Authors/Thomas Aquinas/esse essentia

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Latin English
Translation by Robert T. Miller[1] (1997)
Prooemium De ente et essentia, pr. Quia parvus error in principio magnus est in fine, secundum philosophum in I caeli et mundi, ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit Avicenna in principio suae metaphysicae, ideo ne ex eorum ignorantia errare contingat, ad horum difficultatem aperiendam dicendum est quid nomine essentiae et entis significetur et quomodo in diversis inveniatur et quomodo se habeat ad intentiones logicas, scilicet genus, speciem et differentiam.
Quia vero ex compositis simplicium cognitionem accipere debemus et ex posterioribus in priora devenire, ut, a facilioribus incipientes, convenientior fiat disciplina, ideo ex significatione entis ad significationem essentiae procedendum est. Since we ought to acquire knowledge of simple things from composite ones and come to know the prior from the posterior, in instructing beginners we should begin with what is easier, and so we shall begin with the signification of being and proceed from there to the signification of essence.
Caput 1 Chapter 1
Sciendum est igitur quod, sicut in V metaphysicae philosophus dicit, ens per se dicitur dupliciter, uno modo quod dividitur per decem genera, alio modo quod significat propositionum veritatem. Horum autem differentia est quia secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud, de quo affirmativa propositio formari potest, etiam si illud in re nihil ponat. Per quem modum privationes et negationes entia dicuntur; dicimus enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationi et quod caecitas est in oculo. Sed primo modo non potest dici ens nisi quod aliquid in re ponit. Unde primo modo caecitas et huiusmodi non sunt entia. As the Philosopher says in V Metaphysicae cap. 7 (1017a22-35), being has two senses. In one sense, being signifies that which is divided into the ten categories; in another sense, that which signifies the truth of propositions. The difference between these is that, in the second sense, anything can be called a being about which an affirmative proposition can be formed, even if the thing posits nothing in reality. In this way, privations and negations are called beings, as when we say that affirmation is opposed to negation, or that blindness is in the eye. But in the first sense, nothing can be called a being unless it posits something in reality, and thus in this first sense blindness and similar things are not beings.
Nomen igitur essentiae non sumitur ab ente secundo modo dicto, aliqua enim hoc modo dicuntur entia, quae essentiam non habent, ut patet in privationibus; sed sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo dicto. Unde Commentator in eodem loco dicit quod ens primo modo dictum est quod significat essentiam rei. Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum dividitur per decem genera, oportet quod essentia significet aliquid commune omnibus naturis, per quas diversa entia in diversis generibus et speciebus collocantur, sicut humanitas est essentia hominis, et sic de aliis. The term essence is not taken from being in the second sense, for in this sense some things are called beings that have no essence, as is clear with privations. Rather, the term essence is taken from being in the first sense. Thus in Metaphysicae V, com. 14, the Commentator explains the cited text from Aristotle by saying that being, in the first sense, is what signifies the essence of a thing. And since, as said above, being in this sense is divided into the ten categories, essence signifies something common to all natures through which the various beings are placed in the various genera and species, as humanity is the essence of man, and so on.
Et quia illud, per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel specie, est hoc quod significatur per diffinitionem indicantem quid est res, inde est quod nomen essentiae a philosophis in nomen quiditatis mutatur. Et hoc est quod philosophus frequenter nominat quod quid erat esse, id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid. Dicitur etiam forma secundum quod per formam significatur certitudo uniuscuiusque rei, ut dicit Avicenna in II metaphysicae suae. Hoc etiam alio nomine natura dicitur accipiendo naturam secundum primum modum illorum quattuor, quos Boethius in libro de duabus naturis assignat, secundum scilicet quod natura dicitur omne illud quod intellectu quoquo modo capi potest. Non enim res est intelligibilis nisi per diffinitionem et essentiam suam. Et sic etiam philosophus dicit in V metaphysicae quod omnis substantia est natura. Tamen nomen naturae hoc modo sumptae videtur significare essentiam rei, secundum quod habet ordinem ad propriam operationem rei, cum nulla res propria operatione destituatur. Quiditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc, quod per diffinitionem significatur. Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse. Since that through which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or species is what is signified by the definition indicating what the thing is, philosophers introduced the term quiddity to mean the same as the term essence; and this is the same thing that the Philosopher frequently terms what it is to be a thing, that is, that through which something has being as a particular kind of thing. Essence is also called form, for the certitude of every thing is signified through its form, as Avicenna says in his Metaphysicae I, cap. 6. The same thing is also called nature, taking nature in the first of the four senses that Boethius distinguishes in his book De Persona et Duabus Naturis cap. 1 (PL 64, 1341B), in the sense, in other words, that nature is what we call everything that can in any way be captured by the intellect, for a thing is not intelligible except through its definition and essence. And so the Philosopher says in V Metaphysicae cap. 4 (1014b36) that every substance is a nature. But the term nature used in this way seems to signify the essence of a thing as it is ordered to the proper operation of the thing, for no thing is without its proper operation. The term quiddity, surely, is taken from the fact that this is what is signified by the definition. But the same thing is called essence because the being has existence through it and in it.
Sed quia ens absolute et per prius dicitur de substantiis et per posterius et quasi secundum quid de accidentibus, inde est quod essentia proprie et vere est in substantiis, sed in accidentibus est quodammodo et secundum quid. Substantiarum vero quaedam sunt simplices et quaedam compositae, et in utrisque est essentia, sed in simplicibus veriori et nobiliori modo, secundum quod etiam esse nobilius habent. Sunt enim causa eorum quae composita sunt, ad minus substantia prima simplex, quae Deus est. Sed quia illarum substantiarum essentiae sunt nobis magis occultae, ideo ab essentiis substantiarum compositarum incipiendum est, ut a facilioribus convenientior fiat disciplina. But because being is absolutely and primarily said of substances, and only secondarily and in a certain sense said of accidents, essence too is properly and truly in substances and is in accidents only in a certain way and in a certain sense. Now some substances are simple and some are composite, and essence is in both, though in the simple substances in a truer and more noble way, as these have existence in a nobler way: indeed, the simple substances are the cause of the composite ones, or at least this is true with respect to the first simple substance, which is God. But because the essences of these substances are more hidden from us, we ought to begin with the essences of composite substances, as learning is easier when we begin with the easier things.
Chapter II
In substantiis igitur compositis forma et materia nota est, ut in homine anima et corpus. Non autem potest dici quod alterum eorum tantum essentia esse dicatur. Quod enim materia sola non sit essentia rei planum est, quia res per essentiam suam et cognoscibilis est et in specie ordinatur vel genere. Sed materia neque cognitionis principium est, neque secundum eam aliquid ad genus vel speciem determinatur, sed secundum id quod aliquid actu est. Neque etiam forma tantum essentia substantiae compositae dici potest, quamvis hoc quidam asserere conentur. Ex his enim quae dicta sunt patet quod essentia est illud, quod per diffinitionem rei significatur. Diffinitio autem substantiarum naturalium non tantum formam continet, sed etiam materiam; aliter enim diffinitiones naturales et mathematicae non differrent. Nec potest dici quod materia in diffinitione substantiae naturalis ponatur sicut additum essentiae eius vel ens extra essentiam eius, quia hic modus diffinitionis proprius est accidentibus, quae perfectam essentiam non habent. Unde oportet quod in diffinitione sua subiectum recipiant, quod est extra genus eorum. Patet ergo quod essentia comprehendit materiam et formam. In composite substances we find form and matter, as in man there are soul and body. We cannot say, however, that either of these is the essence of the thing. That matter alone is not the essence of the thing is clear, for it is through its essence that a thing is knowable and is placed in a species or genus. But matter is not a principle of cognition; nor is anything determined to a genus or species according to its matter but rather according to what something is in act. Nor is form alone the essence of a composite thing, however much certain people may try to assert this. From what has been said, it is clear that the essence is that which is signified by the definition of the thing. The definition of a natural substance, however, contains not only form but also matter; otherwise, the definitions of natural things and mathematical ones would not differ. Nor can it be said that matter is placed in the definition of a natural substance as something added to the essence or as some being beyond the essence of the thing, for that type of definition is more proper to accidents, which do not have a perfect essence and which include in their definitions a subject beyond their own genus. Therefore, the essence clearly comprises both matter and form.
Non autem potest dici quod essentia significet relationem, quae est inter materiam et formam vel aliquid superadditum ipsis, quia hoc de necessitate esset accidens et extraneum a re nec per eam res cognosceretur, quae omnia essentiae conveniunt. Per formam enim, quae est actus materiae, materia efficitur ens actu et hoc aliquid. Unde illud quod superadvenit non dat esse actu simpliciter materiae, sed esse actu tale, sicut etiam accidentia faciunt, ut albedo facit actu album. Unde et quando talis forma acquiritur, non dicitur generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Nor can it be said that essence signifies the relation between the matter and the form or something superadded to these, for then the essence would of necessity be an accident and extraneous to the thing, and the thing would not be known through its essence, contrary to what pertains to an essence. Through the form, surely, which is the act of the matter, the matter is made a being in act and a certain kind of thing. Thus, something that supervenes does not give to the matter existence in act simply, but rather existence in act in a certain way, just as accidents do, as when whiteness makes something actually white. Hence, when such a form is acquired, we do not say that the thing is generated simply but only in a certain way.
Relinquitur ergo quod nomen essentiae in substantiis compositis significat id quod ex materia et forma compositum est. Et huic consonat verbum Boethii in commento praedicamentorum, ubi dicit quod usia significat compositum. Usia enim apud Graecos idem est quod essentia apud nos, ut ipsemet dicit in libro de duabus naturis. Avicenna etiam dicit quod quiditas substantiarum compositarum est ipsa compositio formae et materiae. Commentator etiam dicit super VII metaphysicae: natura quam habent species in rebus generabilibus est aliquod medium, id est compositum ex materia et forma. Huic etiam ratio concordat, quia esse substantiae compositae non est tantum formae nec tantum materiae, sed ipsius compositi. Essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur. Unde oportet quod essentia, qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma neque tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit causa. Sic enim in aliis videmus, quae ex pluribus principiis constituuntur, quod res non denominatur ex altero illorum principiorum tantum, sed ab eo, quod utrumque complectitur, ut patet in saporibus, quia ex actione calidi digerentis humidum causatur dulcedo, et quamvis hoc modo calor sit causa dulcedinis, non tamen denominatur corpus dulce a calore, sed a sapore qui calidum et humidum complectitur. The only possibility, therefore, is that the term essence, used with respect to composite substances, signifies that which is composed of matter and form. This conclusion is consistent with what Boethius says in his commentary on the Categories, namely, that ousia signifies what is composite; ousia, of course, is for the Greeks what essence is for us, as Boethius himself says in his book De Persona et Duabus Naturis. Avicenna even says, Metaphysicae V, cap. 5, that the quiddity of a composite substance is the very composition of the form and the matter. And commenting on Book VII of Aristotle's Metaphysicae, the Commentator says, "The nature that species in generable things have is something in the middle; that is, it is composed of matter and form." Metaphysicae VII, com. 27. Moreover, reason supports this view, for the existence of a composite substance is neither form alone nor matter alone but is rather composed of these. The essence is that according to which the thing is said to exist; hence, it is right that the essence by which a thing is denominated a being is neither form alone not matter alone but both, albeit that existence of this kind is caused by the form and not by the matter. Similarly, we see that in other things that are constituted from many principles, the thing is not denominated from just one or the other of the principles but rather from that which embraces both. Thus, with respect to flavors, sweetness is caused by the action of a warm animal body digesting what is wet, and albeit that in this way warmth is the cause of the sweetness, nevertheless a body is not called sweet by reason of the warmth, but rather by reason of the flavor, which embraces both the warmth and the wetness.
