Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4/c4

Chapter 4

Greek	Latin	English
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἵ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, αὐτοί τε ἐνδέχεσθαί φασι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, [1006α] [1] καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν οὕτως. χρῶνται δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ φύσεως. ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν εἰλήφαμεν ὡς ἀδυνάτου ὄντος ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τούτου ἐδείξαμεν ὅτι βεβαιοτάτη [5] αὕτη τῶν ἀρχῶν πασῶν.	Sunt autem quidam qui, ut diximus, dicebant contingere ↵ idem esse et non esse et existimare ita. Utuntur autem ratione ƿ hac multi eorum qui * de natura. Nos autem nunc accepimus quasi impossibili existente simul esse et non esse; et per hoc ↵ ostendimus quod firmissimum hoc principiorum omnium est.	Chapter 4. There are some who, as we said, both themselves assert that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be, [06a] and say that people can judge this to be the case. And among others many writers about nature use this language. But we have now posited that it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be, and by this means have shown that this is the most indisputable of all principles.
ἀξιοῦσι δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδεικνύναι τινὲς δι᾽ ἀπαιδευσίαν: ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γιγνώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τίνων οὐ δεῖ: ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι (εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ ἂν βαδίζοι, ὥστε μηδ᾽ οὕτως εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν), [10] εἰ δέ τινων μὴ δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν, τίνα ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι μᾶλλον τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν.	Volunt autem et hoc demonstrare quidam propter ineruditionem; est enim ineruditio non cognoscere quorum oportet quaerere demonstrationem et quorum non oportet. Totaliter quidem enim omnium esse demonstrationem est impossibile; ↵ nam in infinitum procederet, ut nec ita foret demonstratio. Si vero quorundam non oportet demonstrationem quaerere, quod volunt magis esse tale principium non habent dicere.	Some indeed demand that even this shall be demonstrated, but this they do through want of education, for not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education. For it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything (there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration); but if there are things of which one should not demand demonstration, these persons could not say what principle they maintain to be more self-evident than the present one.
ἔστι δ᾽ ἀποδεῖξαι ἐλεγκτικῶς καὶ περὶ τούτου ὅτι ἀδύνατον, ἂν μόνον τι λέγῃ ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν: ἂν δὲ μηθέν, γελοῖον τὸ ζητεῖν λόγον πρὸς τὸν μηθενὸς ἔχοντα λόγον, ᾗ μὴ ἔχει: ὅμοιος [15] γὰρ φυτῷ ὁ τοιοῦτος ᾗ τοιοῦτος ἤδη. τὸ δ᾽ ἐλεγκτικῶς ἀποδεῖξαι λέγω διαφέρειν καὶ τὸ ἀποδεῖξαι, ὅτι ἀποδεικνύων μὲν ἂν δόξειεν αἰτεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ, ἄλλου δὲ τοῦ τοιούτου αἰτίου ὄντος ἔλεγχος ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις.	p; quaerere rationem ad nullius habentem rationem, in quantum ↵ non habet rationem. Similis enim plante talis in quantum talis iam est. Elenchice autem dico demonstrare differre et demonstrare, quia demonstrans quidem utique videbitur petere quod * in principio, sed nec tali existente causa elenchus utique erit et non demonstratio.	We can, however, demonstrate negatively even that this view is impossible, if our opponent will only say something; and if he says nothing, it is absurd to seek to give an account of our views to one who cannot give an account of anything, in so far as he cannot do so. For such a man, as such, is from the start no better than a vegetable. Now negative demonstration I distinguish from demonstration proper, because in a demonstration one might be thought to be begging the question, but if another person is responsible for the assumption we shall have negative proof, not demonstration.
ἀρχὴ δὲ πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ τὸ ἀξιοῦν ἢ εἶναί τι λέγειν [20] ἢ μὴ εἶναι (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τάχ᾽ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖν), ἀλλὰ σημαίνειν γέ τι καὶ αὑτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ: τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ λέγοι τι. εἰ γὰρ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγος, οὔτ᾽ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλον. ἂν δέ τις τοῦτο διδῷ, ἔσται ἀπόδειξις: ἤδη γάρ τι [25] ἔσται ὡρισμένον. ἀλλ᾽ αἴτιος οὐχ ὁ ἀποδεικνὺς ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ὑπομένων: ἀναιρῶν γὰρ λόγον ὑπομένει λόγον. ἔτι δὲ ὁ τοῦτο συγχωρήσας συγκεχώρηκέ τι ἀληθὲς εἶναι χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως [ὥστε οὐκ ἂν πᾶν οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοι].	Principium vero ad omnia talia non velle aut esse aliquid ↵ dicere aut non esse (hoc enim forsan utique quis opinabitur quod a principio petere), sed significare quidem aliquid et ipsi et alii; hoc enim necesse est, si dicat aliquid. Si enim non, cum tali non utique erit sermo; nec ipsi ad se ipsum nec ad alium. Si quis autem hoc dederit, erit demonstratio; iam ↵ enim aliquid erit diffinitum. Sed causa non demonstrans sed sustinens; interimens enim rationem sustinet rationem.	The starting-point for all such arguments is not the demand that our opponent shall say that something either is or is not (for this one might perhaps take to be a begging of the question), but that he shall say something which is significant both for himself and for another; for this is necessary, if he really is to say anything. For, if he means nothing, such a man will not be capable of reasoning, either with himself or with another. But if any one grants this, demonstration will be possible; for we shall already have something definite. The person responsible for the proof, however, is not he who demonstrates but he who listens; for while disowning reason he listens to reason.
