Authors/Aristotle/priora/Liber 1/C13

Chapter 13

Greek	Latin	English
	(PL 64 0651C) CAPUT XII. De contingenti non necessario.	13
32a16 περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου μετὰ ταῦτα λέγωμεν πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται συλλογισμός. λέγω δ᾽ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, οὗ μὴ ὄντος ἀναγκαίου, τεθέντος δ᾽ ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν ἔσται διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ὁμωνύμως ἐνδέχεσθαι λέγομεν. [ὅτι δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, φανερὸν ἔκ τε τῶν ἀποφάσεων καὶ τῶν καταφάσεων τῶν ἀντικειμένων·	(0651D) De contingente autem post haec dicemus, quando, et quomodo, et per quae erit syllogismus. Dico autem contingere, et contingens, quo non existente necessario, posito autem inesse, nihil erit propter hoc impossibile. Nam necessarium aequivoce contingere dicitur. Quoniam autem hoc est contingens, manifestum ex affirmationibus et negationibus oppositis.	We proceed to discuss that which is possible, when and how and by what means it can be proved. I use the terms ‘to be possible’ and ‘the possible’ of that which is not necessary but, being assumed, results in nothing impossible. We say indeed ambiguously of the necessary that it is possible. But that my definition of the possible is correct is clear from the phrases by which we deny or on the contrary affirm possibility.
τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀνάγκη μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἤτοι ταὐτά ἐστιν ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα, τὸ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν καὶ οὐκ ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἤτοι ταὐτὰ ἔσται ἢ ἀκολουθοῦντα ἀλλήλοις· κατὰ παντὸς γὰρ ἡ φάσις ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις.	(0652A) Nam non contingit esse, non possibile esse, et impossibile esse, et necesse est non esse, vel eadem sunt, vel sequuntur se invicem, quare et opposito his contingit esse, et non impossibile esse, et non necesse non esse, eadem erunt, vel sequentia se invicem. De omni enim affirmatio, vel negatio vera.	For the expressions ‘it is not possible to belong’, ‘it is impossible to belong’, and ‘it is necessary not to belong’ are either identical or follow from one another; consequently their opposites also, ‘it is possible to belong’, ‘it is not impossible to belong’, and ‘it is not necessary not to belong’, will either be identical or follow from one another. For of everything the affirmation or the denial holds good.
ἔσται ἄρα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἐνδεχόμενον.] συμβαίνει δὲ πάσας τὰς κατὰ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι προτάσεις ἀντιστρέφειν ἀλλήλαις.	Erit ergo contingens necessarium, et non necessarium contingens. Accidit autem omnes quae secundum contingere sunt propositiones converti sibi invicem,	That which is possible then will be not necessary and that which is not necessary will be possible. It results that all premisses in the mode of possibility are convertible into one another.
λέγω δὲ οὐ τὰς καταφατικὰς ταῖς ἀποφατικαῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσαι καταφατικὸν ἔχουσι τὸ σχῆμα κατὰ τὴν ἀντίθεσιν, οἷον τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν τῶι ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ παντὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶι ἐνδέχεσθαι μηδενὶ καὶ μὴ παντί, καὶ τὸ τινὶ τῶι μὴ τινί. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	dico autem non affirmativas negativis sed quaecunque affirmativam habent figuram secundum oppositionem, ut ea quae est contingit esse ei quae est contingit non esse, et ea quae est contingit omni ei quae est contingit nulli, vel non omni, et quae alicui, et quae non alicui, eodem autem modo et in aliis.	I mean not that the affirmative are convertible into the negative, but that those which are affirmative in form admit of conversion by opposition, e.g. ‘it is possible to belong’ may be converted into ‘it is possible not to belong’, and ‘it is possible for A to belong to all B’ into ‘it is possible for A to belong to no B’ or ‘not to all B’, and ‘it is possible for A to belong to some B’ into ‘it is possible for A not to belong to some B’. And similarly the other propositions in this mode can be converted.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἐγχωρεῖ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, φανερὸν ὅτι, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ Α τῶι Β ὑπάρχειν, ἐνδέχεται καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· καὶ εἰ παντὶ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν, καὶ παντὶ ἐνδέχεται μὴ ὑπάρχειν.	(0652B) Quoniam enim quod est contingens non est necessarium, et quod non est necessarium possibile est non esse, manifestum quoniam si contingit A inesse B, contingit et non inesse, et si omni contingit inesse, et omni contingit non inesse.	For since that which is possible is not necessary, and that which is not necessary may possibly not belong, it is clear that if it is possible that A should belong to B, it is possible also that it should not belong to B: and if it is possible that it should belong to all, it is also possible that it should not belong to all.