Sed quia individuationis principium materia est, ex hoc forte videtur sequi quod essentia, quae materiam in se complectitur simul et formam, sit tantum particularis et non universalis. Ex quo sequeretur quod universalia diffinitionem non haberent, si essentia est id quod per diffinitionem significatur. Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta est individuationis principium, sed solum materia signata. Et dico materiam signatam, quae sub determinatis dimensionibus consideratur. Haec autem materia in diffinitione hominis, in quantum est homo, non ponitur, sed poneretur in diffinitione Socratis, si Socrates diffinitionem haberet. In diffinitione autem hominis ponitur materia non signata; non enim in diffinitione hominis ponitur hoc os et haec caro, sed os et caro absolute, quae sunt materia hominis non signata. But because matter is the principle of individuation, it would perhaps seem to follow that essence, which embraces in itself simultaneously both form and matter, is merely particular and not universal. From this it would follow that universals have no definitions, assuming that essence is what is signified by the definition. Thus, we must point out that matter understood in the way we have thus far understood it is not the principle of individuation; only signate matter is the principle of individuation. I call signate matter matter considered under determinate dimensions. Signate matter is not included in the definition of man as man, but signate matter would be included in the definition of Socrates if Socrates had a definition. In the definition of man, however, is included non-signate matter: in the definition of man we do not include this bone and this flesh but only bone and flesh absolutely, which are the non-signate matter of man.
Sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et essentia Socratis non differunt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum. Unde Commentator dicit super VII metaphysicae: Socrates nihil aliud est quam animalitas et rationalitas, quae sunt quiditas eius. Sic etiam essentia generis et speciei secundum signatum et non signatum differunt, quamvis alius modus designationis sit utrobique, quia designatio individui respectu speciei est per materiam determinatam dimensionibus, designatio autem speciei respectu generis est per differentiam constitutivam, quae ex forma rei sumitur. Haec autem determinatio vel designatio, quae est in specie respectu generis, non est per aliquid in essentia speciei exsistens, quod nullo modo in essentia generis sit, immo quicquid est in specie, est etiam in genere ut non determinatum. Si enim animal non esset totum quod est homo, sed pars eius, non praedicaretur de eo, cum nulla pars integralis de suo toto praedicetur. Hoc autem quomodo contingat videri poterit, si inspiciatur qualiter differt corpus secundum quod ponitur pars animalis et secundum quod ponitur genus. Non enim potest eo modo esse genus, quo est pars integralis. Hence, the essence of man and the essence of Socrates do not differ except as the signate differs from the non-signate, and so the Commentator says, in Metaphysicae VII, com. 20, "Socrates is nothing other than animality and rationality, which are his quiddity." Similarly, the essence of a genus and the essence of a species differ as signate from non-signate, although in the case of genus and species a different mode of designation is used with respect to both. For, the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter determined by dimensions, while the designation of the species with respect to the genus is through the constitutive difference, which is taken from the form of the thing. This determination or designation, however, which is made in the species with respect to the genus, is not through something that exists in the essence of the species but in no way exists in the essence of the genus. On the contrary, whatever is in the species is also in the genus as undetermined. If animal were not all that man is but rather only a part of him, then animal would not be predicated of man, for no integral part is predicated of its whole. We can see how this happens by considering how body as a part of animal differs from body as the genus of animal. In the way body is the genus of animal it cannot be an integral part of animal,
Hoc igitur nomen quod est corpus multipliciter accipi potest. Corpus enim, secundum quod est in genere substantiae, dicitur ex eo quod habet talem naturam, ut in eo possint designari tres dimensiones; ipsae enim tres dimensiones designatae sunt corpus, quod est in genere quantitatis. Contingit autem in rebus, ut quod habet unam perfectionem ad ulteriorem etiam perfectionem pertingat, sicut patet in homine, qui et naturam sensitivam habet et ulterius intellectivam. Similiter etiam et super hanc perfectionem, quae est habere talem formam, ut in ea possint tres dimensiones designari, potest alia perfectio adiungi, ut vita vel aliquid huiusmodi. Potest ergo hoc nomen corpus significare rem quandam, quae habet talem formam, ex qua sequitur in ipsa designabilitas trium dimensionum cum praecisione, ut scilicet ex illa forma nulla ulterior perfectio sequatur; sed si quid aliud superadditur, sit praeter significationem corporis sic dicti. and thus the term body can be accepted in several ways. Body is said to be in the genus of substance in that it has a nature such that three dimensions can be designated in the body. These three designated dimensions are the body that is in the genus of quantity. Now, it sometimes happens that what has one perfection may attain to a further perfection as well, as is clear in man, who has a sensitive nature and, further, an intellective one. Similarly, above this perfection of having a form such that three dimensions can be designated in it, there can be joined another perfection, as life or some similar thing. This term body, therefore, can signify a certain thing that has a form such that from the form there follows in the thing designatability in three dimensions and nothing more, such that, in other words, from this form no further perfection follows, but if some other thing is superadded, it is beyond the signification of body thus understood. And understood in this way, body will be an integral and material part of the animal, because in this way the soul will be beyond what is signified by the term body, and it will supervene on the body such that from these two, namely the soul and the body, the animal is constituted as from parts.
Potest etiam hoc nomen corpus hoc modo accipi, ut significet rem quandam, quae habet talem formam, ex qua tres dimensiones possunt in ea designari, quaecumque forma sit illa, sive ex ea possit provenire aliqua ulterior perfectio sive non. Et hoc modo corpus erit genus animalis, quia in animali nihil est accipere quod non implicite in corpore continetur. Non enim anima est alia forma ab illa, per quam in re illa poterant designari tres dimensiones; et ideo, cum dicebatur quod corpus est quod habet talem formam, ex qua possunt designari tres dimensiones in eo, intelligebatur: quaecumque forma esset, sive animalitas sive lapideitas sive quaecumque alia. Et sic forma animalis implicite in forma corporis continetur, prout corpus est genus eius. This term body can also be understood as signifying a certain thing that has a form such that three dimensions can be designated in it, whatever form this may be, and such that either from the form some further perfection can proceed or not. Understood in this way, body will be the genus of animal, for there will be understood in animal nothing that is not implicitly contained in body. Now, the soul is a form through which there can be designated in the thing three dimensions, and therefore, when we say that body is what has a form from which three dimensions can be designated in the body, we understand there is some kind of form of this type, whether soul, or lapideousness, or whatever other form. And thus the form of animal is implicitly contained in the form of body, just as body is its genus.
Et talis est etiam habitudo animalis ad hominem. Si enim animal nominaret tantum rem quandam, quae habet talem perfectionem, ut possit sentire et moveri per principium in ipso existens cum praecisione alterius perfectionis, tunc quaecumque alia perfectio ulterior superveniret, haberet se ad animal per modum partis et non sicut implicite contenta in ratione animalis, et sic animal non esset genus; sed est genus secundum quod significat rem quandam, ex cuius forma potest provenire sensus et motus, quaecumque sit illa forma, sive sit anima sensibilis tantum sive sensibilis et rationalis simul. The relation of animal to man is the same. For if animal named just a certain thing that has a perfection such that it can sense and move by a principle existing in itself, without any other perfection, then whatever further perfection may supervene would be related to animal as a component part, and not as implicitly contained in the notion of animal; and in this way animal would not be a genus. But animal is a genus in that it signifies a certain thing from the form of which sensation and motion can proceed, whatever this form may be, whether a sensible soul only, or a soul both sensible and rational.
Sic ergo genus significat indeterminate totum id quod est in specie, non enim significat tantum materiam; similiter etiam differentia significat totum et non significat tantum formam; et etiam diffinitio significat totum, et etiam species. Sed tamen diversimode, quia genus significat totum ut quaedam denominatio determinans id quod est materiale in re sine determinatione propriae formae. Unde genus sumitur ex materia, quamvis non sit materia, ut patet quod corpus dicitur ex hoc quod habet talem perfectionem, ut possint in eo designari tres dimensiones; quae quidem perfectio est materialiter se habens ad ulteriorem perfectionem. Differentia vero e converso est sicut quaedam denominatio a forma determinate sumpta praeter hoc quod de primo intellectu eius sit materia determinata, ut patet, cum dicitur animatum, scilicet illud quod habet animam; non enim determinatur quid sit, utrum corpus vel aliquid aliud. Unde dicit Avicenna quod genus non intelligitur in differentia sicut pars essentiae eius, sed solum sicut ens extra essentiam, sicut etiam subiectum est de intellectu passionum. Et ideo etiam genus non praedicatur de differentia per se loquendo, ut dicit philosophus in III metaphysicae et in IV topicorum, nisi forte sicut subiectum praedicatur de passione. Sed diffinitio vel species comprehendit utrumque, scilicet determinatam materiam, quam designat nomen generis, et determinatam formam, quam designat nomen differentiae. Therefore, the genus signifies indeterminately the whole that is in the species and does not signify matter alone. Similarly, the difference also signifies the whole and does not signify the form alone, and the definition, or even the species, signifies the whole. But these nevertheless signify the same thing in different ways. For the genus signifies the whole as a certain denomination determining that which is material in the thing without a determination of its proper form, whence the genus is taken from the matter, although it is not the matter. This is clear in the case of bodies, as we call something a body in that the thing has a perfection such that in the thing three dimensions can be designated, and this perfection is related materially to some further perfection. Conversely, the difference is like a certain denomination taken from the determined form, beyond the first conception of the form by which the matter is determined. So, when we say something is animated (that, in other words, it has a soul), this does not determine what the thing is, whether it is a body or some other thing. Hence, Avicenna says, Metaphysicae V, cap. 6, that the genus is not understood in the difference as a part of its essence but only as a being beyond its essence, even as a subject is with respect to the concept of a passion. And thus the genus is not predicated per se of the difference, as the Philosopher says in III Metaphysicae cap. 8 (998b24) and in IV Topicorum cap. 2 (122b22-26), unless perhaps as a subject is predicated of a passion. But the definition or the species comprehends both, namely, the determined matter that the term genus designates and the determined form that the term difference designates.