		And again he who admits this has admitted that something is true apart from demonstration (so that not everything will be so and not so).
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δῆλον ὡς τοῦτό γ᾽ αὐτὸ ἀληθές, ὅτι σημαίνει τὸ [30] ὄνομα τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τοδί, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἂν πᾶν οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοι:	Primum quidem igitur manifestum quod hoc idem verum *, ↵ quod significat nomen ‘esse’ aut ‘non esse’ hoc *, quare non ƿ utique omne sic et non sic se habebit.	First then this at least is obviously true, that the word be or not be has a definite meaning, so that not everything will be so and not so.
ἔτι εἰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει ἕν, ἔστω τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον δίπουν.	Amplius si homo significat unum, sit hoc animal bipes.	Again, if man has one meaning, let this be two-footed animal;
λέγω δὲ τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν τοῦτο: εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἂν ᾖ τι ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι (διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐθὲν οὐδ᾽ εἰ πλείω τις φαίη σημαίνειν μόνον δὲ ὡρισμένα, [1006β] [1] τεθείη γὰρ ἂν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ λόγῳ ἕτερον ὄνομα: λέγω δ᾽ οἷον, εἰ μὴ φαίη τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἓν σημαίνειν, πολλὰ δέ, ὧν ἑνὸς μὲν εἷς λόγος τὸ ζῷον δίπουν, εἶεν δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι πλείους, ὡρισμένοι δὲ τὸν ἀριθμόν: [5] τεθείη γὰρ ἂν ἴδιον ὄνομα καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τὸν λόγον: εἰ δὲ μή [τεθείη], ἀλλ᾽ ἄπειρα σημαίνειν φαίη, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη λόγος: τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἓν σημαίνειν οὐθὲν σημαίνειν ἐστίν, μὴ σημαινόντων δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνῄρηται τὸ διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ πρὸς αὑτόν: [10] οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἕν, εἰ δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται, τεθείη ἂν ὄνομα τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι ἕν).	Dico autem * unum significare hoc: si hoc est homo, si sit aliquid homo, hoc est homini esse. Nil autem differt nec si plura quis dicat significare, solum autem * diffinita; ponetur enim utique in singulis ↵ rationibus alterum nomen. Dico autem ut si non dicat hominem unum significare sed multa, quorum unius quidem una * ratio animal bipes; sunt autem et aliae plures, sed diffinite numero; ponetur enim utique proprium nomen secundum ↵ unamquamque rationem. Si autem non ponatur, sed infinita significare dicat, palam quia non utique erit ratio; nam non unum significare nihil significare est. Non significantibus autem nominibus aufertur ad invicem disputare, secundum veritatem autem et ad se ipsum. Nihil enim contingit intelli↵gere nihil intelligentem unum; si autem contingit, ponatur huic rei nomen unum.	by having one meaning I understand this:-if man means X , then if A is a man X will be what being a man means for him. (It makes no difference even if one were to say a word has several meanings, if only they are limited in number; [06b] for to each definition there might be assigned a different word. For instance, we might say that man has not one meaning but several, one of which would have one definition, viz. two-footed animal, while there might be also several other definitions if only they were limited in number; for a peculiar name might be assigned to each of the definitions. If, however, they were not limited but one were to say that the word has an infinite number of meanings, obviously reasoning would be impossible; for not to have one meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no meaning our reasoning with one another, and indeed with ourselves, has been annihilated; for it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing; but if this is possible, one name might be assigned to this thing.)
ἔστω δή, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη κατ᾽ ἀρχάς, σημαῖνόν τι τὸ ὄνομα καὶ σημαῖνον ἕν:	Sit itaque, sicut a principio dictum est, significans aliquid * nomen et significans unum.	Let it be assumed then, as was said at the beginning, that the name has a meaning and has one meaning;
οὐ δὴ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι σημαίνειν ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ εἶναι, εἰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μὴ μόνον καθ᾽ ἑνὸς [15] ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕν (οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀξιοῦμεν τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν, τὸ καθ᾽ ἑνός, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν τὸ μουσικὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἓν ἐσήμαινεν, ὥστε ἓν ἅπαντα ἔσται: συνώνυμα γάρ).	Non itaque contingit homini esse significare quod quidem non esse homini, si homo significat non solum de uno sed et unum. Non enim hoc dignificamus ↵ unum significare quod * de uno, quoniam sic utique musicum et album et homo unum significarent, quare unum omnia erunt; synonima namque.	it is impossible, then, that being a man should mean precisely not being a man, if man not only signifies something about one subject but also has one significance (for we do not identify having one significance with signifying something about one subject, since on that assumption even musical and white and man would have had one significance, so that all things would have been one; for they would all have had the same significance).
καὶ οὐκ ἔσται εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ καθ᾽ ὁμωνυμίαν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὃν ἡμεῖς ἄνθρωπον [20] καλοῦμεν, ἄλλοι μὴ ἄνθρωπον καλοῖεν: τὸ δ᾽ ἀπορούμενον οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα.	Et non erit esse et non esse idem nisi secundum equivocationem, ut si quem nos hominem voca↵mus, alii non hominem vocent. Dubitatum vero non hoc est, si contingit simul idem esse et non esse hominem scilicet nomen, sed * rem.	And it will not be possible to be and not to be the same thing, except in virtue of an ambiguity, just as if one whom we call man , others were to call not-man; but the point in question is not this, whether the same thing can at the same time be and not be a man in name, but whether it can in fact.
