Authors/Aristotle/priora/Liber 1/C33

Chapter 33

Greek	Latin	English
	(PL 64 0676D) CAPUT XXXV. De necessario et thesi terminorum.	33
47b15 Πολλάκις μὲν οὖν ἀπατᾶσθαι συμβαίνει περὶ τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἐνίοτε δὲ παρὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς τῶν ὅρων θέσεως· ὅπερ οὐ χρὴ λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς. οἷον εἰ τὸ Α κατὰ τοῦ Β λέγεται καὶ τὸ Β κατὰ τοῦ Γ· δόξειε γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐχόντων τῶν ὅρων εἶναι συλλογισμός, οὐ γίνεται δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον οὐδὲν οὔτε συλλογισμός.	Frequenter ergo falli accidit circa syllogismos propter necessarium, quemadmodum dictum est prius: aliquoties autem propter similitudinem positionis terminorum, quod non oportet latere nos. Ut si A de B dicitur, et B de C, videbitur enim sic se habentibus terminis esse syllogismus, non fit autem neque necessarium quidquam, neque syllogismus.	Men are frequently deceived about syllogisms because the inference is necessary, as has been said above; sometimes they are deceived by the similarity in the positing of the terms; and this ought not to escape our notice. E.g. if A is stated of B, and B of C: it would seem that a syllogism is possible since the terms stand thus: but nothing necessary results, nor does a syllogism.
ἔστω γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ὧι Α τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι, ἐφ᾽ ὧι δὲ Β διανοητὸς Ἀριστομένης, τὸ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὧι Γ Ἀριστομένης. ἀληθὲς δὴ τὸ Α τῶι Β ὑπάρχειν· ἀεὶ γάρ ἐστι διανοητὸς Ἀριστομένης. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ Β τῶι Γ· ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστομένης ἐστὶ διανοητὸς Ἀριστομένης. τὸ δ᾽ Α τῶι Γ οὐχ ὑπάρχει· φθαρτὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Ἀριστομένης. οὐ γὰρ ἐγίνετο συλλογισμὸς οὕτως ἐχόντων τῶν ὅρων, ἀλλ᾽ ἔδει καθόλου τὴν Α Β ληφθῆναι πρότασιν. τοῦτο δὲ ψεῦδος, τὸ ἀξιοῦν πάντα τὸν διανοητὸν Ἀριστομένην ἀεὶ εἶναι, φθαρτοῦ ὄντος Ἀριστομένους. πάλιν ἔστω τὸ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ὧι Γ Μίκκαλος, τὸ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὧι Β μουσικὸς Μίκκαλος, ἐφ᾽ ὧι δὲ τὸ Α τὸ φθείρεσθαι αὔριον. ἀληθὲς δὴ τὸ Β τοῦ Γ κατηγορεῖν· ὁ γὰρ Μίκκαλός ἐστι μουσικὸς Μίκκαλος. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ Α τοῦ Β· φθείροιτο γὰρ ἂν αὔριον μουσικὸς Μίκκαλος. τὸ δέ γε Α τοῦ Γ ψεῦδος. τοῦτο δὴ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῶι πρότερον· οὐ γὰρ ἀληθὲς καθόλου, Μίκκαλος μουσικὸς ὅτι φθείρεται αὔριον· τούτου δὲ μὴ ληφθέντος οὐκ ἦν συλλογισμός.	(0677A) Sit enim in quo A semper esse, in quo autem B intelligibilis Aristomenes, in quo autem C Aristomenes, verum est autem A inesse B, semper enim est intelligibilis Aristomenes, sed et B de C, nam Aristomenes est intelligibilis Aristomenes, A autem non inest C, corruptibilis est enim Aristomenes; non igitur fiebat syllogismus sic se habentibus terminis, sed oportebat universaliter A B sumi propositionem: hoc vero falsum quod putabat omnem intelligibilem Aristomenem semper esse, cum Aristomenes sit corruptibilis. Rursum sit in quo quidem C Micalus, in quo autem B musicus Micalus, in quo autem A corrumpi cras. (0677B) Verum est ergo B de C praedicari, nam Micalus est musicus Micalus, sed et A de B, corrumpetur enim cras musicus Micalus, A autem de C falsum: hoc autem idem est priori, non enim verum est universaliter, Micalus musicus quoniam corrumpetur cras. Hoc autem non sumpto non erat syllogismus.	Let A represent the term ‘being eternal’, B ‘Aristomenes as an object of thought’, C ‘Aristomenes’. It is true then that A belongs to B. For Aristomenes as an object of thought is eternal. But B also belongs to C: for Aristomenes is Aristomenes as an object of thought. But A does not belong to C: for Aristomenes is perishable. For no syllogism was made although the terms stood thus: that required that the premiss AB should be stated universally. But this is false, that every Aristomenes who is an object of thought is eternal, since Aristomenes is perishable. Again let C stand for ‘Miccalus’, B for ‘musical Miccalus’, A for ‘perishing to-morrow’. It is true to predicate B of C: for Miccalus is musical Miccalus. Also A can be predicated of B: for musical Miccalus might perish to-morrow. But to state A of C is false at any rate. This argument then is identical with the former; for it is not true universally that musical Miccalus perishes to-morrow: but unless this is assumed, no syllogism (as we have shown) is possible.
Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀπάτη γίνεται ἐν τῶι παρὰ μικρόν· ὡς γὰρ οὐδὲν διαφέρον εἰπεῖν τόδε τῶιδε ὑπάρχειν ἢ τόδε τῶιδε παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, συγχωροῦμεν.	Haec ergo fallacia fit in eo quod pene, ut enim nihil differens dicere hoc huic inesse, aut hoc huic omni inesse, concedimus.	This deception then arises through ignoring a small distinction. For if we accept the conclusion as though it made no difference whether we said ‘This belong to that’ or ‘This belongs to all of that’.