Ex hoc patet ratio quare genus, species et differentia se habent proportionaliter ad materiam et formam et compositum in natura, quamvis non sint idem quod illa, quia neque genus est materia, sed a materia sumptum ut significans totum, neque differentia forma, sed a forma sumpta ut significans totum. Unde dicimus hominem esse animal rationale et non ex animali et rationali, sicut dicimus eum esse ex anima et corpore. Ex anima enim et corpore dicitur esse homo, sicut ex duabus rebus quaedam res tertia constituta, quae neutra illarum est. Homo enim neque est anima neque corpus. Sed si homo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali esse dicatur, non erit sicut res tertia ex duabus rebus, sed sicut intellectus tertius ex duobus intellectibus. Intellectus enim animalis est sine determinatione specialis formae, exprimens naturam rei ab eo quod est materiale respectu ultimae perfectionis. Intellectus autem huius differentiae rationalis consistit in determinatione formae specialis. Ex quibus duobus intellectibus constituitur intellectus speciei vel diffinitionis. Et ideo sicut res constituta ex aliquibus non recipit praedicationem earum rerum, ex quibus constituitur, ita nec intellectus recipit praedicationem eorum intellectuum, ex quibus constituitur. Non enim dicimus quod diffinitio sit genus aut differentia. From this is it clear why the genus, the difference, and the species are related proportionally to the matter, the form, and the composite in nature, although they are not the same as these things. For, the genus is not the matter, though it is taken from the matter as signifying the whole; nor is the difference the form, though it is taken from the form as signifying the whole. Thus we say that man is a rational animal, but not composed of the animal and the rational in the sense that we say that man is composed of soul and body: man is said to be composed of soul and body as from two things from which a third thing is constituted different from each of the two. Man, surely, is neither body nor soul. But if man is said in some sense to be composed of the animal and the rational, it will not be as a third thing composed from these two things, but as a third concept composed from these two concepts. The concept of animal is without determination of a special form and expresses, with respect to the ultimate perfection, the nature of the thing from that which is material; the concept of the difference, rational, consists in the determination of the special form. From these two concepts are constituted the concept of the species or the definition. Thus, just as a thing constituted from other things does not have predicated of it these other things, so too a concept does not have predicated of it the concepts of which it is constituted: clearly, we do not say that the definition is either the genus or the difference.
Quamvis autem genus significet totam essentiam speciei, non tamen oportet ut diversarum specierum, quarum est idem genus, sit una essentia, quia unitas generis ex ipsa indeterminatione vel indifferentia procedit, non autem ita, quod illud quod significatur per genus sit una natura numero in diversis speciebus, cui superveniat res alia, quae sit differentia determinans ipsum, sicut forma determinat materiam, quae est una numero, sed quia genus significat aliquam formam, non tamen determinate hanc vel illam, quam determinate differentia exprimit, quae non est alia quam illa, quae indeterminate significabatur per genus. Et ideo dicit Commentator in XI metaphysicae quod materia prima dicitur una per remotionem omnium formarum, sed genus dicitur unum per communitatem formae significatae. Unde patet quod per additionem differentiae remota illa indeterminatione, quae erat causa unitatis generis, remanent species per essentiam diversae. Although the genus may signify the whole essence of the species, nevertheless there is not just one essence of the various species under one genus, for the unity of the genus proceeds from its very indetermination or undifferentiation. Nor is it the case that what is signified through the genus is numerically one nature in the various species such that to it there supervenes some other thing, which is the difference that determines it, as a form determines matter, which is numerically one. Rather, the genus signifies some form (though not determinately this one or that one), which the difference expresses determinately, the very one that is signified indeterminately through the genus. And thus the Commentator says in Metaphysicae XII, 4 com. 14, that prime matter is called one by the removal of all forms, but the genus is called one through the commonality of forms signified. Hence, the indetermination, which was the cause of the unity of the genus, having been removed through the addition of the difference, the species remain essentially diverse.
Et quia, ut dictum est, natura speciei est indeterminata respectu individui sicut natura generis respectu speciei, inde est quod sicut id quod est genus, prout praedicabatur de specie, implicabat in sua significatione, quamvis indistincte, totum quod determinate est in specie, ita etiam et id quod est species, secundum quod praedicatur de individuo, oportet quod significet totum id quod est essentialiter in individuo, licet indistincte. Et hoc modo essentia speciei significatur nomine hominis, unde homo de Socrate praedicatur. Si autem significetur natura speciei cum praecisione materiae designatae, quae est principium individuationis, sic se habebit per modum partis. Et hoc modo significatur nomine humanitatis; humanitas enim significat id unde homo est homo. Materia autem designata non est id unde homo est homo; et ita nullo modo continetur inter illa, ex quibus homo habet quod sit homo. Cum ergo humanitas in suo intellectu includat tantum ea, ex quibus homo habet quod sit homo, patet quod a significatione eius excluditur vel praeciditur materia designata. Et quia pars non praedicatur de toto, inde est quod humanitas nec de homine nec de Socrate praedicatur. Unde dicit Avicenna quod quiditas compositi non est ipsum compositum, cuius est quiditas, quamvis etiam ipsa quiditas sit composita, sicut humanitas, licet sit composita, non est homo, immo oportet quod sit recepta in aliquo quod est materia designata. Furthermore, since, as said above, the nature of the species is indeterminate with respect to the individual just as the nature of the genus is with respect to the species, and since, further, the genus, as predicated of the species, includes in its signification (although indistinctly) everything that is in the species determinately, so too does the species, as predicated of the individual, signify everything that is in the individual essentially, although it signifies this indistinctly. In this way, the essence of the species is signified by the term man, and so man is predicated of Socrates. If, however, the nature of the species is signified in such a way as to exclude designate matter, which is the principle of individuation, then the species is related to the individual as a part; and this is how the term humanity signifies, for humanity signifies that by which a man is a man. Designate matter, however, is not that by which a man is a man, and it is in no way contained among those things that make a man a man. Since, therefore, the concept of humanity includes only those things by which a man is a man, designate matter is excluded or pretermitted, and since a part is not predicated of its whole, humanity is predicated neither of man nor of Socrates. Thus Avicenna says, Metaphysicae V, cap. 5, that the quiddity of a composite thing is not the composite thing of which it is the quiddity, even though the quiddity itself is composite, as humanity, while composite, is not man. On the contrary, it must be received in something that is designate matter.
Sed quia, ut dictum est, designatio speciei respectu generis est per formam, designatio autem individui respectu speciei est per materiam, ideo oportet ut nomen significans id, unde natura generis sumitur, cum praecisione formae determinatae perficientis speciem significet partem materialem totius, sicut corpus est pars materialis hominis. Nomen autem significans id, unde sumitur natura speciei cum praecisione materiae designatae, significat partem formalem. Et ideo humanitas significatur ut forma quaedam, et dicitur quod est forma totius, non quidem quasi superaddita partibus essentialibus, scilicet formae et materiae, sicut forma domus superadditur partibus integralibus eius, sed magis est forma, quae est totum scilicet formam complectens et materiam, tamen cum praecisione eorum, per quae nata est materia designari. But since, as said above, the designation of the species with respect to the genus is through the form, and the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter, the term signifying that from which the nature of the genus is taken thus excludes the determinate form that completes the species and signifies the material part of the whole, as the body is the material part of the man. However, the term signifying that from which the nature of the species is taken, excluding designate matter, signifies the formal part. Thus, humanity is signified as a certain form, and it is said that it is the form of the whole, not, certainly, as a form superadded to the essential parts (the form and the matter), but rather as the form of a house is superadded to its integral parts; and that is better called the form which is the whole, in other words, that which embraces the form and the matter, albeit excluding those things through which the designatability of matter arises.
Sic igitur patet quod essentiam hominis significat hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen humanitas, sed diversimode, ut dictum est, quia hoc nomen homo significat eam ut totum, in quantum scilicet non praecidit designationem materiae, sed implicite, continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est quod genus continet differentiam; et ideo praedicatur hoc nomen homo de individuis. Sed hoc nomen humanitas significat eam ut partem, quia non continet in significatione sua nisi id, quod est hominis in quantum est homo, et praecidit omnem designationem. Unde de individuis hominis non praedicatur. Et propter hoc etiam nomen essentiae quandoque invenitur praedicatum in re, dicimus enim Socratem esse essentiam quandam; et quandoque negatur, sicut dicimus quod essentia Socratis non est Socrates. Therefore, the term man and the term humanity both signify the essence of man, though in diverse ways, as said above. The term man signifies the essence as a whole, in other words, insofar as the essence does not exclude designation of matter but implicitly and indistinctly contains it, in the way in which we said that the genus contains the difference. Hence, the term man is predicated of individuals. But the term humanity signifies the essence of man as a part because it contains in its signification only what belongs to man insofar as he is man, and it excludes all designation, and so it is not predicated of individual men. And for this reason the term essence is sometimes found predicated of the thing, as when we say that Socrates is a certain essence; and sometimes the term essence is denied of the thing, as when we say that the essence of Socrates is not Socrates.
Chapter III
Caput 2 De ente et essentia, cap. 2 Viso igitur quid significetur nomine essentiae in substantiis compositis videndum est quomodo se habeat ad rationem generis, speciei et differentiae. Quia autem id, cui convenit ratio generis vel speciei vel differentiae, praedicatur de hoc singulari signato, impossibile est quod ratio universalis, scilicet generis vel speciei, conveniat essentiae secundum quod per modum partis significatur, ut nomine humanitatis vel animalitatis. Et ideo dicit Avicenna quod rationalitas non est differentia, sed differentiae principium; et eadem ratione humanitas non est species nec animalitas genus. Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae, secundum quod est quaedam res exsistens extra singularia, ut Platonici ponebant, quia sic genus et species non praedicarentur de hoc individuo; non enim potest dici quod Socrates sit hoc quod ab eo separatum est; nec iterum illud separatum proficeret in cognitionem huius singularis. Et ideo relinquitur quod ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae, secundum quod significatur per modum totius, ut nomine hominis vel animalis, prout implicite et indistincte continet totum hoc, quod in individuo est. Having seen what the term essence signifies in composite substances, we ought next see in what way essence is related to the logical intentions of genus, species, and difference. Since that to which the intentions of genus or species or difference is appropriate is predicated of this signate singular, it is impossible that a universal intention, like that of the species or genus, should be appropriate to the essence if the genus or species is signified as a part, as in the term humanity or animality. Thus, Avicenna says, Metaphysicae V, cap. 6, that rationality is not the difference but the principle of the difference. For the same reason, humanity is not a species, and animality is not a genus. Similarly, we cannot say that the intention of species or genus is appropriate to the essence as to a certain thing existing beyond singulars, as the Platonists used to suppose, for then the species and the genus would not be predicated of an individual: we surely cannot say that Socrates is something that is separated from him, nor would that separate thing advance our knowledge of this singular thing. And so the only remaining possibility is that the intention of genus or species is appropriate to the essence as the essence is signified as a whole, as the term man or animal implicitly and indistinctly contains the whole that is in the individual.