δὲ μὴ σημαίνει ἕτερον τὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ μὴ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥστ᾽ ἔσται τὸ ἀνθρώπω [25] ι εἶναι μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι: ἓν γὰρ ἔσται. τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ εἶναι ἕν, τὸ ὡς λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον, εἰ ὁ λόγος εἷς: εἰ δὲ ἔσται ἕν, ἓν σημανεῖ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ. ἀλλ᾽ ἐδέδεικτο ὅτι ἕτερον σημαίνει.	Si autem non significet alterum homo et non homo, palam quia non esse homini * ab esse homini, quare erit homini esse non homini esse; unum enim erunt. Hoc ↵ ƿ enim significat esse unum, ut uestimentum et indumentum, si ratio una. Si vero erunt unum, * unum significat homini esse et non homini. Sed ostensum est quod alterum significat.	Now if man and not-man mean nothing different, obviously not being a man will mean nothing different from being a man; so that being a man will be not being a man; for they will be one. For being one means this-being related as raiment and dress are, if their definition is one. And if being a man and being a not-man are to be one, they must mean one thing. But it was shown earlier that they mean different things.
ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος, ζῷον εἶναι δίπουν [30] (τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὃ ἐσήμαινε τὸ ἄνθρωπος): εἰ δ᾽ ἀνάγκη τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι <τότε> τὸ αὐτὸ ζῷον δίπουν (τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι μὴ εἶναι [ἄνθρωπον]): οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ἀληθὲς εἶναι εἰπεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον.	Necesse itaque, si quid est verum dicere quia homo, animal ↵ esse bipes; hoc enim erat quod significabat homo. Sed si hoc necesse, non contingit non esse hoc ipsum animal bipes; hoc enim significat necesse esse: impossibile non esse hominem. non igitur contingit simul verum esse dicere idem hominem ↵ esse et non esse hominem.	Therefore, if it is true to say of anything that it is a man, it must be a two-footed animal (for this was what man meant); and if this is necessary, it is impossible that the same thing should not at that time be a two-footed animal; for this is what being necessary means –that it is impossible for the thing not to be. It is, then, impossible that it should be at the same time true to say the same thing is a man and is not a man.
ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον:	Eadem autem ratio et in non esse hominem;	The same account holds good with regard to not being a man, [07a]
[1007α] [1] τὸ γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἕτερον σημαίνει, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἕτερον: πολὺ γὰρ ἀντίκειται ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον, ὥστε σημαίνειν ἕτερον. εἰ δὲ καὶ [5] τὸ λευκὸν φήσει τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν σημαίνειν, πάλιν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐροῦμεν ὅπερ καὶ πρότερον ἐλέχθη, ὅτι ἓν πάντα ἔσται καὶ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἀντικείμενα. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο, συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν,	nam homini esse et non homini esse alterum significat, siquidem album esse et hominem esse alterum; multum enim opponitur illud magis, quare significat diversum. Si autem ↵ et album dixerit idem significare et unum, item idem dicemus quod et prius dictum est, quia unum omnia sunt et non solum opposita. Si autem hoc non contingit, contingit * quod dictum est,	for being a man and being a not-man mean different things, since even being white and being a man are different; for the former terms are much more different so that they must a fortiori mean different things. And if any one says that white means one and the same thing as man , again we shall say the same as what was said before, that it would follow that all things are one, and not only opposites. But if this is impossible, then what we have maintained will follow,
ἂν ἀποκρίνηται τὸ ἐρωτώμενον. ἐὰν δὲ προστιθῇ ἐρωτῶντος ἁπλῶς καὶ τὰς ἀποφάσεις, οὐκ ἀποκρίνεται [10] τὸ ἐρωτώμενον. οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τὸ πλῆθος: ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐρομένου εἰ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτο εἶναι ἢ οὔ, ἀποκριτέον τὸ ἓν σημαῖνον καὶ οὐ προσθετέον ὅτι καὶ λευκὸν καὶ μέγα. καὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἄπειρά γ᾽ ὄντα τὰ [15] συμβεβηκότα διελθεῖν: ἢ οὖν ἅπαντα διελθέτω ἢ μηθέν. ὁμοίως τοίνυν εἰ καὶ μυριάκις ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ [17] οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, οὐ προσαποκριτέον τῷ ἐρομένῳ εἰ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ μὴ καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα συμβέβηκε προσαποκριτέον, ὅσα ἐστὶν ἢ μὴ ἔστιν: ἐὰν [20] δὲ τοῦτο ποιῇ, οὐ διαλέγεται.	si respondeatur interrogatum. Si autem apponatur inter↵rogante simpliciter et negationes, non respondetur interrogatum. Nihil enim prohibet esse idem et hominem et album et alia mille secundum pluralitatem. At tamen interrogante si verum est dicere hominem hoc esse aut non, respondendum est unum significans et non addendum quia et album * et ↵ magnum. Et enim impossibile * infinita entia accidentia permeare; aut igitur omnia permeentur aut nullum. Similiter ergo et si milies est idem homo et non homo, non est correspondendum interroganti si est homo, quia est simul et non homo, si non et alia quaecumque acciderunt sunt correspondenda, ↵ quaecumque sunt aut non sunt. Si autem hoc * fecerit, non disputat.	if our opponent will only answer our question. And if, when one asks the question simply, he adds the contradictories, he is not answering the question. For there is nothing to prevent the same thing from being both a man and white and countless other things: but still, if one asks whether it is or is not true to say that this is a man, our opponent must give an answer which means one thing, and not add that it is also white and large. For, besides other reasons, it is impossible to enumerate its accidental attributes, which are infinite in number; let him, then, enumerate either all or none. Similarly, therefore, even if the same thing is a thousand times a man and a not-man, he must not, in answering the question whether this is a man, add that it is also at the same time a not-man, unless he is bound to add also all the other accidents, all that the subject is or is not; and if he does this, he is not observing the rules of argument.
