputationis nos ire conpulit, quibus tibi probaremus et maiora et minora bona non esse nisi ex deo. Quod non tam dilucide ostendi posset, nisi prius adversus opiniones inpiae stultitiae qua dicit "insipiens in corde suo: Non est deus", qualiscumque de re tanta pro nostro modulo inita ratio, eodem ipso deo in tam periculoso itinere nobis opitulante, in aliquid manifestum intenderetur. 2.17.47.181 Quae duo tamen, id est deum esse et omnia bona ex ipso esse quamquam inconcussa fide etiam antea tenerentur, sic tamen tractata sunt, ut hoc quoque tertium, inter bona esse numerandam liberam voluntatem, manifestissime appareat. A. You have remembered correctly what we proposed to discuss, and have been quick to notice that the second question has already been settled. But you should have seen that the third is also solved. You said you thought free choice of will ought not to have been given, because by it we sin. Against your view I argued 40 that we could not act rightly except by this free choice of will, 41 and I claimed that God had given it rather for this purpose. You replied that free will ought to have been given us in the same way that justice has been given, for we can only use justice for its right purpose. This reply of yours forced us into that complicated discussion in which I tried to prove to you that good things, great and small, only come from God. This could not be shown so clearly, unless we first refuted the wicked opinion of the fool who said in his heart, There is no God. 42 We argued on so great a matter according to our poor ability, but God Himself helped us over the dangerous passage. These two propositions, that God exists and that all good things come from Him, we already held with firm faith, but we have examined them so carefully that the third point also becomes most > clear, that free will is to be counted among good things.
2.18.48.182
Iam enim superiore disputatione patefactum est constititque inter nos naturam corporis inferiore gradu esse quam animi naturam ac per hoc animum maius bonum esse quam corpus. Si ergo in corporis bonis invenimus aliqua quibus non recte uti homo possit, nec tamen propterea dicimus non ea dari debuisse, quoniam esse confitemur bona, quid mirum, si et in animo sunt quaedam bona quibus etiam non recte uti possimus, sed quia bona sunt non potuerunt dari nisi ab illo a quo sunt omnia bona? 2.18.48.183 Vides enim quantum boni desit corpori cui desunt manus, et tamen manibus male utitur qui eis operatur vel saeua vel turpia. Sine pedibus aliquem si aspiceres, fatereris deesse integritati corporis plurimum bonum, et tamen eum, qui ad nocendum cuipiam vel se ipsum dehonestandum pedibus uteretur, male uti pedibus non negares. 2.18.48.184 Oculis hanc lucem videmus formasque internoscimus corporum; idque et speciosissimum est in nostro corpore, unde in fastigio quodam dignitatis haec membra locata sunt, et ad salutem tuendam multaque alia vitae commoda refert usus oculorum. oculis tamen plerique pleraque agunt turpiter et eos militare cogunt libidini; et vides quantum bonum desit in facie si ocuii desint. Cum autem adsunt, quis hos dedit nisi bonorum omnium largitor deus? 48 In a former discussion we decided it was plain that the body is a lower kind of thing than the soul, and therefore that the soul is a greater good than the body. If, then, we find among bodily goods some which man can use wrongly, yet if we do not say for this reason that they ought not to have been given us, because we agree that they are good, it will not be surprising if there are also goods in the soul which we can use wrongly, but which, being good, cannot have been given except by the source of all good. You see how much good the body lacks when it has no hands; nevertheless a man uses his hands wrongly if he does cruel or shameful acts with them. If you saw someone without feet, you would agree that an important good was lacking to bodily perfection, and yet you would not deny that a man used his feet wrongly if he used them to harm someone or to dishonour himself. We see the light with our eyes, and with them we distinguish bodily forms. This is the element of greatest beauty in the body, and hence the eyes are given the highest position, the position of honour, and their use serves to guard the health and to assist life in many other ways. Yet men often act shamefully through their eyes and make their eyes minister to their lust. You see what good the face lacks without the eyes, but when we possess them, who else gave them than God, the giver of all good things?