ὁμοίως δὲ κἀπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει καταφάσεων· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ ↵ ἀπόδειξις. εἰσὶ δ᾽ αἱ τοιαῦται προτάσεις κατηγορικαὶ καὶ οὐ στερητικαί· τὸ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶι εἶναι ὁμοίως τάττεται, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον.	Similiter autem et in particularibus affirmationibus, nam eadem demonstratio. Sunt autem huiusmodi propositiones praedicativae, nam contingere ei quod est esse similiter ponitur, quemadmodum dictum est prius.	The same holds good in the case of particular affirmations: for the proof is identical. And such premisses are affirmative and not negative; for ‘to be possible’ is in the same rank as ‘to be’, as was said above.
Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων πάλιν λέγωμεν ὅτι τὸ ἐνδέχε σθαι κατὰ δύο λέγεται τρόπους, ἕνα μὲν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνεσθαι καὶ διαλείπειν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον τὸ πολιοῦσθαι ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὸ αὐξάνεσθαι ἢ φθίνειν, ἢ ὅλως τὸ πεφυκὸς ὑπάρχειν (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ συνεχὲς μὲν ἔχει τὸ ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, ὄντος μέντοι ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ἐστιν), ἄλλον δὲ τὸ ἀόριστον, ὁ καὶ οὕτως καὶ μὴ οὕτως δυνατόν, οἷον τὸ βαδίζειν ζῶιον ἢ βαδίζοντος γενέσθαι σεισμόν, ἢ ὅλως τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενον· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον οὕτως πέφυκεν ἢ ἐναντίως.	Determinatis autem his, rursum dicimus quoniam contingere duobus modis dicitur: uno quidem, quod plerumque fit et deficit, necessarium, ut canescere hominem, vel augeri, vel minui, vel omnino quod natum est esse. Hoc enim non continuum habet necessarium, eo quod non semper est homo, cum tamen homo est, aut ex necessitate, aut ut in pluribus est. (0652C) Alio autem modo infinitum, quod et sic, et non sic possibile, ut animal ambulare, vel ambulante fieri motum terrae, vel omnino quod casu fit, nihil enim magis sic natum est, vel econtrario.	Having made these distinctions we next point out that the expression ‘to be possible’ is used in two ways. In one it means to happen generally and fall short of necessity, e.g. man’s turning grey or growing or decaying, or generally what naturally belongs to a thing (for this has not its necessity unbroken, since man’s existence is not continuous for ever, although if a man does exist, it comes about either necessarily or generally). In another sense the expression means the indefinite, which can be both thus and not thus, e.g. an animal’s walking or an earthquake’s taking place while it is walking, or generally what happens by chance: for none of these inclines by nature in the one way more than in the opposite.
ἀντιστρέφει μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἀντικειμένας προτάσεις ἑκάτερον τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, οὐ μὴν τὸν αὐτόν γε τρόπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πεφυκὸς εἶναι τῶι μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἐνδέχεται μὴ πολιοῦσθαι ἄνθρωπον), τὸ δ᾽ ἀόριστον τῶι μηδὲν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως. ἐπιστήμη δὲ καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἀποδεικτικὸς τῶν μὲν ἀορίστων οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ ἄτακτον εἶναι τὸ μέσον, τῶν δὲ πεφυκότων ἔστι, καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ λόγοι καὶ αἱ σκέψεις γίνονται περὶ τῶν οὕτως ἐνδεχομένων· ἐκείνων δ᾽ ἐγχωρεῖ μὲν γενέσθαι συλλογισμόν, οὐ μὴν εἴωθέ γε ζητεῖσθαι.	Convertitur ergo et secundum oppositas propositiones utrumque contingens, non tamen eodem modo, sed quod natum quidem est esse ei quod non ex necessitate esse. Sic enim contingit non canescere hominem. Infinitum autem ei quod nihil magis sic, vel illo modo. Disciplina autem, et syllogismus demonstrativus, ex infinitis quidem non est, eo quod inordinatum est medium, ex iis vero quae nata sunt esse, pene orationes et considerationes fiunt de sic contingentibus, ex illis autem possibile quidem est fieri syllogismum, non tamen solet quaeri.	That which is possible in each of its two senses is convertible into its opposite, not however in the same way: but what is natural is convertible because it does not necessarily belong (for in this sense it is possible that a man should not grow grey) and what is indefinite is convertible because it inclines this way no more than that. Science and demonstrative syllogism are not concerned with things which are indefinite, because the middle term is uncertain; but they are concerned with things that are natural, and as a rule arguments and inquiries are made about things which are possible in this sense. Syllogisms indeed can be made about the former, but it is unusual at any rate to inquire about them.
Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διορισθήσεται μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις· νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ τίς ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν ἐνδε χομένων προτάσεων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι τόδε τῶιδε ὑπάρχειν διχῶς ἔστιν ἐκλαβεῖν· ἢ γὰρ ὧι ὑπάρχει τόδε ἢ ὧι ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν – τὸ γάρ, καθ᾽ οὗ τὸ Β, τὸ Α ἐνδέχεσθαι τούτων σημαίνει θάτερον, ἢ καθ᾽ οὗ λέγεται τὸ Β ἢ καθ᾽ οὗ ἐνδέχεται λέγεσθαι· τὸ δέ, καθ᾽ οὗ τὸ Β, τὸ Α ἐνδέχεσθαι ἢ παντὶ τῶι Β τὸ Α ἐγχωρεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει –	(0652D) Haec ergo definientur magis in sequentibus, nunc autem dicemus quando et quomodo, et quis erit syllogismus ex contingentibus propositionibus. Quoniam autem contingere hoc huic inesse dupliciter est accipere, aut enim cui inest hoc, aut cui contingit ipsum inesse, nam de quo B, A contingere, horum alterum significat, aut de quo dicitur B, aut de quo contingit dici, de quo autem B, A contingere, aut omni B possibile inesse A, nihil differt.	These matters will be treated more definitely in the sequel; our business at present is to state the moods and nature of the syllogism made from possible premisses. The expression ‘it is possible for this to belong to that’ may be understood in two senses: ‘that’ may mean either that to which ‘that’ belongs or that to which it may belong; for the expression ‘A is possible of the subject of B’ means that it is possible either of that of which B is stated or of that of which B may possibly be stated. It makes no difference whether we say, A is possible of the subject of B, or all B admits of A.
φανερὸν ὅτι διχῶς ἂν λέγοιτο τὸ Α τῶι Β παντὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν. πρῶτον οὖν εἴπωμεν, εἰ καθ᾽ οὗ τὸ Γ τὸ Β ἐνδέχεται, καὶ καθ᾽ οὗ τὸ Β τὸ Α, τίς ἔσται καὶ ποῖος συλλογισμός· οὕτω γὰρ αἱ προτάσεις ἀμφότεραι λαμβάνονται κατὰ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι, ὅταν δὲ καθ᾽ οὗ τὸ Β ὑπάρχει τὸ Α ἐνδέχηται, ἡ μὲν ὑπάρχουσα ἡ δ᾽ ἐνδεχομένη. ὥστ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοιοσχημόνων ἀρκτέον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.	Manifestum igitur quoniam dupliciter dicetur A omni B inesse contingere. Primum ergo dicemus si de quo C contingit B, et de quo B contingit A, quis erit, et qualis syllogismus, sic enim utraeque propositiones sumuntur secundum contingere, quando autem de quo B est contingit A, haec quidem inesse, illa vero contingens, quare A similibus figuris incipiendum, quemadmodum et in aliis.	It is clear then that the expression ‘A may possibly belong to all B’ might be used in two senses. First then we must state the nature and characteristics of the syllogism which arises if B is possible of the subject of C, and A is possible of the subject of B. For thus both premisses are assumed in the mode of possibility; but whenever A is possible of that of which B is true, one premiss is a simple assertion, the other a problematic. Consequently we must start from premisses which are similar in form, as in the other cases.