ὅλως δ᾽ ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ τοῦτο λέγοντες οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. πάντα γὰρ ἀνάγκη συμβεβηκέναι φάσκειν αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ζῴῳ εἶναι μὴ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τι ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ [25] (καίτοι αὗται ἀποφάσεις τούτου): ἓν γὰρ ἦν ὃ ἐσήμαινε, καὶ ἦν τοῦτό τινος οὐσία. τὸ δ᾽ οὐσίαν σημαίνειν ἐστὶν ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ. εἰ δ᾽ ἔσται αὐτῷ τὸ ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ἄλλο ἔσται, ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς [30] λέγειν ὅτι οὐθενὸς ἔσται τοιοῦτος λόγος, ἀλλὰ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός: τούτῳ γὰρ διώρισται οὐσία καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός: τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν ὅτι ἔστι μὲν λευκὸς ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὅπερ λευκόν.	Omnino vero destruunt qui hoc dicunt substantiam et quod ƿ quid erat esse. Omnia namque dicere accidere eis est necesse, et quod vere homini esse aut animali esse * non esse. Nam si erit <quid> quod vere * homini esse, hoc non erit non homini esse aut non esse homini (quamvis hae negationes * ↵ huius); unum enim erat quod significabat *, et erat hoc alicuius substantia. Significare vero substantiam est quia non * aliud aliquid esse ipsi. Si autem erit ipsi quod vere * homini esse quod vere * non homini esse aut quod vere non esse homini, aliud erit. Quare dicere eos est necesse quia nullius ↵ erit talis ratio, sed omnia secundum accidens. Hoc enim determinata est substantia et accidens; album enim accidit homini, quia est albus sed non quod vere album.	And in general those who say this do away with substance and essence. For they must say that all attributes are accidents, and that there is no such thing as being essentially a man or an animal. For if there is to be any such thing as being essentially a man this will not be being a not-man or not being a man (yet these are negations of it); for there was one thing which it meant, and this was the substance of something. And denoting the substance of a thing means that the essence of the thing is nothing else. But if its being essentially a man is to be the same as either being essentially a not-man or essentially not being a man, then its essence will be something else. Therefore our opponents must say that there cannot be such a definition of anything, but that all attributes are accidental; for this is the distinction between substance and accident – white is accidental to man, because though he is white, whiteness is not his essence.
εἰ δὲ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται, οὐθὲν ἔσται πρῶτον τὸ καθ᾽ οὗ, εἰ ἀεὶ [35] τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς σημαίνει τὴν κατηγορίαν. [1007β] [1] ἀνάγκη ἄρα εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι. ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον: οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω συμπλέκεται δυοῖν: τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς οὐ συμβεβηκότι συμβεβηκός, εἰ μὴ ὅτι ἄμφω συμβέβηκε ταὐτῷ, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον τὸ λευκὸν μουσικὸν καὶ τοῦτο λευκὸν [5] ὅτι ἄμφω τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁ Σωκράτης μουσικὸς οὕτως, ὅτι ἄμφω συμβέβηκεν ἑτέρῳ τινί. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὰ μὲν οὕτως τὰ δ᾽ ἐκείνως λέγεται συμβεβηκότα, ὅσα οὕτως λέγεται ὡς τὸ λευκὸν τῷ Σωκράτει, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄπειρα εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, οἷον τῷ Σωκράτει τῷ λευκῷ [10] ἕτερόν τι συμβεβηκός: οὐ γὰρ γίγνεταί τι ἓν ἐξ ἁπάντων. οὐδὲ δὴ τῷ λευκῷ ἕτερόν τι ἔσται συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ μουσικόν: οὐθέν τε γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ ἢ ἐκεῖνο τούτῳ συμβέβηκεν, καὶ ἅμα διώρισται ὅτι τὰ μὲν οὕτω συμβέβηκε τὰ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ μουσικὸν Σωκράτει: ὅσα δ᾽ οὕτως, οὐ [15] συμβεβηκότι συμβέβηκε συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα ἐκείνως, ὥστ᾽ οὐ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεχθήσεται. ἔσται ἄρα τι καὶ ὣς οὐσίαν σημαῖνον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἅμα κατηγορεῖσθαι τὰς ἀντιφάσεις.	Si vero omnia secundum accidens dicuntur, nullum erit primum universale; si autem semper accidens de subiecto aliquo significat ↵ predicationem, in infinitum igitur ire necesse est. Sed impossi↵bile; neque enim plura duobus complectitur. Accidens enim non accidenti accidens, nisi quia ambo eidem accidunt. Dico autem ut album musicum et hoc album, quia ambo homini ↵ accidunt. Sed non Socrates musicus ita, quia ambo accidunt alicui alterl quoniam igitur haec quidem ita illa vero illo modo dicuntur accidentia, quaecumque sic dicuntur ut album Socrati, non contingit infinita esse in superius, ut Socrati albo alterum aliquid accidens; non enim fit aliquid unum ex ↵ omnibus. Nec itaque albo aliquod aliud erit accidens, ut musicum. Nihil enim magis hoc illi quam illud huic accidit. Et ƿ simul determinatum est quia haec quidem ita accidunt haec ↵ autem ut musicum Socrati; quaecumque vero sic, non accidenti accidit * accidens, sed quaecumque illo modo, quare non omnia secundum accidens dicuntur. Erit igitur aliquid et ut substantiam significans. Si autem hoc, ostensum est quia impossibile simul predicari contradictiones.	But if all statements are accidental, there will be nothing primary about which they are made, if the accidental always implies predication [07b] about a subject. The predication, then, must go on ad infinitum. But this is impossible; for not even more than two terms can be combined in accidental predication. For (1) an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless it be because both are accidents of the same subject. I mean, for instance, that the white is musical and the latter is white, only because both are accidental to man. But (2) Socrates is musical, not in this sense, that both terms are accidental to something else. Since then some predicates are accidental in this and some in that sense, (a) those which are accidental in the latter sense, in which white is accidental to Socrates, cannot form an infinite series in the upward direction; e.g. Socrates the white has not yet another accident; for no unity can be got out of such a sum. Nor again (b) will white have another term accidental to it, e.g. musical . For this is no more accidental to that than that is to this; and at the same time we have drawn the distinction, that while some predicates are accidental in this sense, others are so in the sense in which musical is accidental to Socrates; and the accident is an accident of an accident not in cases of the latter kind, but only in cases of the other kind, so that not all terms will be accidental. There must, then, even so be something which denotes substance. And if this is so, it has been shown that contradictories cannot be predicated at the same time.
