Authors/Aristotle/priora/Liber 1/C41

Chapter 41

Greek	Latin	English
		41
49b14 Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ταὐτὸν οὔτ᾽ εἶναι οὔτ᾽ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ὧι τὸ Β ὑπάρχει, τούτωι παντὶ τὸ Α ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν τὸ ὧι παντὶ τὸ Β ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ Α παντὶ ὑπάρχει· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ Β τῶι Γ ὑπάρχειν, μὴ παντὶ δέ. οἷον ἔστω τὸ Β καλόν, τὸ δὲ Γ λευκόν. εἰ δὴ λευκῶι τινὶ ὑπάρχει καλόν, ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι τῶι λευκῶι ὑπάρχει καλόν· ἀλλ᾽ οὐ παντὶ ἴσως. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ Α τῶι Β ὑπάρχει, μὴ παντὶ δὲ καθ᾽ οὗ τὸ Β, οὔτ᾽ εἰ παντὶ τῶι Γ τὸ Β, οὔτ᾽ εἰ μόνον ὑπάρχει, ἀνάγκη τὸ Α οὐχ ὅτι οὐ παντί, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὑπάρχειν.	Non est autem idem neque esse, neque dicere quoniam cui B inest, huic quoque omni A inest, et dicere, cui omni B inest, et A inest omni, nihil enim prohibet B inesse C, non autem omni. Ut sit B pulchrum quid, C autem album, si igitur alicui albo inest pulchrum quid, verum est dicere quoniam albo inest pulchrum, sed non omni fortasse. Si ergo A inest B, non omni autem de quo B (neque si omni C, inest B, neque si solum alicui), non necesse est ei quod est C inesse A, non quia non omni, sed nec inesse ei quod est C.	It is not the same, either in fact or in speech, that A belongs to all of that to which B belongs, and that A belongs to all of that to all of which B belongs: for nothing prevents B from belonging to C, though not to all C: e.g. let B stand for beautiful, and C for white. If beauty belongs to something white, it is true to say that beauty belongs to that which is white; but not perhaps to everything that is white. If then A belongs to B, but not to everything of which B is predicated, then whether B belongs to all C or merely belongs to C, it is not necessary that A should belong, I do not say to all C, but even to C at all.
εἰ δὲ καθ᾽ οὗ ἂν τὸ Β λέγηται ἀληθῶς, τούτωι παντὶ ὑπάρχει, συμβήσεται τὸ Α, καθ᾽ οὗ παντὸς τὸ Β λέγεται, κατὰ τούτου παντὸς λέγεσθαι. εἰ μέντοι τὸ Α λέγεται καθ᾽ οὗ ἂν τὸ Β λέγηται κατὰ παντός, οὐδὲν κωλύει τῶι Γ ὑπάρχειν τὸ Β, μὴ παντὶ δὲ τὸ Α ἢ ὅλως μὴ ὑπάρχειν. ἐν δὴ τοῖς τρισὶν ὅροις δῆλον ὅτι τὸ καθ᾽ οὗ τὸ Β παντὸς τὸ Α λέγεσθαι τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι, καθ᾽ ὅσων τὸ Β λέγεται, κατὰ πάντων λέ γεσθαι καὶ τὸ Α. καὶ εἰ μὲν κατὰ παντὸς τὸ Β, καὶ τὸ Α οὕτως· εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ παντός, οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ Α κατὰ παντός.	Si autem de quocunque B dicatur vere, huic omni inest A, accidet A de quo omni B dicitur, de eo omni dici. (0680C) Si autem A dicitur de omni de quo B dicatur, nihil prohibet ei quod est C inesse B, non omni autem A, aut non inesse omnino. In tribus igitur terminis manifestum est quoniam de quo B quidem omni, et A dicitur, hoc est de quibuscunque B dicitur, de omnibus dicitur et A, et si B quidem de omni, et A similiter, si autem non de omni, non necesse est A inesse omni.	But if A belongs to everything of which B is truly stated, it will follow that A can be said of all of that of all of which B is said. If however A is said of that of all of which B may be said, nothing prevents B belonging to C, and yet A not belonging to all C or to any C at all. If then we take three terms it is clear that the expression ‘A is said of all of which B is said’ means this, ‘A is said of all the things of which B is said’. And if B is said of all of a third term, so also is A: but if B is not said of all of the third term, there is no necessity that A should be said of all of it.
Οὐ δεῖ δ᾽ οἴεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἐκτίθεσθαί τι συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον· οὐδὲν γὰρ προσχρώμεθα τῶι τόδε τι εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ὁ γεωμέτρης τὴν ποδιαίαν καὶ εὐθεῖαν τήνδε καὶ ἀπλατῆ εἶναι λέγει οὐκ οὔσας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οὕτως χρῆται ὡς ἐκ τούτων συλλογιζόμενος. ὅλως γὰρ ὁ μὴ ἔστιν ὡς ὅλον πρὸς μέρος καὶ ἄλλο πρὸς τοῦτο ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον, ἐξ οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων δείκνυσιν ὁ δεικνύων, ὥστε οὐδὲ γίνεται ↵ συλλογισμός. τῶι δ᾽ ἐκτίθεσθαι οὕτω χρώμεθα ὥσπερ καὶ τῶι αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸν μανθάνοντ᾽ ἀλέγοντες· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὡς ἄνευ τούτων οὐχ οἷόν τ᾽ ἀποδειχθῆναι, ὥσπερ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός.	Non oportet autem arbitrari propter expositionem accidere aliquod inconveniens, non enim laboramus in eo quod aliquid sit hoc, sed quemadmodum geometer pedalem, et rectam hanc esse et sine latitudine dicit quae non est, sed non sic utitur, ut eis syllogizans. (0680D) Omnino enim quod non est ut totum ad partem, et aliud ad hoc ut pars ad totum, ex nullo talium ostendit demonstrator, neque enim fit syllogismus, expositione autem sic utimur, ut et sentiat qui discit dicentes, non enim sic ut sine his non possibile sit demonstrare, quemadmodum ex quibus est syllogismus.	We must not suppose that something absurd results through setting out the terms: for we do not use the existence of this particular thing, but imitate the geometrician who says that ‘this line a foot long’ or ‘this straight line’ or ‘this line without breadth’ exists although it does not, but does not use the diagrams in the sense that he reasons from them. For in general, if two things are not related as whole to part and part to whole, the prover does not prove from them, and so no syllogism is formed. We (I mean the learner) use the process of setting out terms like perception by sense, not as though it were impossible to demonstrate without these illustrative terms, as it is to demonstrate without the premisses of the syllogism.