2.18.48.185
Quem ad modum ergo ista probas in corpore et non intuens eos qui male his utuntur Iaudas illum qui haec dedit bona, sic liberam voluntatem, sine qua nemo potest recte vivere, oportet et bonum et divinitus datam et potius eos damnandos, qui hoc bono male utuntur quam eum qui dederit, dare non debuisse fatearis. > You value these bodily organs, and, disregarding those who use them wrongly, you praise Him who has given as such good things. So too free will, without which no one can live rightly, must be a God-given good, and you must admit rather that those who use this good wrongly are to be condemned than that He who gave it ought not to have given it.
2.18.49.186
EVODIUS. Prius ergo vellem ut mihi probares aliquid bonum esse liberam voluntatem, et ego concederem deum illam dedisse nobis, quia fateor ex deo esse omnia bona. E. First, I should like you to prove to me that free will is a good, and then I should grant that God gave it us, because I agree that all good things come from God.
2.18.49.187
AUGUSTINUS. Itane tandem non probavi tanto molimine superioris disputationis, cum omnem speciem formamque corporis a summa omnium rerum forma id est a veritate subsistere fatereris et bonum esse concederes? Nam et capillos nostros numeratos esse ipsa in euangelio veritas loquitur. De numeri autem summitate atque a fine usque ad finem pertendente potentia quae locuti sumus excidit tibi? 2.17.49.188 Quae igitur ista est tanta peruersitas, capillos nostros quamvis inter exigua et omnino abiectissima tamen inter bona numerare nec lnuenlre, cui auctori tribuantur nisi bonorum omnium conditori deo, quia et maxima et minima bona ab illo sunt a quo est omne bonum, et dubitare de libera voluntate, sine qua recte vivi non posse concedunt etiam qui pessime vivunt? 2.18.49.189 Et certe nunc responde, quaeso, quid esse melius videatur in nobis, sine quo recte vivi potest an sine quo recte vivi non potest? A. Did I not prove this to you with much labour in our first discussion, when you agreed that all beauty and every bodily form are derived from the form which is supreme over all things, that is, the truth, and when you agreed they are good? Truth itself says in the Gospel that our very hairs are numbered. 43 Have you forgotten what we said about the supremacy of number and about its power extending from end to end? It would be sheer folly to count as good our hairs, which are least in size and importance, and not to trace them to their cause. God is the source of all good things; the greatest and the least good things come from Him, from whom comes every good thing. It would be sheer folly in view of this to hesitate about free will, without which even those who live the worst lives grant that it is impossible to live rightly. Now answer, please, which you think is the bet> ter in us, that thing without which we can, or that thing without which we cannot, live rightly.
EVODIUS. Iam iam parce, quaeso, pudet caecitatis. Quis enim ambigat id longe esse praestantius sine quo recta vita nulla est? E. Please forgive me; I am ashamed of my blindness. As everyone knows, that without which there is no good life is far nobler.
AUGUSTINUS. Iam ergo tu negabis luscum hominem recte posse vivere? A. Will you deny that a one-eyed man can live rightly? j
EVODIUS. Absit tam inmanis amentia. E.I am not so utterly mad.
AUGUSTINUS. Cum ergo in corpore oculum concedas esse aliquod bonum, quo amisso tamen ad recte vivendum non impeditur, voluntas libera tibi videbitur nullum bonum, sine qua recte nemo vivit? A. -Since, then, you grant that the eye is a good to the body, but that its loss does not prevent us from living rightly, will you not hold that free will is a good, since without it no one lives rightly?
2.18.50.190
Intueris enim iustitiam, qua nemo male utitur. Haec inter summa bona, quae in ipso sunt homine, numeratur omnesque virtutes animi, quibus ipsa recta vita et honesta constat. Nam neque prudentia neque fortitudine neque temperantia male quis utitur; etiam in his enim omnibus, sicut in ipsa quam tu commemorasti iustitia, recta ratio viget, sine qua virtutes esse non possunt. Recta autem ratione male tui nemo potest. Take justice, which no one uses wrongly. This is counted among the highest goods proper to man, and among all the soul's virtues which go to make up a right and worthy life. No one uses wrongly either prudence or fortitude or temperance. In all these, as in justice itself which you mentioned, right reason reigns, without which no virtues can exist. And no one can use right reason wrongly.
