Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l11/c7

Chapter 7

Latin	English
Omnis autem scientia quaerit aliqua principia et causas circa unumquodque eorum quae sub ipsa scibilium, puta medicativa et exercitativa et reliquarum unaqueque factivarum et doc↵trinalium. Unaqueque enim harum circumscribens aliquod genus ipsi circa hoc negotiatur tamquam existens et ens, non in quantum autem ens; sed altera quaedam haec praeter has scientias est scientia.	Chapter 7. Every science seeks certain principles and causes for each [64a] of its objects-e.g. medicine and gymnastics and each of the other sciences, whether productive or mathematical. For each of these marks off a certain class of things for itself and busies itself about this as about something existing and real,-not however qua real; the science that does this is another distinct from these.
Dictarum autem scientiarum unaqueque ↵ sumens aliqualiter quod quid est in unoquoque genere temptat ostendere reliqua debilius aut certius. Sumunt autem quod quid est hae quidem per sensum hae autem supponentes; propter quod et palam ex tali inductione quod substantiae et eius quod quid est non est demonstratio.	Of the sciences mentioned each gets somehow the what in some class of things and tries to prove the other truths, with more or less precision. Some get the what through perception, others by hypothesis; so that it is clear from an induction of this sort that there is no demonstration. of the substance or what .
Quoniam autem est quaedam de natura scientia, palam quia ↵ et a practica altera et a factiva erit. Factive quidem enim in faciente et non in facto motus principium, et hoc est sive ars ƿ aliqua sive aliqua alia potentia. Similiter autem et practice non ↵ in agibili, magis autem in agentibus motus. Quae autem phisici circa habentia in ipsis motus principium est. Quod quidem igitur neque activam neque factivam sed speculativam necessarium esse naturalem scientiam, palam ex hiis. In unum enim aliquod horum generum necesse cadere ipsam.	There is a science of nature, and evidently it must be different both from practical and from productive science. For in the case of productive science the principle of movement is in the producer and not in the product, and is either an art or some other faculty. And similarly in practical science the movement is not in the thing done, but rather in the doers. But the science of the natural philosopher deals with the things that have in themselves a principle of movement. It is clear from these facts, then, that natural science must be neither practical nor productive, but theoretical (for it must fall into some one of these classes).
Quoniam autem ↵ quod quid est necessarium unicuique aliqualiter scientiarum scire et hoc uti principio, oportet non latere qualiter diffiniendum naturali et qualiter substantiae ratio sumenda, utrum ut simum aut magis ut concauum. Horum enim simi quidem ratio cum materia dicitur ea quae rei, quae autem concavi sine materia. ↵ simitas enim in naso fit, propter quod et ratio ipsius cum hoc dicta est; simum enim est nasus concavus. Manifestum igitur quod et carnis et oculi et reliquarum partium cum materia semper rationem reddendum.	And since each of the sciences must somehow know the what and use this as a principle, we must not fall to observe how the natural philosopher should define things and how he should state the definition of the essence-whether as akin to snub or rather to concave . For of these the definition of snub includes the matter of the thing, but that of concave is independent of the matter; for snubness is found in a nose, so that we look for its definition without eliminating the nose, for what is snub is a concave nose. Evidently then the definition of flesh also and of the eye and of the other parts must always be stated without eliminating the matter.
Quoniam autem est quaedam scientia entis in quantum ens ↵ et separabile, considerandum utrum quidem naturali eandem ponendum esse hanc aut magis alteram. Naturalis quidem igitur circa habentia motus principium in ipsis est; mathematica autem speculativa quidem et circa manentia quaedam haec, sed non separabilia. Circa separabile igitur ens et immobile altera ↵ ab hiis ambabus scientiis est aliqua, siquidem existit aliqua substantia talis, dico autem separabilis et immobilis, quod quidem temptabimus ostendere. Et siquidem est aliqua talis natura in ↵ entibus, hic utique erit alicubi et quod divinum, et haec utique erit primum et principalissimum principium. Palam igitur quod tria genera speculativarum scientiarum sunt: naturalis, mathematica, theologica.	Since there is a science of being qua being and capable of existing apart, we must consider whether this is to be regarded as the same as physics or rather as different. Physics deals with the things that have a principle of movement in themselves; mathematics is theoretical, and is a science that deals with things that are at rest, but its subjects cannot exist apart. Therefore about that which can exist apart and is unmovable there is a science different from both of these, if there is a substance of this nature (I mean separable and unmovable), as we shall try to prove there is. And if there is such a kind of thing in the world, here must surely be the divine, and this must be the first [64b] and most dominant principle. Evidently, then, there are three kinds of theoretical sciences-physics, mathematics, theology.
Optimum quidem igitur speculativarum genus, harum autem ipsarum ultima dicta; ↵ circa honorabilissimum enim est entium. Melior autem et deteƿrior unaqueque dicitur secundum proprium scibile.	The class of theoretical sciences is the best, and of these themselves the last named is best; for it deals with the highest of existing things, and each science is called better or worse in virtue of its proper object.
Dubitabit autem utique quis utrum entis in quantum ens scientiam universalem oportet poni aut non. Mathematicarum quidem enim unaqueque circa unum aliquod genus determinatum est, quae autem universalis communiter de omnibus. Si quidem igitur naturales substantiae prime entium sunt, et naturalis utique ↵ prima scientiarum erit. Si autem est altera natura et substantia separabilis et immobilis, alteram necesse et scientiam ipsius esse et priorem naturali et universalem eo quod priorem.	One might raise the question whether the science of being qua being is to be regarded as universal or not. Each of the mathematical sciences deals with some one determinate class of things, but universal mathematics applies alike to all. Now if natural substances are the first of existing things, physics must be the first of sciences; but if there is another entity and substance, separable and unmovable, the knowledge of it must be different and prior to physics and universal because it is prior.