Natura autem vel essentia sic accepta potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo, secundum rationem propriam, et haec est absoluta consideratio ipsius. Et hoc modo nihil est verum de ea nisi quod convenit sibi secundum quod huiusmodi. Unde quicquid aliorum attribuatur sibi, falsa est attributio. Verbi gratia, homini in eo quod est homo convenit rationale et animal et alia, quae in diffinitione eius cadunt. Album vero aut nigrum vel quicquid huiusmodi, quod non est de ratione humanitatis, non convenit homini in eo quod homo. Unde si quaeratur utrum ista natura sic considerata possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum est, quia utrumque est extra intellectum humanitatis et utrumque potest sibi accidere. Si enim pluralitas esset de intellectu eius, nunquam posset esse una, cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in Socrate. Similiter si unitas esset de ratione eius, tunc esset una et eadem Socratis et Platonis nec posset in pluribus plurificari. Alio modo consideratur secundum esse quod habet in hoc vel in illo, et sic de ipsa aliquid praedicatur per accidens ratione eius, in quo est, sicut dicitur quod homo est albus, quia Socrates est albus, quamvis hoc non conveniat homini in eo quod homo. The nature, however, or the essence thus understood can be considered in two ways. First, we can consider it according to its proper notion, and this is to consider it absolutely. In this way, nothing is true of the essence except what pertains to it absolutely: thus everything else that may be attributed to it will be attributed falsely. For example, to man, in that which he is a man, pertains animal and rational and the other things that fall in his definition; white or black or whatever else of this kind that is not in the notion of humanity does not pertain to man in that which he is a man. Hence, if it is asked whether this nature, considered in this way, can be said to be one or many, we should concede neither alternative, for both are beyond the concept of humanity, and either may befall the conception of man. If plurality were in the concept of this nature, it could never be one, but nevertheless it is one as it exists in Socrates. Similarly, if unity were in the notion of this nature, then it would be one and the same in Socrates and Plato, and it could not be made many in the many individuals. Second, we can also consider the existence the essence has in this thing or in that: in this way something can be predicated of the essence accidentally by reason of what the essence is in, as when we say that man is white because Socrates is white, although this does not pertain to man in that which he is a man.
Haec autem natura duplex habet esse, unum in singularibus et aliud in anima, et secundum utrumque consequuntur dictam naturam accidentia. Et in singularibus etiam habet multiplex esse secundum singularium diversitatem et tamen ipsi naturae secundum suam primam considerationem, scilicet absolutam, nullum istorum esse debetur. Falsum enim est dicere quod essentia hominis in quantum huiusmodi habeat esse in hoc singulari, quia si esse in hoc singulari conveniret homini in quantum est homo, nunquam esset extra hoc singulare. Similiter etiam si conveniret homini in quantum est homo non esse in hoc singulari, nunquam esset in eo. Sed verum est dicere quod homo non in quantum est homo habet quod sit in hoc singulari vel in illo aut in anima. Ergo patet quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat praecisio alicuius eorum. Et haec natura sic considerata est quae praedicatur de individuis omnibus. The nature considered in this way, however, has a double existence. It exists in singulars on the one hand, and in the soul on the other, and from each of these there follow accidents. In singulars, furthermore, the essence has a multiple existence according to the multiplicity of singulars. Nevertheless, if we consider the essence in the first, or absolute, sense, none of these pertain to the essence. For it is false to say that the essence of man, considered absolutely, has existence in this singular, because if existence in this singular pertained to man insofar as he is man, man would never exist outside this singular. Similarly, if it pertained to man insofar as he is man not to exist in this singular, then the essence would never exist in the singular. But it is true to say that man, but not insofar as he is man, has whatever may be in this singular or in that one, or else in the soul. Therefore, the nature of man considered absolutely abstracts from every existence, though it does not exclude the existence of anything either. And the nature thus considered is the one predicated of each individual.
Non tamen potest dici quod ratio universalis conveniat naturae sic acceptae, quia de ratione universalis est unitas et communitas. Naturae autem humanae neutrum horum convenit secundum suam absolutam considerationem. Si enim communitas esset de intellectu hominis, tunc in quocumque inveniretur humanitas inveniretur communitas. Et hoc falsum est, quia in Socrate non invenitur communitas aliqua, sed quicquid est in eo est individuatum. Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum esse quod habet in individuis, quia non invenitur in individuis natura humana secundum unitatem, ut sit unum quid omnibus conveniens, quod ratio universalis exigit. Relinquitur ergo quod ratio speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum illud esse quod habet in intellectu. Nevertheless, the nature understood in this way is not a universal notion, because unity and commonality are in the notion of a universal, and neither of these pertains to human nature considered absolutely. For if commonality were in the concept of man, then in whatever humanity were found, there would be found commonality, and this is false, because no commonality is found in Socrates, but rather whatever is in him is individuated. Similarly, the notion of genus or species does not pertain to human nature as an accident arising from the existence that the nature has in individuals, for human nature is not found in individuals according to its unity such that it will be one thing in all the individuals, which the notion of the universal demands. The only possibility, therefore, is that the notion of species pertains to human nature according to the existence human nature has in the intellect.
Ipsa enim natura humana in intellectu habet esse abstractum ab omnibus individuantibus, et ideo habet rationem uniformem ad omnia individua, quae sunt extra animam, prout aequaliter est similitudo omnium et ducens in omnium cognitionem in quantum sunt homines. Et ex hoc quod talem relationem habet ad omnia individua intellectus adinvenit rationem speciei et attribuit sibi. Unde dicit Commentator in principio de anima quod intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in rebus. Hoc etiam Avicenna dicit in sua metaphysica. Et quamvis haec natura intellecta habeat rationem universalis secundum quod comparatur ad res extra animam, quia est una similitudo omnium, tamen secundum quod habet esse in hoc intellectu vel in illo est quaedam species intellecta particularis. Et ideo patet defectus Commentatoris in III de anima, qui voluit ex universalitate formae intellectae unitatem intellectus in omnibus hominibus concludere, quia non est universalitas illius formae secundum hoc esse quod habet in intellectu, sed secundum quod refertur ad res ut similitudo rerum, sicut etiam, si esset una statua corporalis repraesentans multos homines, constat quod illa imago vel species statuae haberet esse singulare et proprium secundum quod esset in hac materia, sed haberet rationem communitatis secundum quod esset commune repraesentativum plurium. Human nature has in the intellect existence abstracted from all individuals, and thus it is related uniformly to all individuals that exist outside the soul, as it is equally similar to all of them, and it leads to knowledge of all insofar as they are men. Since the nature in the intellect has this relation to each individual, the intellect invents the notion of species and attributes it to itself. Hence, the Commentator, in De Anima I, com. 8, says, "The intellect is what makes universality in things," and Avicenna says the same in his Metaphysicae V, cap. 2. Although this nature understood in the intellect has the notion of a universal in relation to things outside the soul (because it is one likeness of them all), as the nature has existence in this intellect or in that one, it is a certain particular understood species. The Commentator, therefore, is in error in De Anima III, com. 5, when he wants to infer the unity of intellect in all men from the universality of the understood form, because the universality of the form does not arise from the existence the form has in the intellect but rather from its relation to things as a likeness of such things. It is as if there were a corporeal statue representing many men; that image or species of statue would have a singular and proper existence insofar as it exists in this matter, but it would have an aspect of commonality insofar as it was a common representative of many.
Et quia naturae humanae secundum suam absolutam considerationem convenit quod praedicetur de Socrate, et ratio speciei non convenit sibi secundum suam absolutam considerationem, sed est de accidentibus, quae consequuntur eam secundum esse, quod habet in intellectu, ideo nomen speciei non praedicatur de Socrate, ut dicatur: Socrates est species, quod de necessitate accideret, si ratio speciei conveniret homini secundum esse, quod habet in Socrate vel secundum suam considerationem absolutam, scilicet in quantum est homo. Quicquid enim convenit homini in quantum est homo praedicatur de Socrate. Since human nature, considered absolutely, is properly predicated of Socrates, and since the notion of species does not pertain to human nature considered absolutely but only accidentally because of the existence the nature has in the intellect, the term species is not predicated of Socrates, for we do not say that Socrates is a species. We would have to say that Socrates is a species if the notion of species pertained to man arising from the existence that the nature has in Socrates or from the nature considered absolutely, that is, insofar as man is man. For whatever pertains to man insofar as he is man is predicated of Socrates.
Et tamen praedicari convenit generi per se, cum in eius diffinitione ponatur. Praedicatio enim est quiddam, quod completur per actionem intellectus componentis et dividentis, habens fundamentum in re ipsa unitatem eorum, quorum unum de altero dicitur. Unde ratio praedicabilitatis potest claudi in ratione huius intentionis, quae est genus, quae similiter per actum intellectus completur. Nihilominus tamen id, cui intellectus intentionem praedicabilitatis attribuit, componens illud cum altero, non est ipsa intentio generis, sed potius illud, cui intellectus intentionem generis attribuit, sicut quod significatur hoc nomine animal. But to be predicated pertains to a genus per se, because being predicated is placed in its definition. Now, predication is completed by the action of the intellect in compounding and dividing, and it has as its basis the unity of those things one of which is said of another. Hence, the notion of predicability can be subsumed in the notion of this intention that is the genus, which is itself completed by an act of the intellect. Still, when the intellect attributes the intention of predicability to something by compounding it with another, this intention is not that of genus; it is rather that to which the intellect attributes the intention of genus, as, for instance, to what is signified by the term animal.
Sic ergo patet qualiter essentia vel natura se habet ad rationem speciei, quia ratio speciei non est de his, quae conveniunt ei secundum suam absolutam considerationem, neque est de accidentibus, quae consequuntur ipsam secundum esse, quod habet extra animam, ut albedo et nigredo, sed est de accidentibus, quae consequuntur eam secundum esse, quod habet in intellectu, et per hunc modum convenit etiam sibi ratio generis vel differentiae. We have thus made clear how the essence or nature is related to the notion of species, for the notion of species is not among those that pertain to the essence considered absolutely; nor is it among the accidents that follow from the existence that the essence has outside the soul, as whiteness or blackness. Rather, the notion of species is among the accidents that follow from the existence the essence has in the intellect. And in this way as well do the notions of genus or difference pertain to essences.