2.19.50.191
Ista ergo magna bona sunt. Sed meminisse te oportet non solum magna sed etiam minima bona non esse posse nisi ab illo a quo sunt omnia bona, hoc est deo. Id enim superior disputatio persuasit cui totiens tamque Iaetus adsensus es. Virtutes igitur quibus recte vivitur magna bona sunt; species autem quorumlibet corporum, sine quibus recte vivi potest, minima bona sunt; potentiae vero animi, sine quibus recte vivi non potest, media bona sunt. 2.19.50.192 Virtutibus nemo male utitur. caeteris autem bonis, id est mediis et minimis, non solum bene sed etiam male quisque uti potest. Et ideo virtute nemo male utitur quia opus virtutis est bonus usus istorum quibus etiam non bene uti possumus. Nemo autem bene utendo male utitur. Quare abundantia et magnitudo bonitatis dei non solum magna sed etiam media et minima bona esse praestitii. Magis laudanda est bonitas eius in magnis quam in mediis et magis in mediis quam in minimis bonis, sed magis in omnibus quam si non omnia tribuisset. These are great goods, but you ought to remember that, not to speak of great goods, not even the least can exist except as coming from Him from whom comes all good, that is, from God. That was the conclusion of our earlier discussion, and you willingly agreed many times. The virtues, then, by which we live rightly, are great goods, but all kinds of bodily beauty, without which we can live rightly, are the least goods. The powers of the soul, without which we cannot live rightly, are the middle goods. No one uses the virtues wrongly, but anyone can use the other > goods, the middle and the least, wrongly as well as rightly. No one uses virtue wrongly, because the work of virtue is the good use of those things which we are capable of using wrongly. No one makes a bad use when he makes a good use. Hence the magnificent abundance of God's goodness has furnished us not only with great goods, but also with the middle and the least. His goodness should be praised more highly for great than for middle goods, more for middle than for least, but for all more than if He had not given all.
2.19.51.193
EVODIUS. Adsentior. Sed illud me movet, quoniam de libera voluntate quaestio est et videmus ipsam bene uti caeteris vel non bene, quo modo et ipsa inter illa quibus utimur numeranda sit. E. I agree. But, since we are discussing free will, and since we see that it uses other things either rightly or wrongly, I am puzzled by the question, how free will is to be counted among those things which we use.
2.19.51.194
AUGUSTINUS. Quo modo omnia, quae ad scientiam cognoscimus, ratione cognoscimus, et tamen etiam ipsa ratio inter illa numeratur quae ratione cognoscimus. An oblitus es, cum quaereremus quae ratione cognoscantur, confessum te fuisse etiam rationem ratione cognosci? 2.19.51.195 Noli ergo mirari, si caeteris per liberam voluntatem lltimur, etiam ipsa libera voluntate per eam ipsam uti nos posse, ut quodam modo se ipsa utatur voluntas quae utitur caeteris, sicut se ipsam cognoscit ratio quae cognoscit et caetera. Nam et memoria non solum caetera omnia quae meminimus comprehendit, sed etiam quod non obliviscimur nos habere memoriam, ipsa se memoria quodam modo tenet in nobis, quae non solum aliorum sed etiam sui meminit; vel potius nos et caetera et ipsam per ipsam meminimus. A. In the same way that we know by reason all those things of which we have exact knowledge, 44 and yet reason itself is counted among the things we know by reason. Have you forgotten that when we inquired what is known by the reason, you agreed that reason itself is known by reason? Do not be surprised, therefore, if we use other things by means of free will, that we can also use free will itself by means of itself. The will, which uses other things, in a certain way uses itself, just as the reason, which knows other things, knows itself. Memory not only grasps all other things which we remember, but it also, since we do not forget that we have a memory, in a certain way retains itself within us; it remembers not only other > things, but also itself, or rather through memory we remember other things, and also memory itself.