ἔτι εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ ἀντιφάσεις ἅμα κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πᾶσαι, δῆλον ὡς [20] ἅπαντα ἔσται ἕν. ἔσται γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τριήρης καὶ τοῖχος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ κατὰ παντός τι ἢ καταφῆσαι ἢ ἀποφῆσαι ἐνδέχεται,	Amplius si contradictiones simul de eodem vere sunt omnes, ↵ palam quod omnia erunt unum. Erit enim idem trieris et murus et homo, si de omni aliquid aut affirmare aut negare contingit;	Again, if all contradictory statements are true of the same subject at the same time, evidently all things will be one. For the same thing will be a trireme, a wall, and a man, if of everything it is possible either to affirm or to deny anything
καθάπερ ἀνάγκη τοῖς τὸν Πρωταγόρου λέγουσι λόγον. εἰ γάρ τῳ δοκεῖ μὴ εἶναι τριήρης ὁ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τριήρης: ὥστε καὶ ἔστιν, εἴπερ [25] ἡ ἀντίφασις ἀληθής. καὶ γίγνεται δὴ τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα: ὥστε μηθὲν ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχειν. τὸ ἀόριστον οὖν ἐοίκασι λέγειν, καὶ οἰόμενοι τὸ ὂν λέγειν περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος λέγουσιν: τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει ὂν καὶ μὴ ἐντελεχείᾳ τὸ ἀόριστόν ἐστιν.	quemadmodum est necesse dicentibus rationem Protagore. Nam alicui si videtur non esse trieris homo, palam ↵ quia non est trieris; quare et est, si contradictio vera. Et fit itaque quod Anaxagore: simul res omnes esse; ut nihil vere unum sit. Indefinitum igitur videntur dicere, et putantes ens dicere de non ente dicunt; nam potestate ens et non endelichia ↵ indefinitum est.	(and this premiss must be accepted by those who share the views of Protagoras). For if any one thinks that the man is not a trireme, evidently he is not a trireme; so that he also is a trireme, if, as they say, contradictory statements are both true. And we thus get the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that all things are mixed together; so that nothing really exists. They seem, then, to be speaking of the indeterminate, and, while fancying themselves to be speaking of being, they are speaking about non-being; for it is that which exists potentially and not in complete reality that is indeterminate.
ἀλλὰ μὴν λεκτέον γ᾽ αὐτοῖς κατὰ [30] παντὸς <παντὸς> τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν: ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ἑκάστῳ ἡ μὲν αὐτοῦ ἀπόφασις ὑπάρξει, ἡ δ᾽ ἑτέρου ὃ μὴ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ οὐχ ὑπάρξει: λέγω δ᾽ οἷον εἰ ὀληθὲς εἰπεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅτι οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἢ τριήρης ἢ οὐ τριήρης. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ κατάφασις, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν: [35] εἰ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχει ἡ κατάφασις, ἥ γε ἀπόφασις ὑπάρξει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ αὐτοῦ. [1008α] [1] εἰ οὖν κἀκείνη ὑπάρχει, ὑπάρξει καὶ ἡ τῆς τριήρους: εἰ δ᾽ αὕτη, καὶ ἡ κατάφασις. ταῦτά τε οὖν συμβαίνει τοῖς λέγουσι τὸν λόγον τοῦτον,	At vero dicenda est ipsis de omni affirmatio aut negatio. Inconveniens enim si unicuique sua quidem negatio inest, quae vero alterius quod non inest ei non inerit. Dico autem ut si verum est dicere hominem quia non homo, palam quod * et non trieris. Ergo si * affirmatio, necesse * et nega↵tionem; si autem non existat affirmatio, negatio inerit magis quam quae sua. Ergo si et illa inest, inerit et quae ipsius trieris; si autem haec, et affirmatio. Haec ergo contingunt hanc dicentibus rationem.	But they must predicate of every subject the affirmation or the negation of every attribute. For it is absurd if of each subject its own negation is to be predicable, while the negation of something else which cannot be predicated of it is not to be predicable of it; for instance, if it is true to say of a man that he is not a man, evidently it is also true to say that he is either a trireme or not a trireme. If, then, the affirmative can be predicated, the negative must be predicable too; and if the affirmative is not predicable, the negative, at least, will be [08a] more predicable than the negative of the subject itself. If, then, even the latter negative is predicable, the negative of trireme will be also predicable; and, if this is predicable, the affirmative will be so too. Those, then, who maintain this view are driven to this conclusion,
καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι. εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ [5] οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ οὔτ᾽ ἄνθρωπος οὔτ᾽ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται: τοῖν γὰρ δυοῖν δύο ἀποφάσεις, εἰ δὲ μία ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐκείνη, καὶ αὕτη μία ἂν εἴη ἀντικειμένη.	Et quia non * necesse aut dicere aut negare. Nam si verum quia homo ↵ et non homo, palam quia nec homo nec non homo erit. Nam duorum due negationes; si autem una ex utrisque, illi et haec una utique erit opposita.	and to the further conclusion that it is not necessary either to assert or to deny. For if it is true that a thing is a man and a not-man, evidently also it will be neither a man nor a not-man. For to the two assertions there answer two negations, and if the former is treated as a single proposition compounded out of two, the latter also is a single proposition opposite to the former.
