Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l12/c9

Chapter 9

Latin	English
↵ Quae autem circa intellectum habent quasdam dubitationes. Videtur quidem enim apparentium divinissimum; quomodo vero * habens tajis erit utique, habet quasdam difficulƿtates.	Chapter 9.The nature of the divine thought involves certain problems; for while thought is held to be the most divine of things observed by us, the question how it must be situated in order to have that character involves difficulties.
Nam sive non intelligat, quid utique erit venerabile? Sed habet quemadmodum [ut] si dormiens *. Sive intelligat, huius vero aliud * principale, non enim est hoc quod est sua substantia intelligentia, sed potentia: non utique erit optima ↵ substantia; per intelligere enim honorabile ei inest.	For if it thinks of nothing, what is there here of dignity? It is just like one who sleeps. And if it thinks, but this depends on something else, then (since that which is its substance is not the act of thinking, but a potency) it cannot be the best substance; for it is through thinking that its value belongs to it.
Amplius autem sive intellectus sit sua substantia sive intelligentia, quid intelligit? Aut enim se ipsum aut alterum aliquid; et si alterum aliquid, aut idem semper aut aliud.	Further, whether its substance is the faculty of thought or the act of thinking, what does it think of? Either of itself or of something else; and if of something else, either of the same thing always or of something different.
Utrum ergo differt aliquid aut nihil *, intelligere bonum aut contingens? Aut et inconveniens * meditari de quibusdam?	Does it matter, then, or not, whether it thinks of the good or of any chance thing? Are there not some things about which it is incredible that it should think?
Palam ergo ↵ quod * divinissimum * et honoratissimum intelligit, et non transmutatur; in indignius enim * transmutatio, et motus quidam iam tale.	Evidently, then, it thinks of that which is most divine and precious, and it does not change; for change would be change for the worse, and this would be already a movement.
Primum quidem igitur si non est intelligentia sed potentia, rationabile est laboriosam esse ei continuationem intelligentie.	First, then, if thought is not the act of thinking but a potency, it would be reasonable to suppose that the continuity of its thinking is wearisome to it.
Deinde palam quia aliud aliquid erit * ↵ dignius * quam intellectus, scilicet intellectum. Et enim intelligere et intelligentia inerit et indignissimum intelligenti. Quare * fugiendum hoc, et enim non videre quaedam dignius quam videre; non si sit optimum * intelligentia. Se ipsum ergo intelligit, siquidem est * potentissimum *, e	Secondly, there would evidently be something else more precious than thought, viz. that which is thought of. For both thinking and the act of thought will belong even to one who thinks of the worst thing in the world, so that if this ought to be avoided (and it ought, for there are even some things which it is better not to see than to see), the act of thinking cannot be the best of things. Therefore it must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things),
t est intelligentia intelligentia intelligentia. Videtur autem semper alius scientia et sen↵sus et opinio et meditatio, ipsius autem in accessorio.	and its thinking is a thinking on thinking. But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding have always something else as their object, and themselves only by the way.
ƿ Amplius si aliud est intelligere et intelligi, secundum quid ei ipsum bene inest? Non enim idem esse intelligentie et ↵ intellecto.	Further, if thinking and being thought of are different, in respect of which does goodness belong to thought? For to be an act of thinking and to be an object of thought are not the same thing. [75a]
Aut in quibusdam * scientia res. In factivis quidem sine materia, substantia enim et quod quid erat esse; in theoricis vero ratio res et intelligentia. Non altero igitur existente eo quod intelligitur et intellectu, quaecumque non ↵ materiam habent, idem erunt, et intelligentia eius quod intelligitur una.	We answer that in some cases the knowledge is the object. In the productive sciences it is the substance or essence of the object, matter omitted, and in the theoretical sciences the definition or the act of thinking is the object. Since, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter, the divine thought and its object will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its thought.
Adhuc autem restat dubitatio, si compositum est quod intelligitur; transmutabitur enim in partibus totius.	A further question is left-whether the object of the divine thought is composite; for if it were, thought would change in passing from part to part of the whole.
Aut indivisibile omne quod non habet materiam, ut humanus intellectus.	We answer that everything which has not matter is indivisible - as human thought,
Aut quod quidem compositorum, habet in aliquo tempore; non enim habet ipsum bene in hoc aut in hoc, sed in ↵ toto quodam quod optimum, ens aliud aliquid. Sic autem * habet ipsa * sui ipsius intelligentia toto eterno.	or rather the thought of composite beings, is in a certain period of time (for it does not possess the good at this moment or at that, but its best, being something different from it, is attained only in a whole period of time), so throughout eternity is the thought which has itself for its object.