Chapter IV
Caput 3 De ente et essentia, cap. 3 Nunc restat videre per quem modum sit essentia in substantiis separatis, scilicet in anima, intelligentia et causa prima. Quamvis autem simplicitatem causae primae omnes concedant, tamen compositionem formae et materiae quidam nituntur inducere in intelligentias et in animam, cuius positionis auctor videtur fuisse Avicebron, auctor libri fontis vitae. Hoc autem dictis philosophorum communiter repugnat, qui eas substantias a materia separatas nominant et absque omni materia esse probant. Cuius demonstratio potissima est ex virtute intelligendi, quae in eis est. Videmus enim formas non esse intelligibiles in actu nisi secundum quod separantur a materia et a condicionibus eius; nec efficiuntur intelligibiles in actu, nisi per virtutem substantiae intelligentis secundum quod recipiuntur in ea et secundum quod aguntur per eam. Unde oportet quod in qualibet substantia intelligente sit omnino immunitas a materia, ita quod neque habeat materiam partem sui neque etiam sit sicut forma impressa in materia, ut est de formis materialibus. We should now see how essences exist in separated substances, that is, in the soul, in the intelligences, and in the first cause. Now, while everyone concedes the simplicity of the first cause, some people have tried to introduce into the intelligences and the soul a composition of form and matter, a position that seems to have begun with Avicebron, the author of the book called Fons Vitae. But this view is repugnant to the common teaching of the philosophers, for they call these things substances separated from matter, and they prove them to be wholly without matter. The most cogent demonstration of this proceeds from the excellence of understanding found in these substances. For we see that forms are not actually intelligible except as they are separated from matter and its conditions, and forms are not made actually intelligible except by virtue of an intelligent substance, which educes the forms and receives them in itself. Hence, in any intelligent substance there is a complete absence of matter in such a way that the substance has neither a material part itself nor even is the substance like a form impressed in matter, as is the case with material forms.
Nec potest aliquis dicere quod intelligibilitatem non impediat materia quaelibet, sed materia corporalis tantum. Si enim hoc esset ratione materiae corporalis tantum, cum materia non dicatur corporalis nisi secundum quod stat sub forma corporali, tunc oporteret quod hoc haberet materia, scilicet impedire intelligibilitatem, a forma corporali. Et hoc non potest esse, quia ipsa etiam forma corporalis actu intelligibilis est, sicut et aliae formae, secundum quod a materia abstrahitur. Unde in anima vel in intelligentia nullo modo est compositio ex materia et forma, ut hoc modo accipiatur essentia in eis sicut in substantiis corporalibus, sed est ibi compositio formae et esse. Unde in commento IX propositionis libri de causis dicitur quod intelligentia est habens formam et esse, et accipitur ibi forma pro ipsa quiditate vel natura simplici. Nor can someone say that only corporeal matter, and not some other kind of matter, impedes intelligibility. For, if it were only corporeal mater that impedes intelligibility, then since matter is called corporeal only insofar as it exists under a corporeal form, matter's impeding intelligibility would come from the corporeal form; and this is impossible, for the corporeal form is actually intelligible just like any other form, insofar as it is abstracted from matter. Hence, in no way is there a composition of matter and form in either the soul or the intelligences, such that an essence is received in these as in corporeal substances. Nevertheless, in separate substances there is a composition of form and existence, and so in the Liber de Causis, prop. 9, com., it is said that the intelligences have form and existence, and in this place form is taken in the sense of a simple quiddity or nature.
Et quomodo hoc sit planum est videre. Quaecumque enim ita se habent ad invicem quod unum est causa esse alterius, illud quod habet rationem causae potest habere esse sine altero, sed non convertitur. Talis autem invenitur habitudo materiae et formae, quia forma dat esse materiae. Et ideo impossibile est esse materiam sine aliqua forma. Tamen non est impossibile esse aliquam formam sine materia. Forma enim non habet in eo quod est forma dependentiam ad materiam, sed si inveniantur aliquae formae, quae non possunt esse nisi in materia, hoc accidit eis secundum quod sunt distantes a primo principio, quod est actus primus et purus. Unde illae formae, quae sunt propinquissimae primo principio, sunt formae per se sine materia subsistentes (non enim forma secundum totum genus suum materia indiget, ut dictum est) et huiusmodi formae sunt intelligentiae. Et ideo non oportet ut essentiae vel quiditates harum substantiarum sint aliud quam ipsa forma. It is easy to see how this is the case. Whenever two things are related to each other such that one is the cause of the other, the one that is the cause can have existence without the other, but not conversely. Now, we find that matter and form are related in such a way that form gives existence to matter, and therefore it is impossible that matter exist without a form; but it is not impossible that a form exist without matter, for a form, insofar as it is a form, is not dependent on matter. When we find a form that cannot exist except in matter, this happens because such forms are distant from the first principle, which is primary and pure act. Hence, those forms that are nearest the first principle are subsisting forms essentially without matter, for not the whole genus of forms requires matter, as said above, and the intelligences are forms of this type. Thus, the essences or quiddities of these substances are not other than the forms themselves.
In hoc ergo differt essentia substantiae compositae et substantiae simplicis quod essentia substantiae compositae non est tantum forma, sed complectitur formam et materiam, essentia autem substantiae simplicis est forma tantum. Et ex hoc causantur duae aliae differentiae: una est quod essentia substantiae compositae potest significari ut totum vel ut pars, quod accidit propter materiae designationem, ut dictum est. Et ideo non quolibet modo praedicatur essentia rei compositae de ipsa re composita; non enim potest dici quod homo sit quiditas sua. Sed essentia rei simplicis, quae est sua forma, non potest significari nisi ut totum, cum nihil sit ibi praeter formam quasi formam recipiens; et ideo quocumque modo sumatur essentia substantiae simplicis de ea praedicatur. Unde Avicenna dicit quod quiditas simplicis est ipsummet simplex, quia non est aliquid aliud recipiens ipsam. Secunda differentia est quod essentiae rerum compositarum ex eo quod recipiuntur in materia designata multiplicantur secundum divisionem eius, unde contingit quod aliqua sint idem specie et diversa numero. Sed cum essentia simplicis non sit recepta in materia, non potest ibi esse talis multiplicatio; et ideo oportet ut non inveniantur in illis substantiis plura individua eiusdem speciei, sed quot sunt ibi individua, tot sunt ibi species, ut Avicenna expresse dicit. Therefore, the essence of a composite substance and that of a simple substance differ in that the essence of a composite substance is not form alone but embraces both form and matter, while the essence of a simple substance is form alone. And from this two other differences arise. One is that the essence of a composite substance can be signified as a whole or as a part, which happens because of the designation of the matter, as said above. Hence, in one way, the essence of a composite thing is not predicated of the composite thing itself, for we cannot say that a man is his own quiddity. But the essence of a simple thing, which is its form, cannot be signified except as a whole, as in this case there is nothing beyond the form that might receive the quiddity, and so, however we take the essence of a simple thing, the essence is predicated of it. Hence, Avicenna says in Metaphysicae V, cap. 5 that "the quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself," because there is no other thing to receive the form. The second difference is that the essences of composite things, because they are received in designate matter, are multiplied according to the division of matter, and so it happens that some things are the same in species but different in number. But since the essence of a simple thing is not received in matter, there can be no such multiplication in this case, and so among such substances we do not find many individuals of the same species, as Avicenna expressly says in Metaphysicae V, cap. 2.
Huiusmodi ergo substantiae quamvis sint formae tantum sine materia, non tamen in eis est omnimoda simplicitas nec sunt actus purus, sed habent permixtionem potentiae. Et hoc sic patet. Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentiae vel quiditatis, hoc est adveniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia, quia nulla essentia sine his, quae sunt partes essentiae, intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia vel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo; possum enim intelligere quid est homo vel Phoenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura. Ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quiditate, nisi forte sit aliqua res, cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse; et haec res non potest esse nisi una et prima, quia impossibile est, ut fiat plurificatio alicuius nisi per additionem alicuius differentiae, sicut multiplicatur natura generis in species, vel per hoc quod forma recipitur in diversis materiis, sicut multiplicatur natura speciei in diversis individuis, vel per hoc quod unum est absolutum et aliud in aliquo receptum, sicut si esset quidam calor separatus, esset alius a calore non separato ex ipsa sua separatione. Si autem ponatur aliqua res, quae sit esse tantum, ita ut ipsum esse sit subsistens, hoc esse non recipiet additionem differentiae, quia iam non esset esse tantum, sed esse et praeter hoc forma aliqua; et multo minus reciperet additionem materiae, quia iam esset esse non subsistens sed materiale. Unde relinquitur quod talis res, quae sit suum esse, non potest esse nisi una. Unde oportet quod in qualibet alia re praeter eam aliud sit esse suum et aliud quiditas vel natura seu forma sua. Unde oportet quod in intelligentiis sit esse praeter formam; et ideo dictum est quod intelligentia est forma et esse. Although substances of this kind are form alone and are without matter, they are nevertheless not in every way simple, and they are not pure act; rather, they have an admixture of potency, and this can be seen as follows. Whatever is not in the concept of the essence or the quiddity comes from beyond the essence and makes a composition with the essence, because no essence can be understood without the things that are its parts. But every essence or quiddity can be understood without understanding anything about its existence: I can understand what a man is or what a phoenix is and nevertheless not know whether either has existence in reality. Therefore, it is clear that existence is something other than the essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there is something whose quiddity is its very own existence, and this thing must be one and primary. For, there can be no plurification of something except by the addition of some difference, as the nature of a genus is multiplied in its species; or as, since the form is received in diverse matters, the nature of the species is multiplied in diverse individuals; or again as when one thing is absolute and another is received in something else, as if there were a certain separate heat that was other than unseparated heat by reason of its own separation. But if we posit a thing that is existence only, such that it is subsisting existence itself, this existence will not receive the addition of a difference, for, if there were added a difference, there would be not only existence but existence and also beyond this some form; much less would such a thing receive the addition of matter, for then the thing would be not subsisting existence but material existence. Hence, it remains that a thing that is its own existence cannot be other than one, and so in every other thing, the thing's existence is one thing, and its essence or quiddity or nature or form is another. In the intelligences, therefore, there is existence beyond the form, and so we say that an intelligence is form and existence.