ἔτι ἤτοι περὶ ἅπαντα οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἔστι καὶ λευκὸν καὶ οὐ λευκὸν καὶ ὂν καὶ οὐκ ὄν, καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας φάσεις καὶ [10] ἀποφάσεις ὁμοιοτρόπως, ἢ οὒ ἀλλὰ περὶ μέν τινας, περί τινας δ᾽ οὔ. καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ περὶ πάσας, αὗται ἂν εἶεν ὁμολογούμεναι: εἰ δὲ περὶ πάσας, πάλιν ἤτοι καθ᾽ ὅσων τὸ φῆσαι καὶ ἀποφῆσαι καὶ καθ᾽ ὅσων ἀποφῆσαι καὶ φῆσαι, ἢ κατὰ μὲν ὧν φῆσαι καὶ ἀποφῆσαι, καθ᾽ ὅσων δὲ ἀποφῆσαι [15] οὐ πάντων φῆσαι. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὕτως, εἴη ἄν τι παγίως οὐκ ὄν, καὶ αὕτη βεβαία δόξα, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι βέβαιόν τι καὶ γνώριμον, γνωριμωτέρα ἂν εἴη ἡ φάσις ἡ ἀντικειμένη:	ƿ Amplius aut circa omnia ita se habet, et est album et non album et ens et non ens, et circa alias dictiones et negationes looxa10 modo simili, aut non, sed circa quasdam quidem et circa quasdam non. Et si quidem non circa omnes, hae utique erunt confesse; si vero circa omnes, iterum aut de quibuscumque dicere et negare et de quibuscumque negare et dicere, aut de quibus quidem dicere et negare, sed de quibuscumque negare non de omnibus dicere. Et si sic, erit aliquid firmiter non ens, ↵ et haec erit firma opinio; et si ipsum non esse firmum aliquid sit et notum, notior utique * erit dictio quam opposita negatio.	Again, either the theory is true in all cases, and a thing is both white and not-white, and existent and non-existent, and all other assertions and negations are similarly compatible or the theory is true of some statements and not of others. And if not of all, the exceptions will be contradictories of which admittedly only one is true; but if of all, again either the negation will be true wherever the assertion is, and the assertion true wherever the negation is, or the negation will be true where the assertion is, but the assertion not always true where the negation is. And (a) in the latter case there will be something which fixedly is not, and this will be an indisputable belief; and if non-being is something indisputable and knowable, the opposite assertion will be more knowable.