Perscrutandum autem est qualiter * habet totius natura bonum et optimum, utrum separatum quid et ipsum secundum se, aut ordinem.	We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the universe contains the good, and the highest good, whether as something separate and by itself, or as the order of the parts.
Aut utroque modo sicut exercitus? Et enim ↵ in ordine ipsum bene et dux exercitus, et magis iste; non enim iste propter ordinem sed ille propter hunc est.	Probably in both ways, as an army does; for its good is found both in its order and in its leader, and more in the latter; for he does not depend on the order but it depends on him.
Omnia vero coordinata sunt aliqualiter, sed non similiter, et natatilia et volatilia et plante; et non sic se habent ut non sit alteri ad alterum nihil, sed est aliquid. Ad unum quidem enim omnia coordinata sunt. Sed quemadmodum in domo liberis ƿ non licet quod contingit facere, sed omnia aut plurima ordi↵nata sunt, seruis vero et bestiis parvum * quod ad commune, multum vero quod contingit; tale namque cuiusque principium ipsorum natura est. Dico autem puta ad discerni quidem necesse omnibus venire, et alia sic sunt quibus communicant omnia ad totum.	And all things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike,-both fishes and fowls and plants; and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do with another, but they are connected. For all are ordered together to one end, but it is as in a house, where the freemen are least at liberty to act at random, but all things or most things are already ordained for them, while the slaves and the animals do little for the common good, and for the most part live at random; for this is the sort of principle that constitutes the nature of each. I mean, for instance, that all must at least come to be dissolved into their elements, and there are other functions similarly in which all share for the good of the whole.
↵Quaecumque vero impossibilia accidunt aut absurda aliter dicentibus, et qualia gratiosius dicentes, et in quibus minime dubitationes, oportet non latere.	We must not fail to observe how many impossible or paradoxical results confront those who hold different views from our own, and what are the views of the subtler thinkers, and which views are attended by fewest difficulties.
Omnes enim ex contrariis faciunt omnia. Neque autem quod omnia nec quod ex contrariis recte, nec in quibuscumque contraria existunt, quomodo ex contrariis erunt, non dicunt;	All make all things out of contraries. But neither all things nor out of contraries is right; nor do these thinkers tell us how all the things in which the contraries are present can be made out of the contraries;
impassibilia namque sunt con↵traria ad invicem. Nobis autem solvitur hoc rationabiliter eo quod tertium aliquid sit. Alii vero * alterum * contrariorum materiam faciunt, quemadmodum qui inequale equali aut uni multa. Solvitur autem et hoc eodem modo; materia enim quae una nulli est contrarium.	for contraries are not affected by one another. Now for us this difficulty is solved naturally by the fact that there is a third element. These thinkers however make one of the two contraries matter; this is done for instance by those who make the unequal matter for the equal, or the many matter for the one. But this also is refuted in the same way; for the one matter which underlies any pair of contraries is contrary to nothing.
Amplius omnia pravi participa↵tione * extra unum; nam prauum ipsum alterum elementorum.	Further, all things, except the one, will, on the view we are criticizing, partake of evil; for the bad itself is one of the two elements.
Alii autem nec principia bonum et malum; quamvis in omnibus maxime quod bonum * principium.	But the other school does not treat the good and the bad even as principles; yet in all things the good is in the highest degree a principle.
Alii vero hoc quidem recte quia principium, sed quomodo quod bonum principium non dicunt, utrum ut finis aut ut movens aut ut species. ↵	The school we first mentioned is right in saying that it is a principle, but how the good is a principle they do not say-whether as end or as mover or as form. [75b]
inconvenienter autem et Empedocles. Amicitiam enim facit bonum, haec autem * principium et ut movens (congregat enim) et ut materia (pars enim mixture). Si itaque et eidem accidit ut materiam et principium esse et ut movens *, sed esse ↵ ƿ non idem. Secundum utrum igitur amicitia? Inconveniens autem et incorruptibilem esse litem; hoc ipsum autem est mali natura.	Empedocles also has a paradoxical view; for he identifies the good with love, but this is a principle both as mover (for it brings things together) and as matter (for it is part of the mixture). Now even if it happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as mover, still the being, at least, of the two is not the same. In which respect then is love a principle? It is paradoxical also that strife should be imperishable; the nature of his evil is just strife.