Omne autem quod convenit alicui vel est causatum ex principiis naturae suae, sicut risibile in homine, vel advenit ab aliquo principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in aere ex influentia solis. Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma vel quiditate rei (dico sicut a causa efficiente) quia sic aliqua res esset sui ipsius causa et aliqua res seipsam in esse produceret, quod est impossibile. Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res, cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat esse ab alio. Et quia omne, quod est per aliud, reducitur ad illud quod est per se sicut ad causam primam, oportet quod sit aliqua res, quae sit causa essendi omnibus rebus, eo quod ipsa est esse tantum. Alias iretur in infinitum in causis, cum omnis res, quae non est esse tantum, habeat causam sui esse, ut dictum est. Patet ergo quod intelligentia est forma et esse et quod esse habet a primo ente, quod est esse tantum. Et hoc est causa prima, quae Deus est. Everything that pertains to a thing, however, either is caused by the principles of its own nature, as risibility in man, or else comes from some extrinsic principle, as light in the air from the influence of the sun. Now, it cannot be that existence itself is caused by the very form or quiddity of the thing (I mean as by an efficient cause), because then the thing would be its own efficient cause, and the thing would produce itself in existence, which is impossible. Therefore, everything the existence of which is other than its own nature has existence from another. And since everything that is through another is reduced to that which is through itself as to a first cause, there is something that is the cause of existing in all things in that this thing is existence only. Otherwise, we would have to go to infinity in causes, for everything that is not existence alone has a cause of its existence, as said above. It is clear, therefore, that the intelligences are form and existence and have existence from the first being, which is existence alone, and this is the first cause, which is God.
Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc quod receptum est in eo est actus eius. Oportet ergo quod ipsa quiditas vel forma, quae est intelligentia, sit in potentia respectu esse, quod a Deo recipit; et illud esse receptum est per modum actus. Et ita invenitur potentia et actus in intelligentiis, non tamen forma et materia nisi aequivoce. Unde etiam pati, recipere, subiectum esse et omnia huiusmodi, quae videntur rebus ratione materiae convenire, aequivoce conveniunt substantiis intellectualibus et corporalibus, ut in III de anima Commentator dicit. Et quia, ut dictum est, intelligentiae quiditas est ipsamet intelligentia, ideo quiditas vel essentia eius est ipsum quod est ipsa, et esse suum receptum a Deo est id, quo subsistit in rerum natura. Et propter hoc a quibusdam dicuntur huiusmodi substantiae componi ex quo est et quod est vel ex quod est et esse, ut Boethius dicit. Everything that receives something from another is in potency with respect to what it receives, and that which is received in the thing is its act; therefore, a quiddity or form that is an intelligence is in potency with respect to the existence that it receives from God, and this received existence is received as its act. And thus there are found in the intelligences both potency and act but not matter and form, unless in some equivocal sense. So too to suffer, to receive, to be a subject and everything of this type that seem to pertain to things by reason of their matter are said of intellectual substances and corporeal substances equivocally, as the Commentator says in De Anima III, com. 14. Furthermore, since, as said above, the quiddity of an intelligence is the intelligence itself, its quiddity or essence is itself the very thing that exists, and its existence received from God is that by which it subsists in the nature of things; and because of this some people say that substances of this kind are composed of what is and that by which it is, or of what is and existence, as Boethius says in De Hebdomadibus (PL 64, 1311 B-C).
Et quia in intelligentiis ponitur potentia et actus, non erit difficile invenire multitudinem intelligentiarum; quod esset impossibile, si nulla potentia in eis esset. Unde Commentator dicit in III de anima quod, si natura intellectus possibilis esset ignorata, non possemus invenire multitudinem in substantiis separatis. Est ergo distinctio earum ad invicem secundum gradum potentiae et actus, ita quod intelligentia superior, quae magis propinqua est primo, habet plus de actu et minus de potentia, et sic de aliis. Moreover, since we posit in the intelligences potency and act, it will not be difficult to find a multitude of intelligences, which would be impossible if there were in them no potency. Hence, the Commentator says in De Anima III, com. 5 that if the nature of the possible intellect were unknown, we would not be able to find a multitude of separate substances. There is thus a distinction among separate substances according to their grade of potency and act such that the superior intelligences, which are nearer the first cause, have more act and less potency, and so on.
Et hoc completur in anima humana, quae tenet ultimum gradum in substantiis intellectualibus. Unde intellectus possibilis eius se habet ad formas intelligibiles sicut materia prima, quae tenet ultimum gradum in esse sensibili, ad formas sensibiles, ut Commentator in III de anima dicit. Et ideo philosophus comparat eam tabulae, in qua nihil est scriptum. Et propter hoc quod inter alias substantias intellectuales plus habet de potentia, ideo efficitur in tantum propinqua rebus materialibus, ut res materialis trahatur ad participandum esse suum, ita scilicet quod ex anima et corpore resultat unum esse in uno composito, quamvis illud esse, prout est animae, non sit dependens a corpore. Et ideo post istam formam, quae est anima, inveniuntur aliae formae plus de potentia habentes et magis propinquae materiae in tantum quod esse earum sine materia non est. In quibus etiam invenitur ordo et gradus usque ad primas formas elementorum, quae sunt propinquissimae materiae. Unde nec aliquam operationem habent nisi secundum exigentiam qualitatum activarum et passivarum et aliarum, quibus materia ad formam disponitur. This scale comes to an end with the human soul, which holds the lowest place among intellectual substances. The soul's possible intellect is related to intelligible forms just as prime matter (which holds the lowest place in sensible existence) is related to sensible forms, as the Commentator says in De Anima III, com. 5. The Philosopher thus compares, III De Anima cap. 4 (430a1), the soul to a tablet on which nothing has been written. Since, among intellectual substances, the soul has the most potency, it is so close to material things that a material thing is brought to participate in its existence: that is, from the soul and the body there results one existence in one composite thing, although this existence, as the existence of the soul, is not dependent on the body. Therefore, beyond this form that is the soul, there are other forms having more potency and being closer to matter, and so much so that they have no existence without matter. Among these forms there is an order and gradation down to the primary forms of the elements, which are closest to matter; and so these have no operation except as required by the active and passive qualities and other such qualities by which matter is disposed by form.
Chapter V
Caput 4 De ente et essentia, cap. 4 His igitur visis patet quomodo essentia in diversis invenitur. Invenitur enim triplex modus habendi essentiam in substantiis. Aliquid enim est, sicut Deus, cuius essentia est ipsummet suum esse; et ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi dicentes quod Deus non habet quiditatem vel essentiam, quia essentia sua non est aliud quam esse eius. Et ex hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in genere, quia omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeat quiditatem praeter esse suum, cum quiditas vel natura generis aut speciei non distinguatur secundum rationem naturae in illis, quorum est genus vel species, sed esse est diversum in diversis. Having treated these matters, we can see clearly how essence is found in various kinds of things. There are three ways in which substances may have an essence. First, surely, is the way God has his essence, which is his very existence itself, and so we find certain philosophers saying that God does not have a quiddity or essence because his essence is not other than his existence. From this it follows that he is not in a genus, for everything that is in a genus has a quiddity beyond its existence, since the quiddity or nature of the genus or species is not in the order of nature distinguished in the things of which it is the genus or species, but the existence is diverse in diverse things.
Nec oportet, si dicimus quod Deus est esse tantum, ut in illorum errorem incidamus, qui Deum dixerunt esse illud esse universale, quo quaelibet res formaliter est. Hoc enim esse, quod Deus est, huius condicionis est, ut nulla sibi additio fieri possit; unde per ipsam suam puritatem est esse distinctum ab omni esse. Propter quod in commento IX propositionis libri de causis dicitur quod individuatio primae causae, quae est esse tantum, est per puram bonitatem eius. Esse autem commune sicut in intellectu suo non includit aliquam additionem, ita non includit in intellectu suo praecisionem additionis; quia si hoc esset, nihil posset intelligi esse, in quo super esse aliquid adderetur. Even though we say that God is existence alone we do not fall into the error of those who said that God is that universal existence by which everything formally exists. The existence which is God is of such a kind that no addition can be made to it, whence through its purity it is distinct from every other existence; for this reason the author of the Liber de Causis, prop. 9, com., says that the individuation of the first cause, which is being alone, is through its pure goodness. But common existence, just as it does not include in its concept any addition, so too in its concept does it not exclude any addition; for, if such existence did in its concept exclude any addition, nothing could be understood to exist in which there was added something beyond existence.
Similiter etiam, quamvis sit esse tantum, non oportet quod deficiant ei reliquae perfectiones et nobilitates, immo habet omnes perfectiones, quae sunt in omnibus generibus. Propter quod perfectum simpliciter dicitur, ut philosophus et Commentator in V metaphysicae dicunt. Sed habet eas modo excellentiori omnibus rebus, quia in eo unum sunt, sed in aliis diversitatem habent. Et hoc est, quia omnes illae perfectiones conveniunt sibi secundum esse suum simplex; sicut si aliquis per unam qualitatem posset efficere operationes omnium qualitatum, in illa una qualitate omnes qualitates haberet, ita Deus in ipso esse suo omnes perfectiones habet. Similarly, although God is existence alone, the remaining perfections and nobilities are not lacking in him. On the contrary, he has all the perfections that exist in every genus, and for this reason he is called perfect without qualification, as the Philosopher, V Metaphysicae cap. 16 (1021b30-33), and the Commentator, Metaphysicae V, com. 21, each say. But God has these perfections in a more excellent way than all other things have them because in him they are one, while in other things they are diverse. And this is because all these perfections pertain to God according to his simple existence, just as, if someone through one quality could effect the operations of all qualities, such a person would have in that one quality all the qualities, so too does God in his very existence have all the perfections.
Secundo modo invenitur essentia in substantiis creatis intellectualibus, in quibus est aliud esse quam essentia earum, quamvis essentia sit sine materia. Unde esse earum non est absolutum, sed receptum et ideo limitatum et finitum ad capacitatem naturae recipientis, sed natura vel quiditas earum est absoluta, non recepta in aliqua materia. Et ideo dicitur in libro de causis quod intelligentiae sunt infinitae inferius et finitae superius. Sunt enim finitae quantum ad esse suum, quod a superiori recipiunt, non tamen finiuntur inferius, quia earum formae non limitantur ad capacitatem alicuius materiae recipientis eas. Et ideo in talibus substantiis non invenitur multitudo individuorum in una specie, ut dictum est, nisi in anima humana propter corpus, cui unitur. Et licet individuatio eius ex corpore occasionaliter dependeat quantum ad sui inchoationem, quia non acquiritur sibi esse individuatum nisi in corpore, cuius est actus, non tamen oportet ut subtracto corpore individuatio pereat, quia cum habeat esse absolutum, ex quo acquisitum est sibi esse individuatum ex hoc quod facta est forma huius corporis, illud esse semper remanet individuatum. Et ideo dicit Avicenna quod individuatio animarum vel multiplicatio dependet ex corpore quantum ad sui principium, sed non quantum ad sui finem. In a second way, essence is found in created intellectual substances, in which existence is other than essence, although in these substances the essence is without matter. Hence, their existence is not absolute but received, and so finite and limited by the capacity of the receiving nature; but their nature or quiddity is absolute and is not received in any matter. Thus, the author of the Liber de Causis, prop. 16, com., says that intelligences are infinite in an inferior way and finite in a superior way: they are finite with respect to their existence, which they receive from something superior, though they are not rendered finite in an inferior way because their forms are not limited to the capacity of some matter receiving them. And thus among such substances we do not find a multitude of individuals in one species, as said above, except in the case of the human soul, and there we do find a multitude of individuals in one species because of the body to which the soul is united. Now, the individuation of the soul depends on the body, in an occasional manner, as to its inception, for the soul does not acquire for itself individual existence unless in the body of which it is the act. But nevertheless, if we subtract the body, the individuation does not perish because, since the soul was made the form of a given body, the form has absolute existence from which it has acquired individuated existence, and this existence always remains individuated. And thus Avicenna says, De Anima V, cap. 3, that the individuation of souls and their multiplication depend on the body for their beginning but not for their end.