εἰ δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ ὅσα ἀποφῆσαι φάναι, ἀνάγκη ἤτοι ἀληθὲς διαιροῦντα λέγειν, οἷον ὅτι [20] λευκὸν καὶ πάλιν ὅτι οὐ λευκόν, ἢ οὔ. καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ ἀληθὲς διαιροῦντα λέγειν, οὐ λέγει τε ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐθέν (τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα πῶς ἂν φθέγξαιτο ἢ βαδίσειεν;), καὶ πάντα δ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἕν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ταὐτὸν ἔσται καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ θεὸς καὶ τριήρης [25] καὶ αἱ ἀντιφάσεις αὐτῶν (εἰ γὰρ ὁμοίως καθ᾽ ἑκάστου, οὐδὲν διοίσει ἕτερον ἑτέρου: εἰ γὰρ διοίσει, τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται ἀληθὲς καὶ ἴδιον): ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ διαιροῦντα ἐνδέχεται ἀληθεύειν, συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν,	Si vero * similiter et quaecumque * negare * dicere, necesse aut verum dividentem dicere, ut quod album et iterum quod ↵ non album, aut non. Et si quidem non verum dividentem dicere, non dicet haec et non est nihil; non entia autem quomodo utique pronuntiabunt aut ibunt? Et omnia utique erunt unum, ut et prius dictum est, et idem erit et homo et deus et trieris et ipsorum contradictiones. Si autem similiter ↵ de unoquoque, nihil differret * aliud ab alio; nam si differret, hoc erit verum et proprium. Similiter autem et si dividentem contingit verum esse, accidit quod dictum est.	But (b) if it is equally possible also to assert all that it is possible to deny, one must either be saying what is true when one separates the predicates (and says, for instance, that a thing is white, and again that it is not-white), or not. And if (i) it is not true to apply the predicates separately, our opponent is not saying what he professes to say, and also nothing at all exists; but how could non-existent things speak or walk, as he does? Also all things would on this view be one, as has been already said, and man and God and trireme and their contradictories will be the same. For if contradictories can be predicated alike of each subject, one thing will in no wise differ from another; for if it differ, this difference will be something true and peculiar to it. And (ii) if one may with truth apply the predicates separately, the above-mentioned result follows none the less,
πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ ὅτι πάντες ἂν ἀληθεύοιεν καὶ πάντες ἂν ψεύδοιντο, καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ὁμολογεῖ [30] ψεύδεσθαι. ἅμα δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ οὐθενός ἐστι πρὸς τοῦτον ἡ σκέψις: οὐθὲν γὰρ λέγει. οὔτε γὰρ οὕτως οὔτ᾽ οὐχ οὕτως λέγει, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως τε καὶ οὐχ οὕτως: καὶ πάλιν γε ταῦτα ἀπόφησιν ἄμφω, ὅτι οὔθ᾽ οὕτως οὔτε οὐχ οὕτως: εἰ γὰρ μή, ἤδη ἄν τι εἴη ὡρισμένον.	Ad hoc autem quia omnes verum dicent et omnes mentientur, et ipse se ipsum falsum dicere confitetur. Simul autem ↵ palam quia de nullo est ad hunc perscrutatio; nihil enim dicit. Nec enim ita nec non ita dicit, sed ita et non ita; et iterum ƿ haec negat ambo, quia nec ita nec non ita; nam si non, iam utique erit aliquid determinatum.	and, further, it follows that all would then be right and all would be in error, and our opponent himself confesses himself to be in error. And at the same time our discussion with him is evidently about nothing at all; for he says nothing. For he says neither yes nor no, but yes and no; and again he denies both of these and says neither yes nor no; for otherwise there would already be something definite.
ἔτι εἰ ὅταν ἡ φάσις [35] ἀληθὴς ᾖ, ἡ ἀπόφασις ψευδής, κἂν αὕτη ἀληθὴς ᾖ, ἡ κατάφασις ψευδής, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι ἀληθῶς. [1008β] [1] ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως φαῖεν ἂν τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς κείμενον.	↵ Amplius si quando affirmatio vera est, negatio est falsa, et si haec vera, affirmatio falsa, non erit utique simul idem dicere ↵ et negare vere. Sed forsan dicet utique hoc esse quod a principio positum.	Again if when the assertion is true, the negation is false, and when this is true, the affirmation is false, it will not be possible to assert and deny the same thing truly at the same [08b] time. But perhaps they might say this was the very question at issue.
ἔτι ἆρα ὁ μὲν ἢ ἔχειν πως ὑπολαμβάνων ἢ μὴ ἔχειν διέψευσται, ὁ δὲ ἄμφω ἀληθεύει; εἰ γὰρ ἀληθεύει, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον ὅτι τοιαύτη τῶν ὄντων ἡ [5] φύσις; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀληθεύει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀληθεύει ἢ ὁ ἐκείνως ὑπολαμβάνων, ἤδη πως ἔχοι ἂν τὰ ὄντα, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη, καὶ οὐχ ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ ὁμοίως ἅπαντες καὶ ψεύδονται καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν, οὔτε φθέγξασθαι οὔτ᾽ εἰπεῖν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἔσται: ἅμα γὰρ ταῦτά τε καὶ [10] οὐ ταῦτα λέγει. εἰ δὲ μηθὲν ὑπολαμβάνει ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως οἴεται καὶ οὐκ οἴεται, τί ἂν διαφερόντως ἔχοι τῶν γε φυτῶν;	Amplius igitur qui quidem aut habere aliqualiter existimans aut non habere mentitus est, qui autem ambo verum dicit? Nam si verum dicit, quid utique erit * quod dicitur ↵ quia talis est entium natura? Si vero non verum dicit, sed magis verum dicit qui illo modo existimat, iam aliqualiter se habebunt entia, et hoc verum utique erit, et non simul et non verum. Si autem similiter * omnes mentiuntur et vera dicunt, nec pronuntiandum nec dicendum est tali; similiter enim haec ↵ et non haec dicit. Si autem nihil suscipit sed similiter existimat et non existimat, quid utique differenter habebit a natis?	Again, is he in error who judges either that the thing is so or that it is not so, and is he right who judges both? If he is right, what can they mean by saying that the nature of existing things is of this kind? And if he is not right, but more right than he who judges in the other way, being will already be of a definite nature, and this will be true, and not at the same time also not true. But if all are alike both wrong and right, one who is in this condition will not be able either to speak or to say anything intelligible; for he says at the same time both yes and no. And if he makes no judgement but thinks and does not think , indifferently, what difference will there be between him and a vegetable?