2.19.52.196
Voluntas ergo, quae medium bonum est, cum inheret incommutabili bono eique communi, non proprio, sicuti est illa de qua multum locuti sumlls et nihil digne diximus veritas, tenet homo vitam beatam; eaque ipsa vita beata, id est animi affectio inherentis incommutabili bono, proprium et primum est hominis bonum. In eo sunt etiam virtutes omnes, quibus male uti nemo potest. 2.19.52.197 Nam haec quamvis magna in homine et prima sint, propria tamen esse unius cuiusque hominis, non communia satis intellegitur. Veritate enim atque sapientia, quae communis est omnibus, omnes sapientes et beati fiunt inherendo illi. Beatitudine autem alterius hominis non fit alter beatus, quia et cum eum imitatur ut sit, inde appetit beatus fieri unde illum factum videt, illa scilicet incommutabili communique veritate. 2.19.52.198 Neque prudentia cuiusquam fit prudens alius aut fortis fortitudine aut temperans temperantia aut iustus iustitia hominis alterius quisquam efficitur, sed coaptando animum illis incommutabilibus regulis luminibusque virtutum quae incorruptibiliter vivunt in ipsa veritate sapientiaque communi, quibus et ille coaptavit et fixit animum quem virtutibus praeditum sibi ad imitandum proposuit. So, when the will, which is a middle good, clings to the unchangeable good, not as a private possession but as common to allin the same way as the truth, about which we have said much, however inadequately then man possesses the happy life. This happy life itself, which consists in the disposition of the soul when it clings to the unchangeable good, is the proper and principal good for man. In this He all the virtues which no one can use wrongly. We understand sufficiently that, though these are important and principal goods in man, they are not held in common, but individually, by every man. It is through clinging to truth and wisdom, which is common to all, that all become wise and happy. One man does not become happy through the happiness of another man. When one man imitates another in order to become happy, he seeks to become happy by the same means by which he sees the other has become happy, that is, by means of the unchangeable truth which is common to all Nor is one man prudent through another's prudence, nor brave through another's bravery, nor temperate through another's temperance, nor is a man made just through another's justice. But he becomes such by conforming his soul to the unchangeable principles and illuminations of the virtues, 45 which have incorruptible life in truth itself and wisdom which is common to all. The model > this man has set up for himself, is endowed with these virtues, and he has conformed and attached his soul to their principles.
2.19.53.199
Voluntas ergo adherens communi atque incommutabili bono impetrat prima et magna hominis bona, cum ipsa sit medium quoddam bonum. Voluntas autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono et conversa ad proprium bonum aut ad exterius aut ad inferius, peccat. Ad proprium convertitur, cum suae potestatis vult esse, ad exterius, cum aliorum propria vel quaecumque ad se non pertinent cognoscere studet, ad inferius cum voluptatem corporis diligit. 2.19.53.200 Atque ita homo superbus et curiosus et lascivus effectus excipitur ab alia vita, quae in comparatione superioris vitae mors est; quae tamen regitur administratione divinae providentiae, quae congruis sedibus ordinat omnia et pro meritis sua cuique distribuit. Ita fit ut neque illa bona quae a peccantibus appetuntur ullo modo mala sint neque ipsa voluntas libera, quam in bonis quibusdam mediis numerandam esse comperimus, sed malum sit aversio eius ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad mutabilia bona; quae tamen aversio atque conversio quoniam non cogitur, sed est voluntaria, digna et iusta eam miseriae poena subsequitur. The will, then, if it clings to the unchangeable good which is common to all, obtains the principal and important human goods, though the will itself is a middle good. But the will sins, if it turns away from the unchangeable good which is common to all, and turns towards a private good, whether outside or below it. It turns towards a private good when it wishes to be its own master outside, when it is anxious to know the private affairs of someone else, or whatever is not its own concern, and below it, when it loves bodily pleasure. Thus a man who becomes proud, curious, and self-indulgent, is caught up in another life, which compared to the higher life is death. This life, however, is under the rule of Divine Providence, which puts everything in its proper place and assigns to everyone his due. So it comes about that those goods which are sought by sinners are by no means evil, nor is free will evil, which we have found must be counted among certain middle goods. Evil is the turning of the will away from the unchangeable good, and towards changeable good. Since this turning from one to the other is free and unforced, the pain which follows as a punishment is fitting and just.