Anaxagoras autem ut movens quod bonum principium ; intellectus enim movet. Sed gratia alicuius movet, ↵ quare alterum , excepto ut nos dicimus; nam medicativa est quodammodo sanitas. Inconveniens autem et contrarium non facere bono et intellectui.	Anaxagoras makes the good a motive principle; for his reason moves things. But it moves them for an end, which must be something other than it, except according to our way of stating the case; for, on our view, the medical art is in a sense health. It is paradoxical also not to suppose a contrary to the good, i.e. to reason.
Omnes autem contraria dicentes non utuntur contrariis, nisi figuret aliquis. Et quare haec quidem corruptibilia haec vero incorruptibilia, nullus dicit; omnia namque entia faciunt ex eisdem principiis. Amplius alii ↵ quidem ex non ente faciunt entia; alii autem, ut non hoc cogantur, unum omnia faciunt.	But all who speak of the contraries make no use of the contraries, unless we bring their views into shape. And why some things are perishable and others imperishable, no one tells us; for they make all existing things out of the same principles. Further, some make existing things out of the nonexistent; and others to avoid the necessity of this make all things one.
Amplius propter quid semper erit generatio et quae est causa generationis, nullus dicit.	Further, why should there always be becoming, and what is the cause of becoming?-this no one tells us.
Et duo principia facientibus aliud necesse principium principalius esse, et hiis qui species quia aliud principium principalius; propter quid enim participavit ↵ aut participat?	And those who suppose two principles must suppose another, a superior principle, and so must those who believe in the Forms; for why did things come to participate, or why do they participate, in the Forms?
Et aliis quidem necesse sapientie et honoratissime scienlie aliquid esse contrarium, nobis autem non. Non enim est contrarium primo nihil. Nam omnia contraria materiam habent, et haec potentia est; contraria autem ignorantia ad contrarium; primo vero contrarium nihil.	And all other thinkers are confronted by the necessary consequence that there is something contrary to Wisdom, i.e. to the highest knowledge; but we are not. For there is nothing contrary to that which is primary; for all contraries have matter, and things that have matter exist only potentially; and the ignorance which is contrary to any knowledge leads to an object contrary to the object of the knowledge; but what is primary has no contrary.
Amplius si non ↵ erunt praeter sensibilia alia, non erit principium et ordo et generatio et celestia, sed semper principii principium, ut theoloƿgis et phisicis omnibus.	Again, if besides sensible things no others exist, there will be no first principle, no order, no becoming, no heavenly bodies, but each principle will have a principle before it, as in the accounts of the theologians and all the natural philosophers.
Si autem erunt species aut numeri, nullius cause; sin autem, non quid motus.	But if the Forms or the numbers are to exist, they will be causes of nothing; or if not that, at least not of movement.
Adhuc quomodo erit ex non magnitudinibus magnitudo et continuum? Non enim numerus facit continuum, nec ut movens nec ut species. ↵	Further, how is extension, i.e. a continuum, to be produced out of unextended parts? For number will not, either as mover or as form, produce a continuum.
At vero nullum erit contrariorum quod et factivum et motivum, continget enim utique non esse. At vero posterius quidem ipsum facere potentia. Non ergo sempiterna sunt entia. Sed sunt. Interimendum igitur est horum aliquid. Et hoc dictum est ut.	But again there cannot be any contrary that is also essentially a productive or moving principle; for it would be possible for it not to be. Or at least its action would be posterior to its potency. The world, then, would not be eternal. But it is; one of these premisses, then, must be denied. And we have said how this must be done.
Adhuc quo numeri unum aut anima et corpus ↵ et totaliter species et res, nihil dicit nullus; nec contingit dicere, si non ut nos dicat quod movens facit.	Further, in virtue of what the numbers, or the soul and the body, or in general the form and the thing, are one-of this no one tells us anything; nor can any one tell, unless he says, as we do, that the mover makes them one.
Dicentes autem numerum primum mathematicum et sic semper aliam habitam substantiam et principia cuiuslibet alia, inconnexam ↵ universi substantiam faciunt (nihil enim alia alii confert ens aut non ens) et principia multa. Entia vero non volunt disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum. Unus ergo princeps.	And those who say mathematical number is first and go on to generate one kind of substance after another and give [76a] different principles for each, make the substance of the universe a mere series of episodes (for one substance has no influence on another by its existence or nonexistence), and they give us many governing principles; but the world refuses to be governed badly. The rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be.