Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l7/c12

Chapter 12

Greek	Latin	English
νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν πρῶτον ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς περὶ ὁρισμοῦ μὴ εἴρηται: ἡ γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἀπορία [10] λεχθεῖσα πρὸ ἔργου τοῖς περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ λόγοις. λέγω δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν, διὰ τί ποτε ἕν ἐστιν οὗ τὸν λόγον ὁρισμὸν εἶναί φαμεν, οἷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον δίπουν: ἔστω γὰρ οὗτος αὐτοῦ λόγος. διὰ τί δὴ τοῦτο ἕν ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πολλά, ζῷον καὶ δίπουν;	Nunc autem dicamus primum, in quantum in Analeticis ↵ de diffinitione non dictum est; in illis enim dubitatio dicta prae opere rationibus de substantia est. Dico autem hanc dubitationem: propter quid quidem unum est cuius rationem diffinitionem esse dicimus, ut hominis animal bipes? Sit enim haec ipsius ratio. Propter quid itaque hoc unum est sed non multa, ↵ animal et bipes?	Chapter 12. Now let us treat first of definition, in so far as we have not treated of it in the Analytics; for the problem stated in them is useful for our inquiries concerning substance. I mean this problem: – wherein can consist the unity of that, the formula of which we call a definition, as for instance, in the case of man, ‘two-footed animal’; for let this be the formula of man. Why, then, is this one, and not many, viz. ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’?
ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἄνθρωπος [15] καὶ λευκὸν πολλὰ μέν ἐστιν ὅταν μὴ ὑπάρχῃ θατέρῳ θάτερον, ἓν δὲ ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ καὶ πάθῃ τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὁ ἄνθρωπος (τότε γὰρ ἓν γίγνεται καὶ ἔστιν ὁ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος): ἐνταῦθα δ᾽ οὐ μετέχει θατέρου θάτερον: τὸ γὰρ γένος οὐ δοκεῖ μετέχειν τῶν διαφορῶν (ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῶν [20] ἐναντίων τὸ αὐτὸ μετεῖχεν: αἱ γὰρ διαφοραὶ ἐναντίαι αἷς διαφέρει τὸ γένος).	In hoc namque homo et album: multa quidem sunt cum alterum non insit alteri, unum vero quando inest et patitur aliquid subiectum, homo; tunc enim fit et est albus homo. Hic autem non participat alterum altero. Genus enim non videtur participare differentiis; simul enim ↵ contrariis idem participaret; nam differentiae contrariae sunt quibus differt genus.	For in the case of ‘man’ and ‘pale’ there is a plurality when one term does not belong to the other, but a unity when it does belong and the subject, man, has a certain attribute; for then a unity is produced and we have ‘the pale man’. In the present case, on the other hand, one does not share in the other; the genus is not thought to share in its differentiae (for then the same thing would share in contraries; for the differentiae by which the genus is divided are contrary).
εἰ δὲ καὶ μετέχει, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, εἴπερ εἰσὶν αἱ διαφοραὶ πλείους, οἷον πεζὸν δίπουν ἄπτερον. διὰ τί γὰρ ταῦθ᾽ ἓν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πολλά; οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ἐνυπάρχει: οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων ἔσται ἕν.	Si vero et participat, eadem ratio, si sunt differentiae plures, ut gressivum, bipes, non alatum. Quare namque haec unum, sed non multa? Non enim quia insunt; nam ↵ sic ex omnibus erit unum.	And even if the genus does share in them, the same argument applies, since the differentiae present in man are many, e.g. endowed with feet, two-footed, featherless. Why are these one and not many? Not because they are present in one thing; for on this principle a unity can be made out of all the attributes of a thing.
δεῖ δέ γε ἓν [25] εἶναι ὅσα ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ: ὁ γὰρ ὁρισμὸς λόγος τίς ἐστιν εἷς καὶ οὐσίας, ὥστε ἑνός τινος δεῖ αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον: καὶ γὰρ ἡ οὐσία ἕν τι καὶ τόδε τι σημαίνει, ὡς φαμέν.	Oportet autem unum esse quaecumque in diffinitione; diffinitio enim ratio quaedam est una et substantia, quare unius alicuius oportet ipsam esse rationem. Et enim substantia unum quid et hoc aliquid significat, ut dicimus.	But surely all the attributes in the definition must be one; for the definition is a single formula and a formula of substance, so that it must be a formula of some one thing; for substance means a ‘one’ and a ‘this’, as we maintain.