Et quia in istis substantiis quiditas non est idem quod esse, ideo sunt ordinabiles in praedicamento, et propter hoc invenitur in eis genus et species et differentia, quamvis earum differentiae propriae nobis occultae sint. In rebus enim sensibilibus etiam ipsae differentiae essentiales ignotae sunt, unde significantur per differentias accidentales, quae ex essentialibus oriuntur, sicut causa significatur per suum effectum, sicut bipes ponitur differentia hominis. Accidentia autem propria substantiarum immaterialium nobis ignota sunt; unde differentiae earum nec per se nec per accidentales differentias a nobis significari possunt. Since in these substances the quiddity is not the same as existence, these substances can be ordered in a predicament, and for this reason we find among these things genera, species, and differences, although their proper differences are hidden from us. In sensible things even the essential differences are unknown to us, and so they are signified through accidental differences that arise from the essential ones, just as a cause is signified through its effect. We take bipedality, for example, as the difference of man. The proper accidents of immaterial substances, however, are unknown to us, and thus we can signify their differences neither per se nor through their accidental differences.
Hoc tamen sciendum est quod non eodem modo sumitur genus et differentia in illis substantiis et in substantiis sensibilibus, quia in sensibilibus genus sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, differentia vero ab eo quod est formale in ipsa. Unde dicit Avicenna in principio libri sui de anima quod forma in rebus compositis ex materia et forma est differentia simplex eius, quod constituitur ex illa, non autem ita quod ipsa forma sit differentia, sed quia est principium differentiae, ut idem dicit in sua metaphysica. Et dicitur talis differentia esse differentia simplex, quia sumitur ab eo quod est pars quiditatis rei, scilicet a forma. Cum autem substantiae immateriales sint simplices quiditates, non potest in eis differentia sumi ab eo quod est pars quiditatis, sed a tota quiditate; et ideo in principio de anima dicit Avicenna quod differentiam simplicem non habent nisi species, quarum essentiae sunt compositae ex materia et forma. We should note, though, that the genus and difference in immaterial substances are not taken in the same way as in sensible substances, for in sensible substances the genus is taken from that which is material in the thing, while the difference is taken from that which is formal in the thing. Hence, Avicenna says, De Anima I, cap.1, that, in things composed of form and matter, the form "is its simple difference because the thing is constituted from it," not, however, because the form is the difference but rather because it is the principle of the difference, as Avicenna himself says in his Metaphysicae V, cap. 6. Further, this difference is called a simple difference because it is taken from that which is a part of the quiddity of the thing, namely, from the form. But since immaterial substances are simple quiddities, in such substances the difference cannot be taken from that which is a part of the quiddity but only from the whole quiddity, and so in De Anima I, cap. 1, Avicenna says that substances "have no simple difference except for those species of which the essences are composed of matter and form."
Similiter etiam in eis ex tota essentia sumitur genus, modo tamen differenti. Una enim substantia separata convenit cum alia in immaterialitate et differunt ab invicem in gradu perfectionis secundum recessum a potentialitate et accessum ad actum purum. Et ideo ab eo quod consequitur illas in quantum sunt immateriales sumitur in eis genus, sicut est intellectualitas vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ab eo autem quod consequitur in eis gradum perfectionis sumitur in eis differentia, nobis tamen ignota. Nec oportet has differentias esse accidentales, quia sunt secundum maiorem et minorem perfectionem, quae non diversificant speciem. Gradus enim perfectionis in recipiendo eandem formam non diversificat speciem, sicut albius et minus album in participando eiusdem rationis albedinem. Sed diversus gradus perfectionis in ipsis formis vel naturis participatis speciem diversificat, sicut natura procedit per gradus de plantis ad animalia per quaedam, quae sunt media inter animalia et plantas, secundum philosophum in VII de animalibus. Nec iterum est necessarium, ut divisio intellectualium substantiarum sit semper per duas differentias veras, quia hoc est impossibile in omnibus rebus accidere, ut philosophus dicit in XI de animalibus. Similarly, in immaterial things the genus is taken from the whole essence, though not in the same way as the difference is. One separated substance is like another with respect to their immateriality, but they differ one from another with respect to their grade of perfection according to how far each recedes from potentiality and approaches pure act. And so, in such substances, the genus is taken from that which arises in these substances insofar as they are immaterial, as intellectuality and such things; the difference, however, is taken from that which arises in these substances from their grade of perfection, although these differences are unknown to us. Nor are these differences accidental because they arise from greater and lesser perfection, which do not diversify the species. For, while the grade of perfection in receiving the same form does not diversify the species (as whiter and less white in participating in whiteness of the same type), nevertheless, a different grade of perfection in these participated forms or natures does diversify the species, just as nature proceeds by grades from plants to animals through those things that are median between plants and animals, as the Philosopher says in VIII De Historia Animalium cap. 1 (588b4-12). Nor is it necessary that the division of intellectual substances always be made through two true differences, for it is impossible that this happen in all things, as the Philosopher says in I De Partibus Animalium cap. 2 (642b5-7).
Tertio modo invenitur essentia in substantiis compositis ex materia et forma, in quibus et esse est receptum et finitum, propter hoc quod ab alio esse habent, et iterum natura vel quiditas earum est recepta in materia signata. Et ideo sunt finitae et superius et inferius, et in eis iam propter divisionem materiae signatae possibilis est multiplicatio individuorum in una specie. Et in his qualiter se habet essentia ad intentiones logicas, supra dictum est. In a third way, essence is found in substances composed of matter and form, in which existence is both received and limited because such substances have existence from another, and again because the nature or quiddity of such substances is received in signate matter. And thus such substances are finite in both a superior way and an inferior way, and among such substances, because of the division of signate matter, there can be a multiplication of individuals in one species. The ways in which the essence in such substances is related to the logical intentions we have explained above.
Chapter VI
Caput 5 De ente et essentia, cap. 5 Nunc restat videre quomodo sit essentia in accidentibus. Qualiter enim sit in omnibus substantiis, dictum est. Et quia, ut dictum est, essentia est id quod per diffinitionem significatur, oportet ut eo modo habeant essentiam quo habent diffinitionem. Diffinitionem autem habent incompletam, quia non possunt diffiniri, nisi ponatur subiectum in eorum diffinitione. Et hoc ideo est, quia non habent per se esse, absolutum a subiecto, sed sicut ex forma et materia relinquitur esse substantiale, quando componuntur, ita ex accidente et subiecto relinquitur esse accidentale, quando accidens subiecto advenit. Et ideo etiam nec forma substantialis completam essentiam habet nec materia, quia etiam in diffinitione formae substantialis oportet quod ponatur illud, cuius est forma; et ita diffinitio eius est per additionem alicuius, quod est extra genus eius, sicut et diffinitio formae accidentalis. Unde et in diffinitione animae ponitur corpus a naturali, qui considerat animam solum in quantum est forma physici corporis. We should now see in what way there are essences in accidents, having said already how essences are found in all types of substances. Now, since, as said above, the essence is that which is signified by the definition, accidents will thus have essences in the same way in which they have definitions. But accidents have incomplete definitions, because they cannot be defined unless we put a subject in their definitions, and this is because they do not have absolute existence per se apart from a subject, but just as from the form and the matter substantial existence results when a substance is compounded, so too from the accident and the subject does accidental existence result when the accident comes to the subject. Thus, neither the substantial form nor the matter has a complete essence, for even in the definition of the substantial form we place something of which it is the form, and so its definition involves the addition of something that is beyond its genus, just as with the definition of an accidental form. Hence, the natural philosopher places the body in the definition of the soul because he considers the soul only insofar as it is the form of the physical body.
Sed tamen inter formas substantiales et accidentales tantum interest, quia sicut forma substantialis non habet per se esse absolutum sine eo cui advenit, ita nec illud cui advenit, scilicet materia. Et ideo ex coniunctione utriusque relinquitur illud esse, in quo res per se subsistit, et ex eis efficitur unum per se; propter quod ex coniunctione eorum relinquitur essentia quaedam. Unde forma, quamvis in se considerata non habeat completam rationem essentiae, tamen est pars essentiae completae. Sed illud, cui advenit accidens, est ens in se completum, subsistens in suo esse. Quod quidem esse naturaliter praecedit accidens quod supervenit. Et ideo accidens superveniens ex coniunctione sui cum eo cui advenit non causat illud esse, in quo res subsistit, per quod res est ens per se, sed causat quoddam esse secundum, sine quo res subsistens intelligi potest esse, sicut primum potest intelligi sine secundo. Unde ex accidente et subiecto non efficitur unum per se, sed unum per accidens. Et ideo ex eorum coniunctione non resultat essentia quaedam, sicut ex coniunctione formae ad materiam. Propter quod accidens neque rationem completae essentiae habet neque pars essentiae completae est, sed sicut est ens secundum quid, ita et essentiam secundum quid habet. But this is the case only with substantial and accidental forms because, just as the substantial form has no absolute existence per se without that to which the form comes, so too does that to which the form comes, namely matter, have no absolute per se existence. Thus, from the conjunction of both there results that existence in which the thing per se subsists, and from these two there is made one thing per se; for, from the conjunction of these there results a certain essence. Hence, although considered in itself the form does not have the complete aspect of an essence, nevertheless it is part of a complete essence. But that to which an accident comes is in itself a complete being subsisting in its own existence, and this existence naturally precedes the accident that supervenes. Therefore, the supervening accident, from its conjunction with the thing to which it comes, does not cause that existence in which the thing subsists, the existence through which the thing is a being per se; it causes, rather, a certain secondary existence without which the subsisting being can be understood to exist, as what is first can be understood without what is second. Hence, from the accident and the subject there is made something that is one accidentally, not essentially; and so from the conjunction of these two there does not result an essence, as there does from the conjunction of form and matter. And so an accident has neither the aspect of a complete essence nor is it a part of an essence; rather, just as an accident is a being only in a certain sense, so too does it have an essence only in a certain sense.