2.20.54.201 > THE CAUSE OF SIN IS NOT POSITIVE BUT NEGATIVE
Sed tu fortasse quaesiturus es, quoniam movetur voluntas cum se avertit ab incommutabil; bono ad mutabile bonum, unde iste motus existat. Qui profecto malus est, tametsi voluntas libera, quia sine iva nec recte vivi potest, in bonis numeranda sit. Si enim motus iste, id est aversio voluntatis a domino deo, sine dubitatione peccatum est, num possumus auctorem peccati deum dicere? 2.20.54.202 Non erit ergo iste motus ex deo. Unde igitur erit? Ita quaerenti tibi si respondeam nescire me, fortasse eris tristior, sed tamen vera responderim. Sciri enim non potest quod nihil est. Tu tantum pietatem inconcussam tene, ut nullum tibi bonum vel sentienti vel intellegenti vel quoquo modo cogitanti occurrat quod non sit ex deo. 2.20.54.203 Ita enim nulla natura occurrit quae non sit ex deo. Omnem quippe rem, ubi mensuram et numerum et ordinem videris, deo artifici tribuere ne cuncteris. Unde autem ista penitus detraxeris, nihil omnino remanebit, quia etsi remanserit aliqua formae alicuius inchoatio, ubi neque mensuram neque numerum neque ordinem invenias -- quia ubicumque ista sunt forma pcrfecta est -- oportet auferas etiam ipsam inchoationem formae, quae tamquam materies ad perficiendum subiacere videtur artifici. Si enim formae perfectio bonum est, nonnullum iam bonum est et formae inchoatio. 2.20.54.204 Ita detracto penitus omni bono non quidem nonnihil, sed nihil omnino remanebit. Omne autem bonum ex deo, nulla ergo natura est quae non sit ex deo. Motus ergo ille aversionis, quod fatemur esse peccatum, quoniam defectivus motus est, omnis autem defectus ex nihilo est, vide quo pertineat, et ad dellm non pertinere ne dubitcs. Qui tamen defectus quoniam est voluntarius in nostra est positus potestate. Si enim times illum, oportet ut nolis; si autem nolis, non erit. 2.20.54.205 Quid ergo securius quam esse in ea vita ubi non possit tibi evenire quod nan vis; Sed quoniam non sicut sponte homo cecidit ita etiam surgere potest, porrectam nobis desuper dexteram dei, id est dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, firma fide teneamus et exspectemus certa spe et caritate ardenti desideremus. Si quid autem de origine peccati diligentius quaerendum adhuc putas, in aliam disputationem differendum est. Perhaps you will ask, since the will moves when it turns from the unchangeable to the changeable good, how this movement arises. The movement is certainly evil, though free will must be counted as a good, since without it we cannot live rightly. The movement, the turning away of the will from Lord God, is undoubtedly a sin but surely we cannot call God the cause of sin? This movement cannot therefore come from God. What, then, is its source? When you ask this question, if I answer that I do not know, you will perhaps be disappointed, but yet I shall be answering truly. For that which is nothing cannot be known. Only keep firm your sense of reverence towards God, so that no good may occur either to your senses, your intelligence, or your thoughts in any way, which you do not acknowledge to be from God. Nothing of any kind is to be found which does not come from God. 46 Recognise God at once as author of everything in which you see measure, number, and order. If you take these entirely away, nothing whatever will be left. You may say there remains some incipient form, where you find neither measure nor number nor order. But, since, when these are present, the form is perfect, you must not speak even of an incipient form: it seems to stand only as material to be perfected by the artist. For, if the perfection of the form is a good, the begin> ning of the form must already be a good. When all good is completely taken away, there will remain not even a trace absolutely nothing. 47 All good is from God; therefore no kind of thing exists which is not from God. Hence that movement of turning away, which we agree to be sin, is a defective movement, and a defect comes from nothing. Notice, then, what is its source and be sure it does not come from God. Yet, since the defect lies in the will, it is under our control. If you fear it, you must simply not desire it; if you do not desire it, it will not occur. 48 What greater security can you have than to live that life in which nothing you do not desire can happen to you? But, though man fell through his own will, he cannot rise through his own will. Therefore let us believe firmly that God's right hand, that is, Our Lord Jesus Christ, is extended out to us from on high; 49 let us await this help with sure hope, and let us desire it with ardent charity. If you still think any further question should be asked about the source of sin I myself think there is no need at all if you really think there is, we must put off the discussion to another time.
2.20.54.206
EVODIUS. Sequor sane voluntatem tuam ut in tempus aliud quod hinc moverit differamus. Nam illud tibi non concesserim, ut satis iam inde quaesitum putes. E.I quite agree with your wish to put off the further problems to another time. I should not admit your view that the question is finished.

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