δεῖ δὲ ἐπισκοπεῖν πρῶτον περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς διαιρέσεις ὁρισμῶν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ πλὴν τὸ [30] πρῶτον λεγόμενον γένος καὶ αἱ διαφοραί: τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα γένη ἐστὶ τό τε πρῶτον καὶ μετὰ τούτου αἱ συλλαμβανόμεναι διαφοραί, οἷον τὸ πρῶτον ζῷον, τὸ δὲ ἐχόμενον ζῷον δίπουν, καὶ πάλιν ζῷον δίπουν ἄπτερον: ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν διὰ πλειόνων λέγηται. [1038α] [1] ὅλως δ᾽ οὐδὲν διαφέρει διὰ πολλῶν ἢ δι᾽ ὀλίγων λέγεσθαι, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ δι᾽ ὀλίγων ἢ διὰ δυοῖν: τοῖν δυοῖν δὲ τὸ μὲν διαφορὰ τὸ δὲ γένος, οἷον τοῦ ζῷον δίπουν τὸ μὲν ζῷον γένος διαφορὰ δὲ θάτερον. [5] εἰ οὖν τὸ γένος ἁπλῶς μὴ ἔστι παρὰ τὰ ὡς γένους εἴδη, ἢ εἰ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὕλη δ᾽ ἐστίν (ἡ μὲν γὰρ φωνὴ γένος καὶ ὕλη, αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐκ ταύτης ποιοῦσιν), φανερὸν ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμός ἐστιν ὁ ἐκ τῶν διαφορῶν λόγος.	Oportet autem intendere primum de hiis quae secundum divisiones diffinitionibus. Nihil enim aliud est in diffinitione ↵ quam primum dictum genus et differentiae. Alia vero genera sunt primum et cum hoc comprehensae differentiae, ut primum animal, habitum vero animal bipes, et iterum animal bipes non ƿ alatum; similiter autem et si per plura dicitur. Omnino vero ↵ nihil differt per plura aut per pauca dici; quare nec per pauca aut per duo; duorum vero hoc quidem differentia illud vero genus, ut eius quod animal bipes: animal quidem genus differentia autem alterum. Si ergo genus simpliciter non est praeter ↵ eas quae ut generis species aut, si est quidem, ut materia autem est (vox enim genus est et materia, differentiae autem apecies et elementa ex hac faciunt), palam quia diffinitio est ex differentiis ratio.	We must first inquire about definitions reached by the method of divisions. There is nothing in the definition except the first-named and the differentiae. The other genera are the first genus and along with this the differentiae that are taken with it, e.g. the first may be ‘animal’, the next ‘animal which is two-footed’, and again ‘animal which is two-footed and featherless’, and similarly if [38a] the definition includes more terms. And in general it makes no difference whether it includes many or few terms, – nor, therefore, whether it includes few or simply two; and of the two the one is differentia and the other genus; e.g. in ‘two-footed animal’ ‘animal’ is genus, and the other is differentia.If then the genus absolutely does not exist apart from the species-of-a-genus, or if it exists but exists as matter (for the voice is genus and matter, but its differentiae make the species, i.e. the letters, out of it), clearly the definition is the formula which comprises the differentiae.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ δεῖ γε διαιρεῖσθαι τῇ τῆς διαφορᾶς [10] διαφορᾷ, οἷον ζῴου διαφορὰ τὸ ὑπόπουν: πάλιν τοῦ ζῴου τοῦ ὑπόποδος τὴν διαφορὰν δεῖ εἶναι ᾗ ὑπόπουν, ὥστ᾽ οὐ λεκτέον τοῦ ὑπόποδος τὸ μὲν πτερωτὸν τὸ δὲ ἄπτερον, ἐάνπερ λέγῃ καλῶς (ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀδυνατεῖν ποιήσει τοῦτο), ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὸ μὲν σχιζόπουν τὸ δ᾽ ἄσχιστον: αὗται [15] γὰρ διαφοραὶ ποδός: ἡ γὰρ σχιζοποδία ποδότης τις. καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ βούλεται βαδίζειν ἕως ἂν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὰ ἀδιάφορα: τότε δ᾽ ἔσονται τοσαῦτα εἴδη ποδὸς ὅσαιπερ αἱ διαφοραί, καὶ τὰ ὑπόποδα ζῷα ἴσα ταῖς διαφοραῖς.	At vero et oportet dividi differentiae ↵ differentiam, ut animalis differentia est pedalitas; item animalis habentis pedes differentiam oportet scire in quantum habens pedes. Quare non est dicendum habentis pedes aliud alatum aliud non alatum, siquidem bene dicit (sed propter non posse faciet hoc), sed si aliud habens fissos aliud non fissos pedes. Hae namque ↵ sunt differentiae pedis; nam fissio pedis pedalitas quaedam est. Et sic semper vult procedere, donec utique veniat ad non differentia. Tunc autem erunt tot species pedis quot differentiae, et pedes habentia animalia aequalia differentiis.	But it is also necessary that the division be by the differentia of the differentia; e.g. ‘endowed with feet’ is a differentia of ‘animal’; again the differentia of ‘animal endowed with feet’ must be of it qua endowed with feet. Therefore we must not say, if we are to speak rightly, that of that which is endowed with feet one part has feathers and one is featherless (if we do this we do it through incapacity); we must divide it only into cloven-footed and not cloven; for these are differentiae in the foot; cloven-footedness is a form of footedness. And the process wants always to go on so till it reaches the species that contain no differences. And then there will be as many kinds of foot as there are differentiae, and the kinds of animals endowed with feet will be equal in number to the differentiae.
εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ τελευταία διαφορὰ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ [20] πράγματος ἔσται καὶ ὁ ὁρισμός, εἴπερ μὴ δεῖ πολλάκις ταὐτὰ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς ὅροις: περίεργον γάρ. συμβαίνει δέ γε τοῦτο: ὅταν γὰρ εἴπῃ ζῷον ὑπόπουν δίπουν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο εἴρηκεν ἢ ζῷον πόδας ἔχον, δύο πόδας ἔχον: κἂν τοῦτο διαιρῇ τῇ οἰκείᾳ διαιρέσει, πλεονάκις ἐρεῖ καὶ ἰσάκις ταῖς [25] διαφοραῖς. ἐὰν μὲν δὴ διαφορᾶς διαφορὰ γίγνηται, μία ἔσται ἡ τελευταία τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ οὐσία:	Si itaque haec sic se habent, palam quia finalis differentia substantia rei erit et diffinitio, si non oportet multotiens eadem ↵ dicere in terminis; superfluum enim. Accidit autem hoc: nam quando dicit animal habens pedes bipes, nihil aliud dixit quam animal pedes habens duos pedes habens, et si hoc dividat propria divisione, multotiens dicet et aequaliter differentiis. Si ↵ quidem igitur differentiae differentia fiat, una erit quae finalis species et substantia;	If then this is so, clearly the last differentia will be the substance of the thing and its definition, since it is not right to state the same things more than once in our definitions; for it is superfluous. And this does happen; for when we say ‘animal endowed with feet and two-footed’ we have said nothing other than ‘animal having feet, having two feet’; and if we divide this by the proper division, we shall be saying the same thing more than once – as many times as there are differentiae.If then a differentia of a differentia be taken at each step, one differentia – the last – will be the form and the substance;
ἐὰν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ διαιροῖ τοῦ ὑπόποδος τὸ μὲν λευκὸν τὸ δὲ μέλαν, τοσαῦται ὅσαι ἂν αἱ τομαὶ ὦσιν.	si vero secundum accidens, ut si dividat habentis pedes aliud album aliud nigrum, tot quot utique sectiones fuerint.	but if we divide according to accidental qualities, e.g. if we were to divide that which is endowed with feet into the white and the black, there will be as many differentiae as there are cuts.
ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ ἐκ τῶν διαφορῶν, καὶ τούτων τῆς τελευταίας [30] κατά γε τὸ ὀρθόν.	Quare palam quia diffinitio ratio est quae est ƿ ↵ ex differentiis, et harum ex finali secundum rectum.	Therefore it is plain that the definition is the formula which contains the differentiae, or, according to the right method, the last of these.
δῆλον δ᾽ ἂν εἴη, εἴ τις μετατάξειε τοὺς τοιούτους ὁρισμούς, οἷον τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, λέγων ζῷον δίπουν ὑπόπουν: περίεργον γὰρ τὸ ὑπόπουν εἰρημένου τοῦ δίποδος. τάξις δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ: πῶς γὰρ δεῖ νοῆσαι τὸ μὲν ὕστερον τὸ δὲ πρότερον; περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν κατὰ τὰς διαιρέσεις [35] ὁρισμῶν τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω τὴν πρώτην, ποῖοί τινές εἰσιν. [1038β] [1]	Palam autem erit, si quis transponat tales diffinitiones, ut eam quae est hominis, dicens animal bipes pedes habens; superfluum enim est habens pedes dicto bipede. Sed ordo non est in substantia; quomodo namque oportet intelligere hoc quidem ↵ posterius illud vero prius? De diffinitionibus quidem igitur secundum divisiones tot dicantur primum, quales quaedam sunt.	This would be evident, if we were to change the order of such definitions, e.g. of that of man, saying ‘animal which is two-footed and endowed with feet’; for ‘endowed with feet’ is superfluous when ‘two-footed’ has been said. But there is no order in the substance; for how are we to think the one element posterior and the other prior? Regarding the definitions, then, which are reached by the method of divisions, let this suffice as our first attempt at stating their nature.