ὅθεν καὶ μάλιστα φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὕτω διάκειται οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε τῶν λεγόντων τὸν λόγον τοῦτον. διὰ τί γὰρ βαδίζει Μέγαράδε ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡσυχάζει, οἰόμενος [15] βαδίζειν δεῖν; οὐδ᾽ εὐθέως ἕωθεν πορεύεται εἰς φρέαρ ἢ εἰς φάραγγα, ἐὰν τύχῃ, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται εὐλαβούμενος, ὡς οὐχ ὁμοίως οἰόμενος μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀγαθόν; δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ὑπολαμβάνει τὸ δ᾽ οὐ βέλτιον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄνθρωπον τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἄνθρωπον [20] καὶ τὸ μὲν γλυκὺ τὸ δ᾽ οὐ γλυκὺ ἀνάγκη ὑπολαμβάνειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ἅπαντα ζητεῖ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει, ὅταν οἰηθεὶς βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ πιεῖν ὕδωρ καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄνθρωπον εἶτα ζητῇ αὐτά: καίτοι ἔδει γε, εἰ ταὐτὸν ἦν ὁμοίως καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος. ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐθεὶς ὃς οὐ [25] φαίνεται τὰ μὲν εὐλαβούμενος τὰ δ᾽ οὔ: ὥστε, ὡς ἔοικε, πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν ἁπλῶς, εἰ μὴ περὶ ἅπαντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ χεῖρον.	Unde et maxime manifestum est quia nullus ita disponitur nec aliorum nec dicentium hanc rationem. Quare namque uadit ↵ domum et non quiescit putans ire? Nequepstatim diluculo uadit * in puteum aut torrentem, si contingat, sed videtur * timens, tamquam non similiter putans non bonum esse incidere et bonum? Palam ergo quia hoc quidem melius existimat hoc autem non melius. Si autem hoc, et hoc quidem hominem ↵ illud autem non hominem, et hoc quidem dulce illud autem non dulce putare est necesse. Non enim ex equo omnia quaerit et existimat, quando putans melius esse aquam bibere et homiƿnem videre deinde ea quaerit; quamvis oportebat, si idem erat similiter homo et non homo. Sed quod dictum est: nullus qui non videtur haec quidem timens illa vero non. Quare, sicut ↵ videtur, omnes existimant habere simpliciter, si non circa omnia, sed circa melius et deterius.	-Thus, then, it is in the highest degree evident that neither any one of those who maintain this view nor any one else is really in this position. For why does a man walk to Megara and not stay at home, when he thinks he ought to be walking there? Why does he not walk early some morning into a well or over a precipice, if one happens to be in his way? Why do we observe him guarding against this, evidently because he does not think that falling in is alike good and not good? Evidently, then, he judges one thing to be better and another worse. And if this is so, he must also judge one thing to be a man and another to be not-a-man, one thing to be sweet and another to be not-sweet. For he does not aim at and judge all things alike, when, thinking it desirable to drink water or to see a man, he proceeds to aim at these things; yet he ought, if the same thing were alike a man and not-a-man. But, as was said, there is no one who does not obviously avoid some things and not others. Therefore, as it seems, all men make unqualified judgements, if not about all things, still about what is better and worse.
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι [28] ἀλλὰ δοξάζοντες, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιμελητέον ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀληθείας, ὥσπερ καὶ νοσώδει ὄντι ἢ ὑγιεινῷ τῆς ὑγιείας: [30] καὶ γὰρ ὁ δοξάζων πρὸς τὸν ἐπιστάμενον οὐχ ὑγιεινῶς διάκειται πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν.	Si autem non scientes sed opinantes, multo magis curandum utique erit de veritate, quemadmodum infirmo existenti * quam sano de sanitate; et ↵ enim opinans ad scientem non salubriter disponitur ad veritatem.	And if this is not knowledge but opinion, they should be all the more anxious about the truth, as a sick man should be more anxious about his health than one who is healthy; for he who has opinions is, in comparison with the man who knows, not in a healthy state as far as the truth is concerned.
ἔτι εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα πάντα οὕτως ἔχει καὶ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τό γε μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὁμοίως φήσαιμεν εἶναι τὰ δύο ἄρτια καὶ τὰ τρία, οὐδ᾽ ὁμοίως διέψευσται ὁ τὰ [35] τέτταρα πέντε οἰόμενος καὶ ὁ χίλια. εἰ οὖν μὴ ὁμοίως, δῆλον ὅτι ἅτερος ἧττον, ὥστε μᾶλλον ἀληθεύει. εἰ οὖν τὸ μᾶλλον ἐγγύτερον, [1009α] [1] εἴη γε ἄν τι ἀληθὲς οὗ ἐγγύτερον τὸ μᾶλλον ἀληθές. κἂν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη γέ τι ἔστι βεβαιότερον καὶ ἀληθινώτερον, καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἴημεν τοῦ ἀκράτου καὶ κωλύοντός τι τῇ διανοίᾳ [5] ὁρίσαι.	Amplius si quam maxime omnia sic se habent et non sic, sed * magis et minus unum est in natura entium; non enim utique similiter dicemus esse duo paria et tria, nec similiter mentitus est qui quatuor pente opinatus est et qui mille. Si ↵ igitur non similiter, palam quia alter minus, quare magis verum dicit. Si ergo quod magis affinius, erit utique aliquid ↵ verum cuius affinius quod magis verum. Et utique si non est, sed iam aliquid est firmius et verius, et a ratione remoti utique erimus incondita et prohibente aliquid mente determinare. ↵	Again, however much all things may be so and not so , still there is a more and a less in the nature of things; for we should not say that two and three are equally even, nor is he who thinks four things are five equally wrong with him who thinks they are a thousand. If then they are not equally wrong, obviously one is less wrong and therefore more right. If then that which has more of any quality is [09a] nearer the norm, there must be some truth to which the more true is nearer. And even if there is not, still there is already something better founded and liker the truth, and we shall have got rid of the unqualified doctrine which would prevent us from determining anything in our thought.