Sed quia illud, quod dicitur maxime et verissime in quolibet genere, est causa eorum quae sunt post in illo genere, sicut ignis qui est in fine caliditatis est causa caloris in rebus calidis, ut in II metaphysicae dicitur, ideo substantia quae est primum in genere entis, verissime et maxime essentiam habens, oportet quod sit causa accidentium, quae secundario et quasi secundum quid rationem entis participant. Quod tamen diversimode contingit. Quia enim partes substantiae sunt materia et forma, ideo quaedam accidentia principaliter consequuntur formam et quaedam materiam. Forma autem invenitur aliqua, cuius esse non dependet ad materiam, ut anima intellectualis; materia vero non habet esse nisi per formam. Unde in accidentibus, quae consequuntur formam, est aliquid, quod non habet communicationem cum materia, sicut est intelligere, quod non est per organum corporale, sicut probat philosophus in III de anima. Aliqua vero ex consequentibus formam sunt, quae habent communicationem cum materia, sicut sentire. Sed nullum accidens consequitur materiam sine communicatione formae. But since that which is greatest and truest in a genus is the cause of the lesser things in the genus (as fire, which is at the extreme of heat, is the cause of heat in other hot things, as the Philosopher says in II Metaphysicae cap. 1 (993b24-27)), thus substance, which is first in the genus of beings and which has essence in the truest and greatest way, is the cause of accidents, which participate in the notion of being only secondarily and in a certain sense. But this happens in a variety of ways. Since the parts of substance are matter and form, certain accidents are principally a consequence of form, and certain accidents are principally a consequence of matter. Now, while we find some forms, like the intellectual soul, whose existence does not depend on matter, matter does not have existence except through form. Hence, among those accidents that are a consequence of form, there are some that have no communication with matter, such as understanding, which does not take place through a corporeal organ, as the Philosopher proves in III De Anima cap. 1 (429a18-b5). Other accidents that are a consequence of form do have communication with matter, and among these is sensation. But no accident a consequence of matter is without some communication with form.
In his tamen accidentibus, quae materiam consequuntur, invenitur quaedam diversitas. Quaedam enim accidentia consequuntur materiam secundum ordinem, quem habet ad formam specialem, sicut masculinum et femininum in animalibus, quorum diversitas ad materiam reducitur, ut dicitur in X metaphysicae. Unde remota forma animalis dicta accidentia non remanent nisi aequivoce. Quaedam vero consequuntur materiam secundum ordinem, quem habet ad formam generalem, et ideo remota forma speciali adhuc in ea remanent, sicut nigredo cutis est in Aethiope ex mixtione elementorum et non ex ratione animae, et ideo post mortem in eis remanet. Among the accidents that are consequences of matter there is found a certain diversity. Some accidents follow from the order the matter has to a special form, as the masculine and the feminine in animals, the difference between which is reduced to the matter, as the Philosopher says in X Metaphysicae cap. 9 (1058b21-23). Hence, the form of the animal having been removed, these accidents do not remain except in some equivocal sense. Other accidents follow from the order the matter has to a general form, and so with these accidents, if the special form is removed, the accidents still remain in the thing, as the blackness of the skin of an Ethiopian comes from the mixture of the elements and not from the notion of the soul, and hence the blackness remains in the man after death.
Et quia unaquaeque res individuatur ex materia et collocatur in genere vel specie per suam formam, ideo accidentia, quae consequuntur materiam, sunt accidentia individui, secundum quae etiam individua eiusdem speciei ad invicem differunt, accidentia vero, quae consequuntur formam, sunt propriae passiones vel generis vel speciei; unde inveniuntur in omnibus participantibus naturam generis vel speciei, sicut risibile consequitur in homine formam, quia risus contingit ex aliqua apprehensione animae hominis. Since everything is individuated by matter and is placed in its genus or species through its form, the accidents that follow from the matter are accidents of the individual, and by these accidents individuals of the same species differ one from another. But the accidents that follow from the form are properly passions of the genus or species, and so they are found in all things participating in the nature of the genus or species, as risibility in man follows from the form, for laughter comes from a certain kind of understanding in the soul of man.
Sciendum etiam est quod accidentia aliquando ex principiis essentialibus causantur secundum actum perfectum, sicut calor in igne, qui semper est actu calidus; aliquando vero secundum aptitudinem tantum, sed complementum accidit ex agente exteriori, sicut diaphaneitas in aere, quae completur per corpus lucidum exterius. Et in talibus aptitudo est accidens inseparabile, sed complementum, quod advenit ex aliquo principio, quod est extra essentiam rei vel quod non intrat constitutionem rei, est separabile, sicut moveri et huiusmodi. We should also note that some accidents are caused by the essential principles of a thing according to its perfect act, as heat in fire, which is always hot, while other accidents are the result of an aptitude in the substance, and in such cases the complete accident arises from an exterior agent, as transparency in air, which is completed through an exterior luminescent body. In such things, the aptitude is an inseparable accident, but the complement, which comes from some principle that is beyond the essence of the thing, or that does not enter into the constitution of the thing, is separable, as the ability to be moved, and so on.
Sciendum est etiam quod in accidentibus alio modo sumitur genus, differentia et species quam in substantiis. Quia enim in substantiis ex forma substantiali et materia efficitur per se unum una quadam natura ex earum coniunctione resultante, quae proprie in praedicamento substantiae collocatur, ideo in substantiis nomina concreta, quae compositum significant, proprie in genere esse dicuntur sicut species vel genera, ut homo vel animal. Non autem forma vel materia est hoc modo in praedicamento nisi per reductionem, sicut principia in genere esse dicuntur. Sed ex accidente et subiecto non fit unum per se. Unde non resultat ex eorum coniunctione aliqua natura, cui intentio generis vel speciei possit attribui. Unde nomina accidentalia concretive dicta non ponuntur in praedicamento sicut species vel genera, ut album vel musicum, nisi per reductionem, sed solum secundum quod in abstracto significantur, ut albedo et musica. Et quia accidentia non componuntur ex materia et forma, ideo non potest in eis sumi genus a materia et differentia a forma sicut in substantiis compositis, sed oportet ut genus primum sumatur ex ipso modo essendi, secundum quod ens diversimode secundum prius et posterius de decem generibus praedicatur; sicut dicitur quantitas ex eo quod est mensura substantiae, et qualitas secundum quod est dispositio substantiae, et sic de aliis secundum philosophum IX metaphysicae. We should further note that in accidents, the genus, difference, and species are taken in a way different from that in substances. For in substances, from the substantial form and the matter there is made something one per se, a certain single nature resulting from the conjunction of these two, and this nature is properly placed in the predicament of substance. Hence, in substances, the concrete terms that signify the composite are properly said to be in the genus, in the manner of the species or the genus, as, for example, man or animal. But in this way neither the form nor the matter is in a predicament except by means of reduction, as when we say that the principles of a thing are in its genus. However, from the accident and the subject there does not result something that is one per se, and thus from the conjunction of these two there does not result a nature to which the intention of genus or species might be attributed. Therefore, the accidental terms taken concretely, like white or musical, cannot be placed in a predicament except by means of reduction; but they can be placed in a predicament when they are signified abstractly, as whiteness and music. And because accidents are not composed of matter and form, in accidents the genus cannot be taken from the matter, the difference from the form, as is the case with composite substances; rather, the first genus is taken from their very mode of existing, as being is said in different ways according to what is prior and what is posterior in the ten genera of predicaments, and thus we call the measure of a substance quantity, the disposition of a substance quality, and so on for the others, as the Philosopher says in IX Metaphysicae cap. 1 (1045b27-32).
Differentiae vero in eis sumuntur ex diversitate principiorum, ex quibus causantur. Et quia propriae passiones ex propriis principiis subiecti causantur, ideo subiectum ponitur in diffinitione eorum loco differentiae, si in abstracto diffiniuntur secundum quod sunt proprie in genere, sicut dicitur quod simitas est nasi curvitas. Sed e converso esset, si eorum diffinitio sumeretur secundum quod concretive dicuntur. Sic enim subiectum in eorum diffinitione poneretur sicut genus, quia tunc diffinirentur per modum substantiarum compositarum, in quibus ratio generis sumitur a materia, sicut dicimus quod simum est nasus curvus. Similiter etiam est, si unum accidens alterius accidentis principium sit, sicut principium relationis est actio et passio et quantitas; et ideo secundum haec dividit philosophus relationem in V metaphysicae. Sed quia propria principia accidentium non semper sunt manifesta, ideo quandoque sumimus differentias accidentium ex eorum effectibus, sicut congregativum et disgregativum dicuntur differentiae coloris, quae causantur ex abundantia vel paucitate lucis, ex quo diversae species colorum causantur. The differences in accidents are taken from the diversity of principles by which they are caused. Since passions are properly caused by the proper principles of the subject, the subject is placed in the definition of the passion in place of the difference if the passion is being defined in the abstract and properly in its genus, as when we say that having a snubnose is the upward curvature of the nose. But it would be the converse if the definition of the passion were taken according to its concrete sense; in this way, the subject is placed in the definition as a genus, for then the passion is defined in the mode of composite substances in which the notion of the genus is taken from the matter, as when we say that a snubnose is an upwardly curving nose. The case is similar when one accident is the principle of another, as the principle of relation is action and passion and quantity, and thus by reference to these the Philosopher divides relation in V Metaphysicae cap. 15 (1020b26-32). But because the proper principles of accidents are not always manifest, we sometimes take the differences of accidents from their effects, as we do with the concentrative and the diffusive, which are called the differences of color and which are caused by the abundance or the paucity of light, which cause the different species of color.
Caput 6 De ente et essentia, cap. 6 Sic ergo patet quomodo essentia est in substantiis et accidentibus et quomodo in substantiis compositis et simplicibus et qualiter in his omnibus intentiones universales logicae inveniuntur excepto primo, quod est in fine simplicitatis, cui non convenit ratio generis vel speciei et per consequens nec diffinitio propter suam simplicitatem. In quo sit finis et consummatio huius sermonis. Amen. We have thus made clear how essence is found in substances and in accidents, and how in composite substances and in simple ones, and in what way the universal intentions of logic are found in all of these, except for the first being, which is the extreme of simplicity and to which, because of its simplicity, the notions of genus, species, and thus definition do not apply; and having said this we may make an proper end to this discourse. Amen.

Notes

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